Full opinion text
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judge BUTZNER joined. Judge ERVIN concurred separately. OPINION LUTTIG, Circuit Judge: Petitioner-appellant ■ Harvey Green, who has been sentenced to death by the state of North Carolina on two counts of first-degree felony murder, appeals the decision of the district court dismissing his petition habeas corpus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court. I. The tragic facts of this case, which we need only summarize here, have been fully set forth by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 153-57, 443 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 547 (1994). On December 19, 1983, while committing a robbery at Young’s Cleaners in Bethel, North Carolina, petitioner Green bludgeoned to death Sheila Bland, a seventeen-year-old high school student who was working as the store cashier, and John Edmondsqn, a thirty-three-year-old church organist who was a store customer at the time. Within a matter of weeks, Green confessed to the crimes to the police. He also showed the police where he hid the murder weapon, which tested positively for blood and the victims’ hair, and he turned over to the police the pair of blood-splattered pants that he wore at the time of the killings. On January 16, 1984, the grand jury of Pitt County, North Carolina, returned an indictment of Green on two counts of first-degree felony murder. Green subsequently pled guilty to both counts. Pursuant to North Carolina law, a capital sentencing proceeding was conducted at which the jury recommended the death penalty for each murder, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether Green’s death sentences were unconstitutionally tainted by racial discrimination in jury selection in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). A Batson hearing was held, after the conclusion of which the lower court determined that there had been no racial discrimination in the selection of Green’s jury. The North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently remanded for a second Batson hearing, at which the trial court made more detailed findings of fact and again found no Batson error. While Green’s sentence was being appealed for the third time, the North Carolina Supreme Court remanded for resentencing in light of the, intervening United States Supreme Court case of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990), which held that it violated the Eighth Amendment for North Carolina to instruct a capital sentencing jury — as had occurred in Green’s case — that it must unanimously find the existence of any mitigating circumstances. At Green’s second capital sentencing hearing, the jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that Green had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, (2) that the murders of Sheila Bland and Michael Edmondson were for pecuniary gain, and (3) that those murders were part of a course of conduct in which Green committed another crime of violence against another person. Although the jury also found seven mitigating circumstances, it ultimately recommended death sentences for each of the two first-degree felony murders. Judgment, again, was entered accordingly. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in a thorough, fifty-eight page opinion, affirmed Green’s death sentences against various assignments of error. State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 443 S.E.2d 14 (1994). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 5,1994. Green v. North Carolina, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 547 (1994). Green then unsuccessfully sought to challenge his sentences through a motion for appropriate relief under North Carolina’s post-conviction relief procedures, and, after that motion was denied, on October 3, 1996, Green filed the instant petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court dismissed Green’s habeas petition, Green v. French, 978 F.Supp. 242 (E.D.N.C. July 16,1997), and Green appealed. II. Green’s petition for federal habeas relief was filed after the date on which the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, was signed into law. Accordingly, Green’s claims are governed by the new standards for federal habeas corpus as amended by the AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, — U.S. —, -, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (holding that the provisions of the AEDPA amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only govern habeas petitions filed after April 24,1996, the effective date of enactment of the AEDPA); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that the provisions of the AEDPA amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254 apply to habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996). Section 2254 provides that “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” upon a showing that his custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d)(1), as amended by the AEDPA, now provides, in relevant part, that such an application shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claims — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ... 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Amended section 2254(d)(1) therefore places at least three limitations upon the availability of federal habe-as relief: the petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of his federal claim was (1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of (2) clearly established federal law (3) as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. The proper constructions of these limitations are matters of first impression in this circuit. A. As a prerequisite to obtaining habeas relief under amended section 2254(d)(1), a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s adverse adjudication of the merits of his federal claim was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of’ clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court. Correctly defining “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of,” and distinguishing between the two terms for purposes of section 2254(d)(1), at first blush appears relatively simple. Upon reflection, however, it is evident that this appearance is deceptive, and that the intended meaning of these terms is not so clear at all. For, at least in common legal parlance and practice, not only is each of these terms invoked to describe various kinds and degrees of relationship between inferior and supreme court decisions, but, as well (or as a consequence), there is overlap between the phrases. A lower court’s decision, for example, certainly is said to be “contrary to” supreme court precedent when, through resolution of a question of pure law, that decision reaches a legal conclusion or a result opposite to that reached in a supreme court opinion which addresses the identical question of law. A lower court’s decision is likewise “contrary to” a higher court’s precedent when' that decision correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the precedent but applies that principle to facts that are indistinguishable in any material respect from those on the basis of which the precedent was decided in such a way as to reach a conclusion different from that reached by the higher