Full opinion text
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, appellants are three officers of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), who, with others, were caught in a reverse-sting operation. They challenge their convictions and sentences for a variety of drug-related charges, raising numerous claims both jointly and individually. In Part I, we summarize the . relevant evidence. In Part II, we address the challenges to the jury instructions on entrapment, specifically, the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on derivative entrapment as well as-the sufficiency of the general entrapment instructions. We also address appellant Washington’s challenge to the refusal to admit evidence of his prior commendations and appellant Harmon’s challenge to the ex-elusion of his prior consistent statement. Further, we address appellants Taylor and Washington’s challenge to the instructions on attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions themselves, as well as appellant Hannon’s challenge to the bribery instruction. In Part III, we address the exclusion of expert testimony and appellants’ various challenges to their firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Finally, in Part IV, we address appellants’ sentencing challenges. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of convictions in all respects save for one of the firearms convictions of each appellant; we remand the cases for resentencing in light of the vacation of these convictions. I. In December 1992, undercover FBI Agent Jose Olivier, posing as a member of a Miami-based narcotics organization, told MPD Officer Nygel Brown that he was interested in obtaining protection from Brown and other willing police officers for his illegal narcotics activities while in the District of Columbia. Olivier explained that he was working for a cocaine dealer named Juan, and they wanted to set up a “drug base” in the District of Columbia. Brown, who was already on a list of suspected corrupt officers, expressed his interest and stated that he knew other potential recruits. On two separate occasions during February and March 1993, Brown accompanied and “protected” Olivier while Olivier delivered $250,000 in cash, ostensibly for a drug purchase on one occasion and for money laundering on the other. Brown was paid $1000 on each occasion. On March 4,1993, Brown introduced Olivier to Officer Sean Wiggins. Brown told Olivier that Wiggins had dealt drugs both before and after becoming a police officer, which Wiggins later confirmed. Upon learning from Olivier the same account of his plans to use the District of Columbia as a transit point for his drug operation, Wiggins was enthusiastic to join. On March 23, Brown and Wiggins escorted Olivier on another staged money laundering run. Olivier paid Wiggins $1000, but this time gave Brown $1500, telling Brown the bonus was for recruiting Wiggins. On April 25, 1993, Brown and Wiggins were flown by Olivier to Miami, Florida, to be introduced to Olivier’s boss “Juan,” undercover FBI agent Robert Williams. After wining and dining the officers, Williams informed them that he intended to fly large quantities of cocaine into the District of Columbia area, and that he wanted police officers to “protect” those shipments until couriers took possession of the cocaine and left the District of Columbia. Williams stated that the officers would receive $2000 for each run, but that Wiggins and Brown would receive $7500 a run for their leadership roles. Williams told them that he wanted “dirty police officers, people who were used to protecting drugs.” Wiggins and Brown agreed to this proposal without reservation. On June 8 and 9,1993, Brown and Wiggins introduced Olivier to Officers Ronald Bailey, William Hackney, and Kyle Davis. After meeting with Olivier individually and learning of the drug operation, they each agreed to join. On July 13,1993, the officers participated in the first of three staged drug runs. Olivier, Brown, and Wiggins drove to the airport, picked up a shipment of cocaine, and drove it back to Olivier’s house in Northwest Washington. “Couriers” subsequently arrived to pick up the drugs, and Wiggins, Bailey, and Hackney escorted them from Olivier’s house to the Capital Beltway, which encircles the District of Columbia. Bailey and Hackney each received $2000, and Brown and Wiggins, $7500. On August 9, 1993, Brown and Hackney brought Roland Harris and John Harmon to meet Olivier. After making sure that Harris and Harmon were interested, Olivier asked each of them whether he had any prior experience with the drug world. Both officers responded affirmatively. Harmon stated that he had sold drugs with Hackney and that he had done “rips” on the street, picking up drugs or money dropped by fleeing dealers. After explaining that the officers would be expected to drive behind the couriers and to be prepared to “use their badges” if necessary, Olivier stated that his organization had successfully employed police officers in numerous other cities. Neither Harris nor Harmon expressed any reluctance to join the endeavor, and on August 10, 199B, both joined in the second of the three runs. Harmon and the other escorts received $2000, while Wiggins and Brown each received $7500 for their day-long services. On August 25, 1993, Olivier told Hackney and Brown that Juan'wanted to set up a second team, and asked Hackney to lead it and recruit as many new officers as he could. Hackney readily agreed, and on September 16, 1998, Brown and Hackney brought Officers Dwayne Washington, Darryl Lawson, Mark Reid, and Vikki Childress to meet Olivier. Officer Troy Taylor, who was also invited, did not attend because he was working. After Olivier engaged in his standard introduction and questions, Washington told Olivier not only that he had worked in vice and was used to being around drugs, but that he had stolen drugs from street dealers because “they ain’t gonna say nothing.” Washington also told Olivier that he was told by Hackney that he would not have to touch the drugs and that he was comfortable with the arrangement. After similar discussions with Olivier, the other three officers also agreed to join the operation.; On October 4, 1993, Taylor was introduced to Olivier. After being given the standard pitch from Olivier, Taylor agreed to participate. Taylor described his former experience “running the coke” and “shipping it out to the little people” for a local drug dealer. Although he claimed to have shot people in the course of his illegal activities, and stated that he would “take somebody’s life, pointblank” if things went wrong, he said he had never killed anyone. He also said that he knew a “hit man” if Olivier encountered “any problems with anybody.” The next day, on October 5, after attending a morning meeting with all the officers, Washington and Taylor joined in the third and final drug run. On November 16, 1993, Olivier held separate meetings with two groups of the officers to update them on the operation. Olivier informed the officers that the next run, which would be conducted around Thanksgiving, would include a larger shipment and would be conducted from a hotel room, rather than his townhouse. During the meeting, Olivier mentioned the high crime rates and murders connected with drug trafficking, and referencing a newspaper article, discussed at length an