Full opinion text
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Chief Judge: The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decided in these cases — one arising in the Port of New York, the other in the Ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads —-that petitioners Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations (CONASA), New York Shipping Association (NYSA), and International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) violated the congressional proscription of secondary boycotts. Petitioners challenge the Board’s rulings as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s work preservation doctrine, and the Board cross-applies for enforcement of its orders. The work preservation doctrine provides generally that efforts to preserve work for employees displaced by technological innovation are not unlawful secondary activities and that union-management contracts with the same purpose are not proscribed “hot cargo” agreements. Activities and agreements, however, that seek not to preserve the traditional work of displaced workers but to acquire work of other employees are unlawful under the congressional proscription. The question before us is whether certain rules agreed to by shipping companies and the ILA are an effort by the ILA to acquire work or merely an attempt to preserve its members’ traditional responsibilities in the era of containerized shipping. The NLRB held that petitioners were engaged in work acquisition rather than work preservation. Because we believe this judgment rests on erroneous interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decisions in National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass’n v. NLRB and NLRB v. Enterprise Ass’n of Steam, etc. Pipefitters, we grant the petitions for review and set aside the Board’s orders. We also deny the Board’s cross-applications for enforcement. I. BACKGROUND The factual antecedents of the instant disputes revolve around a specific technological innovation — containerization—that has had a momentous impact on the loading and unloading of ocean-borne cargo. Containers are large metal receptacles that can accommodate upwards of 30,000 pounds of cargo and that can be moved to and from a ship as a single unit. Historically, longshoremen transported such cargo piece by piece from the hold of a ship to the pier for inbound cargo and vice versa for outbound cargo. Subsequent to the advent of containerization, however, the role of longshoremen in handling cargo has been greatly reduced. It is now the case that containers can be transported to and from ships without longshoremen handling any of the boxes, crates, and packages enclosed in each container. Containerization obviously engendered huge increases in dockside productivity. According to one estimate, the traditional method of handling cargo translated into a productivity factor of 1.4 tons per man-hour; containerization has made it possible for this figure to rise to 30 tons per man-hour. This greater efficiency was only achieved, however, by transforming what was once a labor intensive chore into a largely mechanical one. Hence workers’ expectations of job security have come into conflict with management’s desire to increase productivity. Congress has not enacted a statutory scheme whose specific purpose is either to prevent or to resolve disputes between management and labor over how best to accommodate technological innovations in the workplace. As with most other aspects of American industrial relations, the problem of technological innovation has been left to the system of private ordering we know as collective bargaining. A complete understanding of the controversies before us, therefore, requires not only a knowledge of the specific incidents that precipitated the disputes, but also an appreciation for the adjustments to containerized shipping that have been made through the collective bargaining process in the three port cities involved in these cases. A. Containerization in the Ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads CONASA represents constituent shipping associations, including the Hampton Roads Shipping Association (HRSA) and the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore (STAB), in ports from Massachusetts to Virginia. Since its formation in 1970 CO-NASA has bargained on behalf of its members with the ILA over certain key issues, including containerization, on a master-contract basis. Prior to the formation of CONASA, North Atlantic ports generally adopted the master terms of the labor agreement for the Port of New York. Due in large measure to the controversy surrounding containerization, the negotiation in New York of the 1968 collective bargaining agreement was a bitter affair that occasioned a strike of nearly two months’ duration by members of the ILA. The implications of this dispute for the national economy were sufficiently far-reaching to involve mediators appointed by the President of the United States in the dispute’s resolution. Part of the agreement that finally emerged in 1968 was a set of rules, known as the Rules on Containers, which represented the compromise reached between management and labor on the containerization issue. The 1968 New York agreement, whose master terms were adopted that year by other ports on the North Atlantic coast, marks the first time that the Rules on Containers were included in the labor contracts in Hampton Roads and Baltimore. Containerized shipping was first introduced in Baltimore and Hampton Roads in 1965 and 1966, but did not have a substantial impact on work patterns in these ports until the late 1960s and early 1970s, by which time the Rules were adopted. For example, the first crane used to move containers to and from ships was erected in Hampton Roads in 1968 or 1969. And, as a further example, one major shipper, United States Lines, moved only “a handful” of containers through the Port of Baltimore in 1965, about 4,000 containers in 1969, and 25,000 just a few years later in 1978. Thus, although the 1968 Rules on Containers were the parties’ collectively bargained response to containerization — and, as such, postdated rather than antedated the advent of containerization — there was in fact no significant time lag between the technological development and the parties’ collectively bargained response to it. To understand the scope of the Rules on Containers, we must first appreciate the different ways in which container loads of cargo are classified. A “consolidated full container load” (CFCL) consists of shipments consolidated into a single container whose cargo belongs to more than one consignee. A “less than trailer load” (LTL) or a “less than container load” (LCL) also refers to a container whose cargo belongs to more than one consignee. A “full shippers’ load” (FSL) or “shippers’ load,” in contrast, is a container of cargo from one shipper to a single beneficial owner consignee. The controversy in Baltimore and Hampton Roads centered on the stripping and stuffing — packing and unpacking — of FSL containers. It appears that in the Ports of Hampton Roads and Baltimore, in the few years between introduction of containerized shipping and adoption of the Rules on Containers, ILA labor stripped consolidated container loads at the pier. Unless ILA stripping was requested by the consignee’s agent or by the stevedore, however, shippers’ loads were placed by ILA labor on the pier, where truckmen would then pick up the