Full opinion text
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge: Milan Bagaric, Mile Markich, Ante Lju-bas, Vinko Logarusic, Ranko Primorac, and Drago Sudar appeal from judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, after a trial before Chief Judge Motley and a jury. Appellants urge reversal, relying not only on a series of claimed infirmities of the usual sort, but also upon this court’s recent refusal to permit prosecution of a terrorist organization pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where the Government failed to allege the group or its activities possessed any financial dimension or purpose. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1983). We are asked to expand that holding to the facts of this case. We decline to do so, since the overwhelming proof at trial showed that the defendants, acting through their criminal enterprise, perpetrated an extensive international extortion scheme using the United States and foreign mails. In addition, the defendants directed numerous acts of violence against certain supporters of Yugoslavia. Because we also reject appellants’ myriad other contentions, we affirm the convictions. I The massive, complex and convoluted record of this thirteen-week trial established that appellants were members of a Croatian terrorist group operating principally in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, with participants in Cleveland, San Francisco, Toronto, South America, and Europe. Acting through their criminal enterprise, they perpetrated an international extortion scheme against “moderate Croatians” and persons they believed to be supporters of the government of Yugoslavia, resorting to multiple acts of violence against those not sufficiently sympathetic to their cause. We chronicle the history of their activities in some detail. Operating from his home base in Chicago, Ante Ljubas began in late 1974 to recruit and hire persons to commit murders and bombings. In each case, the intended victim was to be an individual considered unsympathetic to the cause of Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. In time, Ljubas approached a long-time acquaintance, Frank Korenic, inquiring whether Korenic could obtain explosives, and requesting that Korenic introduce Ljubas to one Joe Neary. Neary, a notorious Chicago gangster, was a frequent customer at a restaurant where Korenic’s ex-wife was a waitress, and the two men had known one another since 1973. Korenic took Ljubas to Neary’s home, where Ljubas was introduced to Neary and another local gangster, Louis Almeida. Ljubas told these two men he “was working with other people,” and would be willing to pay well for a series of contract killings. He offered $20,000 for the first murder, and $10,000 for each of approximately ten additional assassinations. Neary and Almeida agreed to perform the killings. Accordingly, Ljubas gave them a photograph and the address of the first intended victim, John Badovinac. At that time, Badovinac was president of the Croatian Fraternal Union in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, an organization Ljubas regarded as pro-Yugoslavian. In February, 1975, Neary and Almeida travelled to Pittsburgh, and went to Bado-vinac’s office. Uncertain whether that was the best locale at which to carry out the murder, they drove to Badovinac’s home address and “look[ed] the place over[,] trying to figure out how ... to assassinate him there.” Still undecided, they telephoned Badovinac’s office, only to discover, from his secretary, that Badovinac was out of town attending a meeting. Neary and Almeida returned to Chicago to tell Ljubas of their frustration. The three men met at a restaurant near Ljubas’s home, where Ljubas expressed his unhappiness that Neary and Almeida had not “[gotten] the job done.” In March, Neary and Almeida set off to Pittsburgh a second time. En route, they were stopped by Ohio police for speeding. A search of their car turned up a .38 Colt firearm with a four-inch barrel, a .380 automatic Barretta, a .380 Walther PPKS with silencer, and a photograph of Badovinac. Shortly after his arrest on firearms charges, Almeida told Illinois state police that Ante Ljubas had approached Neary and Almeida and hired them to murder a man in Pittsburgh. Undeterred by the intervention of fate which spared Badovinac, Ljubas sought out co-appellant Milan Bagaric, and had Bagaric introduce him to Ante Caran. Bagaric and Ljubas demonstrated to Caran the nature and seriousness of their endeavor. Bagaric showed him explosives the two men were storing in Bagaric’s basement, and Ljubas instructed Caran on techniques of bomb construction. Shortly thereafter, apparently convinced of Caran’s bona tides, Ljubas asked Caran if he would be willing to recruit two men to bomb the Pittsburgh home of Milan Vranes, an officer of the Croatian Fraternal Union. Ljubas provided Caran with the address of Vranes’s home in Pittsburgh and told Caran to pick up the bomb at Bagaric’s apartment. Caran acquired the services of two friends, Andrija Skrabo and Vjelko Jaksic. The three men went to Bagaric’s home, where they were shown a bomb and timer device built by Bagaric. Skrabo and Jaksic drove to Pittsburgh with the bomb. In Pittsburgh, the two men had difficulty locating Vranes’s home. After consulting a local telephone directory, they drove to an address other than that provided by Ljubas. They set the timer on the bomb and left it in a snowbank near the sidewalk of that house, later learning from a radio broadcast that the bomb had exploded. Soon after, Bagaric informed them they had bombed the wrong house. This series of misadventures in Pittsburgh seems reminiscent of Inspector Clouseau-style bumbling. Unfortunately, tragedy soon replaced what had appeared to be a comedy of errors. Ljubas and Bagaric, undaunted, continued their private war, taking on new soldiers along the way. Beginning in early 1977, the members of the criminal enterprise began an operation to stockpile dynamite in the United States and to transport it for use in various cities. Ljubas asked Caran to arrange for the use of an automobile “to go to Canada to bring some explosive[s].” Caran secured the assistance of Mico Jaksic, brother of Vjelko. Ljubas, Caran, and Mico Jaksic drove to Canada in Jaksic’s car. Their destination was a small rural town, Elliott Lake, Ontario, site of the huge Dennison uranium mines, the ex-employer of appellant Mile Markich. Upon arrival in Elliott Lake, Ljubas departed alone in the car. He rejoined Caran and Mico Jaksic twenty minutes later, with a bag containing approximately twenty sticks of dynamite which he showed the two men. The dynamite was manufactured by CIL Inc., a Canadian company, bore the coded manufacturing date D7 (signifying April, 1977 manufacture), and had been shipped in April and May of 1977 to Denni-son Mines. Ljubas, Caran, and Jaksic then drove to the Toronto area, where they stopped at the home of Milan Rukavina, a Croatian acquaintance of Caran. To ensure they would not be observed, they drove into Rukavina’s garage, where Jaksic packed the dynamite into the door panels of the car. Blasting caps, also obtained by Ljubas, were separated from the dynamite and were stored “underneath the dashboard so they would blend in with the rest of the wires.” Ljubas left the two men at this point, after instructing them to transport the contraband across the United States-Canada border and deliver it to Markich in Skokie, Illinois. Several