Full opinion text
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge: Confronted, if not overwhelmed, with an avalanche of actions filed in various state and federal courts throughout the United States by citizens of this country as well as of foreign countries seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained by the use of an intrauterine contraceptive device known as a Daikon Shield, the manufacturer of the device, A.H. Robins Company, Incorporated (Robins) filed its petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., in August, 1985. Background The device, which is the subject of these suits, had been developed in the 1960’s by Dr. Hugh Davis at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. In mid-1970 Robins acquired all patent and marketing rights to the Daikon Shield and engaged in the manufacture and marketing of the device from early 1971 until 1974, when it discontinued manufacture and sale of the device because of complaints and suits charging injuries arising allegedly out of the use of the device. The institution of Daikon Shield suits did not, however, moderate with the discontinuance of manufacture of the device, since Robins did not actually recall the device until 1984. By the middle of 1985, when the Chapter 11 petition was filed the number of such suits arising out of the continued sale and use of the Daikon Shield device earlier put into the stream of commerce by Robins had grown to 5,000. More than half of these pending cases named Robins as the sole defendant; a co-defendant or co-defendants were named in the others. Prior to the filing, a number of suits had been tried and, while Robins had prevailed in some of the actions, judgments in large and burdensome amounts had been recovered in others. Many more had been settled. Moreover, the costs of defending these suits both to Robins and to its insurance carrier had risen into the millions. A large amount of the time and energies of Robins’ officers and executives was also being absorbed in preparing material for trial and in attending and testifying at depositions and trials. The problems arising out of this mounting tide of claims and suits precipitated this Chapter 11 proceeding. The filing of the Chapter 11 petition automatically stayed all suits against Robins itself under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, even though no formal order of stay was immediately entered. See In re Larmar Estates, 5 B.R. 328, 330 (Bankr.E. D.N.Y.1980). But a number of plaintiffs in suits where there were defendants other than Robins, sought to sever their actions against Robins and to proceed with their claims against the co-defendant or co-defendants. Robins responded to the move by filing an adversary proceeding in which it named as defendants the plaintiffs in eight such suits pending in various state and federal courts. In that proceeding, the debtor sought (1) declaratory relief adjudging that the debtor’s products liability policy with Aetna Casualty and Insurance Company (Aetna) was an asset of the estate in which all the Daikon Shield plaintiffs and claimants had an interest and (2) injunctive relief restraining the prosecution of the actions against its co-defendants. Service of the summons and complaint in that adversary proceeding, a memorandum of law in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction therein, a notice of the debtor’s intention to apply for a temporary restraining order, a copy of the proposed temporary restraining order and affidavits in support were duly mailed by first-class mail and by Federal Express to all the defendants and their attorneys at their addresses. See Bankruptcy Rule 7004 and Rule 4, Fed.R.Civ.P. The debtor’s application for a temporary restraining order and for the setting of a date for a hearing on the request for preliminary injunction in the adversary proceeding was heard ex parte by the district judge who had jurisdiction over the proceedings. The district judge granted at the time a temporary restraining order in the proceedings and set a hearing on the debtor’s application for a preliminary injunction. On that same day, Robins mailed by first-class mail and by Federal Express to all the defendants and their attorneys at their addresses “Notice of Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.” At the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, a number of defendants as well as the Committee constituted by the court to represent Daikon Shield Claimants appeared by counsel. At the commencement of the hearing the defendant Piccinin, a plaintiff in one of the Dai-kon Shield actions which Robins sought to stay, filed through her attorney a written motion to dismiss as against her. No other defendant filed a motion in response to the motion for a preliminary injunction. After receiving certain testimony, admitting various records, and hearing arguments of parties, the district court granted Robins’ request for a preliminary injunction. In his order granting the preliminary injunction, the district judge found (1) that continuation of litigation in the civil actions threatened property of Robins’ estate, burdened and impeded Robins’ reorganization effort, contravened the public interest, and rendered any plan of reorganization futile; (2) that this burden on Robins’ estate outweighed any burden on the Daikon claimants caused by enjoining their civil actions; and (3) that all remaining insurance coverage in favor of the debtor under its liability policy issued by Aetna was property of the Robins’ Chapter 11 estate. The district judge then held that all actions for damages that might be satisfied from proceeds of the Aetna insurance policy were subject to the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and enjoined further litigation in the eight civil actions, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (3) as supplemented by 11 U.S.C. § 105. Only the defendants Piccinin, the Mosas, and Conrad filed timely notices of appeal from the grant of the preliminary injunction. Their appeals, questioning the propriety of that preliminary injunction as against suits by Robins’ co-defendants is the first of the issues now before this Court. Some three weeks after entry of the preliminary injunction, Robins filed a motion for (1) a determination of trial venue of all Daikon Shield suits, (2) identification of such Daikon Shield cases as were “related to” the Chapter 11 case, and (3) transfer of such cases to the Eastern District of Virginia for trial. It also requested an expedited hearing on these motions. This request for an expedited hearing was granted and the expedited hearing was set ten days later. Notice of the hearing was given the Representatives of the Daikon Shield Claimants Committee and the Unsecured Creditors Committee. The Committees and the defendants Piccinin, the Mosas and Conrad appeared by counsel at the hearing and joined in entering objections to the motion. After a hearing on the motions, the district judge entered an order holding that (1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1834(b), all actions based upon personal injury tort or wrongful death claims arising from the use of the Daikon Shield were proceedings related to this Chapter 11 case over which this court had jurisdiction; (2) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(5) and 1334(b), all such actions, wherever pending, were to be tried in the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia; (3) all