Full opinion text
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. The appellants are five defendants who were convicted of various offenses under the federal narcotics laws. Their appeals raise a plethora of difficult issues for our consideration. We affirm the convictions of all defendants. However, we vacate Me-nelao Orlando Estevez’ sentence and remand his case to the district court for resentencing. I Background A. Facts This case arises out of an extensive cocaine network centered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Testimony at trial revealed the following. Evilio Pinto, an unindicted conspirator, was introduced to Rigoberto Moya-Gomez sometime in the spring of 1985. A short time later, Mr. Pinto learned that Mr. Moya-Gomez was transporting two to three kilograms of cocaine twice monthly from Miami, Florida to Milwaukee. Mr. Pinto decided to join Mr. Moya-Gomez in this criminal venture. In late March 1985, Mr. Pinto and Mr. Moya-Gomez traveled to Miami to purchase cocaine from Mr. Moya-Gomez’ source. That source turned out to be Menelao Orlando Estevez. Thereafter, Mr. Pinto and Mr. Moya-Gomez became part of a cocaine organization that was headed by Menelao Orlando Estevez and included his father Celestino Orlando Estevez and his brother Omar Estevez. At the outset, the Milwaukee end of the cocaine enterprise was managed by Mr. Moya-Gomez. In August 1985, however, Mr. Moya-Gomez had a falling out with the Estevez family. As a result, Orlando bought out Mr. Moya-Gomez’ cocaine connections and thereafter headed both the Florida and Wisconsin ends of the business. During the course of the conspiracy, members of the group regularly transported large quantities of cocaine from Miami to Milwaukee. The cocaine would be driven to Milwaukee, usually concealed in the spare tires of various vehicles. Upon its arrival in Milwaukee, the cocaine would be hidden and then distributed from residences and motel rooms obtained by the Estevez family for that purpose. Extensive records of all drug transactions were maintained. Approximately every two weeks, the money made from the sale of cocaine would be driven back to Florida. Lawrence Jackman, a member of the conspiracy, pleaded guilty and testified at trial about these various activities. As is evident in our later discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence claims raised by several of the defendants, Mr. Jackman’s testimony — along with that of Evilio Pinto— proved crucial to the government’s success in obtaining convictions against the defendants. Over a nine-month period, state and federal officials conducted an investigation into the Estevez organization. Several of the defendants were placed under surveillance. Searches of discarded garbage at residences associated with the defendants regularly turned up evidence of narcotics trafficking such as plastic bags with cocaine residue, drug records, and narcotics paraphernalia. In addition, investigating officers discovered that various vehicles were registered under false names at addresses under surveillance. In the culmination of their efforts, on June 30, 1986 at approximately 7:40 a.m., federal and state officers and agents executed simultaneous search warrants at a house located at 173 North 63rd Street, Milwaukee and a house located at 8495 Woodvale Drive, Oak Creek, a suburb of Milwaukee. Celestino was arrested at the 63rd Street house. Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) searched the house and seized approximately 750 grams of cocaine from an orange safe in the closet of a bedroom, three handguns, and numerous drug paraphernalia, drug notes and documents. Amado Raphael Leon and Adalberto Herrera were arrested at the Oak Creek residence. DEA agents also searched that house and seized approximately 17 kilograms of cocaine from a gray safe in the master bedroom, three handguns, $18,000 in United States currency, and numerous drug paraphernalia, drug notes and documents. On July 11, 1986, pursuant to a second search warrant, officials discovered an additional 12 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a brown Ford LTD parked in the garage at the Oak Creek residence. The keys to the LTD had been found on Celesti-no’s person at the time of his arrest. Neither Rigoberto Moya-Gomez nor Orlando Estevez was present at either the 63rd Street house or the Oak Creek house on the morning of the searches. However, they did not escape the authorities for very long. Mr. Moya-Gomez was arrested on August 21, 1986 following a high-speed car chase. Orlando Estevez was arrested on August 27, 1986 during the execution of a search warrant at his residence in Miami. A search of his Miami residence uncovered an arsenal of weapons, a sum of money in excess of $21,000, two address books, numerous documents bearing the names of other codefendants, several documents detailing large cash purchases, a document entitled “Cocaine Handbook — An Essential Reference,” and other miscellaneous drug-related items. B. Procedural History Celestino Estevez, Amado Leon, and Adalberto Herrera were named in the original indictment, returned by a federal grand jury on July 8, 1986. Thereafter, on August 26, 1986, the government obtained a superseding indictment that named an additional sixteen defendants, including Rigoberto Moya-Gomez and Orlando Estevez. In count 1 of the superseding indictment, the government charged all of the defendants with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In various other counts, the government charged some of the defendants with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In addition, the superseding indictment provided for the forfeiture of any property belonging to any of the defendants that was obtained with drug proceeds, including certain items listed therein. On September 9, 1986, the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment. The second superseding indictment was identical to the superseding indictment except that several assets were added to the forfeiture provision and two counts were added charging Celestino Este-vez and Orlando Estevez with operating a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Seven of the defendants named in the indictment were tried jointly in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Judge Terence Evans presiding. The trial commenced on November 17,1986 and ended on December 17, 1986. Following a month of trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all defendants on all charges. The jury also returned a special verdict of forfeiture as to those assets specifically described in the forfeiture provision of the indictment. II Appeal of Menelao Orlando Estevez, No. 87-1670 Orlando Estevez was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute (count 1), six counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (counts 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, and 14) and one count of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (count 20). The district court sentenced Orlando to fifty years imprisonment on count 20, twenty years imprisonment on counts 4, 7, 9, and 13 to run concurrent with each other and