Full opinion text
FOREMAN, Senior District Judge: In this consolidated appeal, eight appellants appeal their convictions for various narcotics offenses arising from the importation of more than 1,300 kilograms of cocaine aboard the 38-foot cabin cruiser named What’s Up. We affirm. I. Background On September 14, 1988, Customs Agent Richard Johnson received a tip that a suspicious vessel named What’s Up was being towed into Tortola Marina in Key Largo, Florida. Agent Johnson learned that the What’s Up had been previously sighted in the Bahamas and had failed to report its arrival into the United States in violation of United States law. Agent Johnson and other Customs personnel maintained constant visual surveillance of the boat until September 17, when a search of the boat revealed the presence of a large quantity of cocaine in hidden compartments in the boat’s cabin. Subsequently, appellants and others were arrested and indicted on various charges including conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine from the Bahamas. Further investigation revealed that on three different occasions in the summer of 1988, cocaine was smuggled into the United States aboard the What’s Up. Appellants participated in the importation and distribution conspiracy in different roles and, in some cases, at different times. The case proceeded to trial before Judge James Lawrence King. Judge King presided over all phases of the trial with the exception of a portion of the jury’s deliberations and the return of the verdicts. Those portions were presided over by Judge Thomas E. Scott. On May 21, 1990, the jury returned its verdict finding Abella guilty as to Counts I and VII; Caderno guilty as to Counts I, II, VII and VIII; Calderon guilty as to Counts I-VI; Gamboa guilty as to Counts II and VI; Garcia guilty as to Counts I, II, III, and IV; Iglesias guilty as to Counts I, II, VIII, and IX; Martinez guilty as to Counts I, II and VIII; and Noa guilty as to Counts I, II, IV, VI, VII and VIII. Appellants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 188 months to 336 months. We will discuss the facts relevant to appellants’ claims in greater detail in conjunction with our discussion of each of their assertions of error. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Abella, Calderon, and Garcia contend that the evidence presented by the government was insufficient to sustain their convictions. More specifically, all three of them attack the credibility of the coconspirator witnesses, Harold Garcia, Rolando Alvarez, and Sisinio Torres, who testified against them. Abella and Garcia further assert that the evidence adduced at trial merely establishes their presence or association with the co-conspirators, not the knowing participation required to support a conspiracy conviction, and thus was insufficient to impose conspiratorial liability. Finally, Calderon claims that the evidence presented proved three separate conspiracies, not a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment and that Calderon was prejudiced by that variance. In response, the government argues that determination of witness credibility is the sole province of the jury, that as to each of the appellants the evidence proved sufficient knowing participation in the conspiracy, and that the evidence did in fact establish a single conspiracy to import and distribute three loads of cocaine between June and September, 1988. Whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 452 (11th Cir.1994). Although the Court conducts its review without special deference to the district court, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor. Id.; See also, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 661 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984). The verdict must stand if their is substantial evidence to support it, that is “unless no trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Battle, 892 F.2d 992, 998 (11th Cir.1990). It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury is free to choose among the constructions of the evidence. United States v. Hardy, 895 F.2d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983)). If, however, the record reveals a lack of substantial evidence from which a fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must reverse the defendant’s conviction. Kelly, 888 F.2d at 740. We apply these general standards in reviewing each of appellants’ sufficiency claims. A. Credibility Appellants first argue that the witnesses who testified against them were inherently incredible and, because their testimony represented the only evidence linking them to the charged crimes, that testimonial evidence was insufficient to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Garcia contends that Sisino Torres had multiple prior convictions and admitted that his entire testimony in at least one of these earlier eases was untruthful. Abella contends that Harold Garcia has long been involved in drug smuggling, lied on his income tax return, sought and received extensive immunity from the government for himself and his wife despite the government’s knowledge their misdeeds, and admittedly “would lie to save himself.” Abella also claims that Rolando Alvarez was both a cocaine dealer and user, also received immunity for himself and his family, was seeking a sentence reduction, has been accused of insurance fraud, and repeatedly lied to law enforcement agents. Calderon adopts Abella’s and Garcia’s characterizations of these witnesses. It is well established that “[c]redibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury.” United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104, 111 S.Ct. 1005, 112 L.Ed.2d 1088 (1991); See also United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1099, 114 S.Ct. 939, 127 L.Ed.2d 230 (1994); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381 (1981). Hewitt is particularly applicable to the case before us. Therein, the appellant attacked the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for aiding and abetting the use of an explosive to commit a felony based upon the fact that it rested in large part on the testimony of two convicted felons testifying with immunity. Hewitt, 663 F.2d at 1385. In rejecting appellant’s argument, we stated that a judgment of acquittal is not required because the government’s case includes testimony by “an array of scoundrels, liars and brigands.” The jury was free to disbelieve the [ ] government witnesses whose faults were exhaustively catalogued by the attorney[s].... Furthermore, the trial judge fully instructed the jury on the degree of suspicion they should entertain when considering the testimony of accomplices who testify with immunity. By bringing back a verdict of guilty, however, the jury found that the testimony of [the witnesses] was credible. Because the testimony was not incredible as a matter of law, we must accept this determination by the jury. Id. at 1385-86 (citations omitted); See also United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1051, 106 S.Ct. 1275, 89 L.Ed.2d 582 (1986). “For testimony of a government witness to be incredible as a matter of law, it must be ‘unbelievable on its face.’ ” Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1561 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir.1976)). It must be testimony as to “ ‘facts that [the witness] physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.’” Rivera, 775 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Cravero, 530 F.2d at 670). Further, “ ‘the fact that [the witness] has consistently lied in the past, engaged in various criminal activities, [and] thought that his testimony would benefit him ... does not make his testimony incredible.’ ” Id. Applying these well established standards to this case, it is evident that appellants’ credibility challenges must fail. A review of the record reveals that the issues of the witnesses’ prior convictions, drug activity, status as cooperating witnesses, and capacity for truthfulness were thoroughly explored on both direct and cross-examination. Moreover, the district judge fully instructed the jury regarding the credibility of such witnesses. By their verdict, the jury determined, albeit implicitly, that the testimony those witnesses gave was credible. Finally, it is-clear that their testimony implicating appellants in this drug conspiracy was not “incredible as a matter of law” as this circuit has defined that phrase and, thus, the jury’s credibility determination will not be disturbed. Accordingly, we find that the testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to find appellants guilty of the charges against them beyond a reasonable doubt. B. Conspiracy Counts Abella and Garcia also argue that the evidence, even if credible, merely established their presence or association with the other conspirators rather than the knowing participation that they correctly assert is required for their respective conspiracy convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 963 (conspiracy to import cocaine) and 18 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute co caine). “To support [a] conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) appellants knew of the essential objectives of the conspiracy; and (3) appellants knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” Harris, 20 F.3d at 452 (citing United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied sub nom. Sharp v. United States, 505 U.S. 1210, 112 S.Ct. 3007, 120 L.Ed.2d 882 (1992)). Similarly, “[ujnder 21 U.S.C. § 963, the government must prove that the appellants agreed to import narcotics into the United States and knowingly and voluntarily participated in the agreement.” United States v. Obregon, 893 F.2d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1833, 108 L.Ed.2d 961 (1990). Appellants do not contend that the government failed to establish that a conspiracy existed between some or all of the other appellants in this case, but rather limit their argument to whether the government proved that they were knowing and voluntary participants therein. Accordingly, that is the area to which our inquiry is limited. To prove knowing and voluntary participation, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants had a specific intent to join the conspiracy. Harris, 20 F.3d at 452. (citing United States v. Jenkins, 779 F.2d 606, 609 (11th Cir.1986)). However, we are further guided by the fact that “[o]nce the government establishes the existence of the underlying conspiracy, [ ] it only needs to come forward with slight evidence to connect a particular defendant to the conspiracy.” Id. (citing United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Burley v. United States, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 632, 121 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992)). We have described this as a “minimal threshold” that may be passed on either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. Further, the conclusion that appellants had a common purpose and plan with the other coconspirators may be inferred from a “development and collocation of circumstances.” United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.) (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. at 469) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Price v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 262, 133 L.Ed.2d 185 (1995). One of those circumstances is repeated presence at the scene of the drug trafficking. That circumstance standing alone can give rise to a permissible inference of participation in the conspiracy. Id. While not sufficient in and of itself to convict, the inference is “a material and probative factor that the jury may consider in reaching its verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, it is clear that one may be found guilty of participating a conspiracy even though his role is minor in the overall scheme. Obregon, 893 F.2d at 1311. In this case, it is evident that the government surpassed the “minimal threshold.” As to Abella, the government presented evidence he used his skill as a diesel mechanic to ready the What’s Up on each of the three occasions it set sail to the Bahamas to pick up its illicit cargo, assisted in loading the third load of cocaine into secret compartments on the What’s Up in the Bahamas, made arrangements to secure a trailer in the Keys to store that cocaine after it arrived, and traveled to the Keys to participate in off loading the cocaine (although this part of the plan was thwarted when the What’s Up ran aground). As to Garcia, the government presented evidence that he captained the What’s Up on its first voyage to the Bahamas to pick up and return 325-350 kilograms of cocaine to the United States. He was paid $150,000 for his integral role which, as the government points out, was a princely sum for only a few days work. Without a doubt, that suggests that the trip involved drugs. As we have stated, “ ‘[a] conspiracy conviction will be upheld ... when the circumstances surrounding a person’s presence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so obvious that knowledge of its character can fairly be attributed to him.” Parrado, 911 F.2d at 1570 (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir.1983)). [T]he task of determining the sufficiency of the evidence is not aided by the ritualistic invocation of the “mere presence” rubric. Rather it requires an examination of all of the proved circumstances, including presence, to determine whether from them a reasonable jury could infer and find beyond a reasonable doubt knowing and intentional participation. Id. (quoting United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom., Ariza-Fuentas v. United States, 475 U.S. 1049, 106 S.Ct. 1272, 89 L.Ed.2d 580 (1986)). It could and did. C. Variance Calderon argues that his conspiracy convictions must be set aside because the evidence presented trial established three separate conspiracies involving each of the three trips to the Bahamas rather than only a single conspiracy as charged in the indictment and, further, that this variance was prejudicial. The analytical framework for our analysis of Calderon’s assertions is straightforward and derived from well established precedent. We will not reverse convictions based on a variance unless that variance was: (1) material; and (2) substantially prejudicial to the defendant. United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 632 (11th Cir.) (citing United States v. Reed, 980 F.2d 1568, 1581 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 932, 113 S.Ct. 3063, 125 L.Ed.2d 745 (1993)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 115 S.Ct. 525, 130 L.Ed.2d 429 (1994). Thus, a two step inquiry is required. First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government as we must do in all sufficiency claims, we ask whether a reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed. Id. (citing United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1500 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3265, 97 L.Ed.2d 763 (1987)). Thus, the jury makes the initial determination of whether the evidence supports a single conspiracy and their determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Second, if it is determined that there is a material variance, we then determine whether any substantial prejudice resulted to the defendants if more than one conspiracy did in fact exist. Id. From reviewing the evidence in the proper light, we conclude that there was substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine, of which Calderon was a member, existed. In determining whether the jury could have found .a single conspiracy, we consider: (1) whether a common goal existed; (2) the nature of the underlying scheme; and (3) the overlap of participants. Coy, 19 F.3d at 633; See also United States v. LaSpesa, 956 F.2d 1027, 1031 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 956 (11th Cir.1990). First, a common goal, that of cocaine importation and distribution, existed in this case. As we have repeatedly stated, “ ‘common’ for the purposes of this test means ‘similar’ or ‘substantially the same’ rather than ‘shared’ or ‘coordinate.’ ” Coy, 19 F.3d at 633. (citing United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566, 1584 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198, 114 S.Ct. 1310, 127 L.Ed.2d 660 (1994) (“common goal” inquiry satisfied by the common crime of conspirators: importation of marijuana); LaSpesa, 956 F.2d at 1031 (same: fraud); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir.1990) (same: distribution of cocaine); Khoury, 901 F.2d at 956 (same: importation of methaqualone)). Second, the nature of the underlying scheme was the same. The three loads of cocaine were smuggled into the Keys from the Bahamas aboard the same vessel, in the same hidden compartments, in essentially the same manner and over a relatively short period of time. See Khoury, 901 F.2d at 957. Thirdly, and finally, there was extensive overlap of the participants. The jury was presented with evidence that Bias Duran, Harold Garcia, Sisinio Torres, Jose Abella, and Sigfriedo Noa played critical roles in the smuggling operation on each of the three occasions. The evidence showed that Calderon himself was involved with the first two loads. Thus, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there were at least five overlapping participants which we believe, based on our precedents, is a sufficient showing under this prong of the variance test. See LaSpesa, 956 F.2d 1027 (overlap of one coconspirator sufficient); see also Khoury, 901 F.2d 948 (overlap of two sufficient); United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1518 (11th Cir.) (overlap of common distributor sufficient to support finding that five separate “cluster” conspiracies were part of one conspiracy), cert. denied sub nom., Perna v. United States, 479 U.S. 823, 107 S.Ct. 93, 93 L.Ed.2d 44 (1986). Our finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the actions of Calderon and the other appellants constituted a single conspiracy ends our variance inquiry. We note, however, that even if we had come to the opposite conclusion, it would have been incumbent upon Calderon to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the variance. Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1500. This he has not done. To demonstrate such prejudice, appellant must show: 1) that the proof at trial differed so greatly from the charges that appellant was unfairly surprised and was unable to prepare an adequate defense; or 2) that there are so many defendants and separate conspiracies before the jury that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury transferred proof of one conspiracy to a defendant involved in another. Coy, 19 F.3d at 634; Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1500. First, Calderon does not contend he was unfairly surprised. Had the indictment charged separate conspiracies, it is unlikely that the defense at trial would have varied because, in either event, the underlying crimes charged and elements of proof would have been identical. Coy, 19 F.3d at 634. Second, this case did not present an overly complex factual situation where the danger of jury confusion existed. See Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1501 (“case involving eleven defendants and two possible conspiracies [was] not so complex by definition that the jury will be unable to segregate the evidence properly.”); see also Coy, 19 F.3d at 635. Further, the jury’s verdicts demonstrates that it was not confused by the evidence. Abella and Gamboa were found not guilty of at least one of the conspiracy charges brought against them. This shows that the jury was able to sift through the evidence and thoughtfully assign conspiratorial liability on an individual basis. Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1501. Thus, we find that appellants’ various sufficiency challenges must fail. Our review of the record convinces us that substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find each appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt exists. III. Multiple Conspiracy Instruction In a related, but somewhat different argument than Calderon’s variance claim, appellants all contend that the district judge erred in refusing to give the jury a multiple conspiracy instruction. They argue that the evidence presented at trial showed three separate conspiracies corresponding to each of the three loads of cocaine based upon the fact that the participants in each load were not identical. Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 4.3, Multiple Conspiracies, was tendered to the trial court by counsel for co-defendant Margarita De Orovio. The government objected citing the nearly identical scheme, common leader, and the extensive overlap of participants that was shown by the evidence. During the ensuing oral argument, counsel for Appellant Martinez joined in urging the district judge to give that instruction over the government’s objection. After hearing argument, the district judge sustained the government’s objection. Under the rules adopted at the outset of this trial, any motion made by one counsel was assumed to have been adopted by all defendants, unless one or more specifically opted out. Thus, we will treat the instruction as having been tendered by all defendants. Generally, a multiple conspiracy instruction is required where the indictment charges several defendants with one overall conspiracy, but the proof at trial indicates that a jury could reasonably conclude that some of the defendants were only involved in separate conspiracies unrelated to the overall conspiracy charged in the indictment. United States v. Laetividal-Gonzalez, 939 F.2d 1455, 1465 (11th Cir.1991) (emphasis added) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), cert. denied sub nom., Ocampo v. United