actions related to the Robins’ Chapter 11 case now pending in any federal district court or subsequently removed to any federal district court, during the pendency of this Chapter 11 case, were to be transferred to this court [the Richmond Division of the United States District Court]; and (4) nothing in the order limited the power of this court [the Richmond Division of the United States District Court] later to abstain from hearing any proceeding under section 1334(c)(1) or remanding under section 1452(b), 28 U.S.C. From this order, the Committee of Representatives of Daikon Shield Claimants and the defendant Piccinin have appealed. This appeal poses the second issue on appeal. I The initial question in the appeal of the first issue relates to the court’s jurisdiction to grant a stay or injunction of suits in other courts against co-defendants of the debtor or of third parties; none of the parties herein contest the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to stay actions against the debtor itself in any court. Jurisdiction over suits involving co-defendants or third-parties may be bottomed on two statutory-provisions of the Bankruptcy Act itself as well as on the general equitable powers of the court. The first of these statutory grants of jurisdiction is found in section 362, 11 U.S.C. The purpose of this section by its various subsections is to protect the debtor from an uncontrollable scramble for its assets in a number of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts, to preclude one creditor from pursuing a remedy to the disadvantage of other creditors, and to provide the debtor and its executives with a reasonable respite from protracted litigation, during which they may have an opportunity to formulate a plan of reorganization for the debtor. Matter of Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.1982). As the Court in Fidelity Mortg. Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540, put it, “[t]he stay insures that the debtor’s affairs will be centralized, initially, in a single forum in order to prevent conflicting judgments from different courts and in order to harmonize all of the creditors' interests with one another.” Section 362 is broken down into several subsections, only two of which are relevant on this appeal. The first of such subsections is (a)(1), which imposes an automatic stay of any proceeding “commenced or [that] could have been commenced against the debtor” at the time of the filing of the Chapter 11 proceeding; the second is (a)(3), which provides similar relief against suits involving the possession or custody of property of the debtor, irrespective of whether the suits are against the debtor alone or others. We shall discuss the extent of jurisdiction given the bankruptcy court under these two subsections, beginning with (a)(1). (a) Subsection (a)(1) is generally said to be available only to the debtor, not third party defendants or co-defendants. The rationale for this narrow construction of the statute has been stated in Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (6th Cir.1983), and in our own case of Williford v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 126-27 (4th Cir.1983), and it need not be repeated here. However, as the Court in Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 26 B.R. 405, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) remarked, in discussing the oft-cited case, Royal Trucks & Trailer v. Armadors Meritina Salvadoreana, 10 B.R. 488, 491 (N.D.Ill.1981), “there are cases [under 362(a)(1)] where a bankruptcy court may properly stay the proceedings against non-bankrupt co-defendants” but, it adds, that in order for relief for such non-bankrupt defendants to be available under (a)(1), there must be “unusual circumstances” and certainly “ ‘[something more than the mere fact that one of the parties to the lawsuit has filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy must be shown in order that proceedings be stayed against non-bankrupt parties.’ ” This “unusual situation,” it would seem, arises when there is such identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor. An illustration of such a situation would be a suit against a third-party who is entitled to absolute indemnity by the debt- or on account of any judgment that might result against them in the case. To refuse application of the statutory stay in that case would defeat the very purpose and intent of the statute. This fact was recognized by the court in In Re Metal Center, 31 B.R. 458 (D.Conn.1983). In Metal Center the third-party plaintiff had been sued, along with the debtor, on his guaranty of the debtor’s obligation. The third-party was entitled to be indemnified by the debtor on account of any judgment rendered against him because of his guaranty. While the action against both the debtor and the guarantor was pending, the debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition. The action was stayed against the debtor but the plaintiff sought to continue his suit against the guarantor. The guarantor at this point moved to stay the action as against him. The bankruptcy court reviewed the motion because of the possible “effect upon the debtor of a state court judgment against Gardner [the guarantor].” In discussing the issue, the court first dismissed as inapplicable to the facts of this case the situation where the third-party defendant was “independently liable as, for example, where the debtor and another are joint tort feasors or where the nondebtor’s liability rests upon his own breach of duty.” It noted that in such a case “the automatic stay would clearly not extend to such non debtor.” But, in contrast to those situations, it declared that “where, however, a debtor and nondebtor are so bound by statute or contract that the liability of the nondebtor is imputed to the debtor by operation of law, then the Congressional intent to provide relief to debtors would be frustrated by permitting indirectly what is expressly prohibited in the Code.” It concluded with the statement: “Clearly the debtor’s protection must be extended to enjoin litigation against others if the result would be binding upon the debtor’s estate,” and this is so, whether the debtor is a party or not. 31 B.R. at 462. It is true that, although the third-party defendant in Metal Center was found to be entitled to indemnity from the debtor, the court held that the situation was not such as to qualify for a stay under section 362(a)(1). The court reached this conclusion because in its opinion the judgment in the suit against the third-party would not be binding on the bankruptcy court. Of course, if the indemnitee, who has suffered a judgment for which he is entitled to be absolutely indemnified by the debtor, cannot file and have allowed as an adjudicated claim the actual amount of the judgment he has secured but must submit his claim for allowance in the bankruptcy proceeding with the prospect that his claim may not be allowed in the full amount of the judgment awarded in favor of him, the indemnitee will be unfairly mulcted by inconsistent judgments and his contract of indemnity in effect nullified. We do not accept such reasoning with its shocking result and would find a stay under (a)(1) acceptable. Apparently the court in Metal Center recognized the inconsistency and the injustice resulting from its refusal to sustain a stay under (a)(1) for it did grant a stay of the action against the third-party but on equitable grounds, finding in justification that “severing and remanding [the plaintiffs action against the indemnitee to the state court for trial and judgment would] ... potentially expose[s] Gardner [the in-demnitee] to inconsistent judgments.” 