Full opinion text
PER CURIAM: The defendant, a member of the crew of a vessel intercepted on the high seas by the Coast Guard and found to have a cargo of marijuana, challenges his conviction of conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it. He claims: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence; (2) that the court erred in refusing to allow the jury to smell the sample bale of marijuana; and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. An undercover agent joined other law enforcement agents in Louisiana in pretending to be unloaders and truckers of marijuana who were seeking employment. They met with persons who represented themselves to be engaged in smuggling marijuana from Colombia, and who subsequently hired them to provide ships to meet at sea with other ships transporting marijuana. The smugglers informed the agents that a mother ship had departed from Colombia. The agents described the ship to Coast Guard personnel as a converted shrimp boat, approximately seventy-five feet long, with a white hull, its booms removed, and a cargo of marijuana. They informed the Coast Guard that the ship was traveling from Colombia to rendezvous with another vessel at a specific point on the high seas and to unload the marijuana for importation into the United States. Forty or fifty miles south of the rendezvous point, at a point approximately 200 miles southeast of New Orleans, personnel aboard the Coast Guard vessel, VALIANT, sighted a boat that met the agents’ description. The boat was heading north toward the rendezvous site. As the VALIANT neared the vessel, the VALIANT crew was able to identify the vessel as the ALEX LUZ. The lights on the vessel had been reversed so that it appeared to be moving in the direction opposite to its actual course. The ALEX LUZ, presumably after it sighted the VALIANT, changed its course radically from due north to due south. After the VALIANT unsuccessfully attempted to communicate with the ALEX LUZ by radio, it came alongside the vessel and requested permission to board, which was denied. Since the ALEX LUZ was flying the Venezuelan flag, the personnel on the VALIANT obtained permission to board from the Venezuelan government, as well as permission to search the vessel and detain it if marijuana or contraband were found. The VALIANT then attempted to communicate by radio with the ALEX LUZ, but received no response. Finally, the VALIANT crew told the ALEX LUZ to stop because the Coast Guard had permission to board the vessel. When the ALEX LUZ did not stop, the VALIANT crew made several attempts to force a halt, including firing shots into the air and throwing lines into the propeller. After the Coast Guard hosed the vessel, • sending water into its smokestack, the boat finally came to a stop. Eight Colombians, including the defendant, Levino Michelena-Orovio, came out of the cabin with their bags packed and sat on the stern of the vessel. There was apparently no marijuana on the deck of the ALEX LUZ, but Lieutenant Shuck testified at trial that he could smell marijuana when he boarded the vessel. When Lieutenant Shuck asked for the captain of the ALEX LUZ, Oscar Romero, one of the persons aboard who had previously spoken with the Coast Guard crew, responded that there was no captain and that the boat had no official papers. The Coast Guard found 363 bales of marijuana in the hold of the vessel. Government witnesses valued the marijuana at approximately four to six million dollars. On September 25,1981, Michelena-Orovio and others were charged in a three-count superseding indictment with conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States, attempting to import marijuana into the United States and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 846 (1976), respectively. Michelena-Orovio’s pretrial motion to suppress the evidence was subsequently denied. On October 9, 1981, a jury convicted Michelena-Orovio on the two conspiracy counts. The court sentenced him to a four-year term of imprisonment on the first conspiracy count and a five-year term on the second. Imposition of sentence on the latter count was suspended and the defendant was placed on inactive probation for five years, to commence upon his release from custody. The government’s subsequent motion to dismiss the substantive count of the indictment was granted. Mi-chelena-Orovio appealed. II. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. The district court denied the motion to suppress the marijuana, ruling that there was reasonable suspicion for the search of the ship’s hold. Michelena-Orovio argues that there was not a reasonable suspicion that the ALEX LUZ was involved in a crime against the United States. The evidence available to the Coast Guard did give it reasonable grounds for suspicion that such a crime was intended. Coast Guard personnel had been informed by undercover agents that a converted shrimp boat, closely resembling the ALEX LUZ, was traveling from Colombia to rendezvous with another vessel at a specific point and unload the marijuana for importation into the United States. The ALEX LUZ was sighted forty to fifty miles south of the rendezvous point heading north toward the site. Thereafter, the ALEX LUZ changed its course. Even when informed that the Venezuelan authorities had given their permission to search, the boat attempted to avoid a search. The combination of these facts was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that a crime against the United States was intended. Moreover, Michelena-Orovio probably does not have standing to assert the fourth amendment issue because it is questionable whether, as a mere crew member, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in cargo stowed in the hold of the converted shrimping vessel. United States v. DeWeese, 5 Cir.1980, 632 F.2d 1267, 1270, cert. denied, 1981, 454 U.S. 878,102 S.Ct. 358, 70 L.Ed.2d 188, and cases cited therein; United States v. Freeman, 5 Cir.1981, 660 F.2d 1030, 1034. We have held that crew members have no legitimate expectation of privacy in those areas of a commercial vessel which are subject to the common access of those legitimately aboard the vessel. DeWeese, supra. III. THE REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE JURY TO SMELL THE BALE. Michelena-Orovio next contends that the district court erred in refusing his request to permit the jury to smell one of the 363 bales of marijuana. He argues that the evidence was probative on the issue of whether marijuana could be smelled aboard the ALEX LUZ at the time of boarding. The ruling was not in error. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The district court properly excluded the evidence because the conditions of the proposed experiment differed substantially from those aboard the ALEX LUZ. The marijuana was then one year old and the courtroom experiment would have involved only one bale, not the 363 bales found on the vessel. The experiment was to take place in a courtroom rather than on a small vessel at sea. We have held that it is proper to refuse to allow such an experiment if the conditions of the proposed experiment differ substantially from those existing at the time the officer smelled the marijuana. See United States v. Cantu, 5 Cir.1977, 555 F.2d 1327; United States v. Torres, 5 Cir.1976, 537 F.2d 1299; United States v. Vallejo, 5 Cir.1976, 541 F.2d 1164. IV. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. Finally, Michelena-Orovio contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he participated in conspiracies to import marijuana into the United States and to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it. The standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether a reasonably-minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt in light of the evidence produced at trial. In evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence according to this standard, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; United States v. Freeman, 5 Cir.1981, 660 F.2d 1030. In a conspiracy case, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “that a conspiracy existed, that the accused knew about it and, with that knowledge, voluntarily joined it.” United States v. Rodriguez, 5 Cir., 585 F.2d 1234, 1245 (quoting United States v. White, 5 Cir.1978, 569 F.2d 263, 267), aff’d, 5 Cir.1978, 612 F.2d 906 (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Albernaz v. United States, 1981,450 U.S. 333,101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275. In a conspiracy prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 963 or 21 U.S.C. § 846, there is no need to allege or prove overt acts, Rodriguez, 585 F.2d at 1245, aff’d, 612 F.2d at 919 n. 37, or to produce direct evidence of the conspiracy. Glasser, supra. Further, the government is “not required to prove ... knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy or each of its members, provided that [the] prosecution established his knowledge of the essentials] of the conspiracy.” United States v. Alvarez, 5 Cir.1980, 625 F.2d 1196,1198 (en banc) (citation omitted.) We have held that a conspiracy to import marijuana may be proven by a showing sufficient to infer knowledge of the existence of the illegal cargo. The probable length of the voyage, the quantity of marijuana on board, and the relationship between the captain and his crew are all factors from which a jury can infer the requisite knowledge. United States v. Freeman, supra; United States v. Mazyak, 5 Cir.1981, 650 F.2d 788, cert. denied, 1982, 455 U.S. 922,102 S.Ct. 1281, 71 L.Ed.2d 464; United States v. Alfrey, 5 Cir., 620 F.2d 551, cert. denied, 1980, 449 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 337, 66 L.Ed.2d 160. A. The Conspiracy to Import. The evidence in this case is more than sufficient to establish Michelena-Orovio’s guilt of conspiracy to import. The voyage of the ALEX LUZ was at least five days long. The Coast Guard discovered over twelve tons of marijuana aboard the seventy-five foot boat. The jury could infer from the length of the voyage and size of the vessel a close relationship between the captain and the crew. While a crew member may be convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana merely on the basis of his presence on a ship loaded with a large amount of contraband, United States v. Bland, 5 Cir., 653 F.2d 989, cert, denied, 1981, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S.Ct. 602, 70 L.Ed.2d 592; United States v. Willis, 5 Cir.1981, 639 F.2d 1335, the government has established more than mere presence in this case. There was evidence that the odor of marijuana permeated the small vessel. In both Bland and Willis the hold containing the illegal cargo was sealed shut and there was no testimony at trial in either case that the odor of marijuana could be detected. Further, there were other suspicious facts concerning the ALEX LUZ. When the Coast Guard first spotted the vessel, it had its lights reversed so that it appeared to be going in the direction opposite to its actual course. The logical explanation for this unusual lighting practice was that the boat was attempting to escape detection. This suspicion was confirmed when the boat changed direction as soon as its crew became aware of the Coast Guard’s presence. The situation on board was hardly likely to dispel the suspicions aroused by the boat’s outward appearance. Besides the fact that the boat apparently reeked of marijuana, there was no fishing equipment aboard and no cargo other than the contraband. Consequently, it could be inferred that Michelena-Orovio, as a crew member, was hired to handle the marijuana, the only cargo on board. In addition, all eight persons aboard the ALEX LUZ, including the defendant, acted in concert, when they came on deck with their bags packed. They all agreed that there was no captain aboard the vessel. The jury could infer that the group acted in concert to conceal the identity of the captain. B. The Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute. The final contention of Michelena-Orovio is that there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it in the United States. The contention poses a dilemma, for this Court has developed two distinct lines of precedent as to the evidence that is sufficient to warrant conviction for the offense when the accused is a member of the crew of a ship apprehended with contraband on the high seas. One line of cases, starting with United States v. Cadena, 5 Cir.1978, 585 F.2d 1252, has held that the government cannot rely only on the size of the cache to prove the elements of a conspiracy to possess contraband with intent to distribute it in the United States. The other line of cases, starting with United States v. Mann, 5 Cir.1980, 615 F.2d 668, cert. denied, 1981, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1694, 68 L.Ed.2d 193, held, without discussing Cadena, that the jury may infer, from the size of the cache, intent to distribute the contraband, knowledge of the conspiracy, and agreement to join the conspiracy. We choose to resolve this conflict by following Cadena because it is the first of our cases to consider the problem before us, has never been specifically overruled, and is in our view better-reasoned than Mann and its progeny. In Cadena, we reversed the conviction of a sea captain whose ship had transferred a large quantity of marijuana to a smaller craft at a point 200 miles south of the Florida coast. The Cadena Court, speaking through Judge Alvin Rubin, was unwilling to infer knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute based on the size of the cache without greater proof of a knowing agreement to join that conspiracy: As to Cadena, ..., there was no evidence that he knew of a distribution scheme when he conspired to import the marijuana. Unlike the situation presented by an ongoing enterprise, Cadena had no interest in or awareness of what plans, if any, had been reached to dispose of the marijuana once he reached these shores. Although a conspiracy to import facilitates a conspiracy to distribute, one cannot [join] a conspiracy, whether by conduct or verbal accord, unless one knows that it has in fact been concocted.... [F]rom Cadena’s perspective, it was not apparent that any accord had yet been reached, either tacitly or otherwise. 