Full opinion text
COFFEY, Circuit Judge. Juan Herrero, Jose Guillermo Haro and Armando N. Martinez appeal their convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, interstate travel to promote drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and § 2, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 We affirm. I. Facts Herrero, Haro and Martinez were indicted following an investigation of the Este-vez drug conspiracy, headquartered in Miami, Florida, that was responsible for the distribution of large amounts of cocaine in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, area in 1985 and 1986. Members of the Estevez conspiracy purchased cocaine in Miami, transported it to Milwaukee and returned the proceeds of the sales to its Miami base. The three defendants in this case had varied responsibilities in the conspiracy. Juan Herrero supplied cocaine to the conspiracy, and Armando Martinez transported the drugs from Miami to the Milwaukee distribution network and returned the drug sale proceeds to Miami. Jose Haro, a Miami attorney, laundered the conspiracy’s proceeds through the purchase of real estate in the Miami area for the conspiracy. A. THE ROLE OF JUAN HERRERO IN THE CONSPIRACY’S COCAINE SUPPLY Orlando Estevez, the kingpin of the conspiracy, became romantically involved with Elena Gonzales, and as the relationship developed, he allowed Gonzales to play a prominent part in the drug enterprise, including being the only person in the conspiracy who had access to the drug conspiracy’s money supply. At this time Estevez revealed to Gonzales that he was a major drug distributor in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, area. At trial Gonzales provided much of the evidence detailing Juan Herrero’s responsibility as a major supplier of cocaine for the drug conspiracy. Gonzalez related two incidents in which Juan Herrero, known to her as “Gallego,” supplied cocaine to the Estevez conspiracy. The first of these incidents occurred in March 1986, shortly after Gonzalez became involved with Estevez. Gonzalez saw Herrero enter the Estevez house on 95th Street in Miami with a gym bag full of unknown contents. Herrero then departed from the house and went into the garage to meet with Orlando Estevez. Gonzalez later observed that the contents of Herrero’s gym bag had shrunk. Following Herrero’s departure, Orlando Estevez revealed to Gonzalez that “Gallego is my supplier from whom I buy this to take up to Milwaukee.” The second instance of a cocaine sale from Herrero to Orlando Estevez that Gonzalez recounted took place in mid-June 1986. At that time Gonzalez observed Herrero arrive at the 95th Street house in Miami with a kilo of cocaine. She saw Orlando Estevez slit the bag containing the cocaine and sample the drug. About a week later Herrero returned to the 95th Street residence and once again entered the garage with Orlando Estevez. Gonzalez testified that shortly thereafter she walked into the garage and noticed that Orlando Estevez was handing Herrero a box that contained $500,000 in cash. Herrero left and took the box containing the money with him. After Herrero’s departure, Orlando Estevez told Gonzalez that he had given Herrero the money to purchase coke for his next shipment. A few days thereafter, while Gonzalez was shopping, she received a message from Orlando Estevez on her pager. When she returned Orlando’s call he asked her to take $50,000 from the Estevez’ cash supply and bring it to the 95th Street house immediately. Gonzalez, upon arriving at the 95th Street house with the $50,000, observed Orlando Estevez with Herrero. Gonzalez gave the money to Orlando Este-vez and went to another room in the house. Approximately 20 minutes later, after Herrero departed, Orlando Estevez told Gonzalez, in Gonzalez’s words, that “Galle-go [Herrero] had returned to [Estevez] and told [Estevez] that there weren’t (sic) exactly $500,000 there and that (sic) was money missing, and that the money had to be completed for the purchase of the kilos.” Later that night Gonzalez went into the garage of the 95th Street residence, saw a large amount of cocaine and observed Orlando Estevez securing the cocaine packages with a grey duct tape. Other evidence introduced at trial supported the conclusion that Herrero was a source of cocaine for the Estevez drug enterprise. In late April 1986, Larry Jack-man, an individual who assisted in the distribution phases of the Estevez drug conspiracy, recounted a conversation he overheard between Orlando Estevez and co-conspirator Amado Leon. This conversation took place in Miami when Jackman, Este-vez and Leon were loading a car with cocaine for transportation to Wisconsin, and Leon, in Jackman’s words, “said that he [Leon] went and arranged the purchase from Gallego.” Herrero’s involvement in the conspiracy was further corroborated through the discovery of six of Herrero’s fingerprints on three of the kilo bags of cocaine obtained in the July 11, 1986, search of a house the Estevezes had rented in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, a Milwaukee suburb. B. THE ROLE OF ARMANDO MARTINEZ IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE After the Estevezes purchased cocaine in Miami, the conspirators conveyed the drugs to Milwaukee in automobiles. In January and February 1986, Celestino Estevez, Orlando’s father, transported shipments of between 10 and 12 kilograms of cocaine each to Milwaukee from Florida. Later the defendant Armando Martinez became involved in the conspiracy’s drug transportation process. Martinez initially drove from Miami to Milwaukee in early April 1986 when he returned an automobile rented in Milwaukee. At this time he obtained a Wisconsin driver’s license and listed his address as the Flagg Street residence in the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, from which the Es-tevezes had conducted cocaine distribution operations from July to October 1985. In late April of 1986 Martinez transported cocaine from Miami to Milwaukee in the automobile that Orlando Estevez, Amado Leon and Larry Jackman had loaded with 10 to 12 kilos of cocaine. In mid-May 1986 Martinez again drove to Milwaukee and received $5,000 for transporting 23 to 25 kilos of cocaine. In late June of 1986, Martinez and his family conveyed another shipment of drugs from Miami to Milwaukee. This shipment consisted of more cocaine that Estevez had received from Herrero and again Martinez was paid $5,000. After the cocaine arrived in Milwaukee, the Estevez’ co-conspirators distributed the cocaine from several different rented houses in the Milwaukee area. Various members of the Estevez conspiracy then returned to the Estevez' conspiracy’s Miami headquarters with the proceeds from the Milwaukee cocaine sales. Celestino Este-vez transported cash shipments from Milwaukee to Florida in February and March 1986, Orlando Estevez, together with Elena Gonzalez, returned to Miami with shipments in April and June 1986, while Armando Martinez transported another cash shipment in April 1986. In May of 1986 an individual identified as “Abba” took a suitcase full of cash to Florida via commercial air transportation. C. JOSE HARO’S ROLE IN THE LAUNDERING OF PROCEEDS FROM COCAINE DISTRIBUTION Orlando Estevez desired to utilize the proceeds he