Full opinion text
HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. I. These consolidated appeals are from convictions and sentences following a jury trial of six codefendants for various drug and other offenses. The defendants — members of an extended family, and one friend of the family — were charged in an eight-count indictment as follows: Count 1 charged a conspiracy among the six defendants between September 1985 and May 1986 to manufacture amphetamine, to possess and distribute amphetamine, and to use firearms in the commission of these offenses, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 2 charged the six defendants with a separate conspiracy between May 1988 and July 20,1988, with the same three objectives. Count 3 charged all defendants but Steve Brown with attempting to manufacture amphetamine on July 20, 1988, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 4 charged all the defendants with using or carrying firearms during the second conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count 5 charged Russell and Mary Sullivan with possessing an unregistered firearm on July 20, 1988, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Count 6 charged Russell and Mary Sullivan with cultivating approximately 60 marijuana plants, on July 20, 1988, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Counts 7 and 8 charged Russell Sullivan alone with being a felon in possession of two specified firearms on that date, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Russell Sullivan, Mary Ann Sullivan, Steve Brown, and Eugene Lewis Fisher were found guilty on all counts with which they had been charged. Tammy LaWan Sullivan Fisher was convicted on Counts 1 and 2 (the conspiracies), but was acquitted on Counts 3 and 4 (attempted manufacture and use of a firearm count). Jimmy Roger Wright was acquitted on Count 1, but was convicted on Counts 2, 3, and 4. The court sentenced the defendants to terms of imprisonment ranging from thirteen to twenty-five years, and imposed $50 special assessments and periods of supervised release. The defendants present numerous issues on appeal. We address those which are dispositive or are likely to recur. We reverse and remand for a new trial and direct the dismissal of some charges. II. The genesis of this case is a 1988 cooperation agreement among Melvin Ray Rogers, his wife Evelyn, their son Steve Howell, and the government. Melvin Rogers had been convicted four months earlier of four drug related felonies, and agreed to cooperate with the government in return for the government's promise not to prosecute Rogers’ wife and son, and to assist Rogers with a Rule 35 motion in connection with his conviction. Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Agent Fred Means and DEA Agent Doc Shannon extensively interviewed the Rogers family regarding their prior drug activities. During those interviews, the Rogers implicated members of the Sullivan family in six amphetamine “cooks” between September 1985 and May 1986. (A “cook” is loosely defined as the synthesis from various chemicals of a controlled substance, here amphetamine.) The agents decided to investigate the Sullivan family and, in May or June 1988, sent Evelyn Rogers to the Sullivan home to “see what they were up to.” XIII R. at 975. At trial Evelyn Rogers testified that when she arrived at the Sullivan house, she saw boots by the door that smelled like amphetamine. X R. at 322-23. She offered to sell the Sullivans leftover chemicals from their earlier cooks, and, according to Evelyn, Mary and Russell Sullivan instead expressed an interest in using the chemicals to manufacture more amphetamine to make more money. Id. at 323. A week or two later, the Sullivans invited Evelyn to return to the Sullivan house for a weekend. Evelyn testified that on that occasion they discussed setting up a drug lab. Id. at 326-27. According to Evelyn, Russell and Mary Sullivan said they needed “the whole set up, mantle, jug, condenser ... and 55 pounds of [phenylacetic acid].” The Sullivans “said they had everything else.” Id. at 329. Evelyn told them she could get the necessary materials. Mrs. Rogers obtained the needed materials from the case agents and arranged to meet Mary and Russell Sullivan at a motel in Antlers, Oklahoma, to discuss delivery. On July 2, 1988, Evelyn Rogers delivered the glassware furnished by the government agents to the Sullivans’ garage. Evelyn testified that she helped Russell and Mary Sullivan hide the glassware behind the Sullivans’ home in the weeds and bushes. The following day, Evelyn called Russell Sullivan from a motel in Antlers. She asked if he could meet her at the motel room. Russell agreed, and he and Mary drove to Antlers where they met with Evelyn Rogers and her son, Steve Howell. The conversation between the two code-fendants and two informants was recorded. During the conversation the participants discussed previous cooks, certain difficulties they had had with Eugene Fisher, prospects of getting Melvin Rogers out of jail to do a big cook, the events of the previous evening, and a prospective location for the cook they were planning. Approximately a week later, Russell and Mary Sullivan went to Irving, Texas, to meet with Steve Howell and Evelyn Rogers concerning their efforts to obtain the phe-nylacetic acid. According to Evelyn, Russell had in his possession a “clip” that “he could drop in his AR-15 in just a matter of seconds.” X R. at 375-76. Russell said “it would rock and roll then.” Id. On July 18, 1988, Agent Means provided Steve Howell with 55 pounds of phenylaeetic acid which Howell then delivered to the Sullivan home. XIII R. at 989. Howell spent that night with the Sullivans at their home. The following morning, Steve Howell and Russell Sullivan weighed the pheny-lacetic acid in the Sullivans’ garage and then, accompanied by Mary Sullivan, went to Steve Brown’s house where they examined some “cut” that they planned to use to dilute the product. The three men then loaded Steve Brown’s trailer with clothes and groceries, went to pick up the chemicals, and then went to invite Eugene Fisher and Jim Wright to participate. Wright later arrived with five gallons of “a chemical.” Id. at 545. Meanwhile, Russell Sullivan and Steve Howell went to a nearby Wal-Mart to buy duct tape and electrical plugs, and then returned to the Sullivan house. Sullivan and Howell made one more trip to Steve Brown’s house to pick up the glassware and chemicals which they then loaded into Russell Sullivan’s truck. Steve Howell, Russell Sullivan, and Steve Brown then drove to Jack Brown’s barn, some eight to ten miles from the Sullivans’ home, where they then unloaded the truck and began setting up the drug laboratory in the barn. Howell testified that Eugene Fisher and Jimmy Wright then arrived at the lab site with two five-gallon cans. Howell said that Russell Sullivan and Steve Brown hooked up the electrical panel board in the barn while Fisher and Wright began putting the phenylacetic acid into the jugs that were already set up. Eugene Fisher and Jimmy Wright both claimed at trial that they were tricked into coming to the lab site. Fisher testified that on July 19, at dusk, Howell appeared at his home to see if he wanted to go riding around. Howell and Fisher then picked up Jimmy Wright who testified that Howell asked him to assist him in working on a