Full opinion text
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge: Defendants, Amy Ralston Pofahl (“Po-fahl”), Charles T. Nunn (“Nunn”), and Randy White (“White”), were jointly tried before a jury and convicted of offenses stemming from a conspiracy to import into the United States and distribute 3,4-methylene-dioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA” or “Ecstasy”). Pofahl, Nunn, and White were all convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988). Both Pofahl and Nunn were convicted of conspiring to import MDMA into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 (1988). Pofahl was also convicted of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) (1988). All three defendants now appeal their convictions and sentences. We vacate Nunn’s sentence and remand for specific findings of fact. Otherwise we affirm in all respects. I A From 1985 until early 1989, Charles Po-fahl and Morris Key operated an elaborate conspiracy for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA, more popularly known as Ecstasy. Charles Pofahl hired Dr. Morris Key, a professional chemist, to assist in the production of MDMA. Raw chemicals were purchased in West Germany and shipped to Guatemala, where they were used to manufacture MDMA tablets. Key and Charles Pofahl then employed a number of individuals to smuggle the drugs into the United States, where an extensive network of distributors and dealers sold them to consumers. Between 1985 and 1989, several million MDMA tablets were manufactured by the Pofahl-Key operation, some of which were imported and sold. Large quantities of MDMA were seized by law enforcement officials. Amy Pofahl met Charles Pofahl in 1985, and they married in November of that year. Amy Pofahl was personally involved in many aspects of her husband’s drug trafficking operation. She traveled with him to Guatemala on several occasions when he was taking part in the management of the conspiracy. Amy Pofahl assisted Charles Pofahl with counting and bottling MDMA tablets. She also introduced her former boyfriend, Larry Morrow, into the conspiracy and thereafter sold MDMA to him when he became a distributor. Amy Pofahl continued to sell MDMA and receive the proceeds of MDMA sales after Charles Pofahl’s personal involvement in the conspiracy ended with his arrest in West Germany. Charles T. Nunn served the conspiracy as a smuggler. Nunn transported 130,000 tablets of MDMA from Guatemala to the United States by car, and he was in Guatemala preparing to return with another shipment when he learned that Charles Po-fahl had been arrested in Germany. Randy White lived, worked, and sold MDMA in the Dallas area. White regularly received substantial quantities of MDMA — manufactured by the Pofahl-Key operation — from Tom and Dan Drath. The Draths received the MDMA from Charles Wesley Knight, who received it directly from Morris Key and Charles Pofahl. Randy White regularly sold MDMA to several lower-level distributors. B A cooperative investigation by state and federal authorities led to the arrests of a number of participants in the conspiracy, including Pofahl, Nunn, and White, all of whom were charged in an indictment alleging a variety of drug and money laundering offenses. Pofahl, Nunn, and White were tried together before a jury, which found all three defendants guilty of Count One of the indictment — conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988). Both Pofahl and Nunn were found guilty of Count Two— conspiring to import MDMA into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 (1988). The jury also found Pofahl guilty of Count Six — money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988). The district court sentenced Pofahl to consecutive prison terms of 240 months for Count One and 52 months for Count Two. Pofahl received a concurrent term of 60 months on Count Six. The district court sentenced Nunn to 235 months imprisonment for Count One and a concurrent term of 60 months on Count Two. Randy White received a sentence of 109 months imprisonment. C Pofahl, Nunn, and White now appeal their convictions and sentences. All three appellants allege racial discrimination in the selection of the jury. Both Pofahl and White attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support their conspiracy convictions. Pofahl raises several additional claims: (a) that the district court erred in its handling of her motion for appointment of a psychiatric consultant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988), and that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's handling of the motion; (b) that the district court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence seized from her residences in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (c) that the district court, in imposing sentence, held her accountable for an excessive quantity of MDMA; (d) that her sentence was enhanced on account of an erroneous finding that she was a manager in the conspiracy; and (e) that her sentence was enhanced as a result of the district court’s erroneous finding that she attempted to obstruct justice. Charles Nunn argues that (a) the district court erred by denying his motion to sever, (b) the district court held him responsible at sentencing for an excessive quantity of drugs, (c) he should have been granted an offense level reduction as a minimal or minor participant in the conspiracy, (d) he was entitled to an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and (e) the district court erred by enhancing his sentence for possession of a firearm during the course of the offense without first specifically finding that he possessed the gun, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D). Randy White claims that (a) his confession should have been suppressed, because it was made without the benefit of the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and (b) the district court at sentencing held him accountable for an excessive quantity of MDMA. II Joint Claims A Pofahl, Nunn, and White argue that their convictions must be reversed on account of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury. The appellants present several arguments to that effect, none of which has merit. (i) Pofahl, Nunn, and White contend that the district court erred by overruling White’s objection, premised on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to remove all of the African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans from the jury. The Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor to exercise peremptory challenges against prospective jurors solely on account of their race. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. To show that the prosecutor violated the Equal Protection Clause by her use of peremptory strikes, a defendant must first demonstrate that the facts raise an inference that the strikes were racially motivated. Id. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721. Once the defendant makes that prima facie case, the prosecutor has the burden of showing that the strikes were based on “permissible racially neutral selection criteria.” See id. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721. After the prosecutor offers a racially neutral explanation, the district court must determine whether the defendant has established purposeful racial discrimination. See id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. Following voir dire, counsel for White drew the district court’s attention to the fact that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory strikes to remove from the jury the only two African-American venire members and the one Hispanic venire member. See Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 7, at 74, 77. The district court apparently understood counsel to be making a Batson objection, and asked the prosecutor whether he could “state nondiscriminatory reasons for striking” the three venire members. See id. at 74. The prosecutor answered that he generally tended to strike jurors “on economic grounds” rather than racial grounds. See id. at 75. In particular the prosecutor preferred “a middle class jury” made up of jurors “who work[ed] eight hours a day and [were] preferably salaried.” See id. The prosecutor offered specific reasons for striking each of the three contested venire members. See id. He stated that venireman Bolds was struck because he was single and a school bus driver. Based on those facts, the prosecutor surmised that Mr. Bolds probably earned low wages and was not employed full time. See id. The prosecutor said that he struck venireman Olivarez because he was a self-employed auto mechanic, and as a result it was not possible to determine how many hours Mr. Olivarez worked or how much money he earned. See id. at 76. The prosecutor also stated that he was suspicious of Mr. Olivarez’s dress and demean- or. See id. The prosecutor asserted that he struck Ms. Sargent because she was not paying attention during voir dire. See id. at 75-76. After hearing these explanations, the district court overruled White’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory strikes. See id. at 77. Because only White objected to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, see id. at 74-77, the government argues that Pofahl and Nunn are barred from raising a Batson claim on appeal. See Brief for United States of America at 26 n. 13. Because a timely objection is an essential prerequisite to a Batson claim, we agree that neither Nunn nor Pofahl is entitled to assert such a claim. See Wilkerson v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1063 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that failure to make timely Batson objection at trial was “a constitutional bar” to Batson claim), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 18, 1992) (No. 91-7669); Thomas v. Moore, 866 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840, 110 S.Ct. 124, 107 L.Ed.2d 85 (1989); Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 369 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2090, 104 L.Ed.2d 653 (1989); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991, 107 S.Ct. 589, 93 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986). White’s Batson argument lacks merit entirely. “Where ... the [district court] has entertained and ruled on a defendant’s motion charging a Batson violation, we review.only [its] ‘finding of discrimination vel non.’ ” United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1987)). The district court’s determination whether the prosecutor’s strikes are racially motivated is purely factual, and largely turns on an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility. Hernandez v. New York, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). We review the district court’s finding concerning the presence vel non of purposeful racial discrimination under the “clearly erroneous” standard. See Hernandez, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1871; Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d at 94. We will not find a district court’s ruling to be clearly erroneous unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Mitchell, 964 F.2d 454, 457-58 (5th Cir.1992). The prosecutor’s explanations of his peremptory strikes—focusing on employment, economic status, attentiveness, and demeanor—were certainly non-racial. Furthermore, White does not argue, and the record does not indicate, that the prosecutor’s explanations lacked credibility. Therefore, the district court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes were not racially motivated was not clearly erroneous, and White is not entitled to relief. (ii) Pofahl, Nunn, and White also contend that they are entitled to reversal because the jury was selected in violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. (1988). We will not consider that claim, because it was not preserved below. The Act provides: In criminal cases, before the voir dire examination begins, or within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, the grounds therefor, whichever is earlier, the defendant may move to dismiss the indictment or stay the proceedings against him on the ground of substantial failure to comply with the provisions of this title in selecting the grand or petit jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a). By failing to act timely as directed by § 1867(a), a defendant waives her objection under the Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (“The procedures prescribed by this section shall be the exclusive means by which a person accused of a Federal crime ... may challenge any jury on the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with the provisions of this title.”); United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); United States v. Green, 742 F.2d 609, 612 (11th Cir.1984). Because none of the appellants complied with § 1867(a), they are barred from raising a claim under the Jury Selection and Service Act on appeal. (iii) Pofahl, Nunn, and White also appear to claim that they were denied their Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a pool that represents a fair cross-section of the community. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528, 95 S.Ct. 692, 697, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). In order to state a claim of that sort, the appellants must show that a distinctive group is generally and systematically excluded from jury venires. See Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir.1986). The appellants have not alleged, much less demonstrated, general and systematic exclusion of a distinctive group from jury venires in the Western District of Texas. None of the appellants is entitled to reversal on the basis of their complaints regarding the selection of the jury. B Both Pofahl and White contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988). Pofahl further argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for conspiracy to import a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 (1988). Po-fahl’s and White's contentions are without merit. (i) “In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 575 (1992). “It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every rational hypothesis of innoeenee or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “We accept all credibility choices that tend to support the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1274 (5th Cir.1991). In order to prove that a defendant conspired to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) there was a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA; (2) the defendant knew about the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant voluntarily joined in the conspiracy. See United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1348 (5th Cir.1988) (citing United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842, 104 S.Ct. 139, 78 L.Ed.2d 132 (1983)). The government must prove the same basic elements — existence of a conspiracy, knowledge, and voluntary participation — in order to convict an individual of conspiring to import MDMA in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963. See id.; United States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir.1986). “No evidence of overt conduct is required. A conspiracy agreement may be tacit, and the trier of fact may infer agreement from circumstantial evidence.” Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d at 1348 (citations omitted). (ii) Amy Pofahl was convicted of two distinct conspiracies. One concerned possession and distribution of MDMA, while the other concerned importation. Evidence presented by the prosecution established the existence of both conspiracies, as well as Pofahl’s knowledge of and participation in both. Witnesses presented by the prosecution testified to the existence of a conspiracy to import MDMA. Morris Key testified that he met with Charles Pofahl in February of 1985, and Pofahl hired him to determine whether or not MDMA was a legal substance. See Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 7, at 104-05. Key determined that MDMA was not illegal in the United States, but that it soon would be. See id. at 106, 112. As a result, Key and Charles Pofahl agreed to manufacture the drug in Guatemala, and Charles Pofahl promised to pay Key one million dollars for his assistance in manufacturing the MDMA. See id. at 112. Key and Charles Pofahl employed a number of other individuals to smuggle the MDMA into the United States. For example, in the summer of 1988 they arranged with Jerry Williamson to have half a million MDMA tablets carried to the United States from Guatemala by boat. See id. at 150-54. Other smugglers employed by Key and Charles Pofahl included Judy Snell, Charles Nunn, and Robert Petty. See id. vol. 9, at 680-86; id. vol. 10, at 867-72. Evidence of the agreements and overt acts of these individuals established the existence of a conspiracy to import MDMA. Amy Pofahl’s knowledge of, and voluntary participation in the conspiracy were also established by the evidence. Richard Cesarski testified at trial that he manufactured MDMA tablets for Charles Pofahl in Lewisville, Texas, and that Amy Pofahl was present at the time and was “counting [pills] and putting them in bottles.” See id. vol. 8, at 247. Morris Key testified that Amy Pofahl was present in an apartment in Guatemala where MDMA was being stored by Charles Pofahl. See id. vol. 7, at 148. Carlos de la Riva testified that he saw Amy Pofahl at the apartment where the MDMA was stored, and that she was helping Charles Pofahl remove “Made in Guatemala” labels from plastic bottles, which would then be used to package MDMA tablets for shipping to the United States. See id. vol. 8, at 281. Kathleen Key, Morris Key’s ex-wife, testified that she was visited by Amy Pofahl in February of 1989, after Morris Key was arrested. See id. vol. 10, at 771. Pofahl was concerned about her husband and didn’t know where he was. See id. at 772. Pofahl was also concerned about her money, but she told Key “that there was enough product in Guatemala to take care of everyone.” See id. at 773-74. Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Pofahl knew of, and entered into the conspiracy to import MDMA. See United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 261 (5th Cir.1985) (finding that evidence supported conviction for conspiracy to import drugs, where the defendant had knowledge of the origin of the drug shipments, participated in weighing and distributing the drugs, and collected and disbursed funds in connection with the importation), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2921, 91 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986); see also United States v. Rojas-Martinez, 968 F.2d 415, 420-21 (5th Cir.) (finding circumstantial evidence sufficient to support conviction for conspiracy to import marijuana), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 828, 121 L.Ed.2d 698 (1992); United States v. Gibson, 963 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir.1992) (upholding conviction for importation of marijuana where circumstantial evidence — such as defendant’s nervousness and inability to explain her unusual conduct — was sufficient to support finding that defendant knew marijuana was present in side panel of her car). The conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA involved additional participants and agreements. Larry Morrow was a friend of Amy Po-fahl’s who testified that he periodically purchased as many as two thousand tablets from Amy Pofahl. See id. vol. 9, at 594. When Amy Pofahl moved to California, she arranged for Morrow to begin receiving MDMA from her husband. See id. at 596. Morrow testified that he sold the MDMA to Sherry Wallingford, who was his “main distributor.” See id. at 610-15. Pofahl concedes that this evidence was presented at trial, but she argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she participated in the conspiracy. See Brief for Po-fahl at 32 (“At most, the evidence shows that Mrs. Pofahl was acting as an independent dealer for the conspiracy.”). Pofahl also contends that no evidence showed that she participated in negotiations or discussions concerning dealings in MDMA. However, those arguments fall short of demonstrating that the government’s evidence was insufficient to support Pofahl’s conviction. “[T]he trier of fact may infer agreement from circumstantial evidence.” Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d at 1348. Although some of the government’s evidence may have been circumstantial, it was not therefore insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Consequently, we reject Pofahl’s sufficiency claim. (iii) The evidence also supported the jury’s conclusion that White was guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA. At trial Tom Drath testified that he had a meeting with Boyd Knight and Charles Wesley Knight, at which they discussed forming a partnership to sell MDMA. See Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 8, at 404. Thereafter Drath began to receive large quantities of MDMA from Wes Knight, which he sold to two “distributors” who were “underneath” him. See id. at 406-07. Drath testified that Randy White was one of those distributors, see id. at 407, and that White was assigned to him by Boyd Knight. See id. at 433. According to Drath, White carried a beeper, and Drath would call the beeper to let White know that a certain quantity of MDMA was waiting for him at a storage locker to which White had a key. See id. at 410-11. White would retrieve the drugs and sell them, and then pay Drath for the drugs by placing part of the proceeds from his sales back in the locker. See id. Drath stated that he distributed over 100,000 tablets to White between October of 1987 and December of 1988. See id. at 406, 425, 428. Internal Revenue Service Special Agent Gary Terrell testified at trial and recounted an interview