FSL container intact either to deliver it to the beneficial owner or to store the cargo. The 1968 Rules were to an extent a formalization of these work practices. The Rules provided that ILA labor at the pier was to strip and stuff consolidated container loads that came from or were destined for any person who was not the beneficial owner of the cargo and who was located within 50 miles of the port. The Rules further provided that a shipping company had to pay liquidated damages for each of its containers not handled in accordance with the Rules. And for each container, including FSL containers, that passed over the docks without stripping or stuffing by longshoremen, the shipper was required to pay a royalty into an ILA fund. The 1968 Rules on Containers expired with the rest of the collective bargaining agreement in 1971, at which time further labor-management conflict over the containerization issue ensued. By this time CONASA was bargaining on behalf of HRSA and STAB. The ultimate compromise reached by CONASA and the ILA on containerization, after another long strike, was to retain the same rules for handling containers and for paying royalties as were embodied in the 1968 agreement, except that the 1971 agreement provided for an increase in liquidated damages for rule infractions. As can be seen, the Rules in existence from 1968 to 1974 did not in terms require that ILA labor handle FSL cargo at the pier. But the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that, “[bjeginning in 1969, following the execution of the 1968 agreement, ILA longshoremen stripped full shippers’ loads which were to be delivered to a warehouse for storage within a 50-mile radius of the center of the port. ILA freight handlers loaded the freight onto trucks for delivery to the warehouse.” Yet FSL containers whose cargo was not to be warehoused were frequently stripped by truckers at their terminals within the port area before delivery of the cargo to its beneficial owner — a practice known as “shortstop-ping.” Although there is some indication that labor-management Container Committees, established to administer the Rules, considered this practice a violation of the Rules by the shipper that turned over the container, it is clear that most shortstop-ping was not detected by the Committees. In January 1973 a labor-management committee issued an interpretation of the Rules (the “Dublin Supplement”) that brought shortstopped shippers’ loads within the scope of the Rules. Under the Supplement truckmen were permitted to haul FSL containers of import cargo directly to a warehouse in the port area for stripping only when the freight would be stored there for at least 30 days. The Rules on Containers included in the agreement negotiated in 1974 sought to formalize practice with respect to FSL cargo along the lines of the 1968 and 1971 agreements and the Dublin accord. As the ALJ found,'“Under the 1974-77 container rules, ILA labor is entitled to strip full shippers’ loads, whenever such work is to be done within a 50-mile radius of the center of the port by other than the consignee’s employees.” But FSL cargo consigned to the beneficial owner’s place of business or warehoused for at least 30 days within the port area was not to be stripped by the ILA; instead, the ILA would continue to receive a royalty for each container not handled by longshoremen. Thus under the 1974 Rules, assuming that the Dublin Supplement’s warehousing exception was not applicable, when employees of a trucking company before delivering FSL cargo to its beneficial owner stripped an FSL container at the company’s off-pier terminal and that terminal was located within 50 miles of port, the shipping line that turned over its FSL container to the truckmen became liable for liquidated damages of $1,000 per container. B. Containerized Shipping in the Port of New York Containerized transport was first introduced in the Port of New York during the 1950s. In New York, as in Baltimore and Hampton Roads, the general practice prior to containerization was for ILA labor to handle cargo piece by piece. The longshoremen would load export cargo on pallets and would unload and sort import cargo in preparation for delivery. These work practices began to change in the late 1950s with the introduction of containerization. And with the challenge to existing work practices came increased labor-management conflict. Predictably, management wished to secure the efficiency gains represented by containerized shipping as soon as possible; equally predictably, the ILA wished to fulfill its members’ expectations of job security. The ILA-NYSA collective bargaining agreement negotiated in 1959 was the first to contain a provision dealing with containerized shipping. At that point containerization had not yet become widespread in New York. Indeed, by one report the first fully containerized vessel was not introduced into the busy North Atlantic trade route until 1967. It was nevertheless thought necessary by the parties in 1959 to achieve some level of agreement on how containerized shipping would be handled. The 1959 collective bargaining agreement expressly recognized the right of shippers belonging to the NYSA to use containers of any kind or size without ILA restrictions that would cause the containers to be stripped and restuffed at the pier. There were, however, two caveats. First, the NYSA agreed to make royalty payments to a jointly administered fund for each shippers’ load container that was stuffed or stripped away from the pier by non-ILA labor. Second, the agreement also stipulated that [a]ny work performed in connection with the loading and discharging of containers for employer members of the NYSA which is performed in the Port of Greater New York whether on piers or terminals controlled by them, or whether through direct contracting out, shall be performed by ILA labor at longshore rates.!! Applying these terms to actual dockside disputes proved to be an arduous process fraught with difficulties. In particular, the language of the second caveat was sufficiently imprecise to require a clarification which, according to the NYSA, was issued by that shippers’ association on February 28, 1962: Where an employer member of NYSA supplies a container which is the property of such member, to a consolidator for loading or discharging of cargo in the Port of Greater New York, it will be stipulated that such container must be loaded or unloaded by ILA at longshore rates.!! As the 1960s passed, containerized shipping in the Port of New York became more widespread and ILA hostility to the innovation more pronounced. With the 1968 negotiations looming, the ILA, at its 1967 convention, assumed a hard-line position on containerization: All containers were to be stuffed and stripped by ILA labor at long-shore rates, or there was to be trouble. And trouble there was. The prolonged strike, mentioned above in the context of the situations in Baltimore and Hampton Roads, ensued and was terminated only after the appointment of a Presidential Board of Inquiry pursuant to the national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. The compromise ultimately struck between the parties was the same Rules on Containers that were adopted as master terms in Baltimore and Hampton Roads. Shippers’ loads and other containers that came from or went to points 50 or more miles from the Port of New York were not subject to ILA stuffing or stripping requirements. CFCL, LTL, and LCL