court. It is also common to characterize a lower court decision as “contrary to” supreme court precedent when that decision applies a precedent in a factual context different from the one in which the precedent was decided and one to which extension of the legal principle of the precedent is indisputably unjustified, or, conversely, when that decision fails to apply a precedent in a different context to which the precedent’s principle clearly does apply. The phrase “unreasonable application of’ supreme court precedent is similarly invoked to describe various kinds and degrees of relationships between an inferior court decision and a superior court decision. A lower court is said to have unreasonably applied a higher court’s precedent when it extends the legal principle of that precedent to a new context in which the application of that principle is not reasonable, or conversely, as above, when, unreasonably, it fails to extend a principle to a context to which the principle should be extended. But it is also considered to be an “unreasonable application of’ a supreme court precedent when an inferior court applies the correct principle from the higher court’s precedent, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts before it, assuming the facts are not so different from those that gave rise to the precedent as to constitute an entirely new context, requiring examination anew of the applicability of the principle. (If the facts are sufficiently different from those of the precedent, then the application of the principle to those facts may entail not so much the mere application of law to fact, as customarily understood, but, rather, the application of the legal principle to an entirely new context.). That the terms “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of’ precedent, variously invoked, substantially overlap in common legal parlance is apparent. A decision in which a state court commits the error of unjustifiably applying a supreme court precedent in a different factual context from the one in which the precedent was decided, and a decision committing the converse error— the third and fourth examples above — are characterized interchangeably as decisions “contrary to” a supreme court precedent and decisions involving the “unreasonable application of’ that precedent. And the first two examples of a decision “contrary to” precedent might just as well be termed “unreasonable applications of’ the higher court’s precedent, as might the second example of an “unreasonable application of’ precedent be termed a decision “contrary to” precedent. Recognition of the fact that the phrases “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of’ a higher court’s, precedent have overlapping meanings in common • parlance, however, is only to identify the .interpretive conundrum of the statute. The difficult question is precisely what meaning to accord each term in light of- these overlapping meanings and the overarching canon of construction that each term should be construed so as to accord it a meaning different from, and independent of, the other. Ultimately, we believe that according each term its most natural (even if not its only) meaning, results in an interpretation of the statute most faithful to the plain purpose of the statute. On these understandings of the terms, a decision is “contrary to” precedent only when, either through a decision of pure law or the application of law to facts indistinguishable in any material way from those on the basis of which the precedent was decided, that decision reaches a legal conclusion or a result opposite to and irreconcilable with that reached in the precedent that addresses the identical issue. In contrast, a decision represents an “unreasonable application of’ precedent only when that decision applies a precedent in a context different from the one in which the precedent was decided and one to which extension of the legal principle of the precedent is not reasonable, when that decision fails to apply the principle of a precedent in a context where such failure is unreasonable, or when that decision recognizes the correct principle from the higher court’s precedent, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts before it (assuming the facts are insufficiently different from those that gave rise to the precedent as to constitute a new context for consideration of the principle’s applicability). Defining the terms in this manner, respectively, captures, we believe, the obvious common sense of the statute: If a state court decision is in square conflict with a precedent (supreme court) which is controlling as to law and fact, then the writ of habeas corpus should issue; if no such controlling decision exists, the writ should issue only if the state court’s resolution of a question of pure law rests upon an objectively unreasonable derivation of legal principles from the relevant supreme court precedents, or if its decision rests upon an objectively unreasonable application of established principles to new facts. In other words, habeas relief is authorized only when the state courts have decided the question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, The use of the word “unreasonable” in formulating this restrictive standard of review implicitly denotes that federal courts must respect all reasonable decisions of state courts. Thus, given the statutory language, and in the light of legislative history that unequivocally establishes that Congress meant to enact deferential standards, we hold that an application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state .court ruling was incorrect. In other words, we can grant habeas relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996); id. at 769 (holding that state court’s application of law to fact was not “unreasonable” because majority and dissent of court of appeals disagreed over whether state court correctly applied the law to the facts); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (suggesting that purpose of “unreasonable application of’ clause is, not unlike Teague, to “validate[ ] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts” (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990))); id. at 871 (“The Supreme Court of the United States sets the bounds of what is ‘reasonable’; a state decision within those limits must be respected — not because it is right ... but because the grave remedy of upsetting a judgment entered by another judicial system after full litigation is reserved for grave occasions.”). Like our court, our sister circuits are only beginning to consider the new amendments to section 2254(d)(1) and their application to the various aspects of judicial decisionmaking described above, but the emerging interpretations of these terms are consistent with ours today, even if they are alternatively formulated and yet inchoate. Those circuits that have thus far addressed themselves to the amendments, and to section 2254(d)(1) in particular, clearly agree with us that the category of state court decisions that are “contrary to” supreme court precedent includes those cases in which a state court’s decision of a question of pure law is in irreconcilable conflict with a controlling resolution of that same legal question by the supreme court. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871, 877 (referring to category as comprising cases resolved on the basis of “concrete entitlements” or “core legal issues” as determined by the Supreme Court); compare id. at 869 (“[s]o if, for example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had held that the Confrontation Clause does not entitle defendants to cross-examine witnesses to establish bias, then Davis v. Alaska would show that the decision is ‘contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ ... ”), with Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (invalidating robbery and burglary conviction of defendant who was not permitted to cross-examine key prosecution witness for bias); see also Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 768 (referring to category as comprising cases resolved on the basis of a “purely legal question” determined by the Supreme Court); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 923 (11th Cir.1998) (“a state court decision would be ‘contrary to’ clearly established Supreme Court ease law ... [when] a state court, in contravention of Supreme Court case law, fails to apply the correct legal principles to decide a case.”). Indeed, these circuits may believe that the category of decisions “contrary to” supreme court precedent excludes all other decisions of pure law as to which there is no supreme court precedent directly controlling as to both law and fact. See, e.g., Lindh, 96 F.3d at 876 (concluding that state court decision was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law because petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to cross-examine a witness for bias during the dispositional phase of bifurcated proceeding “would be a nontrivial extension of current law,” given that Supreme Court “has not yet so held” that “all [such] testimony ... must be subject to cross-examination”); Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 768-69 (stating generally that all purely legal questions are reviewed under “contrary to” clause, but holding only that state court decision applying directly on point Supreme Court precedent was not “contrary to” precedents); Neelley, 138 F.3d 917, 923-24 (discussing situations where state court decision is “contrary to” relevant law to include only “when a state court faces a set of facts that is essentially the same as those the Supreme Court has faced earlier, but given these facts the state court reaches a different legal conclusion than that of the Supreme Court,” and “a state court, in contravention of Supreme Court case law, fails to apply the correct legal principles to decide a case”). These courts have not differentiated (at least not explicitly) between state court decisions resting entirely on the erroneous resolution of pure questions of law and decisions that incorrectly apply the correct purely legal principle to facts that are so similar to those of the precedent as to be considered indistinguishable. But from their analyses, it is clear these courts would (if they do not already, implicitly) regard these latter decisions, also, as “contrary to” precedent. See, e.g. Neelley, 138 F.3d 917, 923-24. Our sister circuits have also clearly held that a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of’ precedent when that decision invokes the correct principle from the precedent, but unreasonably applies that principle to facts similar to (in contrast to indistinguishable from) those of the precedent. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871 (citing case addressing question of “how long is too long” for purposes of Speedy Trial Clause as example of case analyzed under “unreasonable application of’ clause of section 2254(d)(1)); id. at 876 (“The Supreme Court of Wisconsin asked the legally correct question by inquiring whether the trial judge abused his discretion; this is exactly how [the United States Supreme Court case of] Van Arsdall poses the issue. And the fact-specific answer cannot be called ‘unreasonable’ even if it is wrong.”); Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 767 (stating that “unreasonable application of’ clause refers to “questions that require the application of law to facts”); id. at 768-69 (holding state conviction not “unreasonable application of’ federal law because reasonable judges could disagree about the application of Lockett and Eddings to the facts of the state court case); Neelley, 138 F.3d 917, 923-24. In so holding, though, these circuits have, to date, considered the “unreasonable application of’ precedent in reference only to facts that were sufficiently similar to the facts of the Supreme Court precedent as not to raise a question as to the applicability of the precedent vel non. They do not appear to have considered, or at least to have considered fully, the related circumstance where the state decision applies (or refuses-to apply) a precedent in a factual context sufficiently different from the one in which the precedent was decided that the state court’s action is more appropriately considered not the mere application of law to fact, but, rather, the extension (on nonextension) of a legal principle to an entirely new context. In Lindh, for example, at the point of the opinion where the court might have had to address squarely the precise contours of the “contrary to” clause itself vis-a-vis the precise contours of the “unreasonable application of’ clause, the court was able to sidestep these issues by determining instead that there was no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that a particular principle extended to a new context, obviating the need to decide the meaning of the term.“contrary to,” much less the differences between the meanings of “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of’ in this context. 96 F.3d at 876 (noting that Supreme Court has never held that the Confrontation Clause applies to testimony at dispositional phase of bifurcated proceeding and concluding therefore that “we think it impossible to say that ‘clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of .the United States’” entitled petitioner to cross-examine witness). See also Neelley, 138 F.3d 917, 923-24 (not discussing the category of the application of a legal principle to a new context). When ultimately forced to confront the issue, these courts, to be sure, could analyze decisions addressing this related circumstance under the “contrary to” clause. In particular, although we confess to confusion over the Lindh opinion and its seemingly internally inconsistent passages, we acknowledge that opinion does imply that such an analysis might be appropriate. However, if ultimately forced to decide the question, we believe it more likely that these courts would decide that such decisions are properly analyzed under the “unreasonable applications of’ clause of section 2254, and that they will regard such decisions as “unreasonable applications of’ the precedent if the extension or nonextension of the legal principle was objectively unreasonable. Compare id. at 870 (stating that in every instance where “the dispute lies ... in the meaning of the Constitution” review is to proceed under “contrary to” clause), with id. at 877 (limiting “contrary to” clause to decisions of “core” legal issues), and id. at 871 (“For current purposes it is enough to say that when