with White. White stated to Terrell that he entered into an agreement with Tom Drath to purchase two to three thousand tablets of MDMA per week. See id. at 440. White also told Terrell that he had distributors to whom he resold the MDMA which he received from Tom Drath. See id. at 440-42. These distributors included Shawn Guillory, Sandy Paulas, Gary Strauss, and Chris Edwards. See id. White told Terrell that at one time he accumulated $75,000 in proceeds from sales of MDMA. See id. at 448. This evidence reveals a number of agreements entered into by White for the sake of trafficking in MDMA, and proves that White knew of, and participated in a conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute MDMA. White points out that he did not know the top-level organizers of the conspiracy, such as Charles Pofahl and Morris Key. However, in order for White to be convicted of conspiracy it was not necessary for the government to prove that he knew all of the members of the conspiracy. In Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947), Blu-menthal was convicted of conspiracy to sell whiskey at a price in excess of the price set by the government. See id. The Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Blumenthal’s conviction, even though Blumenthal had no knowledge of the identity or participation of the individual who actually owned the whiskey, see id. at 556-57, 68 S.Ct. at 256: [I]t is most often true, especially in broad schemes calling for the aid of many persons, that after discovery of enough to show clearly the essence of the scheme and the identity of a number participating, the identity and the fact of participation of others remain undiscovered and undiscoverable. Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others. Id. The evidence here amply demonstrated the essential nature of the conspiracy — a network of agreements to traffick in MDMA — as well as White’s participation in the conspiracy. The government was not required to prove that White knew the top-level organizers of the conspiracy. See id.; United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc) (citing Blumenthal), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 2017, 68 L.Ed.2d 324 (1981). White also contends that he dealt in MDMA while it was legal in the United States, but withdrew from the conspiracy “shortly” after MDMA became a controlled substance. We disagree. Although it appears that White began dealing in MDMA before it was illegal to do so, he continued to traffick in the contraband long after-wards. The record reveals that MDMA became a controlled substance on October 27,1986. See Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 10, at 949. The record also reveals that White was still trafficking in MDMA as late as December of 1988, more than two years after it became a controlled substance. See id. vol. 8, at 446. The evidence was sufficient to support White’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute MDMA. Ill Amy Ralston Pofahl A Pofahl makes several claims concerning her motion for appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in preparing and presenting her defense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988). Pofahl's trial counsel, John Hurley, filed in the district court Pofahl’s Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Defense Psychiatric Consultant, “respectfully requesting] the Court to appoint Dr. Stephen Mark, a licensed psychiatrist, as a defense consultant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).” See Record on Appeal, vol. 1, at 313 (sealed). The motion stated that a psychiatric consultant was needed for the following reasons: The contents of some of [Pofahl’s] writ ings express strong beliefs in ideas such as reincarnation and the channeling of spirits. While these beliefs may not in themselves be evidence of mental unsoundness, the sheer volume of writing produced by [Pofahl], her supposed easy access to hallucinogenic drugs, and her steadfast rejection of any suggestion to reduce her potential penal exposure by plea bargaining create a need for [Po-fahl] to be examined by a psychiatric expert, and for this attorney to consult with said expert in order to adequately represent [Pofahl], and investigate all possible defenses available to [her], and to determine whether [she] is unable to properly assist in her defense because of mental disease or defect. Id. The district court entered an order without conducting a hearing or otherwise taking evidence concerning the merits of Po-fahl’s motion. See id. at 324. The district court found “that a psychiatrist should be appointed to examine [Pofahl] and to determine her present competency to stand trial and her sanity at the time of the offense.” Id. The district court appointed Dr. Stephen Mark to conduct the examination, and ordered him to prepare a written report of his findings. The district court directed Dr. Mark to forward copies of his report to the prosecutor. Dr. Mark met with Pofahl and thereafter forwarded to all concerned parties a one-page letter which contained the following description of the meeting: [Pofahl] basically told me that she did not want to talk to me. She did say that she faces lots of years in prison and because of the way things have gone she is not sure who to trust and who not to trust. She did tell me that she has never been in a psychiatric facility nor has she been under psychiatric care or on psychiatric-type medications. The very little bit that she did talk, I could not pick up any reason to believe that she would not be competent to stand trial, although, certainly before I come to that conclusion, I typically like to ask a lot more questions and get responses to questions than what I was able to ask today. Id. (letter of Stephen L. Mark, M.D., Sept. 16, 1991). Pofahl’s counsel, Mr. Hurley, made no objection to the district court’s handling of Pofahl’s motion, and made no further attempts to obtain psychiatric assistance or to present a defense of insanity. (i) Pofahl argues that the district court committed reversible error by denying her motion without first conducting an ex parte inquiry to determine whether she was entitled to the relief requested. When a criminal defendant moves under § 3006A(e) for psychiatric expert assistance, the district court is required to conduct an ex parte inquiry to determine whether the requested relief is appropriate. See United States v. Hamlet, 456 F.2d 1284, 1284 (5th Cir.1972) (holding that the district court “erred in denying the § 3006A(e) motion without conducting the ex parte inquiry required by the statute”); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir.1971) (same). However, the district court’s failure to conduct the inquiry required by § 3006A(e) does not automatically warrant reversal in this case. Where, as here, a party fails to object to an alleged error before the district court, we generally will not disturb the district court’s ruling, unless plain error is shown. See, e.g., United States v. Surasky, 974 F.2d 19, 20 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that plain error standard applied where criminal defendant failed to object to allegedly erroneous application of the sentencing guidelines); United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 49-51 (5th Cir.) (declining to review the merits of