Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DE MENT, District Judge. In this action, plaintiffs Seek to recover from the defendant for injuries they suffered while patients in the care of Air University Regional Hospital at Maxwell Air Force Base (“Maxwell Hospital”) in Montgomery, Alabama. The Court bifurcated the proceedings in this matter and heard evidence on the issues of duty and breach during a bench trial held during July 8 - 12, 1996. In. the Court’s December 12, 1996, Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court found that the defendant owed the plaintiffs both a general duty of care and a duty to protect them from the criminal acts of third parties, and that the defendant had breached these duties. See Gess v. United States, 952 F.Supp. 1529, 1552-60 (M.D.Ala.1996). As a foreseeable result of defendant’s breach, a disturbed medical aide, Michael Beckelic, “tampered” with each of the eleven child-plaintiffs and the adult plaintiff, Cheryl Schoen, either by injecting them with lidoeaine or by harming them in some other manner. Id. at 1539-49. The parties presented the second half of the evidence in this case between August 4, 1997, and August 8, 1997. In this second phase of the trial, the Court must address two issues. First, the Court must- determine what specific injuries, if any, the plaintiffs have suffered and/or continue to suffer. Second, the Court must determine which, if any, of these specific injuries were proximately caused by defendant’s breach. More precisely, the Court must determine which of the plaintiffs’ injuries were proximately caused by Beckelic’s “tampering.” The plaintiffs cannot recover unless a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that they have injuries and that these injuries were proximately caused by Beekelic’s “tampering.” See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 410 So.2d 40, 41 (Ala.1982). Before turning to these questions, however, the Court must first address two preliminary matters. First, defendant argues that the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Richard Colan, must be excluded on the issue of causation because it does not comport with the standards established in Daubert v. Mer- rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Second, defendant contends that the majority of the plaintiffs cannot recover because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Admissibility of Dr. Colan’s Testimony In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admission of expert testimony. Id. 509 U.S. at 589. With regard to scientific testimony, the Court held that, under Rule 702, the testimony must be both reliable and relevant to be admissible. Id. Testimony which amounts to speculation or merely reflects an expert’s subjective belief is not admissible under Rule 702. Id. at 590. On the other hand, scientific testimony does not have to be known to a certainty to be admissible; rather, it must be derived by the scientific method from what is known. Id. When expert scientific testimony is proffered, the district court’s task is to determine “whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Id. at 592 (footnote omitted). This inquiry requires the court to assess “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [ ] whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592-93. In Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir.1996), the Eleventh Circuit held that under the first prong of Dau-bert: [T]he district court must examine the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert opinión to determine whether it utilizes valid scientific methods and procedures. Trial judges must evaluate scientific processes and studies with which they may not be intimately familiar, but be careful not to cross the line between deciding whether the expert’s testimony is based on “scientifically valid principles” and deciding upon the correctness of the expert’s conclusions. Id. at 530. In Daubert, the Supreme Court identified several factors which may assist the district court to determine whether a given scientific theory or study is reliable. These factors include: (1) whether the theory can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the method is generally accepted in the scientific community. 509 U.S. at 593-94. The Court emphasized that the district court’s inquiry must be a flexible one. Id. at 594. Indeed, “[tjhese factors are neither exhaustive nor applicable in every case.” Joiner, 78 F.3d at 530 (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir.1994)). Finally, the Joiner Court reemphasized the role of the trial court: the gatekeeping responsibility of the trial courts is not to weigh or choose between conflicting scientific opinions, or to analyze and study the science in question in order to reach its own scientific conclusions from the material in the field. Rather, it is to assure that an expert’s opinions are based on relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and not mere speculation, and that they apply to the facts at issue. Id. at 530. In the instant case, defendant argues that Dr. Colan’s testimony on causation should be excluded because it is unreliable. Accordingly, the Court must first identify the basis of Dr. Colan’s testimony and then decide whether the methods, procedures and information used by Dr. Colan to reach his conclusions are scientifically reliable. Id. at 530-31. Dr. Colan’s testimony on causation was based on the following: (1) a review of each plaintiffs medical records; (2) a review of the medical records of other patients at Maxwell Hospital who suffered similar symptoms but who are not plaintiffs in this suit; (3) physical examinations of each plaintiff; (4) a review of the findings and conclusions of the other doctors and investigators who reviewed these cases; (5) a review of literature per-tabling to lidocaine and its chemistry and effects on human beings and the available literature on whether and how lidocaine can injure the central nervous system; (6) his-training through medical school and residency; and (7) his extensive experience in treating and diagnosing patients suffering from neurological disorders. Dr. Colan admits that there are no clinical studies which conclusively establish that exposure of neonates to toxic doses of lidocaine causes long-term health effects. Nor will there be any according to Dr. Colan. ■ Such a study would be unethical under the tenets of modern medicine. However, as the Dcmbert Court noted, the subject of an expert’s testimony need not be known to a certainty for that testimony to be admissible. 