the constitutional question is a matter of degree, rather than of concrete entitlement,. a ‘reasonable’ decision by the state court must be honored.”). Any other method of analysis would not only be in tension with the language of the statute itself, which makes no distinction at all between the application of a legal principle to a new context and the application of such a principle to a particular set of facts, but would fail to accord independent meaning to each of the three limitations on granting the writ expressly imposed by the amendment— namely, that the state court decision be (1) “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of’ (2) “clearly established Federal law” (3) “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” But whether our sister circuits analyze state court decisions involving the extension of a principle to a new context under the “contrary to” clause or the “unreasonable application of’ clause of section 2254(d)(1) appears to be of little, if any, practical significance ultimately, because of the manner in which these courts interpret the second and third limitations in the amendments to section 2254(d)(1) that the state decision must have been in conflict with “clearly established federal law” “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” In order to obtain habeas relief, the petitioner must show that the state court decision conflicted with “clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” According to these courts, to make this showing in the context of the extension of a principle to a new context, the petitioner must demonstrate that no reasonable jurist would disagree that, based upon the relevant (even if not directly controlling) Supreme Court’s precedents, the principle should extend (or not extend) to the new context. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 869-70 (the “clearly established” formulation “is unlikely to pose a different kind of interpretive challenge” to that under Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)] which “validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions”); Neelley, 138 F.3d 917, 924 (“The ‘clearly established’ language echoes the concerns underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions in Teague v. Lane and its progeny ---- [and w]e think that a similar analysis obtains under the ‘clearly established’ language of § 2254, as a rule that is ‘new’ cannot be ‘clearly established.’ ”). If no reasonable jurist would disagree over the applicability of the principle to the new context, then the petitioner will have shown not only that the state decision was “contrary to” clearly established precedent on an understanding of section 2254(d)(1) that analyzes extensions of principle to new contexts under the “contrary to” clause of the section; he also will have shown that the decision was an “unreasonable application of’ clearly established law on an understanding of the section that analyzes such extensions under the “unreasonable application of’ clause. And the writ will issue. B. The AEDPA also limits habeas relief to those petitioners who can demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of their federal claims was inconsistent with “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner Green urges us to interpret this limitation as essentially codifying the anti-retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). See Reply Br. at 13 (“The question of whether Appellant’s claim is Teague-barred or precluded by the AED-PA is the same question.”). To be sure, we agree with petitioner that this provision of section 2254(d)(1) imports an anti-retroactivity principle into federal habeas law by requiring a habeas petitioner to demonstrate that the state court’s resolution of his claim was inconsistent with federal law that was clearly established at the time his conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (limiting habeas relief to any claim that “was adjudicated” on the merits in state court unless that decision “was” inconsistent with “clearly established Federal law”). Nevertheless, we decline to interpret this provision of section 2254(d) as simply codifying the Teague doctrine, because that doctrine is different from section 2254(d) in subtle, but several, respects. First, section 2254(d) makes no reference to the two traditional exceptions under Teague, compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 311-12, 109 S.Ct. at 1075-76 (noting exceptions from Teague anti-retroactivity doctrine for new rules which either “plaee[] certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” or are “watershed rules of criminal procedure” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), which is at least some evidence that Congress understood section 2254(d) to impose a different type of limitation upon habeas review. Second, section 2254(d) nowhere employs the “new rule” language of Teague, even though other provisions of the AEDPA do so unmistakably. And, finally, the anti-retroactivity principles of Teague would appear applicable in contexts where the limitations of section 2254(d)(1) are not, such as where a habeas petitioner’s constitutional claim is not properly raised in state court and therefore not “adjudicated on the merits in State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but where a court may nonetheless conclude that the failure to properly raise the claim in state court is not excused (or perhaps, excused but Teague-barred) because the claim relies upon a new rule of constitutional law not made retroactive on collateral review. Compare Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (novelty of constitutional claim is cause for failure to raise the claim in state court) with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (novel claims generally not cognizable on federal habeas review). Because section 2254(d) is different from Teague in at least these three respects, we decline to' interpret the “clearly established” language of the AEDPA as simply codifying the existing non-retroactivity doctrine of Teague. C. The AEDPA also limits the source of clearly established law to that “determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Almost as an afterthought, and apparently for the first time on appeal, Green argues that this limitation unconstitutionally constricts the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts in two ways, and he urges us to construe this source of law limitation out of the statute in order to save the AEDPA from constitutional infirmities. We find neither of Green’s arguments as to the unconstitutionality of this limitation persuasive. First, Green contends that, to the extent the AEDPA limits the source of law cognizable on habeas to Supreme Court precedent, it violates the separation of powers by vesting federal courts with jurisdiction to decide disputes and then “dictating the judiciary’s determination of governing law.” Appellant’s Br. at 34 (quoting Lindh, 96 F.3d at 887 (Ripple, J., dissenting)). See U.S. Const. Art III § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995). Appellant’s reliance on Plaut is misguided, however, because unlike the statute at issue in that case, the amendments to section 2254(d)(1) do not offend the separation of powers by purporting to legislatively reopen a final judgment. In amending section 2254(d)(1), Congress has simply adopted a choice of law rule that prospectively governs classes of habeas cases; it has not subjected final judgments to revision, nor has it dictated the judiciary’s interpretation of governing law and mandated a particular result in any pending ease. And amended section 2254(d) does not limit any inferior federal court’s independent interpretive authority to determine the meaning of federal law in any Article III case or controversy. Under the AEDPA, we are free, if we choose, to decide whether a habeas petitioner’s conviction and sentence violate any constitutional rights. Section 2254(d) only places an additional restriction upon the scope of the habeas remedy in certain circumstances. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 872 (“[r]egulating relief is a far cry from limiting the interpretive power of the courts, however, and Congress has ample power to adjust the circumstances under which the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is deployed.”). As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Lindh in great detail, such a limitation upon the scope of a remedy is entirely ordinary and unexceptionable, even when the remedy is one for constitutional rights. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 870-73; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3430, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (good faith exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (independent discovery doctrine); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Fourth Amendment claims that were capable of full and fair litigation in state court are not generally cognizable in federal habeas review); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (new rules not made retroactive are not cognizable on federal ha-beas review); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (qualified immunity to damages actions claiming official action violated constitutional liberties). Moreover, even if section 2254(d) does limit the interpretive power of the lower federal courts in some sense, that limitation is tantamount to other such choice of law limitations which are widely accepted and have never been thought to raise Article III problems. See Lindh at 870-73 (discussing non-constitutional contexts — such as res judicata, Erie, and federal court certification of state law issues — where federal courts are often bound by another tribunal’s interpretation of law). Green’s second constitutional argument relating to the construction of section 2254(d)(1) relies upon the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause, of course, provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. Art. I § 9. We confess to confusion over Green’s abbreviated argument on this score. Apparently, Green’s argument is that any statutory modification of the availability of habeas relief that “sharply limits” a federal court’s power to grant the writ “threatens a violation of the Suspension Clause.” Reply Br. at 17. And so (the argument goes, or would go) because the provision of section 2254(d)(1) which limits the source of law cognizable on habeas review to that established by the Supreme Court would (presumably) amount to a “sharp limitation” upon the scope of the writ, section 2254(d)(1) must be construed to permit lower federal courts sitting in habeas to issue the writ based only upon an inconsistency between their own precedents and a state court’s adjudication of a federal claim. Green does not, however, articulate why the source of law limitation of section 2254(d)(1) violates the Suspension Clause, nor does he cite to any authority defining the contours of the Suspension Clause, or invalidating any federal statute on Suspension Clause grounds. From our review of the few precedents interpreting the Suspension Clause, we conclude that amended section 2254(d)(1) does not suspend the privilege of the writ, but rather, represents a modest congressional alteration of the standards pursuant to which the writ issues. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 867 (“to alter the standards on which the writ issues is not to ‘suspend’ the privilege of the writ.”). As the Supreme Court and other courts have repeatedly recognized, it is generally the Congress’ prerogative to define the scope of the writ of habeas corpus. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-65, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“we have long recognized that ‘the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law,’ and we have likewise recognized that judgments about the proper scope of the writ are ‘normally for Congress to make.’ ” (citations omitted)); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 48 L.Ed.2d 666 (1976) (plurality) (rejecting Suspension Clause challenge to provision of 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)); Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868 (“Collateral review of judgments ... is subject to legislative control” as evidenced by section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which “prohibited any inquiry by the federal courts into the propriety of state custody” as well as the Congressional repeal in 1868 of the “first created general power of collateral review”). See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 297-306, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2493-98, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (arguing against a proposed construction of section 2254(a) similar to our interpretation of section 2254(d) without concluding any Suspension Clause violation); id. at 305-06, 112 S.Ct. at 2497-98 (apparently acknowledging congressional authority to amend section 2254 in a manner similar to our interpretation of section 2254(d)(1)). In fact, very recently in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996), the Supreme Court rejected a Suspension Clause challenge to a provision of the AEDPA that limited successive habeas petitions. By analogy, we believe Congress can, without offending the Suspension Clause, similarly narrow the source of law cognizable on habeas review of petitions from prisoners in custody pursuant to state court judgments. This conclusion is confirmed by the history of the writ of habeas corpus, which is far broader in scope today than it was at the time that the Suspension Clause was ratified. As the Supreme Court recently discussed in Felker: The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which exists today. As we explained previously, the first Congress made the writ of habeas corpus available only to prisoners confined under the authority of the United States, not under state authority. See Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103, 44 U.S. 103, 11 L.Ed. 514 (1845). The class of judicial actions reviewable by the writ was more restricted as well. In Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 28 U.S. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830), we denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a prisoner “detained in prison by virtue of the judgment of a court, which court possesses general and final jurisdiction in criminal eases.” Id. at 202. Reviewing the English common law which informed American courts’ understanding of the scope of the writ, we held that “[t]he judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of its own legality,” and that we could not “usurp that power by the instrumentality of the writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 207. It was not until 1867 that Congress made the writ generally available’ in “all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.” And it was not until well into this century that this Court interpreted that provision to allow a final judgment of conviction in a state court to be collaterally attacked on habeas. See, e.g. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (some citations omitted). This history strongly suggests that the AEDPA’s modest constriction does not violate the Suspension Clause, as originally understood. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 867 (reviewing historical evidence and concluding “there was (and is) no constitutionally enshrined right to mount a collateral attack on a state court’s judgment in the inferior Article III courts and, a fortiori, no mandate that state court judgments embracing questionable (or even erroneous) interpretations of the federal Constitution be reviewed by the inferior Article III courts”); United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3rd Cir.1953) (“[I]t would appear that the complete denial of the writ of habeas corpus to convicted federal prisoners would not violate the Constitution[ f]or under the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, as well as under the common law in force when the Constitution was adopted, habeas corpus was not available to persons convicted of crime to test the legality of their conviction.” (citations omitted)). Therefore, we conclude that this provision of the AEDPA fits comfortably with both recent Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Suspension Clause, as well as the original meaning of the Clause itself. III. Green’s first constitutional claim is that the trial court denied him due process of law by rejecting his request for an allocution. On August 17,1992, during his second capital sentencing proceeding, Green moved the court for an order permitting him to have an “allocution at the appropriate time before the jury retires to deliberate.” J.A. vol. II at 449. The court denied Green’s motion, but ultimately permitted Green to place his proposed statement into the record, presumably for purposes of appellate review. J.A. vol. II at 451. That proposed allocution is an approximately ten page statement that details aspects of Green’s life story, specifically, how his earlier crime of attempting to rape a woman while he was in the Army led to his dishonorable discharge; his inability to find gainful employment; his descent into alcohol and drug abuse; and his poverty, which he claims eventually forced him to forge checks in his father’s name and then steal money from Young’s Cleaners in order to pay it back. Second Sentencing Transcript at 2216-2225. In his statement, Green denies having had the intent to kill his victims; he explains that he. was simply “trying to rob [Young’s Cleaners] with a toy gun,” id. at 2222, and that he “didn’t mean to hurt anyone” when he killed Sheila Bland and Michael Edmondson. Id. at 2224. The proposed allocution concludes with Green’s plea for the jury’s forgiveness. Id. 2225. On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Green argued, as he does today, that a trial court deprives a criminal defendant of due process of law when it denies his effectively communicated request to plead for mercy with the jury prior to the imposition of his sentence. In support of this argument, petitioner Green relies upon the fact that some right of allocution has been protected since the time of English common law. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129, 11 S.Ct. 761, 765, 35 L.Ed. 377 (1891); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961) (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J.). For further support of his constitutional claim, Green relies upon language in various Supreme Court opinions that, in dissent, concurrence, or otherwise in dicta, refers to the common law right of allocution as “ancient in the law,” United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 165, 84 S.Ct. 295, 296-97, 11 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963) (opinion of Black, J.), a “traditional right,” id. at 167, 84 S.Ct. at 297-98 (opinion of Burger, C.J.), “elementary right,” id. (Harlan, J., concurring), of “immemorial origin,” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1472, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), and of significance because “[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.” Green, 365 U.S. at 304, 81 S.Ct. at 655. Finally, Green relies upon lower court opinions holding that due process protects the practice of allocution. See Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.1978); Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.1992). The North Carolina Supreme Court, after canvassing the history of the common law right of allocution, as well as the Supreme Court and lower court precedents relied upon by Green, ultimately concluded that there is no constitutional right to allocution, at least where, as in Green’s case, the defendant seeks to use allocution as a vehicle for presenting unsworn (and often factual) testimony to the sentencing jury without subjecting himself to government cross-examination. Green, 336 N.C. at 190-93, 443 S.E.2d 14. Based upon our own independent review of the applicable law, we cannot conclude that the North Carolina court’s rejection of Green’s allocution claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of’ “clearly established Federal law,” “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A. Green relies primarily upon three decisions of the Supreme Court: Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961); United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 84 S.Ct. 295, 11 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963); and Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). None of these precedents, however, “clearly establishes” Green’s due process claim. First, petitioner’s reliance upon Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961), is, we believe, ultimately misguided. In Green, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence of a federal criminal defendant who claimed he had been denied his right to allocute guaranteed by Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At that time, Rule 32(a) required the court to “afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.” Id. at 303 n. 1, 81 S.Ct. at 655 n. 1. In Green, the sentencing court asked the defense, “[d]id you want to say something?”, at which time the defendant’s lawyer made a plea for leniency, but the defendant himself never made any statement on his own behalf. Id. at 302, 81 S.Ct. at 654. Several years after the sentence, the defendant moved to vacate his sentence on the grounds that he had not been personally afforded an opportunity to speak, as required by Rule 32(a). The Supreme Court in Green affirmed the sentence. Justice Frankfurter, joined by seven Justices on this point, looked to the common law tradition of personal allocution and construed