appellant’s sentencing guidelines claim, where the alleged error was not raised at trial, and no plain error was found), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2032, 114 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). Plain error is “error so obvious and substantial that failure to notice it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings” and would “result in manifest injustice.” Lopez, 923 F.2d at 50; see also United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, 741 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Howton, 688 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir.1982). We have not previously applied the plain error standard where a criminal defendant failed to object to the district court's failure to conduct the ex parte inquiry required by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). Neither Hamlet nor Theriault mentioned whether the defendant made an objection. However, we now choose to follow the Tenth Circuit in applying the plain error standard in this context. See United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 380 (10th Cir.1986) (applying plain error standard where defendant failed to object to the presence of government attorneys at hearing on § 3006A(e) motion for appointment of penologist), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908, 107 S.Ct. 1353, 94 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Pofahl has not shown plain error resulting from the district court’s failure to conduct an ex parte inquiry. Pofahl would have been prejudiced by that alleged error only if it had prevented the presentation of a meritorious defense of insanity, and nothing in the record suggests that Pofahl suffered from any mental disease or defect which would have supported an insanity defense. The only items in the record which bear on Pofahl's sanity are the allegations in her Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Defense Psychiatric Consultant. Mr. Hurley alleged that Pofahl’s writings revealed her belief in reincarnation and the channeling of spirits, but he conceded that these beliefs “may not in themselves be evidence of mental unsoundness.” See Record on Appeal, vol. 1, at 313 (sealed). Counsel also alleged that Pofahl had “easy access to hallucinogenic drugs,” but did not allege that Pofahl had ever used such drugs, or that she was impaired by their use at the time of the offense. See id. Finally, counsel alleged that Po-fahl refused to consider a plea bargain. See id. While that choice may have been unwise, it is hardly symptomatic of a mental disease or defect. In sum, nothing in the record suggests that Pofahl could have presented a successful defense of insanity. Consequently, we find no plain error in the district court’s failure to conduct an ex parte inquiry. (ii) Pofahl also argues that her conviction should be reversed because she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Pofahl argues that her trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's disposition of her § 3006A(e) motion. We reject Pofahl’s argument, because she has not shown that, in the absence of her counsel’s failures, the outcome of her trial probably would have been different. In order to prevail on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Pofahl must show that (1) her counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced her defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We agree that counsel’s performance in this case was deficient. In United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.1974), a case presenting facts very similar to these, we held that counsel’s performance was ineffective. In Edwards a motion was filed under § 3006A(e), and the district court ordered a psychiatric examination. See id. at 1159. After performing the examination, the psychiatrist reported his findings to the prosecution as well as the defense. See id. As in the instant case, defense counsel failed to object, and we held that Edwards did not receive “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” See id. at 1162, 1165. In light of Edwards we conclude that Pofahl’s counsel's performance was deficient. However, Pofahl is not entitled to reversal unless she demonstrates that her defense was prejudiced by her attorney’s errors. To demonstrate prejudice, Pofahl must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Pofahl was prejudiced by counsel’s errors only if those errors stopped her from presenting a meritorious defense of insanity. As discussed in the preceding section, the record reveals no basis for such a defense. Therefore Pofahl has not shown that, but for counsel’s unprofessional performance, the outcome of her trial probably would have been different. Accordingly, we find no merit to Pofahl’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (iii) Pofahl further argues that “the district court, having itself raised the issue of Mrs. Pofahl’s competency, erred in failing to conclusively determine whether in fact Mrs. Pofahl was competent at the time of offense and at the time of trial.” Brief for Pofahl at 15. Pofahl contends that Dr. Mark’s examination was inconclusive, and therefore the district court erroneously failed to resolve the issue which it raised. Pofahl did not object below to the district court’s alleged failure to determine whether she was competent. Consequently, absent a showing of plain error, Pofahl is not entitled to relief. For the reasons stated previously, see supra III.A.(i)., Pofahl has not shown plain error. Pofahl does not allege that she was ever mentally incompetent, and nothing in the record would support such an allegation. Consequently, we reject Pofahl’s argument. B Pofahl next argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized from three of her residences in California. Law enforcement officers obtained search warrants for the following three locations: 8488 Carlton Way, Los Angeles; 8447 West 4th Street, Los Angeles; and 17 Yawl Street, Marina Del Rey. Pofahl argues that the affidavits supporting the warrants did not establish probable cause. According to Pofahl, the affidavits alleged that her husband, Charles Pofahl, and Dr. Morris Key engaged in criminal activities in Texas, but failed to allege that she engaged in any illegal conduct or that any illegal conduct took place in California. Pofahl contends that the affidavits therefore did not establish a nexus between her residences in California and the evidence sought there by officials. Where a district court denies a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, and the motion is premised on an alleged lack of probable cause to support the warrant, we review the denial of the motion to determine (1) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); and (2) whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 355, 121 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). However, it is unnecessary to address the probable cause issue if the good-faith exception applies, unless the case involves a “ ‘novel question of law whose resolution is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 264, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2346, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 320 (quoting Gates). Because Pofahl’s Fourth Amendment argument does not present a novel question of law, we address the good-faith issue first. Evidence obtained by officers in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant is admissible, even though the warrant was unsupported by probable cause. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420; Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 320. The evidence is not admissible where the warrant is based upon an affidavit “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2265-66, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). We often refer to an affidavit of that sort as a “bare bones affidavit.” See United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir.1988). Where a warrant is supported by more than a bare bones affidavit, an officer may rely in good faith on the warrant’s validity. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321; United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249, 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2064, 114 L.Ed.2d 468 (1991). We review de novo the reasonableness of an officer’s reliance upon a warrant issued by a magistrate. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321 (citing United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir.1990)). (i) The search warrant for 8488 Carlton Way in Los Angeles was supported by the affidavit of Internal Revenue Service Special Agent Michel L. Lamberth. See Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 232-53. The affidavit described at length how Charles Pofahl and Morris Key obtained chemicals in West Germany, shipped them to Guatemala for use in the manufacture of MDMA, and then imported the MDMA tablets into the United States for sale. Most of the criminal activities discussed in the affidavit involved Charles Pofahl and Morris Key, but not Amy Pofahl. However, a confidential informant (“CI-3”) told Lam-berth “that Amy Pofahl was fully knowledgeable and heavily involved with Charles F. Pofahl’s personal and business activities.” Id. at 234-35. Another confidential informant (“CI-5”) stated that, following the arrest of Charles Pofahl in April of 1989, “Amy Pofahl [had] taken charge of the business and personal effects of Charles F. Pofahl.” See id. at 234. Prior to Charles Pofahl’s arrest, he and Amy Pofahl resided at 12526 Sunlight Drive in Dallas. See id. at 243. Confidential informant CI-3 stated that he maintained an office at Charles Pofahl’s residence and was once a business partner of Charles Pofahl. See id. at 244. CI-3 stated that he had seen “numerous filing cabinets containing records relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products ... at Pofahl’s residence located at 12526 Sunlight.” See id. at 243. CI-3 said that additional records were kept at an office at 3317 Finley, in Irving. See id. CI-3 further reported that Charles Pofahl kept a safe at his Dallas residence, which contained “large amounts of currency, jewelry, coins, firearms, and plastic bags containing white powder and tablets.” See id. Around the time of Charles Pofahl’s arrest, Amy Pofahl vacated the residence in Dallas. See id. at 243. A neighbor of the Pofahls reported seeing furniture being loaded into a moving van at 12526 Sunlight Drive in April of 1989. See id. at 234. Amy Pofahl told the neighbor that she was moving to California. See id. CI-5 reported that, following Charles Pofahl’s arrest, he assisted Amy Pofahl by transporting office equipment, books, and records pertaining to Charles Pofahl’s business from an office at 3317 Finley, in Irving, to a storage facility in Dallas. See id. at 241. CI-5 also stated that he helped Amy Pofahl move boxes of documents to the same storage facility from the Pofahls’ house on Sunlight Drive around the same time. See id. Lamberth searched the storage facility and found what he believed to be only part of the Pofahls’ business and financial records. See id. at 238. At the time of Lam-berth’s affidavit, the whereabouts of the safe referred to by CI-3 were unknown. See id. at 242. Utility company records revealed that Amy Pofahl obtained utility services for 8488 Carlton Way in Los Angeles on April 12, 1989, see id. at 235-36, and Pacific Bell Telephone listed a number for Amy Ral-ston (Pofahl’s maiden name) at 8488 Carlton Way. See id. at 235. A Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent told Lamberth that he had seen a woman matching Amy Pofahl’s description at the 8488 Carlton Way residence. See id. Citing United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.1981), Pofahl argues that the foregoing information did not support an objectively reasonable good faith belief in probable cause because it did not allege that Pofahl engaged in any criminal activity in California. In Green, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for Green’s Florida residence. See id. at 226. The affidavits supporting the warrant amply demonstrated that Green was involved in criminal activities in California, “[b]ut no evidence, other than residence, was set forth in the affidavits that connected the Key West, Florida, home to the criminal activity taking place almost 3,000 miles away.” See id. at 225-26. On appeal the question was “whether evidence that a person is engaged in criminal conduct in California constitutes probable cause, in and of itself, to search that person’s Florida residence.” See id. at 226. We answered that question in the negative: The justification for allowing a search of a person’s residence when that person is suspected of criminal activity is the common-sense realization that one tends to conceal fruits and instrumentalities of a crime in a place to which easy access may be had and in which privacy is nevertheless maintained. In normal situations, few places are more convenient than one’s residence for use in planning criminal activities and hiding fruits of a crime. But we are confronted with a different situation: in this case defendant Green allegedly engaged in criminal activity several thousand miles from his residence. The convenience of the residence for use as a place to plan and hide fruits of the crime is thus diminished, if not eliminated. Id. Under those circumstances we found “no justification for a reasonable person to conclude that there was probable cause to believe that fruits or instrumentalities of crimes could be found at the Florida residence.” Id. Pofahl argues that, in light of Green, Lamberth’s allegations of criminal conduct in Texas did not support a reasonable good faith belief in probable cause to search Pofahl’s residence in California. We disagree. In Green the only support for probable cause was the assumption that, because it is usually convenient for criminals to keep the fruits and instrumentalities of their crimes at home, Green would do so as well. Here the search warrant was supported by specific, concrete facts, rather than a mere assumption about the tendencies of criminals to keep evidence of their crimes at home. The facts alleged by Lamberth showed that Amy and Charles Pofahl stored records and fruits of their criminal enterprise at their residence, and that Amy Pofahl moved from Sunlight Drive in Dallas to 8488 Carlton Way in Los Angeles after she took control of the drug trafficking business. Therefore, it was reasonably inferable that Amy Pofahl had the records, fruits, and instrumentalities of the Pofahls’ crimes transported