Full opinion text
WATERMAN, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicting appellant, following a six-day jury trial, of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and of conspiracy to commit that substantive offense. In seeking reversals of his convictions, appellant urges upon us three unrelated claims of error. He first contends that the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress. This motion was predicated on a purported lack of probable cause to institute the warrantless search which resulted in the discovery of a white powdery substance, believed to be heroin, on the person of one Isaac Daniels. This discovery produced the immediate arrest not only of Daniels but also of appellant, who appeared to be accompanying Daniels at the time of the warrantless search and seizure. Not unexpectedly, it was the white powdery substance at which the suppression motion was primarily directed. Appellant’s second claim of error is that the trial court incorrectly admitted into evidence at trial the official report and worksheet of the chemist who analyzed the substance seized from Daniels. Appellant contends that the introduction of this evidence was impermissible for the evidence was inadmissible hearsay under the new Federal Rules of Evidence, and, also, that under the circumstances of this case, the introduction of the report and the worksheet violated appellant’s right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to confront the witnesses against him. The final claim of error relates to an alleged infirmity in the trial court’s charge on the presumption of innocence. We conclude that the motion to suppress was properly denied and that appellant’s assignment of error in the court’s charge, a claim which we do not discuss, is without merit. As to the claim that the chemist’s report and worksheet were improperly admitted into evidence, although we discuss the constitutional grounds for this claim, we find it unnecessary to decide the claim on that ground, for we agree with appellant that those documents were inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for a new trial. I We initially consider appellant’s claim that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress certain evidence, the principal piece of evidence being the white powdery substance discovered on Daniels’ right thigh moments before Daniels and Oates were arrested. The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing and the trial, see United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194, 1196 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927, 93 S.Ct. 2755, 37 L.Ed.2d 154 (1973) , when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, as it must be evaluated on this review of the denial of the motion to suppress, see United States v. Vital-Padilla, 500 F.2d 641, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 236 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 923, 94 S.Ct. 1427, 39 L.Ed.2d 479 (1974) , reveals the following relevant facts. The drama logically begins with the introduction of the protagonist, Garfield Hammonds, Jr. As of April 26, 1972, the date the plot begins to unfold, Hammonds was an experienced special agent of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (“BNDD”), having served with that organization for nearly three years. For approximately the first two years of his service with BNDD, Agent Hammonds had been assigned to the Detroit office but since July of 1971 he had been stationed in New York City. Agent Hammonds’ responsibilities as a special agent included the obtaining, through operations in an undercover capacity, of intelligence concerning persons or organizations engaged in the business of illicit drug trafficking. Initially, this information was gathered in order to identify the unsavory characters engaged in these sordid activities and it was then used to select from among them so-called “targets,” presumably for investigation and eventual prosecution. By April of 1972 Agent Ham-monds had already participated in approximately twenty arrests for violations of federal narcotics laws. According to Agent Hammonds, often these arrestees were armed with dangerous weapons at the time of their apprehension. Agent Hammonds had also spent six months working undercover in a methadone treatment program for drug addicts. Inasmuch as his activities there involved working eight- and twelve-hour shifts with the participants in the program, Agent Hammonds had become intimately familiar with the physical manifestations of drug addiction and was well-qualified to identify addicts by observation. Next in our cast of characters is the antagonist, appellant Paul Oates. Although Agent Hammonds had never met or seen Paul Oates in person, his name and face were familiar to Hammonds for, while stationed at the BNDD office in Detroit, Hammonds had seen photographs of Oates, and he knew through information he hac received from BNDD intelligence sources, the Detroit local police, and the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office, that Oates was reputed to be a major narcotics dealer in the Detroit area. In fact, Hammonds had participated in an investigation in which Oates had been a so-called “target.” It is thus not surprising that Hammonds’ curiosity was aroused when, after giving testimony at a drug trial in Detroit and while waiting for the announcement that American Airlines Flight 440, his return flight to New York City, could be boarded, Hammonds recognized Oates at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport at about 7:00 p. m. on April 26, 1972. At the time he was initially observed by Agent Hammonds, Oates was seated and engaged in conversation with another man, one Isaac Daniels, whom Agent Hammonds did not recognize. It can be inferred from the testimony that Oates and Daniels were a study in sartorial contrast. While Daniels was described as being shabbily dressed, Oates, on the other hand, was apparently more nattily attired, the most distinctive feature of his clothing being “a yellow hat, a Robin Hood style hat with a green feather.” When American Airlines Flight No. 440 to New York was announced Oates and Daniels separated and boarded the aircraft, Oates taking a seat in the first-class section and Daniels occupying a seat in the coach compartment. Agent Hammonds also boarded the plane and moved to the coa'ch section, sitting across the aisle from Daniels at a distance of perhaps five or six feet. During the flight'Oates and Daniels did not associate with each other, but Hammonds carefully observed that Daniels exhibited some of the telltale signs of drug addiction, characteristics with which Hammonds had become acquainted through his intimate contact with drug addicts while working in the methadone treatment program. Both of Daniels’ hands were swollen and there were discernible needle “track” marks on the back of his right hand. Moreover, Daniels suffered from a constantly running nose. Although Agent Hammonds scrutinized Daniels, he did not notice any unusual bulges in Daniels’ clothing. In particular, although he specifically looked at Daniels’ legs, Agent Hammonds did not observe anything suspicious about Daniels except the aforementioned manifestations of drug addiction. After Oates and Daniels deplaned at LaGuardia Airport in New York City, they