actual case in Puerto Rico where two bodies had been found in a car trunk; cut up into “seven pieces.” At trial, Olivier testified that the story was idle conversation; Harmon testified that he understood it to send a message about the consequences of betrayal. On duty during the time 'of the meeting, Taylor learned of the plans from Olivier over the telephone the next day. On December 14, 1993, Taylor, Washington, and Harmon, along with eight other officers, assembled in two hotel rooms with Olivier and another courier to prepare for the cocaine shipment scheduled for that day. While they were discussing their runs, FBI agents and MPD senior officers rushed in to the hotel rooms with guns drawn, and arrested the officers. Officers Wiggins, Hackney, Harmon, Washington, and Taylor were charged on April 26, 1994, in a superseding indictment with the following crimes: conspiracy to commit bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201; attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(A)(ii), 846; and two counts per defendant of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The indictment alleged that the conspiracies existed between March and December 1993. Following the example of seven other defendants, Wiggins and Hackney ultimately pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government. In a jury trial, appellants Washington, Taylor, and Harmon presented an entrapment defense. Each of them stated that before meeting with Olivier, he knew only of the opportunity to do some private security work, not of the work’s connection with drug operations. Each further testified that upon learning of the nature of the operations, he was too scared to back out. Each also testified that he carried a gun during the drug runs. The jury found Washington and Taylor guilty of all six charges; it acquitted Harmon of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine but convicted him of the five remaining. charges. Appellants were each sentenced to prison terms totaling 592 months (49 years, 4 months), aggregating concurrent terms of up to 292 months (24 years, 4 months) for the bribery and drug offenses with consecutive terms of 300 months (25 years) for the firearms offenses. II. A. Sufficiency of the Jury Instructions on Entrapment Issues. With two exceptions, the jury instruction on entrapment given by the district court adhered to the standard Redbook instruction. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 5.05 (4th ed.1993). The two exceptions were that the jury was instructed that (1) “it is not a defense to the crimes charged that the defendants were induced to commit the crimes by their co-conspirators,” and (2) “if you find that a defendant was entrapped as to one offense, you may but are not required to find the defendant was also entrapped as to the other offenses.” Appellants challenge these two deviations from the standard instructions, and they also object to the district court’s refusal to include various additions to the standard instructions they proposed. 1. Refusal to Instruct the Jury on Derivative Entrapment. Appellants first contest the district court’s decision to preclude consideration of a “derivative entrapment” defense. Whereas a regular entrapment instruction is generally given when the evidence shows that the defendant was directly induced to commit a crime by a government agent, the evidence in the present ease showed that the three appellants were not directly recruited by Olivier (the undercover agent), but by Hackney (an “unwitting” intermediary who had previously been recruited by Olivier). All three appellants testified at trial that Hackney approached them claiming that a Miami businessman who carried lots of cash and needed protection while in the area was looking for officers to work private security. On the basis of this testimony, the defense requested an entrapment instruction that would have permitted the jury to consider the conduct of and inducement offered by Hackney in determining whether the defendants had been entrapped. The district court rejected the request for an instruction on derivative entrapment. The jurors were instructed that “they could consider only the representations or actions of the FBI agent” himself, and that “as a matter of law it is not a defense to the crimes charged that the defendants were induced to commit the crimes by their co-conspirators, such as William Hackney or Nygel Brown.” Appellants challenge this instruction, contending that this circuit has recognized the derivative entrapment defense (at least in dicta), Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C.Cir.1963), that other circuits have also recognized it, and that the defense should have been available here because otherwise the government would be allowed to shield itself from regular entrapment claims by designing sting operations to shift the task of recruiting additional sting targets onto the original targets of the operation. Joint Brief for Appellants, at 59-60. The government, on the other hand, asserts that, even if derivative entrapment is a legitimate defense under the law of this circuit, there was “no legal or factual basis” for allowing it in this case. Final. Brief for Appellee, at 96. We review the district court’s decision not to give the derivative entrapment instruction de novo. United States v. Layeni 90 F.3d 514, 517 (D.C.Cir.1996); United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir.1986) (“[W]hether there is evidence sufficient to constitute a triable issue of entrapment is a question of law.”). This case involves a difficult question in the field of entrapment law, and one on which courts around the country have reached vastly different conclusions: to what extent is a derivative entrapment instruction merited in cases where the government acts through an unwitting agent. Although all circuits appear to be in agreement that “[p]ersuasion, seduction, or cajoling by a private party does not qualify as entrapment,” United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1978), and some circuits appear to have rejected the derivative entrapment defense in all its forms, nevertheless a number of circuits have recognized the defense under some circumstances when “government agents act through private citizens.” Of those jurisdictions permitting the defense, some have allowed it only in cases in which the government acts through a knowing agent (e.g., an informant), whereas others have also allowed its application in cases of unwitting (that is, de facto) agents. After carefully examining case law in this and other jurisdictions, we conclude that a limited form of the “derivative entrapment” theory is recognized in this circuit, and extends to cases in which unwitting intermediaries—at the government’s direction—deliver the government’s inducement to a specified third party. In Johnson v. United States, this court first stated that, although “[t]he entrapment defense does not extend to inducement by a private citizen,” nevertheless “it has found general application to cases where the officer acts through a private citizen.” 317 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C.Cir.1963). More recently, in United States v. Layeni we further explained that: [T]he.entrapment defense can be raised by a defendant who was induced by an unknowing intermediary at the instruction or direction of a government official or third party acting on behalf of the government (e.g., an informant). The defense should not apply if, in response to pressure put on him by the government, the unknowing intermediary on his own induces the defendant to engage in criminal activity. 