days later, Caran travelled to Skokie, telephoned Markich to receive directions to the latter’s home, and brought most of the dynamite and blasting caps to Markich, retaining some for his own use. After Markich hid the explosives, the two men spoke briefly “[a]bout Croatia and [the] Croatian cause.” Caran returned to his home in Milwaukee, and later travelled to San Francisco. There, he went to the home of one Mile Boban, and left the explosives he had not given Markich. Bagaric came to San Francisco and wired the explosives into bombs. Also in mid-1977, appellants formalized and commenced their principal operation, a scheme to extort money from so-called “moderate” Croatians in the United States. Ljubas travelled to West Germany, where he and others committed to the violent overthrow of the Belgrade government determined to adopt a tactic which had previously been employed by Algerian terrorists seeking independence from France. They would send letters to “bad Croatians,” demanding they provide financial support for appellants’ criminal enterprise and also stating that, if they balked, reprisals would be carried out against them. Appellant Ranko Primorac headed up the extortion operation in the Los Angeles area, where a number of successful Croatians resided. Primorac compiled a list of potential wealthy victims, and threatened “to squeeze that [sic] people financially, and if they refuse, to be punished [sic] for example for rest of Croatians.” Among other possible targets, Primorac named Steven Búbalo, Krizan Brkic, Marko Zubcic, Frank Strisko-vitch, and Walter Rasic, all of whom later received extortion letters. The letters demanded that a specified sum of money, generally between $5,000 and $20,000, be mailed to a post office box in Asuncion, Paraguay, or “you will ... compel us to set a horrible example by making you the first object of the disciplinary rules.” Miro Bar-esic, an unindicted co-racketeer, who participated in the enterprise’s affairs during 1977 and 1978, see infra, maintained a box in the same postal office. Having established, and set in motion, the extortion scheme, appellants proceeded on two fronts. First, they continued their bombing activities, as well as trafficking in firearms, committing arsons, and attempting additional murders independent of the extortions. At the same time, they began to carry out reprisals against a number of persons who had failed to heed the warnings in the extortion letters. In April, 1978, Caran received a telephone call from Los Angeles. The caller instructed Caran to retrieve the explosives he had first stored at Boban’s home, and later used in the unsuccessful attempt on the Yugoslavian Consulate, and to deliver them to Pri-morac and two other men, Miro Biosic and Baresic, in Los Angeles. Skrabo and a man named Ante Sisko delivered the bomb materials on Caran’s behalf. After making the delivery, Skrabo joined Baresic, Primo-rac and several others, and together these men set fire to the Yugoslavian American Club in San Pedro, California. Several months later, some of the Canadian dynamite turned up on the East Coast. On August 14, 1978, members of the New York City Bomb Squad disarmed and dismantled two bombs which had been placed in a library at the United Nations and in a locker at Grand Central Station. In a communique left with both bombs, a Croatian terrorist group claimed credit for the attempted bombings, and indicated they were intended to protest West Germany’s decision to extradite to Yugoslavia one Stipe Bilandzic, a Croatian nationalist and close associate of Ljubas, Markich, and Primorac. The nine sticks of dynamite used in the two New York bombs were Cilgel D7 dynamite, a rare brand, yet precisely the one obtained by Ljubas during the Elliott Lake trip, and bearing the same date code. The electrical tape on the United Nations bomb was discovered to exhibit an “end match” with tape utilized in a bombing of the factory of one of the extortion victims, see infra, that is, both bombs were made with contiguous pieces cut from a single roll of black electrical tape. In mid-1978, Vjelko Jaksic, then residing in Milwaukee, planned a summer vacation in the San Francisco area. Caran asked him to pick up “something,” which turned out to be a handgun equipped with silencer which Ljubas had offered to provide Caran. Ljubas had arranged for Bagaric to turn over the gun in Chicago. Vjelko and Mico Jaksic left Milwaukee for Chicago. Upon arrival, they spoke with Ljubas and Bagaric, and were informed that the weapon had been hidden in Markich’s apartment. The Jaksics picked up the gun and silencer from Markich. In June, 1978, Vjelko Jaksic went to San Francisco for his holiday, stopping long enough to meet with Caran to deliver the gun and silencer. Caran later tried to use the gun, unsuccessfully, in an attempt to kill the Yugoslavian consul. Nor did Vjelko Jaksic return to the mid-west empty handed. In late May or early June, Primorac had met with Caran in California, and asked Caran to transport weapons to New York. Primorac provided a Westchester telephone number, which Car-an was to call upon arrival in the metropolitan area, to be informed of the exact destination for the assorted rifles, machineguns, and ammunition he would be carrying. If Caran were unable to travel to the East Coast, he was to deliver the arsenal to the home of Ivan Misetic in Chicago. As it turned out, Vjelko Jaksic was the courier, rather than Caran. He brought the weapons to Chicago, en route to his home in Milwaukee. Eventually, the cache made its way to Irvington, a town in Westchester, and to Bridgeport, Connecticut. After Primorac had attempted to use one of the guns to murder a New York critic of the extortion scheme, Joseph Badurina, agents of the Joint Terrorism Task Force seized the weapons from Caran’s home in Bridgeport, and from the Irvington home of Ivan Cale and Stipe Ivkosic, associates and fellow terrorists involved in the principal New York based faction of appellants’ enterprise. The violence threatened in the extortion letters began in the fall of 1978, several months after their mailing. On September 28, Westchester businessman Anthony Ciko-ja, who had received a letter but refused to pay, was shot and killed on his front lawn. Six weeks after Cikoja’s murder, Chicago factory owner Danilo Nikolic, who had also received an extortion demand, narrowly missed becoming the second victim when a bomb exploded near the section of his plant where flammable liquids were stored. The bomb used in this attempt was prepared in the identical fashion, using the same roll of electrical tape, as the bombs made of Canadian Cilgel dynamite discovered at the United Nations and Grand Central Station. In Los Angeles, attacks were carried out on several targets of the extortion scheme. Just after Labor Day, 1978, Primorac had asked Caran to leave his work in Sacramento for one week, to kill one Mario Forgiari-ni, a wealthy recipient of an extortion letter. Three weeks later, Primorac’s roommate, Miro Biosic, met Caran at the Los Angeles airport, and after informing Caran that Primorac had decided to remain out of town because “he don’t [sic] want to be around if anything is happening,” handed Caran a gun and silencer and drove him to Forgiarini’s house. Forgiarini never appeared. Despite Caran’s failure to carry out the attempt on the life of Forgiarini, Primorac paid him the $700 week’s wages Caran lost. In November, 1978, Caran moved to Los