Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT SEITZ, Circuit Judge. On October 23, 1986, appellants Stephen Traitz, Jr. (“Traitz, Jr.”), Edward P. Hurst (“Hurst”), Michael Mangini (“Mangini”), Robert Crosley (“Crosley”), Michael Daly (“Daly”), Daniel Cannon (“Cannon”), Mark Osborn (“Osborn”), Robert Medina (“Medina”), Ernest Williams (“Williams”), James Nuzzi (“Nuzzi”), Stephen Traitz, III (“Traitz, III”), Joseph Traitz (“Traitz”), Richard Schoenberger (“Schoenberger”) and six other individuals were indicted. On June 18, 1987, the grand jury returned a sixty-six count superseding indictment which charged violations of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”), RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, solicitation of kickbacks to influence the operation of an employee benefit plan, embezzlement from an employee welfare plan, Hobbs Act extortion, collection of credit and claims by extortionate means, interstate travel in aid of racketeering and embezzlement of union funds in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(d), 1341,1954, 664, 201, 1951, 894, 1952 and 29 U.S.C. § 501(c), respectively. Appellants were tried and convicted on various counts of the superseding indictment and duly sentenced. This appeal followed. I. JURISDICTION The district court had jurisdiction based on alleged violations of federal criminal statutes. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). II. BACKGROUND Due to the complex nature of this appeal we outline the structure of this opinion. After setting forth both a factual overview and, in a general way, the facts relating to the specific charges, those arguments that were raised in common by several appellants will be resolved. Thereafter, the contentions asserted by individual appellants that are unique to their circumstances will be determined. On September 23, 1985, listening devices and the interception of communications in the Business Manager’s Office and Business Agent’s Meeting Room at the offices of the Roofers Union Local 30/30B were authorized. Electronic surveillance continued through February 26,1986. The fruits of this surveillance and other material eventuated in the indictments and convictions here involved. A. MAIL FRAUD Appellants Medina and Traitz, Jr. were found guilty of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342. The facts concerning this charge are as follows. On June 21, 1985, Medina, while operating an automobile leased for him by the Roofers Union, was involved in a hit-and-run accident. After the accident, Medina took the vehicle to the outskirts of Philadelphia and set it on fire. Medina and Traitz, Jr. then, using the mails, reported to their insurance carrier that the car had been stolen resulting in a payment of $18,075.00 by the insurance company. B.BRIBERY AND KICKBACKS On October 16, 1985, Medina was arrested on Pennsylvania state charges for aggravated assault in connection with the motor vehicle accident of June 21, 1985. Thereafter, conversations were intercepted in which Traitz, Jr. said that he was going to “buy Medina out of trouble” and was going to get the “right” judge for the case. When Medina was released on his own recognizance, Traitz, Jr. acknowledged having “arranged” for Medina’s release with the Bail Commissioner Margaret McCook. Later, Traitz, Jr. gave $300 to Philadelphia Police Officer John McCook, the husband of the Bail Commissioner, and said to John McCook, “give that [the $300] to your wife.” In addition, a conversation on November 11, 1985, among Traitz, Jr., Crosley, Hurst and Mangini, was intercepted in which the men were discussing giving “Christmas” envelopes, containing cash, to various public officials. This discussion was followed by several conversations in November in which Traitz, Jr. and other individuals created the procedure by which the “gifts” were to be made. In order to assure secrecy, the “gift” envelopes would not contain the names of the recipients but would bear a number of hash marks corresponding to the total number of hundreds of dollars contained in the envelope. On December 6, 1985, Traitz, Jr. met with Tommy Brown. Traitz, Jr. gave Brown 21 envelopes and a list of names of the public officials to whom the envelopes were to be delivered, including how large a “gift" each person was to receive. On December 17, 1985, Brown reported to Traitz, Jr. that he had delivered 19 of the 21 envelopes; Brown returned the undelivered envelopes to Traitz, Jr. Other public officials traveled to the offices of the Roofers Union to collect the “gifts” intended for them. In addition, appellant Nuzzi traveled from Pennsylvania to New Jersey to deliver “gifts” to Sheriff William Simon of Camden, New Jersey and his Deputy, Norbert Zuchowski. C. OSHA BRIBERY Evidence presented at trial established that Traitz, Jr. gave Bernard J. Dillon (“Dillon”), Area Director of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), money in return for various favors. Dillon engaged in inspections of nonunion job sites in order to harass the nonunion employers and assisted, at the request of Traitz, Jr., a retired Philadelphia Police Officer to fill out an employment application for OSHA containing false information. D. HOBBS ACT EXTORTION AND COLLECTION OF CREDIT BY EXTORTIONATE MEANS Beginning in September, 1985, Local 30B contractors (also called “principals”) were summoned to the offices of the Roofers Union. The purpose of the meetings was to institute a “new policy” and to “request” principals to pay fines for noncompliance with union rules. The new policy required principals to report at least 100 hours of work per month (the “100 hour plan”), thereby mandating a minimum union payment of $60, in contrast to the previous policy which did not contain a minimum reporting requirement. In addition, nonunion contractors were summoned to the union offices to induce them to become union-contractors. The meetings with the contractors were shown to be confrontational and intimidating in that the principals were often threatened and physically abused by union officials — typically the union business agents who were ex-amateur or ex-professional boxers. III. DISCUSSION A. COMMON ARGUMENTS 1. Facial Sufficiency of the October 24, 1985 Order The October 24, 1985 order (the “Order”), authorizing electronic surveillance of the Business Manager’s Office and the Business Agents Meeting Room of the Roofers Union, was the second of five interception orders signed by the district judge then having responsibility for such matters. On appeal, there is no argument regarding the validity of the other four surveillance orders. The Order, however, was missing page three when it was signed by the district judge. Appellants claim that it was error for the district court to refuse to suppress the fruits of the electronic surveillance during the period when the Order was in effect. The discrete question presented on appeal is whether the absence of page three and the information that would have been contained therein, renders the Order facially insufficient and therefore invalid under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii). Appellants contend that the Order was deficient in that the requirements of § 2518(3)(c) and (d) as well as § 2518(4)(d) were not satisfied requiring the suppression of the fruits of the Order. We will examine the merits of each of these contentions in turn. a. Requirement that § 2518(3) Findings