containers to be stuffed or stripped within 50 miles of port — the containers at issue in this New York case — were, however, to be stuffed or stripped by ILA labor. The seemingly chronic dockside labor problems attributable to containerization continued to flare up. The 1971 collective bargaining agreement left intact the Rules adopted in 1968, but this compromise was agreed upon only after another long strike. Further discord ensued, and the ILA and CONASA, which by this time had begun bargaining for the NYSA on matters pertaining to containerization, issued their Dublin Supplement in 1973 dealing with FSL containers and warehousing in the port area. The collective bargaining agreement adopted in 1974 also included Rules on Containers, the final version of which manifested an intention to carry on the agreement reached in 1968 and 1971 along with the Dublin accord. C. The Role of Truckers and Consolidators Before and After the Advent of Containerized Shipping The charging parties before the NLRB were the following common carriers: Houff Transfer, Inc. (Houff) and Associated Transfer, Inc. (Associated) in the case originating in Baltimore and Hampton Roads, and Dolphin Forwarding, Inc. (Dolphin) and San Juan Freight Forwarders, Inc. (San Juan) in the case originating in New York. Because these charging parties alleged that secondary activities of the ILA and of CO-NASA and its members, including the NYSA, threatened to deprive them of part of their traditional work, we must briefly review what their traditional role has been with respect to the cargo at issue. 1. Baltimore and Hampton Roads Houff and Associated are ICC-licensed interstate common carriers whose work includes transporting cargo by truck to and from the. Ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads. Both carriers have terminals within 50 miles of the Port of Hampton Roads, and Houff has a terminal in Baltimore. Prior to containerization, Houff, Associated, and other trucking companies made trips to the piers in Baltimore and Hampton Roads to pick up loose cargo which had been unloaded and sorted by ILA labor. The cargo would then be transported by the trucking companies to their trucking stations, to their warehouses, or directly to the consignee. Since the advent of containerization in these ports, about 1965, truckmen regularly have transported FSL container loads to beneficial owner consignees both within and beyond 50 miles of the Ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads. Prior to adoption of the 1968 collective bargaining agreement, which was the first in Baltimore and Hampton Roads to speak to the containerization issue, truckmen also picked up FSL containers at the pier, unstripped by ILA labor, and transported them to a- nearby warehouse for stripping and storing. Subsequent to the Rules’ adoption in 1968, FSL containers whose cargo was to be stripped and warehoused in the port area were stripped by ILA labor, but truckmen frequently picked up FSL containers and stripped them at their terminals when the cargo was not to be warehoused. The record indicates that at least some personnel within the trucking industry were aware that this shortstopping of FSL containers within 50 miles of the port was regarded as a violation of the Rules on Containers committed by the shippers. 2. New York In the New York case Dolphin and San Juan employed subcontracted labor to consolidate various customers’ goods by placing them into containers in preparation for shipment by sea. Both companies had inland facilities within a 50-mile radius of the Port of New York. The work done by Dolphin and San Juan that caused NYSA shippers to violate the Rules on Containers in the view of the Container Committee was consolidation of cargo belonging to two or more individuals into containers owned or leased by the shippers. FSL cargo is not at issue in this New York case. Dolphin’s operations antedated the adoption of the Rules on Containers by several years, although the ILA and the NYSA, as we have seen, had been negotiating over containerization since the late 1950s. NYSA shippers contend that they did business with Dolphin only because Dolphin listed Massachusetts as the point of origin for the containers it filled instead of the actual point within the port area. San Juan was established in 1972, several years after the Rules on Containers were first adopted. The containers shipped by San Juan apparently indicated Chicago as the point of origin of the containers, although they in fact were consolidated in the New York area. D. The Incidents Precipitating the Present Disputes 1. Hampton Roads On September 24, 1974 Associated picked up eight FSL containers from United States Lines at a Norfolk pier and hauled them to its Virginia Beach terminal, where it stripped them. Representatives of United States Lines and the ILA, upon inspection of Associated’s terminal, determined that, because of Associated’s short-stopping of the containers, United States Lines was in violation of the Rules on Containers. The HRSA-ILA Container Committee later ratified their determination. Liquidated damages of $1,000 per container were imposed on United States Lines, which demanded reimbursement from Associated. Upon the refusal of Associated to comply with the demand, United States Lines severed business relations with Associated. 2. Baltimore On September 24, 1974 Houff picked up in the Port of Baltimore two FSL containers from United States Lines and one from Lavino Shipping Company and transported them to its terminal in the Baltimore area for stripping before delivery of the cargo to the respective owners. Once it was determined that this shortstopping took place, United States Lines and Lavino were assessed $1,000 per container by the STAB-ILA Container Committee, as stipulated by the Rules on Containers, and sought indemnification from Houff. When the trucking company did not indemnify the two shippers, they ceased doing business with Houff. 3. New York Dolphin and San Juan engaged in consolidation of CFCL, LCL, and LTL cargo into containers within 50 miles of the Port of New York. When this practice was discovered, the NYSA shippers that had been supplying Dolphin with containers — Maritime Transportation Management, Inc. (MTM) and Transamerica Trailer Transport, Inc. (TTT) — were fined $4,000 and $43,000, respectively, in liquidated damages. As a result of the imposition of these damages, MTM and TTT refused to furnish the consolidators with any additional containers. II. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS, WORK PRESERVATION, AND THE RULES ON CONTAINERS The common carriers, charging parties before the NLRB, argued successfully there that certain of the Rules on Containers and efforts by the ILA to enforce those Rules violated the congressional proscription of secondary boycotts. Petitioners here contend that the Rules and action supporting the Rules had a legal primary purpose— work preservation — and that the NLRB committed an error of law in holding otherwise. To respond to these contentions we must peruse the law of secondary boycotts, including the work preservation doctrine, and determine whether the Board applied a proper understanding of the law to the cases before us. A. The Proscription of Secondary Boycotts The NLRA’s proscription of secondary boycotts is premised on the distinction between primary and secondary union activity. As fundamentally important as this distinction is, however, “it does not present a glaringly bright line.” Indeed, both the NLRB and the courts, in interpreting the congressional mandate prohibiting secondary activity, have necessarily undertaken, as Justice Frankfurter put it, the task of drawing lines “more nice than obvious.” The relevant statutory provisions are Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the NLRA. The former — once described as “surely one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal labor statute” — prohibits unions and their agents from engaging in activities the object of which is forcing one employer to cease doing business with another. Although the statutory language does not in terms focus on secondary activity, both the legislative history and a proviso that the prohibition does not apply to “any primary strike or primary picketing” make clear the cardinal importance of the primary-secondary distinction. The latter provision, Section 8(e), proscribes not secondary activity, but “collective-bargaining contracts whereby the employer ceases or agrees to cease doing business with any other person.” Although the provision literally prohibits any understanding aimed at forcing a cessation of business, it is clear that this proscription of “hot cargo” agreements embodies the same distinction between lawful primary and unlawful secondary activity as Section 8(b)(4)(B), and applies only to agreements with secondary objectives. The general aim of Congress in passing these prohibitions is clear: that is, according to one commentator, “to protect neutral employers — those not directly involved in a labor dispute — from direct union sanctions.” The Senate Report accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act casts this general purpose in only slightly more specific terms: Congress sought to proscribe “a strike against employer A [the secondary employer] for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B [the primary employer] * * * (with whom the union has a dispute).” Unfortunately, attempts to characterize congressional intent with any more specificity have not been notably successful. Nevertheless, the NLRB and the courts are required in the course of deciding cases to apply the general congressional proscription in various specific contexts: in cases, for example, where there are ally employers; in common situs situations; in consumer picketing cases; and in the context of work preservation agreements. The last of these contexts is the one with which we are presented here. B. The Supreme Court’s Work Preservation Doctrine: National Woodwork and Pipefitters An immutable feature of modern industrial economies is their dynamism. In large part this is due to the profound impact that technological advances have on the means of production. One can turn to any sector of our economy — from communications to transportation to food processing — and witness the blinding speed with which modern technology can alter our conception of the status quo. It is inevitable that such rapid change will cause cleavages within a society; one example is the displacement of workers whose jobs and skills are tied to supplanted forms of technology. As mentioned earlier, there is no legislative scheme in this country designed specifically to deal with labor disputes engendered by technological innovations. Such disputes instead are channeled into the system of collective bargaining; the labor relations questions raised by changes in the means of production are answered by the parties themselves rather than through state intervention. The courts in this country, including the Supreme Court, have wisely allowed for resolution of such disputes through the collective bargaining process even though the resolutions agreed to by the parties often tread perilously close to the congressional proscription of secondary boycotts. The classic example of such a resolution is an agreement by the parties to preserve work for the contracting employer’s employees when the nature or the location of that work has changed due to technological advances. Inescapably the effects of such agreements are felt upon employers (and their employees) other than the contracting employer. But those effects are incidental to the agreement with the contracting employer and not necessarily reflective of a secondary objective such as organizing the employees of the other affected employers. Thus under the NLRA’s proscription of secondary boycotts, these work preservation agreements, as well as primary collective action enforcing their terms, are not considered illegal. The validity of such agreements under the NLRA is supported by sound policy reasons. First, it is of paramount importance that Congress, rather than imposing a solution, has chosen to allow the parties themselves to deal with labor problems generated by technological change. If the courts and the NLRB were to upset reasonable efforts by the parties to achieve some level of accommodation, this broad policy choice of Congress would be frustrated. Second, unwarranted interference by the NLRB and the courts could inject a massive dose of uncertainty into the planning functions of both management and labor. If the parties suspect that reasonable attempts to accommodate technological advances will be torn asunder by a reviewing agency or court, they will be reluctant to undertake the effort. Workers particularly could be obdurate when asked to compromise some degree of job security for the sake of efficiency if that compromise might later be cast aside. In the event of industrial disruption caused by such induced intransigence there would be no winners: not only would the workers lose work, but also the efficiency gains represented by the innovation would needlessly, if perhaps ternporarily, be lost to management and to our national economy. Two major Supreme Court cases control our understanding of the legality of work preservation agreements under the NLRA. The first is National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass’n v. NLRB, a case in which a provision in a collective bargaining agreement was challenged under Section 8(e). The contested clause stipulated that bargaining unit employees (carpenters) would not handle any doors that were “pre-fitted,” i.e., made ready for installation prior to shipment to the jobsite. The object of this provision, according to the Administrative Law Judge, the Board, and ultimately the Supreme Court, was preservation of the fitting work performed traditionally by on-site carpenters. In upholding the provision the Court expounded upon the nature of the inquiry that courts and the NLRB must undertake when determining the legality of such agreements. “The determination * * * cannot be made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union’s objective was preservation of work for [the contracting employer’s] employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere.” The Court continued: “The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.” As one commentator has written of National Woodwork, “Since the object of the union was to preserve work for unit employees, and since it had no quarrel with the Union status or other personnel relations of the door manufacturer, the contract provision was upheld.” In a case decided in 1977 the Supreme Court once again confronted the work preservation issue, but with a different result. In NLRB v. Enterprise Ass’n of Steam, etc. Pipefitters, the Court refused to approve union activity in support of what appeared