31 B.R. at 463. While, as we have said, it seems that a ruling sustaining the stay in that case under section 362(a)(1) would have been more logical and appropriate, it is unimportant whether the stay is granted under section 362(a)(1) or on equitable grounds: the result is the same; a stay is proper in such a situation. In Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc., 38 B.R. 123 (D.Mass.1984), the issue was similar to that in Metal Center, i.e., whether a guarantor entitled to indemnity by the debtor would be entitled to seek a stay under section 362(a)(1). In granting the stay in that case, the Court, after quoting the language of Metal Center with respect to the case in which “the liability of the non-debtor is imputed to the debtor by operation of law,” said: The concept that notice and an opportunity to defend binds the principal on a judgment against a guarantor (in a case in which the principal did not participate) springs from notions of res judicata. If George Seybolt recovers a judgment against the guarantors in the state court, Bio-Energy Associates’ assertion that the $100,000 was not a loan but a contribution to capital may well be rendered moot when the guarantor subsequently asserts a claim against it for indemnity. At the very least, the dual litigation of these issues in the state court and the bankruptcy court is not judicially economic and potentially exposes Bio-Energy, Inc. and Bio-Energy Associates to inconsistent judgments. See In re Metal Center, Inc., supra, at 463. Accordingly, I find that George Sey-bolt’s claims against the individual guarantors are within this Court’s jurisdiction and should be stayed until an appropriate motion for relief from stay is filed and granted by the bankruptcy court. 38 B.R. at 127-28. In Re Brentano’s, 27 B.R. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) , also involved the situation of a guarantor of a debtor in a Chapter 11 proceeding who was entitled under contract to indemnity by the debtor against any judgment against him. While the case did not directly concern section 362 but the question of bankruptcy jurisdiction, the language of the court appears relevant on the issue under review here. It said that the action against the guarantor-indemnitee “could and would affect the estate in bankruptcy,” since, under the indemnity agreement, “a judgment in favor of the [plaintiff] in the guaranty action would automatically result in indemnification liability against Brentano’s” [i.e., the indemnitor]. Accepting this language one would have difficulty in not concluding that the action was in effect one against the debtor and as such would qualify for relief under (a)(1). Brentano’s is cited and discussed in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 995 (3d Cir. 1984) , which was an asbestos case. The issue in Pacor, as in Brentano’s, was one of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The court described the facts in Brentano’s and stated the resulting legal situation as follows: In Brentano’s, however, it is clear that the action between the landlord and Mac-Millan could and would affect the estate in bankruptcy. By virtue of the indemnification agreement between Brentano’s and MacMillan, a judgment in favor of the landlord on the guarantee action would automatically result in indemnification liability against Brentano’s. See also In re Johnie T. Patton, Inc., 12 B.R. 470 (Bankr.D.Nev.1981); In re Lu-casa International, Ltd., 6 B.R. 717 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1980); In re Brothers Coal Co., 6 B.R. 567 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1980) (all involving guarantors of debt- or’s obligations). Moreover, even in the absence of an explicit indemnification agreement, an action by a creditor against a guarantor of a debtor’s obligations will necessarily affect that that [sic] the creditor’s status vis a vis other creditors, and administration of the estate therefore depends upon the outcome of that litigation. 743 F.2d at 995. Pacor, however, found Brentano’s inapplicable in its case because: In this case, however, there would be no automatic creation of liability against Manville on account of a judgment against Pacor. Pacor is not a contractual guarantor of Manville, nor has Man-ville agreed to indemnify Pacor, and thus a judgment in the Higgins-Pacor action could not give rise to any automatic liability on the part of the estate. 743 F.2d at 995. The clear implication of the decision is that, if there had been a contract to indemnify, a contrary result would have been in order. (b) But (a)(1), which stays actions against the debtor and arguably against those whose interests are so intimately intertwined with those of the debtor that the latter may be said to be the real party in interest, is not the only part of section 362 providing for an automatic stay of proceedings. Subsection (a)(3) directs stays of any action, whether against the debtor or third-parties, to obtain possession or to exercise control over property of the debt- or. A key phrase in the construction and application of this section is, of course, “property” as that term is used in the Act. Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act defines “property” in the bankruptcy context. It provides that the “estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” The Supreme Court in construing this language in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205, n, 9, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2313, n. 9, 76 L.Ed.2d 515, quoted this language in the legislative history of the Section: The scope of this paragraph [541(a)(1) ] is broad. It included all kinds of property including tangible or intangible property, causes of action (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6)), and all other forms of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. Under the weight of authority, insurance contracts have been said to be embraced in this statutory definition of “property.” In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176,184 (5th Cir.1984). For example, even the right to cancel an insurance policy issued to the debtor has uniformly been held to be stayed under section 362(a)(3). Lam, Cancellation of Insurance: Bankruptcy Automatic Stay Implications, 59 Am.Bank. L.J., 267 (1985), (extensively reviewing the cases to this effect). A products liability policy of the debtor is similarly within the principle: it is a valuable property of a debtor, particularly if the debtor is confronted with substantial liability claims within the coverage of the policy in which case the policy may well be, as one court has remarked in a case like the one under review, “the most important asset of [i.e., the debtor’s] estate,” In re Johns Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 229 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Any action in which the judgment may diminish this “important asset” is unquestionably subject to a stay under this subsection. In re Johns Manville Corp., 33 B.R. 254, 261 (S.D.N.Y.1983). Accordingly actions “related to” the bankruptcy proceedings against the insurer or against officers or employees of the debtor who may be entitled to indemnification under such policy or who qualify as additional insureds under the policy are to be stayed under section 362(a)(3). Ibid. (c) The statutory power of the bankruptcy court to stay actions involving the debtor or its property is not, however, limited to section 362(a)(1) and (a)(3). It has been repeatedly held that 11 U.S.C. § 105 which provides that the bankruptcy court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title,” “empowers the bankruptcy court to enjoin parties other than the bankrupt” from commencing or continuing litigation. In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. 