Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT GIBBONS, Circuit Judge: Eleven law firms appeal from an order allowing fees out of a fund resulting from the settlement of class actions charging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The order was entered after a hearing on objections to fee applications made on behalf of some members of the plaintiff class. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Evolution of the Fee Dispute On March 3, 1978, twelve separate fine paper pricefixing lawsuits were transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation for coordinated and consolidated pretrial proceedings to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where four such actions were already pending. The first of these sixteen actions had been filed on July 18, 1977 in the Northern District of Illinois by the law firm of Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. Other actions were later filed in different districts around the country, and these, too, were eventually transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Prior to the March 3,1978 transfer, some members of the law firms which had filed the initial cases met, first in Atlanta in January of 1978, and again in Chicago on February 3, 1978, to organize a common strategy for the handling of the litigation. At the February 3, 1978 meeting these plaintiffs’ lawyers, acting as a committee of the whole, elected an Executive Committee, which designated Granvil I. Specks, Esq., of the Chicago firm of Specks & Goldberg, Ltd., and Harold Kohn, Esq., of the Philadelphia firm of Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C., as co-chairmen. Both Specks and Kohn were experienced in the successful representation of plaintiffs in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) class actions. Those present at the February 13, 1978 meeting also agreed upon a lead counsel team, comprised of Specks, Kohn, Joseph Cotchett, John Noll and, later, Seymour Kurland. Shortly after the March 3, 1978 transfer order, and ten months prior to any class certification, the trial court held a pretrial conference at which, over the objection of the Attorney General of California, who represented one plaintiff, it approved the organizational structure proposed by plaintiffs’ counsel. App.A. 130-43. The court by order expressly approved the creation of the Executive Committee, and expressly contemplated the establishment by that committee of additional standing committees. At the time of this pretrial conference a number of subcommittees, including a Rule 37 Subcommittee, a Plaintiffs’ Discovery Committee, a Compliance With Defendants’ Discovery Committee, an Industrial Analysis Committee and a Finance Committee, had already been created by the Executive Committee. App. 0 262-67. The same Pretrial Order which approved the organizational structure of plaintiffs’ counsel also fixed a 30 day time limit for the filing of a motion or motions for class certification, and a 90 day time limit for completion of discovery relating to class action issues. App. A 138-39. It was not until February of 1979, however, that the court certified a national class of direct purchasers of fine paper. Meanwhile, however, settlement discussions went forward with certain fine paper manufacturer defendants. On July 25, 1978, counsel for the plaintiffs received an offer from St. Regis Paper Co. to settle its total liability for $2 million. Five other defendants made settlement offers between that date and January 16, 1979, when settlement offers totaling $30 million were in hand. Shortly after the entry of the court’s February 1979 order certifying a national class of direct purchasers of fine paper the plaintiffs moved, on March 5, 1979, for preliminary approval of the proposed settlements with the six defendants whose offers totaled $30 million. That proposed settlement was opposed by those paper manufacturer defendants who had not yet offered to settle, some of whom had previously filed cross-claims for contribution. Judicial approval of the partial settlements was not obtained until September 2, 1979. Pretrial Order No. 66. By the time the $30 million settlement with six fine paper manufacturers had been approved, 23 additional separate lawsuits had been added for a total of 38. Fourteen of these were separated from the plaintiff class by virtue of the class certification order. Thus twenty-four individual actions were on file on behalf of the class at the time of court approval of the initial round of settlements. Several of these suits had been filed after the soon to be approved offers totaling $30 million were already in hand. In December of 1979 the trial court entered an order which consolidated discovery in all the'fine paper cases, directed that discovery be completed by July 3,1980, and fixed September 22, 1980 as the trial date. The same order directed plaintiffs to file a pretrial memorandum on August 29, 1980, “in the form to be prescribed by the Court.” Pretrial Order No. 76, App. A 227. Thereafter, on January 8, 1980, the court, in Pretrial Order No. 83, prescribed the form of the plaintiffs’ pretrial memorandum. Other trial preparation went forward against the remaining defendants. That preparation ultimately involved deposing approximately 250 witnesses, inspecting and copying thousands of documents, briefing and arguing numerous motions, and preparing a 643 page pretrial memorandum. A week before the September 22, 1980 trial date Champion International Corporation offered to settle its liability for $4 million, and on the first day of trial the remaining defendants offered an additional $16,650,000. Added to the already approved $30 million partial settlement, these offers brought the total settlement fund to $50,650,000. Under the terms of the settlements the defendants were to be relieved of liability both for damages and for attorneys’ fees, and would immediately pay over the settlement fund so that it would earn interest on behalf of those interested in the recovery until it was disbursed. The settlement thus was structured to create a fund in court from which attorneys’ fees could be paid; a practice approved by the court in Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973) (Lindy I). The trial court fixed March 20, 1981 as the deadline for filing petitions for fees and expenses from the fund. Pretrial Order No. 143, as amended by Pretrial Order No. 147, App. J 472. Prior to that date negotiations took place among members of the plaintiffs’ Executive Committee and others in an effort to reach agreement on a ceiling on fees which would be sought by the attorneys for the class. These negotiations were unsuccessful, and on March 20, 1981, 41 separate petitions were filed by private law firms and state attorneys general, seeking an aggregate of $21 million in fees and expenses for 70,000 attorney hours by 160 lawyers, and for 25,000 paralegal hours. Thus, in the aggregate, attorneys for the class sought over 40% of the $50,-650,000 settlement fund. It soon became apparent that the inability of the Executive Committee to work out an agreed upon maximum for fees and expenses was the result of a dispute among some members of that committee as to the value to the class of their respective services. In the fee application of Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C., Harold Kohn took the position that his firm was chiefly responsible for the results achieved, and that the work claimed to have been performed by other applicants was exaggerated and of little value. On March 27, 1981, several counsel urged the court to appoint a Fee Review Committee, a procedure suggested in the Manual For Complex Litigation, § 1.47(4) (1982). Kohn objected, and the trial court declined to appoint such a committee. 