rejoined, conversed, and then proceeded without luggage, to the exit area where they met a third man. Agent Hammonds’ suspicions were further, and understandably, aroused by this latest development because Hammonds knew the third man to be one Willie McMillan, a former government informant whom Agent Hammonds knew “to be associated with the drug culture in New York City.” Oates and McMillan exchanged greetings, although there was no similar exchange between McMillan and Daniels. The three men then walked to a nearby telephone booth in the airline terminal. McMillan entered the booth, dialed a number, and handed the receiver to Oates who then entered the booth with McMillan and closed the door behind both of them. Meanwhile, Daniels waited outside the booth. Agent Hammonds decided to truncate the surveillance because he was apprehensive that McMillan, the recently deactivated government informant, might recognize him. He also abandoned any thought of trailing the suspects outside of the airline terminal for he did not have a government vehicle at his disposal. Hammonds inquired as to whether there was a return flight to Detroit that evening and, upon learning that the next flight for Detroit was scheduled for about 8:00 a. m. the next morning, he notified his superiors at BNDD of his observations and received from them authorization to conduct a surveillance of the American Airlines terminal the next morning. Agent Hammonds and four other BNDD special agents arrived at the terminal shortly after 7:00 a. m. on the morning of April 27. Oates and Daniels were already in the departure lounge, sitting approximately fifteen feet apart despite the fact that there were empty seats in close proximity to the place where Daniels was sitting; indeed, there was an empty seat right next to Daniels. Although they were more or less facing each other, Oates and Daniels neither conversed nor gave any indication that they recognized each other. It appeared, however, that Oates, whose view of Daniels was unobstructed, was looking at Daniels or, at least, was looking in his direction. At first, Agent Hammonds stood immediately behind Oates and, upon looking at Daniels, noticed a prominent bulge around the area of Daniels’ right coat pocket. Hammonds then sat down next to Daniels and noticed another bulge in Daniels’ clothing, this one being in the area of the inside of Daniels’ right thigh. As stated earlier, Agent Ham-monds had not observed either bulge during tti’e' flight to New York on the previous evening. Now apprehensive that Daniels might be armed, Hammonds sent a member of his BNDD surveillance team to obtain from airport security personnel the assistance necessary to conduct a weapons search. In response to Hammonds’ request for assistance, two uniformed Customs officers, Customs Security Officers Fromkin and DeAlfi, were dispatched to the departure lounge. After being informed of the BNDD observations of the preceding twelve hours, the Customs officers were warned by Agent Hammonds that he had reason to believe that the suspects Oates and Daniels were armed and were carrying narcotics. Although the Customs officers were not informed of Agent Hammonds’ intentions, Hammonds had already decided to arrest Oates and Daniels. The uniformed Customs officers independently observed the large bulge in Daniels’ right coat pocket and, while watching the suspects for several minutes, noticed that both Oates and Daniels appeared nervous and jittery. Inasmuch as the lounge was fairly crowded, it was decided that the most advisable course of action was to interrogate the suspects in an American Airlines office located approximately 50 feet from the boarding area. Officers Fromkin and DeAlfi then approached Oates and Daniels, who at this point were standing on the boarding line, and asked them to accompany the officers to a nearby American Airlines office. Oates and Daniels acquiesced in this request. Waiting in the office were the five BNDD special agents, the four agents other than Hammonds having been instructed by Hammonds not to participate in any search of the suspects. Once in the office, both suspects, when asked, denied being armed. The suspects were requested to produce identification. Oates showed a driver’s license which appeared proper in all respects. Daniels was unable to produce any type of identification. Fromkin then asked Oates, and DeAlfi asked Daniels, whether they objected to being frisked. They stated that they did not object. The pat-down of Oates and a look into a brown paper bag being carried by him produced no weapons or narcotics. Daniels was not so fortunate. While doing the pat-down of him, Officer DeAlfi first discovered a bulge in the suspect’s right coat pocket and then a bulge on the inside of his right thigh. Because DeAlfi was unsure of what the bulge in the coat pocket was, DeAlfi removed it and found it to be nothing but an overstuffed wallet. DeAlfi did not immediately seek to remove the bulge in the area of Daniels’ right thigh but instead asked Daniels what the bulge was. Daniels answered that it was “powder.” The Customs officer then requested that Daniels produce the material, at which point Daniels unzipped his pants and released from his leg a brown manila envelope containing two plastic packages, one rather large, and one somewhat smaller, each containing a white powdery substance. Two of the four BNDD special agents, Lentini and Degnin, immediately placed Oates and Daniels under arrest for violation of the federal narcotics law. Although the arrest was so effected by the BNDD agents, the suspected contraband was retained by the Customs officers and the suspects were taken into custody by the Customs Service after a brief jurisdictional dispute between Customs and BNDD. At the suppression hearing, which was held immediately prior to trial, the government took the position that Oates had no standing under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to move to suppress the evidence seized from Daniels’ person. This position was based principally on two grounds. It was argued that appellant certainly did not have “actual standing" to contest the legality of the search and seizure because the search and seizure which produced the incriminating evidence was the search of and the seizure from Daniels, not any search of and seizure from Oates himself. The government further contended that appellant did not have “automatic standing” under the doctrine of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), because he was not charged with a possessory crime as such, but only with aiding and abetting the commission of a possessory crime and with conspiring to commit that possessory crime. We hold that appellant does have “automatic standing” to challenge the legality of the search of Daniels’ person and the seizure of the white powder from him. In its brief in this Court the government suggests that we need not reach the “broader, and perhaps more important issues that inhere in the question of the continued viability of the automatic standing rule” but instead should proceed directly to the merits of the search and seizure issue, merits claimed by the government to be “frivolous.” While this invitation is appealing, because the law of automatic standing is admittedly in a state of uncertainty after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973), we believe