consecutive to count 20, and fifteen years imprisonment on counts 3 and 14 to run concurrent with each other and concurrent with the sentence imposed on counts 4, 7, 9, and 13. Orlando asserts six reasons why he is entitled to a new trial: (1) the district court violated his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice by issuing a pretrial restraining order pursuant to the criminal forfeiture statute that encompassed attorneys’ fees; (2) the district court violated his fifth amendment due process rights by refusing to hold a prompt, adversary, postrestraint evidentiary hearing to determine whether the restraining order was valid; (3) the district court erred by permitting him to proceed pro se without knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily having waived his sixth amendment right to counsel; (4) the district court violated his speedy trial rights by denying him a continuance; (5) the district court violated his due process rights by denying him access to a law library, and equipment and services necessary for preparing a defense; and (6) the district court violated his due process rights by sentencing him to seventy years in prison. We address each of these contentions seriatim. A. Criminal Forfeiture The most significant issue raised by these consolidated appeals concerns the criminal forfeiture provision in the indictment. The issues that we must decide are (1) whether the pretrial restraint of a defendant’s assets pursuant to the criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, including funds that the defendant would otherwise use to pay attorneys’ fees, violates the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel of choice; and (2) whether the pretrial restraint of a defendant’s assets without affording him an immediate postrestraint hearing violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 1. Background On September 2, 1986, the government sought an ex parte restraining order from the district court pursuant to the forfeiture provision of the indictment and 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A). On September 12, 1986, the district court entered the ex parte restraining order. The order prohibited the defendants from “selling, assigning, pledging, distributing, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of, removing from the jurisdiction of [the] court, or wasting, any and all part of their interest, direct or indirect, in the property described in the Forfeiture Provisions of the Second Superseding Indictment____” Orlando R.5B. Orlando was arraigned in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on September 30, 1986. At that time, attorney William P. Cagney III of Miami, Florida was present. Mr. Cagney advised the district court that he was entering a limited appearance for the purpose of litigating the forfeitability of attorneys’ fees prior to committing to the unconditional representation of Orlando. On October 8,1986, Mr. Cagney filed a motion on behalf of Orlando in which he asked the district court (1) to modify the ex parte restraining order entered on September 12, 1986 to permit Orlando to expend his own funds to retain counsel of his choice; (2) to modify the ex parte restraining order to allow Orlando living expenses for his family; and (3) “to conduct a prompt hearing wherein the government will be immediately required to establish that it is likely to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that ORLANDO ESTE-VEZ committed a violation of CCE [continuing criminal enterprise] and that all of his assets were derived therefrom.” Orlando R.ll at 1 (emphasis in original). The motion asserted that “[a]bsent a modification of the restraining order, Mr. Estevez will be unable to retain counsel____” Id. at 2. The motion also stated that “Mr. Estevez desires to retain Mr. Cagney and his law firm to defend him” but that “Mr. Cagney and his law firm will not enter unconditional appearances as his counsel in this case unless and until the issues and questions concerning the forfeiture of attorneys fees is [sic] determined by this Court.” Id. at 3. On October 20, 1986, the district court issued an opinion on the attorneys’ fees question. The court stated that “[interpreting the forfeiture provisions of the Act to include attorney fees raises serious constitutional questions.” United States v. Estevez, 645 F.Supp. 869, 870 (E.D.Wis.1986). The court noted that the statute exempts from forfeiture transfers made to a “ ‘bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture ____’ ” Id. at 871-72 (quoting 21 U.S. C. § 853(c)). However, the court also noted that “it is understandably difficult for an attorney to qualify under that exception. He is defending a person accused of violations which lead to forfeiture. He can hardly argue that he was without cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture.” Id. at 872. Nevertheless, the court concluded that “because the spirit of the statute allows for exceptions, and because of the constitutional questions the statute raises, it seems reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that legitimate attorney fees be excepted.” Id. Having construed the statute as exempting attorneys’ fees from forfeiture, the court then defined what constituted legitimate attorneys’ fees: While I believe that legitimate, which I take to mean reasonable, attorney fees are excepted from the forfeiture provisions, exorbitant fees are not. I believe that the court, to save the statute, must have some control over the size of the fee to be carved out of the forfeiture. In this case, I believe that Mr. Estevez can find- an eminently qualified attorney to represent him in this case for $40,000. The defendant may, as his motion asks, “expend his own funds” to pay his counsel, and up to $40,000 paid to his attorney will not be subject to forfeiture. The request for other funds is DENIED and, because the trial here is set for November 17, 1986, no hearing will be held. Id. (emphasis in original). On October 27, 1986, Orlando filed a pro se motion in which he argued that the district court’s resolution of the fee issue “continue[d] to thwart [him] from'retaining counsel of his choice.” Orlando R.15 at 1. Orlando asserted that a reasonable fee for Mr. Cagney would be in excess of $125,000. This estimation was based in part on Mr. Cagney’s evaluation of the complexities of the case and in part on conversations that Mr. Cagney had with three other criminal defense lawyers, two in Miami and one in Milwaukee. Id. at 2. Orlando asserted that the district court’s estimation of what constituted a “reasonable” fee was arbitrary because the court did not explain how it arrived at the $40,000 figure or otherwise announce the standards of reasonableness on which it relied. Orlando contended that the district court should never set the fee for retained counsel. According to Orlando, “[i]t is enough that retained counsel affirm that any monies paid him by his client are paid solely as attorney fees and related necessary costs.” Id. at 3. At the very least, Orlando concluded, the district court should “hold a hearing and accept affidavits of experienced criminal trial