Full opinion text
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: Harry L. Hunt is a retired Eastern Air Lines (“Eastern”) pilot seeking to recover a lump-sum retirement benefit under the Eastern Air Lines Variable Benefit Retirement Plan for Pilots (the “Plan”). Eastern, the Plan’s administrator, which is a debtor before the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, has refused to pay the benefit because the Plan has been amended, with the approval of the bankruptcy court, to foreclose the lump-sum benefit Hunt seeks. As the Plan now stands, Hunt is entitled to receive only a modified lump-sum benefit: he may receive a partial distribution immediately and subsequent payments over time as the Plan’s assets are liquidated. Hunt rejected this modified lump-sum benefit, as well as other payment options provided under the Plan, and sued Eastern; the Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”), the pilots’ union; Charles H. Copeland, the Chairman of the Trust Administrative Committee (the “TAC”), the Plan’s named fiduciary; Paul M. O’Connor, Jr., of O’Connor, Morris & Jones, the TAC’s legal counsel (the “O’Connor law firm”); and Hawthorne Associates, Inc. (“Hawthorne”), the TAC’s principal investment advisor, to recover his retirement benefit in a lump sum. Hunt brought his suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub.L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). His complaint, framed in six counts, asked for compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring the defendants to pay his lump-sum benefit, statutory penalties, and attorneys’ fees. Eastern’s Bankruptcy Trustee, in a motion for summary judgment, contended that Eastern could not be held liable to Hunt because it had properly discharged its responsibilities as administrator under the Plan. Later, when opposing Hunt’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Eastern argued that Hunt’s claim for a lump-sum benefit had been foreclosed by a bankruptcy court ruling against Hunt in Eastern’s bankruptcy case. In an apparent attempt to avoid the effect of this ruling, Hunt voluntarily dismissed Eastern from the case with prejudice and, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint against three defendants — Hawthorne, the TAC, and the Plan' — that asserted essentially the same claims presented in his initial complaint. The ease was tried to the district court; by that time, the only defendants before the court were the TAC and the Plan. Without referring to the bankruptcy court’s ruling against Hunt, the court held that he was entitled to his lump-sum benefit and entered judgment for Hunt in the amount of that benefit. The judgment stated that the benefit was to be satisfied out of the Plan’s fund of assets. The court rejected Hunt’s remaining claims and entered judgment for the defendants. The TAC and the Plan now appeal. Hunt cross-appeals the court’s rejection of his claim requesting the court to impose a statutory penalty on the defendants. We reverse the court’s judgment against the TAC and the Plan, and affirm its judgment on the statutory-penalty claim. I. Hunt claims that, under ERISA and the provisions of the Plan, he is entitled to recover his retirement benefits in a lump sum. Unlike the typical scenario in which a participant in an employee benefit plan sues to recover ERISA benefits, Hunt sought his lump-sum payment while the administrator of the Plan, Eastern, was undergoing a highly publicized bankruptcy proceeding that ultimately resulted in the company’s demise. In addition to scrutinizing ERISA and the provisions and operation of the Plan, we must therefore consider the interrelationship between the Plan and Eastern’s bankruptcy in order to evaluate Hunt’s claims for relief. A. ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute” that created a framework for the administration and maintenance of private employee benefit plans. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361, 100 S.Ct. 1723, 1726, 64 L.Ed.2d 354 (1980). The cornerstone of an ERISA plan is the written instrument, which must provide for “the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and administration of the plan.” ERISA § 402(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2); see also ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (“Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”). The written instrument must designate an “administrator,” ERISA § 3(16)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i), “to run the plan in accordance with the ... governing plan documents.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84-86, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 1231, 131 L.Ed.2d 94 (1995); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1086, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996) (“Essentially, to administer the plan is to implement its provisions and to carry out plan duties imposed by [ERISA].”) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In some instances, ERISA imposes specific obligations on the plan administrator. See, e.g., ERISA § 101(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(b) (duty to file plan description, modifications and changes, and reports with the Department of Labor); ERISA § 105(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) (duty to provide plan participants with information regarding their benefits). The written instrument must also “provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan.” ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). The administrator, as well as the named fiduciary, is considered a “fiduciary” under ERISA. Both the administrator and the named fiduciary must discharge their duties “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with [ERISA],” ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D), “for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries,” ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). Because both the plan administrator and named fiduciary must discharge their duties in accordance with the written instrument, we examine the provisions of the Plan in detail. B. The Plan is a variable benefit pension plan for Eastern pilots that was created in 1958 pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Eastern and ALPA. The parties rewrote the Plan in the 1970s to comply with ERISA and subsequently amended it in 1986. The Plan is a “defined contribution plan.” According to 26 U.S.C. § 414(i), a defined contribution plan is a “plan [that] provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant’s account.” More simply, in the words of an ALPA newsletter sent to Eastern pilots, a participant’s interest in a defined contribution plan is “determined solely by contributions made in a beneficiary’s name and the subsequent investment performance of those contributions.” The Plan requires that Eastern make contributions on behalf of each participant, see § 4.1 (“Eastern Contributions”), for investment in stocks, bonds, real estate, and other assets. These investments constitute the Plan’s “Variable Fund” (the “Fund”). See § 1.36 (“Variable Fund”). As a result, the value of a participant’s interest in the Plan depends not only upon the funds contributed but also on the investment return on the Fund’s assets. See Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308, 1311 n. 2 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1066, 115 S.Ct. 1699, 131 L.Ed.2d 561 (1995). The value of the Fund is calculated annually as of December 31 of each calendar year. See § 5.1 (“Fund Value”). The Plan designates Eastern as the “plan administrator.” Eastern has “those powers necessary to carry out the day to day operation of the Plan.” See § 2.2(a) (“Administration”). Those powers include the broad responsibility to “initially determine all questions arising from the administration, interpretation, and application of the Plan pursuant to all applicable law, agreements and contracts and such determination shall be binding upon all persons, except as otherwise provided by law, and further provided that each Participant shall be granted the same treatment under similar conditions.” Id. The Plan also charges Eastern with the responsibility for, inter alia, keeping records, see § 2.4 (“Records”), preparing and distributing periodic Plan summaries, see § 2.5 (“Plan Summary”), and sending to each participant an annual statement reflecting the value of his investment in the Plan, see § 2.6 (“Annual Statement”). Section 13.1 of Article XIII, which is titled “Modification, Suspension or Discontinuance,” grants Eastern the authority to unilaterally modify, suspend, or discontinue any feature of the Plan, provided that any such action does not “adversely affect” any benefits “already provided” to a participant under the Plan. An exercise of this authority, however, would not constitute an amendment to the Plan. The Plan designates the TAC, a small committee that monitors the management of the Plan’s assets, as its “named fiduciary.” Under the Plan, the TAC has “overall supervisory responsibility of the administrative functions of the Fund,” see § 2.13(b)© (“Fund Administration”), and the duty “to maintain surveillance over the status and administration of the Plan and the [Fund],” see § 10.2(b) (“Rights and Duties of the [TAC]”). It must “regularly and periodically suppl[y]” information to ALPA about “transactional detail, cash flow reports, investment status, documentation and Fund performance,” see § 2.11 (“Information and Accountability”), and furnish to ALPA and Plan participants reports about the TAC’s “functions, actions, and decisions ... as are reasonable and appropriate.” See § 10.2(c). Furthermore, the TAC is charged with the responsibility of selecting and replacing investment advisors and trustees of the Fund’s assets, see § 2.7(b) (“Trust Agreement and Trustee”), as well as giving directions and instructions to these trustees, see § 2.8 (“Directions to Trustee(s)”). Before selecting or replacing investment advisors or trustees, however, the TAC must notify ALPA of the TAC’s planned course of action and give ALPA an opportunity to respond, see § 2.7(b), thus effectively giving ALPA a quasi-veto power over these decisions. Similarly, before giving any notice or instruction to a Fund trustee, the TAC must notify ALPA and give it fifteen days to object. See § 2.8. Pursuant to its authority under sections 2.7 and 2.13(d), the TAC hired Hawthorne as the Plan’s principal investment advis- or/manager for the time period relevant in this case. Hawthorne’s duties are enumerated in a written “investment advisor agreement” between the TAC and Hawthorne. According to the testimony of Hawthorne’s chairman, Charles G. Dyer, Hawthorne assumed many of the TAC’s administrative duties involving the Fund and its assets, including the scheduling of TAC meetings and the release of quarterly statements to participants about the value of the Fund’s assets. In essence, Hawthorne served “at the pleasure of the [TAC].” C. Since the Plan’s inception, an Eastern pilot choosing normal or early retirement could elect to receive his benefits in the form of monthly annuity payments. Beginning in 1983, a retiring pilot also could elect to receive his benefits in the form of a lump-sum payment. Processing an application for a lump-sum benefit involved five steps. First, a pilot seeking a lump-sum payment would complete the necessary paperwork and inform the Chief Pilot, an Eastern management employee, of his intention to retire. Second, the Chief Pilot would check to make sure that the pilot met age criteria to qualify for normal or early retirement benefits under the Plan. Third, if the pilot met the age qualifications, the Chief Pilot would inform the Eastern Pension and Insurance Department about the pilot’s decision to retire. Fourth, the Eastern Pension and Insurance Department would contact the Plan’s actuary, William M. Mercer, Inc., which would determine the precise amount of benefits to which the retiring pilot was entitled. Fifth, the actuary would then give that information to the State Street Bank & Trust Company, a Plan trustee, which would make the distribution to the pilot. The lump-sum payment would be equal to the entire actuarial present value of the pilot’s accrued benefit as of his effective retirement date. See § 6.2(e)© (“Lump Sum Option”). A pilot dissatisfied with the disposition of his application for benefits could pursue administrative relief with the Pension Dispute Board pursuant to Article XI (“Determination of Disputes ) of the Plan. D. In the late 1980s, Eastern was experiencing severe financial difficulties against the backdrop of a highly publicized labor dispute. On March 9, 1989, Eastern filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174, in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. On March 20, 1990, Eastern and ALPA signed an interim letter of agreement, effective March 2, 1990, fixing Eastern’s contribution to the Plan for all pilots at 3% of compensation. On April 18, 1990, the bankruptcy court named Martin R. Shugrue as Bankruptcy Trustee of Eastern (the “Bankruptcy Trustee”). The Bankruptcy Trustee began liquidating certain company assets in an attempt to reorganize Eastern as a smaller carrier. On September 11, 1990, the Bankruptcy Trustee, proceeding under section 1113(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, applied to the bankruptcy court for an order, which the court entered, approving an amendment to the Plan. Pursuant to this order, Eastern reduced its contribution to the Plan to 0% for compensation earned by pilots after August 11, 1990, and provided for resumption of its contribution of 3% for such compensation on or after June 1, 1991. This amendment also suspended the Pension Dispute Board’s powers effective August 11,1991. ALPA objected to the Bankruptcy Trustee’s action and appealed to the district court the bankruptcy court’s order authorizing this amendment. The record does not inform us of the district court’s disposition of this appeal. After Eastern’s Chapter 11 filing, the Fund became increasingly illiquid due to three factors. First, because Eastern had suspended and eventually ceased making contributions to the Plan, the Fund’s sole source of cash was the return on its investments. Second, a substantial portion of the Fund’s assets were invested in real estate, which was depressed in value due to a nationwide real estate recession. Third, the lump-sum option for receiving benefits had become increasingly popular with retiring pilots. In fact, the annual amount distributed in lump-sum payments had risen steadily from $52,000,000 in 1986 to more than $200,-000,000 in 1990. On January 18, 1991, Eastern shut down its operations, effectively retiring the approximately 2,500 pilots in its employ at the time. The same day, O’Connor of the O’Connor law firm, which served as counsel to the