98 F.R.D. at 77. On April 24, 1981, 26 lawyers, representing the plaintiffs in 19 of the 24 settled lawsuits, filed objections to the Kohn firm’s fee application. That objection was supported by affidavits of 17 plaintiffs’ attorneys, to which were attached numerous exhibits. App. C 1-396. On May 15, 1981, the Kohn firm filed, on behalf of the two named plaintiffs it represented, a general objection, App. N 50-56, and sixteen specific objections to the fee applications filed by other plaintiffs’ attorneys. In these objections Kohn contended that the applications of other attorneys had not been filed in good faith, and that most of the time which had been expended on the case had been solely for the purpose of generating fees. App. N 57-448- On the same day that Kohn’s objections were filed, class members listed in this appeal as appellees, none of which were named class representatives in the litigation, filed objections to the fees. App. L 18. This group of objectors, represented by Weil, Gotshal & Manges, moved for permission to review all fee applications and file supplemental written objections. App. L 28. That motion was granted. APP' L 42‘ The court fiff June 9’ 1981 for tbe commencement of hearings on the ^ applications. At least in part because °f deputes over discovery of documents in the fllf °f/ome Pontiffs attorneys, re-fee aPPllcatl0ns > Weí’ G°íf' al & Man^es took mTonths' , Jbe ^as not completed by June 9 1981 andAh" heann® f thatdab; was contmued “ that a reP°rt tbe Wei ’ Gotshal & Man^es review could be comPleted At the July 23, 1981 hearing several ap-Plants requested evidentiary hearings on disputed factual allegations, and the trial court observed: Insofar as the request of the motion of Mr. Sloan and Mr. Specks for an eviden-tiary hearing, that of course will abide by the results of the report filed by Mr. Millstein [of Weil, Gotshal & Manges] and the response of the petitioning lawyers. If you want evidentiary hearings y°u W1^ Set it. App. L 76. Finally, on October 5,1981, Weil, Gotshal & Manges filed on behalf of objecting class members a 522 page report, supported by a 164 page appendix of charts, and by three separately bound volumes of documentary exhibits. The trial court permitted the petitioning firms to file responses, and fixed times for hearings on the applications and objections, II. The Hearings The tria] court scheduled a hearing on fee applications and objections for each petitioning firm that requested one. These were scheduled between 4:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. on each court day. The hearings consumed 73.5 hours over 41 days. Eight law firms participated. During the course of those hearings petitioning attorneys objected that the Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report and supporting exhibits were not admissible evidence. Initially, at a hearing on December 17, 1981, the court ruled that they would not be accepted as evidence, App. L 200. Rather they would be treated only as argument. App. L 224. On the fifteenth day of hearings, however, when Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. had completed its case in support of its fee applications, Mr. Millstein of Weil, Gotshal & Manges offered in evidence, apparently against all fee applicants, the three volumes of exhibits referred to in his firm’s report. App. F 395. Many of these exhibits were internal memoranda, or correspondence among some, but not all, of the petitioning law firms. The petitioning attorneys who were present objected to their admissibility on authenticity, hearsay and relevancy grounds. App. F 393-400. The court ruled that the objecting parties could take the volumes home over the weekend and then inform the court what items they objected to, at which time a ruling would be made. App. F 398. The court tentatively ruled that a firm s internal memorandum was not binding on any other firm “[ujnless I con-elude there is a conspiracy. App. F 399. The reference to a conspiracy is understandable in light of the nature of the fee objections made by Harold Kohn. In essence, Kohn charged that Granvil I. Specks and others entered into a conspiracy to overstaff the case, engaging attorneys and paralegals in “busy work” for the purpose of running up time in order to fatten the lodestar determination required by Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973). If such a conspiracy was established by independent evidence, admissions in furtherance of it by each of its members could be used against the coconspirators. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). On March 1, 1982, the sixteenth day of hearings, extended argument was held on admissibility of the tendered exhibits. App. M 317-45. The court observed “I am not going to rule on those particular items until we get everybody in here, everybody who wants to testify comes in.” App. M 343. On May 20, 1982, after the evidentiary hearings were closed, the trial court, without making a finding as to the existence of a conspiracy, and without specifying the basis of admissibility, ordered that the tendered documents be admitted in evidence, with no limitation as to the parties against which or the purpose for which they might be used. App. I 370. These exhibits constitute 1,053 pages in App. N, O, and P. The objectors offered no other evidence, The hearings consisted of testimony and exhibits offered by those petitioning law fjrms which requested evidentiary hearjngS) an(j 0f cross-examination of the witnesses whose testimony those firms presented. Both Weil, Gotshal & Manges, on behalf of the appellee objectors, and Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C., on behalf 0f jts client, waived the right to insist that each petitioning attorney appear for cross-examination. App. F 414-15. Thus evidentiary hearings were not held on all fee applications, but were held on all applications involved in these appeals. The last fee hearing was on May 12, 1982. In. The Trial Court’s Decision . A’ Preliminary Observations On March 3, 1983, the trial court filed a lengthy opinion dealing with the fee applications. Early in that opinion the judge indicates the general impression with which the proceedings left him, observing: These fee petitions are grossly excessive on their face and, regrettably, lend substance to the widely-held and mostly unfavorable impressions of the plaintiffs’ class action bar, sometimes referred to as the class action industry. 98 F.R.D. at 68. The opinion outlines the history of this litigation resulting in the $50,560,000 settlement. It then discusses formation of the organizational structure of plaintiffs’ counsel, noting that after Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. filed the first action in Illinois on behalf of a national class of direct purchasers of fine paper, Granvil I. Specks circulated the complaint to several other lawyers with whom he had worked in prior class actions. These lawyers, the court observed, filed similar complaints on behalf of different named plaintiffs in other districts. Specks and the others then met and “began planning for distribution of patronage, that is, deciding to which firms the work assignments would be allocated.” 