509 U.S. at 590. For Dr. Colan’s testimony to be admissible, he must take what is known, however-large or small that body of knowledge may be, and draw his conclusions from that knowledge using the scientific method. See id. What, then, did Dr. Colan know? To begin, he knew that the eleven child plaintiffs and the one adult plaintiff exhibited a similar core of symptoms after they were “tampered” with by Beckelie. These symptoms included bradycardia, acidosis, apnea, hyperglycemia and cyanosis. Ex. 8 attached to Colan Dep. of 6/6/94. With the exception of Goggans, each of the plaintiffs exhibited most, if not all, of these symptoms. Id. Dr. Colan testified that a toxic dose of lidocaine could cause all of these symptoms. Colan Dep. of -7/22/96 at 37. Significantly, while there are many potential causes for any one of these-symptoms, Dr. Colan’s training, experience and research led to him to conclude that, of the potential causes identified, only lidocaine would create this combination of core symptoms. Id. at 107-08; Colan Dep. of 3/3/94 at 148. Additionally, Dr. Colan knew that lidocaine was easily accessible at Maxwell Hospital', that an empty vial of lido-eaine had been found in the hospital nursery and that one of the plaintiffs, Sharpe, had tested positive for lidocaine. Second, Dr. Colan reviewed all of the literature he could find pertaining to the effects of lidocaine poisoning on the central nervous system. One group of animal studies reviewed by Dr. Colan revealed that pre-term rats, exposed to lidocaine during the latter stages of the dam rats’ pregnancies, suffered permanent impairment of their intelligence, attention and response. A second study found that nerve cells, in their rapid growth stage, are blighted and distorted by lido-caine. A third animal study showed that the actual function of nerve cells is decreased or impaired when they are exposed to lidocaine. As mentioned earlier, Dr. Colan did not have any studies looking into the long-term effects of toxic doses of lidocaine on neonates. Dr. Colan did, however, find articles discussing the effects of neonate exposure to non-toxic doses of lidocaine. The articles reported that neonates exposed to anesthetics (lidocaine) behaved differently than neonates not exposed to lidocaine. One study which tracked neonates who had been exposed to lidocaine through the age of four found that the children’s ability to stop responding to redundant or distracting stimuli was impaired and that their cognitive and language skills were impaired as they grew older. Equally important, according to Dr. Colan, was the fact that there were no articles or studies which concluded that exposure to li-docaine, in either toxic or non-toxic doses, does not cause damage to the nervous system. Although there were few studies of the effects of lidocaine on the nervous system, Dr. Colan believed it significant that all of the studies wherein there was a critical evaluation of the effects of lidocaine exposure on neonates suggested that nervous system damage could result. Finally, Dr. Colan knew that the plaintiffs, as a group, displayed remarkably similar behavioral, cognitive and physical impairments. Dr. Colan’s physical examinations and review of the plaintiffs’ medical records revealed a group of individuals who had one common experience in life, lidocaine poisoning, and who all displayed some form of central nervous system damage. Common sense, as much as scientific deduction, allows one to draw an inference from such evidence. Again, Dr. Colan freely admits that little research has been done, on the effects of lidocaine poisoning on the central nervous system. The Court does not believe, however, that the novelty of this area of research should render Dr. Colan’s testimony inadmissible. It would be truly unjust to say to a group of plaintiffs, “You cannot recover because no deviant person has, as yet; attempted to poison infants with lidocaine, but don’t worry, after you, the next group of unlucky souls will be able to recover.” Holding Dr. Colan’s testimony inadmissible because there is no conclusive cnmcal research to support his theory would send just that message. As the Daubert Court noted, the district court’s inquiry must be a flexible one focusing on the reliability of the expert’s methodology rather than the certainty of his or her conclusions. 509 U.S. at 594-95. Here, Dr. Colan is unable to compare and contrast his theory to a body of clinical research, he is unable to recruit a group of subjects to test his theory, and while he may at some future date, he has not had time to publish his theory or seek the general acceptance of the scientific community. What he has done, however, is gather all available medical information about the plaintiffs, research the effects and chemistry of lidocaine on the human body, read every available article on the long-term impact of lidocaine exposure, consider potential alternate causes of plaintiffs’ injuries and, applying his own knowledge of the central nervous system and extensive experience diagnosing and treating central nervous system disorders, conclude to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that certain of plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by lidocaine. Given all this, the Court cannot find that Dr. Colan’s testimony on causation represents mere speculation or subjective personal belief. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 532-33 (holding that expert testimony was reliable, and thus admissible, where experts gathered all relevant information and utilized extensive experience and specialized expertise to draw conclusions which were supported by a limited number of human and animal studies). Accordingly, the Court finds that, to the extent Dr. Colan has testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that certain of plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by lidocaine poisoning, his testimony is admissible. Statute of Limitations Defense The defendant contends that nine of the plaintiffs, Gess, Patrick Roberts, Fowler, Schoen, Sharpe, Warrick, Barber, Barnes and John Roberts, Sr., cannot recover because they failed to file their claims within the time-frame required .by the applicable statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides in relevant part: “A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues.” Generally, a tort claim “accrues” at the time of the plaintiffs injury. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). However, a medical malpractice claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) does not accrue until the plaintiff (1) knows of the injury and (2) knows the cause of the injury or, in the exercise of due diligence, should discover the cause of the injury. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122; Burgess v. United States, 744 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir.1984) (relying on Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949)); see also Price v. United States, 775 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir.1985) (“[A] medical malpractice claim under the FTCA accrues when the plaintiff is, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should be, aware of both her injury and its connection with some act of the defendant.”). Two Eleventh Circuit decisions illuminate issues which may arise from the application of the two-pronged Kubrick test. In Burgess, the court discussed the application of the first prong of Kubrick. In Burgess, the plaintiffs clavicles were broken at birth by. his mother’s physician in order to facilitate his delivery. Id. at 772. Plaintiffs parents were told by hospital physicians that plaintiff would fully heal. Id. However, approximately twenty days after being discharged from the hospital, plaintiffs parents learned that plaintiff had permanent nerve damage. Id. at 772-73. The defendant in Burgess argued that the statute of limitations had begun running once the plaintiffs parents knew that defendant’s agent had broken plaintiffs clavicles. Id. at 774. The court, however, disagreed with defendant and held that the relevant injury was the nerve damage suffered by the plaintiff, not his broken clavicles. Therefore, the court concluded, the statute of limitations did not begin running