585 F.2d at 1266. United States v. Rodriguez, 5 Cir., 585 F.2d 1234,1245, aff’d, 1978, 612 F.2d 906 (en banc), aff’d sub. nom. Albernaz v. United States, 1981, 450 U.S. 333,101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275, was a companion case to Cade-na. Rodriguez involved the prosecution of four persons who were to receive the marijuana on Cadena’s boat. Although we affirmed the convictions of two defendants for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, we reversed the convictions of two men who had not specifically made arrangements to participate in the distribution of the marijuana. Again speaking through Judge Rubin, we said: However, there was literally no evidence with respect to the involvement of Martins and Smigowski in a distribution scheme except what might be inferred from their participation in an agreement to import it. The direct and circumstantial evidence that they were peripheral participants in the importation scheme does not refute, beyond a reasonable doubt, the hypothesis that they had no knowledge of a conspiracy to distribute once it reached these shores. Unlike Rodriguez and Albernaz, who perforce had to make some arrangements to dispose of their treasure, Smigowski and Martins could each receive his reward and be done with the scheme. Unlike Rodriguez and Albernaz, who, according to the evidence, had contacts outside the Miami area, needed front money, and planned to use Winnebagos, Smigowski or Martins were not shown to have been connected with the actual arrangements for importation. There was evidence that Smigowski and Martins were parties to the importation scheme, but there is no evidence that would establish beyond reasonable doubt that they would likely come in possession of the haul once it arrived, share in its proceeds thereafter, or other evidence from which it could in turn be inferred that they were privy to plans to distribute the contraband. We have already noted that possession of a large supply of a prohibited substance may justify the inference that the possessor intended to distribute it, but there was no evidence that Smigowski and Martins had sufficient dominion over or interest in the marijuana to warrant the inference. 585 F.2d at 1247 (affirmed in pertinent part, 612 F.2d at 908-09 n. 3). In both Cadena and Rodriguez, the Court was unwilling to infer that there was an agreement to distribute marijuana based on the existence of the conspiracy to import and on the size of the cache without more evidence of the defendants’ involvement in the distribution scheme. Several subsequent opinions are inconsistent with Cadena and Rodriguez. In United States v. Mann, 5 Cir.1980, 615 F.2d 668, cert. denied, 1981, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1694, 68 L.Ed.2d 193, the Court held that the defendants, who were American citizens, were properly convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it in the United States when they were caught at sea on an American vessel loaded with 22,500 pounds of marijuana. The Court reasoned that the mere size of the cache and the presence of a conspiracy to import the marijuana allowed the jury to infer intent to distribute and participation in a conspiracy to distribute. In a number of cases after Mann, this Court has followed Mann to reach this same result. See, for example, United States v. Mazyak, 5 Cir. 1981, 650 F.2d 788, cert. denied, 1982, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1281, 71 L.Ed.2d 464; United States v. Shelnut, 5 Cir.1980, 625 F.2d 59, cert. denied, 1981, 450 U.S. 983,101 S.Ct. 1520, 67 L.Ed.2d 818. The government contends that Mann and its progeny are better-reasoned and more consistent with conspiracy law than Cadena and Rodriguez. The government argues that an agreement to possess marijuana with intent to distribute may be inferred from the quantity of marijuana imported. In this case, twelve tons of marijuana is more than a mere mortal crew of eight could ever consume; therefore, the members of the crew intended to join in the scheme to distribute the contraband. In the absence of a legal market to dispose of the contraband, there is no reason to import unless there is a plan for distribution. Finally, the government argues that the act ■of importation is in furtherance of the con- spiracy to possess with intent to distribute, for there would be no distribution without marijuana to distribute. The government overlooks the gulf between the rational inference that someone would distribute the imported marijuana and the irrational inference that an ordinary member of the crew knowingly and intentionally joined the scheme to distribute the marijuana. The government relies partially on United States v. Bruno, 2 Cir.1939,105 F.2d 921, rev’d on other grounds, 1939, 308 U.S. 287, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257, to argue that conspiracies to distribute narcotics should be analyzed as chains or interconnected links — conspiracies in which a participant in part of the conspiracy may be convicted of participation in the whole. In Bruno, the defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. The defendants argued that separate conspiracies were involved — one between the smugr glers and the middlemen and one between, the middlemen and each group of retailers. The Court rejected this argument and recognized the interdependence of participants in a drug distribution scheme: The evidence did not disclose any cooperation or communication between the smugglers and either group of retailers, or between the two groups of retailers themselves; however, the smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers, and the retailers knew that the middlemen must buy of importers of one sort or another. Thus the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not, and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers. That being true, a jury might have found that all the accused were embarked upon a venture, in all parts of which each as a participant, and an abettor in the sense that the success of that part with which he was immediately concerned, was dependent upon the success of the whole. 105 F.2d at 922. The government argues that Bruno and other cases support the holding that suppliers of narcotics such as Michelena-Orovio may be convicted for participation in the entire distribution scheme. This is a question-begging argument. The issue is whether a jury could reasonably infer that a crew member of a vessel on the high seas knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy to distribute and had the required intent to distribute based on the size of the cache and his participation in the conspiracy to import. “An inference is a deduction, warranted by human reason and experience, that the trier of fact may make on the basis of established facts — a process of reasoning from premise to conclusion without the directive force of a rule of law, which characterizes a presumption.” Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings, 63 Va.L. Rev. 281 (1977). “In the case of an inference, the existence of B may be deduced from A by the ordinary rules of reason and logic.” 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 300[01]. The effect of an inference, if any, “is based upon logic and experience, not upon law”. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 Vand. L.Rev. 324, 327 (1952). To be legitimate or permissible, an inference must be deduced as a logical consequence of facts presented in evidence, and there must be a logical and rational connection between the facts in evidence and the fact to be inferred. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Cir.1980, 635 F.2d 188, 194; see National Industries, Inc. v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 9 Cir. 1982, 677 F.2d 1258,1267; Fenner v. General Motors Corp., 5 Cir.1981, 657 F.2d 647, 651, cert. denied, 1982, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653; Wilson v. Winstead, E.D.Tenn.1978, 470 F.Supp. 263, 268. Based on logic and common experience, evidence that a crew member was caught on the high seas in a conspiracy to import marijuana does not warrant the inference that he knew of or voluntarily agreed to join a conspiracy to distribute marijuana in the United States. The size of the cache may allow an inference that someone at some unknown location plans to distribute the marijuana, but it does not warrant pyramiding an inference that a mere crew member was such a person nor does it refute beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis that he did not join in the conspiracy or even know of it. When there is no evidence that a crew member had a stake in the venture or awareness of or interest in the distribution of the contraband, the logical inference is that the crew member joined in a conspiracy to import marijuana to a point on the high seas without any knowledge of, joinder in, or participation in the conspiracy to distribute. This inference is especially rational with respect to Michelena-Orovio because he lacked any contacts with the United States at all. This case is even stronger than Cadena because here the parties stipulated that the defendant, unlike Cadena, was not the captain of the vessel. It is stronger than Rodriguez because the defendants acquitted of the conspiracy to distribute in that case were Americans who were more actively involved than Michele-na-Orovio in the conspiracy to import. We conclude that the reasoning of Cadena is logical and does not require an attenuated chain of inferences to justify its result. This result comports with this Court’s admonition that “ ‘proof of an agreement to enter a conspiracy is not to be lightly inferred.’ ” United States v. White, 5 Cir. 1978, 569 F.2d 263, 267 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 439 F.2d 885, 888, cert. denied, 1971,404 U.S. 880,92 S.Ct. 213, 30 L.Ed.2d 161), reversing a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute because of insufficient evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. The rationale of Cadena is also consistent with the general law of conspiracy. In Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 1943, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed. 1674, a drug manufacturer and wholesaler had supplied large amounts of morphine sulphate to a doctor for several years. The government charged the manufacturer with conspiracy to distribute narcotics unlawfully because the amounts of morphine supplied were so large that the manufacturer must have known that the doctor was distributing them illegally. The court held that: When the evidence discloses such a system, working in prolonged cooperation with a physician’s unlawful purpose to supply him with his stock in trade for his illicit enterprise, there is no legal obstacle to finding that the supplier not only knows and acquiesces, but joins both mind and hand with him to make its accomplishment possible. The step from knowledge to intent and agreement may be taken. There is more than suspicion, more than knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, lack of concern. There is informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation, and there is also a “stake in the venture” which, even if it may not be essential, is not irrelevant to the question of conspiracy. 319 U.S. at 713, 63 S.Ct. at 1270, 87 L.Ed. at 1682 (footnote omitted and emphasis supplied). There was no evidence in Cadena of prolonged cooperation or of the defendant’s stake in the venture. Cadena had no concern as to what was to become of the contraband, and his involvement would have come to an end when the narcotics were delivered on the high seas. The Court in Direct Sales, like the Court in Cadena, recognized that “not every instance of sale of restricted goods ... in which the seller knows the buyer intends to use them unlawfully, will support a charge of conspiracy”. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712, 63 S.Ct. 1269, 87 L.Ed. at 1682. Cadena’s involvement, and that of Michelena-Orovio, is more like the conduct discussed in Direct Sales which was found to be insufficient to constitute a conspiracy: This may be true, for instance, of single or casual transactions, not amounting to a course of business, regular, sustained and prolonged, and involving nothing more on the seller’s part than indifference to the buyer’s illegal purpose and passive acquiescence in his desire to purchase, for whatever end. A considerable degree of carelessness coupled with casual transactions is tolerable outside the boundary of conspiracy. There may also be a fairly broad latitude of immunity for a more continuous course of sales, made either with strong suspicion of the buyer’s wrongful use or with knowledge, but without stimulation or active incitement to purchase. 319 U.S. at 712 n.8, 63 S.Ct. at 1269-70 n.8, 87 L.Ed. at 1682 n.8. Direct Sales supports the conclusion of Cadena that a disinterested knowledge that goods supplied may be put to an unlawful use is insufficient to convict a supplier of participation in a conspiracy to distribute. Under Cadena, the conviction of Michele-na-Orovio for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute must be reversed for lack of evidence. Like Cadena, this case involves a single transaction and not prolonged cooperation with a distributor. There is no evidence that Michelena-Orovio had a stake in the proceeds of the distribution or had any involvement in or knowledge of the scheme to distribute the marijuana once it was in the United States. As far as the record goes, it was more probable than not that Michelena-Orovio, who lives with his family in Colombia and speaks no English, agreed only to serve as a crew member on a vessel delivering marijuana to a point 150-200 miles off the coast of the United States and to return home thereafter. The facts of this case do not warrant the inference that Michelena-Oro-vio was part of a conspiracy to distribute but are at war with this inference. See Fenner, 657 F.2d at 651. Whether his conduct was, in itself, illegal (a violation of the law against conspiracy to import) is irrelevant to his state of mind with respect to another crime (the later violation of the law against conspiracy to distribute). At most, the defendant was indifferent as to any distribution scheme. His involvement began and ended on a ship two hundred miles from the United States. We conclude that a reasonably-minded juror could not rationally find a knowing and voluntary agreement to join a conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it within the United States merely from the fact that a Columbian national is a crew member of a foreign vessel delivering a large load of marijuana to a point on the high seas. Conclusion In final analysis, as the Supreme Court has put it, criminal substantive due process “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”. In re Winship, 1970, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375. This conceptual framework is necessarily broad for it to be meaningfully applied in every criminal case. In its application to a conspiracy charge a certain minimum requirement of mens rea is a “fact necessary to constitute the crime of which [the defendant] is charged”. Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d at 375. Here, based on the amount of marijuana seized, it was rational for the jury to infer a conspiracy to import the marijuana, a scheme in which Michelena-Orovio knowingly participated as a seaman on the vessel. But it was irrational for the jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that this lowly, non-English speaking seaman knew about the plan to distribute the marijuana in the United States or had an intention of joining in any such plans. We affirm Michelena-Orovio’s conviction for conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States and reverse his conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it in the United States. We emphasize that the facts of particular cases are extremely important in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a conspiracy. Our concern is that conspiracy convictions not be based on an inference B that is not logically or by experience linked with predicate A. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. . Although the defendant has not raised the issue, we also note the existence of the requisite statutory authority for the Coast Guard to seize and search the ALEX LUZ. United States v. Williams, 5 Cir.1980, 617 F.2d 1063, 1074 (en banc). A federal statute, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976), authorizes the Coast Guard to stop and search a foreign vessel on the high seas if they have reason to believe that those aboard are involved in a conspiracy to import contraband into the United States. Even if authority had not existed under § 89(a), the Coast Guard’s actions would have been authorized by Venezuela’s consent. Williams, 617 F.2d at 1077. . The most recent case discussing Cadena is United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 5 Cir.1982, 679 F.2d 423. The defendants in Chaparro-AI-meida were Columbian nationals who brought a marijuana-laden vessel to within seven miles of the Louisiana coast. The Coast Guard stopped the vessel while it was waiting to deliver the marijuana to two Americans who had left the boat to arrange for the delivery of the contraband to the United States. The Court did not discuss the conflicting case law in the circuit, but affirmed the convictions for conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it in the United States. The Court, however, distinguished Cadena, noting that the vessel in Cade-na was 200 miles offshore and that there was no supporting evidence of an intention to deliver the contraband to the United States. 679 F.2d at 430. . We recognize that [a]s a panel of this Court, we are without power to overrule a decision of another panel. That task falls solely to the full court sitting en banc. Ford v. United States, 618 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir.1980). Neither can one panel ‘disregard the precedent set by a prior panel, even though it conceives error in the precedent. Absent an overriding Supreme Court decision or a change in the statutory law, only the Court sitting en banc can do this.’ Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1976). Washington v. Watkins, 5 Cir.1981, 655 F.2d 1346, 1354 n. 10. As in Washington, we cannot follow “one line of precedent without disregarding the other, and we lack the authority to overrule one line at the other’s expense.” Id . Judge Brown for the Court en banc stated: The panel properly found the evidence insufficient to show the involvement of Smi-gowski and Martins in a conspiracy involving distribution of the marijuana, once it actually reached the United States. Their conviction on Count II was therefore properly reversed. But Rodriguez and Albernaz “perforce had to make some arrangements to dispose of their treasure,” 585 F.2d 1247, and those two actu- ally arranged (without the involvement of Smigowski or Martins) to transport, by means of Winnebagos, and distribute the marijuana once it reached shore. The panel therefore properly found the evidence sufficient with respect to both counts of the convictions of Rodriguez and Albernaz. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d at 909 n. 3. . The government also relies on United States v. Martino, 2 Cir.1981, 664 F.2d 860, 876, cert. denied, 1982, 102 S.Ct. 3493, and United States v. Elam, 5 Cir.1982, 678 F.2d 1234, 1246, to support the argument that suppliers are aware that they are participating in a collective venture. . One influential commentator has argued that the use of permissive inferences may even interfere with the fact-finding process in criminal cases: The key problem with permissive inferences is that they isolate and abstract a single circumstance from the complex of circumstances presented in any given case, and, on proof of that isolated fact, authorize an inference of some other fact beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction is authorized by the permissive inference in all cases in which the predicate fact appears, even though the correlation between the predicate fact and the element to be inferred is less than perfect. Permissive inferences thus permit juries to avoid assessing the myriad facts which make specific cases unique. Analysis, as Supreme Court opinions demonstrate, is drawn to likelihoods. The thesis pursued here is that any structure which reduces criminal cases to a simplified assessment of what might be called the “chances of guilt” is fundamentally at odds with the concept of reasonable doubt, and hence to be discouraged as a mode of determining the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 Harv.L. Rev. 1187, 1192 (1979) (footnote omitted). . The Court in Direct Sales discussed a previous decision, United States v. Falcone, 1940, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128. In Falcone, suppliers of sugar and yeast to illegal distillers were charged with conspiracy to distill spirits in violation of the revenue laws. The Direct Sales court summarized the Falcone holding rejecting this theory: [The Falcone] decision comes down merely to this, that one does not become a party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the conspiracy; and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from knowledge that the buyer will use the goods illegally. 