TAC, contacted Brian P. White, Director of Eastern’s Pension and Insurance Department, and told White that the TAC “recommended” that Eastern place a temporary moratorium on lump-sum payments. White, in response, said that Eastern lacked the authority to impose a moratorium. On January 19, 1991, O’Connor confirmed the recommendation by letter, a copy of which he sent to ALPA, the TAC, and Hawthorne. On January 27, 1991, according to the deposition testimony of former President Gerald R. Ford, the TAC voted unanimously to impose the temporary moratorium. The record does not disclose how the TAC planned to implement the moratorium. On January 28, 1991, O’Connor, representatives of ALPA and Eastern and their respective attorneys, met to discuss the need to place a temporary moratorium on lump-sum payments. The record does not disclose whether at this meeting the parties discussed Article XIII of the Plan, which gives Eastern the power to “modify, suspend ... or discontinu[e] ... any feature [of the Plan].” On February 1, 1991, the TAC issued a “Certifícate of Action of the [TAC of the Plan] Taken upon Unanimous Written Consent.” In this document, the TAC stated that it, “as named fiduciary of the [Plan], has decided to, and hereby does, impose a temporary moratorium upon the payment of benefits to all Eastern pilots who shall file requests for benefits after the close of business on January 18,1991.” This Certificate also instructed O’Connor to “notify [Eastern] of the [TAC’s] request that Eastern, as [Plan] Administrator, promptly notify all Eastern pilots who shall file requests for benefits after the close of business on January 18, 1991, that, until further notice, a temporary moratorium has been placed in effect by [the TAC].” Pursuant to the TAC’s request, Eastern mailed notice of the moratorium to all of its pilots on February 4, 1991. In this notice, Eastern advised pilots that “[questions regarding the temporary moratorium should be addressed to the [TAC]” at one of the following addresses: (1) the TAC, care of the O’Connor law firm; or (2) the TAC, care of Hawthorne. White stated that, after Eastern’s shutdown and the commencement of the moratorium, the procedure for processing claims for benefits under the Plan remained the same except for two changes: (1) the retiring pilot would contact Eastern’s Pension and Insurance Department directly rather than go through the Chief Pilot; and (2) Eastern’s Pension and Insurance Department would inform the actuary whether a participant had applied for benefits following the shutdown. If the participant had applied after the shutdown, the bank would not issue a benefit check. On May 22, 1991, the TAC mailed a letter and a videotape to all Plan participants and beneficiaries. The letter and videotape were designed to inform these parties about the current status of the Plan and its plans for the future in light of the “present liquidity issues confronting the [Plan]” — that is, the state of the Plan after Eastern’s shutdown and bankruptcy. On June 25, 1991, the Bankruptcy Trustee and ALPA modified the Plan by letter of agreement. This agreement modified the Plan in three significant ways. First, the Plan provided for a periodic-payment option that enabled participants to receive their retirement benefit in substantially equal monthly payments that were made for life (or life expectancy). See § 6.11 (“Periodic Payments”). These payments would be exempt from the 10% additional tax assessed on early distributions from qualified retirement plans. Second, a new article (Article XV) was added in order to enable participants to take out loans from the Plan during this time of financial uncertainty. The amendment provided that the TAC would serve as administrator for these two provisions; Eastern, however, retained its administrative authority for all other provisions of the Plan. See §§ 6.11(f), 15.1. Third, the Plan was amended to provide that the value of benefits distributed from the Plan was to be determined at the time of distribution. Thus, the value of a participant’s lump-sum benefit would no longer be determined as of the effective retirement date. See § 6.2(e)(i). On July 27, 1992, pending approval by the bankruptcy court, the Bankruptcy Trustee and ALPA entered into a letter of agreement once again. Referred to as Document 91C, this proposed amendment would make two fundamental changes to the Plan. First, the Fund would be divided into a liquid portion (i.e., cash, marketable stocks, and bonds) and an illiquid portion (i.e., real estate, alternative investments, and working capital). Each Plan participant would have a percentage interest in both the liquid and illiquid portions of the Fund rather than an interest in the Fund as a whole. Second, the lump-sum option was modified to provide for a partial distribution — that is, an immediate cash payment equal to the liquid portion of each eligible participant’s account. A participant selecting this option also would receive extended payments over time as the real estate and other illiquid assets were sold. The modified lump-sum option had become feasible because of recent favorable changes in the tax code for partial distributions. On August 19, 1992, pursuant to its duties under section 10.2(c), the TAC sent a letter to all Plan participants to describe the modified lump-sum option and to explain why the moratorium had been imposed: The lump sum option in the [Plan] has been modified by Document 91-C to address the reality that the [Plan] has a substantial amount of high quality illiquid assets that cannot be liquidated quickly without suffering a substantial discount in order to achieve a quick sale. The [Plan] does not have sufficient cash and other liquid assets to allow eligible participants to take their lump sum in cash. This is what caused the imposition of the moratorium in January 1991. On October 1,1992, the Bankruptcy Trustee and ALPA filed a joint motion in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York seeking approval of the amendment provided by Document 91C. On November 13, 1992, the bankruptcy court granted their motion and approved the amendment to the Plan, effectively ending the moratorium. The operative date of the Document 91C amendment was June 30, 1992. II. A. Harry Hunt worked as a pilot for Eastern for twenty-four years. He elected to retire effective March 1,1991, and demands that he be paid a lump-sum benefit for the value of his interest in the Plan as of that date. On February 22, 1991, Eastern’s Pension and Insurance Department received his application for benefits, which was signed by Hunt on February 5, 1991. On April 22, 1991, the manager of Eastern’s Pension Administration Department, Ms. S.W. Boles, approved Hunt’s application and authorized payment of his benefits. Given Eastern’s instruction to the actuary that it apply the moratorium to those applications submitted after January 18, 1991, the State Street Bank and Trust never made any payment to Hunt. Although Hunt is eligible to receive a modified lump-sum benefit and future payments in accordance with the Document 91C amendment, he has refused to elect that option. In addition, Hunt did not select the periodic-payment option nor did he take out a loan from the Plan. Dissatisfied with the progress of his application, Hunt dispatched four letters, the first by himself and the other three through two different attorneys. He alleges that these letters were sent pursuant to the instructions