to California and stored at her residence. See United States v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 1152, 1157 (5th Cir.1992) (“Since [the] criminal instruments were not found at Thomas’s ... business, the expectation of finding the [criminal instruments] at Thomas’s home was a reasonable inference supporting a determination of probable cause.”); United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 277 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that-nexus between evidence sought and location to be searched “may be established ‘through normal inferences as to where the articles sought would be located’ ” (quoting United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir.1982))). In Green “[w]e emphasize^] that the affidavits contained] no allegations tending to establish that criminal activity of any kind was taking place at the Florida residence.” Green, 634 F.2d at 226 n. 8. Because the affidavit at issue here contained substantially greater indicia of probable cause than did the affidavit in Green, Pofahl’s reliance on that case is misplaced. Lamberth’s affidavit was not a bare bones affidavit containing only “wholly eonclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause.” See Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321. The specific facts alleged by Lamberth tended to establish the existence of an ongoing criminal enterprise, as well as the likelihood that evidence of that enterprise would be found at Pofahl’s California residence. Therefore, the officers reasonably relied in good faith on the search warrant for the house at 8488 Carlton Way, and the district court did not err by admitting evidence seized at that residence. (ii) Amy Pofahl apparently moved to 8447 West 4th Street in Los Angeles in April of 1990. A search warrant was issued for that address in July. DEA Special Agent Douglas Cortinovis was the affiant in support of the warrant. Cortinovis alleged numerous facts which indicated that Pofahl was actively involved in the importation and distribution of MDMA along with Charles Pofahl and Morris Key. For example, Cortinovis stated that he had interviewed Morris Key at a federal prison, and that Key reported seeing Amy Pofahl carrying 10,000 MDMA tablets in the trunk of her car. See Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 216, 219. Cortinovis also interviewed Charles Pofahl in a German prison, at which time Charles Pofahl stated that Amy Pofahl had full knowledge of his drug business, and even assisted in tableting and packaging MDMA and counting currency acquired through sales of MDMA. See id. at 210-11. Charles Pofahl admitted that he and his associates were involved in the importation and distribution of MDMA from 1985 to 1989. See id. at 220. Corti-novis stated, based on his experience investigating crimes of this kind, that individuals who participate in drug trafficking maintain records and other evidence of their illegal activities at their residences for long periods of time, often months or years. See Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 222-24. Pofahl presses essentially the same arguments with respect to the search warrant for her West 4th Street apartment as she did with respect to the warrant for the Carlton Way residence. Pofahl’s argument under Green is even less persuasive here. In addition to demonstrating Pofahl’s extensive involvement in the MDMA business, Cortinovis alleged specific facts tending to show that Pofahl continued to be involved with MDMA after she moved to California. At the 8488 Carlton Way residence, officers seized Pofahl’s Mercedes Benz, which contained half a dozen MDMA tablets. See id. at 205. Long distance telephone records also indicated that Po-fahl kept in touch with Larry Morrow, a major participant in Charles Pofahl’s MDMA operation, while she was living in the house on Carlton Way. See id. at 204. Because the facts alleged in Cortinovis’s affidavit do not pertain only to Texas, Po-fahl’s reliance on Green is again misplaced. Many of the facts alleged by Cortinovis concerning Amy Pofahl’s involvement in the MDMA trafficking scheme occurred before she moved from Carlton Way to West 4th Street. Therefore, Pofahl argues, the facts alleged by Cortinovis had little if anything to do with the West 4th Street location, and did not justify admission of evidence seized at that location. We disagree. First, facts alleged by Cortinovis tend to show that after Amy Pofahl moved to the apartment on West 4th Street, she regularly communicated with Jerry Williamson, the individual who was responsible for smuggling the majority of Charles Pofahl’s MDMA into the United States from Guatemala. See id. at 204. Williamson stated, during a post-arrest interview, that Amy Pofahl contacted him to warn him that Charles Pofahl was cooperating with the authorities and might be revealing incriminating information about him. See id. Long distance telephone records indicated that Williamson called Amy Pofahl’s residence several times each month during the first few months that she lived at the West 4th Street address. See id. Second, Pofahl’s argument has little weight in light of our decision in United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 355, 121 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). Webster argued that evidence seized at his residence should have been suppressed because the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. See id. at 1306. The affidavit alleged that Webster sold drugs at his residence 18 months before the issuance of the warrant. See id. The more recent drug sales alleged in the affidavit occurred at other locations. See id. at 1307. We affirmed the district court’s admission of the seized evidence, under the Leon good-faith exception: The affidavit alleged that, based on the officer’s experience, drug dealers and traffickers commonly keep caches of drugs, as well as paraphernalia and records of drug transactions, in their residences. In other words, the basis for searching Webster’s residence was his overall drug trafficking and sales activity, not just those sales that actually took place at his residence. See id. The same can be said here. Agent Cortinovis did not submit a bare-bones affidavit. Cortinovis alleged facts tending to show that Amy Pofahl’s involvement in a long-standing drug trafficking operation continued into the period when she lived at the apartment on West 4th. Cortinovis also pointed out that participants in drug trafficking enterprises are likely to keep records and other evidence of their illegal activities at their homes for long periods of time. Therefore, we conclude that the facts alleged by Cortinovis supported a reasonable good faith belief in probable cause. The district court did not err by admitting evidence seized at 8447 West 4th Street. (iii) Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant for Pofahl’s residence at 17 Yawl Street, Unit # 4 in Marina Del Rey on March 27, 1991. Internal Revenue Service Special Agent Gary Gallman submitted an affidavit in support of the search warrant application. Gallman alleged that Charles Pofahl and Morris Key’s MDMA racketeering operation persisted for several years and involved the importation and distribution of millions of MDMA tablets. See Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 185-86. Gall-man