Angeles. There, he was introduced by Pri-morac to another Croatian named Mari jan Rudela. Acting on Primorac’s instructions, Rudela asked Caran to assist him in murdering Forgiarini. This time, Caran declined, apparently having decided the proper approach was to “kill some Yugoslavs, some enemy of our people, not the Croatians.” Caran did not balk several days later, however, when Rudela suggested an alternative target, Marko Zubcic, another successful businessman who had been the recipient of an extortion letter. Caran and Rudela waited near Zubcic’s place of business, intending to ambush him, but Zubcic never emerged. The next morning, Rudela suggested yet another victim, Krizan Brkic. Rudela drove to Brkic’s residence and handed Caran the same gun and silencer that had previously been provided Caran by Primorac’s roommate, Biosic, for the unsuccessful attempt on Forgiarini. Caran hid in bushes outside Brkic’s home, and when Brkic appeared in the yard, Caran shot and killed him. Over the next several months, a new form of violence was employed against the Los Angeles victims. On April 6, 1979, identical pipe bombs, constructed to explode upon impact and scatter metal shrapnel, caused property damage to the homes of Forgiarini and Frank Striskovitch, both of whom, along with Brkic and Zubcic, had been threatened by Primorac. On May 23, 1979, Rudela and another Croatian were killed in the process of arming yet another pipe bomb which detonated prematurely. At the time, Rudela was sitting in an automobile parked seventy feet from the home of extortion victim Martin Balov. According to Bagaric, “We had made a mistake.” In 1979, appellants conceived of still an additional reprisal tactic, the mailing of “book bombs,” that is, hardcover books hollowed out, filled with a stick of dynamite and a blasting cap, and wired in such a fashion that the two naked wire ends would join as the book was opened, setting off a powerful explosion designed, in the words of Richard M. Rogers, a special agent examiner in the FBI Explosives Unit, simply “to kill a human being.” On February 19, 1979, two of these book bombs were mailed, from Akron, Ohio, to Joseph Badurina, a Queens, New York journalist, and Father Timothy Majic, a Catholic priest in Milwaukee. Both men were Croatian nationalists, of significant influence in their home communities, who had taken explicit and adamant editorial positions against the use of violence. Remarkably, Father Majic was being interviewed by an FBI agent on the morning of February 26, when his mail arrived. The agent, seeing the priest about to open the cover of a black book and observing what appeared to be wires inside, seized the book instantly and threw it into a snowbank in the church courtyard. A police officer from the Milwaukee bomb squad separated the blasting cap from the dynamite, losing part of his hand in the process. One week later, Badurina received a similar package. Aware of the unsuccessful attempt to kill Majic, Badurina alerted the FBI. The New York City bomb squad removed the package and disarmed the book. On April 4, detectives of the Cleveland Police Department obtained a warrant and searched the residence of appellant Vinko Logarusic. The search turned up a metal toolbox containing more than eight hundred rounds of ammunition and batteries, as well as a hollowed out book containing wires, a battery and a light bulb. This book, described by an FBI expert as the “prototype, or perhaps test book, which was manufactured prior to the other two book bombs,” was the same size as the ones mailed to Badurina and Father Majic, with a depth of exactly one and one-half inches, permitting a stick of dynamite to be placed flat inside. The glue in all three books was of the same chemical composition, the wire was the same gauge, the wires in all three were twisted into loops and L-shaped hooks, and, finally, all three books employed solder, rather than standard battery connectors, to hook the wire to the power source. Laboratory tests showed the same pair of pliers had been used to cut a wire in the bomb sent to Badurina and the one found in Lo-garusic’s home. In August, 1979, Caran moved his family to Bridgeport, Connecticut. That autumn, he was approached by Ljubas in the Croatian Center in Manhattan. Ljubas asked whether Caran would be interested in learning to make bombs and teaching others, apparently primarily for use in Europe but in this country as well. Caran assented. Several months later, Caran was telephoned at work by appellant Drago Sudar, who informed Caran he had been sent by Lju-bas. After Caran picked up Sudar at the Croatian Center, the two men drove to Fairfield, Connecticut to purchase wires, a clock, a soldering iron, and gloves. From there they went to the apartment of a friend of Caran’s in Bridgeport, where Su-dar taught Caran how to put together a time bomb. Caran’s lesson could not be completed, however, because the two men had been unable to purchase blasting caps in Fair-field. Several weeks later, Ljubas, who had come to the East Coast, offered to have blasting caps delivered to Caran (as well as arranging for Caran to be paid $2,000 to travel to Europe to pass on the skills he had acquired from Sudar). On July 5, 1980, Bagaric’s wife delivered to Caran, at the latter’s Bridgeport home, two blasting caps. In September, 1980, Sudar returned to Bridgeport to resume the bomb construction lessons. After detailing his recent trip to California to teach bombmaking to other Croatians (including the brother of Marijan Rudela), Sudar described to Caran “how to make bombs in the drawer, in the door, in the car, and in the book. In the book ... is most dangerous, you got to be very, very careful to make a bomb.” Sudar demonstrated to Caran the preparation of time bombs. On June 25, 1981, Sudar was arrested at his home in Toronto, Canada, on an extradition warrant. Detectives of the Peel Regional Police Department searched his home, discovering and seizing a watch, batteries, light bulbs for automobile directional signals, tape, and coiled and color coded wires. One of the nine-volt batteries seized had its terminals filled with solder, in a manner similar to that used in the book bombs from the United Nations, Grand Central Terminal, and Logarusic’s home. The Indictment, Racketeering Counts and Trial By indictment S 81 Cr. 402, superseding and consolidating two earlier instruments and filed on June 30, 1981, Bagaric, Markich, Ljubas, Logarusic, Primorac, and Sudar were charged with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Count One charged conspiracy to violate the racketeering statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(d), and Count Two alleged a substantive violation, id. §§ 1961, 1962(c). On July 8, the United States Government filed with Canadian authorities an application for the extradition of Sudar, and on September 11, a warrant of committal was entered by a Canadian court, ordering Sudar’s extradition on Count One of S 81 Cr. 402 only. On July 28, a second superseding indictment, SS 81 Cr. 402, had named all appellants in the same two counts as S 81 Cr. 402. But, as Sudar had been formally extradited on S 81 Cr. 402, he could not be tried on SS 81 Cr. 402. Accordingly, on January 21, 1982, the district court ordered consolidation of the two indictments, Fed.R.Crim.P. 13; see United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 428-29 (2d Cir.1978). Trial commenced on February 16, 1982, and continued for thirteen