Full opinion text
GEORGE C. PRATT, Circuit Judge: Steven Young, Alliebe Afflic, Lloyd Ward, Tangee Afflic, Charles Caviness, and Freddie Myers appeal from judgments of conviction entered on jury verdicts after a five week trial before Judge Sand in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Each appellant was convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and to possess heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (count one). In addition, Myers was convicted of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (count two), and Tangee Afflic was convicted of receiving and possessing an unregistered automatic rifle in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871 (count three). The jury also rendered a special verdict on the continuing criminal enterprise count, finding that approximately $3,000,000 of Myers’s assets, including his house, were subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2). Judge Sand sentenced Myers to 40 years’ imprisonment and a $100,000 fine; Ward to 15 years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine; Young and Caviness each to 10 years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine; Alliebe Afflic to 7 years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine; and Tangee Afflic to 18 months’ imprisonment. With the exception of Tangee Afflic, who is at liberty on bail pending this appeal, appellants have already begun serving their sentences. On appeal defendants raise a myriad of issues, the most significant of which are (1) whether the § 846 conspiracy charged against Myers in count one was an eligible predicate offense for the § 848 continuing criminal enterprise charged against him in count two; (2) whether a search of Tangee Afflic’s apartment was supported by probable cause where it was triggered by a signal from a police dog indicating (erroneously) that narcotics were present; (3) whether a warrant authorizing the search of Myers’s house specified the “things to be seized” with sufficient particularity to satisfy the fourth amendment; (4) whether the extensive use of expert testimony by agents involved in the investigation of this case deprived appellants of a fair trial; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy convictions of Young, Ward, Caviness, and Alliebe and Tangee Afflic; and (6) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the forfeiture verdict as to Myers’s home. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the convictions on all counts except for the conspiracy count against Tangee Afflic, which was not supported by sufficient evidence. However, we agree with Myers that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s special verdict as to the forfeiture of his home, and we therefore vacate the corresponding portion of the judgment of forfeiture entered by the district court. I. BACKGROUND This prosecution was the product of a 10 month investigation by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with the assistance of the police departments of New York City, the City of New Rochelle, the City of Mount Vernon, and Westchester County. According to an affidavit filed by Wilfred Garrett, the DEA agent who supervised the case, the investigation began in the spring of 1982, when the DEA obtained information from a variety of sources, including a confidential informant, a telephone book confiscated from an arrested heroin dealer, and telephone company records, suggesting that Myers, who had previously been convicted of federal narcotics violations, was involved in the trafficking of substantial quantities of heroin. Acting on this information, the DEA initiated surveillance of Myers at his home at 205 Bradley Avenue in Mount Vernon, and his office at 1650 Broadway in Manhattan. After eight months of wider surveillance had implicated Caviness, Young, and Al-liebe Afflic, among others, and after the DEA had obtained corroboration from several other confidential informants, the government obtained an order from the district court, dated January 6, 1983, authorizing the interception of telephone calls to and from two telephone numbers at Myers’s Mount Vernon home for 30 days. On February 4, 1983, that order was extended for an additional 30 days and broadened to include the two telephones at Myers’s Manhattan office. Numerous calls were intercepted and recorded, which, together with intensified surveillance, implicated Ward and Tangee Afflic, among others. The investigation culminated in a series of searches in early March 1983, all but one of which were conducted pursuant to warrants. A. The Government’s Case. As Judge Sand noted toward the end of this five week trial, all of the evidence against defendants was circumstantial. Because of this, and because each appellant has in one form or another challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, we find it necessary to review the government’s case in considerable detail. 1. Overview. The theory of the prosecution was that Myers headed a large scale operation that was involved primarily in the distribution of heroin on a retail basis in Harlem. Ward was depicted as Myers’s “principal business partner”. Caviness and Young were portrayed as “lieutenants” in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the business. Keith Anderson, who was not tried for reasons unrelated to this appeal, allegedly operated a “mill” at which relatively pure heroin was “cut”, i.e., diluted for street-level distribution. Alliebe Afflic, Myers’s common-law wife, and her two daughters, Tangee and Valerie, the latter of whom was acquitted, were allegedly “couriers” who delivered packages of heroin to street-level pushers. The remaining defendant at the trial, William Bivens, was supposedly one such pusher, but he, too, was acquitted by the jury. 2. The March 6, 1983 Searches and Arrests. Much of the evidence introduced by the government at trial was obtained on March 6, 1983 in a series of searches at seven locations belonging to or associated with the defendants. On that day, Myers’s house, his and Anderson’s offices, Ward’s house, and the apartments of Young and Anderson were all searched pursuant to warrants; Margaret Nicks, Caviness’s common-law wife, consented to a search of her apartment. (a) The Search of Myers’s House and the Arrests of Myers and Alliebe Afflic. At Myers’s lavishly furnished home in Mount Vernon, agents discovered evidence of great wealth. An astounding amount of cash was seized: $757,940 was found stuffed in a large black suitcase in the attic crawlspace; $580,100 was found in a safe in a master bedroom closet; $40,000 was found in a woman’s handbag in another master bedroom closet; and $1200 was found on top of a dresser in that room. In all, $1,379,240 in cash was confiscated. An equally astounding amount of jewelry, valued at $1,371,105, was also seized. So were two Mercedes-Benz automobiles and 29 fur coats bearing the embroidered names or initials of Myers and Alliebe Afflic. In addition to two shotguns, agents also discovered numerous photographs and documents that linked Myers and Alliebe Afflic with co-defendants Ward, Young, Caviness, and Anderson. Among the documents was a bill reflecting the sale of $75,000 worth of jewelry by Myers to Anderson and a certificate of title to a Jeep registered to Young. Myers and Alliebe Afflic were present at the time of the search and were placed under arrest pursuant to a warrant. After they were advised of their constitutional rights, they were taken to a DEA office for processing, along