until plaintiffs parents learned of his nerve damage. The court explained: Although the injury to the brachial plexus occurred on September 5, 1978, when the infant’s bones were broken, the record supports [plaintiffj’s contention that his parents were not aware of this injury and the resulting nerve damage until at least September 29, 1978. Nothing that [plain-tiffj’s parents were told prior to that date would lead a reasonable person to suspect that the breaking of the clavicle would cause [nerve damage]. Rather, any information concerning the nerve damage was within the exclusive knowledge of the gov-emment’s physicians at that time. The [plaintiff] acted reasonably in relying upon the government’s representations and assurances concerning [plaintiffl’s condition. Thus, since [plaintiffl’s parents did not know of the existence of the injury until the physicians made them aware of it on September 29, 1978, the statute of limitations commenced running at that time. Id. at 774-75. The court further explained that the plaintiffs case was not one in which he simply did not know the extent or permanence of his injury. Id. at 775 n. 9. In such a ease, the statute begins running upon the initial discovery of the injury. See Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir.1980); Hulver v. United States, 562 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 1576, 55 L.Ed.2d 800 (1978); Ashley v. United States, 413 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1969). Rather, because the plaintiffs nerve damage was neither known nor reasonably discoverable at the time plaintiffs parents learned of plaintiffs initial injury, the nerve damage they later discovered constituted a separate injury for purposes of the statute of limitations. See Burgess, 744 F.2d at 775. Thus, Burgess teaches the Court that when applying the first prong of Kubrick, the Court must ask, “what is the relevant injury?” The second prong of Kubrick was explored in Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir.1988). In Chamness, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having numerous disabilities including profound mental retardation. Id. at 1352. The plaintiffs mother learned of plaintiffs injuries shortly after her birth, but claimed that she did not know the cause of plaintiffs injuries until the plaintiff was over three years old. Id. at 1353. Plaintiffs mother did, however, know that plaintiffs birth had been difficult and that she had been given various drugs to assist in the delivery. Id. at 1352. The plaintiffs mother sought both medical and legal advice. Unfortunately, none of the professionals she consulted were able to diagnose the cause of plaintiffs injuries. • In fact, all of the doctors plaintiffs mother consulted informed her that plaintiff was simply a “statistical aberration.” Id. Then, some thirty-seven months after plaintiffs birth, plaintiffs mother learned that one of the drugs she was given during delivery had probably caused plaintiffs mental retardation. Id. at 1353. The Chamness Court noted that plaintiffs mother could not, without the advice of medical experts, determine the cause of plaintiffs retardation. Id. at 1353 n. 7. The court also observed that a plaintiff may reasonably rely on the advice and assurances of doctors when attempting to discover the cause of his or her injuries. Id. The court quoted from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 805 (9th Cir.1987): “Ordinarily, a plaintiff cannot be expected to discover the general medical cause of his injury even before the doctors themselves are able to do so.” Id. However, the court concluded that because no doctor had actively misled the plaintiffs mother about the cause of plaintiffs injury, the statute of limitations was not automatically tolled. Id. Instead, the court held that there existed a question of fact as to whether plaintiff had exercised due diligence in uncovering the cause of her injuries. Id. Chamness teaches the Court several things about the application of the second Kubrick prong. First, the Court should determine whether the injury is the type whose cause is apparent. If not, the plaintiff is entitled to rely upon the advice of doctors to determine the cause of his or her injury. Second, the Court must decide whether the plaintiff has been actively misled about the cause of his or her injuries. Such misinformation may act to toll the statute of limitations. Finally, if the plaintiff has not been actively misled about the cause of his or her injury, where the Court is the trier of fact, the Court must decide whether the plaintiff has exercised due diligence to uncover the cause of Ms or her -injury. The statute of ■ limitations will not begin to run for a plaintiff until that plaintiff actually discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the cause of his or her injury. Having identified the dispositive legal questions implicated by defendant’s statute of limitations defense, the Court must turn now to the facts in the cases of the Mne plaintiffs named above. However, rather than separately discuss this issue for those Mne plaintiffs, the Court will discuss wholly the cases of each of the twelve plaintiffs and incorporate an analysis of the statute of limitations for the appropriate plaintiffs. The Court’s discussion will utilize the following format for each plaintiff: (1) the Court will identify what mjuries, if any, the plaintiff has suffered; (2) the Court will determine wMeh, if any, of these injuries were proximately caused by the “tampering” wMch occurred while the plaintiffs were patients at Maxwell Hospital; (3) for those plaintiffs against whom the defendant asserts the statute of limitations defense, the Court will identify when the relevant mjury was discovered and when, in the exercise of due diligence, the causal connection should have been discovered; and (4) for any plaintiff who has injuries proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence, the Court will discuss damages. DISCUSSION A. Tiffany Barber Shortly after her’ birth, Tiffany “crashed” — her heart rate slowed, she turned blue and the emergency resuscitation team had to be called. She responded well to oxygen and stimulation and experienced no further incidents while at Maxwell Hospital. When Tiffany was approximately four years old, she was examined by Dr. Colan. Dr. Colan found that Tiffany suffered from dysarthria — an inability to properly pronounce words. Additionally, Dr. Colan noted that Tiffany exMbited explosive aggressive behaviors. Two years later, Tiffany was examined by Dr. Thomas J. Boll, an expert in climcal and neuropsychology and pediatric psychology. Dr. Boll found that Tiffany had some “mild naming difficulties,” but otherwise found her speech to be average for her age. Dr. Boll found that Tiffany displayed bilateral incoordination and clumsiness in gross motor skills. Finally, Dr. Boll found that Tiffany had difficulty with complex cog-mtive processing and memory — suggestive of some neurodevelopmental compromise — but he was not sure whether Tiffany actually had a neurodevelopmental deficit. A year later, Tiffany was examined at the Sparks Center at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. The Sparks Center employs an “evaluation team,” consisting of doctors and experts in a variety of fields, each of whom independently examines a patient. The findings of-the various doctors and experts are then synthesized by a “case coordinator” in an effort to provide a comprehensive understandmg of a patient’s neurological development. The Sparks Center summary for Tiffany indicates that her speech skills were found to be average and she had a “mild delay in gross motor skill most likely related to her mild obesity and joint hyper-laxity.” Tiffany’s mother reported to the evaluation team that Tiffany displayed emotional and behavioral problems. The Sparks center team concluded that these problems may relate to family stressors and that they needed to be explored through mdividual and family therapy. Two years later, Dr. Boll examined Tiffany a second time. In Ms report following tMs examination, Dr. Boll summarily stated: “Tiffany has multiple developmental difficulties, including some speech and language delay, aggressiveness, behavioral management problems, difficulty with reading and clumsiness.” More specifically, however, Dr. Boll stated that Tiffany’s language examination was above average with regard to both receptive and expressive language processing. He also found that Tiffany’s motor examination was normal with the exception of left-sided mcoordination, slowness and unsteadiness. Notably, when Dr. Boll testified at trial, he stated that he eotdd not actually diagnose Tiffany with any problems; rather, he believed that Tiffany was “at-risk” in the areas of sélf-help skills, gross motor skills and social maturity. Tiffany’s mother, Delight Barber, has consistently through the course of these examinations reported that Tiffany displayed emotional and behavioral problems. At trial, Mrs. Barber testified that Tiffany was very volatile, quick to anger and easily frustrated. Additionally, Mrs. Barber stated that Tiffany has poor balance and coordination problems, particularly on her left side. After carefully considering the reports and testimony of these doctors, Mrs. Barber and all other relevant evidence, the Court finds that Tiffany has the following “injuries”: (1) pain and suffering related to the “crash” Tiffany experienced as an infant; (2) emotional and behavioral difficulties; and (3) mild gross coordination problems. The Court must now determine which, if any, of these injuries were proximately caused by Beckelic’s “tampering.” In Dr. Colan’s opinion, Tiffany’s “crash” was caused by Beckelic injecting her with a toxic dose of lidocaine. Tiffany displayed the “core” lidocaine poisoning symptoms of bra-dycardia, acidosis, apnea, hyperglycemia and cyanosis. As noted above, while there are many potential causes for any one of these symptoms, Dr. Colan opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that this combination of symptoms could only be caused by lidocaine poisoning. Dr. Colan’s opinion that Tiffany’s “crash” was caused by lidocaine poisoning is consistent with the opinions of Drs. Stigelman and Walsh. Doctors Stigelman and Walsh were employed by the defendant to assist in the initial investigation into the events that occurred at Maxwell Hospital. Both of these doctors concluded that Tiffany’s crash had no medically explainable cause and that lido-caine poisoning could explain Tiffany’s symptoms. Dr. Carter Snead, the defendant’s expert in pediatric neurology, neuropharmacology and epilepsy, opined that Tiffany’s crash may have been caused by an infection. In fact, Dr. Snead testified that all of the plaintiffs’ “crashes” may have been caused by some bacteria or virus that was present in the nursery and OB/Gyn. Infection, however, was ruled out as a possible cause of the plaintiffs’ “crashes” by the defendant’s own investigation into the events at Maxwell Hospital. Dr. Stanford Sadick, the Director of Hospital Services at Maxwell, testified in his deposition that initially, bacteria or viral contamination in the nursery was suspected as a cause of the plaintiffs’ crashes. However, after investigators’ tests for bacteria and viral contaminants came back negative, infection was ruled out as a possible cause of the plaintiffs’ crashes. Moreover, Dr. Snead’s theory of causation does not account for all of the symptoms displayed by the plaintiffs. Dr. Colan agrees with,Dr. Snead that some of the plaintiffs may have had an infection at the time they were “tampered” with by Beckelic. But, according to Dr. Colan, only lidocaine would explain that combination of symptoms — bra-dycardia, acidosis, apnea, hyperglycemia and cyanosis — found in Tiffany and a number of the other plaintiffs. Finally, there is strong circumstantial evidence which cuts against Dr. Snead’s theory of causation. First, the plaintiffs’ “crashes” all occurred while Beckelic was present in the nursery or OB and the “crashes” ceased once Beckelic was removed from Maxwell Hospital. Second, many of plaintiffs’ “crashes” were reported by Beckelic or occurred shortly after Beckelic had some interaction with a particular plaintiff. Finally, if infection or a virus were responsible for the plaintiffs’ illnesses one would expect many more “crashes” than were reported — presumably, every baby in the nursery during the outbreak would have been exposed. For these reasons, the Court does not accept Dr. Snead’s theory that Tiffany and the rest of the plaintiffs’ crashes were the result of infection or some other medically explainable cause. Instead, the Court finds that Tiffany’s “crash” was caused by Beckelic injecting her with a toxic dose of lidocaine. The Court has previously found that Beekelic’s actions were the foreseeable result of defendant’s negligence—-that is, Beckelie’s actions were the foreseeable result of defendant’s breach of duty to Tiffany and the other plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court finds that Tiffany’s “crash” was proximately caused by the defendant. Dr. Colan also expressed the opinion, to. a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Tiffany’s behavior and motor problems were caused by the lidocaine poisoning. For.the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Dr. Colan’s opinion has sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible under Daubert. Dr. Snead was of the opinion that Tiffany does not have any “injuries,” and thus, offered no opinion oh the cause of Tiffany’s behavior and motor problems. As noted above, the Sparks Center evaluation- team concluded that Tiffany’s gross motor impairment is probably related to her.mild obesity and joint hyperlaxity. The defendant argues that Tiffany’s behavior problem may have been caused by her environment. In support of this contention,the defendant adduced evidence that Tiffany’s home-life may have more than an average amount of family stressors. The Court believes, as does Dr. Co-lan, that behavior is the product of many influences. That fact, however, does not prevent the Court from finding that Tiffany’s behavior problems were proximately caused' by the lidocaine poisoning. The Court believes Dr. Colan’s testimony that lidocaine poisoning can cause this injury. In all likelihood, Tiffany’s environment has exáeerbated her behavior problems, but the existence of a second influence (stressful environment) does not preclude the causal connection between lidocaine and this injury. Accordingly, the Court finds that Tiffany’s behavior problems were proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Similarly, the Court finds that Tiffany’s motor problems were proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence. Once again, the Court believes that the causes identified by