Full opinion text
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINSON and - Judges WIDENER, WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS joined. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote a concurring opinion. Judge WIDENER wrote a concurring opinion. Judge MICHAEL wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Judges MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, and DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ joined. OPINION LUTTIG, Circuit Judge: Following eighteen years of public debate among the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth enacted, and the Governor of the Commonwealth signed into law, the state’s Parental Notice Act, which requires that a minor who decides to have an abortion inform one of her parents twenty-four hours prior to performance of the procedure. Only hours before this law was to become effective, the federal district court for the Western District of Virginia enjoined enforcement of the Act by the Commonwealth. Upon extraordinary motion of Virginia’s Attorney General, we immediately stayed the district court’s injunction, and allowed the law to become effective in accordance with its terms. We hold today that the Commonwealth’s parental notice statute, as legislation that respects the fundamental interests of responsible parents in the rearing and in the educational, moral, and religious development of their children, without unduly burdening the fundamental abortion right, is facially constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. A contrary holding — that the People of Virginia are forbidden by the Constitution of the United States from requiring that the responsible mother and father of a pregnant teenage daughter even be told of the life-defining decision their own daughter confronts — we are convinced, would be a holding not of law, but of will, and thus would betray the trust upon which our very legitimacy as an institution depends.’ I. Virginia’s Governor Allen signed into law the Commonwealth’s Parental Notice Act, Va.Code § 16.1-24RV), on March 22, 1997. The Virginia General Assembly had passed the measure a month earlier. By its terms, the Act was to become effective at 12:01 Tuesday morning, July 1,1997. As the title denotes, the Act is a parental ■ notice statute, not a parental consent statute; it prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on an unemancipated minor unless, twenty-four hours in advance of the procedure, notice of the anticipated abortion is provided to one of the minor’s parents, to a duly appointed legal guardian or custodian of the minor, or to one standing in loco parentis to the minor. The Act expressly allows the performance of abortions without notice in circumstances in which the minor seeking the abortion has been the victim of parental abuse or neglect, and in circumstances in which either an abortion is immediately necessary to prevent the mother’s death or there is insufficient time to permit notification without exposing the minor to serious health risk. Although the Supreme Court has never held that a parental notification law must include a judicial bypass procedure in order to withstand constitutional challenge, the Parental Notice Act includes such a procedure. That procedure permits, if it does not require, authorization of an abortion without parental notification for a minor who shows that she is mature and capable of giving informed consent, and it requires such authorization for an immature minor, and at least the abused mature minor as well, as to whom it is determined that an abortion would be in her best interest. The Act confers upon every minor who avails herself of the bypass procedure the right to participate in the court proceedings on her own behalf and to have counsel assist her throughout the proceedings. If the minor so requests, the court is obligated to appoint counsel for the purpose of assisting the young woman in the bypass proceedings. The Act also provides that bypass proceedings, which are to be conducted before the Commonwealth’s Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, “shall be confidential.” And the statute further provides both that judicial bypass proceedings “shall be given precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay in order to serve the best interests of the minor” and that bypass petitions “shall be heard as soon as practicable but in no event later than four days after the petition [seeking judicial authorization] is filed.” Finally, the Act provides any minor for whom judicial bypass of notification is denied “an expedited confidential appeal to the circuit court.” Notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s inclusion of a judicial bypass procedure in its Parental Notice Act, and of the other aforementioned safeguards, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Virginia, on the eve of the Act’s effective date, preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the Act by the Commonwealth, holding that a substantial probability exists that the Act is facially unconstitutional. See District Court’s Memorandum Op. at 7-8. At 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, following issuance of the district court’s order and the district court’s subsequent denial of the Commonwealth’s motion for stay of its decision, the Commonwealth filed a motion with a single Circuit Judge to stay the district court’s injunction, and, at 7:45 p.m. that night, the judgment of the district court was stayed pending appeal. See Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707 (4th Cir.1997). The stay was thereafter affirmed by the en banc court, see Planned Parenthood v. Cambios, 125 F.3d 884 (4th Cir.1997), and the full en banc court subsequently heard oral argument in the matter on March 3, 1998. II. In enjoining Virginia’s Parental Notice Act, the district court relied entirely upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (Bellotti II), reasoning that, in that decision, the Supreme Court had set forth the constitutional standards applicable to state parental notification statutes, not merely parental consent statutes. Thus, said the district court, “[t]his court will ... apply [Planned Parenthood v.] Casey, [505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) ] and Bellotti II to the case at bar. Bellotti II requires that a judicial bypass satisfy foui' criteria.” Memorandum Op. at 9 (footnote and citation omitted). And the court went on to examine the judicial bypass provisions of Virginia’s parental notification statute under the criteria identified by the Court in Bellotti II as essential in order for a judicial bypass procedure within a parental consent statute to satisfy the Constitution. Specifically, the district court observed that the Supreme Court