in Eastern’s February 4, 1991, letter to all Eastern pilots. On March 15, 1991, Hunt wrote to Charles G. Dyer, the chairman of Hawthorne, to inquire about the status of his pension. On March 20, 1991, through the first of three attorneys whom Hunt employed in this controversy, he wrote to O’Connor in order to request the most current statement of his account and the most recent financial statement for the Plan “showing [its] assets and liabilities.” On July 15, 1991, through a second attorney, he wrote another letter to Dyer of Hawthorne. In that letter, he requested a statement of “the TAC’s position on his application,” copies of all amendments to the Plan affecting his benefits, an explanation if the TAC were to deny his application, and the name, address, and the forms necessary to file a claim with the Pension Dispute Board if the TAC decided not to pay his lump sum. Hunt also sent a copy of this letter to the then-chairman of the TAC. Finally, on August 19, 1991, the same attorney wrote on Hunt’s behalf to O’Connor to request copies of the “amendments to the Plan,” an explanation of whether the TAC “had the right to amend the [Plan],” and a statement disclosing the number of applications for lump-sum benefits filed since January 18, 1991. Hunt complains that none of his letters were answered. B. On February 21, 1992, Hunt filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the following parties: Eastern, ALPA, Hawthorne, Charles H. Copeland as chairman of the TAC, and O’Connor as partner and agent for the O’Connor law firm. The complaint was a typical “shotgun” pleading. With the exception of Count I, Hunt made only general references to “ERISA,” failing to indicate which provision of the statute served as his basis for relief. The complaint contained six counts or causes of action. Each incorporated the allegations, mostly factual, set out in the first twenty-four paragraphs of the complaint. In those paragraphs, Hunt made essentially the following allegations: he was a participant in the Plan; on February 5,1991, he mailed to the Plan administrator’s (Eastern’s) Pension and Insurance Department a “Notice of Retirement Status, electing a lump sum payout of his benefits under the [Plan], effective on his early retirement date of March 1, 1991”; he inquired of Hawthorne on March 15, 1991, May 3, 1991, and May 7, 1991 as to when he would receive his lump-sum payment for his accrued benefit; Hawthorne replied that he would be paid between June 15, 1991, and June 30, 1991; the Plan administrator had not paid his benefit because a moratorium had been placed on the payment of lump-sum benefits; the “moratorium resulted from resolutions rendered by ALPA”; and he retained counsel in order to obtain his lump-sum benefit. Count I of the complaint, titled “Failure to Provide Information,” alleged that the defendants’ failure “to respond within 30 days to repeated written requests made by Hunt since March 20, 1991, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B),” rendered the defendants “liable to Hunt in an amount up to $100 per day from the date of this failure to respond pursuant to [section] 1132(c)(1)(B).” Accordingly, Hunt requested “judgment against Defendants for the applicable penalty and damages, ... such further relief as the court deems appropriate and ... prejudgment interest, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Count II, titled “Action to Enforce Rights under [Plan],” alleged that Hunt had properly submitted his request for a lump-sum benefit; that he was entitled to the benefit; and that the “Defendants have failed to pay or direct payment of said benefits and have failed to provide any disposition of Hunt’s claim.” Accordingly, Hunt asked the court to “enter an order requiring Defendants to pay Hunt his benefits and award to him prejudgment interest, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Count III, titled “Breach of Fiduciary Duty,” alleged in pertinent part: the defendants were fiduciaries under ERISA; “ALPA has a duty not to interfere with Hunt’s interest”; “[t]he value of Hunt’s [Plan] account continues to decrease since his effective retirement date”; the defendants “willfully and wantonly breached their fiduciary duty to Hunt by failing to pay [his lump-sum benefit], by failing to respond to Hunt’s requests for information, by interfering with Hunt’s rights to [his benefit], and by failing to discharge their duties solely in the interest of the participants for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits in accordance with the [Plan] documents”; the decision to impose the moratorium on lump-sum benefits was “arbitrary and capricious, [was] contrary to the terms of the [Plan] and [was] contrary to law”; and “[a]s a result of Defendants’ breach of the fiduciary duties, Hunt has been damaged by failing to receive his lump sum payout and the resulting payment of increased interest expense for loans obtained pending payment.” Accordingly, Hunt demanded “compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants jointly and severally and requested] entry of an order awarding to him prejudgment interest, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Count IV, titled “Recovery of Benefits,” alleged that “Hunt has been damaged by Defendants’ failure to pay Hunt the benefits to which he is entitled under the [Plan].” Accordingly, Hunt demanded “judgment against Defendants jointly and severally for payment of his benefits under the [Plan], plus prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees.” Count V, titled “Estoppel,” alleged in pertinent part: “Defendants represented to Hunt that he was fully vested, that the [Plan] was fully funded, and that his benefits would be paid before June 30,1991”; “Hunt relied on the terms of the [Plan] and on the representation of Defendants in determining his retirement date and in establishing his business plan and financial affairs up on retirement”; and “Defendants should be estopped to deny payment and to refuse to process payment to Hunt.” Accordingly, Hunt demanded “judgment against Defendants jointly and severally f jr payment of his benefits under the [Plan], plus prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees.” Count VI, titled “Declaratory Judgment,” alleged that the defendants “failure to pay to Hunt the benefits to which he is entitled as set forth in the [Plan] have raised dispute regarding Hunt’s entitlement (right) to immediate payment of the [Plan] benefits under the terms of the [Plan] and ERISA” and that “Chapter 86 Fla. Stat.