obtained from his cocaine operations to purchase real estate in the Miami area and had Jose Haro, a Miami attorney, purchase the properties for him. These properties were purchased in Haro’s name through the utilization of methods that generally involved the conversion of cash in amounts of less than $10,000 into bank cashier’s checks. The significance of the $10,000 amount lies in the fact that banks were required to file currency transaction reports (CTR’s) with the Internal Revenue Service for any transactions of more than $10,000. Because Haro challenges his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine on the basis of insufficient evidence, we proceed to consider the evidence concerning Haro’s involvement in the purchase of properties for the Estevezes. i The 95th Street House The first of the properties that Haro acquired for Orlando Estevez was a house located at 11821 S.W. 95th Street, Miami, Florida (hereinafter “95th Street”). On September 15, 1985, Orlando Estevez and a realtor agreed to purchase this residence from Howard Copley, the owner, for $120,-000. However, after the purchase had been agreed to, the realtor contacted Copley and told him that the purchaser was to be listed under the name of “Jose Guillermo Haro and/or assigns.” This property, as well as the properties on 97th Street and on Red Road discussed subsequently, were titled to Haro as a single man although he was married at the time the property was purchased. At the October 1985 closing, Attorney Haro paid for the house with two checks from his attorney trust account in the amounts of $35,522.60 and $12,600 respectively, and nine cashier’s checks in various amounts below the $10,000 statutory minimum level for the filing of a currency transaction report (CTR). These cashier’s checks had been issued from banks in the Miami area on several different dates between September 17, 1985, and October 1, 1985. Haro paid Copley, the seller, for all but $1,200 of the $124,122.60 purchase price with funds drawn from cash sources. In January 1986, Orlando Estevez, his father Celestino Estevez, his mother, Romelia Estevez and his two brothers, Os-waldo and Omar Estevez, together with Orlando and Omar’s wives, began to move into the 95th Street house. During this month Orlando Estevez told Evelio Pinto and Larry Jackman, two persons involved in his cocaine operation, as well as Pinto’s wife, Maria, that he had purchased this house for his parents. In the same month the Pintos and Jackman further observed that the Estevezes were making major improvements on the property including the installation of a swimming pool. On January 30, 1986, Haro borrowed $70,000 against the 95th Street property and deposited the proceeds in an account at Ponce de Leon Federal Savings & Loan Association in Miami. 2. The Red Road Property At about the same time Haro was purchasing the 95th Street house for Orlando Estevez, Estevez also became interested in purchasing a lot in a residential area located at 9000 S.W. 57th Avenue in Miami, Florida (hereinafter “Red Road”). Orlando Estevez told both Elena Gonzalez and Larry Jackman that this was where he intended to build his “dream home.” Estevez further told Evelio Pinto, Maria Pinto and Elena Gonzalez that this property was in Jose Haro’s name. With respect to this real estate, Estevez also told Maria Pinto that the purpose of this practice was to avoid problems because Orlando Estevez had too many assets listed in his own name. Jose Haro purchased the Red Road property through monetary manipulations quite similar to, but somewhat more involved than, those he utilized to purchase the 95th Street property. Haro made a $16,000 down payment on the property from cash sources. At the November 1985 closing Haro presented the property owner with $53,-031.05 in the form of four cashier’s checks in amounts of $9,500, $8,347, $9,800 and $35,384.05. The ultimate source of all but $5,384.05 of the amount paid for the Red Road property at closing was cash. At the time of closing Haro also assumed an $89,-302.49 mortgage on the Red Road property. At this time Haro also opened an account at Flagler Federal Savings in Miami, the financial institution that owned the mortgage on the Red Road property. Haro’s initial deposit into his Flagler account was a $50,000 bail refund check that was issued from the Dade County Circuit Court Clerk and that had been endorsed to Haro on October 2, 1985, from Ornar Estevez. Of this $50,000 amount, $10,000 was used to make monthly mortgage payments on the Red Road property through March 1986 and to pay other expenses related to the Red Road property. Mortgage payments on the Red Road property and the subsequently purchased 97th Street property were made from the Flagler account after money was transferred from another account in a different savings & loan containing proceeds from the mortgage placed on the 95th Street house. 3. The 97th Street House Soon after Orlando Estevez acquired the 95th Street house and the Red Road property through the actions of Jose Haro, Orlando Estevez sought to purchase another house at 11712 S.W. 97th Street, located in the same land development as the 95th Street house. On December 30, 1985, and January 20, 1986, Orlando and Susanna Estevez made cash deposits in the amounts of $800 (December 30, 1985) and $9,200 (January 20, 1986) to the real estate company selling the house. In January 1986 Orlando Estevez stated in the presence of Evelio and Maria Pinto that he was purchasing the 97th Street house for Susanna Estevez and himself. On February 16, 1986, Jose Haro phoned the real estate company and stated that he would be handling the closing. Then, in mid-March 1986, Orlando Estevez advised the real estate company that he could not buy the house but that Jose Haro would. Orlando was given a sales contract, presumably to deliver to Haro. On March 14, 1986, Haro tendered a $10,000 deposit check for the residence from the proceeds of the mortgage that Haro had on the 95th Street property. Delays in the closing on the 97th Street property upset Estevez, and on May 27, 1986, while in Milwaukee, he called Haro in Miami to express his displeasure with the delays in the closing. A series of meetings were held between Haro, Orlando Estevez and Elena Gonzalez concerning the 97th Street property commencing in June of 1986. At the first meeting Elena Gonzalez signed a rental agreement for the 97th Street property although she never made a rental payment. At the next meeting between Orlando Estevez, Gonzalez and Haro, Orlando insisted that Haro proceed with the purchase and pay cash for the property. Haro noted his reluctance because he stated it might cause problems in the future. Nonetheless, Haro ultimately agreed to comply with Estevez’ request. At this same meeting Haro displayed to Estevez a bank statement for an account in his name that contained some of Estevez’ money. At this time Haro also advised Estevez that he would need $20,000 in cash to complete the 97th Street purchase. A third meeting was held between Orlando Estevez, Gonzalez and Haro prior to the closing. At this meeting Orlando handed $20,000 in cash to Haro. Elena Gonzalez testified that Haro told Orlando that he needed to have a few days to arrange for cashier’s checks in amounts of less than $10,000 to avoid arousing the attention of the IRS. Prior to the August 19, 1986, closing, Haro obtained cashier’s checks from various banks for the purchase of the house. At the August 19,1986, closing, these cashier’s checks, together with a $267.28 cash payment from Jose Haro, were given to the realty company to satisfy the house’s $124,-092.28 purchase price. On the closing date, Orlando Estevez picked up the house keys for the 97th Street house from the real estate company. 