the Sparks Center, mild obesity and joint hyperlaxity, may contribute to Tiffany’s motor problems, but these causes do not exclude lidocaine poisoning as the primary or an additional cause. Thus, the Court has found that all three of Tiffany’s injuries were proximately caused by the defendant. The Court must now decide whether all or part of Tiffany’s claim is barred by statute of limitations. As noted above, this inquiry requires the Court to determine two things: (1) when the injury was discovered and (2) when, in the exercise of due diligence, Tiffany’s parents should have discovered the causal connection between Tiffany’s injury and the Defendant. Tiffany’s mother testified that she knew Tiffany had “crashed” at Maxwell Hospital, but stated that she didn’t understand the full circumstances of what happened at the time of the “crash.” Several months later in March 1989, Tiffany’s parents met with investigators from the OSI. Mrs. Barber testified that she was told an investigation was being conducted into the circumstances surrounding a number of infants who had crashed at Maxwell Hospital and that Tiffany was one of them. According to Mrs. Barber, this is all the information she was given about the circumstances of Tiffany’s crash. Mrs. Barber testified that she received no follow-up call from the OSI investigators. The Court finds, however, that in the exercise of due diligence, Tiffany’s parents should have pursued further information about the “investigation.” The Court believes that a reasonable person is put on alert that something may be awry when he or she learns that an investigation is being conducted into the circumstances of an injury. Had Tiffany’s parents pursued the matter, they would have learned that “foul play” was suspected as the cause of Tiffany’s “crash.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Tiffany should have known of the causal connection between Tiffany’s crash and the defendant’s action by March 1989. Tiffany did not file an administrative claim until more than three years later, on July 8, 1992. Therefore, the Court finds that Tiffany cannot recover from the defendant for pain and suffering stemming from her initial “crash” at Maxwell Hospital. Dr. Colan testified that the chronic symptoms of lidocaine poisoning would take additional time to manifest themselves and become recognizable. Accordingly, the Court finds that Tiffany’s motor and behavior problems were neither known nor discoverable at the time Tiffany’s parents learned of Tiffany’s “crash.” Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin running until Tiffany’s parents actually discovered these injuries. See Burgess, 744 F.2d at 775. However, it is not clear from the evidence when Tiffany’s parents first noticed Tiffany’s behavior and motor problems. It is clear however, that Tiffany’s parents did not discover a link between these problems and Beckelic’s tampering until they met with Dr. Colan in 1992. Furthermore, the Court finds that Tiffany’s parents could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have diseov-ered this link any earlier. Without specific information about the nature of the tampering, Tiffany’s parents could not possibly discover a link between these later-developing injuries and the tampering. The Court is unconvinced that an investigation conducted with due diligence by Tiffany’s parents would have turned up sufficient information to allow Tiffany’s parents to discover this link. Accordingly, the Court finds that Tiffany may recover for the defendant’s negligence to the extent that negligence proximately caused Tiffany’s behavior and motor problems. This brings the Court to the question of damages. Because Tiffany has suffered injuries proximately caused by defendant’s negligence she is entitled to recover damages. Under the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”), Tiffany can recover compensatory damages against the defendant to the same extent that she could recover against a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Alabama law governs the award of damages. Edwards v. United States, 552 F.Supp. 635, 639 (M.D.Ala.1982) (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962) and Ross v. United States, 640 F.2d 511, 518-19 (5th Cir.1981)). Under Alabama law, Tiffany and/or her parents may recover the following types of damages: (1) Past and future reasonable and necessary medical expenses including travel expenses attendant thereto, see, e.g., Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So.2d 96, 100 (1965) and the value of nursing care rendered by her parents, see, e.g., Williston v. Ard, 611 So.2d 274, 281 (Ala.1992); (2) lost earning capacity if the injuries suffered are permanent and there is a reasonable basis from which to determine lost earning capacity, see, e.g., Town of Elba v. Bullard, 152 Ala. 237, 44 So. 412, 413 (1907); (3) physical and mental pain, suffering and mental anguish including future pain, suffering and mental anguish for permanent injuries,, see, e.g., Mordecai v. Cardwell, 270 Ala. 723, 121 So.2d 898, 899-900 (1960); and (4) Tiffany’s parents may recover for any loss of household services caused by Tiffany’s injuries, see, e.g., Smith, 171 So.2d at 100. For any future damages,. the Court must take into consideration inflation and the time-value of money. See, e.g., Jack Cole Co. v. Hays, 281 Ala. 118, 199 So.2d 659, 665 (1967). Tiffany’s parents seek a total of $4,679.77 for past medical expenses. Additionally, they claim $332.40 for travel expenses attendant thereto. Of the $4,679.77 in past medical expenses, $3,500 is for past examinations conducted by Dr. Colan and Dr. Boll. The Defendant contends that Tiffany’s parents cannot recover the cost of these examinations because they were, in fact, litigation expenses. The Court, however, finds that these examinations were a part of Tiffany’s reasonable and necessary medical care and treatment. The examinations of Dr. Co-lan and Dr. Boll have been critical to diagnosing Tiffany’s impairments and identifying their cause. While it is possible to treat the symptoms of an impairment without knowing precisely what the impairment is or how it was caused, it seems to the Court that such a “band-aid” method of treatment is not a desirable manner in which to proceed. The Court believes that a precise diagnosis and information about the cause of an impairment is necessary to design an effective and properly tailored program of treatment and care. Therefore, the Court finds that Tiffany’s par1 ents can recover the cost of the past examinations conducted by Dr. Colan and Dr. Boll. Accordingly, the Court finds that Tiffany’s parents are entitled to recover $5,012.17 from the defendant for past medical expenses. • • Unlike past medical expenses, future medical expenses have an inherent degree of uncertainty in them. In addition to disagreements over what care and treatment is reasonably necessary to address an injury, parties frequently disagree over what the. bottom line cost will be for any treatment or services to be received. Consequently, any award of damages for future medical expenses cannot be made with mathematical precision. Here, the plaintiffs and defendants have each produced experts who have testified as to the plaintiffs’ reasonable and necessary future medical expenses. Predictably, their opinions differ. The Court has listened carefully to the testimony of these experts and has considered all of the evidence