weeks. On May 15, after approximately six days of deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts against Ljubas, Markich, Pri-morac, and Bagaric. Sudar was convicted of the single conspiracy count on which he was tried. Logarusic was convicted of conspiracy and acquitted on the substantive offense. The district court sentenced Lju-bas and Primorac to terms of imprisonment of twenty years on each count, to run consecutively. Markich and Bagaric received prison terms of twenty years under Count One and ten years under Count Two, such terms also to be served consecutively. Lo-garusic and Sudar were both sentenced to terms of imprisonment of twenty years on the conspiracy count. All convicted defendants have appealed, raising a multitude of contentions. II The difficult threshold question posed for consideration is whether, in light of our recent decision in United States v. Ivic, supra, the conduct charged in the indictment and proved at trial constituted an offense under RICO. In Ivic, a panel of this court concluded that a prosecution may not properly be brought pursuant to § 1962(c) when the Government does not charge that either the enterprise, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), or the predicate acts which make up the alleged pattern of racketeering activity, id. § 1961(1), (5), possess some financial purpose. United States v. Ivic, supra, at 64. In this case the charges and proof all relate to a terrorist organization, “motivated” by political as well as economic goals, and claimed to have engaged in economic crimes “to obtain money to further [its] activities,” id. at 61 n. 6 (reserving issue of applicability of RICO to such cases). We are called upon to decide whether this case, falling somewhere between the complete absence of financial purpose or activity, on the one hand, and an enterprise engaged solely in siphoning monies from, and infiltrating, legitimate businesses, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 3109, 69 L.Ed.2d 971 (1981), on the other, is within the purview of RICO. For several reasons, we conclude it is. A Relying on isolated language in Ivic, appellants argue the Government is required to prove an ultimate and overriding financial motive to secure a RICO conviction. The Ivic court nowhere stated, however, that economic gain must be the sole motive of every RICO enterprise. Such a rule, we believe, would run counter to fundamental principles of criminal law and risk the politicization of criminal trials. We reject appellants’ contention. Although evidence of motives or purposes underlying criminal behavior is normally admissible, provided certain criteria of reliability are met, Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir.) (financial motive), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828, 85 S.Ct. 56, 13 L.Ed.2d 37 (1964), motive itself is not generally an element of a particular offense. Compare United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11, 97 S.Ct. 22, 23, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976), with United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 917, 95 S.Ct. 195, 42 L.Ed.2d 155 (1974). And, when Congress has required proof of motive, it has generally done so for behavior not deemed blameworthy absent the immoral motive, and not otherwise punishable. So, for example, it may be permissible under various circumstances to communicate with a judge to offer mitigating information relevant to sentence, e.g., United States v. Fasolino, 449 F.Supp. 586, 587 (W.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.1978), but “an endeavor to exploit” a friendship with the judge may be found to be a “corrupt” motive, 586 F.2d at 941 (18 U.S.C. § 1503). RICO demands no such inquiry. The offenses it proscribes are, in the main, activities punishable irrespective of motives for performance, and accordingly they are provable by showing mens rea in the typical fashion. Hence, no additional scienter requirement is imposed by the statute. Unit ed States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833, 101 S.Ct. 103, 66 L.Ed.2d 38 (1980). To carry out a deeper inquiry into long-term or ultimate motive would be to require adjudication of a factor traditionally deemed not exculpatory. E.g., United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.1975) (Hobbs Act applies to extortions committed for religious “purposes”), aff’d sub nom. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977); United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.) (“Appellant’s professed unselfish motivation, rather than a justification, actually identifies a form of arrogance which organized society cannot tolerate.”). Moreover, such an exercise would embroil courts and jurors in a controversy essentially irrelevant to the purpose of the statute under consideration. Whether appellants extorted money for the long-term political purpose of effecting the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia, whether this formed part, but not all, of their “motivation,” or whether the freedom of their former province is an issue they care about not at all, the effect of their activities on the national economy is identical. The Ivic court described RICO as a device to prevent (and reverse) “the draining of] billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct,” United States v. Ivic, supra, at 62. This effect is accomplished whatever considerations compel the creation and execution of an extortion scheme. RICO’s liberal construction provision, Pub.L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947, was deemed irrelevant in Ivic, “since ... construing RICO to cover terrorist activities ... would in no way ‘effectuate its remedial purposes,’ ” id. at 65 n. 8, where there is no allegation or proof the enterprise’s “activities generate monies which can serve as a ‘springboard into the sphere of legitimate [business],’ ” id. at 63. In the case before us today, it is clear that, irrespective of the motive which appellants would have us believe spurred them to action, the remedial purposes of RICO are directly implicated. Pursuant to the direction of section 904(a), we decline to add an element of proof which would hamper the effective implementation of the statute. Further, investigation into motive would serve only to politicize, and otherwise inflame, RICO prosecutions. As discussed in greater detail infra, defense counsel sought to inject peripheral political and religious considerations into -the trial of this case, implying that appellants’ anti-Communism or Catholicism, or their persecution by American and Yugoslavian officials acting in concert, justifiably drove them to commit the acts of extortion and violence charged in the indictment. These suggestions— which ultimately formed no part of the defense case of appellants who testified or presented witnesses — were, viewed charitably, misguided. They can only have served to patronize the jury and to add a distracting element of emotionalism to the proceedings. An interpretation of RICO requiring proof of long-term pecuniary objectives which in some sense can be said to supersede accompanying political or religious ones would invite a repetition of this conduct. It would authorize the admission of evidence of political beliefs, racial animosities, and family and blood feuds as justifications for criminal acts. Because we believe Congress, and the traditions of our criminal law, contemplate trials free of