4. Events Involving Haro Before And At The Time Of The Three Real Estate Transactions Before and during the time that Haro purchased the properties for Orlando Este-vez, Haro became aware of certain facts relevant to the Estevezes’ cocaine trafficking. First, in April 1985, Haro assisted the Estevezes in acquiring a cashier’s check with $50,000 in cash to satisfy a bail requirement placed upon Omar Estevez in relationship to a Miami cocaine trafficking charge. Further, in October 1985, while Haro was in the midst of purchasing the 95th Street and Red Road properties and prior to the date he was purchasing the 97th Street property, Agent Robert Hartman of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, office of the Drug Enforcement Administration traveled to Miami in an attempt to contact Orlando Estevez. Following Hartman’s unsuccessful attempts to speak with Orlando Estevez at the apartment where the Estevezes were living at the time, Hartman received a call from Jose Haro on October 31, 1985, in which Haro stated that he represented Orlando Estevez. Hartman told Haro that he wanted to talk to Orlando Estevez about suspected drug activity involving a vehicle in Milwaukee, and Haro arranged to have Orlando Estevez contact Hartman. 5. Meetings Between Haro And Elena Gonzalez Following Orlando Estevez’s Arrest The Estevez drug conspiracy began to run into difficulties in the summer of 1986. On June 30, 1986, law enforcement agents searched two Milwaukee area houses the Estevez conspiracy rented and seized cash, drugs, firearms and ledgers utilized in the Milwaukee area drug transactions. This search was followed with a subsequent search of one of the houses on July 11, 1986, that turned up additional cocaine. Then, on August 27, 1986, less than nine days after the closing on the 97th Street house, the 95th Street house in Miami was searched. As a result of this search, an arsenal of weapons, address books and money were seized. At the time of the 95th Street search, Orlando Estevez and Elena Gonzalez were arrested at the residence on drug charges. Several meetings took place between Haro, Elena Gonzalez and various Estevez family members following Orlando Este-vez’s arrest. On August 28, 1986, one day after Orlando Estevez’ arrest, Attorney Haro met with Elena Gonzalez, Romelia Estevez (Orlando’s mother) and Lourdes Estevez (Omar Estevez’s wife) in his law office. The women advised Haro that Orlando had been arrested and needed Haro’s help in arranging for his bail. Haro explained to the women that he could not do that because it would be difficult to explain the production of cash for bail in light of the recent purchase of the 97th Street residence and the arms length “landlord-tenant” relationship that supposedly existed between Haro and the Estevezes. Gonzalez showed Haro a copy of the original Estevez indictment that included a request for forfeiture of the 95th Street house. Haro told them that they should not worry about this because no one had contacted him (Haro). During a second meeting Haro, Gonzalez, Romelia Estevez and Lourdes Estevez, discussed the issue of altering a corporate document that Haro prepared. The parties sought to ensure that the document’s listing of Orlando Estevez’ position in the corporation would corroborate the statement that Orlando Estevez had made at the time of his bail proceedings. Haro stated that changes could be made along these lines. At that meeting Haro also displayed a bank statement reflecting that there was sufficient money left in an account to make the payments on the Red Road and 95th Street properties. The next time Elena Gonzalez met with Haro, Haro told Gonzalez that Haro “was shocked by the whole thing about Orlando being charged with a [Continuing Criminal Enterprise] charge” and further stated “that he knew that Orlando was in the drug business but ... did not realize the extent of it,” and had been extremely surprised by the extent of Estevez’ involvement. She also noted that Haro became quite emotional about what was happening to Orlando and stated that he loved Orlando like a brother and “if [Haro] had done what he had done, it was to see if he [could] attempt to get Orlando out of this business.” Gonzalez had another meeting with Haro following the issuance of the superseding indictment that included a request for forfeiture of the 97th Street house. Haro told Gonzalez and Lourdes Estevez that no one had contacted him, that “all my papers on the properties and houses are in order [and] I can’t see why or how they can accuse me of this.” Prior to Gonzalez’ October 27, 1986, arraignment, Haro visited the 95th Street house. He was shocked when he observed the extensive alterations the Estevezes had made to the property, including the installation of a swimming pool. He related that there was no way in which one could explain the fact that renters had made such extensive renovations on properties. Haro suggested that the parties enter into lease agreements with him with an option to purchase. Haro prepared a new lease document for Omar Estevez to sign for the 95th Street property, and Omar’s wife, Lourdes, obtained Omar’s signature while Omar was in hiding. Elena Gonzalez and Lourdes Estevez went to Haro’s office, where Lourdes Estevez handed Haro the previously backdated 95th Street lease he had prepared containing the option to buy with Omar Estevez’ signature now inscribed thereon. At this same time, while conferring with Haro, Elena Gonzalez, at Haro’s direction, also signed a backdated lease containing an option to purchase the 97th Street house. II. JENCKS ACT — 18 U.S.C. § 3500 The Jencks Act compels the government’s production of pre-trial statements that a government witness has signed or otherwise adopted or approved relevant to the subject matter upon which the witness has testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). The Act defines a statement, in relevant part, as “a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him.” 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1) “This definition clearly was intended by Congress to describe material that could reliably and fairly be used to impeach the testimony of a witness.” United States v. Allen, 798 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir.1986). Defendants Herrero, Haro and Martinez contend that the district court erred in concluding that notes federal agents took during two pre-trial interviews of government witness, Elena Gonzalez, were not statements for purposes of the Jencks Act and in reaching this determination without conducting an in camera inspection of the involved materials. “ ‘The district court is vested with broad discretion’ ” in determining whether a particular document is considered a producible statement within the parameters of the Jencks Act, and “ ‘[i]ts findings in this respect may be disturbed on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous.’ ” Allen, 798 F.2d at 994 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 444 F.2d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 1971)). In this case, the critical issue is whether the district court’s determination was proper when finding that Gonzalez had not “adopted or approved” the notes agents took during her pre-trial interviews. The district court during trial ruled on the Jencks Act issue on two separate occasions. Initially, Haro’s attorney briefly cross-examined Gonzalez concerning the fact that the government interviewed her on several occasions, but failed to elicit from Gonzalez any information concerning her adoption or approval of any statements contained in the agents’ notes. The trial court then announced its rejection of Haro’s Jencks Act request to produce on the ground that Haro’s cross-examination of Gonzalez had failed to produce convincing evidence that Gonzalez had either adopted or approved the questioned statement. Following the court’s initial determination, Haro’s attorney conducted a significantly more extensive cross-examination of Gonzalez concerning her possible “adoption or approval” of the notes federal agents took during her pre-trial interviews. With respect to the first investigatory interview, that took place on June 12, 1987, the record contains the following colloquy: “Q: (Rebekah J. Poston, Haro’s Attorney) Did you at any time, were you at any time asked to repeat any of your statements to be certain they had them down correctly? A: (Elena Gonzalez) Yes. Q: And they would do that, would they not, because it was important to them that when they were writing down your statements that they had it correct according to what you said? A: That’s true. Q: And there would be times, would there not, when you would be answering their questions, that they didn’t understand, you would explain to them? A: Yes. Q: And from [time] to time you may have even explained things to them more than once, would that not be correct? A: Yes. Q: And there was an explanation back and forth between you and the agent to be sure that you understood each other? A: That’s correct.” With respect to the September 9 interview, the following cross-examination took place: “Q: (Rebekah Poston, Haro’s Attorney) Who was taking notes at the second meeting? • A: (Elena Gonzalez) Mr. Hartman [a DEA Agent]. Q: And from time to time when he wrote things down would he read them back to you or discuss them with you to be sure they were accurate? A: Yes. * * Sj! * * * Q: And the notes that Mr. Hartman was taking down filled quite a few pages didn’t they? A: I imagine so. Q: (By the Court) Did you ever take them and look at them? A: No sir. Q: (By the Court) Did he ever read them back to you? A: No. Q: (By Ms. Poston) Well, just before you said that he would write things down and then check with you to be certain that they were accurate; are you now changing your mind? A: No. He just asked questions and I would say things to be certain of what I had said. Q: So in other words, you were — was it pretty much your volunteering everything, or was it a mixture of your telling them and them asking you? A: It was a mixture of both. Q: And there would be times that Mr. Hartman would write things, would read back to you what he had written to be sure he was accurate, that’s all my question is? A: Yes. * * * * * * Q: Ms. Gonzalez, earlier in the questioning I asked you whether or not you made a point to check what was being written down regarding your statements and you said that you did? A: Excuse me. They would ask me to be sure what they were writing down. I would not question what they were writing down. Q: They were repeating back to be certain that it was accurate? A: Certain parts, that is correct. Q: (By the Court) Did they repeat back all of it? A: No sir.” Following this cross-examination, Haro’s attorney again sought to obtain the agents’ notes on the basis of Gonzalez’ “adoption or approval” of the notes allegedly reflected in this cross-examination. The court rejected counsel’s request without the benefit of an in camera inspection of the documents. The court stated: “Well, I was convinced after I listened to her [Gonzalez’] testimony they were not statements that were approved by the witness pursuant to the rule, and even though she did say that she on occasion would repeat it and he would read it back to her, and so forth, I don’t think that constitutes an approval of a quote, statement, as the case law reads, so that I am not going to order that on my present state of the knowledge that the notes be turned over.” In Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 110 n. 19, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 1348 n. 19, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976), the Supreme Court made the following observation concerning factual situations of this sort: “Every witness interview will, of course, involve conversation between the lawyer and the witness, and the lawyer will necessarily inquire of the witness to be certain that he has correctly understood what the witness has said. Such discussions of the general substance of what the witness has said do not constitute adoption or approval of the lawyer’s notes within § 3500(e)(1), which is satisfied only when the witness has ‘signed or otherwise adopted or approved’ what the lawyer has written. This requirement is clearly not met when the lawyer does not read back, or the witness does not read, what the lawyer has written.” In light of the failure of the defendants to demonstrate anything more than informal give and take between agent and witness concerning the general substance of her position and the failure to demonstrate the witness’ adoption of the statement as her own, the district court certainly did not commit “clear error” in determining that the agents’ notes failed to constitute Jencks Act statements. With respect to the propriety of a Jencks Act determination without the benefit of in camera inspection of the requested documents, we held in Allen that: “While an in camera inspection is not statutorily mandated for a determination of whether a disputed document is a Jencks Act statement, the presumption is that an in camera hearing is needed to inspect the document. That presumption can be overcome by an articulation on the record as to why an examination of the document was unnecessary or pragmatically impossible.” 798 F.2d at 995. In this case Haro’s cross-examination of Gonzalez resulted in the reception of an extensive body of extrinsic evidence concerning the agents’ notes. As noted previously, the evidence clearly establishes that the interviews reflected nothing other than informal exchanges between Gonzalez and her interviewers concerning the general substance of her story rather than a statement that meets the required “adoption or approval” test of the interviewers’ notes necessary to designate them as “material that could reliably and fairly be used to impeach [Gonzalez’] testimony.” Allen, 798 F.2d at 994. Because the extrinsic evidence in this case concerning the preparation of the interviewers’ notes so clearly established that they did not fall within the definition of Jencks Act statements, there was no need to conduct an in camera inspection of the notes themselves. Thus, we agree with the district court and hold that the court properly determined that the material in the agents’ notes concerning Gonzalez’ pre-trial interviews did not contain statements subject to production under the Jencks Act. III. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PRIVILEGE During Juan Herrero’s detention hearing an FBI agent was asked a question which prompted a government objection and a request for a sidebar conference. During the sidebar conference between the judge, the government’s attorneys and Herrero’s attorney, the government represented that an answer to Herrero’s question would reveal the identity of an individual whom the FBI agent had interviewed with a promise of confidentiality. This particular informant in this factual situation had been promised that both the fact that the interview had taken place and the substance of the interview would not be disclosed to third parties unless the informant made statements which tended to exculpate a criminal defendant. In the course of the sidebar conference the government attorneys disclosed the identity of the informant and the fact that the informant had made statements concerning Herrero’s participation in the conspiracy. In response to a government request, the court issued a protective order forbidding Herrero’s counsel from revealing to Herrero the matters discussed at the sidebar. In particular, the protective order forbade revelation of either the fact that the government interviewed the informant or the substance of the interview. Herrero alleges that the district court erred in issuing this protective order. We recently discussed the history and policies underlying the confidential informant privilege in Dole v. Local 1942, IBEW, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.1989): “The doctrine of the informer’s privilege is not a recent phenomenon, having its roots in the English common law. The underlying concern of the doctrine is the common-sense notion that individuals who offer their assistance to a government investigation may later be targeted for reprisal from those upset by the investigation. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the responsibility of citizens to cooperate with law enforcement officials and, by providing anonymity, encourages them to assume this responsibility. With the threat of reprisal real and unprotected against, well-intentioned citizens may hesitate or decline to assist the government in tracking down wrongdoers.... The most effective means of protection, and by derivation the most effective means of fostering citizen cooperation, is bestowing anonymity on the informant, thus maintaining the status of the informant’s strategic position and also encouraging others similarly situated who have not yet offered their assistance.” (Citations omitted). We went on to discuss the matters a district court must consider in determining whether the privilege applies: “When asserting the privilege the government need not make a threshold showing that reprisal or retaliation is likely, because of the significant policy consideration behind the privilege, as well as the difficulty of such proof. Rather, the government is granted the privilege as of right. But the privilege is qualified; it yields when the identification of the informant or of a communication is essential to a balanced measure of the issues arid the fair administration of justice. Roviaro [v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957)] ("Where the disclosure of the informer's identity, or the contents of the communication is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, the privilege must give way"). The party opposing the privilege may overcome it upon showing his need for the information outweighs the government's entitlement to the privilege. The district judge must take a balanced approach and in the end decide whether the party opposing the privilege has credible need for the information in order to defend itself in the action-a need greater than the important policy consideration underlying the privilege. The privilege will not yield to permit a mere fishing ex'edition, nor upon bare speculation that the information may possibly prove useful. Local 1942, 870 F.2d at 372-73 (citations omitted). Herrero asserts that the government waived the confidential informant privilege when it disclosed the informer’s identity and the subject matter of his statements to Herrero’s counsel during the sidebar. The informant privilege covers both the informant's identity and the contents of his communications with the government if those contents tend to reveal the informant’s identity. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-60, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). It is true that “once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable,” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S.Ct. at 627 (emphasis added), as “the purpose of the privilege is to maintain the Government’s channels of communication by shielding the identity of an informer from those who would have cause to resent his conduct.” Id. at 60 n. 8, 77 S.Ct. at 627 n. 8. When an attorney takes the oath to practice law he becomes an officer of the court, as well as an advocate, and is thus bound to uphold and abide by the orders and rulings of the court under threat of serious sanction. We are not of the opinion that limited, circumscribed disclosure of an informant’s identity and/or the substance of the informant’s statements to a criminal defendant’s counsel during trial is, in itself, disclosure to one “who would have cause to resent [the informant’s] conduct.” Id. at 60 n. 8, 77 S.Ct. at 627 n. 8. It is the defendant, in particular, and not his legal representative, who has a personal stake in the informant’s identity and information and who would likely resent these actions. Herrero appropriately notes that an attorney’s duty to provide an adequate defense for his client would ordinarily require that the attorney share this information with his client, and that usually is the accepted fact, but that is not always the case as in this factual scenario. This is precisely the reason the protective order directing counsel not to disclose the identity of the informant was necessary. If the court had not forbidden Herrero’s attorney from disclosing the information to Herrero revealed in the sidebar conference, a waiver of the confidential informant privilege would obviously have resulted. Herrero also contends that the protective order’s restriction upon attorney-client communications infringed upon his rights to due process of law and effective assistance of counsel. Because it is a ridiculous argument, we have difficulty conceiving how an attorney’s knowledge of privileged information impairs his client’s defense, and, in particular, when it concerns a witness who did not even testify and thus offered no evidence against the defendant. As the government notes, under the terms of the protective order Herrero and his attorney remained free even to call the informant as a witness if they desired. The only requirements of the protective order were