Full opinion text
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge J. SKELLY WRIGHT. J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge: Commercial navigation on the Upper Mississippi River and the Illinois River is made possible through a series of 27 locks and dams known as the Uppér Mississippi River Navigation System. Locks and Dam 26, which is located on the Upper Mississippi near Alton, Illinois, is a vital link in this system. Because it stands just south of the juncture of the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers, and just north of the juncture of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, it serves as a funnel through which all traffic along these waterways must pass. Almost 13 years ago the Army Corps of Engineers proposed that the existing structure be replaced with a new lock and dam. The Corps believed that a new facility was necessary because the existing structure was deteriorating and lacked sufficient capacity to accommodate increasing barge traffic. After years of planning and several vigorously fought court battles, the Corps obtained legislative approval for the project in 1978, when Congress enacted a bill specifically authorizing construction of the new facility. Act of Congress, October 21, 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-502, 92 Stat. 1693 (P.L. 95-502). The Corps began to make construction plans shortly thereafter. Before the Corps could proceed with construction of the facility, appellants, 18 mid-western railroads and three environmental groups, renewed an action against the Government that they had originally commenced in 1974. In their amended complaint they sought to halt further work on the project. The Association for the Improvement of the Mississippi River (AIMR) intervened in the District Court on the side of the Government. Although appellants raised a variety of claims, their objections were, in essence, that: (1) the cost-benefit analysis prepared by the Corps prior to receiving congressional approval of the project violated the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. (1976), various other statutes, and the Corps’ own regulations, 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979); (2) the Corps failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1976); and (3) the planning conducted by the Corps after receiving congressional authorization did not comply with various statutes and Corps regulations. The District Court dismissed the first set of claims for lack of jurisdiction. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Callaway (Atchison IV), 480 F.Supp. 972 (D.D.C.1979). After conducting a short trial it concluded that the Corps had adequately fulfilled its obligations under NEPA. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Alexander (Atchison V), 480 F.Supp. 980, 994-1002 (D.D.C.1979). As for the arguments regarding post-authorization planning, the District Court found that most of the appellants’ claims lacked merit. Id. at 987. It concluded, however, that the Corps violated its own regulations when it failed to hold a public meeting to discuss implementation of the project. Id. at 993-994. It decided not to grant an injunction requiring the Corps to hold such a meeting. Id. at 1002-1003. In this appeal the appellant railroads and environmental groups seek review of the District Court’s decision. In general we are satisfied with the District Court’s disposition of the case. The District Court was clearly correct in holding that it was without jurisdiction to review claims that the cost-benefit analysis prepared by the Corps failed to comply with the Water Resources Planning Act and various other statutes and regulations. We also agree that the Corps’ Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) fulfilled its obligations under NEPA. Finally, we agree that the Corps should have held a public meeting after receiving congressional authorization so that it could solicit comments on implementation of the project. We disagree, however, with the District Court’s decision not to require such a meeting. Thus we affirm in part and reverse in part, remanding so that the District Court may amend its judgment to require the Corps to hold a public meeting. This meeting should be held within 30 days of the time the judgment, as amended, becomes final. To ensure that the meeting is not an empty formality, the District Court should also enter an order requiring the Corps to respond in writing to the objections made at the meeting. This response should be completed no later than 30 days after the meeting is held. I. BACKGROUND The Corps of Engineers first considered replacing existing Locks and Dam 26 with a new structure in the mid-1960’s, when it became concerned about two problems: lack of capacity and structural instability. FEIS Vol. 1 at 1-2. The existing facility consists of a main lock, which is 600 feet long, and an auxiliary lock, which is 360 feet long. It has a maximum annual capacity of 73 million tons. Because the waterways to the north have a capacity of 108 million tons per year, and the waterways to the south have a capacity of 148 million tons, the Corps feared that the existing structure would act as a bottleneck that would restrict full use of the waterways system and delay shipping. Id. at ii, 1-2. These fears were apparently justified. Barges must now wait an average of at least ten hours to pass through the locks. Id. at 2; Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors Report (BERH Rep.) at 16 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit (PX) 427). Locks and Dam 26, which is founded on wooden piles driven into sand, also has a history of structural problems, including settlement, underseep-age, and loss of foundation material. Physical deterioration has led to increased maintenance and operation costs, and may ultimately result in complete breakdown of the facility. FEIS Vol. 1 at 2, 6-11; BERH Rep. at i, 16-18. Identifying the problems that afflict the current structure has proven to be far easier than finding an acceptable solution. Below we recount the long and complicated history of the Corps’ efforts to replace Locks and Dam 26. A. Pre-Authorization Planning The first proposal to replace existing Locks and Dam 26 was made in 1968, when the Corps’ St. Louis District Engineer recommended that a new dam and two 1,200-foot locks be constructed two miles downstream from the existing structure. This recommendation was reviewed by the Board of Engineers for River and Harbor (BERH), which was established by Congress to provide an independent review of water-related projects. The BERH submitted a report to the Chief of the Corps of Engineers in which it approved the project and recommended immediate implementation. The Chief of Engineers then sent a report to the Secretary of the Army, in which he asked the Secretary to approve construction. The Secretary granted approval, acting pursuant to Section 6 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1909, 33 U.S.C. § 5 (1976), which authorizes him to order maintenance and repair of existing navigation facilities. Between 1968 and 1974 the Corps prepared a series of design memoranda, see Design Memoranda (DM) (Defendants’ Exhibit (DX) 33-43), and an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for this two-lock project, see EIS (PX 507). Congress appropriated construction funds in 1974. See Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 984 — 985. In August 1974, before construction of the replacement facility could start, the same environmental organizations and mid-western railroads that are appellants here filed suits in the District Court seeking to enjoin the project. The District Court immediately granted a temporary restraining order that halted bidding on the construction. Shortly thereafter the court issued a preliminary injunction stopping all further activity. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Callaway (Atchison I), 382 F.Supp. 610 (D.D.C.1974). The court stated that a preliminary injunction was justified because the railroads and environmentalists were likely to prevail on their claim that the Secretary of the Army lacked authority to approve the project under Section 6 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1909, 33 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). According to' the District Court, that Act applies only when the Corps plans to repair an existing structure. Here, however, the Corps had proposed an entirely new facility. Before such a project can be implemented, Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976), requires that congressional authorization be obtained. 382 F.Supp. at 616-617. The District Court also stated that a preliminary injunction was justified because the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the Corps’ EIS was inadequate. The court noted that the EIS failed to discuss the systemwide effects of the proposal and to consider reasonable alternatives to the plan. Id. at 620-623. After the District Court issued the preliminary injunction the Corps decided to seek congressional authorization under Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and to revise its EIS. In 1975 the District Engineer for the St. Louis District prepared a Formulation Evaluation Report (FER). See FER (DX 43). The FER, which contained a cost-benefit analysis, evaluated a variety of alternatives, including rehabilitation of the existing structure. Id., Vol. 1 at 7-1 to 9-18. It concluded that replacement would be safer and less costly than rehabilitation, and recommended a project identical in scope to that originally proposed in 1968: construction of a new dam with two 1,200-foot locks. Id., Vol. 1 at 5-17,10-1 to 10-8. In addition to the FER, the District Engineer prepared a Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS), which discussed the systemwide impact of the two-lock proposal and carefully examined reasonable alternatives to the proposal. See DSEIS Vol. 1 at 4-1 to 4-101, 5-1 to 5-9, 6-1 to 6-139 (DX 46). The BERH reviewed the proposal and issued a report recommending construction of a single 1,200-foot lock rather than a double-lock facility. The BERH agreed with the Corps’ determination that, because of the existing facility’s structural instability, rehabilitation or replacement was essential. It also agreed with the Corps’ conclusion that replacement would be safer and less costly than rehabilitation. BERH Rep. at 89. It argued, however, that the environmental impact of the two-lock proposal, which would more than double the capacity of Locks and Dam 26, was uncertain. Id. at 88. A single-lock project, on the other hand, would have an insignificant environmental impact. Id. at 89. Although the economic benefits provided by such a project would be less than those provided by the two-lock project, there would be some gain: the capacity of Locks and Dam 26 would still be increased by 18 percent, so shipping delays would be reduced. See id. The BERH also noted that the single-lock project could be justified on structural grounds. Id. at iv — vi, 89. The Corps decided to accept the BERH’s recommendation. A new Revised Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (RDSEIS), see RDSEIS (PX 526), and a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), which incorporated by reference the FER and the RDSEIS, see FEIS at l, were prepared. In March 1976 the Chief of Engineers issued a report describing the new project to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary terminated his approval of the pending two-lock proposal. He then formally recommended to Congress that it authorize construction of a new dam and single 1,200-foot lock, and that it not authorize a second lock until new studies indicated that one should be constructed. Proposed legislation and the FEIS were transmitted to Congress along with the Secretary’s recommendation. See Communication from the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Locks and Dam No. 26, Mississippi River, Alton, Illinois, H. Doc. 94-504, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (August 26, 1976). The Corps also provided Congress with a Supplemental Economic Data Report (SED), updating and revising the cost-benefit analyses contained in the FER. See SED (PX 534). While the Secretary’s proposal was pending before Congress, the railroads and environmental groups continued to seek judicial relief. In May 1977 the District Court dissolved the outstanding preliminary injunction, since the Secretary’s decision to withdraw approval of the two-lock project removed the possibility of harm to the plaintiffs. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Callaway (Atchison II), 431 F.Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C.1977). At the same time the court reviewed plaintiffs’ standing to seek relief. It recognized a private right of action to enforce Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), which provides that an environmental impact statement must accompany proposals for legislative action. It also held that appellants possessed standing to enforce this right. 431 F.Supp. at 725-730. Approximately one year later the court considered a motion for summary judgment filed by the railroads and environmental groups. In their motion they argued that the FEIS submitted to Congress by the Corps failed to comply with NEPA and that the cost-benefit analysis performed by the Corps was inadequate. The court denied this motion because it believed there were material issues of fact concerning the systemwide environmental impact of the project and the Corps’ calculation of costs and benefits. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Callaway (Atchison III), 459 F.Supp. 188, 190-192 (D.D.C.1978). The court also held that an evidentiary hearing was appropriate to assess the sufficiency of an environmental impact statement under NEPA; review of the FEIS would not be limited to the contents of the administrative record. Id. at 192-193. Finally, the court granted a Government motion to dismiss appellants’ claims seeking to enjoin the proposal of authorizing legislation. Id. Throughout the period preceding authorization by Congress, the railroads and environmental groups not only sought relief in the courts; they also participated actively at the administrative level. Representatives of appellants attended each of the four public meetings held by the Corps during the pre-authorization stage. Appellants also had an opportunity to comment on the DSEIS, which the Corps circulated to interested parties. They provided lengthy responses, in which they argued that: rehabilitation of the existing structure or investment in railroads were environmentally and economically preferable alternatives to replacement; the traffic increase resulting from the increase in capacity would have an adverse environmental impact; upstream locks would not be able to absorb the traffic increase; and a programmatic environmental, impact statement was required because the replacement project was part of a broader program to expand the Upper Mississippi Waterway System. These responses were included and discussed in the FEIS