90 F.3d 514, 520 (D.C.Cir.1996) (emphasis in original). The Layeni court made explicit what was implicit in Johnson—that a derivative entrapment defense could be based on the actions of an “unknowing intermediary.” Then, most recently, in United States v. Spriggs, this court again confirmed the existence of the defense (as well as its application in cases of unknowing, de facto government agents), when it cited Layeni for the proposition that “it may be possible to establish indirect entrapment through an unwitting intermediary.” 102 F.3d 1245, 1261 (D.C.Cir.1996). The combined weight of the decisions in Johnson, Layeni, and Spriggs persuades us that situations may arise in which this court would be obligated to give an instruction on derivative entrapment, even if the intermediary involved did not know that he was acting as a de facto government agent. Of course, the fact that derivative entrapment is a legally cognizable defense in this circuit does not mean that an instruction on the defense was merited on the facts of this case. We do, however, reject the notion that the intermediary’s ignorance of the fact that he is acting as go-between for the government by itself negates a derivative entrapment defense, and so disagree with the district court’s ruling to the extent it suggests a blanket rule against a derivative entrapment instruction in cases where “the defendants were induced to commit the crimes by their co-conspirators.” Indeed, the purpose behind allowing such a defense is to prevent the government from circumventing rules against entrapment merely by deploying intermediaries, only one degree removed from the officials themselves, who carry out the government’s explicit instructions to persuade a particular individual to commit a particular crime using a particular type of inducement. This purpose could too easily be defeated by allowing the government to target specific individuals through unwitting go-betweens. In the present case, nonetheless, for the reasons outlined below we agree with the district court that—regardless of what view of the facts is adopted—there is no basis for the derivative entrapment defense. The facts of the so-called “entrapment” scenario were hotly disputed in the proceedings below. The defense asserted that the appellants were not aware that the “private security work” was illegal until they actually met with Olivier. The prosecution, in contrast, claimed that' the appellants knew from the outset that they were hired to participate in illegal drug-running activities. Generally speaking, “[i]n deciding whether-the trial judge should have given the jury an entrapment instruction, this court must consider appellant’s version of the facts as true.” United States v. McKinley, 70 F.3d 1307, 1310 (D.C.Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C.Cir.1978)). However, if we assume the facts alleged by the defense on appeal, then appellants clearly are not entitled to a derivative entrapment defense. According to appellants, Joint Brief for Appellants, at 58-59 (footnotes and citations omitted). Appellants argue that a derivative entrapment instruction was warranted despite the fact that the “inducement” communicated by Hackney to his recruits was allegedly different than the inducement that Olivier directed Hackney to relay. This assertion conflicts with established law in this circuit. Under our precedents, the derivative entrapment defense may only be raised if the alleged inducement communicated by the unwitting intermediary is the same inducement, directed at the same target, as the inducement that the government agent directs the intermediary to communicate. If the intermediary deviates from the government’s plan, and therefore acts, “on his own,” then the inducement cannot be attributed to the government agent. United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d at 520. Accordingly, even if it were true (as appellants themselves allege) that Hackney modified the alleged inducement, telling the appellants that they would be engaging in legitimate private security work in exchange for $2000 per run, then he would have deviated from the government’s original inducement (offering money in exchange for drug-running), and a derivative entrapment instruction would not be supported by the evidence. Assuming that appellants did not know they were to commit a crime until after they met with Olivier himself, then the only issue for the jury would be whether Olivier himself entrapped them. But the jury was instructed on the issue of direct entrapment, and it was up to the jury to decide whether the elements of the derivative entrapment defense were shown. The three defendants herein had all been recruited by Hackney. Each officer testified, with some variation, that Hackney had approached them under the same- pretext—a Miami businessman who carried lots of money and needed protection while in the area was looking for officers to work private security, a scenario consistent with what Hackney, in his [Pre-Sentencing Report], claimed he had been told by Brown. Based on that testimony, the jury could have concluded that Hackney duped the defendants into meeting with Olivier, by causing them to believe that the work for Olivier involved legal, albeit unauthorized, private security work. On the other hand, because the McKinley rule is based on the principle that, “[i]n deciding whether a jury question is raised, the trial judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant,” and because, ironically, all three appellants might have made a stronger case for a derivative entrapment instruction had they conceded that they were aware from the outset that they would be working for a “drug dealer,” we give appellants every benefit of the doubt on this question and go on to consider whether they would have been entitled to a derivative entrapment instruction under that view of the facts. This second scenario is much closer to a paradigmatic example of derivative entrapment: the undercover agent explicitly directed his initial recruit (who acted as an unwitting government agent) to recruit more “corrupt” officers—and to offer these new recruits a monetary incentive ($2000 per drug run) that Olivier had set. One could argue that, by recruiting the three appellants, Hackney unwittingly acted as a conduit, directly communicating an incentive dictated by a government agent to other sting targets, at the direction of that government agent. Given this scenario, a derivative entrapment instruction almost certainly would have' been necessary, except for the crucial fact that Olivier did not designate particular police officers to whom the intermediaries should offer the $2000 incentive per drug run. Rather, Olivier instructed Hackney and Brown more generally to offer the incentive to undesignated cops whom they knew to be corrupt or “dirty.” Such a general instruction by a government agent to an intermediary is not sufficient to support a derivative entrapment defense. As Layeni made clear, “[t]he defense should not apply if, in response to pressure put on him by the government, the unknowing intermediary on his own induces the defendant to engage in criminal activity.” 