to be a work preservation clause. In Pipe-fitters a subcontractor on a construction project had agreed to the contested clause in its labor agreement with its steamfitter employees. Under the clause all pipe threading and cutting were to be performed on the jobsite by the steamfitters, who had traditionally performed this work. This provision notwithstanding, the main contractor decided, and the subcontractor agreed, to order pre-threaded and pre-cut pipes for the job. The steamfitters refused to install the pipes, and a work disruption ensued. The NLRB, confronted with this factual situation, found that the contested clause had a primary purpose — work preservation — but that the union’s activity to enforce the agreement did not. The NLRB’s holding was premised on its “right to control” test, which is based on the determination whether the coerced employer — in Pipefitters, the subcontractor — could “control,” i.e., award, the work sought by the union. If the coerced employer cannot control the work, then it follows that the union’s actions are directed not at this employer, but at another employer who in fact does control the work. In Pipefitters the' object of the strike was to obtain work controlled not by the subcontractor, with whom the steamfitters had agreed to the lawful work preservation clause, but by the main contractor; in the Board’s view this meant that the object of the boycott was secondary. The decision of the NLRB was set aside on appeal by this court, but the Supreme Court reversed our decision. In so doing the Supreme Court was exceedingly careful to cast its decision in terms of its reasoning in National Woodwork. As the Court discerned the issue in Pipefitters, for example, it turned on “whether the boycott was ‘addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.’ ” This formulation of the issue corresponded to the Court’s view of the scope of Section 8(e), which also came from National Woodwork. The provision “does not prohibit agreements made for ‘primary’ purposes, including the purpose of preserving for the contracting employees themselves work traditionally done by them.” In holding that the strike in Pipefitters was unlawful secondary activity, the Supreme Court affirmed several points of law that merit reiteration here. First, the Court supported National Woodwork!s admonition that courts and the NLRB examine “all the surrounding circumstances” when assessing the validity of a work preservation clause. Second, the Court also affirmed National Woodwork’s insistence that to be considered a legal attempt at work preservation the challenged boycott must focus on the “labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.” Third, the Court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement cannot itself immunize union activity that otherwise is secondary in character. Fourth, the NLRB, according to the Court, was perfectly within the law in applying its right to control test as a means of delineating the scope of lawful primary activity. Fifth, the Court reaffirmed that where the NLRB’s decision is based on a proper understanding of the prevailing law, appellate review is confined to a determination of “whether the Board’s findings were ‘supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ ” Before applying these legal standards to the cases before us, we must make a brief excursus into the litigation history of the Rules on Containers. C. The Rules on Containers in the Courts The Rules on Containers have been the subject of extensive litigation over the past decade. The Second Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to adjudge the validity of the Rules when, in Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping Association (ICTC), a consolidator challenged the Rules as a conspiracy in restraint of trade and hence as violative of the Sherman Act. To decide whether the Rules amounted to an antitrust violation the court had to determine whether the union’s activities of bargaining for and enforcing the Rules fell within the labor exemption to the Sherman Act. This determination rested in part on “whether the action is in the union’s self-interest in an area which is a proper subject of union concern.” The court had little difficulty in finding that the Rules were in the interest of the union and its members. Noting that the' Supreme Court has repeatedly held that preservation of jobs is within the area of proper union concern, the court concluded that “[t]he [Rules] have as their object the preservation of work traditionally performed by longshoremen covered by the agreement.” Rather than aiding a group of businessmen to violate the Sherman Act, “the union here, acting solely in its own self-interest, forced reluctant employers to yield to certain of its demands.” The agreement between management and labor on the containerization issue was held within the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. After the Second Circuit’s decision in ICTC, unfair labor practice charges were filed against the ILA and the NYSA by two off-pier consolidators that operated near the Port of New York. The charges alleged that the Rules on Containers were an agreement to engage in a secondary boycott — a “hot cargo” agreement — contrary to the NLRA and that enforcement of the Rules by the ILA was also violative of the Act’s proscription of secondary boycotts. The Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case upheld the Rules as valid work preservation clauses, but he was reversed by the NLRB. The ILA and the NYSA sought review of the NLRB’s decision in the Second Circuit, which, in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. NLRB (Conex), affirmed the Board. The court noted its previous decision in ICTC, but found the holding in that case distinguishable because ICTC arose in an antitrust context. In Conex, by contrast, the court believed that a measure of deference was owed the NLRB and that this factor allowed it to affirm the Board without directly overruling its decision in ICTC. The NLRB, in reviewing the claim of the ILA and the NYSA that the Rules were valid under the Supreme Court’s work preservation doctrine enunciated in National Woodwork, had found that the work at issue was not the loading and unloading of ships, the traditional work of the ILA, but the off-pier stripping and stuffing of containers. In the relatively few years since the advent of containerization, off-pier stripping and stuffing of containers had been performed by the employees of consolidators; hence the ILA was really engaged in work acquisition rather than work preservation. This conclusion, according to the divided Second Circuit panel, was “supported by substantial evidence and by sound analysis.” The Board’s order thus was enforced. The First Circuit, in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. NLRB, reached a conclusion similar to that of the Second Circuit in Conex. The panel was presented with a dispute apparently generated by an expansive interpretation of the Rules by a Puerto Rican local of the ILA, Local 1575. Although observing that Conex was “strikingly similar” to its case, the First Circuit went on to note that “[t]he fact situation we face presents a slightly stronger case for enforcement under National Woodwork than did the situation considered by the Second Circuit.” The NLRB had found that Local 1575 wished to apply the Rules not only so that any consolidating work would be done by ILA labor at the pier, but also so that members of the local would displace the non-union employees at the consolidator’s facilities. Hence the union, through its local, had manifested an interest not only in work preservation, but also in union organization of the excluded employer. The union’s interest in the labor relations of the excluded employer was in itself sufficient to make National Woodwork’s work preservation exception to secondary boycotts inapposite. Again, the Board’s order was enforced. The Rules on Containers also have been reviewed by the Fourth Circuit in a case arising out of the instant proceeding in the Port of Hampton Roads. In Humphrey v. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n that circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s order denying a temporary injunction sought by the Regional Director of the NLRB under 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). The District Court had held that the NLRB did not have reasonable cause- to believe that the Rules violated the NLRA. The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the District Judge had erred because the work in controversy was not the ILA’s traditional work of loading and unloading ships, but the off-pier work of stripping and stuffing containers. Consequently, the court “conclude[d] that [the NLRB] ha[d] ample reasonable cause to believe that appellees are violating the Act.” The court ordered that on remand the District Court enter the appropriate injunction. D. Work Preservation and the Rules on Containers Under the Rules on Containers included in the 1974-1977 collective bargaining agreement, ILA labor was entitled to strip and stuff FSL containers whenever that work would otherwise be done within 50 miles of port by workers other than the employees of the cargo’s beneficial owner. Houff and Associated complained to the NLRB that this provision and its enforcement by the ILA in the Ports of Baltimore and Hampton Roads allowed ILA labor to acquire work of Houff and Associated rather than to preserve work for members of the ILA. Also under the 1974-1977 Rules, ILA labor was entitled to stuff and strip all LCL, LTL, and CFCL containers that originated or terminated within 50 miles of port. Dolphin and San Juan complained to the NLRB that this provision and its enforcement by the ILA in the Port of New York served to acquire work traditionally done by Dolphin and San Juan rather than to preserve work for members of the ILA. To decide whether the NLRB’s receptivity to these charges was well founded, we must apply the teaching of National Woodwork and Pipefitters to the NLRB’s decisions. 1. All the surrounding circumstances Did the Board, in characterizing the challenged Rules as work acquisition rather than work preservation clauses, examine “all the surrounding circumstances”? When defining the work in controversy— the. first step in determining whether the union was engaged in work preservation or work acquisition — the Board settled on off-pier stripping and stuffing of containers. Because longshoremen have always done their work on the piers, the Board reasoned, they could not traditionally have performed the work in controversy. Instead, employees of consolidators and trucking companies with off-pier terminals did the work of stuffing and stripping containers away from the pier. Hence for ILA labor to lay claim to this work amounted to work acquisition rather than to preservation of traditional ILA work. This formulation of the work in controversy, however, could not reasonably have been based on “all the surrounding circumstances” as required by National Woodwork and Pipefitters. When a technological innovation is introduced in the workplace, new work may be created and may initially be performed, as in these cases, by employees other than those who worked with the old technology. The crucial question is how best to rationalize the work that results from the innovation into traditional work patterns. As a rule, this cannot be done by ignoring those traditional work patterns when defining the work in controversy. But that is precisely what the NLRB has done here. Rather than define a category of work based on work patterns both prior and subsequent to the innovation, the Board has defined the work in controversy specifically in terms of the innovation, thus by definition removing any opportunity for pre-innovation workers to preserve their work. Under such a formulation the Supreme Court’s work preservation doctrine is sapped of all life. There may be cases, of course, in which work engendered by the technological innovation is so different in character from the traditional work that claims based on that traditional work can rightly be discounted, even ignored. But we are not presented with such a case here. The overriding similarities between the traditional work of longshoremen and the work of stuffing and stripping containers are evident. Longshoremen have historically loaded and unloaded ocean-borne cargo, which not only has meant loading the cargo into and out of the hold of the ship, but also has meant sorting the cargo and loading it on to equipment such as pallets. From the longshoremen’s standpoint, therefore, containerization merely represents a change in equipment. Further, the very nature of containers belies any notion that they present work distinctly different from and unrelated to traditional longshoremen’s work. As Judge Friendly recently observed in another context, “Stripping a container of goods destined to different consignees is the functional equivalent of sorting cargo discharged from a ship; stuffing a container is part of the loading of the ship even though it is performed on shore and not in the ship’s cargo holds.” The Supreme Court, in affirming Judge Friendly’s observations, wrote of containerization: “In effect, the operation of loading and unloading has been moved shoreward; the container is a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel.” The correspondence between the shift to containerized shipping and the sharp reduction in employment opportunities for longshoremen bears witness to the wisdom of these observations. We hold that the NLRB committed reversible legal error by ignoring circumstances crucial to responsible application of the Supreme Court’s work preservation doctrine enunciated in National Woodwork and Pipefitters. If the NLRB cannot, as it has not in these cases, establish that the new work is sufficiently unrelated to the old work to present a clear break with the past, it must not ignore traditional work patterns when defining the work in controversy. In this case proper consideration of the relevant work patterns both prior and subsequent to the advent of containerization might have led to a different categorization for the work in controversy. The loading and unloading of ocean-borne cargo, with its directly related peripheral tasks such as sorting cargo, is an example of one possible categorization. It is the province of the NLRB to settle upon the correct categorization, of course, and we offer no opinion on the proper one. We simply hold that the Board erred as a matter of law by ignoring traditional work patterns when defining the work in controversy. 