[ ] provides that such rights may be determined by the court.” Accordingly, Hunt requested that “this court enter an order declaring his right to payment of his lump sum [Plan] benefits under the terms of the [Plan] and pursuant to ERISA and awarding to Hunt costs of this proceeding, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The defendants, proceeding individually, responded to Hunt’s complaint. Hawthorne and the Bankruptcy Trustee, who appeared for Eastern, filed answers that denied liability and included the affirmative defense that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. The remaining defendants, with the exception of Copeland, moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief; Copeland moved for dismissal on the ground that Hunt had not served him with process as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j). Because Hunt had “demonstrated neither good reason for Copeland’s continued presence in this lawsuit nor good cause for the lack of timely service upon Copeland,” the court dismissed Copeland from the case. Before the court could address the question whether the complaint stated a claim for relief against any of the defendants, the Bankruptcy Trustee moved the district court on August 6,1992, for summary judgment on the grounds, among others, that Eastern was not a fiduciary under the Plan because its duties were purely ministerial; that Eastern lacked discretion to impose the moratorium; and that the moratorium was imposed at the TAC’s direction. Athough the Plan contained no provision requiring Eastern to accept the TAC’s decisions as binding, Eastern contended that it “had no choice but to abide by” the TAC’s decision to impose a moratorium on the payment of lump-sum benefits. Finally, Eastern contended that “its sole obligation in the retirement benefits process is limited to determining eligibility, here whether an applicant meets the age criteria.” “Once this is done,” Eastern argued, “[it] has no role in deciding whether to pay an eligible participant benefits, what benefits an eligible participant is entitled to, or how those benefits will be distributed” (emphasis in original). On October 1, 1992, while this motion for summary judgment and the Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss were still pending, the Bankruptcy Trustee and ALPA jointly moved the bankruptcy court for the entry of an order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 approving the Document 91C amendment to the Plan. See supra part I.D. Their motion advised the bankruptcy court of the following: On July 27, 1992, Eastern and ALPA entered into a letter of agreement to amend the [Plan], conditioned on the approval of this Court. Under the agreement, designated as “Document 91C”, the [Plan] would be amended to provide ... for the segregation of the assets of the [Plan] into liquid and illiquid segments, and would modify the distribution of lump-sum benefits under the [Plan], Under Document 91C, Eastern would remain both the “Sponsor” and the “Administrator” of the [Plan] for purposes of [ERISA], Eastern and ALPA have been told that one or more groups object to Document 91C, and may file suit challenging its implementation. Because Eastern’s ministerial role in the [Plan] is a continuing obligation of the estate, and to provide a single forum to consider the objections to Document 91C, the [Bankruptcy] Trustee and ALPA hereby jointly seek an Order from this Court approving Document 91C under its authority to approve contracts made by the [Bankruptcy] Trustee other than in the ordinary course of business. See 11 U.S.C. § 363. On October 26, 1992, Hunt, acting through his attorney in the instant case, filed with the bankruptcy court an “Objection to Joint Motion for Entry of Order Approving Amendment to [Plan].” The essence of his objection was that “[t]he movants have failed to provide any authority which would permit amendment of the [Plan] in such a manner that would alter or adversely impact Hunt’s ability to receive a lump sum payment upon his retirement.” According to Hunt, section 13.1 of the Plan precluded any amendment that would “adversely affect the retirement benefits provided to the participant at the time of the modification.” Aternatively, Hunt had “no objection to any amendment that excepts or exempts him, or that otherwise permits him to receive his lump sum payout.” Finally, Hunt contended that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the administration of the Plan because “Eastern’s involvement in the [Plan], according to its own representations, is merely ministerial. The motion seeks to elevate and escalate Eastern’s involvement in administering the plan without providing plan participants with any means of participating in Eastern’s administration.” On November 13, 1992, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Bankruptcy Trustee’s and ALPA’s joint motion for approval of the Document 91C amendment to the Plan. In addressing objections of Plan participants such as Hunt, the court stated the following: It is clear from this record that the objections are not well-founded. The record does support the relief that has been requested, which does give equitable treatment to inherent competing interests to the [Plan]. In any situation such as this there are always competing interests. And it is clear from this record that the proposal is equitable. The bankruptcy court granted the joint motion. According to the Bankruptcy Trustee, neither Hunt nor any other objector appealed this ruling. On December 4, 1992, following the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Document 91C amendment to the lump-sum benefit provision of the Plan, Hunt moved the district court for leave to file an amended complaint. The Bankruptcy Trustee, ALPA, and Hawthorne opposed Hunt’s motion in separate filings. The Bankruptcy Trustee and Hawthorne argued that Hunt’s motion should be denied on the ground that the bankruptcy court’s rejection of Hunt’s objection to the approval of the Document 91C amendment barred his claim for a lump-sum benefit. The Bankruptcy Trustee also represented that Hunt “had a full opportunity to address his concerns before the bankruptcy court. Having failed in his efforts before the bankruptcy court, he is barred under the doctrine of res judicata from collaterally attacking Document 91C before this [District] Court.” ALPA objected to Hunt’s proposed amended complaint on the ground that the claims Hunt proposed to assert against it were frivolous. On February 1, 1993, the district court disposed of three of the pending motions. The first two were ALPA’s alternative motions to dismiss Hunt’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and for summary judgment. The court granted both motions. It concluded that ALPA was not an administrator of the Plan and that Hunt’s breach of fiduciary duty claim was improperly asserted; ALPA, therefore, could not have been held liable for any of the relief Hunt sought in Counts I through IV. The court also rejected Hunt’s Count V estoppel claim because the complaint failed to allege that Hunt had relied on a representation made by ALPA. The third motion disposed of was Hunt’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The court denied that motion “because ... [the amended complaint Hunt tendered with his motion] suffer[ed] from some of the same infirmities contained in his original complaint.” The court did not specify the infirmities in Hunt’s original complaint; whatever they were, the court gave Hunt twenty-two days to cure them and to “file an appropriate amended complaint.” C. On February 24, 1993, Hunt filed an amended complaint. Without obtaining leave of court as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, Hunt dropped from the case four of the defendants named in his original complaint: Eastern, ALPA, Copeland, and O’Connor He replaced them with two new defendants, the TAC and the Plan, which joined Hawthorne as the defendants in the case. The Bankruptcy Trustee subsequently learned that Hunt had dropped Eastern from the case, and on April 30, 1993, it obtained from Hunt and filed with the court a stipulation that recited: Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff ... Hunt and defendant ... Eastern ... hereby agree and stipulate that the above captioned action shall be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice as to Eastern, each party to bear its own costs. Hunt’s amended complaint contained seven counts. With the minor exceptions set out in the margin, the first six counts of the amended complaint simply replicated the allegations and prayers for relief contained in the original complaint. For example, as before, Count I was titled “Failure to Provide Information”; Count II was titled “Action to Enforce Rights under [Plan]”; Count III was titled “Breach of Fiduciary Duty”; Count IV was titled “Recovery of Benefits”; Count V was titled “Estoppel”; and Count VI was titled “Declaratory Judgment.” In the original complaint, twenty-four paragraphs preceded the presentation of the counts. The amended complaint had twenty-five such paragraphs. These paragraphs, compared to their counterparts in the original complaint, differed materially in the following way. After alleging in the original complaint that the Document 91C amendment affecting Hunt’s lump-sum benefit had been made by Eastern and ALPA, which were no longer parties in the case, Hunt changed his position and alleged that the TAC, which “renders decisions regarding administration of the [Plan],” was the party responsible for the moratorium rather than Eastern or ALPA. According to Hunt, Eastern and ALPA were “the only entities which can act to amend or modify the [Plan]”; he therefore implied that the moratorium allegedly imposed by the TAC constituted an unauthorized amendment or modification of the Plan. As noted, the amended complaint added a seventh count to those asserted in the original complaint. Count VII, titled “Injunctive Relief,” alleged essentially that the defendants had breached their duty to maintain sufficient “reserves” with which to pay Hunt’s lump-sum benefit. It alleged further that [n]o other parties will be prejudiced by enjoining the imposition of the moratorium, modification or amendment or payments made thereunder beyond keeping sufficient reserves for the payment of Hunt’s lump sum benefit; i.e., payments would continue under the [Plan], but defendants would be enjoined from so depleting the liquid portion of the fund that Hunt’s total lump sum benefit could be paid. Accordingly, Hunt “demand[ed] that [the] Court enter an order enjoining payment of benefits under the [Plan] to current beneficiaries, at least to the extent that sufficient funds are retained to pay Hunt’s lump sum benefit, interest, costs and attorney’s fees.” The TAC and the Plan jointly moved the court to dismiss the counts of the amended complaint on the ground that none stated a claim for relief. In part, they repeated the arguments previously addressing the sufficiency of Hunt’s original complaint that were advanced in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s and ALPA’s objections to Hunt’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. These arguments included the claim that Hunt lacked standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty and that the moratorium and the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Document 91C amendment foreclosed his claim. As for Hunt’s claim seeking the $100 per day statutory penalty, these defendants contended that such penalties were assessable only against the administrator of the Plan, Eastern, which had been dismissed from the ease with prejudice. Hawthorne answered the complaint with a general denial of liability. The district court disposed of the joint motion to dismiss the amended complaint in the following manner: the court (1) denied the motion to dismiss Count I; (2) denied the motion to dismiss Count II; (3) dismissed Count III to the extent that it sought comprehensive and punitive damages for Hunt, but held that he had standing to sue the TAC for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the Plan’s participants; (4) denied the motion to dismiss Count IV; (5) dismissed Count V after Hunt conceded that he had no case for estoppel; (6) dismissed Count VI on the ground of ERISA preemption; and (7) denied the motion to dismiss Count VII, although the court was unable to discern— from what it described as an “inartfully” drafted pleading — whether Hunt stated a claim for relief. Following these rulings, the TAC and the Plan answered the amended complaint, denying liability, and then jointly moved for summary judgment. Their motion essentially restated the arguments presented in their motion to dismiss. Hawthorne also moved for summary judgment. It contended, among other things, that Hunt’s claim for the lump-sum benefit (Counts II and IV) could be brought only against the Plan and a person or entity, such as the Plan administrator, possessing the authority to order the payment of his benefit. Hawthorne argued that it had no such authority and, thus, could not provide the relief sought. In addition, Hawthorne contended that it could not be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty (Count III) because the Plan, the appropriate plaintiff for such a cause of action, was not injured by the failure to pay Hunt his lump-sum benefit. The court deferred ruling on these motions for summary judgment until the morning that the trial of the case began. In the meantime, Hawthorne settled with Hunt and agreed to the entry of judgment in favor of Hunt on Count I in the sum of $10,000; all other counts against Hawthorne were to be dismissed with prejudice. The court denied the only motion that was pending, the TAC’s and the Plan’s motion for summary judgment, and the trial commenced. D. The case was tried to the court. Five counts from the amended complaint were at issue: Hunt’s claim for the $100 per day statutory penalty under Count I; his identical claims under Counts II and TV seeking judgment in the amount of the lump-sum benefit, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees; his claim on behalf of the Plan participants for breach of fiduciary duty under Count III; and his request that the TAC and the Plan be enjoined from paying benefits to other participants until they satisfied his claim under Count VII. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the court, in an “Order Directing Entry of Judgment,” held as follows: Count I. The court found that only designated plan administrators are subject to the $100 penalty imposed by ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), for failing to respond to a plan-participant’s requests for information as required by the statute. Because Hunt had established neither that the TAC was the Plan administrator nor that it had assumed the “information-providing function” of the administrator, the TAC could not be held liable under section 502(c). Counts II and TV. The court first found that Hunt had properly applied for the lump-sum benefit and that his application had been denied because of the moratorium the TAC had “imposed” unilaterally. The TAC had done so because it concluded that a “moratorium was needed to maintain the financial integrity of the [Plan] and to protect the economic interests of all plan participants and beneficiaries.” The court then turned to the question whether the TAC had the authority to impose the moratorium for such purpose. Although the Plan did not expressly give the TAC such authority, the court assumed that the common law of trusts did so. Having made that determination, the court addressed the question whether Hunt or the TAC had the burden of proof regarding the need for the moratorium: it concluded that the TAC had the burden. With this ruling