relevant to the issue of future reasonable and necessary medical expenses. Based upon careful consideration of all this evidence, the Court finds that Tiffany is entitled to recover $17,000.00 from the defendant for future medical expenses. Finally, Tiffany seeks recovery for past and future pain and suffering. The trier of fact determines the amount of damages to be awarded for pain, suffering and mental anguish in light of all the relevant circumstances including, but not limited to, the intensity, severity, character and duration of the pain, suffering and mental anguish. See Brandwein v. Elliston, 268 Ala. 598, 109 So.2d 687 (1959). Here, Tiffany’s injuries appear to be permanent. While therapy may make her injuries manageable, therapy cannot reverse the damage to Tiffany’s nervous system. Moreover, it is impossible to know whether the problems Tiffany is experiencing will improve or worsen as she moves through adolescence and into adulthood. On the other hand, Tiffany’s injuries are less severe than those suffered by many of her co-plaintiffs. In light of these considerations, the Court finds that Tiffany is entitled to $50,000 from the defendant for past and future pain, suffering and mental anguish. Thus, in summary, the Court finds that judgment is due to be entered for Tiffany and her parents and against the defendant for the sum of $72,012.17. A judgment in accordance with this opinion will be entered separately. B. Camoi Barnes Three days after his birth, Camoi’s temperature dropped and he had an episode of hypoglycemia and tachypnea. After an IV was started, Camoi experienced an abrupt deterioration becoming cyanotic with hyperglycemia and severe metabolic acidosis. Ca-moi began exhibiting seizure-like activity. Camoi was then transferred from Maxwell Hospital to Baptist Medical Center (“BMC”). Camoi remained at BMC for two weeks. Doctors at BMC opined that Camoi may have suffered a right-sided brain hemorrhage, but Dr. Colan disagreed with this interpretation of the medical evidence. As part of the follow-up care from BMC, Camoi was seen once at the Monsky Clinic in 1989 and again in 1990. At the clinic, doctors noted that they were concerned about Ca-moi’s small head. Also, during the 1990 visit, Camoi’s mother told the doctors she was worried that Camoi was having difficulty with his right hand and his feet. In October of 1991, Camoi was seen at the Gunter Child Development Center. After examining Camoi, doctors at Gunter expressed concern that Camoi’s fine and gross motor skills may have been impaired. The doctors also reported that Camoi had noticeable trouble with his right arm, his running gait and foot. Camoi’s mother agreed that these were noticeable problems. A reevaluation at the Monsky clinic a month later confirmed the existence of these impairments. In addition, the Monsky doctors concluded that Camoi needed speech therapy. Dr. Colan examined Camoi on March 2, 1994. Dr. Colan found that Camoi had a speech impediment and a slow rate of speech development. Dr. Colan diagnosed Camoi as suffering from cerebral palsy (“CP”) with right-sided paralysis or hemiparesis. Dr. Boll examined Camoi on June 9, 1994. Dr. Boll characterized Camoi as “somewhat hyperactive, uncooperative, and inattentive.” Dr. Boll’s test revealed that Camoi had mild dysnomia and difficulty with productive language. Dr. Boll observed, “obvious right sided motor slowness and marked incoordination and unsteadiness.” Camoi’s sensory perceptual examination showed “inconsistencies and developmental immaturity that very probably reflects neurodevelopmental deficits.” Finally, Dr. Boll found that Camoi’s cognitive capabilities were markedly impaired. Camoi displayed deficiencies in higher cognitive processing and with verbal and nonverbal memory processing. Dr. Boll summarized his findings: “Camoi demonstrates memory, language, and learning difficulties, problem solving impairment as well as mild right hemiparesis, all consistent with neurological impairment, in addition to which he demonstrates at least mild attentional difficulties at the current time.” Camoi was seen at the Sparks Center approximately one year later. The Sparks Center summary report indicates that Camoi had right hemiparesis, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), a possible learning disability with reading, acute bilateral otitis media and a mild conductive hearing loss. Sparks Center doctors found that Camoi’s speech and cognitive abilities fell within the average range. Finally, Camoi was seen by Dr. Boll again in 1997. Dr. Boll again noted Camoi’s right hemiparesis, sensory-perceptual difficulties, language impairment and memory difficulties. While Dr. Boll noted that Camoi’s language examination revealed improvement, he concluded that Camoi “continues to present evidence of neurological impairment, as well as neurodevelopmental inconsistency.” Camoi’s mother testified at trial. She stated that while Camoi was performing adequately in school, she was required to work very hard with Camoi to maintain that performance. She also expressed concern that Camoi might regress or fall behind at some point in the future. Finally, Mrs. Barnes testified that Camoi exhibits problems with his right arm (he keeps his arm locked and his fist balled), is frequently confused and is hyperactive and impulsive. After carefully considering the reports and testimony of these doctors and Mrs. Barnes, and all other relevant evidence, the Court finds that Camoi has the following “injuries”: (1) pain and suffering stemming from his “crash” at Maxwell Hospital; (2) cerebral palsy with right-sided hemiparesis and consequent motor impairment; (8) ADHD; (4) cognitive impairment; (5) sensory-perceptual impairment; and (6) language impairment. Dr. Colan testified that he believes, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Camoi’s injuries were caused by lidocaine poisoning. At the time of his crash, Camoi exhibited the pattern of “core symptoms” which Dr. Colan testified can only be attributed to lidocaine poisoning. Dr. Colan’s research, training and experience, as well as the strong circumstantial evidence discussed above, led him to conclude that Camoi’s permanent and chronic injuries are the sequelae of lidocaine poisoning. The Court has previously discussed' and discredited Dr. Snead’s opinion that Camoi’s “crash” was the result of infection. Like Tiffany, Dr. Snead does not recognize the majority of Camoi’s injuries and, therefore, does not offer an opinion as to their cause. Dr. Snead does, however, have an opinion as to the cause of Camoi’s cerebral palsy and right-sided hemiparesis. Based upon his review of a recent MRI performed on Camoi, Dr. Snead opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Camoi suffered a left thalmic infarct or stroke which caused Ca-moi’s CP and hemiparesis. Dr. Snead went on to state that lidocaine toxicity could not cause the stroke. Dr. Colan also reviewed Camoi’s MRI and agrees with Dr. Snead that there is some evidence that Camoi suffered a left-sided stroke. However, Dr. Colan disagrees with Dr. Snead over whether the stroke could have been caused by lidocaine poisoning. Dr. Colan believes that a stroke is consistent with the effects of lidocaine poisoning. Dr. Colan explained that the damage to Camoi’s brain resulted from a disruption in the flow of blood to his brain which, in turn, was caused by lidocaine poisoning. The Court accepts Dr. Colan’s explanation of