90 F.3d at 520. In Layeni, this court held that a derivative entrapment instruction was not required in a case where a government informant (directed by the government) attempted to apprehend a known heroin dealer by persuading the dealer’s girlfriend to arrange for the dealer to sell drugs to the informant. On the day of the proposed sale, however, the dealer happened to be out of town, and the girlfriend instead sent defendant Layeni to make the sale. In affirming the denial of the defendant’s request for an entrapment instruction, we reasoned that, because the girlfriend had acted “on her own” (rather than at the explicit direction of the government) in sending Layeni (rather than her boyfriend) to make the sale, the government had not entrapped the defendant. The meaning of acting “on one’s own” was further expounded upon in Spriggs, where this court noted that, although government agents conducting a money-laundering sting operation had indirectly communicated monetary incentives to the defendant through a go-between, the actual inducement of that particular defendant “was not specifically contemplated by the Government, which had not targeted any particular salesperson.” 102 F.3d 1245, 1261 (D.C.Cir.1996). In this way, Spriggs elaborated on the reasoning of Layeni, making clear that a derivative entrapment theory should only apply to sting operations conducted through unwitting intermediaries if the intermediaries are directed to target specific individuals and follow these instructions. Here, in contrast, Hackney acted independently—that is, on his own—in deciding who would be targets of Olivier’s offer. Because appellants were not specifically targeted by the government’s scheme, they are not entitled to a derivative entrapment defense. We therefore conclude that appellants were not entitled to a derivative entrapment defense under any possible version of the facts that the jury could have found. 2. Sufficiency of the General Entrapment Instructions. In addition to the claim that the district court should have given an instruction on a derivative entrapment defense, appellants also challenge the general entrapment instructions actually given on four grounds, arguing that the district court erred when it refused to add the appellants’ suggested language. In reviewing jury in-struetions for legal error, “we consider not just the challenged phrases, but the instruction as a whole.” United States v. Merlos, 984 F.2d 1289, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (citation omitted). We conclude that, viewed as a whole, the instructions given by the district court correctly informed the jury about the entrapment defense and about the legal standards to be applied in this case. Appellants first contend that the entrapment instruction in its entirety was “severely imbalanced” because it “exhaustively catalogued a veritable litany of proper government actions while failing” to mention that the government cannot “create the crime” under Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540-41, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). See Joint Brief for Appellants, at 65. Although it is true that the instruction did not specifically use the Jacobson language that the government may not “create the crime,” this fact alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that the instruction was flawed. On the contrary, the instruction did include—in standard Redbook form—the functional equivalent of the Jacobson language by stating that, “[a] person is entrapped if law enforcement officials induced or persuaded a person to commit a crime which he would not otherwise have committed.” Nor in our view were the instructions “severely imbalanced” in any other way. Although the instruction did dte many examples of proper police conduct, it also suggested numerous examples of improper conduct, explaining that inducement “may take many forms, including persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based upon need, sympathy, or friendship.” We therefore find that the court fairly and adequately described the legal meanings of improper inducement; ultimately, it was the jury’s province to decide whether Olivier’s specific conduct fit this model. Second, appellants challenge the district court’s denial of defendants’ request that the jury “be instructed that it could consider Olivier’s actions as relating to the scope and nature of the inducement, and its effect on the defendants’ states of mind.” Joint Brief for Appellants, at 65 (citing United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 617 (2d Cir.1983), as an example of a case where such an instruction was given). According to the defense, it was necessary so to instruct the jury because Olivier accompanied the monetary inducement with constant reassurances that it was “easy money,” and because Olivier exerted subtle coercion over the defendants, presenting himself as “a ‘Columbian’ drug dealer—behind locked doors, and in the presence of other armed policemen, some of whom were not known to the officers, and all of whom appeared already to be in cahoots with Olivier.” Id. at 66. This argument is without merit. As the government rightly points out, the entrapment instruction included standard Redbook language which adequately conveyed to the jury that it could consider both the impact that Olivier’s words and actions may have had on the appellants’ states of mind, as well as the various forms that “inducement” by a law enforcement officer might take. Moreover, adding the precise language requested by the appellants could have misled the jury into judging the defendants’ predisposition on a subjective basis, when the established standardfor predisposition is objective. United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 698 (D.C.Cir.1984) (for entrapment defense, relevant issue is whether the government agent’s conduct was likely to overcome “a law-abiding citizen’s will to obey the law”). Third, appellants argue that, despite the repeated objections of defendants at trial, the judge’s entrapment instruction misconstrued the legal principles set forth in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374, 78 S.Ct. 819, 821-22, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). They contend that the jury should have been allowed to consider that the sting operation and the resulting actions of the participants constituted a single continuing course of conduct such that once a defendant was entrapped, he may have stayed entrapped throughout the duration of the conspiracy. However, appellants’ reliance on this theory (and on the nearly forty-year old Sherman case) ignores the fact that we recently rejected the “once-entrapped-always-entrapped” theory. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.Cir.1996) (interpreting Jacobson to permit “a jury to consider the possibility that a defendant’s disposition to commit a crime changed over time”); United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 517 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1996) (explaining that “the continuing entrapment theory” was rejected by Vaughn); Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1260 (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding that an instruction on continuing entrapment was foreclosed by Vaughn, and reasoning that the fact “[tjhat a particular defendant might have lacked predisposition to launder money once does not mean he lacked it at a later time.”). As the Vaughn court explained, “Sinners may become saints and saints may become sinners. Nothing is necessarily permanent about either state. A person might be disposed to commit a crime one day and not disposed to do so some time later.” 