in hand, the court considered whether the TAC’s proof established that “its action was both prudent and necessary to protect the interests of all plan participants and their beneficiaries.” The court held that although the moratorium may have been justified, the TAC’s proof was insufficient to carry the day. The court therefore gave Hunt judgment on Counts II and TV in the sum of $352,748.74 plus costs. Count III. The court’s findings on this claim are ambiguous. Hunt had alleged that “if the moratorium was imposed [by the TAC] because of the [Plan’s] inability to pay lump sum benefits to retiring employees electing that option, then these Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties to the [Plan] and to Hunt through mismanagement and failure to take such action to ensure that the [Plan] was adequately funded so as to pay the lump sum benefit option exercised by Hunt.” See supra note 44. In other words, the TAC breached its fiduciary duty to the Plan’s participants, and therefore to Hunt, by imposing the moratorium because of its inability to pay the lump-sum benefits. The court found no such breach: “Hunt submitted neither evidence of mismanagement nor — assuming, for the sake of argument, that he proved a breach of fiduciary duty — evidence from which this court could fashion a remedy. Hunt having thus failed to satisfy his burden of proof on Count III, judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants.” Therefore, under the district court’s analysis, whether the TAC had breached its fiduciary duty to the Plan participants, including Hunt, by imposing the moratorium turned on which party had the burden of proof. On Counts II and IV, the court held that the TAC had the burden but failed to sustain it by showing that prudence required that a moratorium be imposed. On Count III, the court held that Hunt had the burden of proof but failed to show that the TAC had acted imprudently in imposing the moratorium. The district court’s “Order Directing Entry of Judgment” makes no mention of the remaining count (Count VII). After disposing of the other counts in the amended complaint by number, including Counts V and VI which were dismissed from the case prior to trial, the court instructed the clerk of court in paragraph four of its order (“paragraph 4”) how judgment should be entered: “4. On the remaining counts [i.e., Counts II, IV, and VII], the clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Harry L. Hunt in the amount of $352,-748.74 plus costs. The judgment shall be paid from the [Plan] [F]und.” We read this language, and the final judgment entered by the clerk, as disposing of Count VII in favor of Hunt, although the court did not grant the injunctive relief the count requested. Following the entry of final judgment, the TAC and the Plan appealed the district court’s judgment on Counts II and IV. Hunt cross-appealed the court’s judgment on Count I but not Count III. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the court’s judgment on Counts II and IV, and affirm as to Count I. III. Paragraph 4 of the district court’s “Order Directing Entry of Judgment,” which gave Hunt judgment on Counts II, IV, and VII for the lump-sum benefit, presents several threshold issues that must be resolved before we can consider the merits of his claim to that benefit. As stated previously, in paragraph 4, the court directed the clerk to “enter judgment in favor of [Hunt] in the amount of $352,748.74 plus costs. The judgment shall be paid from the [Plan] [F]und.” The first threshold question is whether the relief granted in paragraph 4 is legal or equitable; that is, does the relief granted constitute a money judgment or an in personam order directing the TAC or the Plan to pay Hunt a sum of money from the assets of the Plan’s Fund. The answer to this question is important because, as we explain below, the relief provided in an action to recover benefits under ERISA is equitable, not legal. More specifically, the relief consists of an order directing a person or entity having the necessary authority under the benefit plan to pay the participant the benefit that he seeks. Hunt sought such equitable relief in Count II of his amended complaint, asking the district court to enter “an order requiring Defendants to pay Hunt his benefits.” In Count IV, Hunt sought legal relief, demanding “judgment against Defendants ... jointly and severally for payment of his benefits.” In Count VII, titled “Injunctive Relief,” Hunt asked the court to “enter an order enjoining payment of benefits ... to current beneficiaries, at least to the extent that sufficient funds are retained to pay Hunt’s lump sum benefit.” Nothing in the language of paragraph 4 orders the TAC to do anything. If, however, we construe — that is, effectively rewrite— paragraph 4 so that it orders the TAC to pay the benefit from the Fund, then we must decide whether the TAC has the authority under the Plan to effect payment; if not, the TAC cannot provide the relief sought. Despite its representations to the contrary, Eastern, the Plan administrator, obviously could effect payment if ordered to do so, see supra part I.C and infra part III.B, but Hunt voluntarily dismissed it from the case with prejudice. Nor can the Plan as an entity provide any relief; the Plan alone is simply a written instrument executed by Eastern and ALPA. We turn now to these issues, taking them up in order. A. Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides that “[a] civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary ... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). On its face, this language does not indicate whether a participant seeking to recover retirement benefits may obtain legal or equitable relief. Although the “causes of action authorized by section 502(a)(1)(B) [of ERISA] are not explicitly denominated as equitable,” see Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir.1989), this circuit has treated actions to recover benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) as equitable in nature. See, e.g., Shannon v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 113 F.3d 208, 209-10 (11th Cir.1997) (denying appeal of district court’s judgment ordering plan administrator to pay benefits to plan participant); Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 756-57 (11th Cir.1996) (affirming district court’s issuance of “an injunction ordering [Plan administrator] to comply with ERISA and pay [participant] ... benefits”). This position is consistent with our view that participants suing under section 502(a)(1)(B) are not entitled to a jury trial. In Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., we reasoned: The nature of an action under section 502(a)(1)(B) is for the enforcement of the ERISA plan. Although the plaintiffs assert that they are claiming money damages, in effect they are claiming the benefits they are allegedly entitled to under the plan. Although ... a money judgment would satisfy their demands, ... only an order for continuing benefits would be sufficient. This is traditionally equitable relief____ 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir.1990). This view accords with the majority of circuits that have considered this issue. We therefore hold that Hunt’s claim for legal relief (i.e., a money judgment) under section 502(a)(1)(B) fails to state a claim. Accordingly, we dismiss Count IV of Hunt’s amended complaint, leaving only his claim for equitable