that the more logical approach in these matters, see United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 659 n. 6 (5th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976), is to address first the problem of whether the appellant in the case at bar has any right to raise the issue at all. We are especially drawn to this course of action because, although we ourselves had on prior occasions expressed misgivings about the continued survival of the concept of automatic standing, see United States v. Tortorello, 533 F.2d 809, 814 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894, 97 S.Ct. 254, 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976); United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1205 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974), our recent decision in United States v. Galante, 547 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1976), has eliminated, at least until the Supreme Court itself rules definitively on the matter, any question in this circuit about the continuing viability of the “automatic standing” principle of Jones v. United States, supra. It is hornbook law that, in general, “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” United States v. Tor-torello, supra at 814, quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,171-72, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). Therefore, to establish standing to move to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, the movant must ordinarily demonstrate that the evidence was seized as a result of an invasion of his own legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or in his person, papers or effects. Mancusi v. De-Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-68, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). However, the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, supra, carved out an exception to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights may not be asserted vicariously. As well as expanding the class of persons who have a sufficient interest in the premises searched to challenge such a search, the Supreme Court in Jones also held, as recently explained in United States v. Ga-lante, supra at 737, “that one charged with a ‘possessory’ crime would be given ‘automatic’ standing to contest the search and seizure.” This holding, which represented .-a marked departure from then-existing Fourth Amendment law, was impelled by the “Hobson’s Choice” to which defendants seeking suppression of evidence in possession cases formerly had been subjected, that the proof offered at the suppression hearing to establish “the interest in the searched premises or the seized property necessary for standing [was] often highly probative of guilt [at trial],” United States v. Galante, supra at 736, because, until 1968, any of the testimony given by the defendant at the suppression hearing could be used by the prosecution as substantive evidence in its case-in-chief at trial. The “automatic standing” doctrine also found its genesis in the so-called “vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction,” the perceived evil being the government’s denying at the suppression hearing that the defendant had a sufficient possessory interest to confer standing to challenge the search and seizure which produced the evidence while at trial attempting to prove possession. When, however, in 1968 the Supreme Court decided in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), that “when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of 'guilt unless he makes no objection,” doubts arose as to whether, with the self-incrimination problem basically resolved, the “automatic standing” rule of Jones v. United States remained viable. In Brown v. United States, supra, a case in which there was no prosecutorial self-contradiction, see 411 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 1565, the Court acknowledged the existence óf these doubts but expressly refrained from deciding whether the “vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction warrants the continued survival of Jones’ ‘automatic’ standing now that . . . Simmons has removed the danger of coerced self-incrimination.” Id. If Brown was intended as an implied invitation to overrule Jones, we have graciously declined that invitation, expressly deciding in United States v. Galante, supra at 737, that such a significant step should be taken only by the Supreme Court, not this circuit. We held in Galante that in this circuit automatic standing exists whenever “possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is ‘an essential element of the [crime] charged.’ ” United States v. Galante, supra at 738. Inasmuch as we found such standing in Galante, despite the fact that the vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction did not exist there, see id. at 737 n.4, it appears that the absence of this evil has no bearing on whether the rule of automatic standing should be applied in a particular case. Turning to the requirements for automatic standing, we must first determine what is the “crime charged.” Ordinarily there would be absolutely no doubt about the answer to this inquiry. There seems to be doubt here, however. The government would have us believe that the “crimes charged” here are aiding and abetting the possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and that of conspiracy to possess heroin with the intent to distribute. While of course the government is correct with regard to the conspiracy charge, see, e.g., United States v. Galante, supra at 737-38; United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048, 95 S.Ct. 622, 42 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), we believe the government’s position is unsupportable with respect to the “charge” of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute. To be sure, Count Two of the indictment here charged that “the defendant Isaac Daniels aided and abetted by the defendant Paul V. Oates knowingly and intentionally did possess with intent to distribute” heroin. Yet, the simple, although perhaps not immediately apparent, truth of the matter is that the “crime charged” here was possession with intent to distribute, not aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute. This is so because “aiding and abetting” does not constitute a discrete criminal offense but only serves as a more particularized way of identifying the “persons involved,” see United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1970), in the commission of the substantive offense, and serves to describe how those “person[s] involved,” committed the substantive offense. The foregoing propositions are made eminently clear by United States v. Campbell, supra. The defendant there was charged “with aiding and abetting a revenue officer in the unlawful receipt of a fee for the performance of his official duties, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 (1964) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).” 426 F.2d at 553. In arguing that the statute of limitations made specifically applicable to the substantive offense set forth in § 7214 did not apply in his case, the defendant claimed that his offense was not the substantive offense expressly created by § 7214 but was rather that of “aiding and abetting” the commission of that offense. We rejected this argument, explaining, as have other circuits, see, e.g., Powers v. United States, 470 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), that “18 U.S.C. § 2 does not define a crime; rather it makes punishable as a principal one who aids or abets the commission of a substantive crime.” 