with the other five defendants arrested that day. Upon encountering co-defendant Ward, Myers remarked, “You have my whole crew here. It looks like we are going to have a party here tonight.” (b) The Search of the Offices of Myers and Anderson. Numerous documents and other exhibits were seized during the search of Suite 1210 at 1650 Broadway, the location of Myers’s purported businesses: Rissa Chrissa Entertainment Consultants, Inc. and Myers & Associates Consulting, Inc. Papers seized there established that Myers was Rissa Chrissa’s “executive vice president” and owned 50 percent of its stock. Business cards there indicated that Anderson, who had an office in the Rissa Chrissa suite, was a Rissa Chrissa “representative”. Other documents showed that Myers leased an apartment at Harmon Cove Towers in Secaucus, New Jersey, at a monthly rental of $1,520, paid for that apartment from the checking account of Myers & Associates Consulting, and took weekly salaries of $650 from Rissa Chrissa and $500 from Myers & Associates Consulting. In Myers’s desk agents also found an electronic device for the detection of tape recorders and electronic transmitters. (c) The Search of Anderson’s Apartment. In a back room of Anderson’s apartment at 984 Sheridan Avenue in the Bronx, agents discovered what the government contended at trial was a heroin “mill”, equipped to “cut” heroin for street-level distribution. The room featured a large table covered with a white powdered residue. Using a vacuum cleaner with a special filter, a DEA chemist collected dust samples from a rug in the mill and from its perimeter. Subsequent chemical analyses showed that these dust samples contained traces of heroin. Further, residue on a plastic strip found in the mill also was determined to contain heroin with a purity in excess of 80 percent. In addition to the heroin traces, a total of approximately 650 pounds of mannite was found in Anderson’s apartment. Most of the mannite was contained in 17,000 packages bearing the brand name “Juppa”, packed into 28 large cartons. Approximately 100 pounds of quinine were also recovered from Anderson’s apartment. Special agent Magno testified as an expert that “in your better run organizations, they will use principally quinine and mannite” to cut heroin. Among the other items that were seized from the mill were a measuring spoon, a heat sealer for sealing plastic bags, seven boxes of plastic bags, 14 wire strainers, playing cards, and shower caps. Special agent Magno testified that this type of paraphernalia was commonly used for cutting heroin. The agents also discovered in Anderson’s apartment a shotgun and bullets suitable for use in an automatic pistol. Various papers were seized as well, including telephone messages taken by Anderson from Myers and Rissa Chrissa business cards bearing the names of Myers and Anderson. One of the cards bore the handwritten notation “Train” (Young’s nickname), and the notation “Eighth Avenue, 145th and 146th Street downtown, Ace Barber”. Finally, the agents found three laundry tags bearing the name “Afflic”, which proved to be an important link in the government’s case against Alliebe Afflic. (d) The Search of Ward’s House. The search of Ward’s private residence in Teaneck, New Jersey yielded more than 90 pieces of gold and diamond jewelry; a safe containing a .38 caliber revolver loaded with “hollow point” bullets, $7,300 in cash, and a diamond ring; nine fur coats bearing Ward’s nickname “Omar” and the name of his wife Dorthula; and keys to two safe deposit boxes. On March 7, 1983, a search of Ward’s safe deposit box at the U.S. Safety Deposit Corporation in Manhattan, pursuant to a search warrant, revealed $60,020 in cash as well as two diamond rings. The aggregate value of the jewelry seized from Ward’s house and his safe deposit box was $236,-655. In addition, two Mercedes-Benz automobiles were found in his driveway, and documents showing his interest in these automobiles were found in his house. Also seized from Ward’s house were a series of imprinted business cards for “Myers & Associates Consulting, Inc.”, “Rissa Chrissa Records”, and “Rissa Chris-sa Entertainment Consultants”, all bearing the name of Freddie Myers; a telephone book that listed, among other things, the numbers of defendants Caviness (under the entry “Cad”) and Young (under the name “Train”); a telephone bill for Ward’s home telephone, showing five telephone calls to Anderson’s apartment and other calls to Myers’s home; and photographs of Ward with Myers, Caviness, Young, Anderson, and Alliebe Afflic, which were identical to some of the photographs found at Myers’s home. Other documents seized from Ward’s home reflected large expenditures, including the construction of a 16'x32' swimming pool for over $41,000, and the rental of a $975 apartment at Harmon Cove Towers, the New Jersey luxury apartment complex in which Myers had also rented an apartment. (e) The Search of Margaret Nicks’s Apartment. At the Bronx apartment of Margaret Nicks, Caviness’s common-law wife, the searching agents seized an Ohaus triple-beam balance scale, which special agent Rooney testified was commonly used to measure narcotics that are being cut. They also found $17,685 worth of jewelry belonging to Caviness, and two sets of keys on a chain with a plastic tag bearing a large letter “C”. Two of these keys opened the only two functioning locks on the door to the “mill”, Anderson’s apartment. (f) The Search of Young’s Apartment. At Young’s residence, Apartment 6A at 1600 Sedgwick Avenue in the Bronx, the agents found an Ohaus triple-beam balance scale, similar to the one found in Margaret Nicks’s apartment, as well as a variety of holsters and live ammunition, a jacket containing traces of lactose, another commonly used cutting material, and a substantial amount of jewelry. Other evidence seized in Young’s apartment included stock certificates indicating that he owned 50 percent of the Best Yet Car Service, located in the Bronx; two personal telephone books containing the telephone numbers of Ward (under the nickname “Amar”), Anderson (under his first name, Keith), and Myers (under “New York F”); and two photographs, depicting Young with co-defendants Myers, Caviness, Ward and Anderson. (g) The Search of Charles Afflic’s Apartment. The final search that took place on March 6, 1983, at the apartment of Charles Afflic, Alliebe Afflic’s son, also yielded incriminating evidence. However, Judge Sand granted Charles Afflic’s pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of this search on the ground that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. As a result of this ruling, the government, dropped Charles Afflic from the case prior to trial. 