car. Both Fisher and Wright testified that Howell then drove the vehicle to the scene of the lab site where, to their surprise, Howell advised them that he was going to make dope. They testified that Howell supervised and set up the drug laboratory and then asked Fisher and Wright if they would stay and watch the lab while Howell ran an errand. Fisher and Wright testified that they attempted to leave the lab site, but were unable to start the car left there by Howell. They testified that because they were left without transportation, they spent the night in a small trailer near the barn. The following morning, the lab site was raided by several law enforcement agents at which time Russell Sullivan, Eugene Fisher, and Jim Wright were arrested. Steve Brown had left the night before with Steve Howell, and was arrested the following day. Mary Sullivan and Tammy Fisher were arrested at the Sullivan home. Officers raided the drug lab site and the residences of Russell and Mary Sullivan and Steven Brown pursuant to search warrants obtained from a state court. An additional warrant for a search of the Fishers’ residence was secured later that afternoon. Substantial evidence was seized as a result of the searches: controlled substances, including a number of marihuana plants found growing near a pond in the vicinity of the Sullivan home, drug manufacturing equipment, motor vehicles, firearms, and a large number of records, receipts, documents, and other papers said to be related to the drug trafficking enterprise. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was filed for all defendants. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. I R., doc. 20, at 6. The jury trial concluded with the guilty verdicts. These appeals followed from the judgments on the verdicts. III. Sufficiency of the Indictment A. Count If. The defendants contend that Count 4 of the indictment is defective for failure to allege an essential element of the offense. Count 4 charges that the six defendants “did knowingly and unlawfully use or carry firearms during the commission of a felony ...” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). That section makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm “during and in relation to any drug trafficking crime....” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that Count 4 is fatally defective for failing to charge that the firearms in question were used or carried “in relation to,” and not merely “during,” the charged drug conspiracy. The recent decision of another panel of this court in United States v. Bullock, 914 F.2d 1413 (10 Cir.1990), obliges us to uphold Count 4 of the indictment in the instant case against the argument of the defendants here. In Bullock, there was a challenge to Count 9 of that indictment. That Count 9 charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c) for knowingly using or carrying firearms unlawfully “during the commission of a drug trafficking [crime].” (at 1414). The Bullock panel held that as to Count 9 and another count challenged in that indictment for the first time on appeal, the indictment was adequate. (at 1417). Here, Count 4 of the indictment alleged that the defendants “did knowingly and unlawfully use or carry firearms during the commission of a felony ... to-wit: conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine....” See note 4, supra. We see no reasonable basis for distinguishing the wording of the charge in this Count 4 from the language of Count 9 in the Bullock indictment, which the panel there upheld. Accordingly, we must uphold Count 4 of the instant indictment. B. Count 5 Russell and Mary Sullivan further argue that Count 5 must be dismissed because that charge is imprecise and ambiguous. Count 5 charged that “Russell Sullivan and Mary Ann Sullivan knowingly possessed a firearm, that is, an AR-15 Rifle, bearing serial number SP207875 with a drop-in auto sear, which had not been registered to them in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record,” in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The term “firearm” is not used in its conventional sense; instead it is specifically defined for purposes of the National Firearms Act in eight subsections of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). The specific weapons listed in the eight subparagraphs of subsection (a) are further defined in greater detail in subsections (b)-(f) of § 5845. The defendants argue that the several definitions of the term “firearm” in § 5845(a)-(e) are distinct and mutually exclusive. They therefore say that it is impossible to tell from the indictment whether the grand jury charged that the “AR-15 Rifle ... with a drop-in auto sear” was a “rifle” as defined in § 5845(c), a “machine gun” as defined in § 5845(b), or “other weapon” as defined in § 5845(e). We do not agree. Count 5 clearly alleges every element of the offense charged. The only question is whether it does so with the requisite clarity. An indictment that merely tracks the language of the relevant statute is valid only if the statute “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, sets forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense....” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1881)). Where the statutory definition of an offense employs generic terms, it is not sufficient to charge the offense in the same terms employed by the statute; the indictment must “descend to particulars.” Russell, 369 U.S. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1047 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875)). In Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.1973), we held that an indictment which alleged that the defendant did “knowingly possess a firearm, that is, a destructive device being more particularly described as one homemade incendiary bomb, which had not been registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record” sufficiently alleged the essential facts constituting an offense under the statute and need not be accompanied by citation to the section of the statute which defines the term “firearm.” 476 F.2d at 30. We held that the indictment was not vague or indefinite. Id. at 31. Here the indictment specifically identified the “firearm” by serial number and as an AR-15 Rifle with a drop-in auto sear. We think that is sufficient. Although it might have been preferable to allege that the AR-15 was a “machine gun” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and not a “rifle” (§ 5845(c)), we do not think the failure to specify which statutory definition applied to the AR-15 Rifle impermissibly hindered the defendants’ ability to prepare their defense or deprived them of their Fifth Amendment right to trial on charges made by a grand jury. We hold that Count 5 sufficiently charged a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). IV. Improper Use of 4-0^(b) Evidence All of the defendants argue that they were denied a fair trial because the prosecutor repeatedly elicited evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs or other acts in contravention of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404. They make three related arguments: first, that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted such evidence; second, that the defendants were unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper use of such evidence