counsel as to what would be a fair and equitable fee a client should be allowed to pay his counsel prior to the trial of this cause.” Id. at 2-3. Later in the day on October 27, 1986, the district court held a pretrial conference. At this time, the court entertained oral argument by Mr. Cagney on the issues raised in Orlando’s motion for reconsideration. In response to Mr. Cagney’s arguments, the district court reiterated that Orlando was free to expend his own funds and up to $40,000 paid to an attorney would not be subject to forfeiture. Orlando R.25 at 36 (Tr. of Oct. 27, 1986 — Partial Proceedings). The court indicated that it did not think that the issue of a fee in excess of $40,000 was ripe at that time: What we’re dealing here with is a very elusive thing. First of all, I don’t know if the defendant has any more money, for one thing. I don’t know if the defendant would even be convicted. Let’s suppose the defendant decided to give Mr. Cagney $150,000 or something. He may be acquitted. He may be convicted and the government may decide they can’t show that the funds were obtained by his being involved in drug related activities. There is a lot of unknowns out here. Id. However, the court stated that it might consider raising the $40,000 limit at a later point. The court said: “Now, obviously if I became convinced at some time in this case that a sum in excess of [$40,000] was necessary to retain a competent lawyer and what the lawyer did in the case exceeded $40,000, I think I could and I would modify this order.” Id. Mr. Cagney nevertheless declined to represent Orlando under the conditions imposed by the district court’s October 20, 1986 order as orally amended on October 27, 1986. 2. The Sixth Amendment Issue a. As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether we even need to reach the forfeiture issue. The government argues that we do not, for three reasons. First, the government contends that Orlando’s reading of the district court’s restraining order was overly broad, and that the order froze only those assets specifically listed in the forfeiture provision of the indictment. Second, the government asserts that the restraining order did not prohibit Orlando from paying fees to an attorney of his choice and that Orlando thus was always free to pay Mr. Cagney whatever he wished with his own funds. Third, the government argues that, in any case, Orlando’s sixth amendment rights were not violated because the district court in fact exempted $40,000 in attorneys’ fees from the restraining order. We reject the government’s contentions on all three points. The government’s first argument assumes that the forfeiture provision in the indictment reached only those assets specifically listed therein. In this regard, we note that the indictment states that the property to be forfeited “shall include but not be limited to” the property thereafter listed. Orlando R.4 (emphasis supplied). The government conceded before the district court that this provision is “admittedly ambiguous,” but explained that it did not intend that the restraining order reach assets not specifically identified in the forfeiture provision. Orlando R.13 at 2. The government further stated that it assumed that the district court also did not intend to restrain assets other than those specifically described in the forfeiture provision. The district court’s only comment in this regard was its statement that “[ajrguably, the order also prohibits the disposal of assets which, if there is a conviction, will be found to have been obtained from violating the law. ” Estevez, 645 F.Supp. at 869 (emphasis supplied). We need not resolve this ambiguity because, as we shall explain, Orlando’s sixth amendment right to counsel of choice was implicated by the forfeiture provision regardless of whether his assets were subject to a pretrial restraining order. In addition to the above, the government’s first and second arguments assume that Orlando could have paid his lawyer with assets not listed in the forfeiture provision of the indictment. In response to Orlando’s motion in the district court to exclude attorneys’ fees from forfeiture, the government contended that Orlando “ha[d] not shown that no unforfeitable funds [were] available to pay his counsel,” Orlando R.13 at 7, and that Orlando also had not shown that he “propose[d] to pay attorney fees from funds generated by the liquidation of assets named in the forfeiture provisions.” Id. at 8. The government concluded that, “absent any indication to the contrary, we must assume that the defendant ha[d] access to unrestrained funds not named in the forfeiture provisions, with which he can pay Mr. Cagney.” Id. However, Orlando asserted in his motion to exempt attorneys’ fees that the restraining order “froze all o/[his] assets,” Orlando R. 11 at 5 (emphasis supplied), and that the “restraining order effectuated a total forfeiture of the defendant’s assets.” Id. at 27. The district court never made a finding on whether Orlando had other assets with which to pay counsel. The district court’s only comments on the matter were to note that the government contended that Orlando could pay his lawyer with assets not mentioned in the forfeiture provision and to state in a conclusory manner that, notwithstanding the government’s contentions, “it seems clear that a defendant has standing to raise the issues Este-vez raises here.” Estevez, 645 F.Supp. at 870 (citing United States v. Bassett, 632 F.Supp. 1308 (D.Md.1986)). While the district judge held that Orlando was free to expend his own funds to pay counsel, id. at 872, he also commented that he did not “know if the defendant ha[d] any more money.” Orlando R.25 at 36. Thus, the issue of whether Orlando had any of his own funds outside of the items listed in the forfeiture provision never was addressed or decided explicitly. We cannot resolve this factual dispute on appeal. In any case, even if Orlando had funds outside the restraining order with which to hire Mr. Cagney — indeed, even if there had been no restraining order at all— we cannot say that the forfeiture provision of the indictment did not affect his right to counsel of choice. Under the “relation back” provision of the forfeiture statute, title to a defendant’s property ultimately found to be forfeitable is deemed to vest in the government “upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Thus, any property transferred to an attorney prior to trial ultimately may be forfeited if the defendant is convicted. As the Fourth Circuit said in a recent opinion on the subject: Pre-conviction restraining orders and, indeed, the mere threat of ultimate forfeiture without any such orders operate directly and immediately to inhibit a defendant’s ability to retain private counsel for his defense. Counsel inevitably will be reluctant or unwilling to accept private employment knowing that they may not be able to collect or retain agreed-upon fees. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 921 (4th Cir.1987) (emphasis supplied), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom., In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1988) (No. 87-1729); see also United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1403 (2d Cir.1988) (en banc) (per curiam) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring) (“the ‘relation back’ provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) has the same effect as a restraining order when applied to attorney’s fees, since practical considerations will keep an attorney from accepting fees based upon the contingency of success at the criminal trial”). Assuming arguendo that Orlando had assets other than those subject to the restraining order with which to pay attorneys’ fees, the distinct possibility existed that the government would seek forfeiture of those other assets after his conviction. Thus, while the government may have been correct that there was “no current impediment to Mr. Cagney’s acceptance of fees for the representation of Mr. Estevez,” Orlando R.13 at 4, the threat of forfeiture, as a practical matter, impacts upon the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. Of course, the defendant must demonstrate that he desired to hire counsel of choice and that the threat of forfeiture prevented him from doing so. Cf. United States v. Pipito, 861 F.2d 1006, - (7th Cir.1987) (court holds that the defendant’s “Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel argument makes little sense because he was always represented, and most of the time by counsel of his choice”). But we think this showing certainly was made here. The forfeiture provision clearly prevented Orlando from hiring his counsel of choice, Mr. Cagney. Finally, we address the government’s third argument that Orlando cannot complain of a sixth amendment violation because the district court exempted $40,000 to pay attorneys’ fees. This contention ignores the basis for Orlando’s sixth amendment claim. Orlando argues that his sixth amendment right entails the right to pay an attorney of his choice whatever he wants as long as those fees are a bona fide payment for legal services rendered. Although we ultimately may disagree with Orlando’s characterization of his sixth amendment right, we are squarely presented with deciding whether that characterization is the correct one. It is to this task that we now turn. b. In 1984, Congress amended the criminal forfeiture provisions of both the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 848, under which Orlando was convicted. These amendments sought to address specific problems perceived by the government in utilizing the criminal forfeiture statutes as initially drafted in 1970. “[T]he bill ... is designed to enhance the use of forfeiture, and in particular, the sanction of criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing the country: racketeering and drug trafficking.” S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3374. The Senate Report describes the perceived problems in preamendment criminal forfeiture law: [A] serious problem in achieving the forfeiture of significant assets in racketeering and drug cases is that the criminal forfeiture provisions of the RICO and CCE statutes fail adequately to address the phenomenon of defendants defeating forfeiture by removing, transferring, or concealing their assets prior to conviction. Unlike civil forfeitures, in which the government’s seizure of the asset occurs at or soon after the commencement of the forfeiture action, in criminal forfeitures, the assets generally remain in the custody of the defendant until the time of his conviction for the offense upon which the forfeiture is based. Only after conviction does the government seize the asset. Thus, a person who anticipates that some of his property may be subject to criminal forfeiture has not only an obvious incentive, but also ample opportunity, to transfer his assets or remove them from any possibility of forfeiture. Id. at 3378. In response to this problem, section 853 of the CCE statute now permits the government to apply to the district court for a restraining order once an indictment is returned in order “to preserve the availability of property” that the government claims is subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1). The statute does not expressly exclude attorneys’ fees from the property subject to restraint. Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether the statute, properly read, applies to attorneys’ fees. c. We begin with the wording of the statute. It is clear that the plain language of section 853 makes no exception for attorneys’ fees. As the Tenth Circuit explained: The language of section 853 is clear. Assets subject to forfeiture include “any property” obtained as a result of the crime, “any of the person’s property” used to commit the crime, and “any of his interest in” a continuing criminal enterprise. The only limitations on what property can be forfeited relate to the nexus with the illegal activity. How a defendant intends to use property that would otherwise be forfeited is irrelevant. Property is not exempted because a defendant wants to use it to pay an attorney any more than property is exempted because a defendant wants to purchase a house or employ a financial advisor. As the Fourth Circuit said in [United States v.] Harvey, “Property marked for or paid as attorney fees is necessarily included within that defined as subject to forfeiture [in the statute] for the simple reason that those provisions define forfeitable property without regard to its intended or actual use, whether for payment to attorneys or for other uses.” 814 F.2d at 914. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir.1988). Given the unambiguous wording of the statute, there is no need to refer to the legislative history. Indiana Port Comm’n v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 835 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir.1987); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1592, 94 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). Nevertheless, an examination of the relevant history of the statute’s legislative gestation produces nothing to undermine our conclusion with respect to the plain meaning. Indeed, it supports the wording of the statute. The House Report specifically notes that the treatment of attorneys’ fees under the forfeiture statute is to be left to the courts. See H.R.Rep. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n. 1 (1984). The Senate Report states broadly that the purpose of criminal forfeiture is to “strip these offenders [racketeers and drug dealers] and organizations of their economic power.” S.Rep. No. 225, supra, at 3374. In determining that the statute does not reach legitimate attorneys’ fees, some courts have focused on other language in the Senate Report expressing concern with sham or fraudulent transactions that defeat forfeiture. See United States v. Ianniello, 644 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F.Supp. 1332, 1347 (D.Colo.1985). We do not think the Senate Report can be read so narrowly. Certainly, Congress’ manifest concern with sham transactions does not indicate that its focus was narrowed exclusively to these abuses —especially when the language of the statute itself protects only the bona fide purchaser who purchases “reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture____” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). See Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1494. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute as written applies to attorneys’ fees. d. We turn therefore to the argument that the application of the statute to attorneys’ fees violated Orlando’s sixth amendment right to counsel by depriving him of his counsel of choice. It is not in dispute that a criminal defendant has a qualified right to retain counsel of his own choosing to conduct his defense in a criminal case. See In the Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir.1985); Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832, 104 S.Ct. 114, 78 L.Ed.2d 114 (1983). More than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 58, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); see also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 1291, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958); Glosser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). However, the sixth amendment right is not solely, or even primarily, concerned with ensuring that a criminal defendant be provided with his counsel of choice. As the Supreme Court recently explained: The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 667, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), we observed that this right was designed to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process. Realizing that an unaided layman may have little skill in arguing the law or in coping with an intricate procedural system, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2572-73, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), we have held that the Sixth Amendment secures the right to the assistance of counsel, by appointment if necessary, in a trial for any serious crime. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). We have further recognized that the purpose of providing assistance of counsel “is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, “the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657, n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 n. 21, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Thus, while the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617-1618, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). Wheat v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1696-97, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (emphasis supplied). Thus, while all criminal defendants are entitled to some counsel, the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to counsel of choice has been limited by other considerations, some under governmental control, some not. As the Fourth Circuit noted: Purely private predicaments may leave a defendant without the counsel of his choice. Any attorney may decline to accept a case despite the fact that he was chosen by a defendant. This decision may be made for the simple financial reason that the attorney does not expect the defendant to be able to pay. The possibility also exists that a creditor might obtain liens against a criminal defendant’s property, preventing the defendant from hiring a lawyer. Rules imposed by the government may likewise prevent the hiring of chosen counsel. Rules requiring appointment of local counsel may have this effect. See Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692-93 (7th Cir.1983). Court-imposed scheduling may also prevent participation by chosen counsel. See [United States v.] Inman, 483 F.2d [738] at 740 [4th Cir.1973], In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 645 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1988) (No. 87-1729). Forfeiture, or a restraining order freezing assets to ensure their availability for forfeiture, is another factor that can qualify the right to retain counsel of choice. A person cannot retain an attorney whose fee he cannot pay with his own assets. In the forfeiture situation, the assets in question are not the defendant’s. As the Fourth Circuit so aptly stated: The very point of the inclusion of forfeiture in an indictment is the government’s assertion that the assets possessed by a defendant are not legally his own, but the fruits of crime in which the law recognizes no ownership rights of the defendant. Forfeiture is not an attempt to punish those with legal assets by denying them an attorney; it is an assertion that the defendant does not have the legal assets that entitle him to a right to counsel of choice in the first place. Id. at 644. The Fourth Circuit further explained: The most relevant analogy ... is to the example of bank robbers’ loot. Suppose a bank is robbed and $100,000 taken. A defendant is arrested in possession of $100,000 and nothing more. The defendant protests his innocence and claims, without the slightest proof, that the $100,000 was in fact a gift from a friend. Surely no one will contend that the $100,-000 must be made available to pay the defendant’s lawyer, and not be kept available for return to the bank in the event the defendant is found guilty. Id. at 645. The imposition of a pretrial restraining order freezing the assets of the defendant that the government believes are subject to forfeiture may well have the practical effect of rendering the defendant indigent. However, this possibility does not, when it occurs, constitute a denial of the defendant’s absolute sixth amendment right to counsel. While a defendant whose entire assets are subject to a restraining order will not be able to retain counsel of choice, he has the right to have counsel appointed. See United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y.1985). Appointed counsel must, of course, be competent in the constitutional sense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Although we expect that, in making such appointments district courts will make every effort to appoint counsel experienced in complex criminal litigation, it must be acknowledged that appointed counsel may not always be able to offer the defendant the depth of experience or the range of investigative services that counsel of choice may have been able to provide. However, this contingency does not render infirm the forfeiture statute. Lack of economic resources often requires individuals to settle for a mode of professional service other than the one they would retain if expense were no object. One cannot spend money one does not have and, by virtue of the forfeiture provision and the restraining order, the funds in question are not the defendant’s to spend. 