consideration of such issues, we reject appellants’ argument that economic motive must surmount all others. B Appellants appear to argue also that the enterprise itself, rather than the predicate acts of racketeering, must be shown to yield financial gain. This contention is supported neither by a careful reading of the Ivic opinion nor by reference to the underlying purposes of RICO. The literal terms of the narrow Ivic holding require no more than an objective appraisal that some economic purpose was to be accomplished by the crime charged: “We hold that when an indictment does not charge that an enterprise or the predicate acts have any financial purpose, it does not state a crime under [RICO].” Id. at 65 (emphasis supplied). Additionally, this court has recognized that the nature of the misconduct often provides the best clue toward defining the enterprise. We have upheld application of RICO to situations where the enterprise was, in effect, no more than the sum of the predicate racketeering acts. United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 at 88-89 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 3142, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir.1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 736, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977). These decisions reflect the common sense recognition that a group of individuals may join together, and therefore be “associated in fact,” § 1961(4), although not a legally cognizable entity in one of the traditional forms, id., solely for the purpose of conducting their activities. That is, it is logical to characterize any associative group in terms of what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure. See also United States v. Chovanec, 467 F.Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (enterprise need not be a group having characteristics of “organized crime,” since Congress enumerated acts “with no restrictions limiting [RICO] to persons with particular affiliations”); United States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1095-97 (E.D.Pa.) (same), aff’d without opinion, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S.Ct. 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980); cf. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885-86 (9th Cir.1970) (rejecting contention that “business enterprise,” 18 U.S.C. § 1952, reaches only “businesses] ... associated with or controlled by a clandestine criminal organization”). Moreover, even where the enterprise is one of the legal entities listed in § 1961(4), and proof of that element diverges from the proof of a pattern of racketeering, we think the requisite economic dimension may be demonstrated through the latter. Section 1961(4) appears to contemplate application of RICO to enterprises which, for example, are not themselves profit-making, or reinvest all their funds. Cf. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (in § 1961(4), use of word “any” in clause dealing with unions and individuals associated in fact signals congressional intent to impose no restriction upon associations embraced by definition; illegitimate associations therefore included); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30-31 (2d Cir.1981) (New York City Civil Court held a RICO “enterprise;” use of word “any” indicates intent to make list all-inclusive, and “any being whose existence is recognized by law is within the term ‘enterprise’ ”), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S.Ct. 1442, 71 L.Ed.2d 657 (1982). The situation reached by § 1962 may thus not always be one in which the enterprise “makes money” for its members. Yet, even absent a requirement that the enterprise be a profit-making one, the section implements the principal congressional purpose, “the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce,” S.Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), in two significant ways. First, by “striking at the source of the problem,” United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at 593, 101 S.Ct. at 2533, that is, proscribing the racketeering activities demonstrably capable of providing “a springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise[s],” id. at 591, 101 S.Ct. at 2533, whether “profit-making” or otherwise, Congress sought to make RICO preventive as well as remedial. Second, since non-profit corporations (as well as entirely illegitimate associations of individuals, see id. at 588-93, 101 S.Ct. at 2531-33; United States v. Maz-zei, supra, at 88-90) compete within the economy for funds and services, it would have been counter-productive to exempt from the statute those invested in, acquired, or maintained through a pattern of racketeering activity. Accordingly, the Government may meet its obligation to show “financial purpose” through either the enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering. We recognize that, read in isolation, language in I vie can be taken to support a requirement that, quite apart from the nature of the predicate acts, the enterprise itself must be “the sort of entity one joins to make money.” United States v. Ivic, supra, at 60. The court noted the usage of “enterprise” in other parts of § 1962, concluded it referred to “the sort of entity in which funds can be invested and a property interest of some sort acquired,” id., and applied the same definition to subsection (c). Initially, we note this language is dictum, and differs from the holding of the case, which stated only that because neither the acts charged nor the purpose of the enterprise was economic, the indictment was outside the scope of § 1962(c). More significantly, the context in which it was employed persuades us the panel had no intention of insisting the necessary showing of economic purpose be confined to the enterprise. Ivic involved a group of individuals associated in fact. That phrase is defined in the portion of § 1961(4) designed to bring within § 1962 the commission of criminal acts related, in any one of several ways, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c), to enterprises with ascertainable associative structures but not one of those enumerated in the other part of § 1961(4). See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir.1979) (group of corporations not legally related may be “group of individuals associated in fact;” otherwise “[o]ne could simply transfer assets from the corporation whose affairs had been conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity to another corporation whose affairs had up to that point not been so conducted”), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 758 (1980). If the statute did not include this definition of enterprise, there might occur “the anomolous [sic] result that a large scale underworld operation which engaged solely in trafficking of heroin would not be subject to RICO’s enhanced sanctions, whereas small-time criminals jointly engaged in infrequent sales of contraband drugs and illegal handguns arguably could be prosecuted under RICO.” United States v. Mazzei, supra, at 89. And, as noted, we have sanctioned RICO prosecutions where the enterprise and the predicate acts of racketeering, although of course separate and necessary elements of § 1962(c), need not be proved by distinct and independent proof. The Ivic panel’s consideration of the meaning of “enterprise” in subsections (a) and (b) therefore amounted to no more than support for its ultimate conclusion that