and RDSEIS. See FEIS Vol. 2 at 243-247, 265-267, 271 — 457; RDSEIS Vol. 1, Parts 2, 3; see generally FEIS Vol. 1; RDSEIS Vol. 1. Finally, appellants were given an opportunity to comment on the FER, which contained the Corps’ economic evaluation of all project alternatives. Again, their responses were included and discussed in the FEIS and the RDSEIS. See FEIS Vol. 2 at 243-247, 271 — 457; RDSEIS Vol. 2, 3. The Corps revised its cost-benefit analysis in part because of appellants’ objections. See SED Vol. 1 at 5-1 to 5-9. B. Congressional Authorization: P.L. 95-502 Congress considered the Secretary’s proposal to replace existing Locks and Dam 26 during 1976 and 1977. Extensive hearings were conducted before House and Senate committees. See Locks and Dam 26: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (“Senate Hearings 1976”); Proposed Waterway User Charges and Replacement of Locks and Dam 26: Hearings on S. 712, S. 790, and S. 923 Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (“Senate Hearings 1977”); Replacement of Locks and Dam 26 at Alton, Illinois: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the House Committee on Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (“House Hearings 1977”). The merits of the project were also debated on the floor of Congress. See, e. g., 124 Cong.Rec. S18043-S18052 (daily ed. October 10, 1978) (Senate debate); 124 Cong.Rec. H12695-H12702 (daily ed. October 13, 1978) (House debate). The appellants participated in the hearings before Congress, raising essentially the same objections they made during the pre-authorization stage. The environmental groups argued that the traffic increase expected from the single-lock facility would have a substantial adverse environmental impact. See, e. g., H.R.Rep.No.95-545, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977); Senate Hearings 1976 at 417-428; House Hearings 1977 at 341 — 362. Both the environmentalists and the railroads opposed construction of the replacement facility on the ground that it was part of a plan to expand capacity throughout the waterways system. See, e. g., S.Rep.No.95 — 215, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). The railroads also emphasized the argument that the Corps had failed to give adequate attention to the rehabilitation alternative. See, e. g., Senate Hearings 1977 at 270-292, 344-350. They presented a rehabilitation scheme that they claimed would be safer and less expensive than replacement. See, e. g., H.R.Rep.No.95-545, supra, at 14 — 15. All of the appellants argued that the Corps had not properly computed the project’s economic cost-benefit ratio. See, e. g., Senate Hearings 1976 at 849-909. Despite the objections raised by appellants, both the House and the Senate committees issued reports recommending authorization of a single-lock replacement facility. S.Rep.No.95-215, supra; H.R.Rep.No. 95-545, supra. After the floor debate, Congress enacted Public Law 95-502, in which it authorized construction of a single-lock replacement for Locks and Dam 26 as part of a broad scheme for management of the Upper Mississippi Waterway System. Act of October 21, 1978, P.L. 95-502, 92 Stat. 1693 (1978). P.L. 95-502 also: (1) requires development of a “master plan” for the Upper Mississippi River System following comprehensive studies of the environmental and economic effects of expanded navigation; (2) prohibits further expansion of the capacity of any lock, dam, or channel in the system, apart from Locks and Dam 26, until the study has been completed and Congress has approved the master plan; and (3) establishes a user charge on the inland waterways in order to recover a portion of the public investment in the system. President Carter signed the bill in October 1978. C. Post-Authorization Planning and Litigation After P.L. 95 — 502 was enacted, the Corps of Engineers, acting pursuant to its own regulations, see Engineering Regulation (ER) 1110-2-1150 (describing post-authorization procedures), reprinted at Statutory Appendix (SA) 178 — 185, commenced its post-authorization planning. The Chief of Engineers issued a memorandum in which he stated that because the project as authorized did not differ from the project as proposed, and because there had been no major changes in external conditions since authorization, full reevaluation of the project was not necessary; neither the cost-benefit analysis nor the FEIS need be reviewed. Chief of Engineers Memorandum, January 10, 1979, reprinted at Joint Appendix (JA) 2406, 2408-2409. The memorandum also directed the St. Louis District Engineer to restate the cost-benefit calculations in current prices and to prepare final engineering plans and specifications. It noted that most of the engineering work had been accomplished in the design memorandum prepared before the District Court enjoined construction of the two-lock project in 1976. Id. Acting pursuant to the directive of the Chief of Engineers, the Corps prepared Design Memorandum Supplement No. 2 (GDM Supp. No. 2). See GDM Supp. No. 2 (PX 540). Congress appropriated funds for the project in October 1979 and work commenced the next month. Appellants responded to the new legislation by renewing their claims for judicial relief. They filed an Amended Complaint in the District Court in which they claimed that the pre-authorization cost-benefit analysis performed by the Corps failed to comply with the Water Resources Policy Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. (1976), the Water Resources Council Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land Resources (Principles and Standards), 38 Fed.Reg. 24778 (1973), reprinted at SA 191, the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1656(a) (1976), the River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970, P.L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1823, and the Corps’ own planning regulations, 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979). They also argued that the Corps had failed to comply with NEPA. Finally, they claimed that the Corps’ post-authorization planning was inadequate in several respects. Before trial the Government moved to dismiss appellants’ claim that the pre-au-thorization cost-benefit analysis had violated the Water Resources Act, the Corps’ own regulations, and various other statutes. The District Court conceded that each of the statutes and regulations in question established standards and principles that the Corps must apply in evaluating federal water projects. But the court also noted that the statutes and regulations • established these standards primarily for the benefit of Congress; they were intended to aid Congress in deciding whether a particular project should be undertaken. Once the legislature had exercised its judgment by deciding to authorize a project, judicial review of the analysis on which that judgment was based would interfere with the legislative process. Atchison IV, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 976-980. The District Court refused to grant the Government’s motion to dismiss appellants’ NEPA claims. It distinguished NEPA from the other statutes, reasoning that NEPA set forth guidelines for agency conduct, not just to benefit the legislature, but also to benefit the general public. Id. at 974-975. In September 1979 the District Court conducted a five-day trial, at which it confronted the two remaining issues: (1) whether the Corps had complied with NEPA, and (2) whether the Corps’ post-authorization planning was adequate. Appellants made a variety of arguments with respect to the first question. They claimed that the record was inadequate for review because various calculations made by the Corps in evaluating the environmental and economic impact of the project were based on “secret data”; that the FEIS failed to give enough attention to alternatives to the replacement project; that the Corps should have prepared a programmatic environmental impact statement because the Locks and Dam 26 project was part of a larger plan to expand the entire Upper Mississippi River System; that the FEIS underestimated the adverse environmental impact of the Locks and Dam 26 project; and that the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the Corps, which was referred to in the FEIS; understated the environmental and economic costs attributable to the replacement project. Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 994-1001. Appellants presented their case through the testimony of six expert witnesses — two economists, two biologists, an engineer, and a railroad president. Deposition excerpts and hundreds of documentary exhibits were also produced. The Government responded by putting four of its own economists and engineers on the stand. Id. at 989-990. After carefully reviewing the evidence, the District Court rejected each of appellants’ arguments. It held that the Corps’ FEIS adequately fulfilled the Corps’ obligations under Section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). It also ruled that the Corps had fulfilled its substantive obligation under Section 101 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976), to balance the economic benefits of the project against its environmental costs. 480 F.Supp. at 994 — 1001. Appellants also made several arguments with respect to the question whether the Corps’ post-authorization planning was adequate. First, they claimed that under the Water Resources Planning Act and the Corps’ own planning regulations, 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979), the Corps should have performed a de novo cost-benefit analysis before deciding to go ahead with construction. The District Court rejected this claim, suggesting that a new cost-benefit analysis was not required absent a material change in circumstances. Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 987. Second, appellants argued that the Corps had violated its regulations when it failed to hold a public meeting before implementing the project. ER 1110-2-1150, reprinted at SA 148, 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.405(d), (f)(5), and 209.410(n)(ii) (1979). The District Court agreed, holding that the Corps must conduct at least one public meeting during post-authorization planning. Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 993-994. It entered a declaratory judgment in favor of appellants on this issue. After balancing the various interests at stake, however, the court decided not to grant injunctive relief requiring the Corps to hold a meeting before going ahead with the project. The court reasoned that the passage of P.L. 95-502 reflected a strong public interest in proceeding with construction of the new lock and dam. Appellants had already participated vigorously at the administrative and legislative levels, and would be unlikely to benefit from an additional meeting. Moreover, the public had an opportunity to comment on the project through their representatives in Congress. Finally, any additional delay would undoubtedly harm the Corps. Id. at 1002-1003. II. REVIEWABILITY OF PRE-AUTHO-RIZATION COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS Before submitting the Locks and Dam 26 proposal to Congress, the Corps, acting pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. (1976), the Water Resources Council Principles and Standards, supra, SA 191, the Department of ‘ Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1656(a) (1976), the River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970, P.L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1823, and its own planning regulations, 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979), conducted a cost-benefit analysis in which it examined the economic and environmental impact of the single-lock project, as well as several alternatives. It concluded on the basis of this analysis that the single-lock project was justified. The analysis was submitted to Congress along with the request that construction of the new facility be authorized. Appellants sought review of the analysis in the trial court, arguing that the Corps failed to comply with the relevant statutes and regulations. The court dismissed this claim, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to review pre-authorization cost-benefit analyses conducted by the Corps. We agree with this conclusion. The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 establishes the inter-agency Water Resources Council and directs the Council to establish “principles, standards, and procedures” for the “formulation and evaluation” of federal water projects. 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-2 (1976). The primary goal of this legislation was to provide Congress with guidance in its planning efforts in the water resources field; Congress hoped that it would be better equipped to evaluate various development projects. See H.R. Rep.No.169, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5 (1965). In 1973 the Water Resources Council issued its Principles and Standards, supra, 38 Fed.Reg. 24778-24868, SA 191-283. The Council stated that, in general, projects should be evaluated by measuring their costs and benefits in light of two objectives: national economic development and environmental quality. SA 194. More specifically, the Principles and Standards provide that a planning organization should consider several alternative plans for dealing with a problem. It should evaluate the economic and environmental costs and benefits of each of these alternatives. A plan should be recommended to Congress only if its net economic benefits are positive, unless economic benefits have been foregone or economic costs incurred in order to enhance environmental quality. SA 199-200. The Department of Transportation Act provides the Water Resources Council with additional authority to establish standards governing economic evaluation of water resource projects. 49 U.S.C. § 1656(a) (1976). It also sets forth a definition of “primary direct navigation benefits” and states that this definition should be employed whenever agencies evaluate water projects. Id. Like the Water Resources Planning Act, this statute was intended primarily to assist the legislature in deciding whether to approve particular projects. The River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970 requires the Corps to develop guidelines to assure that “possible adverse economic, social, and environmental effects” relating to any project are fully considered. P.L. No. 91-611 § 122, 84 Stat. 1818. This statute also was clearly intended to assist Congress in evaluating water projects; the statute provides that the guidelines are to be applied in all proposals that the Corps submits to Congress. The Corps’ cost-benefit analysis regulations, 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979), implement the commands embodied in these statutes and in the Principles and Standards. They are based primarily on the criteria described by the Water Resources Council in its Principles and Standards, supra They provide that projects are to be evaluated in light of their economic and environmental costs and benefits. The planning regulations also contain the guidelines required by the River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970. See 33 C.F.R. Part 294 (1979); see generally id. Parts 290-295 (describing multi-objective planning framework outlined in River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970). Like the statutes, the regulations reflect the fact that the cost-benefit analysis is intended to assist Congress; the regulations state that they “provide[] the basis for selecting [a plan] and, if appropriate, recommending it for authorization.” Id. § 290.11. Because these statutes and regulations indicate that the cost-benefit analysis is prepared for the benefit of Congress, we do not believe that they give the federal courts jurisdiction to review that analysis, once the legislature has made its decision to approve or not to approve a project. In deciding whether authorization should be granted, Congress will itself review the analysis and determine whether it has been conducted properly. Once it has made this determination, the courts should not interfere. See Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 990. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 501 F.Supp. 742, 754-760 (N.D.Miss.1980). We note, in any event, that judicial review would be contrary to the express language of the Water Resources Planning Act, which states that it does not in any way “limit the authority of Congress to authorize and fund projects[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1 (1976). The absence of any need for judicial interference is amply demonstrated by the facts of this case. The legislative record of P.L. No. 95-502 shows that Congress gave extensive consideration to claims the Corps had not properly computed the replacement project’s costs and benefits. For example, appellants argued before Congress that a modest increase in traffic from Locks and Dam 26 would cause congestion on the Illinois River and lead to significant “delay costs.” See, e. g., Senate Hearings 1976 at 849-909. Congress explicitly rejected this and all other arguments challenging the cost-benefit ratios; both the House and Senate Reports adopt, with minor adjustments, the cost-benefit analysis prepared by the Corps. H.R.Rep.No.95-545, supra, at 17-18; S.Rep.No.95-215, supra, at 5. Additional support for our conclusion is provided by decisions that have confronted the question whether the courts have jurisdiction to review cost-benefit analyses performed by the Corps pursuant to the Flood Control Act of 1936,33 U.S.C. § 701a (1976). That statute, like the statutes and regulations at issue here, directs the Corps to submit cost-benefit analyses to Congress. It has consistently been held that determination of economic costs and benefits is a matter of legislative judgment and that, since the analyses are performed for Congress, the legislative branch rather than the judiciary is best suited to review their adequacy. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 527-528, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 1060, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941); United States v. West Virginia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733, 738 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 683, 62 S.Ct. 187, 86 L.Ed. 547 (1941) (“So far as the benefit exceeding the cost is concerned, this was a matter of legislative policy * * *.”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 368 F.Supp. 231, 240-241 (W.D.Mo.1973), aff’d, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974) (“questions of fact involved in connection with the ultimate resolution of conflicting data in regard to the determination of benefit-cost ratios ‘are solely a matter for congressional determination’ ”); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F.Supp. 404, 413 (W.D.Va.), aff’d per curiam, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F.Supp. 916, 925 (N.D.Miss.1972), aff’d, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974) (“any question as to the adequacy or accuracy of defendants’ economic and technical analysis must be addressed to the Congress”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F.Supp. 728, 740 (E.D.Ark.1970), aff’d, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 2749, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973) (it is for Congress to determine in authorizing a water resources project whether benefits are in excess of the estimated costs). These decisions clearly lend support to our conclusion that review of cost-benefit analyses should not be available under the statutes and regulations relied on by appellants. Our conclusion that the cost-benefit analysis may not be reviewed to determine compliance with the Water Resources Planning Act, the Department of Transportation Act, the River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970, and the Corps’ cost-benefit regulations does not completely insulate the analysis from judicial review. Later in this opinion we hold that the Corps’ analysis is reviewable to determine whether the Corps complied with its substantive obligations under Section 101 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976), which requires agencies to weigh the economic benefits of a project against its environmental costs. See Part IV — A, G infra. The Corps relied on its cost-benefit analysis in concluding that the Locks and Dam 26 project would not have an unjustifiable adverse environmental impact. III. POST-AUTHORIZATION PLANNING A. Post-Authorization Decision to Implement the Project Appellants argue that after Congress has passed authorizing legislation the Corps makes a de novo evaluation of the project, repeating all pre-authorization economic and environmental studies. On the basis of these studies the Corps computes a new cost-benefit ratio, and makes a new determination whether to build or not to build. But appellants seriously misunderstand the nature of the post-authorization planning conducted by the Corps. The Corps does not reevaluate ab initio every project that has been approved by Congress. The Corps’ Engineering Regulation, ER 1110-2-1150, SA 148, states that the central purpose of post-authorization planning is to execute the congressional decision, or “to establish the most suitable overall plan for accomplishment of the authorized improvement and to establish the basic design of the project features.” Id. Post-authorization planning consists largely of advanced engineering and design work on the project that results in the issuance of one or more “General Design Memoranda.” Id. 150. It is true that the Corps makes a post-authorization decision whether to implement the approved project. This decision is more limited in scope than appellants suggest, however. Changes in external conditions may require a new project design or otherwise fundamentally alter the assumptions on which economic feasibility was originally premised. Thus at the outset of post-authorization planning the Corps will determine whether the project should be reaffirmed as authorized, or whether changes in circumstances warrant reformulation of the project. ER 1110-2-1150 at SA 148, 150, 153 — 159. In those rare situations where the Corps concludes that such changes have occurred and that reformulation is necessary, a new cost-benefit analysis may be conducted pursuant to the cost-benefit guidelines set forth at 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979). See 33 C.F.R. § 290.12(d) (1979). The Corps may also decide to revise the environmental impact statement. Or the Corps may decide that because of a change in conditions an