426 F.2d at 553. What we meant by this remark, and what 18 U.S.C. § 2 definitely means, is made even clearer in Campbell when we also later said that “[cjlearly one can violate Section 7214(a) as an aider and abettor.” 426 F.2d at 553. In other words, one who aids and abets the commission of a crime is not only punishable as a principal but is a principal. In fact, this is how 18 U.S.C. § 2 formerly was phrased before 1951 when the then existing language, “is a principal,” was replaced by the phrase presently used in § 2, “is punishable as a principal.” This revised language was “ ‘intended [only] to clarify and make certain the intent to punish aiders and abettors regardless of the fact that they may be incapable of committing the specific violation which they are charged to have aided and abetted.’ . . . There is [, however,] no evidence of any Congressional intent to change the substantive law that an aider and abettor is a principal.” Swanne Soon Young Pang v. United States, 209 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1953) (emphasis supplied). We thus conclude that when a person is charged with aiding and abetting the commission of a substantive offense, the “crime charged” is, at least for purposes of determining whether automatic standing to challenge the legality of a search exists, the substantive offense itself. In the instant case, therefore, the “crime charged” was possession with intent to distribute, which is, in fact, one of the two specific crimes, along with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, which the judgment of conviction here discloses appellant was actually convicted of committing. Finally, in what may have been-nothing more than Freudian slips, the government itself on at least three occasions, in its opening statement to the jury, during trial and in its brief here in this court, has stated that Oakes was “charged” with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. We consider these representations to be accurate. Having found that the “crimes charged” were possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to commit such possession, we experience no difficulty in concluding that proof of possession is an essential element of the count charging possession with intent to distribute and we therefore hold that, as to that count, appellant has automatic standing to challenge the legality of the search of and seizure from his companion Isaac Daniels. Having decided that appellant has automatic standing to litigate the issue, we now consider the merits of appellant’s argument that the district court erroneously denied the motion to suppress, inter alia, the white powdery substance seized from Daniels just before Oates and Daniels were formally placed under arrest. Relying upon Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the district court in its oral decision denied the motion on the apparent ground that the law enforcement officers had reasonable grounds to stop Oates and Daniels. Once such a lawful temporary detention was instituted, the court ruled, an agent, having good reason to believe that the suspects might be armed and dangerous, has a right to perform limited searches for weapons, a search which in the case of Daniels produced the incriminating white powdery substance. The district court also found that from the time Agent Hammonds first noticed the bulges in Daniels’ clothing, there was probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed and that therefore an arrest at that time was proper. Appellant challenges the district court’s decision in several respects. First of all, appellant argues that Oates and Daniels were actually subjected to arrest, rather than some lesser form of detention, from the moment they were asked to accompany Customs Security Officers Fromkin and DeAlfi. Correctly asserting that an arrest can be based only on probable cause and not on mere suspicion, appellant contends that no such probable cause existed at the time Oates and Daniels were accosted by the Customs officers. The arrest was therefore illegal, the argument continues, and any evidence flowing from it should have been suppressed. Appellant’s second line of argument is that, even assuming, contrary to what appellant believes the evidence shows, that the initial detention was only a Terry stop rather than an executed arrest, there was no justification for even this more carefully circumscribed action as at that time the agents did not have specific and articulable grounds that would reasonably justify their suspicions that they were witnessing narcotics trafficking in progress. Finally, assuming arguendo that the officers were justified in making a Terry stop, and correctly pointing out that any search incident to such a stop must be based on a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous and must be narrowly limited to a search for weapons, appellant contends that the officers in this case did not have any reason to believe that Oates and Daniels were carrying weapons. We find all of these arguments to be unpersuasive. Appellant initially contends that Oates and Daniels were under arrest from the instant they were asked by Customs Security Officers Fromkin and DeAlfi to accompany them to a nearby office. We disagree. While it is clear that Oates and Daniels were not at that point free to do as they pleased, it can no longer be questioned that, although every arrest is a form of detention, the converse is not true. It is now well-settled that under certain circumstances a citizen may be temporarily detained, or, in police parlance, “stopped,” for investigative purposes. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 19-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Salter, 521 F.2d 1326,1328 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Walling, supra at 235; United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 702-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820, 94 S.Ct. 115, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973); United States v. Fields, supra at 1197. Without commenting for the moment on the propriety of the stop in this case, it is clear from the record that neither Daniels nor Oates was actually arrested until after the white powdery substance was discovered on Daniels’ person. First of all, as in United States v. Salter, supra at 1328, we “see nothing wrong in [the agent’s] asking [Oates and Daniels] to step into the [nearby office], a place more convenient for interrogation” and more conducive to insuring the safety of other passengers in the crowded departure area. See United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995, 92 S.Ct. 1270, 31 L.Ed.2d 463 (1972). Moreover, while not dispositive, it is significant that here, unlike the situation in United States v. Lampkin, 464 F.2d 1093, 1094 (3d Cir. 1972), a case upon which appellant relies, Customs Security Officers Fromkin and DeAlfi did not approach Oates and Daniels with their guns already drawn. Instead, Oates and Daniels were politely requested to accompany the