economic purpose must be shown in either the proof of enterprise or the proof of predicate acts. In Ivic, the two were functionally equivalent, and “the proof used to establish [them] ... coalesce[d],” United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2528. The problem for the Government was that no proof established (nor did the indictment allege) that the group’s “activities [were] designed to obtain, [or] in fact yield[ed], any money whatsoever.” United States v. Ivic, supra, at 63. C This case fits well within the principles we have enunciated. The core of the enterprise was the commission of more than fifty acts of the classic economic crime of extortion, and many of the violent crimes perpetrated were in aid of the extortion scheme. They were carried out either to compel payment or in retaliation for refusal to meet appellants’ extortionate demands. Indeed, the Assistant United States Attorney said in his opening statement to the jury that appellants sought to extort money from “moderate Croatians [to] help finance [their] criminal enterprise,” and emphasized that “this extortion scheme ... is one of the centerpieces of this criminal case.” The first ten Government witnesses were extortion victims or widows of murdered extortion victims and proof of economic crimes continued throughout the lengthy trial. The indictment and proof in this prosecution were consistent with the language and purposes of RICO. We decline to impose upon the Government an obligation to show pure or ultimate economic motive in any of the various formulations urged by appellants. Although we have previously noted, United States v. Huber, supra, 603 F.2d at 395-96, and we repeat the admonition here, “that the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse [when the statute is] applped] ... to situations for which it was not primarily intended,” our obligation is “to rule on actual, as opposed to hypothetical, applications of the statute,” United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980), and it is clear to us that the present one was appropriate. Ill Numerous claims unrelated to the I vie issue have been advanced. We shall first consider those applicable to all appellants. Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleging repeated and persistent instances of improper prosecutorial comment, appellants claim they were deprived of a fair trial. They challenge a number of statements as derogatory of defendants or their counsel, as injecting into the trial the prosecutor’s personal belief the defendants were lying, or as exceeding the appropriate bounds of cross-examination. Although appellants have fashioned a superficially impressive compilation of alleged misconduct, and although some remarks by the Government were perhaps ill-advised, when read in the context of the entire record of this thirteen-week trial, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242, 60 S.Ct. 811, 853, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940); United States v. Bivona, 487 F.2d 443, 446-47 (2d Cir.1973); see United States v. White, su pra, 486 F.2d at 206 (prejudice less likely in “long and hotly contested trial”), the Government’s statements did not prejudice appellants’ right to a fair trial. The Assistant’s opening remarks to the jury were concise and free of rhetoric. Apart from a single remark that this case “is important ... because the office [the prosecutors] represent is responsible for enforcing .. . federal laws,” into which appellants manage to read an appeal to the jury’s patriotism, the prosecutor adhered closely to the facts and indictment. He ended by asking the jury to approach your responsibilities as jurors in this case in the spirit of the utmost seriousness and fairness. ... I urge you to listen carefully as the proof is presented in this case. Again, I remind you to be patient, that only one witness can testify at a time. I am confident that you are going to do that and I am equally confident that you are going to see that the defendants on trial here have a fair trial. In marked contrast, appellants’ counsel began, before a single witness had testified, to interject extraneous and potentially inflammatory considerations into the proceedings. Ljubas’s trial attorney, for example, told the jury that Ljubas was the victim of “the Communists and the Secret Police of Yugoslavia, which was trained by the Russian Secret Police;” “that attempts [on Lju-bas’s life] were made by the Communist Secret Police known as UDBA, which is the Communist Secret Police of Yugoslavia that has agents throughout this country and in various Yugoslavian embassies throughout this country;” “that [Ljubas] was [in Rome in 1970] as a devout Catholic;” and that “[t]he first Croatian Saint was canonized by the Catholic Church in 1970 and there were many Croatians that went to Rome.” The Government’s witnesses, yet to testify, were characterized as “traitors, double agents, or Communist Secret Police, trying to infiltrate and destroy people in good standing.” This collection of statements reflects the substance of the entire opening, which takes up only five pages in the transcript. The second defense counsel, representing Markich, continued this approach. Markich was labelled a victim of the “Yugoslavian Police.” Counsel then implied the Government’s case served only to advance goals of the Yugoslavian Secret Police force: ... You are going to hear how [Mar-kich] is victimized. You are going to hear about the entire story, why he is here. Now, [Ljubas’s trial counsel] has told you about the Secret Police. That’s going to be part of this entire trial. It’s going to be part of it from the beginning to the end. You are going to hear it from the government’s own witnesses, about the Yugoslavian Police, and what they do and how they do it and how they get their goals, and the object of those individuals who are here or over there are to suppress the people who speak out for freedom. That is the greatest crime of Mr. Markic [sic]. Counsel for Primorac ended his, also brief, opening with the following: I submit to you that [Primorac] wasn’t part of any conspiracy or criminal enterprise of worldwide or local or of any import, but rather that he is himself a victim of political persecution, and unfortunately the evidence will show that the United States Government through the offices of [the two prosecutors] is being used to persecute this man, and this is being done by a foreign country, a communist country, if you will. Each of the remaining defense attorneys engaged in similar conduct, including references to political or religious persecution in Yugoslavia and the alleged victimization of their clients in this country. More than oblique hints were given that the United States Government was acting at the behest of officials in Belgrade: Somehow [Logarusic] has been put into the [prosecution], either by the government informant or by the government itself or God knows, and somebody said, by the secret police. And if you think that was made up, listen carefully to the evidence in this case, because more things go on in this heaven and earth than you would suspect, especially in a case that involves foreign countries and American foreign policy and our relationships with European countries and communist countries in 1982, in 1981, in 1980. Thus, from the first, defense counsel sought to put in question the legitimacy of this prosecution and the Government’s reasons for pursuing it, as well as