authorized project should be shelved. See McKinney Deposition at 21-29, 48-49 (PX 294); Cohn Deposition at 68-69, 74, 142-143 (PX 301). The post-authorization planning in this case followed the general pattern just outlined. Planning commenced in January 1979, about three months after enactment of P.L. 95-502. In a memorandum addressed to the District Engineer for the St. Louis District, the Corps’ Chief of Engineers stated that no significant change had occurred since authorization, and that no updating of the economic analysis or the environmental impact statement was required. See Chief of Engineers Memorandum, January 10, 1979, JA 24-26, 2408-2409. After reaffirming the project, the Chief ordered preparation of a Design Memorandum containing the advanced engineering and design work necessary before construction could begin. He also ordered that the Design Memorandum restate project costs and benefits in current prices. Id. The GDM was completed on May 17, 1979. See GDM Supp. No. 2. Appellants argue that even if the Corps did not conduct a de novo analysis of this project, and even if its internal regulations, ER 1110-2 — 1150, do not ordinarily require such analysis, the Water Resources Planning Act, the Water Resources Council’s Principles and Standards, and the Corps’ own cost-benefit regulations, 33 C.F.R. Parts 290-295 (1979), require a new analysis. But as we have already seen, the Water Resources Planning Act and the Water Resources Council’s Principles and Standards develop criteria to be used in evaluating water projects before they are submitted to Congress for authorization. Nothing in the Act or the Principies and Standards requires a post-authorization analysis. See Part II supra. And the Corps’ cost-benefit regulations, which implement the Act and the Principles and Standards, are also intended primarily to apply to pre-authorization studies. It is true that they may be used if the Corps decides that a substantial change in circumstances warrants a complete reevaluation. See 33 C.F.R. § 290.12(d) (1979); text and note at note 32 supra. But nothing in the regulations requires the Corps to reevaluate every project during the post-authorization stage. In addition to their claims about the scope of the Corps’ post-authorizaticn decisions, appellants raise several claims regarding: (1) the procedures the Corps must follow in making its post-authorization decisions, and (2) judicial review of those decisions. First, they suggest that under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution the Corps must conduct a full adjudicatory hearing before deciding to go forward with a project. If it fails to conduct such a hearing, then any disputed issués of fact must be tried de novo in the courts. Second, appellants suggest that they are entitled to a full evidentiary hearing under Sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1975) . The courts must review the decision reached as a result of this hearing by applying the “substantial evidence” standard set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976) . Appellants go on to suggest that if no adjudicatory hearing is provided at the agency level, then they are entitled to de novo review in the courts under Section 706(2)(F) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1976). We find that these claims are without merit. We agree that the Corps’ decision to implement an authorized project should be subject to judicial review, since it is a final agency decision. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976). We do not believe, however, that either the Constitution or the APA entitles appellants to a full adjudicatory hearing at the agency level. Nor do we believe that appellants are entitled to de novo judicial review of the agency decision, or even to review under the “substantial evidence” standard. The Constitution plainly does not require a full hearing either before the Corps or in the courts. The protections of the Due Process Clause are extended only when a “property” or “liberty” interest has been threatened. But generalized environmental concerns do not constitute a property or liberty interest. See, e. g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Federal Employees for Non-Smokers’ Rights v. United States, 446 F.Supp. 181, 184-185 (D.D.C.1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926, 100 S.Ct. 265, 62 L.Ed.2d 182 (1979). Nor can the railroads’ interest in avoiding competition be viewed as a property or liberty interest creating a right to procedural due process. See, e. g., Wells Fargo Services Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, 547 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Dixie Highway Express, 389 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 539, 19 L.Ed.2d 639 (1967) (per curiam); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974). As for their rights under the APA, nothing in that act or any other statute entitles appellants to a full adjudicatory hearing at the agency level. Under the APA, a formal adjudication is necessary under Sections 556 and 557 only when some statute requires a determination “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). There is no statute setting forth such a requirement for the Corps. Although we hold below, see Part III-B infra, that the Corps must conduct a public meeting at some point during the post-authorization stage, that meeting is nonadjudicatory. Post-authorization decisions to implement a project should be viewed as an example of “informal” adjudication. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (decision to build highway is not formal adjudication). As for the scope of judicial review under the APA, appellants would have us ignore the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra. In that case the Supreme Court held that Section 706(2)(F) requires de novo review in only two circumstances: “when the action is adjudicatory and the agency fact-finding procedures are inadequate,” or “when issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to. enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.” Id. at 415, 91 S.Ct. at 823. Neither situation exists here. Moreover, the “substantial evidence” standard of Section 706(2)(E) does not apply. Review under that section is necessary only when the agency action is “taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, * * * or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing.” Id. at 414, 91 S.Ct. at 822. But the Corps is not exercising its rulemaking powers. And as we have already stated, no adjudicatory hearing is required. We believe that the Corps’ decision to go forward with the project should be reviewed under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review set forth in Section 706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). Cf. Overton Park, supra (decision to build highway is subject to “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review). To summarize, the Corps makes a post-authorization decision to implement the project after determining whether there have been significant changes in circumstances. This decision, which constitutes informal adjudication, is reviewable under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. In our view, the Corps’ conclusion that there had been no major change in circumstances warranting reevaluation, and that the authorized project should be reaffirmed and implemented, was not arbitrary or capricious. Like the District Court, see Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 987, 1001, we do not believe that any material changes affecting