Rule 32(a) in light of that history as creating a personal right even though the language of Rule 32(a) did not clearly do so. See id. at 302, 81 S.Ct. at 654 (plurality opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and Harlan); id. at 307, 81 S.Ct. at 656-57 (dissenting opinion of Black, J., joined by the' Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan). However, Justice Frankfurter went on to conclude that the defendant had not carried his burden of proving that he was denied any personal right because the trial judge’s question “[d]id you want to say something?” might have been directed toward the defendant himself who may have chosen to speak through his attorney. In this conclusion, Justice Frankfurter was joined by three other Justices. Justice Stewart concurred in the result on the grounds that Rule 32(a) created no personal right at all. Id. at 306, 81 S.Ct. at 656 (opinion of Stewart, J., concurring) (“Rule 32(a) does not seem to me clearly to require a district judge in every case to volunteer to the defendant an opportunity personally to make a statement, when the defendant has a lawyer at his side who speaks fully on his behalf.”). Finally, after finding defendant Green’s sentence to be legal, Justice Frankfurter opined that in future cases, and “as a matter of good judicial administration,” sentencing judges should “unambiguously address themselves to the defendant” when complying with the requirements of Rule 32(a). Id. at 305, 81 S.Ct. at 655-56. Rule 32(a) was subsequently amended to reflect Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion. Compare id. at 303 n. 1, 81 S.Ct. at 655 n. 1 (text of old Rule 32(a)), with Rule 32(c)(3)(C) (before imposing sentence the court shall “address the defendant personally and ask the defendant if the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment”). Thus, Green does not “clearly establish” any due process right to allocution. The opinion simply interpreted Rule 32(a) in light of its common law origins. The opinion never held, nor did any of the Justices even hint, that the right to allocution is protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Green, 365 U.S. at 307, 81 S.Ct. at 656-57 (Black, J., dissenting) (referring to allocution as a “eom-mon-law right” and mandated by “Federal Criminal Rule 32(a)”). In fact, the plurality opinion of Justice Frankfurter instructed the lower federal courts in future cases to address defendants personally only as a matter of “good judicial administration” — not as a matter of constitutional right. Id. at 305, 81 S.Ct. at 655-56. Moreover, the Court in Green evidenced little solicitude for the practice of allocution; the plurality opinion of Justice Frankfurter indicated that it declined to vacate the defendant’s sentence because the defendant could not prove that he had not waived his personal rights under Rule 32(a), id. at 305, 81 S.Ct. at 655-56 (“[i]t may well be that the defendant himself was recognized and sufficiently apprised of his right to speak and chose to exercise this right through his counsel”), even though the government had admitted in its brief that the sentencing judge’s question “[d]id you want to say something?” was addressed to the defendant’s counsel and not the defendant himself. Id. at 310, 81 S.Ct. at 658 (Black, J., dissenting). Therefore, reading the dicta in Green regarding the ancient origins of allocution in the context of what the Court actually did in that case, we cannot conclude that Green clearly established any substantial due process right to allocution. Cf. id. at 311, 81 S.Ct. at 658 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Green was not enforcing the right of allocution but rather was “merely prais[ing it] in resounding glittering generalities calculated to soften the blow of nonenforcement”). Neither does United States v. Behrens “clearly establish” any due process right to allocution. 375 U.S. 162, 84 S.Ct. 295, 11 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963). That case held, at most, that a trial court cannot modify a defendant’s temporary sentence, in the defendant’s absence, without violating Rule 32(a). Again, the opinion only interpreted Rule 32(a), and 18 U.S.C. section 4208(b) (the provision for sentence modification), and did not in any way suggest that a right of allocution applied in state criminal proceedings by operation of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g. id. at 165, 84 S.Ct. at 296-97 (opinion of Black, J.) (allo-cution in federal criminal cases is “recognized by Rule 32(a)”); id. at 167, 84 S.Ct. at 297-98 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring) (allocution in federal criminal eases is “embodied in Rule 32(a)”). The case of Hill v. United States is particularly unsupportive of Green’s due process claim. 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). In Hill, the Supreme Court held that a federal trial court’s failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) and-ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he had anything to say before sentence is imposed, was not cognizable in a later habeas challenge to the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the face of the established practice of allowing allocution, the Court in Hill held that a federal court’s failure to comply with that practice as re-' quired by the Federal, Rules of Criminal Procedure was an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. Id. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Hill therefore held that the conceded violation of the right of allocution protected by Rule 32(a) was not cognizable in a section 2255 habeas action because, in such a habeas proceeding, relief was generally limited to challenging “a sentence [that] was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. at 426, 82 S.Ct. at 470 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Accord Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). Petitioner Green insists that the facts of Hill are distinguishable from the case sub judice, and that Hill therefore does not foreclose his allocution claim. To be sure, and as the Supreme Court itself recognized in Hill, the trial court in that case denied the defendant’s right to allocute only in the sense that it did not inform him of his personal right of allocution and the defendant ultimately did not allocute; the court did not deny an affirmative request for allocution by the defendant. Id. at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 471-72. Thus, petitioner is unquestionably correct that the Supreme Court has not specifically foreclosed his argument that he has a due process right to allocute once he effectively communicates his desire to do so. Indeed, as the Supreme Court emphasized in the later landmark case of McGautha v. California, the Court has never decided whether it violates due process to turn down a defendant’s affirmative request for allocution. 