1018, 1020 (D.N.M.1982). In that case, the Court said: Appellant cites only one case decided under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code which found that the bankruptcy court lacked [under § 105] the power to enjoin parties from pursuing actions against non-bankrupts in state court. In re Aboussie Brothers Construction Co., 8 B.R. 302 (E.D.Mo.1981). In Aboussie, the court did not address § 105(a), but relied on cases decided under the old Bankruptcy Act to hold that there was no jurisdiction to enjoin parties from pursuing actions which did not involve the bankrupt directly. The pre-1978 Act confined jurisdiction to “the debtor and his property, wherever located.” Act of June 22,1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 906 (1938). Under the new Bankruptcy Code, the jurisdictional statute provides that the bankruptcy court shall have jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (Supp.1982). This broader jurisdictional statute, combined with § 105(a), grants the bankruptcy court power to enjoin parties from proceeding in state court against non-bankrupts where the state proceeding is related to a case arising under Title 11. 25 B.R. at 1020. In stating the same scope for section 105, the Court in Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 425 (S.D.N.Y.1983), quoting from 2 Collier on Bankruptcy §§ 362.02 and 362.-05 (15th ed. 1982), put the matter thus: [Section 362 of the Code] does not attempt to state the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court with respect to stays and injunctive relief or to determine the boundaries of the exercise of the court’s injunctive power. Section 105 which is the successor to Section 2A(15), gives the court the power to issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. [T]he exceptions to the automatic stay of § 362(a) which are set forth in § 362(b) are simply exceptions to the stay which protect the estate automatically at the commencement of the case and are not limitations upon the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or upon its power to enjoin. That power is generally based upon § 105 of the Code. The court will have ample power to enjoin actions excepted from the automatic stay which might interfere in the rehabilitative process whether in a liquidation or in a reorganization case. See to the same effect, In Re Landmark, 19 B.R. 556, 559 (N.D.Ohio 1982); In Re Larmar Estates, Inc., 5 B.R. 328, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y.1980). Accepting that section 105 confers on the bankruptcy court power under its expanded jurisdiction as expressed in section 1471(b) [28 U.S.C.] of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and now section 1334(b), 28 U.S.C. of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments to enjoin suits against parties in other courts, whether state or federal, it is necessary to mark out the circumstances under which the power or jurisdiction may be exercised. In Otero Mills, supra, the Court approved a ruling that “[t]o so enjoin a creditor’s action against a third party, the court must find that failure to enjoin would effect [sic] the bankruptcy estate and would adversely or detrimentally influence and pressure the debtor through the third party.” 25 B.R. at 1020. In Johns-Manville, the Court phrased somewhat fuller the circumstances when section 105 may support a stay: In the exercise of its authority under § 105, the Bankruptcy Court may use its injunctive authority to “protect the integrity of a bankrupt’s estate and the Bankruptcy Court’s custody thereof and to preserve to that Court the ability to exercise the authority delegated to it by Congress” [citing authority]. Pursuant to the exercise of that authority the Court may issue or extend stays to enjoin a variety of proceedings [including discovery against the debtor or its officers and employees] which will have an adverse impact on the Debtor’s ability to formulate a Chapter 11 plan. 40 B.R. at 226. (d) Beyond these statutory powers under section 362 and section 105 to enjoin other actions whether against the debtor or third-parties and in whatsoever court, the bankruptcy court under its comprehensive jurisdiction as conferred by section 1334, 28 U.S.C., has the “inherent power of courts under their general equity powers and in the efficient management of the dockets to grant relief” to grant a stay. Williford v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., supra, 715 F.2d at 127, Austin v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1983). In exercising such power the court, however, must “weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance” and must justify the stay “by clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm to the party against whom it is operative.” Williford, supra, Metal Center and Seybolt, discussed supra, are illustrative of situations in which courts have found sufficient grounds to grant a stay under this power. (e) There are thus four grounds on which the bankruptcy court may enjoin suits against the bankrupt or its assets and property. In some instances only one of these grounds may be relevant; in an involved and complex case, several or even all of the grounds may require consideration. The present case is such an involved and complex case. It has a striking similarity to a Chapter 11 proceedings, initially begun in the bankruptcy court of the Southern District of New York, concerning the reorganization of the Johns-Manville Corporation. In that proceeding, which was litigated both in the New York and Louisiana courts, many of the issues posed on this •aspect of the case were raised and analyzed by the courts of the two circuits and the decisions resolving such issues present in a practical form the application of the power of a bankruptcy court to stay actions relating to the bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor, its property and their operations. For this reason, it seems pertinent to review the decisions in those proceedings, for their guidance on the resolution of the issue herein. We begin with the initial proceedings in the bankruptcy court of the Southern District of New York. (f) Johns-Manville, an asbestos producer, was beset by a mass of suits seeking large awards for damages sustained by reason of asbestos exposure much as has Robins in this case and, after suffering large and burdensome recoveries by plaintiffs and making substantial settlements in many of the cases, filed its Chapter 11 petition in the Southern District of New York in August, 1982. Such filing operated as an automatic stay of all proceedings against Johns-Manville. However, many of the thousands of cases named as defendants not only Johns-Manville but a number of other asbestos producers and dealers as co-defendants. Shortly after Johns-Man-ville filed its Chapter 11 petition, these co-defendants, charged in the complaints of the plaintiffs in the actions as joint tort feasors, sought judicial relief in the bankruptcy court, “inviting,” that court by way of a declaratory judgment in the exercise of “its equitable powers” to enlarge the automatic stay provided by section 362 of the Act to include nondebtor defendants “under the penumbra of section 362’s protection” as well as under section 105, and to extend this stay throughout the nation to all asbestos litigation. Matter of Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The primary issue at this stage was stated to be “whether this Court should take the unprecedented step of exercising its discretion pursuant to section 105 of the Code to extend the section 362 automatic stay so as to encompass the co-defendants herein.” 