presenting irrelevant and potentially prejudicial political and religious matters. We have repeatedly held that the Government is ordinarily permitted to respond to arguments impugning the integrity of its case, e.g., United States v. Miller, 478 F.2d 1315, 1318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 851, 94 S.Ct. 144, 38 L.Ed.2d 100 (1973), and to “reply with rebutting language suitable to the occasion.” United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir.1979) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 162, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980). We thus consider the specific categories of alleged prosecutorial conduct, mentioned above, as having occurred in the unfortunate context of appellants’ own making. United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973). The instances where the prosecutor is alleged unfairly to have engaged in name-calling or disparagement of defendants all constitute fair comment. For example, references to appellant Ljubas as a “man of peace” or “the Croatian Albert Schweitzer” were direct responses to defense counsel’s effort, on direct examination, to portray Ljubas as a religious figure whose sole diversions were participation in the affairs of his church and religious pilgrimages. The Government had a right to rebut this defense tactic, cf. United States v. Marrale, supra, 695 F.2d at 667 (“permissible desire to dispute defense histrionics”), and the use of rhetorical devices such as sarcasm was permissible, United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982); DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) (“To shear [the prosecutor] of all oratorical emphasis, while leaving wide latitude to the defense, is to load the scales of justice; it is to deny what has always been an accepted incident of jury trials, except in those jurisdictions where any serious execution of the criminal law has yielded to a ghostly phantom of the innocent man falsely convicted.”), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706, 45 S.Ct. 640, 69 L.Ed. 1168 (1925). Similarly without merit is the contention the prosecutor relied on the prestige of his office to improperly vouch for the credibility of the Government’s case, or attack that of the defense. The long list of examples of alleged misbehavior is not only lifted from the cold record of an eleven-hour summation which comprises over three hundred transcript pages, see United States v. White, supra, 486 F.2d at 206, but it includes only one statement which arguably implied the existence of extraneous proof, or of a requirement that special credence be accorded the office of the United States Attorney, United States v. Modica, supra, 663 F.2d at 1179. All other arguments and characterizations were confined to the proof, and were “fairly based on record evidence.” United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 796, 46 L.Ed.2d 650 (1976). The cross-examination techniques employed by the Assistant were also proper. Characterizations of Ljubas as “a man of peace” already have been discussed. And supposed attempts to compel defendants to rebut the veracity of the Government’s witnesses in fact amounted to no more than requests that they characterize testimony already in evidence, concerning events in which they were alleged to have participated, as accurate or inaccurate. Indeed, on direct examination, the same or similar questions were asked. In sum, although we believe the Government would have been better advised to avoid entirely the use of words and phrases such as “lie,” “preposterous,” “sham,” and “insulting to [the jury’s] intelligence,” but see United States v. Hysohion, 439 F.2d 274, 277-79 (2d Cir.1971), its conduct here was largely responsive to the prosecutor-baiting tactics chosen by appellants, and involved almost exclusively characterizations of record testimony rather than appeals to Government expertise or extrinsic, unutilized evidence. Viewed in context, the Government’s remarks constituted fair argument, and if errors were committed, they were neither significant nor did they prejudice appellants. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., supra, 310 U.S. at 239-40, 60 S.Ct. at 851-52. The jury’s discriminating acquittal of four defendants (and partial acquittal of Logaru-sic) demonstrates it was able to rely on the evidence adduced. United States v. White, supra, 486 F.2d at 207. The Indictment Appellants contend the indictment was defective. They argue the pattern of racketeering failed to particularize the predicate acts in which each defendant was alleged to have been involved. This lack of specificity is claimed to have deprived appellants of notice of the charges against them and thereby to have thwarted effective trial preparation. This argument is without merit. An indictment need only track the language of the statute and, if necessary to apprise the defendant “of the nature of the accusation against him,” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), state time and place in approximate terms. United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272, 1277. (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985, 94 S.Ct. 1579, 39 L.Ed.2d 882 (1974). The indictment in this case clearly met this requirement. So, for example, subparagraphs 13.B. and C. allege “[the following] acts [or] threats ...: B. Arson with explosives of the home of Milan Vranes, in the vicinity of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on and [sic] about January 4, 1977. C. Transportation of dynamite from Canada to the vicinity of Chicago, Illinois, in and [sic] around the spring, 1977.” The remaining paragraphs are similarly sufficient. See Joint App. at A-56 to -59. The claim that preparation for trial could not be undertaken without knowledge of which defendants were to be tied to the individual racketeering acts is more appropriately addressed to a bill of particulars, Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(f); United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 819 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828, 82 S.Ct. 845, 7 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962), and in any event precisely this information was provided by the Government six months before trial. A letter was sent listing each of the subparagraphs of paragraph 13 of the indictment and attributing each racketeering act to one or more defendants. The Jury Charge Several elements of the jury charge are said to have been in error. First, appellants contend the jury was led to believe that conspiracy to commit the predicate acts constituted conspiracy to violate § 1962(c). We think Chief Judge Motley’s instruction on conspiracy to violate RICO, which appears in large part to have followed the Supreme Court’s recent elucidation of the statutory elements, see generally United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at 578-83, 101 S.Ct. at 2526-28, was correct. The- court first charged that “a criminal enterprise as defined in the statute [must have] existed,” and that “the defendant you have under consideration [must have been] associated with that enterprise.” “Enterprise” was defined in detail. The jury was informed that the enterprise need not have a name, or be a commonly recognized legal entity, but could be a “group of individuals who are associated in fact although not a legal entity. Thus, any group of persons who associate together in order to achieve common illegal purposes can constitute a criminal enterprise under the statute.” Compare id. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2528 (“The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”) And, the court stated that the jury “must find that a group of individuáis in fact associated together for the purposes charged in the indictment — that is, to carry out a pattern of murders, arsons, extor-tions, and racketeering travel — and that the defendant you have under consideration was one such individual who associated himself with that criminal enterprise.” Turning to the conspiracy element here under attack, the judge stated that this necessitated the defendant “unlawfully, knowingly and willfully conspired with others to conduct the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” language derived directly from 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and further distinguished from conspiracy merely to commit predicate acts of racketeering by the language which immediately followed: “that is, that the defendant conspired to commit at least two acts or threats ... in aid of racketeering in the course of the activities of the enterprise.” This instruction was well within the meaning of our cases. See United States v. Scotto, supra, 641 F.2d at 54 (one conducts activities of enterprise through pattern of racketeering when predicate offenses are simply related to activities of enterprise); United States v. Weisman, supra, 624 F.2d at 1122 (pattern of racketeering activity must be done “in the conduct of the affairs of an ‘enterprise’ ”). Appellants also argue the court was obliged to charge the elements of the penal codes of the various states where acts of racketeering occurred, and was not permitted to rely upon generic definitions of murder, arson, and extortion. We disagree. Under RICO, as under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952; see United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289-95, 89 S.Ct. 534, 536-39, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969), “[s]tate offenses are included by generic designation.” H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4032. “Courts construing the racketeering statutes have found that the references to state law serve a definitional purpose, to identify generally the kind of activity made illegal by the federal statute.” United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 1577, 55 L.Ed.2d 800 (1978); see United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 n. 8A (3d Cir.1977) (“Section 1961 requires, in our view, only that the conduct on which the federal charge is based be typical of the serious crime dealt with by the state statute, not that the .particular defendant be ‘chargeable under State law,’ at the time of the federal indictment.”) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072, 98 S.Ct. 1256, 55 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978). Absent an allegation that the racketeering act is not prohibited at all under state law, cf. United States v. Nardello, supra, 393 U.S. at 295, 89 S.Ct. at 539, a claim obviously not available to appellants here, accurate generic definitions of the crimes charged were sufficient. Finally, the court’s charges on “pattern of racketeering activity” and the “knowledge” element of conspiracy were detailed and correct. The language for the former came from the statute, and was similar to instructions we have upheld. E. g., United States v. Scotto, supra, 641 F. 2d at 53-54. As to “knowledge,” the charge provided precisely the protection appellants now claim was lacking, since the district court first defined the objective of the “overall” conspiracy, United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1111-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975), and then required the Government to demonstrate “an agreement as to the objective of the conspiracy. This does not mean that the conspirators must be shown to have agreed on the details of their criminal enterprise, but it does mean that the essential nature of the plan must be shown to have been agreed upon.” And, “mere knowledge by a defendant of the conspiracy or any illegal act on the part of an alleged co-conspirator is not sufficient to establish his relationship in the conspiracy. You must find ... actual knowing participation of [the] defendant [under consideration] in the agreement .... ” See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 16-17 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082, 100 S.Ct. 1037, 62 L.Ed.2d 767 (1980). We turn to an examination of the claims raised by individual appellants. Bagaric Bagaric advances two contentions. Initially, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, and crediting every inference in its favor as we must at this stage of the case, United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 759, 765-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 609, 66 L.Ed.2d 496 (1980), we conclude the evidence elicited from four accomplice witnesses (Caran, Skrabo, Vjelko Jaksic, and Mico Jaksic), see United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 99 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970, 96 S.Ct. 2166, 48 L.Ed.2d 793 (1976), was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on both counts. Bagaric’s participation in the enterprise commenced as early as 1975. That year, he showed Caran weapons and explosives he and Ljubas were storing in Bagaric’s basement. Caran testified Bagaric concealed the explosives in a mound of coal. Efforts were made on cross-examination to ridicule this testimony (by, for example, suggesting Bagaric did not heat his home with coal, Caran had not seen a shovel or furnace, and the pile of coal never became smaller), but a former manager of Bagaric’s building testified that in 1977, when he assumed responsibility for the building, he too saw a pile of coal in the corner of the basement. This certainly served to strengthen Caran’s credibility. Further accomplice testimony showed Ba-garic was the bomb-maker in two of the bombing incidents charged in the indictment as acts of racketeering. In 1976, Ba-garic gave Skrabo and Vjelko Jaksic a time-bomb to carry to Pittsburgh to use at the home of Milan Vranes. In 1977, Bagaric travelled to San Francisco to wire bombs in Mile Boban’s home. Later that year, Caran used one of the bombs in his unsuccessful attempt to bomb the Yugoslavian consulate in that city. This evidence, standing alone, was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict. When combined with other testimony implicating Bagaric, along with Baresic and Mico Jaksic, in an aborted attempt on the life of Father Majic; tying him to the transportation of guns and ammunition from California to New York, via Chicago, and to the delivery of blasting caps to Caran; and otherwise demonstrating his allegiance to and knowledge of the operations of the enterprise, the evidence of Bagaric’s guilt was more than ample. Bagaric’s other claim is that the district court erred by admitting evidence of an act not alleged in the indictment as one of the predicate acts of racketeering. Specifically, he objects to the testimony of Mico Jaksic, that Jaksic met with Bagaric and Baresic in 1978, and the latter two men indicated they planned to bomb the church of Father Majic, only to be dissuaded by Jaksic. Bagaric contends this testimony was prejudicial, not significantly probative, and he was den