States, 503 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1280, 117 L.Ed.2d 505 (1992)). Thus, this claim varies from Calderon’s variance claim in that there the question was whether a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed. Here, on the other hand, the issue to be resolved is whether that same jury could also have reasonably concluded from the evidence that multiple conspiracies, rather than the single charged conspiracy, existed. The answer to the former does not necessarily dictate the answer to the latter. See United States v. Stowell, 947 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 1269, 117 L.Ed.2d 497. “The issue of whether the defense produced sufficient evidence to sustain a particular instruction such as a multiple conspiracy instruction, is generally a question of law subject to de novo review.” United States v. Mazo, 93 F.3d 1390, 1399 (8th Cir.1996). It is not, of course, required if the evidence only supports a finding of a single conspiracy as charged. Id.; See also, United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 883 (4th Cir,1996). Thus, the evidence presented at trial must sufficiently support the tendered instruction. Maza, 93 F.3d at 1399 (holding that record did not sufficiently support defendants’ multiple conspiracy theory); See also Tipton, 90 F.3d at 883 (same). To find that the evidence established a single conspiracy “it is not necessary for each conspirator to participate in every phase of the criminal venture, provided there is assent to contribute to a common enterprise.” United States v. Ghazaleh, 58 F.3d 240, 244-45 (6th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 716, 133 L.Ed.2d 669 (1996). “It is often possible, especially with drug conspiracies, to divide a single conspiracy into sub-agreements .... This does not, however, mean that more than one conspiracy exists. The key is to determine whether the different sub-groups are acting in furtherance of one overarching plan.” Id. (citations omitted). Finally, [t]he fact that various defendants entered the conspiracy at different times[,] ... performed different functions[, and] ... participated in numerous separate transactions does not convert a single conspiracy to multiple conspiracies. Furthermore, the fact that eoeonspirator may change roles in the conspiracy or even depart from the conspiracy may signal only that the single conspiracy has moved to a new phase. Maza, 93 F.3d at 1399 (citations omitted). After careful review, we conclude that the record does not sufficiently support appellant’s theory of multiple conspiracies to warrant the requested instruction; rather the evidence, as the jury implicitly determined, shows a single overarching conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine from the Bahamas. As detailed above in our review of Calderon’s variance claim, the evidence presented to the jury showed a common scheme, that of cocaine importation and distribution, undertaken under the leadership of Bias Duran by an overlapping group of participants. The importation was accomplished over a relatively short amount of time, aboard the same vessel, in the same manner, and from the same supplier. As the above cited cases demonstrate, the mere fact that some participated in this load, but not that one, or that their areas of responsibility changed from one load to another, does not mean that this single conspiracy was transformed into multiple ones. Some participants may very well have joined the conspiracy for the duration of only one or two loads, but that does not change the fact that what they joined was a single conspiracy with a common objective headed by Bias Duran. Our review convinces us that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented is that the conspiracy that existed in this case was, as charged by the government, a single conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine. In addition, the instructions given by the judge adequately informed the jury that in order to convict, it must find that each appellant joined in the conspiracy charged. The instructions given included the following: What the evidence in the case must show beyond a reasonable doubt is: First: That two or more persons in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, as charged in the indictment; and Second: That each defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of such a conspiracy .... So, if a defendant has an understanding of the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though he had not participated before and even though he played only a minor role ... Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a conspirator. R.2: Doc. 227 at 10 (emphasis added). In light of the evidence presented, the language of this instruction was sufficient to inform the jury that it could convict only if the government proved that each defendant was a member of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment and not any other. Thus, we find no reversible error in the district judge’s refusal to give the tendered instruction. We are further persuaded of the correctness of our conclusion by that fact that, even assuming that such an instruction was warranted, in order to succeed in such a challenge, appellants must show that they were substantially prejudiced by the refusal to give the instruction. Tipton, 90 F.3d at 883. To find such prejudice, we would have to conclude that the evidence of multiple conspiracies was so strong that the jury would probably have acquitted appellants of the conspiracy charges had it been given the tendered instruction. Id. After careful review of the evidence presented against each appellant, that is something of which we are certainly not persuaded. IV. Evidence of Prior Kidnaping Conviction Iglesias challenges the admission of evidence regarding his prior conviction for kidnaping and marijuana trafficking pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The trial judge admitted the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing Iglesias’ intent to commit the charged crimes which he found had been put in issue by Iglesias’ not guilty plea and by his defense that he was merely present at the scene of the drug activity in order to give his brother, Jose Iglesias, a ride. Iglesias first contends that the prior kidnaping conviction was improperly admitted because there was no logical connection between the states of mind required for kidnaping on the one hand, and cocaine importation and distribution on the other. As a result, he claims the only possible relevance of that evidence was to impermissibly demonstrate his bad character and propensity to break the law. Iglesias next contends that the government failed to establish that he formed the requisite intent to kidnap anyone. He argues that, despite the fact that he pled guilty to the kidnaping charge, the evidence presented showed only that he was involved in the ransom portion of the kidnaping, not the actual abduction. Finally, Iglesias argues that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice that resulted from its admission because the government possessed sufficient evidence of his intent without it. As a result, Iglesias contends that the evidence of his prior convictions should have been excluded or, at the very least, the district judge should have redacted