3. The Due Process Issue We turn to Orlando’s second contention that the district court’s issuance of a restraining order without holding an immediate postrestraint hearing violated his fifth amendment right to due process. The fifth amendment provides that a person may not be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Thus, we must decide first whether Orlando suffered a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and second whether that deprivation occurred without due process of law. a. We think it is clear that Orlando suffered a deprivation of property in the constitutional sense. Although the government’s title is not established definitively until the entry of a judgment of conviction, title shifts, through the operation of the relation back provision, at the time of the commission of the crime. The restraining order thus operates to remove the assets from the control of the defendant on the claim of the government that it has a higher right to those assets. While the restraining order does not divest definitively the ownership rights of the defendant, it certainly does remove those assets from his immediate control and therefore divest him of a significant property interest. Accordingly, we must decide whether the method of removal is consonant with the requirements of the due process clause. b. Due process requires that a person not be deprived of his property without notice and opportunity for a hearing. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). To determine what process is due in a particular setting, we must consider three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural prerequisites would entail. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493-94, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). We turn first to the private interest that is affected in this case. The interest at stake here is Orlando’s interest in retaining counsel of choice. As we have noted already, this right is hardly an absolute one. On the other hand, the right also can be very significant. Staging a defense against a complex criminal charge is not an easy, nor an inexpensive, matter. It requires counsel skilled in marshalling complicated facts as well as learned in legal principles. It often involves dealing not only with the government but with many codefendants whose interests are not compatible and oftentimes overtly adverse. It also often involves significant investigative resources. As the Fourth Circuit noted: Post-indictment restraining orders of the kind authorized by the Act and as actually entered in Harvey’s case obviously may work a tremendous hardship on accused persons. Stripped of all or major portions of his financial resources, an accused (unless in detention) may be unable pending and throughout trial to provide for the basic necessities of life and whether or not in detention, to provide for the preparation of his legal defense. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 928. In assessing the nature of the private interest at stake, another factor must be recognized. For some purposes, the freeze imposed by the restraining order may in fact be characterized as “temporary.” For instance, pending the outcome of trial, the existence of the freeze will require the defendant to postpone the use of the assets subject to the freeze. On the other hand, with respect to attorneys’ fees, the freeze operates as a permanent deprivation. The defendant needs the attorney now if the attorney is to do him any good. It may be that the defendant retains some use of the funds inasmuch as he is able to secure other credit on the contingency that the assets subject to the freeze will later be available because of a favorable verdict. Assuming arguendo that such a contingency is a realistic one, it only partially assuages the immediate impact of the freeze on the defendant’s ability to retain private counsel. Even if it is conceded that the freeze does not eliminate completely the use of the funds for the purpose of retaining counsel, it certainly diminishes, to a wholly different degree of certitude, the utility of the assets. We next examine the second of the Mathews factors: the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. The return of an indictment by the grand jury is, no doubt, adequate notification to the defendant of the pending forfeiture action as part of the criminal proceeding against him. However, due process requires that the party who may be deprived of a property right not only be informed of that possibility but also have an adequate opportunity to respond. For the opportunity to be adequate, it must be afforded “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. at 902; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80, 92 S.Ct. at 1994; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the in rem seizure of a yacht carrying illegal narcotics without prior notice and a hearing did not violate procedural due process. However, the forfeiture statute at issue in the case provided for an immediate, post-seizure hearing. Id. at 665-66 and n. 1, 94 S.Ct. at 2084 and n. 1. The Court held that, under those circumstances, the case presented an “ ‘extraordinary’ situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.” Id. at 680, 94 S.Ct. at 2090 (footnote omitted). The statute at issue here does not provide for a post-restraint hearing. Indeed, when the pertinent provision, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A), is contrasted with the section governing preindictment freeze orders, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B), it is clear that Congress did not intend that such a hearing be held. What is, we submit, already clear in the text of the statute is reinforced by the legislative history. The Senate Report notes that: Paragraph (1)(A) provides that a restraining order may issue “upon the filing of an indictment or information ... and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section.” Thus, the probable cause established in the indictment or information is, in itself, to be a sufficient basis for issuance of a restraining order. While the court may consider factors bearing on the reasonableness of the order sought, it is not to “look behind” the indictment or require the government to produce additional evidence regarding the merits of the case as a prerequisite to issuing a post-indictment restraining order. Since a warrant for the arrest of the defendant may issue upon the filing of an indictment or information, and so the indictment or information is sufficient to support a restraint on the defendant’s liberty, it is clear that the same basis is sufficient to support a restraint on the defendant’s ability to transfer or remove property alleged to be subject to criminal forfeiture in the indictment. In contrast to the pre-indictment restraining order authority set out in paragraph (1)(B), the post-indictment restraining order provision does not require prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The indictment or information itself gives notice of the government’s intent to seek forfeiture of the property. Moreover, the necessity of quickly obtaining a restraining order after indictment in the criminal forfeiture context presents exigencies not present when restraining orders are sought in the ordinary civil context. This provision does not exclude, however, the authority to hold a hearing subsequent to the initial entry of the order and the court may at that time modify the order or vacate an order that was clearly improper (e.g., where information presented at the hearing shows that the property restrained was not among the property named in the indictment). However, it is