the MRI findings. As the Court noted earlier, the Court is convinced that Dr. Co-lan’s theory on, and explanation of, the effects of lidocaine poisoning on neonates is based upon a reasonable extrapolation from reliable scientific research and literature. Accordingly, the Court believes Dr. Colan’s testimony that lidocaine poisoning can cause a disruption in the flow of blood to the brain and that this disruption caused Camoi’s stroke. Consequently, the Court finds that all of Camoi’s injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence. The defendant asserts that Camoi’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Ca-moi’s mother testified that in January 1989, she met with agents from the OSI. Mrs. Barnes testified that in this meeting she was told that someone had been injecting or using dirty instruments on babies at Maxwell Hospital. Based upon this testimony the Court finds that by January 1989, Camoi’s parents knew that he had been injured in that he had “crashed” and that the injury may have been caused by an act of the defendant. Therefore, because Camoi did not file an administrative claim until March 30, ■ 1993, the Court finds that statute of limitations bars Camoi’s claim for recovery for the “crash” suffered at Maxwell Hospital. It-appears that Camoi’s parents discovered the first signs of his hemiparesis by the time he was evaluated at the Monsky clinic in 1990. Apparently, however, it was too premature for any doctor to specifically diagnose Camoi as suffering from CP and right-sided hemiparesis, because no diagnosis was made. There is no evidence which indicates that Camoi’s parents discovered his other injuries prior to Camoi’s examinations by Drs. Colan and Boll and, as noted earlier, no reason to believe these other injuries were discoverable at any earlier point. Even if the Court assumes that Camoi’s parents should have discovered Camoi’s CP and hemiparesis in 1990, his claims would not be barred by the statute of limitations because (1) he did not know, nor could he have discovered in the exercise of due diligence, the existence of a causal link between these injuries and an act of the defendant and (2) the defendant actively misled Camoi’s parents as to the cause of his injuries. Mrs. Barnes testified that in her meeting with the OSI agents she was told that, despite the investigation, everything would be “OK” with Camoi. Furthermore, Mrs. Barnes testified that she did not learn that the tampering which occurred at Maxwell Hospital could permanently affect Ca-moi’s health until she met with Drs. Colan and Boll. The Court believes that Mrs. Barnes could reasonably rely on assurances from the defendant that the effects of the suspected tampering, if any, were limited to the “crash” Camoi suffered at Maxwell Hospital. Because the defendant actively misled Mrs. Barnes as to the cause of Camoi’s injuries, the Court finds that the statute of limitations was tolled. See Chamness, 835 F.2d at 1353. Thus, the Court has found that Camoi suffered multiple injuries proximately, caused by the defendant’s negligence and that the statute of limitations only prevents Camoi from recovering damages for the “crash” he suffered at Maxwell Hospital. The Court turns now to the issue of damages. Camoi’s parents seek $4,064.95 in compensation for past medical expenses and travel costs attendant thereto. The Court finds that these costs were incurred for reasonable and necessary medical treatment, and therefore, Camoi’s parents are entitled to recover this sum from the defendant. Once again, plaintiffs’ and defendant’s experts differ as to the future therapies, treatments and services reasonably necessary to address Camoi’s injuries. Based upon careful consideration of all the- evidence relevant to the issue of reasonable and necessary future medical expenses, the Court finds that Camoi is entitled to recover the sum of $211,500.00 for future medical treatment, services and therapy. Camoi seeks to recover for lost earning capacity. Camoi has established that his injuries are permanent and, therefore, he is entitled to recover for lost earning capacity if he provides the Court with a reasonable basis from which to make such a determination. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Randall McDaniel, has offered testimony concerning Camoi’s lost earning capacity. The Court finds that Dr. McDaniel’s testimony is credible and establishes that Camoi’s earning capacity will be diminished. Dr. McDaniel furnished his conclusions to Dr. Hebert, plaintiffs’ expert in economies. Based on Dr. McDaniel’s opinion regarding Camoi’s diminished earning capacity, Dr. Hebert calculated the present economic value of Camoi’s lost earning capacity. The Court finds that Dr. McDaniel and Dr. Hebert’s testimony provides the Court with a reasonable basis from which to award damages for lost earning capacity and accordingly, finds that Camoi is entitled the sum of $742,366.00 from the defendant to compensate him for this loss. Next, Camoi’s parents seek to recover $6,178.00 for the loss of household services caused by Camoi’s injuries. Dr. McDaniel opined that Camoi’s injuries will reduce his ability to contribute household services. Based on this opinion, Dr. Hebert calculated a present day dollar value for the loss of those services. The Court finds the testimony of Drs. McDaniel and Hebert credible and on the basis of their testimony, the Court finds that Camoi’s parents are entitled to recover $6,178.00 from the defendant. Finally, Camoi seeks recovery for past and future pain, suffering and mental anguish. Camoi’s injuries are substantial. Cerebral palsy is a very serious disability with potentially devastating effects. Physically, Camoi will never be able to function like his peers. Although Camoi is currently doing well in school, plaintiffs’ experts have testified that maintaining this level of achievement will become increasingly difficult. Also, should Camoi’s ADHD grow more severe, even the simplest tasks will become challenging. In light of these considerations, the Court finds that Camoi is entitled to recover $5,000,000 from the defendant for past and future pain, suffering and mental anguish. Thus, in summary, the Court finds that judgment is due to be entered in favor of Camoi and his parents and against the defendant for the sum of $5,964,108.95. A judgment in accordance with this opinion will be entered separately. C. Jennifer DeHaai Only hours after her birth and shortly after a routine check by Beekelic, Jennifer began coughing and choking, became cyanotic, had an elevated respiratory rate and her heart started racing (tachycardia). Tests later revealed that she was hyperglycemic. Jennifer was placed on a heart monitor but no further acute life threatening events occurred at Maxwell Hospital. Dr. Colan examined Jennifer in September 1992. At this examination Jennifer’s mother reported that Jennifer was inattentive, aggressive and overactive. Dr. Colan was also informed that Jennifer had a history of gastrointestinal problems and ear infections. Dr. Colan did not identify any other injuries to Jennifer. Dr. Boll examined Jennifer in June 1994. Again, Mrs. DeHaai reported that Jennifer displayed difficulty with attention and concentration. Dr. Boll found that Jennifer had some language impairment, dysnomia and reduced expressive language processing. Jennifer’s cognitive functioning was inconsistent, but Dr. Boll felt that the inconsistency could