the economic or environmental soundness of the replacement facility occurred after passage of P.L. 95 — 502. Appellants point to three “events” they believe constitute material changes. First, they note a 1979 report estimating the capacity of replacement Locks and Dam 26 to range from 96 to 101 million tons per year. See Waterway Experiment Station Report (PX 300). They argue that congressional approval was based on a proposed capacity of 86 million tons. But appellants fail to recognize that these revised capacity figures are well within the range of capacity estimates disclosed to Congress in the FER and the RDSEIS. See FER Vol. 3 at G-l to G-40, G Att-1 to G Att — 180; RDSEIS Vol. 1 at 6-24, 6-144, Tables 6-5 and 6-32 (capacity up to 109 million tons); see also, e. g., FEIS Vol. 2 at 235, 279-284, 310-322, 338-355, 367-371, 443-450 (critiques of capacity estimates); Senate Hearings 1977 at 696-714, 794r-805. Second, appellants note that the GDM Supp. No. 2 adjusted the cost-benefit ratio to account for 1978 prices. See GDM Supp. No. 2, 20-11 to 20-14. But these revisions were based on data developed at the time of or prior to enactment of the 1978 authorizing legislation. Moreover, even after the revisions were made the benefit-cost ratio remained above unity. Finally, appellants point to a 1979 report discussing in detail the possibility of rehabilitating existing Locks and Dam 26. GDM Foundation and Test Program (DX 80d). As the Government explains, however, this report was originally commissioned prior to the enactment of P.L. 95 — 502. After Congress authorized the replacement project, the Corps concluded that the rehabilitation alternative had been mooted. It nonetheless decided to permit completion of the report, because it would be of general interest to members of the engineering profession. See Chief of Engineers Memorandum, January 10, 1979, at JA 2406. In any event, the Corps was able to produce ample evidence supporting its decision not to pursue rehabilitation. See Part IV-D infra. B. Post-Authorization Public Meeting At the outset of post-authorization planning, the Chief of Engineers decided that a post-authorization public meeting would not be necessary since no significant changes had occurred after the enactment of P.L. 95-502. See Chief of Engineers Memorandum, January 10, 1979, at JA 2406-2409. The District Court found that this decision violated Corps regulations. Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 993-994. The court ruled that the Corps should have held an informal nonadjudicatory public meeting in order to inform the community about the proposed project and to elicit views on implementation. It decided not to enter an order requiring such a meeting, however. We agree with the District Court that a public meeting should have been held, but disagree with its decision not to require a meeting. The general policy of the Corps is to conduct their programs in “an atmosphere of public understanding * * 33 C.F.R. § 209.405(c) (1979). Consistent with this policy, Corps regulations provide that “at least one public meeting will be held in connection with the preconstruction planning of authorized projects.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.405(f)(5) (1979). The Corps and AIMR argue that this regulation is precato-ry only; they point out that 33 C.F.R. § 209.405 purports to do no more than set forth “policy, responsibility and guidance for holding * * * public meetings in connection with all Civil Works planning activities * * V’ But as the District Court observed, the interest in public participation, which is reflected in several other regulations explicitly stating that meetings should be held, strongly supports the conclusion that the requirement is mandatory. The Corps’ NEPA regulations explicitly state that “[pjublic meetings * * * will be held during post-authorization planning studies to insure that views of interested parties will be considered in the development of the plan and that all interested parties will be kept informed of study progress.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.410(n)(ii) (1979). And the Corps’ internal regulations state that “one or more public meetings or workshops should be held during post-authorization planning studies to insure that views of interested parties will be considered in the development plan and that all interested parties will be kept informed of study progress.” ER 1110-2-1150 at SA 162. Instead of requiring the Corps to conduct such a meeting before proceeding with construction of Locks and Dam 26, the District Court simply entered a declaratory judgment in favor of appellants. Atchison V., supra, 480 F.Supp. at 1002-1003. After noting that equitable relief is committed to the discretion of the court, it provided several reasons which led it to conclude that the Corps should not be required to hold a meeting. First, Congress had authorized the project after carefully considering all objections, and had decided that construction should begin. An order requiring the Corps to hold a public meeting might unduly delay implementation of this legislative decision. Second, appellants would not benefit from a public meeting, since they had already participated vigorously at the administrative and legislative levels. Third, the public had already received an opportunity to comment on the project through their representatives in Congress. Under the circumstances, reasoned the court, a public meeting might be “vain or useless.” Id. at 1002-1003. However, the court did urge the Corps to “conduct their own evaluation of the situation and to hold a meeting if they find that one may be reasonably scheduled.” Id. at 1003. In our view, the District Court should have required the Corps to hold a public meeting. It is true that the decision whether to grant equitable relief ordinarily rests in the discretion of the trial court. Cf. Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 457 (D.C.Cir.1977) (injunctive relief need not be provided for every violation of NEPA); State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 485-487 (D.C.Cir.1978) (same). But we do not believe that this discretion was properly exercised here. When an agency has clearly violated its own public meeting regulations, there should be a presumption in favor of an order requiring a meeting. Cf. Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 513 (D.C.Cir.1974) (presumption in favor of injunction in NEPA cases); Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, supra, 564 F.2d at 456 (same). This presumption should be particularly strong in cases like this one, where the project in question will have a wide-ranging impact. As the District Court observed, the economic and environmental impact of replacement of Locks and Dam 26 “may eventually be felt in every home and farm in the Midwest. Moreover, at stake is the soundness, utility and beauty of perhaps the greatest water resource on the continent — the Upper Mississippi and its tributaries.” Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 994. The public has not had an opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process since 1975, when the last public meetings were held. Indeed, although four public meetings were held prior to that time, they focused on the two-lock proposal; no meeting has ever been held regarding the single-lock proposal. If the fact that the public was represented in Congress vitiates the need for a post-authorization meeting, then such meetings would never be required. It may be that the benefit provided by the meeting will be relatively small. But the Corps’ regulations require such a meeting, and there is no good reason why one should not be held. Thus we remand to the District Court so that it may amend its judgment to require a public meeting. This meeting should be held not later than 30 days after the time the judgment, as amended, becomes final. We emphasize that this meeting should be more than a mere formality. The Corps must receive any comments with an open mind. As the District Court noted, “A public meeting after an agency has already made its decision would be an empty gesture.” Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 1003. See Nat’l Tour Brokers Ass’n v. ICC, 591 F.2d 896 (D.C.Cir.1978). To ensure that the meeting is more than a formality, the District Court should also enter an order requiring the Corps to respond in writing to any objections made at the meeting. This response should be prepared within 30 days of the date the meeting is held. Such a response will not constitute a substantial departure from ordinary Corps practice; responses have been prepared in the past. See RDSEIS Vol. 3 § 9.5.3; see also 33 C.F.R. § 209.405(a) (1979) (requiring preparation of record of public meetings). IV. COMPLIANCE WITH NEPA The appellants argue that the FEIS prepared by the Corps pursuant to Section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976), is deficient in several respects. They also argue that the Corps failed to fulfill its substantive obligations under Section 101 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). After deciding that it had jurisdiction to review these claims, Atchison IV, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 974-975, and after considering the evidence submitted by the parties, the District Court concluded that the Corps had complied with NEPA, Atchison V, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 993-1001. We agree with this determination. A. Reviewability of Claims under NEPA ^ Appellant AIMR suggests that the question whether the Corps has complied with NEPA is insulated from review. It makes two closely related arguments. The first pertains only to the claims of the environmental and railroad appellants that the FEIS is deficient. AIMR suggests that the FEIS, like the pre-authorization cost-benefit analysis, was prepared solely for the benefit of Congress. ' Thus, once Congress reviewed the project and decided that authorization should be granted, judicial review is unnecessary and intrusive. The second argument applies to both the FEIS and the Section 101 claims. AIMR suggests that Congress repealed NEPA by implication when it passed the authorizing legislation. After carefully reviewing the evidence on environmental impacts, Congress decided that construction should begin immediately. Judicial review to determine compliance with NEPA would be inconsistent with this decision. We believe that both of these arguments are without merit. With respect to the first argument, we do not believe that the FEIS should be viewed simply as a legislative aid. Unlike the pre-authorization cost-benefit analysis, the Corps’ environmental impact statements are not prepared solely for the benefit of Congress. Section 1Q2(2)(C) of NEPA establishes the environmental impact statement requirement for proposals for legislation in part to ensure that the public has an opportunity to participate meaningfully in deci-sionmaking at the administrative and legislative levels. See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1974); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973); Atchison IV, supra, 480 F.Supp. at 774-775; see also Atchison III, supra, 459 F.Supp. at 726-730. Thus the argument that supported dismissal of appellants’ claims that the pre-authorization cost-benefit analysis failed to comply with the Water Resources Planning Act, various other statutes, the Water Resources Council Principles and Standards, and the Corps’ cost-benefit regulations, does not by itself justify dismissal of claims that the Corps’ FEIS failed to comply with NEPA. AIMR’s claim that Congress impliedly repealed NEPA when it enacted P.L. 95-502 deserves somewhat more discussion. To support its argument AIMR notes that Congress gave considerable attention to the environmental claims raised by the appellants and concluded that they were without merit: [T]he environmental impact statements have been reviewed very carefully by the Committee * * *. This final environmental impact statement setting forth the impacts of a single 1200 foot lock and new dam is considered by the Committee to provide adequate information for Congress to make its decision with respect to the recommended project. * * * H.R.Rep. No. 95-545, supra, at 9. The Committee then concluded that “[t]he impact of the single lock proposal will be minor.” Id. at 18. AIMR also points out that although P.L. 95-502 authorizes immediate construction of the new Locks and Dam 26, it prohibits further expansion of the waterways system until a study of the environmental and economic effects of this expansion has been completed. AIMR suggests this provision shows that Congress intended to exempt the Locks and Dam 26 project from any further environmental studies. In effect, argues AIMR, Congress reached a compromise between the environmentalists and the proponents of waterways development. See brief for AIMR at 13-14. The court should not now tamper with this compromise by taking steps to determine whether the Corps has complied with NEPA. The Supreme Court has stated that repeal by implication is disfavored. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978), it confronted the argument that Congress had impliedly repealed the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1976), when it appropriated funds for construction of Tellico Dam even though it knew this project would destroy the habitat of an endangered species of fish, the snail darter. The Court rejected this claim, stating that to find Congress had repealed the Endangered Species Act by passing an appropriations measure would do violence to “ ‘the cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored.’ ” Id. at 189, 98 S.Ct. at 2299, quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (ellipsis in original). As the Supreme Court has stated elsewhere, “Only a clear repugnancy between the old law and the new results in the former giving way * * Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 457, 65 S.Ct. 716, 726, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945). In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for finding repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. Morton v. Mancari, supra, 417 U.S. at 550, 94 S.Ct. at 2482. This court has applied the principles set forth by the Supreme Court to hold that an appropriations bill will not operate to relieve an agency from compliance with NEPA. See Realty Income Trust v. Eck-erd, supra, 564 F.2d at 458 n.38; see also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785-786 (D.C.Cir. 1971); National Audubon Society v. Andrus, 442 F.Supp. 42, 45-47 (D.D.C.1977). These decisions do not directly control the result in this case, however; P.L. 95-502 is not an appropriations measure, but substantive legislation authorizing a specific project. Other courts have found repeal by implication in cases involving substantive legislation. In Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966, 99 S.Ct. 455, 58 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978), the Fifth Circuit ruled that a statute giving the Forest Service authority to permit immediate commencement of