26 B.R. at 408-409. The bankruptcy court ruled, first, “that section 362 is limited in scope to the debtor and does not operate to stay actions against the co-defendants of this debtor.” 26 B.R. at 409-414. Secondly, it held that relief under section 105 is only available if found to be “necessary or appropriate in order to achieve the goals of a Chapter 11 reorganization,” and, even then, only after a finding that “a failure to enjoin would affect the bankruptcy estate and would adversely or detrimentally influence and pressure the debtor through that third-party,” thereby justifying a finding of irreparable injury and likelihood of prevailing on the merits. None of these facts the court found present on the instant showing, but it added: In an appropriate case, where the proposed extension of the stay is designed to cover actions against entities that truly are inextricably interwoven with the debtor or which affect property of the debtor’s estate, section 105 may be used. In the instant case, such is not the situation as any liability of these co-defendants is not directly attributable to the debtor as it would be if these co-defendants were, for example, key employees of the debtor. 26 B.R. at 418 (italics in text). It concluded by declaring that there was “no basis [as shown by the record] to extend the section 362 stay to cover them [the appeals] by means of section 105.” A second action was begun shortly after-wards, this time by the debtor, to enjoin (1) the prosecution of “proceedings against Manville’s employees, agents and others” and of discovery proceedings involving them in actions covering “the same issues and subject-matter as are involved in the stayed litigations against Manville,” (2) “ ‘direct action’ lawsuits against insurers and sureties of the debtor” since the coverage of such policies of insurance or suretyship “represent[ed] property of [the debtor’s] estate which must be preserved for the benefit of all creditors,” and (3) a suit brought by certain security holders against “various of the ‘employees, agents and others’ ” in the district court of Colorado. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y.1983). It will be observed that this proceeding involved matters not litigated in the earlier proceeding; in fact, it involved actions against the debt- or’s employees for actions attributable to Manville, precisely the point which the court in the earlier case had said was not before it at that time. The bankruptcy court granted a temporary injunction against the continuance of either the suits or of discovery against present or future officers, employees and agents but refused a stay for past officers and employees. In reaching that conclusion it found that “in great measure the suits being pursued against Manville’s officers and employees are in reality derivative of identical claims brought against Manville,” which, if sustained against the officers and employees, would expose the estate “to claims for contribution and indemnification” and might result in collateral estoppel against the debtor “in subsequent actions.” 26 B.R. at 426. It accordingly held it proper to stay these actions and discovery “against [such] non-debtors which would frustrate the statutory scheme or impact adversely on a debtor’s ability to formulate a plan or on the debtor’s property.” 26 B.R. at 427. It further granted the injunction against the security action, finding “that [such] suit is nothing more than an effort to circumvent section 362 by suing Manville’s officers and directors when the real party in interest is Manville. In all but formal detail, the [security] litigation is against the debtor within the meaning of section 362.” 26 B.R. at 428. It, also, said that: An adverse judgment in the [security] case would have serious consequences for the debtor’s estate. Manville’s ByLaws require it to indemnify its officers and directors for their litigation expenses, including any amounts paid to satisfy a judgment of liability, so long as the conduct at issue was intended to benefit the company ____ Although Man-ville believes that the insurance policies which it had in force cover these expenses, the insurance company has reserved its right to contest coverage and to terminate on 30 days notice the payment of defense costs. If the insurance company fails to live up to its obligations, the officers and directors would look to the Company for reimbursement pursuant to the By-Laws. In any event, the policies have specific dollar limits beyond which Manville itself must pay. To the extent expenditures related to the (security) suit exhaust those limits, an asset of the estate is diminished and Manville’s exposure in other litigations increases. 26 B.R. at 429. But it denied a stay of the suits against the insurers and sureties, saying: Unlike suits against the debtor’s employees and agents, Manville maintains no obligation to indemnify or pay for the defense costs of its insurers or sureties. Thus, the liability of these insurers and sureties in no way inures to the detriment of the Manville estate. 26 B.R. at 431. On motion for rehearing, however, the bankruptcy court withdrew its decision denying an injunction against suits directed against the debtor’s insurers and granted such injunction. It did so on the basis of these findings: The debtor “could be adversely affected by the continuation of such suits” since the “insurance policies and proceeds thereof and the causes of action previously asserted by Manville against its insurance carriers in suits pending in California (“California Insurance Litigation”) and elsewhere constitute substantial property of the Manville estate which will be diminished if and to the extent that third party direct actions against the insurance carriers result in plaintiffs’ judgments” and since “important issues respecting policy coverage and liability may be pressed as collaterally estopping Manville.” 26 B.R. at 435. Further, “[t]o permit the third party actions to continue against Manville’s insurance carriers will result in a multiplicity of positions and defenses on the part of the insurance carriers and will most likely result in inconsistent decisions and rulings concerning the coverage and liability of the insurance carriers to the third party claimants and to Manville. Such a disorganized and fragmented procedure for resolving such major issues will undermine Manville’s attempt at reorganization.” 26 B.R. at 436. It ended with these legal conclusions: 1. “Manville’s rights under its insurance policies and all the causes of action arising thereunder constitute property of the Manville estates within the purview of section 541(a) of the Code.” 26 B.R. at 436. 