officers to a private room and, without objection, they acquiesced in that request. The Customs officers did not, moreover, in the boarding area or upon arrival in the private room, represent in any way that their detainees were being placed under arrest. Furthermore, it was only after the discovery of the white powdery substance and BNDD Agent Lentini’s formal announcement that Oates and Daniels were being arrested that Agent Lentini informed the detainees of their constitutional rights. Our review of the record clearly demonstrates that from the time Oates and Daniels were first approached by Fromkin and DeAlfi the actions subsequently taken against them describe a classic stop and frisk. Appellant strenuously argues that what is of crucial importance here is the subjective intention of Agent Hammonds, reached before requesting assistance from the Customs officers but unexpressed to either of them, to arrest Daniels and Oates. Hammonds’ belief, however, that he had sufficient probable cause at this point to support an arrest, even assuming arguendo that belief to be wrong, and his intention to act upon that belief, are of no consequence here. What controls here is not what Hammonds subjectively intended to do but what he did. Hammonds did not disclose to either From-kin or DeAlfi that it was his intention to arrest Daniels and Oates. The Customs officers were fully informed, however, as to all the circumstances known to Hammonds and, before approaching the two men, they independently observed the men’s behavior and the bulges in Daniels’ clothing. The BNDD agents were, instructed by Ham-monds to refrain from participating in the searches of the suspects and they complied with this order. It is thus obvious that the Customs officers were acting independently of Hammonds, a fact confirmed by the so-called “jurisdictional dispute” that arose between BNDD and Customs after the arrest. There is simply no indication that the Customs officers had any intention of arresting, or took any action that could be construed as an arrest of, the suspects before the powder was discovered on Daniels. To be sure, the actual arrest was made by-two BNDD agents, one of whom was Lentini, a person who had previously intended to make an arrest. But, prior to the formal announcement of arrest, in no way whatsoever had either Hammonds or Lentini acted upon their intention to effect the arrest themselves. Moreover, even if Hammonds and Lentini thought that DeAlfi and From-kin were in fact arresting Oates and Daniels by removing them from the boarding line, this subjective belief on their part would not affect the validity of the detention instituted independently by DeAlfi and Fromkin if all the circumstances, viewed objectively and apart from what Lentini and Hammonds thought was happening, disclose that the detention was a stop and not in fact an arrest. This is so because the issues involved in determining the propriety of stops, arrests and searches must be resolved by an objective rather than a subjective standard. United States v. Vital-Padilla, supra at 644; Smith v. United States, 402 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926, 92 S.Ct. 974, 30 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972). Appellant has anticipated that we might decide, as we in fact just have, that the initial removal of Oates and Daniels to the private room was not an arrest but only a Terry -type stop. While conceding, as he must, that Terry v. Ohio authorized temporary detentions based on less than full probable cause, appellant vigorously argues that the facts known to and relied upon by the government agents in this case do not generate the so-called “reasonable suspicion,” see, e. g., United States v. Magda, supra at 758, necessary to justify a temporary stop for purposes of investigation. Our analysis of the prevailing legal standards and our examination of the record in this case indicate otherwise. It is now axiomatic that a law enforcement officer has the power, indeed the obligation, to detain a person temporarily for the purpose of interrogating him if the officer reasonably suspects that the detainee has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 20-23, 88 S.Ct. 1868; id. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Magda, supra at 758; United States v. Riggs, supra at 702-03; United States v. Fields, supra at 1197. To establish the constitutionality of the stop, however, the “officer [must be able to] point to specific and •áfticulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” United States v. Magda, supra at 758, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see, e. g., United States v. Riggs, supra at 703. Inasmuch as “[t]he reasonableness of [the officer’s] conduct must be determined by balancing the need for the stop against the gravity of the intrusion which the stop entailed,” United States v. Magda, supra at 758; accord, Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Fields, supra at 1197, it is readily apparent that the “specific and articulable facts” and the inferences that can be drawn from these facts relate to the need for the stop. “Need,” in turn, depends on factors such as the seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of the detainee’s involvement in the known or suspected criminal activity. See United States v. Walling, supra at 235. Obviously, if the offense is minor and there is substantial uncertainty that the detainee is involved, only a minimally intrusive stop would be proper. On the other hand, when the police officer knows or suspects that an offense with serious societal consequences is being committed and there is some reasonable possibility that the person he detains is involved, a more substantial detention is justified. Between these two extremes lie the great majority of cases; those in which the offense is minor but there is strong suspicion that the detainee is involved, or those in which the offense is egregious but the suspicion that the prospective detainee is involved amounts to little more than a visceral feeling on the part of the police officer. We believe that the agents’ stop of Oates and Daniels, while it did not rise to the level of an arrest, was enough of an intrusion upon their liberty, to require more than 'a minimal’ showing of’ need. A significant portion of that need is supplied by the inherent odiousness and gravity of the offense, the societal costs of which, in terms of ruined and wasted lives, are staggering. We further believe that the need for the stop was supported by the fact that quick and decisive action may be required when suspected large-scale dope peddlers are about to board a jet aircraft with narcotics which, as is commonly known, are a “readily disposable commodity.” United States v. Lampkin, supra at 1097. Having said all this, we still must be able to find some “specific and articulable facts” which point logically to a reasonable possibility of the involvement of Oates and Daniels in the narcotics trafficking Agent Hammonds believed he was witnessing. We hold, as did the district court below, that the government agents had available to them and justifiably relied upon such facts when they temporarily detained Oates and Daniels. Agent Hammonds was warranted in basing his suspicions in part on Oates’ reputation as a major narcotics dealer. While investigative stops