98 F.R.D. at 71. The general tone of the court’s discussion of the organizational meetings discloses disapproval of the steps leading to the filing of these separate lawsuits, and of the organization of plaintiffs’ counsel for the purpose of allocating work. The opinion acknowledges that the committee structure agreed upon at the February 3, 1978 meeting was approved by court order, but observed: In retrospect, I can recognize the force of Mr. Spiegel’s argument [on behalf of California, opposing that structure] but at the time the court was persuaded by the array of distinguished counsel for the private plaintiffs and had no reason to anticipate that the case would not be prosecuted in the best interests of the class. 98 F.R.D. at 74. The opinion further notes that eight new firms came into the case after the first $30 million in settlement offers was in hand, and that the Executive Committee, over Kohn’s objection, assigned work to some of these newcomers. 98 F.R.D. at 74. About the committee system the opinion notes: It was inevitable that this type of structure would generate wasted hours on useless tasks, propagate duplication and mask outright padding. 98 F.R.D. at 75. Turning to the objections, the court noted Kohn’s assertion that the 97,000 hours claimed by plaintiffs’ lawyers were excessive and that the same work could have been accomplished with the expenditure of 5,000 to 15,000 hours by one competent firm. 98 F.R.D. at 78. The court also noted the Weil, Gotshal & Manges challenge to fee requests, and the recommendations in the Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report. 98 F.R.D. at 79. Regarding the objections filed to the Kohn firm’s fee petition, the court observed: Plaintiffs’ counsel returned the volley by filing numerous objections to the Kohn firm’s fee petition. Although these same objectors did not challenge any other fee petitions, the objections to the Kohn petition apply equally to many other petitions. 98 F.R.D. at 79. About the responses to the Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report, the trial court observed: Not unexpectedly, the petitioners (except Kohn) defended the organizational structure and the hours charged claiming that the division of labor had been the most effective way of tackling the massive task confronting them and that only their long hours, hard work and sheer persistence produced the fund which benefited the class. Kohn, in his response, agreed with Weil, Gotshal that there had been tremendous waste, particularly in the deposition program. 98 F.R.D. at 80 (footnote omitted). B. General Guidelines Following the foregoing preliminary observations, the court’s opinion sets forth general guidelines to be applied in making the analyses required by Lindy Bros. Bldrs. Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973) (Lindy I), and 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.1976) (Lindy II). The trial court proposed disallowing or reducing lodestar hours for the following tasks: 1. Pretrial memorandum time. 2. Read and review time. 3. Fee petition time. 4. Pretrial conference time. 5. Hours without adequate supporting data. 6. Industrial Analysis Committee time. 98 F.R.D. at 81-82. It also determined that in lieu of the specific rates historically charged by the petitioning attorneys there would be allowed: 1. Hourly rate for partner-level work performed by a partner — $100.00. 2. Hourly rate for associate-level work performed by an associate — $50.00. 3. Hourly rate for co-lead counsel (Specks and Kohn) — $150.00. 98 F.R.D. at 83. The trial court also categorized the types of work appropriate for partners, associates, and paralegals. In instances in which experienced persons were found to have performed compensable tasks which in the court’s view should have been assigned to persons with less experience or less professional training, the court included the time in the lodestar, but at uniform hourly rates for the less experienced or less professionally trained persons. Addressing the Lindy I and II contingency factors, the court ruled that a 1.5 positive contingency multiplier would be allowed for lodestar time expended prior to the consummation of the $30 million settlements on January 16, 1979. 98 F.R.D. at 84. As to time expended after that date, the court ruled that “[o]nce the initial settlements were approved, there was no risk of non-payment for services or reimbursement of expenses.” 98 F.R.D. at 84. And in justifying the selection of 1.5, rather than some higher rate, as the multiplier for time expended prior to January 16, 1979, the court observed: I have not chosen a higher multiplier because prior to January 1979, the risk of an unsuccessful result in this case was spread among 25 law firms and 7 attorneys general. Moreover, it appears that this was not a case of high risk because there was a “large number of attorneys who were willing to prosecute this case on a purely contingent basis. This was quite obviously not a case where counsel were reluctant to invest considerable time because of the fear they would go unpaid.” In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. [907] at 919 n. 30 [ (E.D.Pa.1976) ]. 98 F.R.D. at 84 (footnote omitted). Addressing the Lindy quality multiplier, the court ruled that none would be allowed, observing: Under all the circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded that any counsel demonstrated such an unusually high degree of skill as would warrant compensation beyond that reflected in the hourly rates. 98 F.R.D. at 84. One firm, Specks & Goldberg, Ltd., was singled out, however, for the application of a negative quality multiplier: Specks and Goldberg ... because of its dominant leadership role, must be charged with primary responsibility for all the wasted hours, duplication and gross inefficiency which marked this case from its inception. 98 F.R.D. at 84. A 50% negative quality multiplier was applied to the Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. lodestar amount. 98 F.R.D. at 84. The court also ruled that it would not allow reimbursement for expenses incurred by attorneys arising from activities for which their time would be disallowed, and that close scrutiny would be made of charges for meals consumed at hometown restaurants. 98 F.R.D. at 85. C. Application of the Guidelines Having laid down the foregoing general guidelines, the trial court proceeded to apply them to each separate fee application. The result, overall, was a series of awards aggregating approximately $4.3 million in fees, and expenses of approximately $1.1 million. Thus the aggregate fees and expenses awarded amounted to slightly more than 10% of the $50.6 million settlement fund. Every fee application was reduced to some extent. Listed in the margin are the requests and awards for those petitioners who have not appealed, or whose appeals have been withdrawn. The fees and expenses requested by appellants, and the court’s rulings on them, are as follows: Requested Allowed Firm Fees Expenses Fees Expenses Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. Chicago, 111. (App. J 174-183) 727,105.00 (App. J 174) 39,974.57 (App. J 174) 229,930.00 (App. J 182) 39,933.28 (App. J 182) Phillip C. Gold-stick & Associates, Ltd. Chicago, 111. (App. J 184-191) 31,203.76 (App. J 184) 2,505.35 (App. J 190) 6,917.50 (App. J 190) 2,505.35 (App. J 190) Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Eiger, P.C. Chicago, 111. (App. J 250-271) 787,433.25 (App. J 250) 50,410.29 (App. J 250) 188,230.00 (App. J 270) 47,476.35 (App. J 270) O’Brien & Hallisey San Francisco, Calif. (App. J 272-290) 725,782.65 (App. J 272) 35,783.69 (App. J 272) 109,534.50 (App. J 290) 35,602.64 (App. J 290) Walter E. Riorda'n, P.A. Minneapolis, Minn. (App. J 291-327) 795,482.00 .