80 F.3d at 552. Here, the challenged instruction, which properly required the jury to find predisposition for each separate offense, but which also stated that, “if you find that a defendant was entrapped as to one offense, you may but are. not required to find the defendant was also entrapped as to the other offenses,” was entirely consistent with Vaughn, Layeni, and Spriggs. Fourth and finally, appellants claim the entrapment instruction did not inform the jury adequately about the essential timing of a finding of predisposition. According to appellants, “[i]t is fundamental that a defendant’s predisposition to engage in the crime must precede or arise simultaneously with the proffered inducement.” Joint Brief for Appellants, at 66 (emphasis in original) (citing cases). Contrary to appellants’ assertion, we conclude that‘the court did not err (let alone plainly err) - by omitting an instruction that the jury must find that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the crime before being approached by. government agents. Although at least one of our sister circuits has stated that, “[a] defendant’s predisposition is not to be assessed ‘as of that time when he committed the crime,’ ” and that “predisposition refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government agents make any suggestion that he should commit a crime,” United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir.1983) (emphasis added), the government is correct in arguing that this circuit has interpreted the “prior to” language of some of our cases “to mean only that the government must prove that the defendant’s disposition was ‘independent and not the product of the attention that the Government’ directed at the defendant.” Vaughn, 80 F.3d at 552. The district court explained to the jury that inducement and predisposition were two distinct elements of the entrapment defense, and that the jury was required to make a finding that “the defendant was otherwise ready and willing to commit the crimes charged.” These instructions made clear to the jury that the defendants’ predisposition to commit the crime, or lack thereof, was a separate and independent element from the government’s inducement. An additional instruction emphasizing that the predisposition must be “prior to” the alleged inducement was not required by current law and would have been superfluous. B. Refusal to Admit Evidence of Appellant Washington’s Prior Commendations. In the proceedings below, the government was permitted to present “other crimes” evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to rebut the defendants’ entrapment defense, and to “prove that [the officers’] betrayal of trust was done intentionally and knowingly and not done mistakenly or accidentally” and that they were predisposed to abuse their authority as police officers. Government’s Notice of Rule 404(b) Evidence, at 1-2. Washington, in turn, sought to have evidence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) of several commendations he had received for his work on the police force. He proffered this evidence in an attempt to rebut the instances of alleged criminal activity raised by the government, and to disprove predisposition. Washington argued at trial that the jury could then contrast prior good with pri- or bad acts and be better able to determine the presence or absence of criminal intent. The district court refused to admit the commendations into evidence, explaining that they did not fit the criteria for any exception from the hearsay rule for character evidence, that they did not constitute rebuttal evidence, and that neither Rules 404 nor 405 provided a basis for their admission. We review the district court’s refusal' to admit evidence of the commendations for abuse of discretion. United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1349 (D.C.Cir.1990). On appeal, Washington complains that the district court was expansive in its admission of the government’s evidence of prior bad acts, while at the same time it was unfairly strict in its admission of evidence of prior good acts. In arguing that the commendations were admissible, he relies on Michelson v. United States, in which the Supreme Court stated that a defendant “may introduce affirmative testimony that the general estimate of his character is so favorable that the jury may infer that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged.” 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 219, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). In some eases, the Court explained, “such testimony alone ... may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.” Id. The defense contends that the letters “would have rebutted the government’s repeated declaration that Washington was prepared to ‘sell his badge’ and clearly cast doubt on whether the evidence of prior bad acts established a predisposition” on Washington’s part. Individual Brief for Appellant Washington, at 16. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the commendations. It is true that the accused may introduce-evidence of a “pertinent trait of character” under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1). Such evidence generally must be in the form of testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an “opinion,” Fed:R.Evid. 405(a), but “[i]n cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct.” Fed.R.Evid. 405(b). Under these Rules, the district court acted well within its discretion when it excluded the evidence at issue here. As the government persuasively argues, the commendations were not admissible under either Rule because appellant’s “dedication, aggressiveness and assertiveness” in investigating drug dealing and carjacking is neither “pertinent” to nor an “essential element” of his supposed lack of predisposition to engage in the corrupt criminal activity with which he was charged. Cf. United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1168 (1st Cir.1989) (excluding evidence of police officer’s prior commendations because “the traits which they purport to show—bravery, attention to duty, perhaps community spirit—were hardly ‘pertinent’ to the crimes [of perjury and conspiracy to commit mail fraud] of which [the defendant] stood accused”). In addition, even if the exclusion amounted to error, it would have been harmless. When a court reviews a nonconstitu-tional trial error, it must determine “whether the error ‘had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). Any error that might have occurred here would not have had a substantial effect on the jury’s verdict because (1) the government produced overwhelming evidence of Washington’s predisposition, and because (2) the commendation evidence was cumulative of other “good character” evidence that was admitted. First, the government produced reliable evidence that Washington told Olivier that he had previously sold marijuana, and that, while Washington was a police officer, he had stolen money