stressed that at such a hearing the court is not to entertain challenges to the validity of the indictment. For the purposes of issuing a restraining order, the probable cause established in the indictment or information is to be determinative of any issue regarding the merits of the government’s case on which the forfeiture is to be based. S.Rep. No. 225, supra, at 3385-86 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 3396. Whatever may be the precise limits on the authority of the district judge at a hearing pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A), it is clear that the court may not inquire as to the validity of the indictment and must accept that “the probable cause established in the indictment or information is ... determinative of any issue regarding the merits of the government’s case on which the forfeiture is to be based.” Id. at 3386. It is therefore not open to the defendant to attempt to persuade the court that the government’s claim to the property is any less strong than suggested by the government in the indictment which it procured on an ex parte basis. While a different legislative intent demonstrating more flexibility on the part of Congress might make our task easier, we cannot change, as Judge Miner points out in Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1411-12, what is so clearly articulated both in the statute and the legislative history. While the statute does not provide for a postdeprivation hearing, it has been argued that the subsequent criminal trial is an adequate opportunity for the defendant to contest the validity of the restraining order. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 103 S.Ct. 2005, 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), seems to lend some support for this proposition. There, the Court held that the government’s eighteen-month delay between the seizure of currency pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and the filing of a civil forfeiture action did not violate the claimant’s procedural due process rights. However, in reaching this result, the Court stressed that there was no evidence that the claimant desired early commencement of the civil forfeiture proceeding and that she had never alleged or shown that the delay prejudiced her ability to defend against the forfeiture. Id. at 569-70, 103 S.Ct. at 2014-15. In contrast, a criminal defendant without any funds not subject to the restraining order needs the frozen assets to make his case at the criminal trial. Relief not obtained prior to the commencement of the criminal trial simply will not be helpful in securing the assistance of counsel of choice at the criminal trial. We also must note that the statutory scheme does present a great opportunity for abuse by the prosecutorial arm of the government. It permits the government, on the basis of an ex parte application to a grand jury — not a judicial officer — to affect significantly the ability of the defendant to participate in the adversary process of the criminal trial. We, of course, do not presume that those charged with the high responsibility of representing the government of the United States in a criminal proceeding would indulge in such a perversion of the criminal process. However, the constitutional validity of a statutory scheme hardly can turn on such an expectation. The adversary process is the basic framework of the American criminal justice system. It ensures the integrity of the truth-finding process and “sharpens the presentation of issues----” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). If one party can skew the process to its advantage, the integrity of the entire process is harmed. It may be argued, and not without some cogency, that the availability of appointed counsel diminishes, at least to some extent, the impact of any untoward government action that might otherwise be destructive of the adversary process. Yet, the fact remains that if the defendant is deprived of assets he otherwise would have, he is deprived artificially of his right to join issue with the government as he chooses. Without access to his resources, his options are limited. We now turn to the third consideration mandated by the Supreme Court in Mathews: the government’s interest, including the burdens that additional or substitute procedural prerequisites would entail. Here, we need not conjecture with respect to the burden on the government. Congress has spelled it out in no uncertain terms. Discussing the state of the law prior to the enactment of the present statute, the Senate Report noted that: Although current law does authorize the issuance of restraining orders in the post-indictment period, neither the RICO nor CCE statute articulates any standard for the issuance of these orders. Certain recent court decisions have required the government to meet essentially the same stringent standard that applies to the issuance of temporary restraining orders in the context of civil litigation and have also held the Federal Rules of Evidence to apply to hearings concerning restraining orders in criminal forfeiture cases. In effect, such decisions allow the courts to entertain challenges to the validity of the indictment, and require the government to prove the merits of the underlying criminal case and forfeiture counts and put on its witnesses well in advance of trial an order to obtain an order restraining the defendant’s transfer of property alleged to be forfeitable in the indictment. Meeting such requirements can make obtaining a restraining order— the sole means available to the government to assure the availability of assets after conviction — quite difficult. In addition, these requirements may make pursuing a restraining order inadvisable from the prosecutor’s point of view because of the potential for damaging premature disclosure of the government’s case and trial strategy and for jeopardizing the safety of witnesses and victims in racketeering and narcotics trafficking cases who would be required to testify at the restraining order hearing. S.Rep. No. 225, supra, at 3378-79 (footnote omitted). These considerations, the product of a careful and deliberate judgment of Congress with respect to the need to deal with a very special and particularly dangerous form of crime, require our careful and respectful acceptance. It is not for us to second-guess the legislative branch with respect to the magnitude of the threat, the ineffectiveness of the earlier means of combating that threat, or the effectiveness of the means set forth in the present enactment. Nevertheless, it is our duty to determine whether the means chosen by the legislature are compatible with the principles of due process enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Having set forth the various considerations under the three-part test enunciated in Mathews applicable to the statutory scheme at issue in this case, we now turn to that question. c. In our view, the present statutory scheme — allowing no opportunity to place in question the government’s allegation that certain property is subject to forfeiture — violates the due process clause when it results in preventing the defendant from using the restrained funds to secure the services of counsel of choice. Accord United States v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of Shop in the Grove Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir.1988); Harvey, 814 F.2d at 928; United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (5th Cir.1986) (court does not consider the constitutionality of section 853(e)(1)(A) because “[t]he statute does not on its face or by necessary implication bar [the] minimum due process protections [of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65]”), modified on other grounds 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.1987). But see United States v. Draine, 637 F.Supp. 482, 485-86 (S.D.Ala.1986) (limiting Crozier to its facts); cf. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1492 n. 4 and 1505 (without deciding due process issue, court nevertheless holds that “a court does not act ‘arbitrarily’ when it relies ... on a grand jury indictment to issue a restraining order”); United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir.1986) (“the reliance of the district court upon the grand jury indictment in issuing a restraining order which restricted free alienation of the subject property” did not violate due process). The interest of the defendant in utilizing the funds in order to conduct a defense, coupled with the unchecked possibility of prosecutorial abuse, outweigh the articulated need for this extraordinary power by the government. We stress, however, the very limited degree to which we find the present statutory scheme constitutionally infirm. We deal only with a situation where the defendant presents a bona fide need to utilize assets subject to the restraining order to conduct his defense. If the district court finds that the defendant does not have other assets from which such payments can be made, it then must require the government to demonstrate the basis for its assertion, contained in the indictment, that the assets are subject to forfeiture. However, if the government elects not to disclose sufficient information to justify its retention of all of the assets subject to the freeze order, then the court must order the release of funds in an amount necessary to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees for counsel of sufficient skill and experience to handle the particular case. Where such an order is entered, we stress that the district court, exercising its authority pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e), has a continuing obligation to scrutinize carefully the amount of attorneys’ fees in order to avoid lavish fees or improper payments to the attorney. Of course, the district court's determination of what constitutes “reasonable” fees is subject to review on appeal. By following this approach, the court’s intrusion into the balance mandated by Congress is limited to the degree necessary to accommodate the particular demands of due process required by the request for attorneys’ fees. d. In this case, the district court did not require the government to establish the sufficiency of the factual basis for its assertion that the funds subject to the restraining order eventually would be forfeited to the United States. Nor did the court determine whether Orlando in fact had funds not subject to forfeiture with which to pay his counsel of choice. However, under the circumstances of this case, these omissions did not deprive Orlando of his due process rights. The district court made available to Orlando what it believed to be a sufficient sum to permit the retention of an attorney of adequate experience and learning to conduct Orlando’s defense. Moreover, the court made clear that it would permit additional funds to be released from the order if, at any point, it became obvious that the foregoing estimate was incorrect. We believe that the district court’s order appropriately accommodated Orlando’s right to adequate funds to secure private counsel and the court’s continuing obligation to give effect to the will of Congress when there is no compelling due process concern to the contrary. 4. Conclusion In conclusion, we hold that application of the criminal forfeiture statute to include fees paid to an attorney does not violate the qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. However, we also hold that the pretrial, postindictment restraint of a defendant’s assets without affording the defendant an immediate, postrestraint, adversary hearing at which the government is required to prove the likelihood that the restrained assets are subject to forfeiture violates the due process clause to the extent that it actually impinges on the defendant’s qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. If the government seeks to restrain a defendant’s assets without subjecting itself to a due process hearing of the type described above, and if the district court finds that the defendant has no other assets with which to hire his attorney of choice, then the government must consent to the exemption of reasonable attorneys’ fees, as determined by the district court in its supervisory role, from the property otherwise subject to forfeiture. B. Waiver of Counsel We next consider whether the district court erred in permitting Orlando to proceed pro se. Orlando asserts that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his sixth amendment right to counsel. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 1. Requirement of a Knowing and Intelligent Waiver a. It is well established that a defendant has a right to conduct his own defense in a criminal case. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). However, before permitting a defendant to exercise this right, the district court must ensure that he knowingly and intelligently waived his sixth amendment right to counsel: When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S., [458] at 464-465 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461] [1938]. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 [68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309] (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. [269], at 279 [63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268] [1942], Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court recently has reemphasized the need for strict safeguards before permitting a defendant to waive his right to counsel. In Patterson v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988), the Court addressed the question of what “type of warnings and procedures ... should be required before a waiver of [the Sixth Amendment] right [to counsel] will be recognized.” The Court said that its approach to the waiver question was a pragmatic one that asks “what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that stage.” Id. The Court further explained: At one end of the spectrum, we have concluded there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel whatsoever at a postin-dictment photographic display identifica-tion____ At the other extreme, recognizing the enormous importance and role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial, we have imposed th