(App. J 319) 45,061.59 (App. J 319) 33,681.50 (App. J 319) 27,759.61 (App. J 319) Rogers, Rude, Candlin, Faulkner & Sjostrom Minneapolis, Minn. (App. J 342-346) 106,481.03 8,026.03 -0-(App. J 346) -0-(App. J 346) Sachnoff, Weaver & Ruben-stein, Ltd. Chicago, 111. (App. J 347-375) 1,160,295.33 (App. J 347) 93,278.10 (App. J 347) 304,533.38 (App. J 374) 90,869.45 (App. J 375) Saveri & Saveri San Francisco, Calif. (App. J 376-384) 2,076,792.75 (App. J 376) 60,771.24 (App. J 376) 184,707.50 (App. J 376) 54,594.96 (App. J 384) Sloan & Connelly Chicago, 111. (App. J 390-400) 510,994.86 (App. J 390) 20,760.80 (App. J 390) 116,517.00 (App. J 400) 20,760.80 (App. J 400) Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. Chicago, 111. (App. J 421-482) 735,760.00 (App. J 421) 37,869.73 (App. J 432) 142,517.75 (App. J 432) 37,675.73 (App. J 432) Totals $7,657,380.63 $394,U1.S9 $1,316,569.13 $357,178.17 Thus the appellants requests for fees were reduced by $6,340,761.50 and for expenses by $37,263.22, an overall disallowance rate of approximately 80%. The listed fee requests include in each instance requested Idndy multipliers. To the eleven appellants, the court awarded a contingency multiplier for time expended prior to January 16, 1979 and included in the lodestar calculation, but not for time thereafter, as follows: Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. 9,892.50 App. J 182 Philip C. Goldstick & Associates, Ltd. -0- Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Eiger, P.C. 4,972.50 App. J 270 O’Brien & Hallisey 5,405.25 App. J 290 Walter E. Riordan -0- App. J 319 Rogers, Rude, Candlin, Faulkner & Sjostrom -0- App. J 346 Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. 7,496.88 Saveri & Saveri 7,462.50 App. J 384 Sloan & Connelly, P.C. 2,750.00 App. J 400 Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. 115,900.00 App. J 413 Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. 6,001.25 App. J 432 Total 159,880.88 The 50% negative quality multiplier ap-Dlied to the court’s calculation of a $789.-330.50 lodestar amount for Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. reduced its lodestar amount to $394,665.75, and thus the pre-January-1979 contingency factor increased it to $510.-565.25, the amount awarded. 98 F.R.D. at 215. Applying its general guidelines the court also reduced the number of hours in each firm’s lodestar calculation as follows: (1) Pretrial Memorandum Time . ... . . the court, concluding that time spent m preparing the court-ordered pretrial memorandum was grossly excessive, reduced each firm’s time expended on that task by one-half. 98 F.R.D. at 81. This resulted in elimination of 712.70 lodestar hours for the appellants’ lodestar calculations as follows: Firm, Hours Requested Hours Allowed Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. Robert S. Atkins 95.10 47.60 App. J 175 Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Eiger P.C. Lawrence H. Eiger 88.75 44.38 App. J 251 Michael B. Hyman 88.45 44.23 App. J 259 Stephen A. Kanner 105.95 59.98 App. J 262 O’Brien & Hallisey Jeremiah F. Hallisey 62.25 31.13 App. J 275 Anne Treseder 82.59 41.29 App. J 278 Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. Sarah R. Wolff 333.25 166.63 App. J 355 Sloan & Connelly, P.C. James Sloan 8.40 4.20 App. J 395 Robert Davy 14.80 7.40 App. J 398 Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. Granvil I. Specks 293.50 146.75 App. J 404 Perry Goldberg 77.25 38.60 App. J 408 Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. Lawrence Walner 108.10 54.05 App. J 424 William Sidlinger 81.10 40.55 App. J 427 Total 1439.49 726.79 The court also disallowed one half of an unspecified amount of all of the time of Saveri & Saveri included in time disallowance because records were too vague. See Part III.C.(5), infra. Since for the attorneys in question hourly rates ranging from $50 to $150 per hour were approved by the court, the 50% across the board elimination of time devoted to the pretrial memorandum produced a significant fee reduction. (2) Read and Review Time The court observed that “[hjundreds of hours were billed to the class by individual attorneys who spent time reading and reviewing a multitude of documents such as memoranda, correspondence, briefs, motions, and interrogatories, which crossed their desk during the course of this case, even though these attorneys were not closely involved with or responsible for the subject matter of these documents.” 98 F.R.D. at 75-76. It therefore disallowed all hours billed for reading and reviewing documents except by the members of the fourteen-member Executive Committee. Id. at 81. (3) Fee Petition Time In accordance with Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 111, the court eliminated from the lodestar all timé spent in the preparation of fee petitions. Id. (4) Pretrial Conference Time The court observed that “counsel billed a total of 1446 hours for the 31 conferences. This large number of hours was primarily due to the attendance of attorneys who contributed nothing to the conferences but were merely there as spectators. The hours billed by these attorneys will not be compensated by the class.” 98 F.R.D. at 81. The time thus disallowed totaled almost 1,400 hours. Among the appellants it was disallowed as follows: Firm Hours Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. Robert S. Atkins 17 App. J 175 Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Eiger, P.C. Michael J. Freed 10 App. J 254 O’Brien & Hallisey Jeremiah F. Hallisey 22 App. J 274 Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. Lowell Sachnoff 41.75 App. J 348 Dean A. Dickie 8 App. J 351 Saveri & Saveri Guido Saveri 144.5 App. J 379 Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. Lawrence Walner 21.4 App. J 424 Total 264.65 (5) Hours Billed Without Adequate Time Records. The court observed that hundreds of hours were described in time records “by vague and meaningless terms or insufficiently documented.” 98 F.R.D. at 81-82. Such hours the court refused to include in the lodestar. For the appellants the excluded time is as follows: Firm Hours Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. Robert S. Atkins 32 App. J 175 Robert C. Goldberg 14.3 App. J 177 Philip C. Goldstick & Associates, Ltd. Philip C. Goldstick 2.4 App. J 185 Alan L. Fulkerson 5.5 App. J 186 Stewart M. Weltman 11.1 App. J 187 Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Eiger, P.C. Lawrence H. Eiger 40.6 App. J 251 Robert A. Skirnick 7.7 App. J 256 Anthony C. Valiulis 5.6 App. J’ 257 Michael B. Hyman 26 App. J 259 Stephen A. Kanner 30.82 App. J 261 Paralegal time 15.9 App. J 265 O’Brien & Hallisey Jeremiah F. Hallisey 68.25 App. J 273 Anne Treseder 78.25 App. J 277 Gary Reiss 81.45 App. J 280 Daniel B. Leraul 6.38 App. J 282 George J. McNabb .3 App. J 283 Robert Murphy 2.37 App. J 285 Don B. Kates 2.7 App. J 287 Stanley S. Taylor 3 App. J 288 Kenneth Goshorn .55 App. J 288 Walter E. Riordan, P.A. Walter E. Riordan 858. App. J 314 Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. Lowell Sachnoff 3.5 App. J 349 Bary Rosen 28.25 App. J 358 Mitchell Goldsmith .5 App. J 360 Andrew Schatz 24.25 App. J 362 Paralegals 241.55 App. J 360 Outside Services 223.75 App. J 367 Saveri & Saveri Guido Saveri 368.25 App. J 379 164.65 App. J 379 Sloan & Connelly, P.C. James Sloan 32.5 App. J 395 Michael Connelly 4.1 App. J 398 Robert Davy 3.6 App. J 398 Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. Granvil I. Specks 319.8 App. J 403 Perry Goldberg 46.25 App. J 407 Howard L. Fink 7 App. J 410 Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. Lawrence Walner 7.6 App. J 423 Total 2818.72 (6) Industrial Analysis Committee Time The court excluded from the lodestar all of the approximately 1,800 hours of work performed for the Industrial Analysis Committee, one of the subcommittees formed by the Executive Committee, noting that “[t]he work of this committee was basically useless. It duplicated the efforts of others and resulted in no appreciable benefit to the class. 