the kidnaping portioh of the prior conviction, leaving only the marijuana trafficking portions. Because the district court admitted the prior convictions over appellant’s Rule 404 objections, we begin our discussion with that rule. Subject to specific exceptions, Rule 404(b) provides that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove defendant’s character in order to show action in conformity therewith. Such evidence is, however, admissible if it is relevant to other material issues in the cáse. Specifically, the test for admissibility of extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b) that we apply has three parts: First, the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character. Second, as part of the relevance analysis, the evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant actually committed the extrinsic act. Third, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir.1993); See also, United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979). In reviewing the district court’s admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, we are governed by the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942, 113 S.Ct. 382, 121 L.Ed.2d 292 (1992). Thus, we will not disturb the discretionary ruling of the trial court absent a clear demonstration by Iglesias that the district judge abused that discretion. After careful consideration, we do not believe that he has so demonstrated. The circumstances surrounding appellant’s 1982 convictions are a bit out of the ordinary. Those convictions involved the kidnaping of Linda Martinez, the wife of marijuana smuggler Jesus Martinez. It seems that Jesus had, in one way or another, lost a rather large load of marijuana which had been entrusted to him. The true owners were understandably distressed by this turn of events. Their solution: Kidnap Linda Martinez and hold her for ransom. The ransom: 3,000 pounds of marijuana. Unfortunately for them, however, Jesus turned to the police for help. They, with the cooperation of the Drug Enforcement Administration, set up a controlled delivery of the 3,000 pounds of marijuana. It was Iglesias who showed up to drive the marijuana-laden van away from the surveilled location. He was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to both marijuana trafficking as well as kidnaping. The jury was informed of these inter-related events through the testimony of an investigating police officer and by the introduction of a certified copy of the judgment of conviction and commitment order in that case. Applying the first prong of the test, we believe that it is beyond question that Iglesias’ prior convictions were directly relevant to a material issue in this case other than his character. The government proffered the evidence on the issue of intent and Iglesias concedes that, as a result of his theory of defense, his intent was a material issue. Evidence of prior large scale drug trafficking is directly relevant to the question of intent regarding the charged crimes of cocaine importation and distribution. See Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1224. Iglesias’ relevancy arguments, however, are focused on the admission of evidence relating to the kidnaping portion of his prior conviction. Specifically, Iglesias contends that before the certified copy of the judgment of conviction and commitment order from that case was introduced, the kidnaping portion should have been redacted and the testifying witness admonished not to discuss it. The district judge refused this request, stating that the entire circumstances of the prior drug trafficking incident should be presented to the jury. While we cannot say that we would have made the same ruling had we been in the position of the district judge, we also cannot say that his decision abused the broad discretion with which trial judges are vested in ruling on evidentiary matters. Iglesias’ arguments would be well taken had the conviction in question been for an ordinary run-of-the-mill kidnaping, if indeed there is such a thing. This kidnaping, however, was undeniably intertwined with his highly relevant pri- or drug trafficking and, it would appear from the record, perhaps inextricably so. The only realistic way for the government to explain to the jury how it was that appellant came to be in possession of a van loaded with 3,000 pounds of marijuana, that is that he was not just merely present in that situation as well, was to divulge some details of the kidnaping. The record indicates that the government did not linger on the kidnaping more than was necessary to place Iglesias at the scene of the controlled delivery and explain his subsequent arrest with the marijuana. See R. 12-196-204. In short, it was well within the district judge’s discretion to find the entire drug-related episode relevant. Under the second prong of the test, the evidence of Iglesias’ prior conviction must be sufficient to support a finding that he actually committed the act in question. In this case, his convictions were based upon his guilty plea to both the kidnaping and marijuana trafficking charges. Again, the jury heard the testimony of the investigating officer who witnessed Iglesias enter the van and his subsequent arrest, as well as received a copy of his judgment of conviction. Appellant’s contention that his guilty plea does not provide a basis upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that he formed the requisite intent is misplaced and merits little discussion. First, the fact that he was convicted of the extrinsic crimes sufficiently answers the question of whether he had the intent to commit them. If Iglesias did not have the intent to kidnap anyone, he should not have pled guilty to kidnaping. Second, and more importantly, the proper inquiry is whether the government’s evidence supports a finding that Iglesias actually committed the extrinsic act, not whether he had the requisite intent. See Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1224. It is elementary that a conviction is sufficient proof that he committed the prior act. United States v. Arambular-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1993). The fact that the conviction was based on a guilty plea is inconsequential. See United States v. Edwards, 696 F.2d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1884, 76 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (holding that appellant’s own statement admitting act, even if mere puffery, is sufficient to justify a jury finding that he committed the act for purposes of Rule 404(b)). Under the third and final prong of our inquiry, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Again, this determination lies within the sound discretion of the district judge and calls for a “common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense,” including prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well as temporal remoteness. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914-15; See also Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1225. We have already determined that the extrinsic crimes involving possession of 3,000 pounds of marijuana (inarguably a dealer amount) and the present cocaine importation and distribution charges, bore sufficient similarity to uphold the district judge’s relevance determination. We are also of the opinion that the six year span between Iglesias’ prior convictions and the conduct upon which the present charges are based does not render the 1982 conviction too remote for proper consideration. Finally, we must ask whether the government was in need of this evidence to demonstrate Iglesias’ intent. Id. As we have explained, “if the government can do without such evidence, fairness dictates that it should; but if the evidence is essential to obtain a conviction, it may come in. This may seem like a ‘heads I win; tails you lose’ proposition, but it is presently the law.” United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 593, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). Iglesias contends that the government did not need to introduce the evidence because it possessed sufficient evidence of his guilt, including his intent, through the testimony of previously convicted coconspirators Alvarez, Garcia, and Torress. We disagree for two reasons. First, we have long recognized the “ ‘special difficulty of proving intent in conspiracy cases.’” Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1225 (quoting Pollock, 926 F.2d at 1048). Ample precedent exists in this circuit finding that a not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case, such as we have here, makes intent a material issue and opens the door to admission of prior drug-related offenses as highly probative, and not overly prejudicial, evidence of a defendant’s intent. Id. (citations omitted). Second, while we agree that the government’s case against Iglesias was substantial, it did rest on the testimony of coconspirator witnesses. Given the fact these were not “overwhelmingly credible witnesses,” we cannot say that the government had no need to introduce evidence of appellant’s prior drug activity to establish his intent. See Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1225; see also United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir.1990). These witnesses were obviously subject to impeachment on several fronts. Indeed, as we have discussed above, Iglesias’ fellow appellants spend considerable time arguing that these witnesses were inherently incredible. As a result, we do not believe that the district judge abused his discretion in implicitly determining that the probative value of appellant’s drug-related convictions was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Furthermore, any unfair prejudice that may have existed was mitigated by the district judge’s hmiting instruction. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d at 1225. Immediately following the introduction of the evidence of Iglesias’ prior convictions, and again during his final charge, the district judge instructed the jury that it could “consider the evidence not to prove Manuel Iglesias did the acts charged in this case, but only to prove that the defendant’s state of mind, that is, that the defendant, Iglesias, acted with the necessary intent, and not through accident or mistake.” Accordingly, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the 404(b) evidence. V. Prosecutorial Misconduct Iglesias next contends that the government, through the actions of the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) assigned to prosecute this case, committed various acts of misconduct that warrant reversal of his conviction. We do not agree. In addressing a claim of cumulative error, we must examine the trial as a whole to determine whether the appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial. United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1329 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Galvan v. United States, 464 U.S. 914, 104 S.Ct. 275, 78 L.Ed.2d 256 (1983). We first consider each claim individually to assess whether Iglesias’ assertions of error are correct. A. Witness Examination Iglesias first asserts that the AUSA improperly elicited testimony from Customs Agent David Robinson during his re-direct examination regarding appellant’s prior conviction for kidnaping. Agent Robinson had been asked on cross-examination by Iglesias’ counsel about the dismissal of a prior indictment against appellant based upon the same events as the current indictment. From the record, it appears that defense counsel’s questions were designed to insinuate that the reason the indictment was dismissed was that the government determined that insufficient evidence existed to convict Iglesias. See R. 8-436-438. On re-direct, the AUSA asked the agent why the indictment had been dismissed. Iglesias’ objected on the grounds that the question called for a legal conclusion. The district judge, however, found that defense counsel’s line of questioning had opened the door to the AUSA’s question. Agent Robinson answered: We found out from the FBI, from the finger print cards that were sent in, that those finger prints that were taken from the gentleman who is now known as Manuel Iglesias having given us the name of Alvaro Perez at the time of arrest, those finger prints for instance the FBI showed that he had been previously arrested for kidnaping. R. 8-445-446. This drew another general objection from Iglesias. The district judge sustained the objection, instructed the jury to disregard the answer, and denied Iglesias’ motion for a mistrial. Iglesias asserts that, despite the curative instruction, this comment amounted to “plain error.” ‘“Plain error’ is found where there is a particularly egregious error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” See United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 1300, 108 L.Ed.2d 477 (1990). We have already determined that, at a later point in the trial, the district judge committed no’ error in admitting evidence of Iglesias’ drug-related kidnaping as Rule 404(b) evidence. Thus, the jury would be in possession of the information that Iglesias was an admitted kidnapper soon after Agent Robinson’s testimony. We conclude that its injection into the trial at this point, although improper, does not appear to rise to the level of misconduct and was not so egregiously prejudicial that it could not be cured by the appropriate instruction. First, we must agree with the district court that appellant’s line of questions regarding the dismissal of the original indictment against him certainly entitled the government to rebut appellant’s subtle insinuations by asking the witness to explain the reason for the prior dismissal. As for the gratuitous information offered by the witness regarding appellant’s prior criminal activity, while it may have been unresponsive to the question, it falls far short of being so prejudicial that the fundamental fairness of the proceedings would be called into question. Compare United States v. DeGeratto, 876 F.2d 576, 586-87 (7th Cir.1989) (holding repeated questioning and closing argument comments on a variety of uncharged misconduct, including “loan sharking,” was clearly prejudicial and “too far afield,” thus warranting a new trial). As we have repeatedly stated, “a prejudicial remark may be rendered harmless by curative instructions to the jury.” See e.g., United States v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082, 1087 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033, 113 S.Ct. 1854, 123 L.Ed.2d 476 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (upholding denial of mistrial where prosecutor made improper comments suggesting a shift in the burden of proof). Such an instruction “purges the taint of prejudicial remarks because a ‘jury is presumed to follow jury instructions.