3. The Investigation Prior to March 6, 1983. (a) Surveillance of Defendants’ Activities. The jury learned of defendants’ activities prior to March 6,1983 through the testimony of officers who had conducted surveillance during the investigation. This testimony revealed Myers’s close relationship with Young and Caviness and the apparent degree of trust he placed in them. For example, Young was seen entering Myers’s garage when he was not at home. Similarly, Young and Caviness sometimes drove Myers’s cars, and frequently chauffered him to and from his office in Manhattan. Surveillance also established that Young was associated with co-defendants Ward and Bivens. At one time Young drove his Cadillac to the New Salaam Restaurant on Lenox Avenue, which was managed by Ward. Young parked the ear in front of the restaurant and went into the restaurant with an unidentified companion. After one or two minutes, Young and his companion walked out of the restaurant and were approached by Bivens. Thereupon, Young reached inside his jacket and pulled out a small package that “was white and * * * appeared to be clear plastic”, and handed the package to Bivens, who put it inside his jacket and walked away from the area. Further surveillance linked Ward with Caviness. Caviness was seen driving to the Ace Barber Shop on Eighth Avenue near 145th and 146th Street in Manhattan, a location that was also linked to Anderson through a written notation on a Rissa Chrissa business card found in Anderson’s apartment. After double-parking his car, Caviness entered the barbershop without carrying anything, and returned less than two minutes later with a package which he put in the glove compartment. He then drove to the New Salaam Restaurant, where he met Ward. Like Ward, Young, and Caviness, Alliebe and Tangee Afflic were also the subjects of extensive surveillance. On one occasion, Alliebe Afflic was seen driving to West 116th Street, where she gave a brown bag to an unidentified man who immediately entered a building that was surrounded by 25 to 30 people. The government offered expert testimony that these people “were waiting to purchase drugs.” On another occasion, Alliebe Afflic drove to Fifth Avenue between 119th and 120th Streets, accompanied by her daughter Valerie. After double-parking the car, Alliebe Afflic waited for almost ten minutes until Bivens approached. Reaching into the car and grabbing a folded newspaper that contained a small black bag, Bivens tucked it under his arm and walked across Fifth Avenue. On a third occasion, Alliebe Afflic drove with Tangee Afflic to the vicinity of the building in which Myers maintained his office in Manhattan. The women parked the car in a garage on 52nd Street and walked toward the office building. Tangee Afflic was carrying a shopping bag. After turning onto Seventh Avenue, Tangee Afflic came back around the corner and stared directly at detective Magaletti, the surveillance officer. The women then continued toward the office building, “both looking all around.” Tangee Afflic went directly into the 51st Street entrance of the building, while her mother walked further down the block, turned around and entered the building. When Alliebe and Tangee Afflic left the building together about 15 minutes later, neither was carrying anything. The following day, Tangee Afflic was seen in front of 1600 Sedgwick Avenue in the Bronx. She brought “a small white package, or small white bag” out of the building and handed it to Alliebe Afflic, who was seated in her car, parked outside the building. Alliebe Afflic then drove home. Additional surveillance, some of which was videotaped and played for the jury, linked Bivens to a building with a red door on Fifth Avenue between 118th and 119th Streets. At various times, a dozen or more people congregated in front of this location. Bivens appeared to control their access to and from the building. In addition, on one occasion, Bivens was seen on West 120th Street, handing an unidentified woman “[ajbout twelve” “glassine bags or little packages”, which he counted out in exchange for money. Officer Hight was permitted to narrate as the government played for the jury a videotape of activities at the “red door” location. In addition, as the government’s expert on street-level narcotics transactions, he testified that in his opinion, there was a narcotics “shooting gallery” behind the door, the people in front of the door included “lookouts” and “touts”, and some of the other people observed during the surveillance were distributing heroin. (b) The Intercepted Conversations. Several of the intercepted conversations that were played for the jury purportedly shed further light on the relationship among various defendants. For example, Myers gave Caviness what the government contended were “coded” instructions about a narcotics transaction he wanted to take place on 112th Street in Harlem. Using the name “Pleasure”, Myers called Young at the Best Yet Car Service office, and asked to speak to Caviness, whom he directed in the following manner: Myers: Yeah, ah, what you, what I was telling you about the, uh, uh, uh, Twelfth Street, uh, do that by yourself, that part. Caviness: Uh, huh. Myers: Y’know? And, ah, y’know and the fellow go ahead, and, and be with his lady. Caviness: Yeah. Myers: Understand? What, where we’re talking about around Twelfth Street. Caviness-. Yeah. Myers: Y’understand? Caviness: Uh huh. Myers: And, that way, that’ll be cool. Caviness: O.K. Similarly, Myers castigated Ward for not bringing something to him on time, but did not suggest what he was referring to. Myers reminded Ward that he had told him “[E]ither give it to me late Tue-, Monday, or early Tuesday,” and complained about not hearing from Ward until 2:30 P.M. on Tuesday. He reiterated that “[t]he last thing I told you was I said, man, either come see me late Monday, or see me early Tuesday, so I can take care of my business!” Finally, he instructed Ward to “come on up so I can take care of that.” Along the same lines, one “Lee” called Myers’s office and told Ward that he “left somethin’ * * * in the drawer for Fred * * * in two little bags.” He told Ward to look for them, and to give them to Myers if he did not show up. Finally, Myers was connected to Anderson’s apartment by a telephone call made to Myers at his office. On February 24, 1983, a woman named Robin Majors called Myers to make arrangements for a trip that Myers, Ward, and others were taking to Atlantic City. When she asked Myers if there was a place she could leave a message late at night, Myers asked Anderson for “the number uptown to the apartment with the machine on it.” Myers then gave Majors the telephone number of Anderson’s Sheridan Avenue apartment, the “mill”, which was equipped with a telephone answering machine. (c) Defendants’ Efforts to Detect and Elude Visual and Electronic Surveillance. There was also evidence that many defendants were aware that they were subject to the surveillance and sought to avoid it. For example, Myers, Caviness, and Young frequently drove their cars as if they were seeking to determine whether they were being followed, and if so, by whom. On one occasion, soon after Caviness had driven to Myers’s home in Myers’s blue Mercedes-Benz, Young, who was driving Caviness’s BMW, suddenly stopped the car en route to Myers’s house, remaining in the ear and looking over his left shoulder for approximately five minutes. He then proceeded to Myers’s house in the BMW and went inside. About one hour later, Young and Caviness left Myers’s house and entered Caviness’s car; Young was carrying a small light-colored package in his hand. Both men looked up and down the street before entering the car, as they frequently did before entering Myers’s house. Thereafter, Caviness and Young drove at an unusually slow rate of speed. Another time, while driving from Myers’s house to Manhattan, Caviness pulled to the side of the road to let a surveillance car pass him. He then took a meandering tour of local streets in the Bronx — often starting and stopping erratically — taking about one hour for a distance ordinarily travelled in five minutes. Similarly, while being tailed one time, Myers surprised the surveillance officer by abruptly leaving the West Side Highway at the 79th Street exit. Myers immediately returned to the highway and followed the surveillance