2. Whose labor relations? National Woodwork instructed us, and Pipefitters reinstructed us, that to be classified as work preservation a boycott must be focused on the “labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.” The boycott must not be “tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere.” Ever since containerized shipping was first introduced in New York, Baltimore, and Hampton Roads, it has been a hotly debated item between shippers and their associations (CONASA, NYSA, STAB, HRSA, etc.), on the one hand, and the ILA on the other. Indeed, containerization bears primary responsibility for months of work stoppages by ILA members infuriated by actions of shippers with respect to containerization. The Rules on Containers and activities seeking to enforce the Rules are directly traceable to the collective bargaining relationship between the shippers and the ILA and to the efforts of the parties, within the confines of that relationship, to adjust to an extremely thorny industrial issue: technological innovation versus job security. Nowhere has it been established, or even intimated, that the ILA, perhaps with a view to organization, was attempting to focus its boycott on the labor relations of the trucking companies and the consolidators. Those employers were affected by the boycott, to be sure, as were their employees. But we must distinguish between the incidental effects of primary activity, on the one hand, and a secondary purpose on the other. The former are allowable under the national labor laws, and there has been no convincing showing' by the NLRB that the latter exists. The challenged boycott unquestionably focused on the “labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.” 3. The effect of the Rules on the legality of union activity Under Pipefitters a work preservation agreement does not itself immunize secondary activity from the effects of the congressional proscription of secondary boycotts. Neither the NLRB nor this court relies on this thesis, hence this issue is not raiséd. 4. The right to control test In Pipefitters the Supreme Court resolved a dispute among the circuits by affirming the validity of the Board’s right to control test as a means of delineating primary activity. Under this test an employer subjected to an industrial sanction by his employees must be able to control the disposition of the work sought by those employees for their activity to be considered primary. The Court held that this test was an acceptable gloss on the congressional proscription of secondary boycotts. Ironically, after defending use of this test in circuit after circuit and finally vindicating its use in the highest court in the land, the NLRB’s posture in the cases before us is not supported by rational application of the right to control test. CONASA and NYSA shippers — the employers of the boycotting ILA members in these cases, and the coerced employers under Pipefitters — controlled the disposition of all the containers at issue. Indeed, according to the Board the Rules reach no containers except those owned or leased by the shippers. Thus when the relevant Container Committees found the shippers in violation of the Rules and fined them, the shippers, after unsuccessfully seeking indemnification from the truckers and consolidators, simply refused to supply their containers to the truckers and consolidators so that the Rules would be complied with — that is, so that ILA labor would do the work if the work were to be done. It is difficult to imagine a more forceful demonstration of control. 5. The substantial evidence standard The Pipefitters Court made abundantly clear that under the NLRA, courts reviewing NLRB decisions are bound by the Board’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. But the salient facts underlying the cases before us are not in dispute. This is the fourth circuit to adjudge the validity of the Rules on Containers or of action seeking to enforce the Rules, and the factual backgrounds of these cases overlap to a significant degree. As the NLRB forthrightly observed with respect to the instant case arising in Baltimore and Hampton Roads. “[Pjetitioners’ real complaint is with the Board’s analytic framework not its findings of fact,” a characterization in which the petitioners heartily concur. And as to the New York case, the Board commented that its decision in Conex is controlling. The Conex case involved the identical Respondents [NYSA and ILA] and dealt with the same Rules on Containers. The charging parties in Conex were also consolidating companies engaged in off-pier stripping and stuffing of containers. * * * [] In Conex Judge Wyzanski, who wrote the majority opinion affirming the NLRB, stated that “[t]here is no dispute as to the objective facts in this case.” Like the petitioners and the other circuits, this court has no dispute with the Board’s factual findings. Rather, our conflict with the NLRB is exclusively focused on the Board’s misinterpretation and misapplication of the prevailing law — the doctrine of work preservation. The Supreme Court has consistently, maintained that NLRB rulings should not be sustained by reviewing courts where those rulings rest on “erroneous legal foundations.” The NLRB’s decisions before us are of such a character, and thus reversal is warranted. III. CONCLUSION: CONTAINERIZATION AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY The relationship between the ILA and CONASA shippers has been under continual strain over the past two decades due to containerization. Their relationship has survived prolonged negotiations, presidential intervention, and the occasional use of economic force. The result of their efforts is the Rules on Containers. These Rules represent a reasoned response to the difficult problem of technological innovation and are an exemplar of the self-government contemplated by Congress when it left the bulk of industrial problems to be resolved in the private sector. The Rules seek neither to stymie technological innovation nor to introduce manual labor in ■situations where the work otherwise would be handled by more efficient mechanized means; rather, the Rules intend to secure for ILA labor any stripping and stuffing of containers that is to be performed within 50 miles of port' by other than the employees of the cargo’s beneficial owner. Courts and the NLRB must take great care not to disturb the parties’ reasoned attempts at self-governance unless those attempts contravene the law. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we believe that the NLRB has failed to demonstrate that the Rules on Containers and action seeking to enforce the Rules are in contravention of the law. Accordingly, the NLRB’s decisions in these cases are vacated, and its cross-applications for enforcement are denied. We remand to the NLRB for any further proceedings it deems appropriate. So ordered. APPENDIX A 1968 Hampton Roads Rules on Containers I. CONTAINERIZATION Containers owned or leased by Employer-signatory members (including containers on wheels) containing LTL loads or consolidated full-container loads, which are destined for or come from, any person (including a consolidator who stuffs containers of outbound cargo or a distributor who strips containers of inbound cargo and including a forwarder, who is either a consolidator of outbound cargo or a distributor of inbound cargo) who is not the beneficial owner of the cargo, and which either comes from or is destined to any point within a 50-mile radius from the center of any North Atlantic District port shall be stuffed and stripped by ILA longshore labor at long-shore rates on a waterfront facility under the terms and conditions of the General Cargo Agreement. (Rules on Containers are listed below.) II. RULES ON CONTAINERS The following provisions are intended to protect and preserve the work jurisdiction of longshoremen and all other ILA crafts at deepsea piers or terminals. To assure compliance with the collective bargaining provisions the following rules and regulations shall be applied. A. Definitions and Rule as to Containers Covered Stuffing — means the act of placing cargo into a container Stripping — means the act of removing cargo from a container Loading — means the act of placing containers aboard a vessel Discharging — means the act of removing containers from a vessel. These provisions relate solely to containers meeting each and all of the following criteria: 1. Containers owned or leased by employer-signatory members (including containers on wheels) which contain LTL loads or consolidated full container loads. 