2. “Pursuant to § 105(a), the Bankruptcy Court may extend the automatic stay under § 362 of the Code to stay and enjoin proceedings or acts against non-debtors where such actions would interfere with, deplete or adversely affect property of Manville’s estates or which would frustrate the statutory scheme of Chapter 11 or diminish Manville’s ability to formulate a plan of reorganization.” 26 B.R. at 436. 3. Pursuant to § 362(a) of the Code, all actions “to obtain possession of or interfere with property from Manville estates” are stayed and enjoined. 26 B.R. 436. As a result of action in the Fifth Circuit to which we later advert and in order to enlarge the stay theretofore granted to include past officers and employees, (the court having reached the decision that suits against past as well as present employees of the debtor should be stayed) the bankruptcy court in New York entered a third reported decision in 33 B.R. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). It found that: In the event of a recovery against the past or present officers, directors or employees of Manville in any of the pending 1,000 cases, Manville’s insurers may be called upon to indemnify such officers, directors and employees under the provisions of the policies issued by them to Manville. If such insurers are called upon to make such indemnification payments, those payments may cause an asset of the Manville estates to be diminished. 33 B.R. at 261. It reiterated in this same decision its ruling that the insurance policies constituted assets of the debtor, and stated the test for granting a stay or injunction in the circumstances: “(a) possible irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.” It concluded by granting the stay in favor of the insurers and the past as well as present directors, officers and employees, finding that the required findings for a preliminary injunction had been satisfied. 33 B.R. at 262-63. On appeal of certain of these decisions, the district court affirmed the decisions of the Bankruptcy Court staying discovery of any officers, directors or employees of the debtor and ruled that the provisions of section 362 stayed proceedings against the debtor’s insurers. Specifically, it declared that “the fact that it [Manville] ultimately may not receive all of the proceeds under its products liability insurance does not affect its status as property under the Code subject to the provisions of the automatic stay.” 40 B.R. at 230. At the same time that these Johns-Man-ville cases were proceeding in New York, similar issues were arising in asbestos cases filed against Johns-Manville, other joint tortfeasors, and their insurers in the three districts of Louisiana. The three district courts had ruled differently on the right to a stay of all co-defendants of Man-ville, there being no dispute that the stay was proper of Manville itself. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held in Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard, 706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1983), that the automatic stay applied only to Manville, not to the other defendants and that the showing as made was insufficient to sustain a stay in favor of the co-defendants under equitable principles; however, it sustained the right of the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to state a “direct action” under the Louisiana statute against Manville’s insurer and held that such an action was not stayed by any provision of the Bankruptcy Act. After a petition for rehearing, however, the Court modified its decision on the plaintiffs’ motion to amend and held “that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to add, as party defendants, the liability insurance carriers of Johns-Manville and Unar-co.” 706 F.2d at 548. Two days after this decision was filed, the bankruptcy court modified its previous orders by staying “any and all suits against any past, present or future Manville officer, director or employee or against [his or her] insurers.” It added in this order, also, that its prior order would be amended to preclude discovery of the parties against whom suits were proscribed. In an appeal based on a petition for certiorari and for a writ of prohibition against a contempt order against plaintiffs’ counsel for violating such stay, the orders of the bankruptcy court were in effect sustained in In Re Davis, 730 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.1984). (g) As we have earlier indicated, we have discussed at some length these proceedings in the Johns-Manville proceedings in New York and Louisiana, because, with their striking similarity both factually and on the legal issues to this case, the decisions of those courts provide persuasive guidance for our action herein. Though the district judge below did not cite the various rulings of the Manville courts in support of his decision, there was a close identity of issues between those in the Manville cases and in the present case. In the three situations in which the defendants have challenged the injunction granted by the district judge [i.e., the Mosa, Conrad and Piccinin cases], the only defendants other than the debtor, are the two Robins, Dr. Frederick A. Clark, Jr., Dr. Hugh J. Davis, and the debtor’s insurer Aetna. So far as the suits against the two Robins and Dr. Clark, those defendants were entitled to indemnification by the debtor under the corporate by-laws and the statutes of Virginia, the State of debtor’s incorporation, and were, in addition, additional insureds under the debtor’s insurance policy. Dr. Davis was the beneficiary of an express contract of indemnification on the part of Robins and was, under a compromise agreement with Robins and Aetna, an additional insured under Robins’ insurance policy. The Manville court had granted a preliminary injunction in favor of defendants in the same position as these defendants, as we have seen, on facts similar to those here, finding that the requirements of possible irreparable harm “had been satisfied by the showing ... [that the suits against the defendants would represent] an immediate and irreparable impact on the pool of insurance assets, of the existence of sufficiently serious questions going to the merits,” and of the tipping in the defendants’ favor in the hardships in a balancing of the debtor’s and the plaintiffs’. 33 B.R. at 262-63. That court had previously disposed of the public interest being weighted in the debtor’s favor: “Indeed, this Court finds the goal of removing all obstacles to plan formulation eminently praiseworthy and supports every lawful effort to foster this goal while protecting the due process rights of all constituencies.” 