that Herrero’s attorney refrain from disclosing to the defendant or anyone the informant’s identity, and the fact that the informant had spoken with the government as well as the substance of his conversation with the government. Herrero has failed to establish that his rights to due process of law or to effective assistance of counsel were impaired as a result of the district court’s protective order. Going beyond his attack on the protective order, Herrero additionally contends that due process requires disclosure of the confidential informant’s statement and identity. In Roviaro the Supreme Court observed that “Where the disclosure of an informant’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 627-28. The Supreme Court went on to state that: “We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-29. Herrero alleges a number of different areas relevant to his case upon which the informer might have spoken with the government. The difficulty with his position is that it is most likely that any information the informer would have provided and which Herrero now seeks, would, in fact, have damaged, rather than assisted, Herrero. Even more significantly, the fact that the informer was never called as a witness at trial means that the information provided the government was not relevant to the government’s case nor would it have been helpful for impeachment purposes. In view of the information being irrelevant and/or damaging to Herrero’s defense, we are convinced that Herrero’s interest in disclosure of the informant’s identity and statements did not outweigh the “public interest in protecting the flow of information” that underlies the informer’s privilege. The public interest in non-disclosure is especially strong because the violent and clandestine nature of drug conspiracies results in serious danger, ofttimes even death, to a confidential informant if his cover is broken. We are convinced that the district court did not commit error in issuing its protective order preserving the confidential informant privilege in this matter. IV. CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY — FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E) Herrero asserts that two statements of the conspiracy’s kingpin, Orlando Estevez, admitted as statements of co-conspirators under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. In the initial statement in March 1986, Orlando Estevez spoke with Elena Gonzalez after Gonzalez had observed Herrero entering the Estevez residence with what appeared to be a full gym bag, meeting with Orlando Estevez in the garage and leaving the dwelling with the same bag's contents greatly depleted. Following Herrero’s departure, Orlando Estevez apologized to Gonzalez for taking so long and went on to state in Gonzalez’ words “Galle-go [Herrero] is my supplier from whom I buy this to take up to Milwaukee.” The second statement occurred in June 1986, after Gonzalez had taken $50,000 out of Orlando Estevez’ cash supply at Estevez’ request. Approximately 20 minutes after delivering the cash Orlando told Gonzalez, again in her words, that “Gallego [Herrero] had returned to [Estevez] and told [Este-vez] that there weren't (sic) exactly $500,-000 there and that [there] was money missing, and that the money had to be completed for the purchase of the kilos.” “In order to admit evidence under [Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) ], the district court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy; (2) when the hearsay statement was made; and (3) that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. D Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1217 (7th Cir.1989). “We disturb the district court’s finding that these requirements are met only if it is clearly erroneous.” United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir.1988). Herrero challenges the district court’s decision to admit these statements on the ground that the statements were not “in furtherance” of the conspiracy. In Garlington v. O’Leary, we recently considered the scope of the “in furtherance” element of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. We observed: “A coconspirator’s statement satisfies the ‘in furtherance’ element of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) when the statement is ‘part of the information flow between conspirator-, intended to help each perform his role.’ United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir.1988). Statements that further the objectives of a conspiracy can take many forms, including statements made to recruit potential coconspirators, see United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 356, 98 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987); statements seeking to control damage to an ongoing conspiracy, see Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d at 499, statements made to keep coconspira-tors advised as to the progress of the conspiracy, see United States v. Potts, 840 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1987); and statements made in an attempt to conceal the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, see United States v. Kaden, 819 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 985-86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983)....” Garlington v. O’Leary, 879 F.2d 277, 283-84 (7th Cir.1989). “ ‘[Wjhether a particular statement tends to advance the objectives of the conspiracy can only be determined by examination of the context in which it is made,' ” Garlington, 879 F.2d at 284 (quoting J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 801(d)(2)(E)[l] at 80-240 to -241 (footnotes omitted)), and, in the milieu of the developing relationship between Estevez and Gonzalez, Estevez’ March 1986 statement concerning Herrero’s role as an Estevez drug supplier may be seen as a “statement[] made to recruit [a] potential coconspirator[ ]”, Garlington, 879 F.2d at 283, through familiarization with the various members of the conspiracy, and, thus, as “ ‘part of the information flow between conspirators intended to help each perform his role.’ ” Id. (quoting Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d at 499). With respect to Estevez’ June 1986 statement, Gonzalez’ act of delivering $50,-000 to Estevez at Estevez’ request in that month clearly establishes that she had become a trusted member of his drug distribution operation. After the money had been delivered to Herrero, Estevez made the challenged statement that explained to Gonzalez why Estevez had her retrieve the $50,000. “A coconspirator’s statement satisfies the ‘in furtherance’ element ... when the statement is ‘part of the information flow between conspirators intended to help each perform his role.’ ” Garlington, 879 F.2d at 283 (quoting Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d at 499). “[Statements made to keep coconspirators advised as to the progress of the conspiracy,” Garlington, 879 F.2d at 283, are clear examples of declarations that further a conspiracy’s objective. Estevez’ statements to Gonzalez in March and June 1986 informed her (a co-conspirator) not only about the status of the drug conspiracy’s most recent cocaine purchase transaction (June 1986), but also the area (Milwaukee) where Estevez was doing business (March 1986). These statements, as well as the statement directing Gonzalez to obtain cash from the conspiracy’s money supply, furthered the cocaine conspiracy’s purpose as well as kept Gonzalez abreast and knowledgeable about the conspiracy. Thus, Estevez’ statements to Gonzalez were obviously “in furtherance” of the drug distribution conspiracy and were properly admitted at trial. V. ADMISSION OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE Herrero next alleges that the district court erroneously admitted fingerprint evidence. During pre-trial discovery the government provided Herrero with access to the government expert’s official fingerprint examination report that stated that Herrero’s fingerprints were found on the seized plastic bags containing cocaine. From Haro’s opening statement it is evident that both parties mistakenly assumed that Herrero’s fingerprints were found on the exterior of certain cocaine packages. The parties were not aware at that time of the existence of both inner and outer plastic bags surrounding the cocaine. Herre-ro’s attorney declared in his opening statement: “Now it’s hard to dispute fingerprints. And I don’t suppose we can dispute them.... If my client touched that dope, it’s because the dope was stored in the garage at the time my client was working in the garage.... You’re going to find that the inner bags of cocaine had a lot of prints, and I don’t believe they’ve found any on the tin foil, and then the outer wrapping with the silver tape, and it’s on that outer wrapping where you can’t see the cocaine because the tin foil is in the way. Juan Herrero’s prints are on three of the 30 bags we are talking about.” A few minutes before the government’s fingerprint expert testified at trial, Herre-ro’s attorney was informed that Herrero’s fingerprints were indeed on plastic bags that contained cocaine, but that these prints were to be found on plastic bags that were contained within other plastic bags. Neither of the respective counsels seemed to be aware until the day of the fingerprint expert’s testimony, that there were separate inner and outer plastic bags, and that Herrero’s fingerprints were found on the inner bags. Herrero’s attorney raised this problem immediately prior to the testimony of the government’s fingerprint expert, alleging that the discrepancy between his opening statement and the evidence received at trial could prejudice the jury’s opinion of his client. At that time Herrero requested a specifically tailored jury instruction on this point, and the government did not object to the request. Indeed, Herrero’s attorney made the following suggestion for a jury instruction: “How about if the Court does something like this. I made that statement, I said to them, and as a matter of fact, I discussed the package in detail on my opening and I said my client’s prints were found on the very exterior of the package and if the Court could just say, Mr. Mishlove made that statement in opening, in reliance upon information provided to him by the United States Government, boom, leave it at that.” The government’s fingerprint expert was then called to the stand. Following testimony and a stipulation concerning the expert’s qualifications, and prior to receipt of any substantive testimony from the fingerprint expert, the court gave an instruction concerning the role of an expert witness and then continued with the following specifically tailored instruction: “While we are at this point, attorneys are always most conscious of the fact that when they make their opening statements and they say that the evidence is going to be thus and so, that they better produce on what they say they are going to produce because obviously, if you are in the jury and a lawyer stands up and says the evidence is going to show such and so, and then it doesn't, why, it puts him and his client in a very poor light. I have been asked to make an explanatory statement to you. Mr. Mishlove [Herrero’s attorney] in his opening statement indicated on the basis of information that he had at that time that his client’s fingerprints would be identified as having been on the exterior plastic of one of these, one or more of these packages. Now, apparently there was a miscommunication. He got that information and of course, through the Government, in the course of discovery, pretrial, and there was a miscom-munication and that is not in fact where the fingerprints were, will be shown to have been. But that can await the proof that the Government will be putting in. All I am doing, and this is by stipulation between the parties, is explaining to you that when Mr. Mishlove made that statement to you during his opening, that he was acting upon the information that had been provided to him and it was in fact erroneous. So you should not hold him to that particular part of his statement to you.” At the end of the day on which the fingerprint expert testified, Herrero argued that the instruction that he had originally requested was inadequate to protect his rights and further that the breakdown in the discovery process might affect his decision on whether to testify. He moved to strike the fingerprint testimony, and the court rejected the motion. Herrero renewed the motion to strike following the conclusion of closing arguments. At that point Herrero speculated that the change in defense theories necessitated as a result of the discovery problems meant that the jury might wonder why Herrero had not taken “the witness stand to explain the difference between counsel’s opening and closing.” The court rejected the renewed motion stating “I made an explanation to the jury at the time. I felt then that it was sufficient, and I feel that it is sufficient now.” Herrero “carries a heavy burden on appeal because an evidentiary ruling will be reversed only if the trial court committed ‘a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir.1981) (emphasis in Jones). Furthermore, issues relating to the discovery process are “ ‘committed to the sound discretion of the district court and an error in [such a determination] is reversible only on a showing that the error was prejudicial to the substantive rights of the defendant.’ ” United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 919 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 175 (7th Cir.1982)). There can be no question that Herrero’s fingerprints on the cocaine packages were very relevant, damaging and probably very convincing on the question of his involvement in the cocaine conspiracy, as they confirm Herrero’s participation in the cocaine enterprise with Orlando Estevez as well as Elena Gonzalez’ testimony concerning Herrero’s role as a drug supplier. We will reverse the court’s admission of this relevant evidence only if all of the following three requirements are met: (1) the irregularities in the discovery process constituted violations of the discovery rules, (2) if the results of this violation prejudiced Herrero’s “substantive rights” and (3) if the striking of the evidence was an appropriate sanction for alleged discovery problems. The second element, absence of a violation of Herrero’s substantive rights disposes of this matter. See Grier, 866 F.2d at 919-22 (Relying upon absence of infringement of substantive rights as a sufficient basis for holding that alleged criminal discovery violation was not reversible error). In Grier we explained that: “The ‘substantive rights’ or ‘substantial rights’ standard this court utilized in United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 175 (7th Cir.1982), stems from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) which states that: ‘Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.’ Unlike the harmless error standard, the government is not required to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the government must establish only that the error had no ‘substantial influence on the verdict.’ United States v. Kotteakos, [328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)]. The Supreme Court in Kotteakos, [328 U.S. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. at 1247-48], explained the standard in the following manner: ‘If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phrase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.’ (Footnote and citation omitted).” Herrero alleges that he was prejudiced because the change in defense theories necessitated as a result of the newly discovered evidence raised questions in the jury’s mind that could only be resolved through Herrero’s testimony, and thus put Herrero in a position where he was impermissibly pressured to testify. We disagree with Herrero as his assertion falls far short of squaring with the facts in the record. Pri- or to hearing the fingerprint testimony, the court informed the jury, at Herrero’s request, of the precise reason for the possible change that might take place in Herrero’s theory of defense. Based upon our review of the record and, in particular, considering the court’s timely, thorough and well tailored instruction, we disagree with Herre-ro’s claim that the jury would have questions about any change in defense strategy. Statements from Orlando Estevez concerning Herrero’s role as a supplier of drugs to the conspiracy, together with both the direct and circumstantial evidence of drug transactions between Herrero and Es-tevez recounted in Elena Gonzalez’ testimony and the fingerprint evidence, establish Herrero’s active participation in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, based upon the presentation of more than sufficient evidence against Herrero combined with Herrero’s failure to demonstrate prejudice, we hold that the admission of the fingerprint evidence following discovery problems did not “substantially influence” the jury’s verdict and hold that the court properly exercised its discretion in determining that Herrero was not prejudiced as a result of inadequacies in discovery procedures and the reception of the expert fingerprint testimony. Thus, we are of the opinion that the court appropriately denied Herrero’s motions to strike and its reception of the fingerprint testimony following the delivery of its instruction to the jury explaining the change in the anticipated testimony of the fingerprint expert was proper. VI. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Haro alleges that the evidence of his money laundering activity was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(2) (the Controlled Substances Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Specifically, Haro asserts that his actions in this case did not constitute knowing participation in the Estevez drug conspiracy. “In evaluating [Haro’s] sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we note that [he] bears a heavy burden. Initially, we ‘review all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.’ ” United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1509 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1984)). “The test is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Pritchard, 745 F.2d at 1122 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original)). “As we emphasized in United States v. Giangrosso, 779 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1985): ‘[T]his court is not the trier of fact and we are required to uphold the [trier of fact’s] verdict where “any rational trier of fact” could have found the defendant guilty of the crime. ’ ... ‘Only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the [trier of fact] could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the verdict. ’ Nesbitt, 852 F.2d at 1509 (quoting United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1472 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988) which quoted in turn, United States v. Moore, 764 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir.1985)) (emphasis added).” United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 793 (7th Cir.1988). “This [evidentiary standard] includes, in conspiracy cases, circumstantial as well as direct evidence.” United States v. Williams, 858 F.2d 1218, 1221 (7th Cir.1988). “A conspiracy is a ‘combination or confederation between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act.’ ” United States v. Herrera, 757 F.2d 144, 149 (1985) (quoting United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084, 1088 (7th Cir.1983)). “Thus, the ‘essential elements of a conspiracy under § 846 [of the Controlled Substance Act] are the existence of an agreement between two or more individuals, with the intent to commit an offense in violation of the Controlled Substance Act.’ ” Nesbitt, 852 F.2d at 1510 (quoting United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1140 (7th Cir.1982)). “Under a combination § 841(a)(1), 846 prosecution, the government must prove that the defendant knew of the conspiracy to [possess with intent to distribute and distribute] drugs and that he intended to join and associate himself with its criminal design and purpose.” United States v. Griffin, 827 F.2d 1108, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909, 108 S.Ct. 1085, 99 L.Ed.2d 243 (1988). As we observed in United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 988-89 (7th Cir.1983): “Once a conspiracy is shown to exist evidence that establishes a particular defendant’s participation beyond a reasonable doubt, although the connection between defendant and conspiracy is slight, is sufficient to convict_ [M]ere association, knowledge or approval of a conspiracy is not sufficient to prove a defendant’s guilt. However, while ‘mere presence at the scene of the crime or mere association with conspirators will not themselves support a conspiracy conviction ... presence of a single act will suffice if the circumstances permit the inference that the presence or act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 361, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)) (citations omitted). As we noted in United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 924 (7th Cir.1989): “To convict a defendant of participation in a single conspiracy with other defendants, it is sufficient if it is established that: ‘[t]he parties to the agreement were aware that others were participating in the scheme. The co-conspirators must have “knowingly embraced a common criminal objective.” United States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir.1983). However, there is no requirement that the participants in the plan “personally know the indiv