vehicle to the vicinity of 57th Street. Defendants’ sensitivity to surveillance by law enforcement officers was demonstrated not only by their actions in response to visual surveillance, but also by their own words. In several wiretapped conversations, they specifically talked about detecting or eluding surveillance. Intercepted conversations also revealed defendants’ concern that their telephones might be wiretapped. For example, in two telephone conversations with Charles and Tangee Afflic, Alliebe Afflic said that the telephones were messed up . On one such occasion, she told Tangee Afflic to be “careful ’ not to talk in her home. A similar exchange took place when Alliebe Afflic called Myers to inform him that one Tito Johnson had just been arrested by “the Feds” after “five pounds” of “stuff” had been found in an apartment where Johnson had been staying. Myers responded by making a transparent attempt to change the subject, saying, “Uh huh, so I didn’t know nothing about it. I ain’t seen the motherfucker in a hundred years. „ ' 1 know y°u didn>t cal1 me t0 tel1 me (d) “The Flash Inn Incident”. One of the more important episodes in the investigation was the so-called “Flash Inn Incident”. On January 14, 1983, at 9:34 P.M., a man identified only as “Joe” placed a call from one of Myers’s home telephones to another man named Rudy at a bar in Queens called “Mr. Ugly”. Joe suggested that they meet at “The Flashin’ Inn”. When Rudy hesitated, Joe said to Myers, “He don’t know how to get there too good. Anywhere else, Freddie?” Although Myers suggested a Mobil gasoline station on 125th Street, Rudy ultimately agreed to meet at “The Flashin’ Inn”. Joe asked Myers when they would leave to go to this meeting and Myers said, “Half an hour.” After this conversation, Myers and an unidentified man were followed as they left Myers’s house and travelled in Myers’s car to the Flash Inn, a bar located on the Manhattan side of the Macombs Dam Bridge. Myers and his passenger remained in the car with the engine running and the lights on for approximately 25 minutes. A white Lincoln with Pennsylvania license plates occupied by two unidentified men then pulled up about 15 feet from Myers’s car. The driver of the Lincoln approached Myers’s Mercedes-Benz, talking with Myers and his passenger for a few minutes before returning to the Lincoln, All four men then entered the Flash Inn. Myers’s passenger carried a small light-colored handbag. Two minutes later, Myers’s passenger came out of the bar, looking back and forth, this time carrying a dark-colored handbag, which he placed in the trunk of the Lincoln. He then returned to the Flash Inn. Two minutes later, Myers emerged from the Flash Inn, went to his car, and drove away by himself. Notwithstanding the agents’ failure either to apprehend the principals involved or to seize either of the handbags that were exchanged at the Plash Iim> detective Maga]etti, one of the agents who witnessed the incident, testified as an expert “that it was a narcotics transaction that took place.” He went on to explain that “[t]he telephone call was placed by a middleman to the buyer of the narcotics”, that participants in transactions of this nature “talk coded”, that the exchange took place at the Flash Inn, a public place, to avoid a possible “rip-off”, and that the middleman, rather than Myers, carried the narcotics into the Flash Inn, so that “[if] they are stopped g°in£ to the door the middleman’s got it, n°t Freddie.” ^ The Seizure °f an M~16 A1 Aut°matic Rifle at Tangee Afflic s Apart-men! On February 27, 1983, one week before the other searches in this case, DEA agents executed an oral search warrant at Tangee Afflic s apartment, Apartment 7A at 1600 Sedgwick Avenue in the Bronx. Tangee shared this apartment ^ with Young, although Young also maintained an apartment of his own in the same building. As discussed in detail in Section II B infra, this search warrant was based in part on a signal from a police dog indicating that narcotics were present in the apartment. In fact, none were found there, but behind a dresser near the bed in Tangee’s bedroom agents found an automatic rifle and two loaded magazines, with a total capacity of 50 shells. This rifle was the subject of the firearms violation alleged in count three of the indictment. Also seized from Tangee’s bedroom were two fur jackets, one bearing the name “Tan-gee” and a picture of a train (“Train” was Young’s nickname), and gold jewelry worth a total of $6,120. Shortly after the search warrant had been executed, at 7:32 A.M., Myers called Young at his own apartment, one floor below Tangee Afflic’s. He told Young that “the Feds just went in Tangee’s house, man, and kicked the door down” and that “[t]hey got dogs up in the house, sniffing”. Reporting that the agents had seized a gun, Myers said, “I don’t think they found nothing but that though.” Myers told Young that “[i]f they had dogs, you know what they’re looking for,” leading Young to speculate that his own conduct might have occasioned the search: Young: You know what they’re probably looking for? ’Cause I had came in here with a fucking bag and my briefcase. Myers: Yeah. Young: When, ahh, when my motherfucking, you know my books were in the store. Myers: Yeah. Yeah. Young: Yeah, That’s probably what happened. 4. Evidence of the Lack of Any Legitimate Source for Defendants’ Wealth. The final component in the government’s case was a series of income tax returns demonstrating that neither Myers, Alliebe Afflic, Ward, Caviness, nor Young had any legitimate reported source of income that would explain their considerable wealth. Myers, who in 1983 had over $3,000,000 in assets, listed income of only $18,500 and $7,000 in 1977 and 1978, respectively. And even this income he attributed to an unspecified source “Other” than wages or salary. In 1979, Myers reported a total of $4,950 in salary from Sound Place, Inc. and Rissa Chrissa. In 1980, Myers listed an adjusted gross income of $27,100, and in 1981, he reported a gross income of $22,-449, nearly all of which was purportedly earned as an “Entertainment Consultant” working for Rissa Chrissa. On April 13, 1983, a little more than one month after his arrest in this case, when Myers applied for an automatic extension of time in which to file a 1982 federal income tax return, he stated that his 1982 tax liability was $11,-115. The government also sought to establish that Rissa Chrissa’s financial condition could not have generated any legitimate, albeit unreported, income for Myers. Unaudited financial statements for Rissa Chrissa for the nine months ending September 30, 1982, showed total assets of $581, current liabilities of $80,000, a retained deficit of $79,619, and $43,663 net loss for the first three quarters of calendar year 1982. Rissa Chrissa’s corporate income tax returns confirmed that the business, which began operation in 1979, had never made a profit. Equally unimpressive was the financial condition of Myers & Associates Consulting, which was formed in April 1982. Other than “inconsequential” receipts, its corporate checkbook was the only financial record. That checkbook showed few deposits and few expenditures other than Myers’s $500 weekly salary, rent and electricity for Myers’s New Jersey apartment, and estimated tax payments on Myers’s personal taxes. Alliebe Afflic filed no federal income tax returns for the years 1977 through 1980, inclusive. In 1981, she listed $30,000 in “gambling winnings” as her only reportable income. For 1982, she filed a request for