26 B.R. at 428. II. The district court in this case applied the test for a grant of preliminary injunctive relief as stated by us in Blackwelder Furniture, 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4th Cir.1977), and Televest v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir.1980). It found, as had the Johns-Manville courts, that irreparable harm would be suffered by the debtor and by the defendants since any of these suits against these co-defendants, if successful, would reduce and diminish the insurance fund or pool represented in Aetna’s policy in favor of Robins and thereby affect the property of the debtor to the detriment of the debtor’s creditors as a whole. The likelihood of success by the debtor under these circumstances appeared indisputable. The hardships which would be suffered irreparably by the debtor and by its creditors generally in permitting these plaintiffs to secure as it were a preference in the distribution of the insurance pool herein to which all creditors were entitled, together with the unquestioned public interest in promoting a viable reorganization of the debtor can be said to outweigh any contrary hardship to the plaintiffs. Such was the finding in the Manville cases and that finding does not appear unreasonable here. The appellants, however, suggest that the record is insufficient to support such findings by the district judge. We disagree. The record is not extensive but it includes every fact considered by the courts in the Manville cases to be necessary for their decision. The rights of Dr. Davis, Dr. Clark and the two Robins to indemnity and their status as additional insureds under Robins’ insurance policy are undisputed on the record. That there are thousands of Daikon Shield actions and claims pending is a fact established in the record and the limited fund available under Robins’ insurance policy is recognized in the record. It seems incontestable that, if the suits are permitted to continue and discovery allowed, any effort at reorganization of the debtor will be frustrated, if not permanently thwarted. It is obvious from the record that if suits are permitted to proceed against indemnitees on claims on which the indemnitees are entitled to indemnity by Robins, either a binding judgment against the debtor will result or, as the court in Metal Center said, inconsistent judgments will result, calling for the exercise of the court’s equitable powers. In our opinion, the record was thus more than adequate to support the district court’s grant of injunctive relief. Certainly, the district court did not commit an abuse of discretion in granting the injunction herein. The appellants add a final complaining note that the district judge stated in his decision that the “Conclusions of Law” made by him should apply “with equal force to all defendants similarly situated who are brought to the attention of the court.” This is little different, however, from the language of the court in the Man-ville cases in which there was a broad, general injunction against all present or future suits. In summary, we have no difficulty in sustaining the grant of a preliminary injunction herein. We are sustained in this conclusion by the fact, recognized by the district judge on the record, that any Dai-kon Shield plaintiff may at any time petition for the vacation of the stay as it affects his or her suit and he or she is entitled to a hearing on such petition. Actually, there is one such petition pending and the district judge has agreed to set a hearing on that petition. Ill The second appeal questions the validity of the district court’s order of November 9, 1985, fixing the venue for the trial of all Daikon Shield cases and providing for the transfer of such cases to the District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia at Richmond. Robins has challenged the appéala-bility of such order. We find the challenge without merit. It is unquestionably true that, as the Court in In Re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1038-39 (3d Cir.1985), declared, jurisdiction in a Court of Appeals to review a decision or order of a district court sitting in bankruptcy is controlled by § 1291, 28 U.S.C. See also Matter of UNR Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1114-16 (7th Cir. 1984). While section 1291 limits jurisdiction to appeals from “all final decisions of the district courts,” the concept of finality under such statute has traditionally been applied “in a more pragmatic and less technical way in bankruptcy cases than in other situations.” Amatex, supra, at 1039. Judge Breyer in In Re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443-45 (1st Cir.1983) has traced this traditional rule of more liberal construction of finality as applied to appeals in bankruptcy cases over the years. In tracing appealability under the statute in bankruptcy cases, Judge Breyer noted the definition of a “proceeding” in bankruptcy as stated in Taylor v. Voss, 271 U.S. 176, 181, 46 S.Ct. 461, 463-64, 70 L.Ed. 889 (1926), as “not the overall liquidation or reorganization, but rather an individual ‘matter[] of an administrative character ... presented in the ordinary course of the administration of the bankrupt’s estate.” (Emphasis added by Judge Breyer.) He then declared on the basis of this determination that “any dispute between a bankrupt and his creditors over a claim or priority was a separate ‘proceeding’ and an order settling such dispute was appealable.” 711 F.2d at 445. Such is but another practical expression of the princi-pie that “finality” under 1291 is to be given not an absolute and inflexible construction in bankruptcy cases in which a “functional” and “practical” application is to be the rule. The special or unique reason for this relaxed rule of appealability in bankruptcy is that [bankruptcy cases frequently involve protracted proceedings with many parties participating. To avoid the waste of time and resources that might result from reviewing discrete portions of the action only after a plan of reorganization is approved, courts have permitted appellate review of orders that in other contexts might be considered interlocutory. In Re Amatex, supra, at 1039. This particular appeal illustrates well the justification for the relaxed rule of appeala-bility in bankruptcy cases. Should appeal be denied and trials proceed in the district court of the myriad of claims involved with the possibility of reversal on appeal from a final decision in such proceedings, months and months of litigation, carried on at great expense to all concerned might be voided and the reorganization derailed/ with consequent extensive delays both in reorganization and in resolution of the claims of the tort plaintiffs themselves. Weighty considerations of fairness and efficient judicial administration, therefore, mandate appealability in this case. We accordingly dismiss Robins’ challenge to the appealability of the order in question. Were it necessary, appealability could be sustained under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), as well as in mandamus. See In re Raison Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir.1984). We, however, prefer to ground our decision on the more relaxed standard of finality for appeal purposes under 1291 traditionally assigned bankruptcy appeals. Turning to the merits of the appeal on this part of the case, we address first the power of the district court, sitting in bankruptcy, to enter an order fixing the venue for the trial of tort personal injury claims against the debtor and for transferring all such cases to the bankruptcy court for trial and disposition. Section 157(b)(5), 28 U.S.C. states: The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending. We do not understand the appellants to contend that under this language the district court did not have authority under this statute to issue an order fixing the venue for trial of tort cases against a Chapter 11 debtor. They do argue, however, that the sense of the section, if not its precise language, was to decentralize the trial of these tort claims and to permit their continuance for trial in the court in which the complaints were filed and that the ruling of the district judge in