relief in Count II to recover his lump-sum benefit. Given the equitable nature of Hunt’s recovery-of-benefits claim under ERISA, we also find that an in personam order enjoining the payment of benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) must be directed to a person or entity other than the plan itself. While ERISA § 502(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1), does state that “[a]n employee benefit plan may sue or be sued ... as an entity,” nothing in ERISA permits the district court to issue an injunctive order solely against the plan. Rather, the case law of this circuit demonstrates that an order enjoining the payment of benefits from an ERISA plan must issue against a party capable of providing the relief requested. See, e.g., Shannon, 113 F.3d at 209-10; Godfrey, 89 F.3d at 756-57; cf. Fisher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1074 (5th Cir.1990) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs second amended complaint in part for failure to name the plan administrator as an “indispensable party”). We therefore reject the notion that an injunctive order to pay benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA can issue solely against an ERISA plan as an entity. B. We next examine the district court’s ruling in paragraph 4 that “the clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Harry L. Hunt [on Counts II, IV, and VII]” and that “[t]he judgment shall be paid from the [Plan] fund.” Because an injunctive order cannot issue against the Plan itself, we assume that we have discretion to construe — i.e., effectively rewrite — paragraph 4 so that it directs the TAC to pay Hunt the lump-sum benefit from the Fund. Our review of the record and the Plan, however, makes clear that the TAC has no authority under the Plan to issue or deny payment of a lump-sum benefit to a participant. Rather, the TAC has limited powers under the Plan and plays no role in the process of reviewing applications for retirement benefits. Unlike Eastern, the TAC’s authority is primarily limited to the management and supervision of the Fund’s assets. Its “overall supervisory responsibility” is restricted to the “administrative functions of the Fund,” see § 2.13(b)(i) (“Fund Administration”), and its duty to the Plan is limited “to maintain[ing] surveillance over the status and administration of the Plan and the [Fund],” see § 10.2(b) (“Rights and Duties of the [TAC]”). In addition, as discussed in part I.B, supra, the TAC must exercise its limited powers in a manner consistent with its obligations to ALPA. For example, before selecting and replacing investment advisors and trustees, the TAC must notify ALPA of its planned course of action and give ALPA an opportunity to respond. See § 2.7(b) (“Trust Agreement and Trustee”). Similarly, before giving any notice or instruction to a trustee of the Fund, the TAC must serve a copy of the trust direction on ALPA and give it fifteen days to object to the TAC’s proposed direction. See § 2.8 (“Directions to Trustee(s)”). In addition, the TAC must “regularly and periodically suppl[y]” information to ALPA about transactional detail, cash flow reports, investment status, documentation and Fund performance,” see § 2.11 (“Information and Accountability”), and furnish to ALPA and Plan participants reports about the TAC’s “functions, actions, and decisions ... as are reasonable and appropriate,” see § 10.2(c). In stark contrast, the plain language of the Plan gives Eastern broad discretion as administrator to make decisions for the Plan. The Supreme Court has stated that a plan administrator has a “statutory responsibility [under ERISA] ... to run the plan in accordance with the currently operative, governing plan documents.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 1231, 131 L.Ed.2d 94 (1995). Section 2.2(a) of the Plan confers upon Eastern “those powers necessary to carry out the day to day operation of the Plan.” Its responsibilities include the authority to “initially determine all questions arising from the administration, interpretation, and application of the Plan pursuant to all applicable law, agreements and contracts, and such determination shall be binding upon all persons, except as otherwise provided by law, and further provided that each Participant shall be granted the same treatment under similar conditions.” Id. The Plan also charges Eastern with the responsibility for, inter alia, keeping records, see § 2.4 (“Records”), preparing and distributing periodic Plan summaries, see § 2.5 (“Plan Summary”), and sending to each participant an annual statement reflecting the value of his investment in the Plan, see § 2.6 (“Annual Statement”). More important, based on the record before us, we find that Eastern exercises ultimate authority in determining whether a participant should receive payment of his benefit. The record reveals that Eastern plays the central role in the process of reviewing applications for benefits. The Plan makes Eastern responsible for providing the benefit-application forms to participants. See § 12.9(a) (“Application for Benefits”). A pilot seeking a lump-sum payment must complete the necessary paperwork and inform an Eastern management employee, the Chief Pilot, of his intention to retire. The Chief Pilot checks the pilot’s eligibility under the Plan, and then informs the Eastern Pension and Insurance Department about the pilot’s decision to retire. The application is then presented to the Eastern Pension Administration Department, which must provide an authorizing signature beneath a line that states: “The above information is approved and the. appropriate allocation from the Plan to provide the benefit payable is hereby authorized.” If the application is approved, the Eastern Pension and Insurance Department contacts the Plan’s actuary, which determines the precise amount of benefits to which the retiring participant is entitled. The actuary then gives that information to the State Street Bank & Trust, which makes the distribution to the participant. Eastern is responsible for establishing and maintaining a procedure for giving the participant written notification if the application is denied. See § 2.3 (“Notification of Denial of Benefits”). If there is a legal dispute as to the proper recipient of a benefit, Eastern may withhold payment pending final determination of the proper beneficiary. See § 12.10 (“Beneficiary Dispute”). The facts of this case support our reading that Eastern, not the TAC, has the authority to order payment of retirement benefits. First, the record makes clear that Eastern retained its authority as administrator at all times during the events giving rise to this litigation. When Hunt’s application was “approved” by Eastern’s Pension Administration Department on April 22, 1991, Eastern was listed in the written instrument as the Plan administrator. When the Plan was amended effective June 25,1991, Eastern continued to serve as administrator for all aspects of the Plan, with the exception of the newly introduced periodic-payment option and the provision for Plan loans. See § 6.11(f) (“Periodic Payments”), Article XV (“Plan Loans”). Even after the Plan was amended effective June 30, 1992, with the bankruptcy court’s approval of Document 91C, Eastern retained its authority as Plan administrator. Second, the record demonstrates that Eastern, despite its representations to the contrary, made the decision to honor the moratorium and ultimately pre