referred to an interview with Morris Key, during which Key stated that Amy Pofahl had full knowledge of the MDMA operation, and that he had seen her carrying about 10,000 MDMA tablets in the trunk of her car. See id. at 183. Charles Pofahl also stated that Amy Pofahl knew about, and assisted him with, the production, importation, and distribution of MDMA. See id. at 181. Gallman alleged facts which tended to show that, after the arrest of Charles Pofahl in Germany, Amy Pofahl removed large sums of cash from various storage facilities in the Dallas area and transported the money, or had it transported, to California. See id. at 174, 177-79. Other facts alleged by Gallman indicate that Amy Pofahl placed at least some of the currency in storage facilities in California. See id. at 173. Gallman recounted an interview with an individual named Robert Petty, who stated that he had sold MDMA for Amy Pofahl and delivered the proceeds ($218,930) to her while she was living in Los Angeles. See id. Dean Born-stein and Heather Teague were friends of Amy Pofahl, who claimed that Pofahl provided them with MDMA for their personal use during 1989 and 1990. See id. at 173-74. Gallman also alleged facts tending to show that Amy Pofahl, while living in California, maintained contact with Jerry Williamson, who had been primarily responsible for importing Charles Pofahl’s MDMA into the United States from Guatemala. See id. at 175-76. Finally, when Amy Po-fahl was arrested on March 26, 1991 — the day before the search of the Yawl Street residence — the arresting officers asked her where her money was hidden. See id. at 170-71. Pofahl asked the officers whether they “would let her go free if she gave up her money.” See id. at 170. Agent Gallman did not submit a bare-bones affidavit. The specific facts alleged by Gallman tended to show that Amy Po-fahl had been involved in an elaborate, longstanding MDMA trafficking operation, and that she continued to be involved with the operation, or at least some facets of it, after she moved to California. Because Amy Pofahl utilized storage facilities in California, it was likely when the Yawl Street warrant was issued that evidence of drug trafficking, particularly the proceeds of drug sales, had not been seized at either of Amy Pofahl’s residences in Los Angeles and remained in her hands. That conclusion would have been bolstered by Amy Pofahl’s offer to the arresting officers to hand over her money in return for her freedom. These facts supported a reasonable good faith belief in probable cause to search the Yawl Street residence. See Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d at 949; Webster, 960 F.2d at 1307. The district court did not err by admitting evidence seized at the Yawl Street location. C Pofahl also contends that the district court erred by calculating her sentence on the basis of the full amount of MDMA involved in the conspiracy — 1.4 million grams. Pofahl argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable to her that the conspiracy would involve such a large quantity of MDMA, and therefore the district court should not have taken that amount of drugs into account in determining her base offense level for the drug conspiracy counts. The district court assigned Po-fahl a base offense level of 38 based on 1.4 million grams of MDMA. Pofahl failed to object to the amount of MDMA used to calculate her base offense level. See Letter from Attorney John M. Hurley to U.S. Probation Officer William H. Moore, attached to Presentence Report, United States of America v. Amy Ralston Pofahl, No. W-91-CR-038 (Pofahl’s objections to Presentence Report); Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 12 (Pofahl’s sentencing hearing). Because Pofahl failed to object below, the district court’s ruling will be reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Hatchett, 923 F.2d 369, 376 (5th Cir.1991) (applying plain error standard where defendant failed to object to district court’s consideration of a quantity of cocaine in calculating his base offense level). Plain error is “error so obvious and substantial that failure to notice it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings” and would “result in manifest injustice.” United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2032, 114 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, 741 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Howton, 688 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir.1982). We find no plain error here. “Questions of fact capable of resolution by the district court upon proper objection at sentencing can never constitute plain error.” Lopez, 923 F.2d at 50. The quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to Pofahl is a question of fact which the district court could have resolved at sentencing. See United States v. Cockerham, 919 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that determination of relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 is “primarily factual”); United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that quantity of drugs implicated by a crime is a factual question). In the alternative, we find no plain error in holding Pofahl accountable for the full amount of MDMA involved in the conspiracy because it appears that the full amount of MDMA was reasonably foreseeable to Pofahl. Evidence presented by the prosecution revealed that Pofahl was personally involved in several aspects of her husband’s MDMA business, practically from the inception of the conspiracy, and that she knew or should have known of the large quantities of MDMA that were involved in the conspiracy. Before the manufacturing operation was moved to Guatemala, Amy Pofahl assisted in counting MDMA tablets and placing them in bottles in Lewisville, Texas. See Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 8, at 247. Pofahl was also present in Guatemala at the apartment where Charles Pofahl stored MDMA before importing it into the United States, and she helped him to remove the “Made in Guatemala” labels from bottles that were used to package the MDMA. See id. vol. 7, at 148; vol. 8, at 281. Charles Pofahl stated to law enforcement officers that Amy Pofahl had full knowledge of his manufacturing, importation, and distribution activities, and that she frequently assisted him in counting large quantities of currency received in exchange for MDMA. See Record on Appeal, vol. 2, at 181 (affidavit of IRS Special Agent Gary Gallman in support of search warrant). A confidential informant reported that, after Charles Pofahl’s arrest, Amy Pofahl took charge of Charles Pofahl’s “business and personal effects.” See id. at 234 (affidavit of IRS Special Agent Michael Lamberth in support of search warrant). Amy Pofahl’s knowledge of the large quantity of MDMA involved in the conspiracy was also evident from a conversation with Morris Key’s wife, Kathleen Key, soon after Morris Key’s arrest. See Supp. Record on Appeal, vol. 10, at 771-74. Pofahl stated that she did not know where her husband was, and she was concerned about her money, but “that there was enough product in Guatemala to take care of everyone.” See id. at 772-74. The district court’s consideration of 1.4 million grams of MDMA did not amount to plain error. D Pofahl also contends that the district court erred in increasing her offense leve