after the trial court sustained defendants’ objections, and the judge’s failure to strike it or instruct the jury to disregard it; and third, that the prosecutor’s repeated attempts to use the evidence in disregard of the court’s admonitions constitute prosecutorial misconduct. A. The Disputed Evidence Prior to trial, the district court warned the prosecutor about the use of evidence of other wrongs. IX R. at 60-62. Specifically, the court warned the prosecutor that evidence about “the propensity of some of the defendants to carry pistols and automatic weapons” was evidence of other crimes, and as such was “not relevant unless you can get around it some way.... ” Id. at 60. The court instructed the prosecutor to “talk with your witnesses about that, and about all other 404(b) material they might be prone to testify about.” Id. at 60-61. Following a noon recess, the court again warned the prosecutor about the use of Rule 404(b) evidence. Id. at 64. The prosecution sought to introduce testimony regarding three events: (1) Eugene Fisher’s alleged participation in an amphetamine cook in Mississippi; (2) the investigating agents' fear that Jim Wright might be guarding the lab site with a “sniper rifle,” and the corresponding fact that the arresting officers were heavily armed when they raided the lab; and (3) Russell Sullivan’s alleged possession of a firearm and holster in Irving, Texas. In each case, testimony concerning these events reached the jury either because the trial court admitted the testimony over the defendants’ objection or, as was more often the case, because the prosecutor elicited improper references to those events despite sustained objections to the testimony and in disregard of the district court’s repeated admonitions to avoid such testimony. In every such instance, the defendants unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. 1. The Mississippi Incident The first reference to the alleged Mississippi incident was elicited by the prosecutor about half way through the direct examination of the prosecution’s third witness, informant Steve Howell. He was recounting a late night conversation he had with Russell and Mary Sullivan when the prosecutor asked whether Fisher’s Aunt Millie was present during the course of the conversation. Defense counsel objected on the ground of relevance, which objection was sustained. IX R. at 528-29. However, the prosecutor persisted: Q. Well, did anyone else participate in the conversation, actually say things other than you and Russ and Mary? A. No. Q. Did you talk at all with Millie? A. Yes. Q. And what did you talk with Millie about? Id. at 529. Defense counsel again objected, and the court again questioned the relevancy of the testimony. This time, however, the court overruled defense counsel’s objection on the prosecutor’s representation that Millie was an unindicted and unnamed co-conspirator. Id. at 529-30. The prosecutor then asked Mr. Howell what he spoke with Millie about. Howell answered, “we talked about when Eugene went to Mississippi to cook. ” Id. at 530 (emphasis added). Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial. The court expressed amazement at the prosecutor’s effort to inject such evidence into the case. Id. at 531-532. The court twice noted that thé evidence was unnecessary to the government’s case, and again asked the prosecutor why he thought it was relevant. The prosecutor answered, “because I think it’s part of the history of the conspiracy.” Id. at 533. The judge ultimately ruled in favor of admissibility, but expressed grave doubts as to the relevancy of the testimony and refused to give a cautionary instruction because the judge believed the damage had been done. The court did not expressly rule on defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial. Near the end of the trial, the prosecutor returned again to the alleged Mississippi cook and referred to amounts of ammunition present there. Defense counsel objected. The court sustained the objection, but declined to hear defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial until, the jury was excused for the day. Id. at 1846. Later, counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had again referred to the Mississippi incident, in violation of the court's previous order. Id. at 1895-96. The prosecutor again argued that the Mississippi incident was part of the history of the conspiracy and that defense counsel had opened the door by asking the defendant if he knew anything about drugs, or if he knew how to manufacture them. Id. at 1896. The court rejected the prosecution arguments and again admonished the prosecutor to stay away from the events that allegedly occurred in Mississippi. XVI R. at 1897-98. Despite the admonitions, the prosecutor again referred to the alleged Mississippi cook during his closing argument. XVII R. at 2178. Defense counsel again unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor’s closing argument. Id. at 2246-47. 2. The Sniper Testimony Another category of allegedly improper testimony concerns two witnesses’ references to the possibility that Jim Wright might be acting as a sniper in the vicinity of the lab site, and related testimony that the arresting officers were heavily armed when they made the lab site arrests. The defendants argue, and the district court apparently agreed, that the prosecution’s repeated references to fear of a sniper, despite sustained objections and admonitions from the court, unfairly prejudiced the defendants. The subject first came up during the prosecutor’s direct examination of Officer Duncan, one of the arresting officers. Duncan testified that “I planned to go into the situation with a full force raid team ... [because] one of the suspects, Mr. Wright, was supposed to be in the woods with a sniper rifle.” XI R. at 710. Defense counsel immediately objected on the basis of hearsay. Id. The court sustained the objection and, during a bench conference, observed that the evidence was both unnecessary and could not have been offered “for any other reason than to try to prejudice the defendants,” stating the evidence was “just more prejudicial than probative.” Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added). Defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial, however, was denied. Id. at 713. After the bench conference, the prosecutor requested permission to confer with Officer Duncan, presumably to advise him of the court’s ruling and admonition. However, during cross-examination Duncan again stated that, “We had been told that Jimmy Wright was the sniper in this deal, that he was supposed to be out in the woods and he would cover from the woods periodically.” Tr. XII at 863-64. The answer was admittedly unresponsive, and counsel requested an appropriate admonishment from the court. The judge cautioned the witness to merely answer the questions, but did not strike the testimony or admonish the jury to disregard it. Id. at 864. The subject arose again during the prosecution’s direct examination of Agent Means. The prosecutor had returned to the subject of the raid on the drug lab and Agent Means said that because he was “fearful that a sniper may be concealed in the woods,” he sent four or five men into the woods 30 to 40 minutes before his main assault team went in. Id. The court sustained defense counsel’s timely objection on the ground that the testimony was cumulative. Id. at 102-03. 