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 745, 79 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984)). In this case, the district judge sustained defense counsel’s objection and promptly instructed the jury to disregard the answer. Furthermore, as we noted above, the jury was also instructed twice regarding the proper use of the testimony that Iglesias had been convicted in a drug-related kidnaping, which is precisely the testimony that Agent Robinson gave. Appellant offers nothing to rebut the presumption that the jury followed these instructions. Iglesias also objects to the testimony of Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent George Miller who testified that when Iglesias was arrested in December 1989, he identified himself as “Del Campo.” Iglesias asserts that there was no legitimate purpose to support eliciting this testimony because it involved “an unrelated extrinsic crime occurring in 1989.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. His argument runs directly contrary to the record. According to Agent Miller’s testimony, Iglesias was arrested by the Miami Police after he fled from the area Agent Miller was surveilling. It was to Agent Miller that appellant represented himself has “Del Campo” while being processed at the DEA office in Miami on the charges contained in the November 15, 1989, indictment against him. We find nothing improper about this testimony. In any event, Iglesias failed to object to Agent Miller’s testimony at trial. As an evidentiary matter, a contemporaneous objection was required to allow the district court the opportunity to correct any error that may have existed. Simon, 964 F.2d at 1085. Absent such an objection, we do not apply the customary abuse of discretion standard. Our review, rather, would be limited to a search for “plain error.” While the relevance of this testimony may not be readily apparent, it was clearly not plain error to allow its admission. B. Disclosure of Jencks Material Iglesias next alleges that the government misrepresented the existence of Jencks material. Following the direct examination testimony of Harold Garcia, counsel for Pablo Martinez demanded that the government provide the defendants with a transcript of some prior testimony of Garcia which was given at a suppression hearing before a magistrate judge during the prosecution of a related case. A lengthy hearing followed in which counsel argued that the government’s obligations under the Jencks Act and Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required it to provide that testimony. Counsel further argued that, even if the government did not have actual possession of the transcript, it knew of its existence and was required to order it and give it to defendant so that “I don’t have to spend my client’s money to acquire these things.” R. 10-147. The government responded that it never ordered a transcript of the hearing and, therefore, there was nothing to provide because the information was not “in the possession of the United States” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 or Rule 26.2. The government further pointed out, and counsel apparently conceded, that at least one of the defense attorneys knew of the testimony’s existence because he was present during the suppression hearing in which it was given. The district judge denied both the motion to obtain the transcript, as well as a second motion by Iglesias’ attorney to dismiss on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. The district judge’s staff did, however, locate an audio tape of the suppression hearing proceedings which the district judge then made available to defense counsel. R. 10-203-204. We need spend little time addressing Iglesias’ contentions in this regard. Our precedent on this issue could not be more clear. The government is not required to disclose any statement in its possession until after the witness has testified on direct. United States v. Loyd, 743 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir.1984). Thus, such disclosure would not be untimely or tardy. Further, “[a] statement is ‘in the possession of the United States’ for Jencks Act purposes if it is in the possession of a federal prosecutorial agency.” United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856, 104 S.Ct. 175, 78 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). In Cagnina the defendant sought from the government the prior testimony of a government witness given during a suppression hearing. In upholding the district judge’s denial of the Jencks request, we stated: The testimony of [the witness] had apparently never been transcribed. In any event, no transcript was in the prosecutor’s possession. Anything in control of a district court, such as the court reporter’s notes, is not in the possession of the prosecutor and therefore does not fall within the requirements of the Jencks Act. Because neither [witnesses’] testimony was in the possession of the prosecutor and both could have been obtained by the defendant with reasonable diligence, the Government had no obligation to produce them. 697 F.2d at 922-23 (citations omitted). Closer factual similarity could not exist. The district judge here found, and counsel conceded, that there was nothing to indicate that the government did in fact have possession of a transcript of the hearing testimony. Accordingly, there was nothing to disclose or provide under either the Jencks Act or Rule 26.2. The defendants’ argument at trial that the Jencks Act was intended to force the government to search for such readily available statements, order them, and turn them over to the defense so that the defendant will not have to spend his own money is utterly without merit. We find no prosecutorial misconduct here. In any event, Iglesias has not alleged, nor do we find, any prejudice. From the record, it appears that the district judge went to great lengths to afford defense counsel the opportunity to listen to the suppression hearing tape and obtain a transcript if they so desired. Under these circumstances, we fail to see how there could be any prejudice. C. Closing Argument Iglesias next claims that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was so improper and inflammatory that his due process rights were violated. As a result, he argues, his conviction must be reversed and a new trial held. “For a prosecutor’s remarks to offend due process, the remarks must be improper and a reasonable probability must exist that, but for the offending remarks, the defendant would not have been convicted.” United States v. Rodgers, 981 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir.1993). “Prosecutorial misconduct is a basis for reversing an appellant’s conviction only if, in the context of the entire trial in light of any curative instruction, the misconduct may have prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused.” United States v. Lopez, 898 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1136, 107 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1990)). We apply these standards in reviewing