319 U.S. at 709; 63 S.Ct. at 1268, 87 L.Ed. at 1680. The Direct Sales opinion distinguished the act of supplying narcotics from the supply of sugar and yeast involved in Falcone. Because the narcotics were heavily regulated, there was a greater inference that the distributor knew the doctor would use the goods illegally and that the distributor intended to further, promote and cooperate in the illegal enterprise. Falcone, however, stresses that more than a disinterested knowledge that goods supplied may be put to an unlawful use is required to convict a defendant of participating in a conspiracy to distribute. . United States v. Bruno is distinguishable from Cadena and Michelena-Orovio on this ground. In Bruno, an ongoing scheme to import and distribute narcotics was shown. Because the arrangement extended over a long period and because the suppliers must have known that the unlawful conduct would not stop with them, there was no question that the arrangements for distribution had been made. In addition, a continuing relationship between supplier and retailer gives each group a “stake” in the successful endeavors of the other. The government’s reliance on Bruno, therefore, is misplaced. . The government contends that it is not necessary to have an ongoing venture in order to establish involvement in a plan for distribution. In the context of the importation of a large quantity of marijuana, it contends that the required interest in the distribution scheme is supplied by the fact that the cargo cannot be disposed of unless such a scheme exists. This argument misconstrues both Cadena and Mi-chelena-Orovio’s defense. The argument is not that the defendant knew of the conspiracy but claims not to have joined it. Instead, the argument is that the defendant did not know whether a conspiracy to distribute had been formed or not. Even if Michelena-Orovio knew of the conspiracy, under Direct Sales there must be. “informed and interested cooperation” rather than “knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, lack of concern” to find he is guilty of joining it. . See Trial Transcript at 22 (opening statement of Edward Castaing, attorney for Miche-lena-Orovio).
RANDALL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in Parts I, II, III and IV.A of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent from the panel’s decision, in Part IV.B of the majority opinion, to reverse Michelena-Orovio’s conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it in the United States. The majority recognizes that Michelena-Orovio’s challenge to his conviction of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it “poses a dilemma, for this Court has developed two distinct lines of precedent as to the evidence that is sufficient to warrant-conviction for [this] offense .... ” 702 F.2d at 501. One line of cases holds that once the jury has determined that the defendant was involved in the conspiracy to import contraband, it is entitled to conclude that the defendant was also a participant in the conspiracy to distribute on the basis of the quantity of marijuana imported. See e.g., United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1281, 71 L.Ed.2d 464 (1982); United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1694, 68 L.Ed.2d 193 (1981). Two other cases have held that participation in the conspiracy to distribute cannot be inferred solely from participation in the conspiracy to import a large quantity of marijuana. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir.), aff’d, 612 F.2d 906 (en banc), affd 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). The majority has chosen to resolve this conflict by following Cadena, “because it is the first of our cases to consider the problem before us, has never been specifically overruled, and is in [the majority’s] view better-reasoned than Mann and its progeny.” at 501. I would reach the opposite conclusion. I. THE MORE BINDING PRECEDENT. The majority claims that Cadena was the earliest precedent to deal with the problem before us. Cadena was the first case only to the extent that it dealt with the conviction of a foreign crew member found on board a marijuana-laden boat outside United States territorial waters. Long before Cadena was decided, we had held that persons could be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute on the basis of the size of the cache. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 521 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming conviction on one count of conspiracy to import and to possess with intent to distribute of owner of automobile who was present at arrival of boat carrying 300 pounds of marijuana, and stating that distribution was established by the fact that it was “virtually impossible for two mere mortals to consume 300 pounds of marijuana, personally, within a reasonable span of time”); United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1567, 43 L.Ed.2d 777 (1975) (affirming convictions of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession of persons observed on a beach where 18,000 pounds of marijuana was floating, but reversing convictions of conspiracy to import and importation because there was not sufficient evidence that the contraband came from a foreign source); see also United States v. Perry, 480 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.1973) (affirming conviction of substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute and holding that the size of the cache could support the inference that the contraband was not solely for personal use); United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085, 93 S.Ct. 685, 34 L.Ed.2d 672 (1972) (same). Cadena is the “first case” only to the extent that any case may be considered as the first based on its unique set of facts. The doctrine of stare decisis precludes such a broad understanding of “first case.” While the majority notes that Cadena and Rodriguez have never been specifically abandoned, they appear to have been overruled sub silentio, since there has been no case that has followed either precedent for the proposition that the amount of contraband imported cannot be the sole basis for connecting a defendant to an existing conspiracy to distribute. The cases have either attempted to distinguish Cadena, see United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.1982) (convictions affirmed where marijuana-laden vessel was stopped within seven miles of the Louisiana coast while boat was waiting to deliver marijuana to two Americans), or ignored it completely. See United States v. Borchardt, 698 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.1983) (affirming convictions of conspiracies to import and to possess with intent to distribute, and substantive offenses, of person who arranged importation of 481 pounds of marijuana from Mexico); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 606 (5th Cir.1982) (affirming convictions of conspiracy to import and to possess with intent to distribute of some persons found on pleasure boat that contained 30, 000 pounds of marijuana, but reversing convictions of those defendants not shown to have knowledge of the cargo); United States v. Escobar, 674 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming convictions of crew — -and captain — on shrimp boat, where the boat had left a foreign port with at least four tons of marijuana and docked in Mississippi without it); United States v. Hernandez, 668 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.1982) (affirming conviction of person who got off of a boat that contained thirteen bales of marijuana and five boxes of methaqualone tablets, where he had keys to the cabin where the contraband was kept and had a station wagon on land waiting to transport the boat); Mazyak, supra (affirming convictions of captain and crew found on forty-two foot trawler laden with 14,611 pounds of marijuana; the trawler had left Miami nineteen days before it was stopped seventy miles south of Cuba); United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 1520, 67 L.Ed.2d 818 (1981) (citing United States v. Love, 599 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 302, 62 L.Ed.2d 312 (1979)) (affirming convictions of defendants who were found on a shrimping vessel headed toward Texas, where the boat contained no shrimping equipment or shrimp, but did contain fifteen tons of marijuana). Other cases have cited Rodriguez for the contrary proposition, i.e., that participation in the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute may be inferred from the size of the cache. In Mann, supra, we held: The defendants were apprehended with over 22,500 pounds of marijuana in their possession, far too much for the personal consumption of four individuals. Having determined that defendants planned to import their cargo, the jury was entitled to infer from the facts before it that some plan had been made for its disposition. As we have previously noted “[t]he very size of a ... cache can be sufficient to show intent to distribute.. .. ” United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir.1978), aff’d, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc). 