an automatic extension of the time to file a return, stating that she had incurred no income tax liability and that she had no taxes withheld and no estimated tax paid. Although in 1983 he owned a home with a swimming pool, $236,655 in jewelry, two Mercedes-Benz automobiles, and rented a luxury apartment, Ward filed no income tax return in 1977 and reported incomes of $6,500 in 1978, $7,800 in 1979 and $6,625 in 1980. In each of those years, he listed his occupation as “food clerk”. In 1981, he reported a salary of $26,500, which he attributed to his position as manager of the New Salaam West Restaurant. Ward filed no return for 1982. Young, who in 1983 had a Cadillac and a Jeep registered in his name and possessed over $16,000 in jewelry, reported income of $4,200 in 1977, earned while working for the Fort Wayne Candy & Cigar Co. in Pittsburgh; $4,888.45 in 1978, earned as a clerk with B. Jadow & Sons, Inc. in Manhattan; $9,132.95 in 1979, earned working for both Fort Wayne and Jadow; and $3,183.81 in 1980, earned as a stock clerk with Jadow. Young filed no returns for 1981 and 1982. Caviness, who in 1983 possessed over $17,000 in jewelry and drove a 1982 BMW, filed no federal income tax returns for any year between 1977 and 1982, inclusive. B. The Defense Case. Defendants Myers, Alliebe Afflic, Valerie Afflic, Tangee Afflic, and Bivens each presented evidence. To counter some of the government’s expert testimony, Myers called Daniel Sweeney, a former policeman, who testified as an expert that the location depicted in the video tapes on which Bivens appeared was a “numbers” operation, not a narcotics distribution point. Myers also offered evidence that “Juppa” brand mannite could be purchased in a number of stores in Greenwich Village. Alliebe Afflic called Clementine Stokes, an employee of the Broadway Exclusive Cleaners, who testified about laundry tags of the type found in Anderson’s apartment. She also called William Rawald, a former member of the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force, who testified at great length concerning the operation of heroin mills in general, and suggested that Anderson’s apartment was only a location from which cutting materials were sold. In addition, she introduced a stipulation concerning the lack of identifiable fingerprints on the gun seized at Tangee Afflie’s apartment. Tangee Afflic offered a stipulation and payroll records establishing her employment in a Manhattan daycare center. Bivens testified in his own behalf, admitting that he was a “numbers runner”, but denying that he sold narcotics. He testified that the Fifth Avenue building with the red door housed a numbers operation for which he worked. He also called several numbers customers to corroborate his testimony. II. DISCUSSION A. Myers’s Conviction Under 21 U.S.C. § 848. Myers’s principal contention on appeal is that he was improperly convicted on count two of conducting a “continuing criminal enterprise” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. More specifically, Myers contends (1) that the general narcotics conspiracy charged in count one under 21 U.S.C. § 846 was improperly charged as a predicate offense underlying count two’s continuing criminal enterprise; and (2) that the uncharged predicate offenses, which were submitted to the jury in support of count two, and which arose out of the Flash Inn incident and Myers’s alleged use of the telephone to conduct narcotics-related business, were flawed in several respects. 1. The Statutory Scheme. Title 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) makes it unlawful to engage in a “continuing criminal enterprise”. Under § 848(b), one engages in such an enterprise if: (1) he violates any provision of this subchapter [21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904] or subchapter II of this chapter [21 U.S.C. §§ 951-66] the punishment for which is a felony, and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter— (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. As the statute has been construed by the fourth circuit, United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69 (4th Cir.1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1005, 102 S.Ct. 1642, 71 L.Ed.2d 874, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2966, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982), and by Judge Sand below, its “elements are divided in two parts. First, it is necessary to prove the predicate felony violation [referred to in subsection (1) ] (element one) and second, the other elements [referred to in subsection (2)] must be proved.” United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76. With respect to the first of the statute’s “other elements”, the “continuing series of violations” required by subsection (b)(2), there is a consensus of authority that to establish a “series” the government must prove at least three felony violations. United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 174 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2945, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982); United States v. Chagra, 653 F.2d 26, 27-28 (1st Cir.1981), cert., denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1252, 71 L.Ed.2d 445 (1982); see United States v. Graziano, 710 F.2d 691, 697 n. 11 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1013 (5th Cir.1981), cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 865, 100 S.Ct. 136, 62 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979). This does not necessarily mean, however, that the government must obtain convictions on a minimum of three felony violations to establish a continuing criminal enterprise. United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 78; compare United States v. Gomberg, 715 F.2d 843, 850 n. 4 (3d Cir.1983) (unnecessary to reach the question); United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1000 n. 15 (5th Cir.) (same), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1975). On a number of occasions, this court has affirmed § 848 convictions where the government apparently did not indict the defendant on three of the eligible predicate felonies in addition to the § 848 count, e.g., United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1020 n. 1 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1271 & n. 2 (2d Cir.1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 981, 1019, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408, 100 S.Ct. 1833, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980), or indicted the defendant on three or more of the eligible predicate felonies in addition to the § 848 count but ultimately obtained convictions on two or less of them, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 130-31, 167 (2d Cir.1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 1833, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980); United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1328, 1345 (2d Cir.1974) (Sperling I), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). Further, “some courts have apparently allowed proof of an overt act in violation of the drug laws to suffice [as a “violation”], even though it was not the basis for a separate substantive count.” United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d at 1000 n. 15 (citing cases). Moreover, in Sperling I, 506 F.2d at 1344, this court stated that an indictment charging a violation of § 848 need not “specify each violation constituting the continuing series of violations proscribed by the statute.” In light of this language, Myers has conceded (but only for purposes of his appeal to this court) that in order to support a § 848 charge, the government is not required to plead in any form, much less obtain convictions on, any of the eligible predicate offenses, but may instead simply prove at trial the continuing series of offenses. As to the next requirement of the statute, that the continuing series of violations be undertaken by the defendant in concert with five or more other persons whom the defendant supervises, it is sufficient to note that the government need not establish that the defendant acted in concert with each of the other five persons at the same time. E.g., United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 157. Finally, the government must demonstrate that the defendant obtained “substantial income or resources” from the “continuing series of violations” referred to in § 848(b)(2). See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 588 (10th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Graziano, 710 F.2d at 697-99. 