and drugs. Second, appellant was permitted to call four witnesses who attested to his “good character.” The commendations that were excluded from evidence were unlikely to be more effective in rebutting the government’s predisposition evidence than the testimony of these live witnesses. For these reasons, any conceivable error committed in declining to admit the commendations was harmless. C. Refusal to Admit Evidence of Appellant Harmon’s Prior Consistent Statement. At trial, appellant Harmon (like Washington and Taylor) claimed that at the time he entered his first meeting with Olivier, he still believed that Olivier was offering the opportunity to do legitimate private security work. Harmon attempted to establish that, by the time he learned at the first meeting that the work involved illegal drug-running, he was already too scared to get out of the conspiracy. In support of his story, he sought admission of testimony from his friend and mentor, Russell Hairston, that Harmon had told Hairston separately that he was going to be doing some part-time private security work, that he would be paid in cash for the work, and that other police officers would be working with him. Although the court found that Harmon’s statement to Hairston was material, and that Hairston was a credible witness, it nevertheless ruled that the statement did not meet the specific criteria for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). The court acknowledged that the government had challenged Harmon’s credibility, but found that Harmon had not been directly impeached with prior inconsistent statements, or expressly or impliedly charged with recent fabrication, or improper influence or motive, as required by the Rule. We review the court’s refusal to admit the statement for abuse of discretion (although the court’s ruling on the residual hearsay exception may not be overturned unless this court has a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment,” United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (as amended) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Hannon argues that the district court erred by refusing to admit evidence of the prior statement. Individual Brief of Appellant Harmon, at 7-8. He claims that the issue of what he knew before entering the townhouse for the initial interview with Olivier was crucial in the jury’s determination of his predisposition at the time that he was induced to join the conspiracy. He asserts three alternative theories of admissibility: (1) the statement was admissible non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) because it was offered to rebut an implied charge of improper motive; (2) it was admissible to rehabilitate Harmon’s trial testimony even if it did not meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B); and (3) it was admissible under the residual hearsay exceptions set forth in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5). The government, on the other hand, argues that the statement should have been excluded both for lack of rebutting force under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and for insufficient probative value under Rule 403. We conclude that the district court did not err in excluding Hairston’s statement from evidence. First, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to exclude the statement . under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because, even if there had been a charge of recent fabrication or improper incentive or motive by the prosecution, Hairston’s statement had no rebutting force against such a charge. The statement would only have established that appellant told Hairston he was going to be doing private security work, not that he did not know that his employer was a drug dealer. Second, the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in finding that the statement was inadmissible for rehabilitation purposes because the credibility of Harmon’s testimony was subjected only to a “generalized attack,” and more than this is required for admission under this rationale. United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1986) (prior consistent statements must have some rebutting force “beyond showing that the witness had at an earlier time been consistent with his trial testimony”). Finally, we do not have the requisite “definite and firm conviction that the [district] court made a clear error of judgment” in refusing to admit the statement under the residual hearsay exceptions of Rules 803(24) or 804(b)(5). North, 910 F.2d at 909. These two exceptions to the hearsay rule are extremely narrow and require testimony to be “very important and very reliable.” United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C.Cir.1979); see also Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1225 (D.C.Cir.1989) (stating that “the legislative history of the [Rule 803(24) ] exception indicates that it should be applied sparingly” and “acknowledg[ing] the broad discretion a trial court enjoys in assessing the probity and trustworthiness of documents”). Thus, the proponent of the statement bears a heavy burden to come forward with indicia of both trustworthiness and probative force, neither of which appellant has succeeded in doing, here. Despite the fact that the district court found Hairston to be a “credible” witness, the prior statement was not trustworthy because of the unlikelihood that Harmon would have disclosed the true, illegal nature of the security work he was performing to a friend who was not involved in the conspiracy. See, e.g., Tome, 61 F.3d at 1453 (explaining that, in order to find the statement trustworthy, a court must find that the declarant of the prior statement “was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the statement was not “more probative on the point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence which the proponent [could have] procure[d] through reasonable efforts.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(24). As the government pointed out, the prior consistent statement was too vague to be inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory. Even if the jury believed the statement to be true, it only established that appellant said he was going to be involved in some security work and that other officers would be involved. It did not show that appellant had no knowledge that his prospective employer was a drug dealer. Thus, the statement did not meet the requirements of these residual hearsay exceptions. For similar reasons, even if there were any error here, it too would be harmless under the Brecht-Kotteakos standard. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (error is harmless unless it “ ‘had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”). As noted above, the prior consistent statement was too vague to be inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory. Moreover, a rational juror would not expect any of the appellants involved in the conspiracy to tell their friends or mentors who were not involved in the conspiracy about its illegal nature. Thus, admission of the statement would not have significantly helped Harmon’s ability to prove his theory of the case, and in light of the overwhelming evidence against him, any error was harmless. D. Sufficiency of Charge on Attempted Possession of Cocaine With Intent to Distribute. Appellants Taylor and Washington challenge their convictions for attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on two grounds: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict them on this count; and (2) that the jury instructions were erroneous because they permitted the jury to convict based on insufficient evidence. Individual Brief for Appellant Taylor, at 8-11 (argument adopted by appellant Washington in his individual brief). We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, according the Government the benefit of all legitimate inferences, and recognizing that it is the jury’s province to determine credibility and to weigh the evidence, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented. United States v. Singleton, 702 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C.Cir.1983) (emphasis in original). In reviewing the jury instructions, we must determine whether, taken as a whole, they accurately state the governing law and provide the jury with sufficient understanding of the issues and applicable standards. United States v. Merlos, 984 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“[I]n reviewing a jury instruction we consider not just the challenged phrases, but the instruction as a whole.”). However, as appellants concede, see Individual Brief for Appellant Taylor, at 8, the jury instructions here will be reversed only for plain error because they were not challenged below. United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1990). 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The record contains no evidence that appellants themselves attempted to possess the cocaine that was being transported by the undercover officers. Rather, the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the government for purposes of this appeal) showed that appellants willingly and knowingly helped Olivier, whom they believed to be a drug dealer, in what they believed to be his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Consistent with these facts, the prosecution put forth its charge of attempted possession on an aiding and abetting theory. In support of the proposed charge, the prosecution explained: The fact that [appellant] Harmon never touched the suitcase, never touched any drugs is irrelevant under the government’s theory of aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute cocaine. What he did was take a substantial step in furtherance of his intended purpose to aid Jose Olivier in the transportation of [the drugs]. After some initial controversy raised by Harmon’s counsel, the judge ultimately allowed the attempt charge against all three appellants on the basis of this aiding and abetting theory. Appellants now claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict them under an aiding and abetting theory because they did not possess “the same criminal intent as the principals.” United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1990). They argue that their convictions must be reversed because the undercover FBI agents participating in Operation Broken Faith, who were the so-called “principals” to the attempted possession crime, had no criminal intent whatsoever. The government, on the other hand, argues that the “shared intent” requirement of accomplice liability refers not to the fact that the accomplice and the principal must have the same intent, but rather to the fact that “the accomplice must have some criminal purpose in mind.” Final Brief for Appellee, at 111. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on the attempted possession with intent to distribute charge. It is true that in order to convict an accomplice of a completed substantive crime (rather than a mere attempt), “there must be a guilty principal before there can be an aider and abettor,” United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 887 (D.C.Cir.1978), and the accomplice and the principal must have a “shared intent.” United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 442 (D.C.Cir.1996). In United States v. Raper, we set forth the specific requirements for convicting an accomplice: The elements of aiding or abetting an offense are (1) the specific intent.to facilitate the commission of a crime by another; (2) guilty knowledge on the part of the accused; (3) that an offense was being committed by someone; and (4) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the offense. 676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C.Cir.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In purported reliance on these principles, appellants here claim that they could not legitimately be convicted of aiding and abetting attempted possession of drugs with intent to distribute because there was no guilty principal, and because there was no “shared intent” between the “principals” and the accessories (because the government agents, unlike the appellants, were only pretending to be drug dealers and therefore did not have the necessary mens rea for the offense). Whatever merit such arguments might have in another context, appellants’ reliance on these principles here is entirely misplaced—because they were not charged or convicted of the completed substantive crime, but only of an attempt. The Model Penal Code has expressly addressed the question we face here. In a section on the law of criminal attempt, it states: Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt. (3) Conduct Designed to Aid Another in Commission of a Crime. A person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime that would establish his complicity under Section 2.06 if the crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by such other person. Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part I, § 5.01(3) (A.L.I.1985). In an explanatory note, the Code identifies the purpose behind subsection (3): Subsection (3) fills what would otherwise be a gap in complicity liability. Section 2.06 [of the Model Penal Code] covers accomplice liability in situations where the principal actor actually commits the offense. In eases where the principal actor does not commit an offense, however, it is provided here that the accomplice will be liable if he engaged in conduct that would have established his complicity had the crime been committed. Id. at 297-98 (explanatory note to § 5.01(3)). It is important to highlight the fact that this passage does not describe an offense of aiding and abetting an attempted crime (in that case, there would be a guilty principal and an offense, thus posing no problem under the traditional aiding-and-abetting framework), but rather refers to attempting to aid and abet a crime (an offense for which there may not be a guilty principal). See id. at 354-56 (comment to § 5.01(3)). But in either case, paradoxically, the crime ultimately charged is the same. If the principal had actually attempted to commit a crime but had failed, the aider and abettor would be charged with the same offense as the principal (attempt to commit the crime). If (as here), the principal had only pretended to commit the crime, and the accomplice attempted to aid the principal by “engag[ing] in conduct that would have established his complicity had the crime been committed,” the accomplice may also be charged with an attempt to commit the crime. In the latter scenario, however, the prosecution need not show that an offense was actually committed, nor