615 F.2d at 670 (other citations omitted); see also United States v. Perez, 648 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S.Ct. 602, 70 L.Ed.2d 592 (1981) (citing Mann's citation of Rodriguez in affirming convictions of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, where agents watched defendants unload 18,900 pounds of marijuana onto a conveyor belt behind a Florida beach house). Thus Cadena and Rodriguez stand alone for the proposition that a defendant cannot be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute on the basis of the large quantity of contraband that he has imported. Finally, the majority maintains that Cadena is the better-reasoned precedent. The majority heavily emphasizes the well-settled rule that “[t]o be legitimate or permissible, an inference must be deduced as a logical consequence of facts presented in evidence, and there must be a logical and rational connection between the facts in evidence and the fact to be inferred.” at 504. Since I agree with the majority that an inference must flow logically from the facts, I set them forth at the outset of this dissent. One more well-settled principle must be kept in mind, however: a jury verdict should not be overturned lightly. The test for sufficiency of the evidence in this circuit is whether “a reasonable trier of fact could [have found] that the evidence established] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted on other grounds,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 444, 74 L.Ed.2d 600 (1982). There is no doubt in this case about the existence of a conspiracy to distribute the marijuana found on board the ALEX LUZ. The customs agents were able to apprehend the vessel and her crew because the Florida-based importers had informed undercover agents, who were posing as persons interested in aiding in the distribution of marijuana, that the ALEX LUZ was carrying a cargo of contraband for distribution in the United States. The American importers gave the agents detailed information about the boat and the site planned for the rendezvous with a second boat; the second boat was supposed to bring the marijuana into the United States. Michelena-Orovio himself was arrested on board a small vessel, the ALEX LUZ, that had just completed a relatively lengthy voyage from Colombia. The boat was laden with twelve tons of marijuana and reeked of its illicit cargo. Although the boat was a shrimping vessel, there was no fishing equipment aboard and no cargo other than the contraband. The marijuana was found in the ship’s cargo hold. The cargo hatch was neither locked nor fastened, and there was open access to the cargo hold from the engine room of the vessel. The ship’s crew, including Michelena-Oro-vio, engaged in a concerted endeavor to elude capture and protect each other. When the Coast Guard first spotted the vessel, it had its lights reversed so that it appeared to be going in the direction opposite to its actual course, apparently in the hopes that it would escape detection. The boat changed direction as soon as its crew became aware of the Coast Guard’s presence. When the agents came on board, all eight crew members were waiting on deck with their bags packed, and all eight insisted that there was no captain aboard the vessel. The majority agrees that this “collocation of circumstances,” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); was sufficient to support Mi-chelena-Orovio’s conviction of conspiracy to import marijuana. The issue is whether those same circumstances, in particular the covert importation of a large quantity of marijuana, were sufficient to support the conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute the marijuana. I con-elude that they were, and that the line of cases permitting the inference of participation in the distribution conspiracy from participation in the conspiracy to import a large quantity of marijuana is the more consistent with the general law developed in this and other circuits concerning drug conspiracies. Further, the allowance of this inference does not infringe on the requirement that the government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).. II. CONSPIRACY LAW: SPOKES AND CHAINS. Conspiracy is an area of the law filled with figurative analogies, including chains and wheel parts. See generally Note, “Single vs. Multiple” Criminal Conspiracies: A Uniform Method of Inquiry for Due Process and Double Jeopardy Purposes, 65 Minn.L. Rev. 295 (1980); Developments in the Law — Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 920 (1959); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 362, at 480-82 (1978). The question of the type of conspiracy involved is generally raised in a defendant’s claim, similar to Michelena-Orovio’s, that the government has proven not one but several conspiracies and that the defendant cannot be convicted of the conspiracies in which he did not participate. In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), the Supreme Court was confronted with the classic spoke conspiracy involving fraudulent loan schemes that revolved around one man, Brown. To use the analogy, Brown was the hub of the wheel, while the other defendants were the spokes. The government conceded that there was more than one conspiracy, i.e. that there was no rim to connect the spokes, but it maintained that the defendants had not suffered substantial prejudice from being convicted of a single general conspiracy. The Supreme Court thought otherwise and reversed the convictions. In contrast, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of participants in a chain or rimmed wheel conspiracy. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947). The defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to sell whiskey at prices above the ceiling set by government regulations. In distinguishing the factual situation in Kotteakos, the Court noted that Blumenthal and his colleagues were all involved in one scheme — to sell whiskey unlawfully — and that “the several agreements were essential and integral steps” in a single conspiracy. 332 U.S. at 559, 68 S.Ct. at 257. Conspiracies to distribute narcotics have generally been considered to be prime examples of chain, or interconnected, conspiracies, in which a participant in a segment of the conspiracy may be convicted of participation in the whole. For example, in United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2nd Cir. 1939), rev’d on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257 (1939), the defendants were indicted for and convicted of a conspiracy to import, sell and possess narcotics. They argued that there were at least three separate conspiracies- — one between the smugglers and the middlemen and one between the middlemen and each group of retailers. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument, specifically recognizing the interdependence of participants in a drug distribution scheme: The evidence did not disclose any cooperation or communication between the smugglers and either group of retailers, or between the two groups of retailers themselves; however, the smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers, and the retailers knew that the middlemen must buy of importers of one sort or another. Thus the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not, and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers. That being true, a jury might have found that all the accused were embarked upon a venture, in all parts of which each was a participant, and an abettor in the sense that the success of that part with which he was immediately concerned, was dependent upon the success of the whole. 105 F.2d at 922. The Second Circuit has followed the Bruno rationale in more recent narcotics cases under the present statute: As we have long recognized, in many narcotics distribution networks the ultimate retailers may not know the identities of those who supply their wholesaler, and the retailers’ identities may be unknown to those suppliers; but all are well aware that they are participating in a collective venture. United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 876 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3493, 73 L.Ed.2d 1373 (1982). In our own circuit we have stated: Where the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme or to the overall success of the venture, where there are several parts inherent in a larger common plan, or where the character of the property involved or the nature of the activity is such that knowledge on the part of one member concerning the existence and function of other members of the same scheme is necessarily implied due to the overlapping nature of the various roles of the participants, the existence of a single conspiracy will be inferred. United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987, 100 S.Ct. 2973, 64 L.Ed.2d 845 (1980). Thus, there is a line of precedent in a number of circuits, including our own, holding that the suppliers of narcotics may be convicted for participation in the entire distribution scheme. The majority describes as “question-begging” the argument that “Bruno and other cases support the holding that suppliers of narcotics such as Michelena-Orovio may be convicted for participation in the entire distribution scheme.” at 504. As the majority explains, the issue in this case is whether the jury could reasonably infer, on the basis of Michelena-Orovio’s participation in the conspiracy to import twelve tons of marijuana, that he had knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy to distribute it. Relying on Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943), and United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940), the majority maintains that there is no evidence that Michelena-Orovio had the requisite “stake” in the distribution scheme to connect him to the conspiracy to distribute. It emphasizes the absence of prolonged cooperation in this case in support of its conclusion that the defendant was at most “indifferent” to the contraband’s ultimate destination. The majority admits, however, that Direct Sales recognized that the strength of an inference of participation in the illicit conspiracy based on the sale of goods to the conspirators is dependent on the nature of the goods sold. Because the narcotics in Direct Sales were heavily regulated, there was a greater inference that the distributor knew that the buyer would use the goods illegally and that the distributor intended to further, promote and cooperate in the buyer’s misuse of the commodity: The commodities sold [in Falcone] were articles of free commerce, sugar, cans, etc. They were not restricted as to sale by order form, registration, or other requirements. When they left the seller’s stock and passed to the purchaser’s hands, they were not in themselves restricted commodities, incapable of further legal use except by compliance with rigid regulations, such as apply to morphine sulphate. The difference is like that between toy pistols or hunting-rifles and machine guns. All articles of commerce may be put to illegal ends. But all do not have inherently the same susceptibility to harmful and illegal use. Nor, by the same token, do all embody the same capacity, from their very nature, for giving the seller notice the buyer will use them unlawfully. Gangsters, not hunters or small boys, comprise the normal private market for machine guns. So drug addicts furnish the normal outlet for morphine which gets outside the restricted channels of legitimate trade. 319 U.S. at 710-11, 63 S.Ct. at 1269. The Court explained that the difference in commodities was important in terms of both the seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s intended use, and the seller’s intent to promote and cooperate in the illegal action: This difference is important for two purposes. One is for making certain that the seller knows the buyer’s intended illegal use. The other is to show that by the sale he intends to further, promote and cooperate in it. Id. In recognition of the obvious difference between the sale of morphine and the sale of sugar, yeast and cans, the Court specifically stated that the quantum of proof required to show knowledge that the buyer will use the commodity unlawfully is dependent on the nature of the commodity: The difference between sugar, cans, and other articles of normal trade, on the one hand, and narcotic drugs, machine guns and such restricted commodities, on the other, arising from the latters’ inherent capacity for harm and from the very fact they are restricted, makes a difference in the quantity of proof required to show knowledge that the buyer will utilize the article unlawfully. Additional facts, such as quantity sales, high-pressure sales methods, abnormal increases in the size of the buyer’s purchases, etc., which would be wholly innocuous or not more than ground for suspicion in relation to unrestricted goods, may furnish conclusive evidence, in respect to restricted articles, that the seller knows the buyer has an illegal object and enterprise. Knowledge, equivocal and uncertain as to one, becomes sure as to the other. So far as knowledge is the foundation of intent, the latter thereby also becomes the more secure. 319 U.S. at 711-12, 63 S.Ct. at 1269 (emphasis added). Falcone and Direct Sales must be viewed along a continuum of transactions. At one end of the continuum is Falcone, which did not involve an inherently illegal transaction at all, but rather the sale of goods “in themselves innocent.” 311 U.S. at 207, 61 S.Ct. at 205 (quoting the opinion below, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1940)). The sale of morphine in Direct Sales fell somewhere in the middle of the continuum, in that it involved the sale of a restricted commodity. Thus, “not every instance of sale of restricted goods” would support a charge of conspiracy. 319 U.S. at 712, 63 S.Ct. at 1269. But the restrict