2. The Instant Indictment and Jury Charge. To understand how the continuing criminal enterprise charged in count two of the indictment was tried to the jury, it is first necessary to focus on the § 846 conspiracy charged in count one, which alleged that Myers conspired with his co-defendants and others to possess and to distribute heroin. It then alleged 17 overt acts, the last of which consisted of a series of 15 telephone calls made “in order to facilitate the distribution of heroin, or possession of heroin with intent to distribute or conspiracy to distribute heroin and to possess heroin with intent to distribute it.” Building on count one, and tracking the language of § 848, count two of the indictment charged Myers with: * * * engaging] in a continuing criminal enterprise in that he committed violations of Subchapter I of Chapter 13, Title 21, United States Code, including the violations alleged in count one of this Indictment, all of which count is incorporated by reference herein, as well as other violations of said statutes, all of which violations were part of a continuing series of violations of said statutes undertaken by FREDDIE MYERS in concert with at least five other persons with respect to whom FREDDIE MYERS occupied the position of organizer, supervisor and manager and from which continuing series of violations FREDDIE MYERS obtained substantial income and resources. In his charge to the jury, Judge Sand initially stated that in order to convict Myers on count two, the government had to prove “three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws, and that such violations were related acts committed over a period of time.” However, at the request of Myers’s attorney and consistent with the two-tier approach of United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, and the structure of the indictment, Judge Sand also instructed the jury that one of those three or more violations had to be the § 846 conspiracy charged in count one. The court thus charged the jury — over the government’s objection— that it could not consider count two unless and until it found Myers guilty of the conspiracy count. With respect to the other potential predicate offenses, Judge Sand instructed the jury it could find that “on January 14, 1983 [the day of the Flash Inn incident], defendant Myers was guilty of two crimes, first, of possessing heroin with intent to distribute it, and second, the crime of actually distributing heroin.” (emphasis added). The judge also instructed the jury it could find that Myers was guilty of seven violations of the federal narcotics law prohibiting the use of the telephone in committing, causing, or facilitating narcotics offenses, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), as a result of his participation in seven of the telephone conversations listed under the last overt act in count one of the indictment. 3. Section 846 as a Predicate Offense for § 848. Against this backdrop, we turn to Myers’s main argument that the § 846 conspiracy charged in count one was improperly used as a predicate for the § 848 continuing criminal enterprise charged in count two. Emphasizing that the same essential facts supported both counts, Myers submits that the conspiracy charged in count one was a lesser included offense of the continuing criminal enterprise charged in count two, and, as such, was ineligible as a predicate. Put another way, Myers contends that since a narcotics conspiracy must always be proved to satisfy the “in concert” requirement of § 848(b)(2)(A), the same conspiracy cannot also be used as the felony violation required by § 848(b)(1). To allow the same conspiracy to satisfy both of these statutory elements would, in Myers’s view, “collapse them into a single element, in complete derrogation of the Congressional scheme.” Myers’s brief at 21. The government, on the other hand, disputes both Myers’s premise that a § 846 conspiracy is a lesser included offense within § 848, and his conclusion that such a lesser included conspiracy may not be used as a predicate offense of a continuing criminal enterprise. According to the government, § 848 means exactly what it says: any felony violation of Subchapter I or II of Chapter 13 of Title 21 may serve as a predicate violation under § 848; the statute does not say any felony violation except a lesser included § 846 conspiracy. While the precise issue raised by Myers has not heretofore been the subject of extensive consideration in the courts, several circuits have briefly touched on the question. In United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76, the fourth circuit stated, without any explanation, that “[ojne may not first prove a conspiracy to distribute to establish a § 846 violation, and then move on to convict under § 848 as well, by using the very same conspiracy to distribute for the felony violation of the federal narcotics laws [required by § 848(b)(1) ].” Nevertheless, the court in Lurz went on to hold that a second § 846 conspiracy, upon which a conviction had already been obtained, which was also “altogether distinct” from the § 846 violation that the government used to satisfy § 848(b)(1), could be used to satisfy all of the “other elements” set forth in § 848(b)(2). Id. at 76-77. More recently, in United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 702 (7th Cir.1983), the seventh circuit noted “that § 846 stands in a different posture with respect to § 848 than do the substantive offense provisions of the Act”. The court elaborated in a footnote, citing Lurz, that “the substantive offenses may serve as predicate offenses for a conviction under § 848, while a conspiracy offense under § 846 may not.” Id. n. 27. In contrast, in United States v. Middleton, 673 F.2d 31 (1st Cir.1982), the first circuit, per Judge Timbers, remarked that “[ejither possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), or conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute it, id., § 846, may serve as the predicate offense.” Id. at 33. However, that court was concerned with the issue of successive prosecutions under the double jeopardy clause and had no need to address the precise issue presently before us. Finally, in United States v. Raffone, 693 F.2d 1343, 1349 n. 12 (11th Cir.1982), the eleventh circuit merely observed that “[wjhile the former Fifth Circuit never took a position on whether or not a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 