be in Writing Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) “[extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon ... the court making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section.” Subsection (3) of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 provides in pertinent part: Upon application the judge may enter an ex parte order ... if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that— ****** (c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; (d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense ... The findings required to be made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) and (d) were not set forth in writing. Appellants contend that these findings must be set forth in writing for the order to be valid. The appellants argue that it is only through written findings that a reviewing court can be satisfied that a district court has complied with the statutory mandate. Section 2518(3) authorizes a judge to issue an ex parte order permitting electronic surveillance after the judge determines, inter alia, that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed or appear unlikely to succeed if attempted or are too dangerous and that probable cause exists to believe that the place at which electronic surveillance is to be conducted is being used in connection with an offense. Nothing in the language of this section compels the judge to set forth the required findings in writing. As one court stated: “[tjhere is nothing in § 2518(3)(e) which requires that particular words be used in the requisite finding or indeed that the finding be actually expressed in words rather than by act of the judge.” United States v. Tortorello, 342 F.Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y.1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973). See also, United States v. Escandar, 319 F.Supp. 295, 304 (S.D.Fl.1970) (“Section 2518(3) requires only that the authorizing judge make a determination that normal investigative procedures have been tried and appear likely to fail. There is no specific mandate that such determination be reflected in the written order.”). Based on the language of the statute, we can conclude that the judge’s act of signing the Order is sufficient evidence that the judge made the findings required under § 2518(3) of the statute. Appellants, however, ask this Court to look beyond the language of the statute and find that overriding policy considerations warrant requiring the findings to be put into writing. Appellants urge this Court to find that it is only through written findings that a proper review of the district court’s decision to allow electronic surveillance can be had. Appellants liken this to the requirement that a court make specific written findings of fact in order to comply with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants’ argument is without merit. In this case, in order to review the district court’s decision to enter an ex parte order allowing electronic surveillance this Court need only look to the affidavit which was presented to the district court in support of the government’s application. This in fact is the practice that has developed. See United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858, 96 S.Ct. 111, 46 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975). Thus, it cannot be said that the findings of fact required to be made pursuant to § 2518(3) must be made in writing in order for an appellate court to have a “clear understanding of the trial court’s judgment.” See Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 935 (3d Cir.1964). This conclusion becomes all the more apparent when one examines the other four electronic surveillance orders in which the district court set forth its findings in writing. In each of these four orders the district court’s findings simply tracked the language of § 2518(3)(a)-(d). Such bald recitations do little to aid this Court in assessing the propriety of the district court’s order. Instead, requiring the district court to set forth its findings in writing would promote form over substance and would create a requirement, amounting to a trap for the unwary, where none was apparently on the mind of Congress. See e.g., S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 2112, 2153. Nevertheless, appellants ask this Court to draw upon precedent in the federal immunity context and find a requirement that the district court place its findings in writing. In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 6003 provides that a United States Attorney may request an immunity Order from the district court immunizing a witness if in “his [the United States Attorney’s] judgment— (1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and (2) such individual has refused to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.” Although not mandated by the statute, it has been held that the findings of the United States Attorney must be made explicitly. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1201 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979); In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 635 (D.C.Cir.1962). Appellants contend that this establishes that important statutory findings should not be left to inference. Notwithstanding the merits of requiring a United States Attorney to set forth statutory findings explicitly in the immunity context, we decline to adopt such an approach where, as here, such a requirement is not mandated by the statute and where policy considerations actually disfavor such an an approach. Finally, appellants argue that the missing recitations reveal that the district court impermissibly “rubber stamped” the request of the government for electronic surveillance. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 165-166 (D.C.Cir.1977). Appellants claim that the district judge’s signature on an order which was missing a page indicates that the judge had not carefully reviewed the order and that this requires invalidation of the order. Appellants’ contention, although superficially attractive, is analytically flawed. In examining whether the judge properly performed his function it is not the order which must be examined but rather the application and the affidavit which were submitted in support of the interception order. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d at 169; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (“Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.”). In the instant case, there is no suggestion on appeal that the affidavit submitted by the government in support of electronic surveillance was improper. Thus, examining the words in the proper light, we cannot conclude that the district court “rubber stamped” the government’s request without exercising its independent judgment. b. Requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2518(4) Section 2518(4) provides in pertinent part: (4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication under this chapter shall specify— ****** (d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; Appellants claim that the Order is facially defective because it fails to identify either the investigating agency or the Department of Justice official who authorized the application for electronic surveillance. It should be noted that each of the other four surveillance orders stated: Wherefore, it is on this [date] ... Ordered that Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice are authorized pursuant to the application provided by Honorable Stephen S. Trott. A two tiered analysis must be employed to review appellants’ claim. First, this Court must determine if the Order was facially deficient. If we find that the Order was defective in some manner, we must examine the defect to determine if it is merely a technical defect which would not require suppression of the evidence obtained from the electronic surveillance. United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir.1975). In this case, the Order cannot be considered to have been facially defective. First, the Order effectively identifies the FBI as the agency authorized to intercept identifies the FBI as the agency authorized to intercept oral communications. Page six of the Order states “the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania shall furnish the Federal Bureau of Investigation such information, facilities and assistance as are necessary to accomplish the oral interception. ...” As the district court concluded: “Logic dictates that if the order directs the Bell Telephone Company to assist the FBI with the interception, then the FBI is the agency authorized to intercept.” Second, the Order sufficiently identifies the person authorizing the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 provides in relevant part that: “[t]he Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal Judge ... [for] an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation In the instant case, page four of the Order states that the: “Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, who has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States to exercise the power conferred upon him by Section 2516, Title 18, United States Code ...” The necessary inference from the above quoted passage of the Order is that the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division was in fact using the power granted him by the Attorney General and was authorizing the application for an electronic surveillance order. It makes little difference in law that the person authorizing an application for interception was identified by title rather than by name. Cf. United States v. Camp, 723 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir.1984) (Attorney General complies with § 2516(1) when he specially designates an Assistant Attorney General by job title rather than by name). Even if, arguendo, it can be said that the Order failed to adequately make the relevant identifications, these omissions are properly viewed as technical defects not warranting suppression of the evidence discovered as a result of the electronic surveillance. In United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d 513, 518 (3d Cir.1975) this Court stated: “suppression is not required for facial insufficiency relating to less critical requirements which may be varied by subsequent affidavits. The identification directives [of § 2518(4)(d) ] in our opinion fall within this category. In such a situation, suppression will not be required where there was substantial compliance with the statute.” Id. See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 861 (3d Cir.1976). It must be recognized that “§ 2518(4))(d) ‘requires that the order note the agency authorized to make the interception and the person who authorized the application so that responsibility will be fixed.' ” S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1968), quoted in, United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 572, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 1854-55, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974). In determining whether there was substantial compliance with the statute we may look beyond the face of the order to the facts as they actually existed in order to determine if there was compliance with the substantive requirements of the statute. United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d at 518. In Acon, for example, an unauthorized person signed the application for electronic surveillance. This Court, however, accepted affidavits, which were first presented at the suppression hearing, from both the unauthorized person and the Attorney General showing that the Attorney General had actually authorized the application. Id. at 514. This Court found that the Attorney General’s actual approval of the wiretap was substantial compliance with the statute. Id. at 519. In the instant case the application for the Order and the accompanying affidavit reveal substantial compliance with the statute. The application and the accompanying affidavit reveal numerous references to the FBI as the agency that will conduct the electronic surveillance. Moreover, the application states that: “Pursuant to Section 2516 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, the Honorable Stephen 5. Trott, having been specifically designated by the Attorney General of the United States ... has approved the application for an order authorizing the interception of oral communications.” Thus, there can be no question that Stephen Trott, a person specifically designated by the Attorney General, actually authorized the application for electronic surveillance. Moreover, the purpose of the statutory rule, accountability, has not been undermined because both the agency undertaking the surveillance and the party authorizing the application for surveillance are clearly identified. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 572, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 1854-55, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974). Under either or both of the approaches the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) were satisfied. 2. Hobbs Act Extortion Counts twenty-four through forty-one of the superseding indictment charged nine of the thirteen appellants with Hobbs Act violations, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. These charges stemmed, inter alia, from the appellants’ participation in the “100 hours” program described above. All of the nine persons charged were found guilty of at least one count of Hobbs Act extortion. In pertinent part, the Hobbs Act provides: (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than twenty years or both. “Extortion” is defined in the Act as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear....” 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2). At trial appellants objected to several parts of the judge’s charge to the jury on the Hobbs Act counts. The district judge instructed the jury that four elements must be satisfied before it can find appellants in violation of the Hobbs Act. The court stated: In order to meet its burden of proving that the defendants committed extortion under the Hobbs Act, the Government must prove each of the following elements: First, that the defendants induced or attempted to induce others to part with their property; Second, that the defendants did so with the victims’ consent, but that this consent was compelled by the wrongful use or threat of force, violence or fear; Third, that interstate commerce or an item moving in interstate commerce was delayed, obstructed or affected in any way or degree; and Fourth, that the defendants acted knowingly and willfully. The appellants do not challenge the district judge’s general recitation of the essential elements of the Hobbs Act but rather contend that the district judge erred in his instructions on the appellants’ defense theories. We review the district judge’s charge to “determine whether the charge, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of the evidence, fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to the jury.” Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir.1986). We will address appellants’ three challenges to the district court’s charge seriatim. a. Wrongfulness of Threat or Use of Force In United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), striking workers committed acts of violence against their employer’s property in pursuit of higher wages and other benefits. Id. at 398, 93 S.Ct. at 1009. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that an alleged extortionist could not be convicted under the Hobbs Act for violence related to union activity aimed at obtaining property to which s/he had a lawful claim. The basis for this holding is the fact that such conduct is not “wrongful” as that term is used in the Hobbs Act. Thus, in Enmons the Supreme Court found that an alleged extortionist must not only employ an unlawful means but must act in pursuit of an unlawful end. Appellants claim that the jury charge on the Hobbs Act was in error because the judge told the jury that the Enmons defense hinged on whether the collective bargaining agreement authorized the “100 hours” plan. That is to say, the district court’s test for whether the union had a lawful claim to the proceeds of the 100 hours program turned on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the discrete question presented on appeal is whether it was appropriate, in this case, for the district court to use the collective bargaining agreement as the polestar for determining wrongfulness. We conclude that the collective bargaining agreement was the correct test and that the district court’s charge on the En-mons defense was therefore proper. In United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 487, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983), the Sixth Circuit was forced to determine if the appellants, an officer and an employee of the J & J Cartage Company, had acted “wrongfully” as that term is used in the Hobbs Act. In that case the Company and the Teamsters Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which provided, in relevant part, that the Company would make the necessary contributions to the employees’ union Health and Welfare Fund. Thereafter, the Company, without renegotiating the collective bargaining agreement, imposed an 11% “service charge” on the employees to cover the Company’s contribution to the benefits plan. The court concluded that the Company had no lawful claim to the service charge because the existing collective bargaining agreement “expressly required the Company to make payments to the welfare and pension funds out of the Company’s own funds.” Id. at 215. Thus, Russo stands for the proposition that ‘Enmons does not apply to the extraction of payments in violation of the collective bargaining agreement because there could be no lawful claim to that property.” United States v. Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002 (6th Cir.1985), citing, United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d at 215. See also, United States v. Cusmano, 729 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984) (same facts and same result as Russo). In this case, as in Russo, the violent acts of the appellants were not perpetrated either during a strike or during an attempt to modify a collective bargaining agreement. Viewed in the best light, the appellants’ violent actions were taken to enforce an unwritten union policy. In such a circumstance, the only way in which the appellants’ conduct can arguably be said to be insulated from Hobbs Act liability is for the actions to have been taken in pursuit of property to which they were entitled under the collective bargaining agreement. See United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 215; United States v. Cusmano, 729 F.2d at 882. Thus, examining the jury charge in the light of the evidence, the Enmons defense was fairly and adequately submitted by the court to the jury. b. Advice of Counsel Defense In September, 1985 the advice of an attorney, Bernard N. Katz, was sought regarding the implementation of the 100 hours program. At trial, appellants sought to prove that they relied on Katz’s legal advice that the 100 hours program was legitimate. Thus, the appellants contended at trial that because they relied on the advice of counsel they were entitled to an acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts. The district judge’s charge to the jury on the advice of counsel defense included the following language: “you must determine whether the defendants relied in good faith on the lawyer’s advice after full disclosure to him of all the material facts about how they [appellants] would conduct themselves in the union’s conference room.” Appellants claim that this charge was in error because it required that the appellants receive their lawyer’s advice on the manner in which they conducted themselves in the union’s conference room. Appellants contend that so long as they received the advice of counsel on the legitimacy of the end sought, i.e. the collection of the proceeds of the 100 hours program, then under En-mons the means used to obtain these funds becomes irrelevant. Appellants’ contention is meritless. The advice of counsel defense, “based on good faith reliance on an attorney’s advice[,] requires full disclosure of all the material facts. United States v. Martorano, 767 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949, 106 S.Ct. 348, 88 L.Ed.2d 296 (1985). It must be remembered that the advice of counsel defense is meant to be available only to those who, after full and honest disclosure of the material facts surrounding a possible course of action, seek and obtain the advice of counsel on the potential legality of their actions. Id. The defense is not designed to insulate illegal conduct. Id. Rather, the basis for the defense “is that, in relying on counsel’s advise, [a] defendant lacked the requisite intent to violate the law.” United States v. Polytarides, 584 F.2d 1350, 1353 (4th Cir.1978). See also United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 574 (11th Cir.) (must consult attorney in good faith for the purpose of securing advice on the lawfulness of future conduct), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821, 106 S.Ct. 72, 88 L.Ed.2d 59 (1985). In this case, counsel’s advice was sought on the legitimacy of the 100 hours program. The nature of the disclosure required to satisfy the materiality element of the advice of counsel defense requires an ex ante examination. Disclosures which are material before the potentially illegal action was taken cannot be rendered immaterial for the purposes of the advice of counsel defense based on the fortuity of a later conceived litigation strategy, i.e. by the Enmons defense. Thus, material facts, in this case, included not only the ends sought from the 100 hours program but the means to be used in the collection process. It was only through disclosure of both the means and the ends that counsel could properly evaluate the potential legality of the 100 hours program. Accordingly, viewed in the light of the evidence, the advice of counsel defense was fairly and adequately