402 U.S. 183, 219 n. 22, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1473 n. 22, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). Green therefore insists that Hill does not foreclose his claim, and that because the Supreme Court has “never disavowed” that precise due process claim, Reply Br. at 24 (emphasis, added), he is • entitled to habeas relief. That-a particular claim is open to question, has been specifically reserved, or has never been “disavowed” by the Supreme Court does not, however, establish that the lower court’s rejection of that claim was either “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of’ “clearly established Federal law[ ] as determined by the Supreme Court.” Although Green would have us award habeas relief upon the basis of any federal claim that the Supreme Court has not specifically “disavowed,” such an interpretation would transform habeas review under amended 2254(d)(1) into a one-way ratchet whereby a state court must resolve all open questions of federal law in the defendant’s favor in order to prevent the conviction or sentence from being vacated on habeas review. Rather, as we discussed supra, petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his allocution claim was at odds with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent, or else applied Supreme Court precedent in a patently unreasonable way. It follows from this interpretation of section 2254 that, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Green’s allocution claim was not “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court caselaw. Not only is there no Supreme Court case holding that someone in Green’s position has been denied a constitutional due process right to allocution, but the Supreme Court on more than one occasion has specifically mentioned that the .merit of such a claim is an open question. Hill, 368 U.S. at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 471-72; McGautha, 402 U.S. at 219 n. 22, 91 S.Ct. at 1473 n. 22. Furthermore, none of the other Supreme Court decisions cited by petitioner clearly establishes the existence of such a due process right of allocution. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (invalidating summary contempt conviction of attorney on due process grounds in a ease where contempt was adjudicated and punishment imposed after the close of court proceedings and contemnor was not afforded notice or an opportunity to respond to contempt charges); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972) (holding state legislature had imposed the punishment of legislative contempt in violation of due process because it failed to provide contemnor with notice or an opportunity to respond); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 12 S.Ct. 525, 36 L.Ed. 218 (1892) (common law practice of allocution not applicable in appellate court); Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 11 S.Ct. 761, 35 L.Ed. 377 (1891) (holding that order that defendant be executed by hanging was not an appeal-able final judgment triggering time limit for filing appeal, in part, because it did not appear that at the time of entry of order the defendant was asked why sentence should not be pronounced against him). Green therefore cannot point to any decisions of the Supreme Court to which the state court’s adjudication of his allocution claim was “contrary.” Nor did the North Carolina Supreme Court unreasonably apply any clearly established Supreme Court caselaw in rejecting Green’s allocution claim. Although petitioner has cited us to dicta in opinions from the Court discussing the common law practice of allocution, he has not directed us to any Supreme Court decision holding that there is a constitutional foundation, under any circumstances, to that common law right. And, in fact, many lower courts have read this same body of Supreme Court precedents not to create any constitutional right to allo-cution. See United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.1997) (no constitutional right to allocution even when affirmative request for allocution is denied); United States v. Fleming, 849 F.2d 568 (11th Cir.1988) (same); Martin v. United States, 809 F.2d 81 (10th Cir.1962) (same); United States v. Coffey, 871 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.1989) (holding allocution not required prior to resentencing defendant for probation revocation because no due process right to allocution exists); United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.1989) (no constitutional right to allocution); United States v. De La Paz, 698 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.1983) (same); Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 357, 509 A.2d 120 (1986) (vacating sentence based on state common law right of allocution but holding “allocution is not a fundamental right secured by either the federal or state constitution” even when affirmative request for allocution is denied); State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 374 A.2d 1107 (1977) (no deprivation of due process for state to deny defendant’s affirmative request for allocution); see also State v. Chow, 77 Hawai'i 241, 247, 883 P.2d 663 (1994) (reading Hill to foreclose any federal due process right not to be denied an affirmative request for allocution); cf. Freeman v. State, 876 P.2d 283 (Ct.Crim.App.Okl.1994) (holding no federal' due process right of criminal defendant not to be denied an affirmative request for allo-cution). Indeed, it appears as if only about half of the states provide by statute or other rule for any allocution right, and “[i]n states where the right is not codified, ‘the tendency is to regard the practice as a technical formality of little importance in modern criminal procedure, where other procedural devices afford the accused ample opportunity to protect himself at all stages of the proceedings.’ ” In re Shannon B, 22 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1240, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 800 (1994) (quoting 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, at 1295). We are reluctant to conclude that all of these lower ■ courts and states have applied Supreme Court authority unreasonably, and we conclude that, at the very least, it was reasonable for the North Carolina Supreme Court to read extant Supreme Court caselaw not to clearly establish a federal constitutional right to allocution based upon the common law practice of the same. Even assuming arguendo that the traditional common law practice of allocution has risen to the level of a constitutional entitlement, the North Carolina Supreme Court was nevertheless reasonable in concluding that common law history does not create a constitutional right to allocution in the quite different modern context where a¡ criminal defendant receives other sufficient procedural rights and protections to cure any potential constitutional defect of being deprived of a formal allocution. At English common law, in capital cases, the practice of allocution required the judge to inquire of the defendant if he had any reason why sentence should not be imposed upon him. See State v. Green, 336 N.C. at 191, 443 S.E.2d 14 (noting defendant’s common law right to be asked formally whether he had “anything to offer why judgment should not be given against him” (quoting Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 175 (1689))).- At that time, however, capital defendants Fad no right to counsel nor could they testify in their own behalf. In re Shannon B, 22 Cal.App.4th at 1240, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 800. Allocution therefore afforded a convicted defendant with his only opportu