certainly cannot be made “merely because [the detainees] have criminal records or bad reputations,” United States v. Fields, supra at 1198, a police officer’s knowledge of a person’s reputation as a prominent narcotics trafficker can properly be considered, along with other factors, as an element justifying the officer’s reasonable suspicion or his belief that probable cause exists, United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Santana, supra at 368; United States v. Riggs, supra at 701, 703; United States v. Lampkin, supra at 1096; United States v. Fields, supra at 1196, 1197. From his work in the Detroit office of BNDD Agent Hammonds was thoroughly familiar with Oates’ reputed background in illicit drug peddling in the Detroit area. Significantly, Oates had been considered an important enough figure to be designated as a “target” for the federal enforcement agents located there. Furthermore, Oates’ traveling with a person who was obviously a narcotics addict and Oates’ eventual rendezvous in New York with a man known personally to Agent Hammonds as there being “involved in the drug culture” certainly lends substantial credence to the belief that Oates’ purposes in going to New York City were far from commendable. The level of suspicion rises when we add to the narcotics connections of the three principal characters the fact that the trip which was made here was made under circumstances which are suggestive of narcotics activity and which have been so recognized, at least implicitly, by previous cases in this and the Third Circuit. When known narcotics dealers, carrying no luggage, see, e. g., United States v. Riggs, supra at 701; United States v. Fields, supra at 1196, make air flights to other cities followed by virtually immediate return flights, a police officer might justifiably become suspicious. See, e. g., United States v. Riggs, supra at 703; United States v. Lampkin, supra at 1096. The suspicion would be particularly warranted when, as here, the nine hours spent in the city to which the narcotics dealer has traveled are from 10:00 in the evening to the early morning hours of the next day. As well as the suspicion that could understandably be aroused in a law enforcement officer when observing three persons with narcotics backgrounds consorting during the course of a quick, overnight trip by two of them, including the one known to be a major trafficker, there were other factors here observed by the government agents which might have reasonably heightened the suspicions they already harbored. For instance, although Agent Hammonds had carefully scrutinized Daniels during the evening flight to New York on the 26th, he did not notice any unusual bulkiness in Daniels’ clothing. Thus, when Agent Ham-monds and the Customs'officers saw the distinct bulges on Daniels on the morning of the 27th, they were properly apprehensive that the bulges might be either weapons or narcotics. Another factor upon which the officers could properly rely was the apparent effort of Oates and Daniels, who, by Agent Hammonds’ own observations knew each other and had been together the previous evening, to avoid any appearance of recognition at LaGuardia Airport while waiting to board the return flight to Detroit. See United States v. Riggs, supra at 703; United States v. Fields, supra at 1196. Despite the fact that there were seats available in close proximity to where Daniels was sitting, and indeed the seat next to Daniels was unoccupied, Oates chose to sit diagonally across from Daniels. From this vantage point Oates’ line of vision was unobstructed and the testimony indicates that Oates was indeed looking at Daniels or in Daniels’ direction. Of course, this intentional avoidance would comport perfectly with the hypothesis that Oates, the dealer, while having an obvious interest in keeping his minion Daniels within sight, would prefer to maintain enough distance to allow a quick exit, or at least a plausible claim of ignorance, in the event the illicit transportation should be unexpectedly detected and frustrated by the authorities. Furthermore, while sitting in the departure lounge, both Oates and Daniels gave the appearance of being nervous and jittery. This behavior could reasonably suggest to the observing officers, in connection with the other circumstances of which the officers were aware, that Oates and Daniels were engaging in conduct which could get them in trouble with the law. See United States v. Walling, supra at 235; United States v. Fields, supra at 1196 (“nervous and ill at ease”); United States v. Lindsey, supra at 703, 704 (“appeared nervous and was ‘looking about’ and ‘perspiring’ ”, “extremely anxious behavior”). In deciding whether the circumstances which we have described pass the threshold of„reasonable suspicion necessary to justify, the stop which was-made in ¡fhis case, we should emphasize that these circumstances “are not to be dissected and viewed singly; rather they must be considered as a whole.” United States v. Magda, supra at 758, quoting United States v. Hall, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976), and they “are to be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States v. Magda, supra at 758, quoting United States v. Hall, supra, 525 F.2d at 859. That it is the police officer’s perspective from which the reasonableness of his suspicion must be gauged has been firmly established by a long line of cases which have either expressly so stated or alluded to the officer’s training or experience. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Mag-da, supra at 758; United States v. Salter, supra at 1328; United States v. Walling, supra at 235; United States v. Santana, supra at 368. Thus, it may well be that some patterns of behavior which may seem innocuous enough to the untrained eye may not appear so innocent to the trained police officer who has witnessed similar scenarios numerous times before. In this case, the principal law enforcement officer, Special Agent Hammonds, was a highly experienced narcotics undercover officer who was thoroughly familiar with the dope peddler’s clandestine methods of doing business. We therefore find him to have been particularly capable of comprehending the significance of the activities of Paul Oates and Isaac Daniels on the night of April 26 and the morning of April 27, 1972. As was the Third Circuit in United States v. Lampkin, supra at 1096, we are satisfied that to Agent Hammonds’ eye “[tjhere were far too many interrelated factors to have been the result of pure coincidence.” We therefore hold that “[t]he combination of these circumstances sufficed to meet the rather lenient test fpr a, stop which the .Supreme Court, reversing [the Second Circuit], applied in Adams v. Williams.” United States v. Santana, supra at 368. That the initial “stop” was permissible does not, of course, establish, without more, that any search, or “frisk,” incident to that stop was equally sustainable. Case law teaches that any search of the detainees must be limited to a protective frisk for weapons, see, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, and before such a pat-down search can be conducted the police officer must have reason to believe that the suspect may be armed and dangerous. E. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. We do not hesitate to uphold the pat-down search conducted by Customs Security Officers DeAlfi and Fromkin in' this case, for we believe that the officers were fully justified under the circumstances in believing that either Oates or Daniels or both of them might be armed and dangerous. First of all, the bulges in Daniels’ clothing were highly suspicious, see, e. g., United States v. Lindsey, supra at 703, 704; United States v. Marshall, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 440 F.2d 195, 197 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 909, 91 S.Ct. 153, 27 L.Ed.2d 148 (1970), and a reasonable police officer, in the interest of protecting himself, can surely, at the very least, feel the bulge to ascertain whether it is, in fact, a weapon. If by touch the officer remains uncertain as to whether the article producing the bulge might be a weapon, he is entitled to remove it. Here Customs Security Officer DeAlfi justifiably removed Daniels’ wallet when he could not determine what caused the bulge by feeling it through Daniels’ outer clothing. Secondly, the police officer’s own experience can serve as a critical factor in deciding to conduct a “frisk”: .And in .determining whether the officer acted reasonably íu such, circumstances, due weight must be given,' not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883 (emphasis supplied). It was Agent Hammonds’ personal experience that persons arrested as narcotics violators often were found in possession of weapons at the time of their arrest. Indeed, even apart from the agent’s personal experiences, we have recognized that to “substantial dealers in narcotics” firearms are as much “tools of the trade” as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia. United States v. Wiener, 534 F.2d 15,18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820, 97 S.Ct. 66, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976). We are in full agreement with Judge Friendly’s remarks in United States v. Santana, supra at 368, that “[wjhile [a narcotics agent may have] received no specific information that [a narcotics dealer or his companion] was armed, it would not be unreasonable for a policeman to assume that a man believed to be one of the top narcotics violators in [a major metropolitan] area [or his companion] would be carrying arms or would be otherwise violent.” As did Judge Friendly in Santana, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio indicated that, despite the fact that the police officer has not personally observed a weapon or any physical indication, such as a bulge, that would indicate the presence of a weapon, the belief of the police officer that the suspect may be armed and dangerous can be predicated on the nature of the criminal activity involved. See 392 U.S. at 27-28, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Finally, we believe that inherent in Terry v. Ohio is the notion that the standard of suspicion necessary to allow a frisk for weapons is not a difficult one to satisfy, for even if “ ‘the belief that [the suspect] might be carrying a weapon rested upon fragile grounds’ . . . courts should not set the test of sufficient suspicion that the individual is ‘armed and presently dangerous’ too high when protection of the investigating officer is at stake.” United States v. Riggs, supra at 705. We therefore find that the Customs officers in this case were entitled to pat down both the suspects. This brings us to the point at which Customs Security Officer DeAlfi felt the bulge on Daniels’ right thigh. In contrast to DeAlfi’s quick removal of the overstuffed wallet when he felt it, DeAlfi did not immediately seek to remove or to ask Daniels to remove whatever article was causing the leg bulge. The wallet felt harder to the touch and, without removal, it would have been difficult to determine whether it was a weapon. The thigh bulge, on the other hand, was presumably not so rigid and therefore there conceivably might have been less likelihood that it was a weapon. While it may well be that DeAlfi, in view of all the other circumstances, had probable cause to make an arrest upon feeling the thigh bulge, we need not so decide. We prefer, instead, to focus on DeAlfi’s immediate response to his feeling the bulge. He asked Daniels what the bulge was. He had, of course, every right to so inquire, for the right to interrogate during a “stop” is the essence of Terry and its progeny. Once Daniels said “Powder,” probable cause clearly existed, and any of the government agents present was fully entitled, in view of all the circumstances, to make an arrest, for the existence of a probable cause sufficient to support an arrest may develop during the course of a stop based on reasonable suspicion. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U.S. at 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921; United States v. Walling, supra at 236; United States v. Riggs, supra at 704; White v. United States, supra at 253. Moreover, if, as was the case here, the search is conducted in compliance with the governing constitutional standards, it is immaterial that what was discovered is not the article for which the police officers were originally and specifically looking. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 335, 34 L.Ed.2d 258 (1972). Finally, we should stress that, despite the fact that the white powdery substance was discovered only on Daniels, probable cause then existed to arrest Oates as well as Daniels. See, e. g., United States v. Vital-Padilla, supra at 644; cf. United States v. Salter, supra at 1328. The motion to suppress was properly denied. II Appellant next claims that the trial court committed error by admitting into evidence at trial two documentary exhibits purporting to be the official report and accompanying worksheet of the United States Customs Service chemist who analyzed the white powdery substance seized from Isaac Daniels. The documents, the crucial nature of which is beyond cavil, concluded that the powder examined was heroin. Appellant contends, first of all, that under the new Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter “FRE”) the documents should have been excluded as hearsay and, alternatively, that, even if they were not inadmissible on that basis, their exclusion was nonetheless required because their admission into evidence over appellant’s objection would have violated and did violate appellant’s right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to confront the witnesses against him. Before discussing the merits of these contentions, which raise difficult and important issues of evidential and constitutional law, it will be helpful to describe briefly the circumstances surrounding the admission of the report and the worksheet. At trial the government had planned upon calling as one of its final witnesses a Mr. Milton Weinberg, a retired United States Customs Service chemist who allegedly had analyzed the white powder seized from Isaac Daniels. It seems that Mr. Weinberg had been present on the day the trial had been scheduled to commence but he was not able to testify then because of a delay occasioned by the unexpected length of the pretrial suppression hearing. The government claims that by the time Weinberg was rescheduled to testify he had become “unavailable.” The Assistant United States Attorney explained the circumstances of this unavailability as follows: “I am told by his wife [he is] very sick. Apparently he has some type of bronchial infection.” After a short adjournment the prosecutor added the following comment: “Mr. Weinberg called my office this morning and I was made known about it about 10:30 this morning, prior to coming upstairs.” Considering these two explanations to be consistent with each other, it appears that Weinberg called the United States Attorney’s office to inform them of his unavailability and that subsequently the Assistant United States Attorney attempted to speak to Weinberg personally but was able, for some reason, to speak only to Weinberg’s wife who advised that Weinberg had “some type of bronchial infection.” There is no indication in the record as to why the Assistant United States Attorney was at that time unable to speak to Weinberg himself, although earlier that day Weinberg had been able to carry on a telephone conversation. Nor is there any other indication in the record that the prosecutor made any further attempts to confirm the fact that Weinberg was ill, and, if so, how ill he might be. No request was made of the district court for a brief continuance for the purpose of determining the nature and expected duration of Weinberg’s illness. Before the onset of Weinberg’s bronchial condition, the prosecutor had planned to call Weinberg for the purpose of eliciting from him testimony that Weinberg had analyzed the powder seized from Daniels and found it to be heroin. When Weinberg became “unavailable,” the government decided to call another' Customs chemist, Shirley Harrington, who, although she did not know Weinberg personally, was able to testify concerning the regular practices and procedures used by Customs Service chemists in analyzing unknown substances. Through Mrs. Harrington the government was successful in introducing Exhibits 13 and 12 which purported to be, respectively, the handwritten worksheet used by the chemist analyzing the substance seized from Daniels and the official typewritten report of the chemical analysis. The report summarizes salient features of the worksheet. Mrs. Harrington claimed to be able to ascertain from the face of the worksheet the various steps taken by Weinberg to determine whether the unknown substance was, as suspected, heroin. When the defense voiced vigorous objection to the attempt to introduce the documents through Mrs. Harrington, the government relied upon three different hearsay exceptions contained in the new Federal Rules of Evidence to support its position that the documents were admissible. While principal reliance was placed on the modified “business records” exception found in FRE 803(6), the evidence was also claimed to be admissible under FRE 803(8) as a “public record” or under FRE 803(24). The defense was primarily concerned that the defendant was being denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers, in this case, the missing chemist Weinberg. Mrs. Harrington was obviously an experienced chemist, having conducted thousands of tests while working for the Customs Service, including hundreds designed to identify heroin. She was also an experienced witness, having testified “probably a hundred or so” times in the course of her duties with the Customs Service. She had never worked with Weinberg personally and had never observed him perform any chemical tests. She had never received any notes or letters from him, but she identified Weinberg’s writing on Exhibit 13 and his signature on Exhibit 12, presumably because she had, in accordance with Customs Service practices, reanalyzed, prior to destruction, substances Weinberg had previously analyzed shortly after the substances were seized. The defense, in addition to having no opportunity to cross-examine Weinberg, the chemist who had performed the analysis, was also disturbed about two other circumstances surrounding the introduction of Exhibits 12 and 13. In particular, the defense was surprised that Exhibit 12, the official typewritten report, contained Weinberg’s signature, for no such signature had appeared on the copy of this exhibit given to the defense beforehand. Moreover, the defense was particularly, and understandably, distressed about the absence of Weinberg in view of the fact that the two exhibits differed in one important particular, a particular in which they certainly should have been identical. A notation pertaining to the chain of custody of the powder within the agency appeared on both exhibits, in typewritten form on the official report and in handwriting, presumably Weinberg’s, on the worksheet. The notation read “Received from and returned to CSO Fromkin.” On the typewritten official report, however, this statement had been crossed out, although it still was legible beneath the scribbling. Mrs. Harrington knew nothing about this deletion. There is nothing in the exhibits themselves or in the testimony of any witnesses that would explain why, when and by whom this deletion was made. We now turn to consider appellant’s claims that the chemist’s report and worksheet were excludable on either evidential or constitutional grounds. Mindful of our responsibility to avoid, if at all possible, dispositions on constitutional grounds, we shall first determine whether the chemist’s documents were admissible under the new Federal Rules of Evidence. In view of the unquestionably crucial character of these documents, constituting as they do the only evidence in the case establishing that the confiscated substance was heroin, a holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence precluded their admission would obviate the need for our resolving what we regard as substantial and complex constitutional issues relating to the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. It is eminently clear that the report and worksheet were “written assertions” constituting “statements,” FRE 801(a)(1), which were “offered [by the prosecution] in evidence [at trial] to prove the truth of the matters asserted [in them].” FRE 801(c). As such, they were hearsay and, for our present purposes, under FRE 802 were inadmissible “except as [otherwise] provided by” other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The so-called “exceptions” to the hearsay rule are delineated in FRE 803 and 804. What immediately catches one’s attention upon referring to these sections is the prefatory language of each: “The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule. . . . ” (Emphasis supplied.) These two rules enumerating the exceptions to the hearsay rule are thus not designed to insure admissibility of the questioned evidence but only designed to prevent automatic exclusion on hearsay grounds. Why this language was drafted in this fashion, and why, as we shall see, other specific language, either contained in the rules as proposed to and approved by Congress or inserted by Congress itself during the legislative process, was drafted with comparable circumspection, is succinctly explained by the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence (hereinafter “Advisory Committee”) in the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, Introductory Note to Article VIII, 56 F.R.D. 183, 292 (1972) (hereinafter “Advisory Committee’s Notes”). The reason for “the exceptions set forth in Rules 803 and 804 [being] stated in terms of exemption from the general exclusionary man