98 F.R.D. at 82. For the appellants the excluded time is as follows: Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. Robert C. Goldberg 58.1 App. J 177 Saveri & Saveri Guido Saveri • 50.75 App. J 379 Sloan & Connelly, P.C. James Sloan 5.2 App. J 395 Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. Granvil I. Specks 34 App. J 404 Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. Lawrence Walner 216.5 App. J 424 William Sidlinger 100.5 App. J 427 Total 464.9 D. Other Specific Rulings (1) Disallowance of Time of John A. Ki-thas and Charles Lamont Saveri & Saveri, P.C. included in its petition 1,717.25 hours of work performed by John A. Kithas and Charles Lamont. The Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report objected to the inclusion of their time on the ground that Kithas & Lamont was, at the time the work was performed, a separate entity. Pretrial Order No. 143 provides: (12) If the time or rate of any lawyer who is not a partner or employee of the petitioning firm is included in any petition, the petition shall contain a detailed statement prepared by the petitioning firm and such other lawyer, setting forth in detail the arrangements between them for compensation and defraying of cost disbursements during the litigation and the division or allocation of any fee or reimbursements awarded, together with a statement of the reasons why it was necessary for the petitioner to enter into such arrangements. The court excluded from the lodestar for Saveri & Saveri, P.C. all time of Kithas and Lamont because it had not filed the statement required by Pretrial Order No. 143. 98 F.R.D. at 202-03. (2) Disallowance of Time of Rogers, Rude, Candlin, Faulkner & Sjostrom Rogers, Rude, Candlin, Faulkner & Sjos-trom of Minneapolis filed a petition seeking compensation for 513.6 hours expended as associate counsel with the firm of Walter E. Riordan, P.A. The firm’s petition was denied by the court because it did not comply with paragraph (14) of Pretrial Order No. 143, in failing to disclose the nature of its arrangement with Walter Riordan, P.A. The court also found that James W. Rude had agreed to work on the case for Walter Riordan for $15 an hour, and was in fact paid at that rate for 76.4 hours of work. 98 F.R.D. at 188-89. (3) Sloan and Associates, P.C., Pricing Study Time During the course of trial preparation a dispute arose among members of the Executive Committee over the best way to establish damages. Some 4,200 hours of time were devoted to pricing/damage studies. Granvil I. Specks turned over to Sloan & Connelly pricing materials obtained on discovery for a pricing study, although Harold Kohn opposed giving the assignment to that firm. Later the firm of Berger & Montague and the Kohn firm prepared new studies. The Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report urged that the trial court cut all time spent on pricing/damage studies by one-half, or, alternatively determine which attorneys’ time benefited the class and which did not. Sloan & Connelly, P.C. devoted 747.9 attorney hours and 1,070.75 paralegal hours to the pricing study. On July 23, 1980, two months before the scheduled trial date, the Executive Committee was informed by one of its experts that the study had not yet produced support for a theory of parallel pricing. Further efforts were made to refine the study. The court ruled: It is my considered judgment that this pricing project involved too many hours of too many attorneys. The end-product does not justify so substantial a charge against the class fund as Sloan & Connelly requests. Accordingly, to reflect my determination that an excessive number of hours are claimed for this work as compared to the results achieved, I will only permit half of the total 1818.65 hours to be compensated. 98 F.R.D. at 207. Thus the Sloan & Con-nelly, P.C. lodestar for compensation was reduced by 909.33 hours. (4) Disallowance of Other Walter E. Riordan, P.A. Time Walter E. Riordan discovered a witness, James Nelson, who had been President of General Paper Corporation, a now bankrupt paper firm, during the period when the conspiracy allegedly operated. According to Riordan, Granvil I. Specks of the Executive Committee anticipated that Nelson would be subject to rigorous cross-examination at deposition and for that reason directed Riordan to represent Nelson during those proceedings. The court excluded from the lodestar for Walter E. Riordan, P.A. 678 hours spent in'these activities. The court also disallowed one-half of an additional 1,347.25 hours because of the nature of the tasks performed and the incompleteness of the supporting records. 98 F.R.D. at 177-78. IV. Appellants’ Contentions The appellants dispute and take considerable offense at the court’s preliminary observations. Each appellant contests the legality of the court’s general guidelines. Each, as separately affected, contests the factual basis for the court’s application of those guidelines to its petition. The appellants impacted by the court’s specific rulings dispute their factual and legal predicates. Several raise procedural objections to the manner in which the hearings were conducted, and evidentiary objections to the materials upon which the court relied. Thus each aspect of the court’s decision referred to in Part III is challenged on some basis and must be addressed by this court. V. Our Rulings A. Governing Legal Standards As noted in Part I above, the underlying lawsuit was a class action brought pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, to enforce section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which was settled by the creation of a fund in exchange for the release of the defendants from liability both for damages and for statutorily authorized fees. In Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. of Phila. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir.1973) (Lindy I), this court considered such a settlement for the first time. The court might have taken the position that in instances in which statutory fees are authorized the liability for damages must be settled separately, and only when the settlement fund for the class members was approved would the court either entertain litigation or consider a separate settlement of the defendants’ liability for statutory fees. That course would have eliminated the possibility of a conflict of interest between attorneys for the class and class members, and would have established a framework in which the amount of fees to be awarded would be determined in a genuinely adversarial context. Had we taken that approach, the need for judicial scrutiny of fee requests would have been substantially reduced. In cases where settlements of fee requests are made with the defendants after prior approval of damage claim settlements, the court can, in most instances, assume that the defendants closely scrutinized the fee requests, and agreed to pay no more than was reasonable. Additionally, when a damage settlement is followed by litigation over statutory fee requests, the amount awarded would be determined by the normal workings of the adversary system. Instead, mindful of the desirability of facilitating the commencement and disposition of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) class actions, we held that settlements releasing defendants from both damage and statutory fee liability were proper, and would result in a •fund in court from which fees could be awarded under the equitable fund doctrine. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 164-65. The consequence of that holding was to create an inevitable conflict of interest between the attorneys for Rule 23(b)(3) class members and the class members for whom they appeared. Whether the holding has in fact had the hoped for effect of facilitating settlements of class actions is an open question. Be that as it may, we recognized in Lindy I that by authorizing the conversion of statutory fee cases into fund in court cases we were creating the potential for such a conflict of interest. Thus we held that fee requests from the resulting equitable fund in court must be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. Those standards were refined in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.1976) (Lindy II). This court recognizes that the first step in allocating a fund in court among the attorneys responsible for its creation and the class members for whose benefit it was created is a determination of how many hours were spent, by which attorneys, and in what manner. Next the court must determine the value of each attorney’s services to the class: The value of an attorney’s time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate. A logical beginning in valuing an attorney’s services is to fix a reasonable hourly rate for his time — taking into account the attorney’s legal reputation and status (partner, associate)____ Similarly, the court may find that the reasonable rate of compensation differs for different activities. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167. Thus the hourly rate must be individually determined, separately for each attorney, and for separate categories of activities engaged in by each attorney. Once this lodestar amount is determined the court must adjust it to reflect the contingent nature of the attorneys’ undertaking. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168. This contingency adjustment involves two separate aspects. The first aspect to be determined is the likelihood of success in obtaining a judgment or settlement in the underlying lawsuit, to be measured at the point when the attorney’s time was committed to the case. Id.; Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 113. The second aspect is the time value of compensation long delayed, when compared with normal billing and collection practice of law firms for fees and expenses. We explicitly recognized in Lindy II that the contingency factor must take into account delay in receipt of payment. 540 F.2d at 117. See also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 (D.C.Cir.1980). A second delay factor, unrelated to the contingency of the outcome, is discussed in Part V.C.(l), infra. Finally we require that the court may adjust the amount determined in the lodestar calculation for the quality of an attorney’s work. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168. Quality must be evaluated in light of the results obtained for the class, considering the complexity of the case, and “the professional methods utilized in processing the case, — rewarding the use of efficient methods to expedite the case and penalizing the use of methods the predominant purpose of which was to delay or obstruct the proceedings.” Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 118. Our equitable fund case law also makes clear that the attorneys’ claim for fees from a fund in court is a cause of action, belonging to the attorneys, for the reasonable value of their services, for which a hearing is required. As we observed in Lindy I: Much of the evidence on which the judge will base his award or denial of fees may be disputed; the evidence presented by an attorney petitioning for fees may be incomplete. The denial of fees obviously harms the petitioning attorney. Just as obviously, award of attorneys’ fees harms the unrepresented claimant by re-during his net recovery. These opposing interests should be afforded a hearing to provide an evidentiary basis for resolution of disputed factual matters and to allow the parties to supplement possibly incomplete statements of opposing partieS- 487 F.2d at 169. See also Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165, 167 n. 5 (3d Cir.1975). Plainly, therefore, the hearing „ . j on a tee application m an equitable fund . ..fi,, case requires compliance with those procedural rules which assure fair notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard. Equally plainly, the requirement of an evidentiary hearing demands the application in that hearing, of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Fed.R.Evid. 1101(b) (rules apply generally to civil actions). Since we are reviewing a civil proceeding tried to the court, our review of the court’s determination of fact questions is by the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). On legal issues, including legal standards for the admissibility of evidence, our review is plenary. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.1983). Most of the issues presented by this appeal, however, fall into categories which, as noted specifically hereafter, we have held to be committed to the discretion of the trial court. In reviewing those issues we must first decide whether in determining the facts upon which the court predicated the exercise of discretion it relied upon properly admissible evidentiary materials and, if so, whether ^he fadings are clearly erroneous. In reviewing the court s exercise of discretion in light of supportable factual premises, we must consider whether the court has taken into account properly relevant considerations. A trial court which gives weight to improper considerations, or ignores those properly relevant, abuses its discretion or commits legal error. Id. at 263, 265, 277, 302. Finally, we do not approach the review process with any predisposition against what we know to be the fairly common practice in large class action litigation of encouraging the participation, on the plaintiffs’ side of the case, of a number of law firms which may divide the work, and thus the risk. Such spreading of work, and hence of risk, seems to us consistent with the decision by Congress, in the antitrust laws and elsewhere, to encourage enforcement of federal statutory policies by private litigants. ,, . . . . . . , With these general principles m mmd, we , , ,, .