3. The Irving, Texas Incident A further claim of the prosecutor’s improper use of evidence concerns testimony that Russell Sullivan was in possession of a gun and holster in Irving, Texas, an act not alleged in the indictment. The first reference to the incident occurred on the first day of trial, during the direct examination of Evelyn Rogers. She testified that during a visit by the Sullivans to her home in Irving, Texas, Russell Sullivan had carried a firearm. X R. at 367-68. The court sustained defense counsel’s objection on the ground of relevance. Id. at 371. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor showed Mrs. Rogers a holster that had been marked for identification, but not yet admitted into evidence. Id. at 382. While laying a foundation for the holster’s admission, the prosecutor asked Mrs. Rogers where she had seen it before. Mrs. Rogers responded that she had seen the holster in Russell Sullivan’s possession at Irving, Texas. Id. at 382-83. Defense counsel requested that her testimony be stricken and that the jury be admonished to disregard it. Id. The prosecutor acknowledged that counsel’s request should be granted in view of the court’s earlier ruling. Id. at 384. The court sustained the objection, but denied defense counsel’s request for a mistrial. Instead, the court ordered the testimony stricken from the record and cautioned the jury to disregard it. Id. at 387. The last reference to Russell Sullivan’s possession of a gun in Irving, Texas, occurred during the government’s direct examination of informant Steve Howell. The witness identified a photograph of a .38 caliber revolver which he said was in Russell Sullivan’s possession in Irving. XI R. at 581. After a bench conference, the court admitted the evidence over the objection of defense counsel on the prosecutor’s representation that the witness would eventually place the gun at the lab site. Id. at 584. Russell Sullivan argues that the prosecutor’s repeated efforts to elicit testimony concerning his possession of a gun in Irving, Texas, constituted prosecutorial misconduct which deprived him of a fair trial. The premise of his argument is that the evidence was inadmissible because it concerned an event not charged in the indictment and which did not occur in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Sullivan argues that the prosecutor’s repeated efforts to elicit such testimony was improper in light of the trial court’s admonition to the prosecutor not to bring up evidence of other crimes, including testimony about the propensity of some of the defendants to carry firearms. See IX R. at 60. At trial, the prosecutor argued that the evidence was admissible because it tended to prove an essential element of the offense charged in Count 4 of the indictment, namely possession of a firearm during and in relation to the 1988 conspiracy. In its brief, however, the government simply asserts that the evidence is admissible under Rules 403 and 404 “for all the same reasons [as] the Mississippi incident,” and that “none of the defendants has shown prejudice which could negate a finding of harmless error.” Appellee’s Joint Brief at 67. B. Analysis Defendants argue that the prejudicial references to the unrelated wrongs or acts were inadmissible under Rules 403 and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the district court abused its discretion to the extent that it admitted such evidence; that to the extent the court sustained objections to the evidence and admonished the prosecutor not to use such evidence, the prosecutor’s repeated use of the prohibited evidence despite the court’s warnings deprived the defendants of a fair trial. We must agree, except with respect to the government’s inquiries regarding the Irving, Texas incident, which we believe were permissible and are discussed later. See infra at 1417. Rule 404(b) “generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the actor’s character, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such as motive, opportunity or knowledge.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); see also United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1523 (10th Cir.1989). Because “[ejvidence of prior criminal acts is almost always prejudicial to the defendant,” United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 513 (10th Cir.1984), the use of such evidence must be carefully circumscribed to protect the defendant from unfair prejudice. In Huddle-ston the Court stated: the protection against such unfair prejudice emanates not from a requirement of a preliminary [Rule 104(a)] finding by the trial court, but rather from four other sources: first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402 ...; third, from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice ...; and fourth, from [Rule] 105, which provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Id. 485 U.S. at 691, 108 S.Ct. at 1502 (citations omitted). The improper interjection of prejudicial evidence concerning the “Mississippi cook” and sniper testimony compels us to remand for a new trial. The testimony referring to a “Mississippi cook” was clearly remote and not offered for a proper purpose. After the trial judge sustained two objections to the prosecution’s effort to elicit Howell’s testimony about the Mississippi incident, the prosecutor replied that the evidence was relevant because “it’s part of the history of the conspiracy.” XI R. at 533. Such a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b). See United States v. Doran, 882 F.2d at 1523. In some conspiracy cases we have upheld the admission of evidence to establish identity, intent, motive, or plan as relevant and proper. See, e.g., United States v. Mora, 845 F.2d 233, 237 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995, 109 S.Ct. 562, 102 L.Ed.2d 587 (1988); United States v. Davis, 780 F.2d 838, 847 (10th Cir.1985). When specifically relevant in such circumstances, particular history of a conspiracy may be probative. Here, however, the prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case. At various points, the trial judge found that the evidence was unnecessary, irrelevant and prejudicial. We likewise are convinced that the evidence concerning the supposition of a sniper being in the area of the lab site was inadmissible and prejudicial. The testimony elicited from Officer Duncan referred to using an armed team because defendant Wright was supposed to be in the woods with a sniper rifle. XI R. at 710. Although the court sustained objections to questions about the sniper, the trial court did not strike the testimony or admonish the jury to disregard it, XII R. at 864, and denied a motion for a mistrial. We are convinced that the repeated interjection of such prejudicial evidence violated Rule 404(a). The evidence of other wrongs did not tend to establish a consequential fact at issue, and instead tended to prove only criminal disposition. The rule clearly prohibits the introduction of evidence of a person’s character or trait merely to prove action in conformity with such character. United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir.1988). The “Mississippi cook” evidence was of this type and it was emphasized to the prejudice of the defendants. Id. at 824; see also United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 