can be a predicate offense under § 848, see United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979), at least one Circuit Court of Appeals has said that it can. See United States v. Middleton, 673 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1982).” While there is thus a paucity of reasoned authority directly on point, the relationship between § 846 and § 848 has been more thoroughly explored in the somewhat analogous context of multiple punishments under the double jeopardy clause. In United States v. Sperling, 560 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1977) (Sperling II), this court held that cumulative sentences could not be imposed on a defendant convicted of violating both § 846 and § 848 where the convictions were based on the same underlying facts. The court in Sperling II rested its decision on two related grounds. See United States v. Martinez-Torres, 556 F.Supp. 1255, 1260-67 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd 722 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.1983). First, it reasoned that * * * on the facts here involved, § 846 defines a lesser included offense within § 848. One of the elements required to convict of a § 848 offense is that the defendant shall have violated the narcotics laws “in concert with five or more other persons.” “Concerted” means “mutually contrived or agreed on,” or “performed in unison.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 233 (1976 ed.). We think it is too plain for cavil that to act “in concert” to violate the law necessarily includes conspiring to do so, and, hence, to prove the continuing criminal enterprise charge is to prove the conspiracy. * In the present setting, then, these two offenses are “the same in law and in fact.” 560 F.2d at 1055 (citations omitted). Second, after reviewing the relevant legislative history, the Sperling II court found “that Congress did not intend §§ 846 and 848 to be offenses separately and simultaneously punishable where the facts on which the violations rest are the same”. Id. at 1059. Although the government would have us confine the lesser included offense analysis of Sperling II to the cumulative punishment context, we believe it applies with equal force in a case like the one at bar. We are aware, of course, that in Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 144 n. 9, 149-50 & n. 15, 153 n. 20, 155, 97 S.Ct. 2207 (1977), which involved issues of both consecutive prosecutions and cumulative punishments under the double jeopardy clause, the Supreme Court “expressly declined to settle ‘definitively’ the issue as to whether § 846 was a lesser included offense of § 848.” United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir.1984); see United States v. Gomberg, 715 F.2d at 849-50 & n. 3. Nevertheless, we decline the government’s invitation to limit the language of Sperling II, which has been followed by numerous courts, e.g., United States v. Graziano, 710 F.2d at 699; United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C.Cir.1983); United States v. Samuelson, 697 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Smith, 690 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir.1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S.Ct. 1435, 75 L.Ed.2d 793 (1983); United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d at 1001. As we suggested in Sperling II, § 846 is a lesser included offense of § 848 in the purest form: as a matter of statutory definition, § 848 necessarily encompasses § 846. See generally Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included Offense, 50 Brooklyn L.Rev. 191, 198-203 (1984); cf. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1446-47, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) (Rehnquist, J, dissenting). Thus, whatever facts may be alleged in any given indictment, there can never be a § 848 violation without a violation of § 846, although as the Lurz case illustrates, not every § 846 conspiracy entered into by a § 848 defendant is necessarily included within the § 848 charge. Our reaffirmance here of Sperling II, however, does not compel the conclusion that the lesser included § 846 conspiracy charged against Myers in count one was ineligible as a predicate for the § 848 continuing criminal enterprise charged in count two. To begin with, the statutory language is unambiguous. Section 848(a)(1) provides that any felony violation of Subchapters I and II of Chapter 13 of Title 21 is an eligible predicate, and nothing in the text of either § 848 or § 846 suggests that although a § 846 conspiracy is such a felony it does not qualify as a predicate for a § 848 charge. The reference in § 848 to “any” felony violation of the narcotics laws does not mean “any felony violation except a § 846 conspiracy”. In an analogous context under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) we refused to exclude illegitimate enterprises from the expression “any enterprise” found in 18 U.S.C. § 1962. We found the word “any” to be “clear, precise and unambiguous,” and we noted that “Congress could, if it intended any other meaning, have inserted a single word of restriction.” United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir.1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 736, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977); accord United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at 581, 101 S.Ct. at 2527 (“[h]ad Congress not intended to reach criminal associations [under RICO], it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, ‘legitimate.’ ”). Similarly here, had congress intended to exclude § 846 violations from the list of permissible predicates for a continuing criminal enterprise, it could have inserted limiting language in § 848. We are therefore obliged to follow this plain statutory language “in the absence of ‘a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary’ ”. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Commission v. GTE Syl-vania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). As we read the history of § 848, there is no indication whatsoever, much less a “clear expression”, of any such contrary legislative intent. The house report, for example, echoes the statutory language, construing § 848(b)(1) as requiring proof of a violation of “any provision * * which is punishable as a felony”. H.Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4566, 4618. While it may well be that congress never specifically considered whether lesser included § 846 conspiracies should be eligible as § 848 predicates, it has provided us with no specific direction that they should not. Further, there is no reason to believe that allowing a lesser included § 846 conspiracy to serve as a § 848 predicate is at odds with the general congressional intent underlying § 848. Described by some courts as the “King Pin” statute, see United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir.1978) (citing cases), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 907, 99 S.Ct. 1214, 59 L.Ed.2d 454 (1979), section 848 was aimed at “the business of trafficking in the prohibited drugs on a continuing, serious, widespread, supervisory and substantial basis.” United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 602-03 (2d Cir.1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2651, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974). In our view, a “continuing series” of violations consisting of a § 846 offense and two of the other designated offenses is a