2. Such containers which come from or go to any person (including a consolidator who stuffs containers of outbound cargo or a distributor who strips containers of inbound cargo and including a forwarder, who is either a consolidator of outbound cargo or a distributor of inbound cargo) who is not the beneficial owner of the cargo. 3. Such containers which come from or go to any point within a geographical area of any port in the North Atlantic District described by a 50-mile circle within its radius extending out from the center of each port. It is understood that the center of Hampton Roads will be defined as Middle Ground Light. B. Rule of Stripping and Stuffing Applied to Such Containers A container which comes within each and all of the criteria set forth in “A” above shall be stuffed and stripped by ILA long-shore labor. Such ILA labor shall be paid and employed at longshore rates under the terms and conditions of the General Cargo Agreement. Such stuffing and stripping shall be performed on a waterfront facility, pier or dock. No container of cargo shall be stuffed or stripped by ILA longshore labor more than once. Notwithstanding the above provisions, LTL loads or consolidated container loads of mail, of household goods with no other type of cargo in the container, and of personal effects of military personnel shall be exempt from the rule of stripping and stuffing. C. Rules on No Avoidance or Evasion The above rules are intended to be fairly and reasonably applied by the parties. To obtain non-discriminatory and fair implementation of the above, the following principles shall apply. 1. Agreement in the Port as to the geographic area as provided in “A (3)” is based on present LTL movement patterns in the port. Should any person, firm or corporation, for the purpose of evading the provisions of “B” hereof, seek to change such pattern by shifting its operations to, or commencing new operations at, a point outside agreed-upon geographic area, then either party may raise the question whether said point should be included within the said geographic area, and upon agreement that the purpose of the shift in its operations was to evade the provisions of “B”, then said point shall be deemed to be within the said geographic area for the purpose of these rules. 2. Containers owned or leased by companies which are affiliated either directly or through a holding company with an employer-member shall be deemed to be containers owned or leased by employer-members. Affiliation shall include subsidiaries and/or affiliates which are effectively controlled by the employer-member, its parent, or stockholders of either of them. 3. It shall be the obligation of employer-members to clearly mark each container’s documentation as to whether or not it is an “A” container which is to be stuffed and stripped at the waterfront facility (pier or dock). 4. Each employer-member shall keep records of each container supplied to a consolidator or other non-owner of cargo, located within the agreed geographic area, and such record shall be available to the Committee provided in (7) below. With respect to all containers received at or delivered from the vessel, a record of the same shall be made by ILA Checkers or Clerks. 5. Failure to stuff or strip a container as required under these rules will be considered a violation of the contract between the parties. Use of improper, fictitious or incorrect documentation to evade the provisions of “B” shall also be considered a violation of the contract. If for any reason a container is no longer at the waterfront facility at which it should have been stuffed or stripped under the rules then the steamship carrier found guilty of intent to cause improper, fictitious, or incorrect documentation to evade the provisions- of “B” above shall pay to the joint Welfare Fund $150.00 per container which should have been stuffed or stripped. 6. If any shippers or their agents who have at any time used, are now using, or in the future use containers owned or leased by employer-members, hereafter use containers not owned or leased by employer-members, for the purpose of evading the provisions of “B” hereof, then the containers so used shall be considered to be within “A” and “B”. 7. A committee represented equally by management and Union shall be formed and shall have the responsibility and power to h.ear and pass judgment on any violations of these rules. Any inability to agree shall be processed as a grievance under the applicable contract except as limited by “C (8)” hereof. 8. If the purpose of protecting and preserving the present work jurisdiction of longshoremen and all other deepsea ILA crafts over any containers loaded with LTL cargo, or consolidated full container loads as defined herein is not accomplished by the provisions of these rules on containers, then either party shall have the right to renegotiate these provisions or any part thereof by giving notice to the other party. This provision shall not be subject to arbitration. Pending renegotiation and settlement of the given dispute, the employees may decline to work the specific containers involved in the dispute and such refusal to work shall not be subject to arbitration. The renegotiation referred to above will not be subject to arbitration. Interpretation of this provision shall not be determined by an arbitrator but by a court of competent jurisdiction. APPENDIX B 1974 Rules on Containers CONASA-ILA RULES ON CONTAINERS PREAMBLE This Agreement made and entered into by and between the carrier and direct employer members of the CONASA Port Associations (hereinafter referred to collectively as “CONASA”) and the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (“ILA”), its Atlantic Coast District (“ACD”) and its affiliated local unions in each CONASA port (“locals”) covers all container work at a waterfront facility which includes but is not limited to the receiving and delivery of cargo, the loading and discharging of said cargo into and out of containers, the maintenance of containers, and the loading and discharging of containers on and off ships. CONASA agrees that it will not directly perform work done on a container waterfront facility (as hereinafter defined) or contract out such work which historically and regularly has been & currently is performed by employees covered by CONASAILA Agreements, including CONASA-ILA craft agreements, unless such work on such container waterfront facility is performed by employees covered by CONASA-ILA Agreements. RULES The following provisions are intended to protect and preserve the work jurisdiction of longshoremen and all other ILA crafts whic