„. y. ., „ . , turn to the specifics of the appellants con-tenj.jons B. Objections to the Manner of Conducting the Hearing Some appellants complain about the manner in which the fee hearings were conducted, making particular reference to the failure of the objectors to offer testimony; to the court’s excessive reliance upon the Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report; to the fragmentation of the hearings into two hour segments at the end of regular court business days; to the delay in ruling upon the admissibility of three volumes of documents until after the close of the hearings; and to the admission of those documents over objections on authenticity, hearsay and relevancy grounds. The failure of the objectors to offer testimony is not dispositive of any issue in this appeal. The fee applicants had the burden of persuasion on the number of hours to be included in the lodestar, the rates to be applied, and the propriety of affirmative multipliers. The court was entitled to rule on the basis of their presentations, the cross-examination of their witnesses, and its own knowledge of the proceedings. See Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 169. As noted in Part II above, the court indicated during the hearing that it would treat the Weil, Gotshal & Manges Report in the nature of a brief. App. L 224. Appellants point to striking similarities between that Report and the contents of the court’s fee opinion. We give no weight to this criticism. There is no indication in the court’s fee opinion that evidentiary weight was given to the Report. It is hardly surprising that there may be similarities between the text of a judicial opinion and that of a brief by counsel that the court found to be persuasive. Legal writing, including judicial opinion writing, is rarely entirely original. The complaint about fragmentation of the hearing is more substantial. Requiring counsel from distant cities, applicants and objectors alike, to conduct hearings between four and six p.m. over a rather extended period was certainly an imposition on them. Moreover the fragmentation of the hearings into short segments produced a record which is, from the point of view of appellate review, less than ideally tidy. Nevertheless, the time for scheduling hearings is a matter which must of necessity remain in most instances a matter' of virtually unreviewable district court discretion, for only the district court has the information required to balance the demands of any litigant against the competing time demands of other litigants. Moreover, no appellant has pointed to any way in which the fragmented manner in which the hearings were conducted affected the substantive results of which it complains. Thus we give no weight to criticism of the fragmented hearings. The timing of the court’s ruling on the admissibility of three volumes of documents, offered in evidence over objection on the sixteenth day of the hearings, and admitted in evidence without explanation of the basis for the ruling on May 20, 1982, is a far more troubling matter. Ordinarily in any hearing, and fee applications are no exception, litigants are entitled to a ruling on objections to the admission of evidence, if not simultaneously, at least sufficiently in advance of the close of the hearing so they know what record evidence must be met. Thus we have carefully considered whether, putting aside questions of admissibility, any prejudice resulted in this case from the delayed ruling. We conclude that there was none. No appellant has suggested that any additional evidence would have been offered had it been known that the three volumes of documents would be admitted. Since the court made it known on March 1, 1982 that admission of the documents was under consideration, the appellants did have the opportunity to make an offer of proof of any such additional evidence in anticipation of a ruling favoring admission. Following the entry of the May 20, 1982 order admitting the three volumes of documents, moreover, no appellant made any motion to supplement the record. Thus the delay in ruling on admission of the documents until after the close of the hearings, while hardly the preferred practice, cannot be found to have prejudiced the appellants. That leaves for consideration the correctness of the court’s disposition of the objection to admissibility. As to authenticity, no more is required than evidence establishing prima facie that the matter in question (here documents from various attorneys’ files) is what it purports to be. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Assuming that the court entirely disregarded the authenticity objections, such an error would on this record be completely harmless. No appellant has suggested that the documents are other than what the objectors claim them to be. There is ample evidence in the record suggesting, prima facie, the authenticity of each document. Once such evidence is in the record, the document is authenticated for all purposes against all parties. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 285 (3d Cir.1983). Thus we attach no significance to the court’s failure to deal specifically with the Rule 901(a) objection. The hearsay objection cannot be disposed of so easily because the court failed to make the findings required by Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), namely that a conspiracy existed; that the parties against whom the documents were offered were coconspirators; and that the documents contained statements made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court simply admitted the entire three volumes of documents against all appellants without limitation as to purpose. The appellee fee objectors defend this ruling on several grounds. Some documents, they urge, are non-hearsay because they fall within Rule 801(d)(1) (prior statement by witnesses) or Rule 801(d)(2) (admission by party-opponent). That is undoubtedly the case for some of the documents, but even then such admissions may only be used against the party who made them. Some are duplicative of documents offered by the fee petitioners in support of their own applications, and are thus at most duplicative of other evidence properly before the court. Some are pleadings or memoranda filed with the court in the course of the proceedings, which may be presumed to have been given the consideration appropriate for such documents. Some are summaries of the contents of other documents properly before the court, such as the fee petitions. Finally, as to other documents, such as correspondence from the files of several counsel, the objectors rely on the catchall hearsay exception in Rule 803(24) as statements having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. We place no reliance on Rule 803(24), however, because since the authors of the correspondence could have been called as witnesses, the statements cannot be found to be “more probative on the point for which [they are] offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(24)(B). For the same reason we place no reliance on Rule 804. Having examined the documents, we conclude that many of them, as introduced against many of the appellants, are inadmissible hearsay. That conclusion only commences our inquiry, however, for in this non-jury proceeding we have the benefit of a lengthy opinion by the trial court. A party may only raise a serious claim of prejudice if some evidentiary use of an inadmissible document was made against that party. The vast majority of the contested rulings on this appeal involve the application of rules of law to undisputed facts. In those instances where rulings as to specific appellants involve factual issues, we will determine whether any inadmissible hearsay significantly affected the court’s determination of those factual issues. We will make the same determination with respect to the relevancy objections. Two final objections to the manner in which the hearing was conducted must be addressed, both of which involve discovery. Sloan & Connelly, P.C. complains that the trial court quashed subpoenas served upon objectors’ counsel for the purpose of cross-examination to establish the objectors’ motivation in pressing their objections to the requested fees. The court’s ruling was, in essence, a relevancy ruling under Fed.R.Evid. 403. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to permit an already cluttered record to be further confused by an inquiry so completely collateral to the central issue of reasonableness of the fee requests. The position of the objectors, who have been referred to pejoratively by some appellants as “Fortune 500 companies” and potential class action defendants, is hardly unique. They are in no different position than was Humble Oil and Refining Company, one of the objecting class members in the seminal IAndy fee proceeding. We fail to see how motives of the objectors, other than the obvious financial one of maximizing their recovery, would make any fact of consequence to the determination of reasonable fees more or less probable. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Certainly we can find no abuse of discretion. Lawrence Walner and Associates, Ltd. moved to have the court require the disclosure, in camera, of fees paid by the settling defendants in the underlying litigation, and by the corporate objectors in this and other antitrust litigation. The request was made for the purpose of enlightening the court as to reasonable hours and hourly rates for comparable lawyers in complex litigation. The information sought certainly was relevant, and arguably even helpful. See, e.g., Blowers v. Lawyers Co-op. Pub. Co., Inc., 526 F.Supp. 1324 (W.D.N.Y.1981); Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D.Ga.1979); Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 77 F.R.D. 662 (W.D.N.C.1978). But see Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 80 F.R.D. 293 (W.D.Pa.1978). Discovery rulings are reviewed, however, for abuse of discretion. Marroquin Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.1983). Considering all the evidence offered on hours and rates, and the likelihood that such discovery would generate inquiries into collateral matters, such as privilege, we cannot hold that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Summarizing, we conclude that with the possible exception of admission of some hearsay evidence, to which particular reference will be made hereafter, none of the objections to the manner in which the fee hearings were conducted affect the disposition of any issue presented in this appeal. C. Objections to the Trial Court’s Guidelines We have outlined in Part III. B., supra, the general guidelines adopted by the trial court. We now turn to the appellants’ objections to those guidelines. (1) Contingency Factors All appellants urge that the court committed legal error in several respects in its treatment of the Lindy contingency multipliers. As noted in Part V.A., supra, Lindy I and II require an adjustment to the lodestar amount for (1) the risk of lack of success inherent in the lawsuit, and (2) the time value of compensation long delayed. The appellants contend that the court erred (1) in limiting application of the risk of lack of success multiplier to time committed pri- or to January 16,1979, and (2) in disregarding entirely the delay in payment factor. We hold that the court committed legal error when it ruled that “[o]nce the initial settlements were approved, there was no risk of non-payment for services or reimbursement of expenses.” 98 F.R.D. at 84. The major premise of the court’s reasoning is that time expended after the initial $30 million settlement fund came into existence could, if no other amount was recovered, be paid for out of that fund. That premise is false as a matter of law, for under the equitable fund doctrine payment for those services can be charged to the fund only for services which benefit the class members interested in that fund. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 15 Otto 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881). Thus attorneys expending time, after January 16, 1979, in processing lawsuits against those paper manufacturers which had not settled did so at the risk of lack of success, and would have received nothing from the fund for such time had there been no further recovery. The objectors defend the ruling, not on the basis of the trial court’s reasoning, but on the theory that once six defendants settled, it was inevitable that the remaining defendants would do so, and thus there was in fact no risk of lack of success. The trial court, however, made no such finding. In light of information in the récord about the vigor with which the defendants remaining in the case after January 16, 1979 continued to contest it, and about concerns among plaintiffs’ counsel about a viable damage theory, such a finding, had it been made, would be hard to support. Certainly it is not a finding which an appellate court can make as a basis for affirming on a theory which the trial court did not address. We also hold that the court committed legal error in disregarding the delay in payment of compensation in calculating the contingency multiplier. In a fund-in-court case delay in payment occurs during two separate periods. First, the attorneys remain unpaid, and remain at risk of going without payment at all, during litigation until the time that a fund is created. Next, they are deprived of the use of their share of the settlement fund until the court finally determines what that share is. During the first period the delay and risk of lack of success elements are so interrelated that it is perhaps not feasible to measure them separately, although several appellants have suggested approaches for so doing. During the second period, on the other hand, the risk of lack of success is eliminated, and the delay in payment factor is precisely measurable. The attorneys are entitled to a share of the fund measured at the time it comes into existence, and the class members are entitled to the balance. When, as here, the fund is earning interest, the time value of the money is, to each party entitled to a share, equal to the interest earned on that share pending its distribution. The court in its discussion of general guidelines made no mention of delay in payment as an element of the contingency multiplier. Nowhere else in the opinion is delay in payment prior to the creation of the fund discussed. At one point, in evaluating the application, of a firm not before us as an appellant, the court observed: Fine, Kaplan & Black argue for the higher hourly rate as reflected by the fees calculated on a current basis in order to compensate for the loss due to inflation and loss of interest over the time period during which they have had to wait for payment. Any delay in payment can be considered in determining whether to add a positive multiplier____ Since a substantial part of the delay in this case has been occasioned by the protracted litigation over fees among plaintiffs’ counsel, I will not enhance any award for the delay factor. 98 F.R.D. at 124 n. 66 (citations omitted). The stated reason is legally insufficient as a justification for refusing to consider delay in payment as an enhancement factor. First, litigation over fees had nothing whatever to do with delay encountered prior to the creation of the settlement fund. Second, the litigation over fees pitted against each other competing claimants for a share in that fund. No rule of law or equity suggests that the entire time value of money withheld during the resolution of those claims should be borne by some but not other claimants. Moreover, even if the court’s reasoning were legally supportable, the statement that “a substantial part of the delay in this case has been occasioned by the protracted litigation over fees among plaintiffs’ counsel” is simply not accurate. Nineteen months elapsed between the filing of the first complaint and the first round of settlements. Another nineteen months elapsed before approval of the final settlement on September 22, 1980. The court by order fixed