663 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 512-13 (10th Cir.1984). Likewise, we are persuaded that there was a violation of Rule 403, which calls for a weighing of the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of the evidence. Indeed, the trial judge made strong statements that the sniper evidence was more prejudicial than probative and could not have been introduced for any other reason “than to try to prejudice the defendants.” XI R. at 710-11. The judge made a similar statement concerning the “Mississippi cook” evidence and clearly announced his view that it was not relevant. E.g. at 534. Moreover, the court declined to give a cautionary instruction despite the prosecutor’s offer to withdraw the question, because “you can’t take it out of these people’s minds_” Id. We are convinced that any probative value of “such precarious evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” and therefore the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403. United States v. Temple, 862 F.2d at 824; United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 925-926 (10th Cir.1979); United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1319 (10th Cir.1983). However, with respect to the evidence concerning Russell Sullivan’s possession of a gun and holster in Irving, Texas, we find no reversible error. We agree with the government’s contention at trial that the evidence was probative of charges made in the indictment concerning firearms. The trial judge has broad discretion to determine whether such evidence is relevant, and whether the probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We do not believe the judge abused his discretion in his rulings concerning this evidence. We are convinced that the violations of the rules with respect to the “Mississippi cook” evidence and that concerning the sniper matter were clearly prejudicial, requiring remand for a new trial. V. Jury Instructions A. Entrapment Instruction All of the defendants except Russell Sullivan and Tammy Fisher argue that the district court erred in refusing to give an entrapment instruction as to Counts 2 through 5. The defendants requested an entrapment instruction prior to the close of the evidence, and again after the closing arguments. See XVII R. at 2153. The district judge did not articulate his reason for refusing to give the requested instruction, but he had earlier expressed the view that the defendants were not entitled to an entrapment instruction unless they admitted all the essential elements of the crimes charged. See XI R. at 745-46. Although that was formerly the law in the Tenth Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 688 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 874, 108 S.Ct. 33, 98 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987), the Supreme Court has clearly held to the contrary in Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988). In Mathews the Court held that a defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime. 485 U.S. at 62, 108 S.Ct. at 886. The only issue before us, therefore, is whether the evidence warranted such an instruction. Although we must reverse on grounds already discussed, we consider the issue because of its likely significance on retrial. The defense of entrapment has two elements: “First, government agents must have induced the defendant to commit the offense; and, second, the defendant must not have been otherwise predisposed to commit the offense, given the opportunity.” United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir.1988); Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 887. Inducement is “government conduct which creates a substantial risk that an undisposed person or otherwise law-abiding citizen would commit the offense.” United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir.1986). “[It] may take the form of ‘persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 913 & n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966, 99 S.Ct. 1516, 59 L.Ed.2d 782 (1979)). Predisposition is the “defendant’s inclination to engage in the illegal activity for which he has been charged,” Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165, and “may be inferred from a defendant’s history of involvement in the type of criminal activity for which he has been charged, combined with his ready response to the inducement offer.” Id. The defendants must point to evidence of both inducement and lack of predisposition to establish a genuine issue concerning the origin of criminal intent. Id. Although we have variously described the degree of proof required to submit an entrapment defense to a jury, “the test is whether the evidence, regardless of amount, creates a factual issue.” Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1430. If the evidence on the question of entrapment is conflicting, therefore, the question should be submitted to the jury. We believe the evidentiary record in this case warranted a jury instruction on entrapment with respect to Counts 2, 3 and 4. These four defendants argue that they have no prior felony convictions and that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that any one of them was predisposed to commit the crimes charged. All of the defendants testified and they each denied any prior involvement in the manufacture of amphetamines or any related illegal drug trafficking activity. Although there was evidence from which a jury might conclude otherwise and infer predisposition, this point was a factual dispute. Furthermore, all of the defendants testified that they were induced in one way or another by the government informants to participate in the 1988 drug manufacturing effort. The defendants were first approached by Evelyn Rogers at the direction of Agent Means. Mary Sullivan testified that Mrs. Rogers repeatedly entreated her to assist in the venture to help alleviate Mrs. Rogers’ supposedly desperate situation. XVII R. at 2062-65, 2067, 2069-70. She further testified that she only reluctantly agreed to go to the Antlers motel and participate in the discussion there with her husband, Mrs. Rogers and Steve Howell. Id. at 1076-77. Jimmy Wright and Eugene Fisher both testified that they were tricked into going to the lab site. Finally, it is undisputed that the government provided the defendants with most of the necessary glassware for the drug lab, and 55 pounds of phenolacetic acid. “Of course evidence that government agents merely afforded an opportunity or facilities for the commission of the crime would be insufficient to warrant [an entrapment] instruction.” Mathews, 485 U.S. at 66, 108 S.Ct. at 888. Nevertheless the evidence here was relevant and tended to support the defendant’s version of the facts. We are persuaded that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on entrapment and that the instruction should have been given on Counts 2, 3 and 4 for defendants Mary Sullivan, Eugene Fisher, Jimmy Wright and Steve Brown, as well as for Russell Sullivan for whom an entrapment instruction was given. On retrial, if a similar record is made, we feel the charge should be given. B. Defendants’ Claim of Error Due to Lack of “Balanced” Credibility Instruction Defendants argue that the instructions of the trial judge improperly pointed to defendants and their interest in the result of the trial, that there