be entirely developmental. Finally, Dr. Boll believed that Jennifer may have had either a neuroeognitive developmental delay or deficit and that further monitoring was warranted. The Sparks Center evaluation team saw Jennifer in October 1995. The summary conclusions of the Sparks Team were that Jennifer’s cognitive functioning was normal, and that she showed no evidence of a learning disability or attentional problem. Like Dr. Boll, the Sparks Center team found that Jennifer had some language impairment, specifically an' expressive language deficit. The Sparks team also expressed concern about Jennifer’s flat and possibly depressed emotional state. Dr. Boll saw Jennifer for the second time on June 4, 1997. Jennifer’s parents told Dr. Boll that Jennifer was moody and aggressive ■with attentional difficulties. On the basis of his examination, Dr. Boll found that Jennifer had some right-sided gross motor difficulties, significant tactile memory perceptual difficulties and some inefficiency in learning. Notably, however, Dr. Boll did not find any language impairment or significant structural impairment in the cognitive process. Dr. Boll opined that Jennifer could possibly have a learning difficulty related to mathematics. At trial, Dr. Boll stated that Jennifer’s expressive language difficulties had improved. He also testified that he believed Jennifer could “grow out of’ her right-sided motor difficulties. Mrs. DeHaai also testified during the trial. She stated that Jennifer’s gastrointestinal problems and ear infections, which arose shortly after Jennifer’s birth, stopped at around the age of three. Mrs. DeHaai testified that she didn’t believe Jennifer had attention problems. According to Mrs. DeHaai, Jennifer’s primary on-going difficulties relate to inappropriate behavior, mood swings and anger. After carefully considering the reports and testimony of these doctors, Mrs. DeHaai and all other relevant evidence, the Court finds that Jennifer has the following “injuries”: (1) pain and suffering related to the crash at Hospital; (2) gastrointestinal problems which persisted until the age of three; (3) ear infections which persisted until the age of three; (4) emotional and behavioral problems; and (5) an improving language disorder. Although Jennifer’s initial symptoms differed somewhat from the “core” symptoms Dr. Colan has identified as indicative of lidocaine poisoning, Dr. Colan testified that Jennifer’s tachycardia (as opposed to brady-cardia) and elevated respiratory rate (as opposed to apnea) were consistent with the initial stages of lidocaine poisoning. Dr. Co-lan maintains to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that- Jennifer’s “crash” was the result of lidocaine poisoning. In this regard, Dr. Colan’s testimony is consistent with the testimony of Drs. Walsh and Stigelman. As discussed earlier, Dr. Colan has identified language impairments and emotional and behavioral problems as sequelae of lidocaine poisoning. Dr. Colan testified that he could not link Jennifer’s ear infections to lidocaine poisoning. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jennifer’s language impairment and emotional and behavioral problems were caused by defendant’s negligence, but that Jennifer’s ear infections were not caused by defendant’s negligence. Dr. Colan stated that he could not identify a scientific “mechanism” by which lidocaine poisoning would cause Jennifer’s gastrointestinal problems. .Nevertheless, Dr. Colan testified that he did believe that lido-caine poisoning could cause gastrointestinal dysfunction. Dr. Colan explained that the incident rate of gastrointestinal problems in the group of Maxwell Hospital patients he suspects were tampered with represents a tenfold increase over what one would expect to find in the pediatric population by chance alone. Dr. Colan concluded that based on the abnormally high rate of gastrointestinal problems in the plaintiffs as a group, “it is highly unlikely from a scientific standpoint that these are random events and likely represent heretofore undiscovered effect of Li-docaine introduction at this fragile developmental stage.” Colan Dep. of 3/3/94 at 155. The Court, applying ordinary commonsense to the facts as developed by the evidence, also believes that lidocaine poisoning can cause gastrointestinal difficulties. The Court believes it is reasonable to infer that lidocaine poisoning can cause gastrointestinal impairment from the fact that so many of the plaintiffs, people whose only common experience in life is the fact that they were poisoned with lidocaine, experienced this problem. • Moreover, the defendant did not offer any alternative explanation as to why so many of the plaintiffs suffer from gastrointestinal problems. Thus, given that the standard of proof is merely a preponderance— that is, the plaintiffs must only prove that it is more likely than not — the Court finds that Jennifer’s gastrointestinal problems were caused by lidocaine poisoning and, thus, proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence. The defendant does not contend that Jennifer’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court turns directly to the issue of damages. Jennifer’s parents seek $5,937.90 for past medical expenses, value of attendant care and travel expenses. The Court .finds that this amount was reasonable and necessary and that Jennifer’s parents are entitled to recover the same from the defendant. Once again, the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s experts disagree over what future medical services, treatments and therapies will be reasonably necessary to address Jennifer’s injuries. Based upon careful consideration of all the evidence relevant to the issue of reasonable and necessary future medical expenses the Court finds that Jennifer is entitled to recover the sum of $18,500. Finally, Jennifer seeks to recover for the pain, suffering and mental anguish she has and will continue to endure. Unlike Camoi and Tiffany, Jennifer is entitled to recover for. the pain and suffering occasioned by the initial “crash” at Maxwell Hospital. Although Jennifer’s gastrointestinal problems have apparently abated, she appears to have suffered greatly because of them. While Jennifer’s expressive language is improving, Jennifer continues to have difficulty with emotional and behavioral problems. It is unclear whether these latter problems will worsen or improve with time. In light of these considerations, the Court finds that Jennifer is entitled to recover $200,000 from the defendant for past and future pain, suffering and mental anguish. Thus, in summary, the Court finds that judgment is due to be entered in favor of Jennifer and her parents and against the defendant for the sum of $224,437.90. A judgment in accordance with this opinion will be entered separately. D. Corey Fowler The “tampering” Corey was subjected to at Maxwell Hospital differed from that suffered by the other plaintiffs. Corey was found by a nurse essentially choking on his own blood. An examination revealed that he had a deep laceration of the upper palate. The next day Corey was again found to have blood coming from his nose and mouth. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to BMC. Although Dr. Colan hypothesized that Corey’s lacerated palate may have been the result of an attempt to inject him with lido-eaine through the roof of his mouth, Corey did not exhibit the pattern of core symptoms which Dr.