sufficiently serious matter to trigger these congressional concerns. Further, before a defendant charged with such a series may receive the severe penalties provided for in § 848, the government must also establish that he was manager or supervisor of five other people and that he accumulated substantial resources from his narcotics dealings. We are unpersuaded by Myers’s argument that permitting a lesser included § 846 conspiracy to serve as a § 848 predicate “collapses” the statutory elements. His view makes sense only if one treats the felony violation required by § 848(a)(1) and the continuing series of violations required by § 848(a)(2) as separate elements. In actuality, however, these elements overlap, since the (a)(1) felony violation must be part and parcel of the (a)(2) continuing series. The overlap may take on an added dimension when a § 846 conspiracy is used as one of the predicate felonies, but the fact that the entire series must be carried out “in concert” is no reason to prevent a § 846 violation from qualifying as one of the series. Moreover, even if the (a)(1) felony and the (a)(2) continuing series are viewed as separate elements, Myers’s argument is still unavailing in light of our decision in United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2124, 77 L.Ed.2d 1304 (1983). In Mazzei, a RICO case, we held that while the government was required to prove, as two distinct elements of RICO, the existence of both an “enterprise”-and a “pattern of racketeering activity”, it was not necessary “that proof of these separate elements be distinct and independent, as long as the proof offered is sufficient to satisfy both elements.” Id. at 89. See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2528 (“the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce”). The same rule applies here. In the absence of any indication that congress intended to impose the unusual requirement that each element of a compound offense like § 848 should be satisfied by distinct and independent proof, we are unwilling to read such a limitation into the statute. We therefore hold that a lesser included § 846 conspiracy may serve as a predicate offense for a § 848 continuing criminal enterprise. The only remaining issue involving the relationship between these statutes is Myers’s claim that there was “plain error” because the court failed to give what he refers to as the “typical” lesser included offense charge, i.e., that the jury should first consider the greater offense, and only if the defendant is found not guilty of that offense should the jury consider the lesser included offense. As previously noted, Judge Sand charged the jury precisely the opposite, i.e., that it should not even consider the § 848 count unless it first found Myers guilty on the § 846 count. Myers cannot now complain of this charge, however, because he requested it, and not even the plain error doctrine permits reversal on the ground that the trial court granted a defendant’s request to charge. “We have been especially reluctant to reverse for plain error when it is ‘invited.’ ” United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C.Cir.1982). “Appellant not only failed to raise any objection to the court’s charge, but it is clear that his retained trial counsel specifically requested and urged the trial court to give the instruction now objected to. In such circumstances we decline to find error, plain or otherwise.” United States v. Thurman, 417 F.2d 752, 753 (D.C. Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1026, 90 S.Ct. 1269, 25 L.Ed.2d 535 (1970). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 n. 2, 71 S.Ct. 857, 862 n. 2, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (“petitioners themselves requested a charge similar to the one given, and under Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., would appear to be barred from raising this point on appeal”), reh’g denied, 342 U.S. 842, 72 S.Ct. 20, 96 L.Ed. 636 (1951), reh’g denied, 355 U.S. 936, 78 S.Ct. 409, 2 L.Ed.2d 419 (1958); United States v. Wiggins, 530 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C.Cir.1976) (“an invited error generally does not require reversal, i.e., appellant cannot now complain that the court gave an instruction which he requested”); Petschl v. United States, 369 F.2d 769, 774 (8th Cir.1966) (“A party is in no position to challenge the giving of an instruction which he has requested”); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 194 (8th Cir. 1955) (“The defendants are not in a position to object to an instruction given at their request”). 4. The Predicate Acts Arising Out of the Flash Inn Incident. Myers next argues that Judge Sand erred in permitting the jury to consider evidence of the Flash Inn incident as predicate offenses on count two. Myers contends that the government’s proof “did not even come close to establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Myers was involved in a substantive heroin transaction on January 14th”. Myers’s brief at 29. Further, Myers contends that Judge Sand erred in charging the jury that proof of the single Flash Inn incident could be considered as two separate offenses — possession of heroin with intent to distribute it and distribution of heroin. By way of background to these arguments, in connection with his Rule 29 motion Myers argued that both counts of the indictment should have been dismissed primarily because there was no evidence that the various packages and envelopes that defendants were seen carrying contained heroin, as opposed to “counterfeit/ money”, “stolen bonds”, “cocaine”, “Quaaludes, marijuana, [or] the multitude of narcotic drugs that seem to pop up from year to year.” During the trial Judge Sand distributed a draft charge adopting the government’s argument that the jury could find a “series” of offenses composed of the conspiracy charged in count one, telephone calls made in furtherance of that conspiracy, and two substantive offenses based on the Flash Inn incident. Myers’s trial counsel objected to this portion of the proposed charge in the following manner: Before we go any further, can I suggest something at this point: It was made with some degree of precision at the Rule 29 motion but in the context of the charge to the jury, we would object to the inclusion of any descriptive language which permits the jury to determine guilt on Count 2 based upon their finding that a crime was committed, which is not charged in the indictment, which is, of course, what we are going over right now, in other words, the government’s assertion in the charge of definitions of crimes which are not set forth in the indictment. So that what we are saying really, two things would work, one is that the indictment is insufficient on its face, No. 2 — actually, three things — No. 2, even if the indictment is sufficient, that the government has failed substantively to prove the charges, and No. 3, that they cannot, can’t be included in the charge to the jury. So that the jury should not be permitted at this juncture to determine whether a substantive crime is committed where that substantive crime has not been charged in the indictment. Judge Sand responded: I really think that is not an objection to the charge, but is an aspect of the Rule 29 motion. In any event, I don’t accept it as a correct statement of the law, and the objection predicated on that is overruled. With this background in mind, we turn to Myers’s argument that Judge Sand erred in submitting the Flash Inn incident to the jury. W