was no proper balancing instruction by informing the jury of the defendants’ “equal competence as witnesses,” and that under decisions, such as United States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 749-50 (2d Cir.1988), inter alia, the prejudicial charge requires reversal. See, e.g., Appellants’ Joint Brief at 42-44. We do not agree. The instructions given by the trial judge in no way amounted to an undue emphasis on the “deep personal interest which every defendant has in the result of his case” and other portions of the charge stressed in Matias, 836 F.2d at 749-50. We have examined the entire charge given here and are not persuaded by the defendants’ arguments. The judge properly cautioned the jury as to the testimony of informants with a self-interest being considered with caution and weighed with great care, and he likewise properly instructed that accomplice testimony is to be received with caution and weighed with great care. Tr. 2232-33. And the judge gave the customary instruction that the jurors were the judges of the facts, the weight of the evidence, and credibility of the witnesses, and that they might consider the interest, if any, which a witness may have in the result of the trial, inter alia. Tr. at 2235. We have considered the defendants’ several related complaints concerning the instructions and believe they are without merit except, as noted, with respect to submitting an entrapment instruction. VI. Other Evidentiary Rulings A. Evidence of Multiple Firearms Defendants contend that the trial court erred when it admitted in evidence a .22 caliber rifle seized from a trailer approximately 100 yards from the lab site and photographs of approximately 20 weapons seized from the Sullivan and Fisher residences. They say the firearms were not relevant since there was no credible evidence linking the firearms to any of the crimes charged. Defendants also argue that to the extent the evidence was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The prosecution contends that the firearms, or photographs of them, were admissible as evidence of the crimes charged under a “tools of the trade” theory, and that any error as to the admissibility of the firearms was harmless since there was other substantial and direct evidence to support the defendants’ convictions. As a general rule, evidence that the defendants possessed weapons or other paraphernalia that may have been used in committing the crimes for which they are charged is relevant. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 11401[10], at 401-70 & n. 14 (a collection of cases). In United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.1982), we upheld the admission of two revolvers seized from a van in which the defendants were transporting marijuana because “[t]he firearms may have been part of the circumstantial evidence of an intent to distribute the marijuana.” 692 F.2d at 705. Although the instant case is not on all fours with Romero, that court’s reasoning is applicable here. In this prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine, and attempted manufacture of amphetamine, the firearms seized from the Sullivan and Fisher homes were introduced for a proper probative purpose. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the introduction of the photographs of various weapons in evidence at trial. Several courts have held that firearms are generally admissible in a drug conspiracy trial because they are “tools of the trade” for those engaged in illegal drug activity. See, e.g., United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 554 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 2033, 100 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988); United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 1962, 95 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987); United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.1985). Without accepting this broad proposition as a substitute for a more detailed case-by-case analysis under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, we are persuaded that there was sufficient independent evidence to tie the weapons found at the Sullivan and Fisher residences to the crimes charged so that their admission in evidence was not error. Furthermore, although the large number of weapons involved here ereates some risk of undue prejudice, we are persuaded that any undue prejudice was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Before the weapons were admitted, several witnesses testified that the defendants routinely carried firearms, both for legal and illegal purposes. Moreover, the defendants testified that it was their general practice to possess and carry firearms for recreational purposes and that most of the persons in the community possessed guns. E.g., XIV R. at 1332, 1338; XV R. at 1558. Finally, the government did not attempt to parade the weapons before the jury; instead, it relied on photographs of the weapons found at the Sullivan and Fisher residences. This use of the evidence was proper. In sum, we feel there was ample evidence in this case from which a jury could infer that the defendants’ access to firearms not only facilitated their drug manufacturing efforts, but also provided the type of protection the defendants believed they needed for their operation. Admission of the evidence was not error. B. Exclusion of Evidence of Russell Sullivan’s Mental Condition Defendants argue that the trial judge erred in excluding expert testimony concerning Russell Sullivan’s mental condition. Defendants’ attorney offered proof that Dr. Bohn from the Springfield, Missouri, Medical Facility would testify that Sullivan would have the resistance of a five to nine-year-old, and that this, coupled with the rest of his physical and mental condition, would make him extremely susceptible to being persuaded to commit an illegal act to commit an illegal act. XV R. at 1467-68. The trial judge excluded the testimony, ruling that timely notice pursuant to Rule 12.2(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., had not been given. The judge further denied a motion for leave to file the notice at the time of trial. XI R. at 744-45; XV R. at 1589-90 (“I am going to tell you that my ruling still stands as to anything under 12.2.”). Because we reverse and remand for a new trial for reasons stated elsewhere, we express no opinion on the defendants’ argument that the trial judge abused his discretion in so ruling. This issue is likely to arise again on retrial, given the strenuous arguments on appeal that the evidence should be admitted on the entrapment defense. However, because the circumstances at the time of the retrial will be considerably different from those which were before the judge at the earlier trial, we decline to express any view as to the ruling that should be made at a subsequent trial. We do feel it proper to address one question because it too is likely to be presented again. We must decide whether Rule 12.