submitted to the jury. c. Knowledge and Willfulness The district court instructed the jury on the element of knowledge and willfulness as follows: If you find that a defendant had a good faith belief that he was acting pursuant to a legitimate union objective, such as the resolution of a grievance or the enforcement of a contract term, then you should find that the defendant did not act wilfully. On the other hand, if a defendant believed that requiring working principals to report at least a hundred hours per month was a hustle, or if a defendant did not really believe that he was acting legitimately to resolve a bona fide grievance as contemplated by the contract, then you should find that the defendant did not have such a good faith belief. Appellants claim that the inclusion of the word “hustle”, over their objection, was unnecessary and prejudicial. Appellants note that the phrase “a hustle” was a quote from one of the taped conversations between Traitz, Jr. and Medina. Appellants contend that by using the word “hustle” in the context of the 100 hours program the district court highlighted one piece of the evidence in such a way as to demean the appellants’ Enmons defense and was therefore in error. It is settled law that “in examining an allegedly erroneous instruction to the jury, it is necessary to view the charge as a whole.” Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2952, 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1977). See Walters v. Mintec/International, 758 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir.1985). It must be recalled that a “district judge has broad discretion in framing the form and language of the charge to the jury.” Board of Water Works of the City of Des Moines, Iowa v. Alvord, Burdick & Howson and Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 706 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir.1983). “When the instructions, taken together, properly expresses the law applicable to the case, there is no error even though an isolated clause may be inaccurate, ambiguous, incomplete or otherwise subject to criticism.” Somer v. Johnson, 704 F.2d 1473, 1477-78 (11th Cir.1983). In order for this Court to be justified in reversing the district court, we “must be left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1478; quoting, Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir.1981). Admittedly, “hustle” was not the best word for the district court to use. As the appellants note, it would have been better for the district judge to have said that the jury must assess whether the defendants had a “genuine belief” that the 100 hours program was legitimate. This error, however, amounts to no more than a minor indiscretion and cannot form the basis for reversal of the district court. The district judge’s charge on the issue of knowledge and willfulness, when viewed as a whole, clearly and accurately set forth the law. The district judge informed the jury that if the defendants had a good faith belief that they were acting in pursuit of a legitimate union objective then the jury should find that the defendants did not act willfully. We are not permitted, and it would not be desirable, to reverse the district court simply because its use of the word “hustle” may be “subject to criticism.” Somer v. Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1478. Therefore, we conclude that the issue was fairly and adequately submitted to the jury. 3. Pennsylvania and New Jersey Bribery Statutes as RICO Predicate Acts In Count two of the superseding indictment, appellants Traitz, Jr., Hurst, Mangi-ni, Crosley, Osborn, Williams and Nuzzi were charged with violations of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey bribery statutes as predicate acts comprising a pattern of racketeering in violation of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The indictment specifically charged the appellants with violations of the Pennsylvania Bribery statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701, and the New Jersey Bribery statute, N.J.S.A. § 2C:27-2. All of the above mentioned appellants were convicted on the substantive RICO count charged in count two. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In addition, counts 64 and 65 of the superseding indictment charged appellants Traitz. Jr. and Nuzzi with traveling in interstate commerce to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Specifically, appellants Traitz, Jr. and Nuzzi were charged with traveling from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to Camden, New Jersey with the intent to bribe New Jersey Sheriff William Simon and New Jersey Deputy Sheriff Norbert Zuchowski. Thus, it is New Jersey law which is to be used to furnish the definition of bribery for purposes of the § 1952 counts. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2). See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 47 (3d Cir.1976). Both Traitz, Jr and Nuzzi were convicted on both counts 64 and 65. In charging the jury on the elements of bribery in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the district judge charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows; To prove the acts of racketeering charging bribery under Pennsylvania and New Jersey law, the government need not show that the public official or public servant performed any act or intended to perform any act in return for the money or property given to him. Rather, the focus must be on the alleged bribers— that is, the defendants — and whether or not they intended to influence official action through the payment of money or giving of property. Appellants contend that the district judge’s charge to the jury was in error in that the judge should have informed the jury that in order to find a violation of either the Pennsylvania or New Jersey bribery statutes the jury must find a quid pro quo between the alleged briber and the alleged bribee. More specifically, appellants claim that the judge should not have charged the jury that the relevant inquiry is whether the appellants intended to influence official action. Rather, in appellants’ view, the judge should have told the jury that they must find that an agreement existed between the appellants and those receiving the benefit in order for the jury to find that the appellants acted in contravention of the state bribery statutes. We must review the jury charge to determine if, taken as a whole and in the light of the evidence, it fairly and adequately submitted the issue to the jury. Link v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir.1986). If the district judge communicated the substance of the law correctly to the jury such that the jury was not mislead as to the applicable law and the relevant issues, then there is no error. Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Makeover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1127-28 (5th Cir.1981). Both Pennsylvania and New Jersey make it a crime for a party to offer, confer or agree to confer upon another any benefit in consideration for the violation of an official duty. The question which must be addressed is whether the “in consideration for” language creates a requirement of mutual assent on the parts of both the briber and the bribee to form an agreement or if it instead merely requires a subjective intent on the part of the briber to confer a benefit in return for some illicit gain. We conclude that the latter position is the correct one and that the district judge’s charge to the jury on the state bribery laws accurately reflected the legal elements of those offenses. Both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey bribery statutes were adopted from § 240.1 of the Model Penal Code. Under both Pennsylvania and New Jersey law it is a crime to offer, confer or to agree to confer any benefit as consideration for the violation of an official duty. The offering of a benefit as consideration does not logically imply that an agreement has been formed (much less that a quid pro quo has been delivered) but merely evidences a party’s, i.e. the offeror’s, subjective intent to enter into a transaction. This position is in accord with the clear intent of the authors of the Model Penal Code, to wit: The Offense of bribery is defined in a manner that includes a completed agreement between the person who offers the bribe and the person who receives it. It also permits prosecution of inchoate conduct intended to achieve that objective. The terms “offers” and “solicits” clearly refer to such inchoate behavior and are designed to include what might be regarded as an attempt to give or receive a bribe. >>< * * * H< # In the context of bribery one who “solicits” a benefit “in consideration for” his official conduct is thus one who, with the purpose to promote or facilitate his receipt of a benefit in exchange for his official action, commands, encourages, or requests another to supply the benefit. ... The solicitation aspect of the offense is thus, in effect, a crime of purpose; the actor must have as his conscious objective the receipt of a benefit as consideration for official conduct on his part. The term “offers” as it applies to the bribe giver similarly implies purposeful conduct. Model Penal Code § 240.1 Comment 4(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1980). Similarly, the “conferring” of a benefit does not require the formation of an agreement. As the Comments to the Model Penal Code instruct: Given the established applicability of the bribery offense to inchoate behavior, it would be possible to construe “confers” and “accepts” as signifying a completed bilateral arrangement-in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as consideration for the performance of an official function. To do so, however, would impose a burden of proof on the prosecution which seems wholly unwarranted. The evils of bribery are fully manifested by the actor who believes that he is conferring a benefit in exchange for official action, no matter how the recipient views the transaction ... It is wholly appropriate, therefore, to view the action of conferring a benefit or accepting a benefit entirely from the point of view of the actor. If he meant to confer a benefit as consideration for official action or accept a benefit for that purpose, the offense of bribery is complete, (emphasis in the original) ifc $ $ ijc Each defendant should be judged by what he thought he was doing and what he meant to do, not by how his actions were viewed by the other party. Model Penal Code § 240.1 comment 4(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1980), quoted in, Martinez v. State, 696 S.W.2d 930, 933 n. 2 (Tex.App.1985). The superseding indictment charged appellants with having offered or conferred benefits in violation of both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey bribery laws. Thus, against the backdrop of the superseding indictment in this case, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey bribery statutes do not require for their satisfaction, that an agreement be reached between the briber and the bribee but only require that the briber offer money or property to another with the subjective intent that s/he will induce some prohibited act in return. Therefore, the relevant inquiry, as the district court charged, was whether the appellants intended to influence official action through the payment of money or giving of property- This view is in accord with previous decisions of this Court, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as well as decisions of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. This Court previously noted that “the gravamen of the offense defined in § 4701 [of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code] is the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe not the delivery of its quid pro quo.” United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836, 99 S.Ct. 119, 58 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). See also United States v. Mazzio, 501 F.Supp. 340, 343 (E.D.Pa.1980) (mere offering of a bribe to a public servant completes the offense of bribery under Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 681 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134, 102 S.Ct. 2961, 73 L.Ed.2d 1351 (1982). As the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: “Under the section of the Crimes Code prohibiting bribery in official and political matter, once the offer to confer the proscribed benefit ... is made, the crime is complete.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 311 Pa.Super. 446, 457 A.2d 970, 972 (1983), quoting, Commonwealth v. Ohle, 291 Pa.Super. 110, 435 A.2d 592, 596 (1981). For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district judge’s bribery-charge fairly and accurately submitted the law to the jury and that, accordingly, the charge was not in error. 4. Extension of Credit by Extortionate Means Counts 42-61 of the superseding indictment charged appellants Traitz, Jr., Medina, Crosley, Shoenberger, Williams, Osborn, Traitz, Traitz, III, Mangini and Cannon with the collections of extensions of credit by extortionate means in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. In addition, counts 42-44, charging Traitz, Jr. with violating 18 U.S.C. § 894, was included by reference into count two as predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering in violation of RICO. Each of the appellants charged with violating § 894, with the exception of Mangini, were found guilty of at least one count. Section 894 provides: (a) Whoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do so, in the use of any extortionate means (1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or (2) to punish any person for nonpayment thereof. shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both. Section 891(1) states that “[t]o extend credit means to make or renew any loan, or enter into any agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt or claim, whether acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, and however arising, may or will be deferred.” Appellants claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict them on the § 894 charges. The appellants also contend that the jury instructions on these charges were improper. We will deal with each of appellants’ objections in turn. a. Sufficiency of Evidence The appellants claim that their convictions on counts 45, 48-50, 52-54 and 56-61, stemming from the appellants activities in the 100 hour program, were in error as there was insufficient evidence upon which to rest a guilty verdict. In order to find a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894 there must be both “an ‘extension of credit’ and the use of ‘extortionate means.’ ” United States v. Giampa, 758 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir.1985). Appellants argue that the union pronouncement that working principals must make a minimum monthly payment to the union of $60 was not an “extension of credit” as that term is used in § 894. The jury verdict must be upheld if there is “substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it.” United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1175 (3d Cir.1988). Appellants’ argument does not withstand analysis. In United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 1226, 84 L.Ed.2d 364 (1985), this Court noted that “Congress explicitly intended that chapter 42 [of which § 894 is a part] be wielded with ‘vigor and imagination.’ ” Id. at 1288, citing, Cong.Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong.2d. Sess. 31, reprinted in, 1968 U.S.Code Cong.Ad.News 1962, 2029. This Court also noted that the “definition of extension of credit in § 891(1) was generously drafted ... [and] has been even more generously construed.” United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d at 1288. Thus, to find an “extension of credit” we need only find an agreement whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt— even a wholly fictitious debt — may or will be deferred. Id. at 1287. The agreement to defer repayment may be a tacit one which is implied from the circumstances surrounding the creation of the debt. Id. In DiPasquale, the appellants engaged in several instances of violent conduct whereby the appellants would, after claiming the right to a fictitious debt, torture their “debtor” and collect the claimed debt. On these facts, this Court concluded that under “section 891(1) an agreement to defer the repayment of a debt may be implied from the debt, even if the debt is wholly fictitious.” Id. In this case, there was both a debt and a tacit agreement that the debt’s repayment would be deferred. The appellants, through their involvement in the union’s 100 hour program, adopted a policy that working principals had to make a minimum monthly union payment of $60. Thus, on the first day of each month union contractors subject to the 100 hours program owed the Roofers Union a debt of at least $60 in fees for that month. This debt was not, however, expected to be paid until sometime after the end of each month when the union-contractor would submit a statement indicating the number of hours worked for the preceding month. On these facts, we can find both a debt and a tacit agreement to defer repayment of the debt. The requirement of “an extension of credit” under § 891(1) is satisfied. Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are entirely unavailing. First, appellants place great weight on United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 375, 74 L.Ed.2d 509 (1982), in claiming that § 894 must be interpreted narrowly. This Court, however, explicitly rejected Boulahanis concluding that it was inconsistent with both the language and the purpose of chapter 42. United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d at 1288. Second, appellants claim that this Court’s decision in United States v. Giampa, 758 F.2d 928, cannot be reconciled with DiPasq-uale and thereby limits DiPasquale. In Giampa, the alleged extortionist and several of his friends gave a man named Ciam-brone funds in excess of $70,000 in the course of several separate transactions on the promise by Ciambrone that business ventures would be undertaken with the investors as partners in the enterprises. Id. at 930. The businesses were never opened and Giampa was eventually indicted based on threats he made to Ciambrone. Id. at 930-31. The district court in Giampa entered a judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence. The issue on appeal was whether the district court’s judgment of acquittal barred this Court from reviewing the merits of the case on appeal because of principles of double jeopardy. Id. at 933. This Court concluded that the district court’s entry of judgment of acquittal barred review of the case on the merits. Id. at 934. In passing, this Court noted that based on the evidence at trial the district judge could reasonably find that there was no “extension of credit” within the terms of § 891(1) because the funds were given by the alleged extortionist as an investment rather than as a loan. Even if we were inclined to look beyond the clearly distinguishable factual setting of Giampa, we could not find that Giampa restricts our analysis. This is the case because the holding in Giampa was that the appeal was barred by the double jeopardy clause and, accordingly, any comments regarding the merits of the § 894 charge are mere dicta. Thus, viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions under § 894. b. Jury Instructions Appellants contend that the district judge erred in refusing to permit the jury to consider Enmons as a defense to the § 894 (extension of credit by extortionate means) charges. Appellants’ contention is without merit. Appellants do not cite any case in which Enmons has been applied as a defense to a prosecution under any statute other than the Hobbs Act. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s “holding in Enmons turned on its reading of the specific language of § 1951 — in particular the term ‘wrongful’ in the definition of extortion — and its reading of the Hobbs Act’s singular legislative history.” United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S.Ct. 601, 70 L.Ed.2d 591 (1981). We believe it wholly inappropriate to find that Enmons was meant to create a defense to a violation of § 894 where no legislative history can be found indicating a congressional intent to create such a defense. Cf. United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1330 (court refused to find Enmons defense applicable to the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) or to use of explosives charges under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)). Accordingly, we find that the charge given to the jury was not erroneous. 5. Admission of Evidence Concerning Uncharged Acts of Violence The district court, over the objection of the appellants, admitted 24 tape recordings involving uncharged acts of violence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Appellants contend that the tapes should not have been admitted because they do not bear on the appellants’ intent. “The standard by which we review a trial judge’s decision to admit evidence of uncharged offenses is abuse of discretion.” United States v. O’Leary, 739 F.2d 135, 136 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107, 105 S.Ct. 782, 83 L.Ed.2d 776 (1985). Recently, this Court has had the opportunity to address the scope of Rule 404(b). United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 263, 102 L.Ed.2d 251 (1988). In Scarfo this Court stated that “[t]he drafters contemplated that Rule 404(b) would be construed as a rule of ‘inclusion’ rather than ‘exclusion.’ ” Id. at 1019. We also noted that “[t]he possible uses of other crimes evidence listed in the Rule — motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity and absence of mistake — are not the only proper ones.” Id. at 1019. The relevant inquiry is not simply whether the tapes were probative of intent but “whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). In ruling on a suppression motion, the district court found, and the appellants do not contest, that the evidence of other violence goes to a “shared tradition” of violence and toward showing a “symbiotic relationship.” Therefore, the evidence shows “the background of the charges, the parties’ familiarity with one another and their concert of action.” United States v. O’Leary, 739 F.2d at 136. Thus, in a conspiracy context these matters constituted permissible grounds for admission of evidence of other violence under Rule 404(b). Id. at 136-137. Given that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) and the enlarged mount of deference to be given a district judge under Rule 403 in balancing its probative value and the prejudice to appellants, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the tapes pursuant to Rule 404(b). See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1019 (“[i]f judicial self restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.”), citing, United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 577, 58 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). Appellants contend that notwithstanding the merits of the district court’s analysis concerning the admissibility of the tapes under Rules 403 and 404(b), the district court erred in admitting the evidence without requiring the government to prove that the tapes were admissible pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 894(b) and (c). Appellants’ argument is fatally flawed. 18 U.S.C. § 894(b) and (c) do not provide independent limitations on the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As the legislative history of these subsections indicate, § 894(b) was meant merely to “codify a principle of evidence which already appears in the case law ... [t]o allow evidence as to other criminal acts by the defendant to be introduced for the purpose of showing the victim’s state of mind.” Conf.Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., cited in, 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2028. Similarly, § 894(c) was enacted to permit the introduction of reputation evidence where such introduction was not uniformly permitted. See Id. at 2026. Thus, the district court did not err in failing to analyze the admissibility of the tapes under § 894(b) and (c) after finding that they were admissible pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. B. OSBORN Appellant Osborn was convicted, inter alia, of four counts of Hobbs Act extortion. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Osborn contends that there was insufficient evidence upon which to convict him of any of these charges. We must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if it was sufficient. To support a conviction under the Hobbs Act the government was required to prove (1) that the defendant induced his victim to part with property; (2) that the defendant did so by extortionate means; and (3) that interstate commerce was affected. United States v. Rabbit, 583 F.2d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116, 99 S.Ct. 1022, 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979); United States v. Addronizio, 451 F.2d 49, 59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949, 30 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972). Extortion is in turn defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Before moving to the appellant’s specific arguments, we must address appellant’s contention that in three of the four counts upon which he was convicted the government failed to show that there was an effect on interstate commerce. This assertion merits priority consideration because it raises a challenge to this Court’s jurisdiction. See e.g. United States v. Staszuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59 (7th Cir.1975) (en banc). The basis for this contention is that in three of the four counts the government failed to elicit specific testimony as to how the businesses of the individual contractors who were the object of the extortion effected or were effected by interstate commerce. This Court has recognized that “Congress intended, by enacting the Hobbs Act, to punish interference with interstate commerce to the fullest extent possible under its constitutional power.” United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642 (3d Cir.1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014, 96 S.Ct. 446, 46 L.Ed.2d 385 (1975). Consistent with this view, other courts of appeal have recognized that the impact on interstate commerce necessary to satisfy the Hobbs Act required is de minimis. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir.1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981); United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir.) (“minimal effect” on interstate commerce is necessary.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835, 101 S.Ct. 108, 66 L.Ed.2d 41 (1980); United States v. Rabbit, 583 F.2d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir.1978). Moreover, the impact on interstate commerce may actually be positive or beneficial to interstate commerce. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d at 1195. See also United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 642 n. 1 (“We do not consider the absence of affect on interstate commerce is shown by the fact that BMI [the object of the extortion] had a net cash inflow by reason of entering into the leases.”)- In each of the cases cited above, the effect on interstate commerce was found to have existed by virtue of a depletion of the assets of the object of the extortion thereby diminishing that party’s ability to purchase goods in interstate commerce. In this case, however, the government failed to introduce evidence that three of the four contractors either bought or sold any goods in interstate commerce. While the government contends that the jury was entitled to infer such facts based on evidence that roofing contractors in general purchased supplies in interstate commerce, we need not rely on this justification. Instead, we find that the interstate commerce element is satisfied by the fact that the Roofers Union and its affiliated benefit plans were interstate entities. To the extent that the Roofers Union would increase its revenues, or attempt to do so, by extorting or attempting to extort payments from contractors, the Roofers Union would have, or would attempt to have, more funds available to provide benefits to union members in several states. This is sufficient to supply the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. We believe that this conclusion is consistent with the congressionally intended breadth of the Hobbs Act as well as the Act’s language prohibiting a party from affecting commerce in “any way.” Having determined that there was the requisite affect on interstate commerce, we next discuss the sufficiency of evidence as to each of the four counts upon which Osborn was convicted. 1. Valentino Foti — Count 26 Osborn contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he extorted money from Valentino Foti in that the government failed to provide evidence that the second prong of the Hobbs Act test was met. Specifically, Osborn claims that the government failed to prove that Foti was put in fear and, even if the government proved otherwise, that it failed to prove there was a nexus between the fear and Foti’s payments to the Roofers. “It is well settled that the element of ‘fear’ required for the Hobbs Act can be satisfied by placing a person in apprehension of economic loss