the three specific areas of impropriety which appellant asserts. First, Iglesias takes exception to the prosecutor’s beginning remarks of his rebuttal argument which were allowed by the district judge over the defendants’ objections. The prosecutor stated: It offends me that lawyers can come up here and argue their case and call witness [sic] and yet these lawyers misstate the evidence to you. It offends me that lawyers can come up to you and tell us that witness [sic] are lying and then they incorrectly recite facts that weren’t in evidence for you. It offends me that lawyers can come up here and impugn the integrity of agents after calling these witness [sic] liars with no basis in fact whatsoever. It offends me that lawyers can come up here and call witnesses liars and not have listened during the trial that has lasted three weeks to understand the sequence in which the case was presented to you. I submit to you one day there is going to be a great book of fiction entitled lawyers [sic] closing arguments. Supp.R. 1-3-3^. Iglesias argues that these statements amounted to the injection of personal beliefs and vouching for the credibility of the government’s witnesses. The government contends that, taken in context, these statements were merely introductory comments meant to outline the prosecutor’s rebuttal that was to focus on specific assertions of defense counsel and characterizations of witnesses with which the government disagreed. Immediately following them, he stated: .1 just want to go down the list as to each attorney and help correct those misstatements that were made to you and help correct the inaccuracies because you are here to determine the facts, that are in evidence, not what lawyers tell you because that is not evidence. Supp.R. 1-3-4. We agree with the government that the prosecutor’s statements were, at a minimum, unartful. We do not, however, find that they rise to the level of misconduct. In hindsight, we agree that different words should have been chosen, but we are not prepared to say Iglesias has demonstrated that they were part of a calculated attempt to inflame the jury. Assuming for the moment that they were, it would strain reason to say that, taken in context of this entire three week trial, these five short statements were so infectious and prejudicial that, but for them, Iglesias would not have been convicted. Thus, we find no misconduct and, hence, no due process violation. Iglesias’ second claim of misconduct arising from the prosecutor’s closing argument concerns his allegation that the prosecutor deliberately misrepresented facts in the record to the jury. Specifically, Iglesias contends that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when addressing Iglesias’ defense that he was merely unwittingly present at the scene of the drug trafficking in order to give his brother a ride home. The evidence showed that it was during this time that weapons were delivered to the conspirators from the same car in which Iglesias soon left. The prosecutor argued that Iglesias was present because he was involved in supplying the conspirators with weapons. Iglesias’ objection that this was a misstatement of the evidence was initially sustained, but after explaining that he was arguing an inference that could be drawn, the district judge allowed the prosecutor to continue. Supp.R. 1-3-34-35. “Although it may be error to allow counsel to argue to the jury facts that are not in evidence, ‘a attorney is entitled to urge the conclusions which the attorney thinks the jury should draw from the evidence.’ ” United States v. Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450, 1456 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 1100, 1108 (5th Cm.), cert. denied sub nom., Perkins v. United States, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 2415, 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1979)). In this case, we think it clear that there was evidence to support the inference urged by the prosecutor in this part of his closing argument. The jury was instructed that the arguments of the lawyers where just that — arguments, not evidence. We therefore find no misconduct. Furthermore, as Iglesias himself aptly points out in his brief, there was other substantial evidence of his participation in this conspiracy. The jury heard evidence that Iglesias obtained the services of Caderno to captain the What’s Up for the third trip, was paid $50,000 for his integral efforts, helped unload a shipment of burlap bags in which the cocaine was to be stored, and told Torres that the weapons discussed above had been brought to the location to protect the cocaine shipment. Appellant’s brief at 14. Thus, again, even assuming the argument was improper, we are not prepared to say that, but for the prosecutor’s comments, the outcome would have been different. The third and final assertion that Iglesias makes concerning the government’s rebuttal is that the prosecutor’s reference to Iglesias’ prior conviction for the drug-related kidnaping was the culmination of the prosecutor’s efforts to portray appellant as a “bad man with the propensity to break the law” and amounted to “a flagrant violation of the appellant’s substantial right to his presumption of innocence for the crime charged as guaranteed by the due process clause [sic].... ” The reference occurred during the prosecutor’s attempt to rebut Iglesias’ argument that the government dismissed the original indictment against Iglesias for lack of evidence. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that “[t]here is a purpose for that testimony and the Court is going to instruct what that purpose is.” In sustaining the objection, the district judge stated, “That’s correct; it is to determine intent which is an issue in this case. Sustained.” As we have twice stated, this evidence was relevant to the issue of Iglesias’ intent. While the district judge had stricken Agent Robinson’s testimony regarding the kidnaping, that information came in later as Rule 404(b) evidence. It is clear that the prosecutor should not have used the evidence in the manner he was attempting to here. As we have also twice stated, however, the district judge repeatedly instructed the jury that it was only to consider that evidence on the issue of appellant’s intent. Indeed, in sustaining the objection, the judge again stated for the jury the sole purpose for which the evidence was to be used. Because the jury is presumed to follow the court’s instruction and, more importantly, because we do not find that this improper comment was so prejudicial that it deprived Iglesias of a fair trial or dictated the outcome, we must reject his argument. Thus, from our review of the prosecutor’s actions, taken individually or as a whole, we find no misconduct on the part of the government that deprived Iglesias of his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial. VI. Improper Prosecutorial Comment Noa, Abella, and Iglesias contend that they are entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor allegedly made an improper reference to the appellants’ exercise of their right not to testify. Specifically, appellants challenge comments made by the prosecutor during the testimony of Harold Garcia, a government witness. On cross examination, Noa’s counsel attempted to discredit Harold Garcia’s t