this case fixing venue in the district court in which the bankruptcy petition was filed flies in the face of this congressional purpose. They refer to the language of Senator Dole in commenting on the Senate Conference Report on the 1984 amendments and construe it as suggesting that tort claims were to be tried in the court in which those claims were originally filed. Senator Dole, in the language to which appellants refer and out of which the appellants arrive at their finding of the sense of the Congress, actually restated simply the language of the statute itself. He said that “where abstention does not occur, those cases [i.e., “personal injury cases”] will be handled by the district court where the bankruptcy has been filed or, if that court finds it appropriate, where the claim arose.” Statement by Hon. Robert Dole 180 Cong.Rec. S 8889 (daily sd. June 29, 1984), reprinted in, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 586, 587. We discern nothing in that language to warrant the conclusion that, in enacting the statute the Congress favored decentralizing the administration of the bankruptcy by leaving all “personal injury cases” to the court in the place where the claim “arose.” In fact, to accept the view of the appellants on the construction of the statute would be completely at variance with the House version of the bill, which was in effect accepted by the Conference Committee, and would be to adopt the Senate version, which, according to Congressman Kastenmeier’s statement as a House Conference member, was “largely reject[ed]” by the Conference Committee and “would have dissipated the assets of the estate by creating a multiplicity of forums for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case.” Nor-do we find anything in In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d 270, 273-74 (6th Cir.1985), also relied on by the appellants, that lends support to appellant’s construction of § 157(b)(5). The extent of the holding in White Motor was that the district court had the power under the statute to allow products liability cases to be tried where the claim arose; there was nothing in the opinion, however, that declared that such action was mandated or even preferred. Specifically, there was no statement in the opinion that the district court in which the bankruptcy was pending could not try the claim. Unquestionably the district court in this case had the power under the statute to fix the trial venue in its district for all the Daikon Shield cases. The primary point of difference between the parties, however, relates not so much to the power of the district court in this case to fix venue for all the pending Daikon Shield tort cases — that power is stated in unmistakable terms in section 157(b)(5) — but to the manner in which that power may be exercised. Concededly, section 157(b)(5) does not prescribe any procedure. The appellants suggest that the procedure to be followed is laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1412, which provides that “[a] district court may transfer a case or proceeding under title 11 to a district court for another district, in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties.” As the appellants correctly construe section 1412, the authority to transfer a suit under that statute rests solely with the court in which the suit is pending and it provides no authority whatsoever to a district court sitting in bankruptcy in one district and having jurisdiction of the bankruptcy to transfer the venue of a case against the bankrupt to another district. Section 157(b)(5), however, expressly confers on the district court sitting in bankruptcy and having jurisdiction of the bankruptcy proceedings the power to fix the venue of any tort case against the debtor pending in other districts. The purpose of this latter statute was, as Congressman Kastenmeier declared, to centralize the administration of the estate and to eliminate the “multiplicity of forums for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case.” 130 Cong.Rec. H 7492, June 29, 1984, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News at 579. That purpose would be thwarted and the plain language of section 157(b)(5) nullified if the power of the district court sitting in bankruptcy to fix the venue for tort claims against a debtor was to be preempted by the provisions of section 1412. We do not believe this to have been the intention of Congress in enacting the two statutes. Section 157(b)(5) was drafted to cover the procedure in connection with a special group of cases, to wit, personal injury tort claims against a debtor in Chapter 11 proceedings wherever pending and in that connection the section is supreme. In all other cases related to the bankruptcy proceedings, however, the general statute (i.e., section 1412) would govern. This, we think, is the proper construction to be given the two statutes. It is a construction which harmonizes the two sections. It conforms to that established canon of statutory construction that “[w]e must read the statutes [in those instances where there is any possible conflict] to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981); Columbia Gas v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm., 651 F.2d 1146, 1158 (5th Cir. 1981); Pennsylvania v. Dept, of Health & Human Resources, 723 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir.1983). To accept the appellants’ interpretation and to negate the plain language of § 157(b)(5) “would violate the basic principle of construction that statutes should be read, if possible, as harmonious texts.” Leaf Tobacco Exporters Assn. v. Block, 749 F.2d 1106, 1115 (4th Cir.1984). We, therefore, have no difficulty in finding that the district judge’s authority to fix venue of personal injury tort actions against the debtor exists under § 157(b)(5), irrespective of the district in which such controversy is pending. And there are very real considerations that support a centralization of all the Dai-kon Shield claims, at least at first, in the district court having jurisdiction of the bankruptcy. The “single focal point” of this proceeding is the development of a reasonable plan of reorganization for the debtor, one which will work a rehabilitation of the debtor and at the same time assure fair and non-preferential resolution of the Daikon Shield claims. See In re Towner v. Petroleum Co., 48 B.R. 182, 190 (W.D. Okla.1985). These Daikon Shield claims, asserted by thousands of individuals in courts throughout the United States on behalf of both citizens of this country and citizens or residents of other countries, represent what are characterized in the Act as “contingent or unliquidated claims.” 11 U.S.C. § 502. Ordinarily such claims would be “estimated” by the bankruptcy court as a “core proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), for purpose of allowance if failure to do so “would unduly delay the administration of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(c); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 502.-03 (15 ed. 1982). That duty of estimation in a proper case under section 502(c) is not a permissive one; it is a mandatory obligation of the bankruptcy court. In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 23 B.R. 62 (E.D.Va.1982). This customary process of estimation of contingent claims is, however, different where the unliquidated, contingent claims are personal injury tort claims. Section 157(b)(2)(B) ex