that the principal and accomplice had a “shared intent.” As with other attempt crimes, the focus of the court’s analysis shifts away from external circumstances to an examination of the defendant’s intent and actions in furtherance of that intent. Thus, the prosecution must show that the defendant “acted with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime which he is charged with attempting,” and that he “engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.” United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974); accord 2 Wayne R. La Fave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 18 (1986) (“The crime of attempt ... consists of (1) an intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent which ... goes beyond mere preparation.”). Factual impossibility is no defense. United States v. Duran, 884 F.Supp. 577, 580 n. 5 (D.D.C.1995) (citing cases), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 41 (“[F]actual impossibility, where the intended substantive crime is impossible of accomplishment merely because of some physical impossibility unknown to the defendant, is not a defense.”). The court looks instead to the question of whether, if the facts had been as the accomplice believed them, the principal would have been guilty. As with other attempt crimes, permitting convictions on the basis of the “attempt to aid and abet” theory is justified because, even if an offense was not actually committed, the defendant “manifests the same dangerousness of character as the actor who himself attempts to commit the offense.” Model Penal Code, supra, at 356. In a ease very similar to the one we decide today, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.1987). In that case, a government informant and other undercover government agents posed as drug dealers in order to catch a corrupt police officer who “had solicited money from [the informant] in return for providing protection for drug deals.” Id. at 1065. The undercover agents recorded a conversation in which the defendant “demanded] $500 a month to provide protection for [the informant’s] involvement in what [the defendant] assumed to be a drug operation.” Id. at 1066. After several more recorded conversations in which the defendant accepted money from the undercover agents, assuring them that in exchange he would “provide security” to drug dealers, the defendant was arrested. Although the drug operation that the defendant intended to help did not really exist (since the undercover agents were only pretending to be drug dealers), the defendant was charged with and convicted of attempting to aid and abet in the federal crime of possession and distribution of marijuana. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction for attempted aiding and abetting of the drug offense. As the Cartlidge court pointed out, the federal Controlled Substances Act punishes “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense” enumerated in the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). Neither the statute itself nor its legislative history provides any other explanation of what constitutes an attempt, so “federal courts have, like state courts faced with a similar problem, followed the principles of attempt liability developed at common law.” Cartlidge, 808 F.2d at 1066. Under the common law model, the defendant could be convicted of attempted aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute, despite the fact that no drug offense was actually committed by a principal, if he (1) had exhibited a criminal intent consistent with the crime of aiding and abetting a drug operation; and (2) had “moved beyond preparation” and completed the “requisite sub-, stantial step” toward committing that crime by accepting the money and by promising to protect the purported “drug dealers.” Id. at 106&-69. Similarly here, the evidence construed in the light most favorable to the government showed that appellants had a criminal intent consistent with the crime of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine (based on the tapes of their discussions with Olivier, evidence of their discussions with each other, as well as their actions). Moreover, they took very substantial steps toward committing that crime {e.g., meeting with Olivier, agreeing to protect drug dealers and accepting cash payments for doing so, and protecting the “drug dealers”), and would have committed the crime, but for the fact that the crime was made factually impossible because the “principals” were really undercover government agents. As noted above, factual impossibility is no defense to an attempt crime. Under these circumstances, there clearly was sufficient evidence to convict appellants of attempted possession with intent to distribute. 2. Jury Instructions. Although we have established that there was sufficient evidence to convict appellants of the attempted possession with intent to distribute charge, we must still address the question of whether the jury instructions on that charge were plainly erroneous. United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1524 (D.C.Cir.1996). Most of appellants’ objections to the jury instructions are based on their erroneous view that, for a charge of attempted aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute, the accomplice and the “principal” must have a “shared intent.” Individual Brief for Appellant Taylor, at 10-11. Those arguments were addressed and rejected in the previous section on the sufficiency of the evidence. However, appellants do correctly point out that the district court included some language in the jury instructions that was not supported by the evidence. For example, although the language of the second to last paragraph of the charge is drawn from the Redbook, that particular version of the instruction is explicitly designed for situations like felony murder, in which there is originally a shared intent between the principal and the accessory, but where the accessory may not actually have intended the crime which the principal ultimately committed. Id. at 10 (citing D.C. Bar Association, Criminal Jury Instructions (1993 ed.) (Instr. 4.02 Comment)). Similarly, some of the district court’s instructions (for example, those that explain the requirements for convicting a person of attempted possession, without referring to an aiding and abetting theory) seem to lay the groundwork either for a charge of direct attempted possession, or for aiding and abetting attempted possession, neither of which was supported by the evidence here. Yet, in spite of the fact that the district court included some superfluous language describing legal theories that were not supported by the evidence, we cannot conclude that these inclusions constituted plain or reversible error. We will find plain error “only if the defendant has shown a clear or obvious error occurred that affected substantial rights.” Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1525. The defense must show that this error “was prej-udieial and actually affected the outcome below,” and that it was an error that “seriously affeet[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-86, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is not met here. First, no error was committed that seriously affected the fairness of the trial. Although the instructions included descriptions of theories of liability