-2(b), concerning “expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of his guilt,” applies to testimony going to the defendant’s susceptibility to entrapment. In United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 518 (3d Cir.1981), the Third Circuit held that Rule 12.2(b) does not apply in such circumstances, “given the lack of a clear indication that Rule 12.2(b) will apply to an entrapment defense, we find it an insufficient basis to exclude the proffered testimony in this case.” 655 F.2d at 518. See also United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710-11 (5th Cir.1980) (rule inapplicable where expert testimony was offered to show lack of propensity to commit a violent act); cf. United States v. Ellsworth, 738 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1042, 105 S.Ct. 528, 83 L.Ed.2d 415 (1984) (ruling 12.2(b) inapplicable to proffered psychiatric testimony that taxpayer had a good faith belief income tax was voluntary). We are persuaded by the dissent of Judge Rosenn in Hill. Rule 12.2(b) requires notice under Rule 12.2(a) with respect to a broad range of expert testimony — that “relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of his guilt....” The dissent reasons that: “The purpose in requiring notice of mental condition evidence is as compelling in an entrapment defense as it is in an insanity defense. In either case, the government must prepare for a psychiatric defense and it should have the requisite notice to avoid trial delay and provide adequate preparation.” 655 F.2d at 520. See also United States v. Edwards, 90 F.R.D. 391, 397-98 (E.D.Va.1981) (Rule 12.2(b) applies to testimony of diminished intellectual capacity or stupidity affecting mental state required for the income tax offense); United States v. Hearst, 412 F.Supp. 863, 870 (N.D.Cal.1975) (Rule 12.2(b) applies to proffered testimony on mental and psychological brainwashing pressure). In sum, we feel the notice requirements of Rule 12.2 apply to testimony such as that involved here. However, the application of the rule and discretionary rulings as to whether leave should be granted to file such notice on remand are matters on which we express no opinion. The circumstances are obviously far different now with the passage of time. The trial judge can reassess the matter on remand. C. Claim of erroneous denial of suppression of evidence All the defendants except Jimmy Wright contend that the district court erroneously allowed the introduction of illegally seized evidence. They challenge an allegedly warrantless search of the residence of Tammy and Eugene Fisher, an allegedly faulty affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrants, and they claim that there were overly broad searches conducted by the state officers under the search warrants. 1. Search of the Fishers’ mobile home On the morning of the July 20, 1988 raids, officers searched the suspected lab sites and the residences of Russell and Mary Sullivan and Steve Brown pursuant to search warrants issued by the District Judge of McCurtain County. The warrants authorized the seizure of specified contraband, lab equipment, and other described personal property. At about the same time, the officers also searched the mobile home of Tammy and Eugene Fisher, located approximately 50 yards from the Sullivan’s residence. The law enforcement officers characterized their search of the Fisher’s mobile home as a “protective sweep,” intended to assure their safety. IX R. at 19. Later that day the state officers obtained a further search warrant for the Fisher’s residence and returned to carry out a comprehensive search of it. The defendants contend that the initial search of the Fisher’s mobile home was unlawful and that it tainted the seizure later that afternoon of evidence introduced at trial and used against defendant Eugene Fisher. On this appeal, the government responds to the claims of error in the admission of evidence from the Fisher’s mobile home and of alleged error in denial of suppression, arguing also the protective sweep theory. On examination of the affidavit and search warrant, we are persuaded that the protective sweep theory need not be reached. The trial judge was correct in his denial of suppression because, we conclude, the initial search warrant was supported by probable cause clearly shown by the affidavit of Officer Means. Moreover, the initial warrant adequately described the mobile home and authorized its search. The property description specifically covers a “white mobile home” and says it is one facing west with a redwood deck. It is true that in the concluding portion of the search warrant authorizing search there is a provision for “search of said person, vehicle and/or house, building and premises, the curtilage thereof....” Despite this singular reference to “house,” we feel the warrant should be read in a practical sense and as a whole. Doing so, we hold that the warrant and authorization were intended to cover the mobile home. The phrase last quoted would appear to be a standard form of language of a boilerplate sort, and this should be read with the particular description of the property in the earlier part of the warrant. In sum, we are convinced that the trial judge properly denied suppression of the unfiled or draft income tax return, firearms and truck seized at the Fisher’s mobile home. 2. The affidavits. Defendants contend that all of the search warrants were invalid because they were “saturated with false information” and argue that at the suppression hearing, Mr. Means admitted information in the affidavit was false, although he denied that the information was intentionally false. Brief in Chief of Appellant Eugene Fisher at 20-21. After a hearing on the motion to- suppress, the trial judge entered a written order with findings adverse to the defendants and denied the motion. I R., Item 20 at 6-9. The order found that the affidavit of probable cause, which was attached to the affidavits for the search warrants, relied on information from “previously reliable informants, the affiant’s personal observations and confirmations of the informants’ information, and the affiant’s experience and expertise as a narcotic agent.” Id. at 6. Under the totality of the circumstances standard of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-32, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the search warrants were upheld. The trial judge noted that the task of the issuing magistrate under Gates was simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place. The trial judge rejected the contention that there was knowingly false information furnished in the affidavits. The judge noted that the affiant admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the allegation of the actual presence of a drug lab at more than one of the locations was an error, since the same affidavit was used for all four locations. However, the trial judge found this was an inadvertent error and that there was sufficient probable cause without that allegation in the other three affidavits for the magistrate to find probable cause. The judge found there was a substantial basis for the issuing magistrate to find probable cause for the issuance of all four warrants under Gates and United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d 744 (10th Cir.1985). I R., doc. 20, at 7. We are satisfied that the findings of the trial judge were not clearly erroneous. The affidavit here in question did contain errors. The drug agent in charge of the raids admitted an erroneous identification of the drug locations. The trial judge accepted the credibility of the drug agent in his statement that the mistakes were inadvertent. The defendants have not demonstrated that the findings of the judge were clearly erroneous. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), it was the burden of the movants to demonstrate deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant. We hold that the findings underlying the judge’s order were not clearly erroneous and the denial of suppression was not error. 3. The claim of lack of particularity in the search warrants' descriptions Lastly, the defendants say the warrant was overly broad and constitutionally deficient, because it merely directed the officers to seize a “laundry list” of personal papers likely to be found in any Oklahoma home, as well as drugs and drug paraphernalia and equipment. Brief in Chief of Appellant Eugene Fisher at 26. The issue implicates the Fourth Amendment mandate that warrants not issue without “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” inter alia. The trial judge considered the affidavits and warrants and their descriptions of the property which constituted evidence of criminal conduct. The descriptions of the property as constituting evidence of criminal conduct were broad. We agree with the trial judge, however, that the language of the warrant was sufficiently specific in detail to avoid the evils of a general search. In United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir.1986), we upheld a description against such a claim when it included records of a physician constituting insurance billings, a record book of payments from insurance companies, checkbook stubs for two years, financial records and any other property that constitutes evidence of commission of the criminal offense. In light of the on-going drug activities described in the affidavits, and the nature of the operations, we feel the descriptions were sufficient to be valid under the constitutional standard. VII. Prosecutorial Misconduct The defendants argue that they were denied a fair trial because, in his closing argument, the prosecutor improperly commented that the trial judge had already passed on the sufficiency of the evidence and improperly referred to matters outside the record. Although we reverse and remand for a new trial on other grounds, we address these arguments because of their importance and possible recurrence on retrial. A. Comment on the Sufficiency of the Evidence During the prosecutor’s final argument to the jury, he insinuated that the trial judge had already determined that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendants. The prosecutor stated: And don’t believe this defense lawyer when he says that all we have to do is decide to prosecute and that’s the end of the story. It’s not. There’s always a judge involved. And you can be assured, based on the conduct of this trial, that this judge isn’t going to put up with any Mickey Mouse about the government trying to railroad somebody into a conviction if the evidence does not substantiate it. XVII R. at 2204. At the conclusion of the argument, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion was overruled. Id. at 2247. The trial court acknowledged that the prosecutor’s comment was “uncalled for,” but ruled that the misconduct was “not sufficiently egregious” to warrant a mistrial. Id. We think the prosecutor’s comment was highly improper. See United States v. Gambert, 410 F.2d 383, 384-85 (4th Cir.1969). The clear implication of the prosecutor’s comment was that if the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendants, the trial judge would have dismissed the charges. Such comments denigrate the role of the jury and should not be tolerated. Not too unlike the misleading portrayal of the jury’s role at issue in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2642, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the prosecutor’s argument “create[s] an intolerable danger that the jury will choose to minimize the importance of its role.” In Gambert, the prosecutor made the following statement in his closing argument: You all are the ones to decide whether I have proved the facts under the law. But legally, I have satisfied the court that it can go to the jury for your determination. 410 F.2d at 384. The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “the jury may well have been left with the impression that the trial judge had been persuaded by the prosecution’s case,” id., and stating further: In arguing a close ease before the jury, it is manifestly unfair for the prosecutor to throw into the scales the weight of the judge’s influence by intimating, even mildly, that the judge thinks the defendant guilty. Id. at 385. ■ Because we must reverse on other grounds, we need not decide whether in the context of this trial this comment, standing alone, would warrant reversal. We nevertheless emphasize that such comment was clearly improper and should not occur on retrial. B. Reference to Matters Outside the Record During trial and during his closing argument, the prosecutor read several times from a purported transcript of the tape recording which had been played for the jury at the close of the government’s case. See, e.g., XVI R. at 1830-32; XVII R. at 2040-42, 2173-76. The transcript itself was never admitted in evidence as an exhibit, and it was never determined to be accurate. Defendants argue that because the recording was substantially inaudible, it was improper for the prosecutor to read passages from the purported transcript, thereby reinforcing his version of selected portions of the conversation that the jury may or may not have heard. We have heard the entire recording and, although we do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the playing of the tape, see United States v. McIntyre, 836 F.2d 467, 469-70 (10th Cir.1987), the tape is of an extremely poor quality, inaudible in numerous places, and difficult to understand because of a persistent echo due to the use of more than one microphone. Even if the jury was able to discern a damaging statement here and there, we cannot fairly say that the jury could hear and would have found that the statements from the purported transcript were made as the prosecutor quoted in his closing argument. Although the court admonished the jury to rely on its own recollection of the evidence, the prosecutor should not have read from the purported transcript, the accuracy of which was not determined and which was not in evidence. VIII. The Brady Claim The defendants argue that they were deprived of due process because the government destroyed handwritten notes made during Agent Means’ investigative interviews with the three government informants. The issue arose at trial when defense counsel’s cross examination of Melvin and Evelyn Rogers disclosed that Means had conducted as many as thirty-two interviews with the informants, whereas the government provided interview notes for only five of those meetings. In some but not all cases the government apparently provided defense counsel with a typewritten report of the interview in lieu of the agent’s handwritten notes. According to the defendants’ briefs, when defense counsel confronted the prosecutor with this information, he was informed that Means had “shredded” the notes pursuant to “departmental policy.” See Wright Br. at 17; Sullivan Br. at 7. Thereafter, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss for suppression of evidentiary material in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The t