in Bellotti II held that “[i]f [a pregnant minor] satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.” Memorandum Op. at 10 (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.) (emphasis added by district court)). The court then contrasted this requirement with the relevant provision of the Commonwealth’s Act, which provides that, “[a]fter a hearing, a judge may authorize a physician to perform an abortion upon finding that the minor is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion.” Id. (quoting Va.Code § 16.1— 241(V) (emphasis added by district court)). Concluding that the Virginia statute confers upon the judicial officer the absolute discretion whether to authorize a physician to perform an abortion without notice on a minor whom the court has determined is mature, the district court held that “[t]his discretion violates the Bellotti II rule for ‘mature’ minors.” Memorandum Op. at 11. As discussed more fully below, although the Supreme Court held in Bellotti II that parental consent statutes must include specified judicial bypass procedures, including mandatory judicial bypass for mature minors, the Court did not address what, if any, such procedures are necessary in the context of a parental notice statute, like that enacted by the Commonwealth. And although the Supreme Court has subsequently upheld parental notice statutes which included Bellotti II-style bypass procedures, see Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 117 S.Ct. 1169, 137 L.Ed.2d 464 (1997) (per curiam); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990) (Akron II); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990), the Court has always carefully distinguished such statutes from parental consent statutes, explicitly reserving the question of what, if any, bypass procedures are required for parental notice statutes, see, e.g., Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1171-72; Akron II, 497 U.S. at 510-11, 110 S.Ct. 2972; see discussion infra. In concluding that the Supreme Court has held that a parental notification statute must meet the very same requirements that obtain for a parental consent statute, the district court seems to have confused the question of the standard of review applicable in facial challenges to abortion statutes and the question of the substantive requirements that a state’s judicial bypass must satisfy if it is to meet constitutional standards. It appears that the district court conflated these two distinct questions because of its misreading of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir.1995), as equating the two separate questions. Thus, for example, and most tellingly, the district court stated that, [i]n [Miller], the Eighth Circuit considered whether Bellotti II or [United States v.] Salerno, [481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987),] applied to a parental notification statute. The court concluded that “the [Supreme] Court [in Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791,] effectively overruled Salerno for facial challenges to abortion statutes” and went on to apply the Bellotti II standard. Significantly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari of Miller. Memorandum Op. at 8 (citations omitted); see also id (stating that plaintiffs argue that “Casey left intact the Bellotti v. Baird standard of review for judicial bypass provisions in parental consent statutes” (citations omitted)). The Eighth Circuit in Miller, however, did not reason or hold as the district court believed. That court first decided that the standard of review articulated in Casey, rather than that in Salerno, applies to facial challenges to abortion statutes and then, separately, concluded that a Bellotti II-type bypass procedure is required if a parental notification statute is to be upheld as constitutional. As that court framed the standard of review issue before it: The critical issue in this ease is a threshold one: what is the standard for a challenge to the facial constitutionality of an abortion law? The State would have us apply the test set out in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), under which “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Planned Parenthood, on the other hand, contends that the Supreme Court replaced the Salerno test in Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Under Casey, it claims, an abortion law is unconstitutional on its face if, “in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.” 112 S.Ct. at 2830. Miller, 63 F.3d at 1456-57 (parallel citations omitted). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit did not even cite Bellotti II in its discussion of the appropriate standard of review. See Miller, 63 F.3d at 1456-58. The district court compounded the error created by its misreading of Miller by misunderstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Lambert as “reinforcing]” its misreading of Miller. See Memorandum Op. at 9. Specifically, the district court reasoned that the Supreme Court affirmed in Lambert that Bellotti II applies in the context of parental notification statutes because the Court described the Ninth Circuit’s error in that case merely as a “misapplication” of the Bellotti II standard, and not as an application of the “wrong” standard. Thus, said the district court: The Supreme Court reinforced the Eighth Circuit’s Miller conclusion in Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S.Ct. at 1169, when it reversed a Ninth Circuit decision which held the Montana Notice of Abortion Act unconstitutional under Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (1991). In its opinion, the Court discussed the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Bellotti II standard to the Montana act and concluded that the court had misapplied existing case law. Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1171. This discussion of the misapplication of the Bellotti II standard — as opposed to the application of the wrong standard — and the denial of certiorari in Miller leads this court to conclude that the Supreme Court intends for Casey and Bel-lotti II to be applied to parental notice bypass provisions. This court will therefore apply Casey and Bellotti II to the case at bar. Memorandum Op. at 9 (emphases in original; footnote and citations omitted). Contrary to the district court’s belief, the Court in Lam-beri said nothing whatsoever concerning the standard of review applicable to facial challenges to abortion regulation statutes, as one would expect given that Lambert was a summary reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, without even argument. Indeed, neither Salerno nor Casey is even cited in the Court’s relatively brief per curiam opinion in Lambert. In Lambert, the Supreme Court did, as the district court noted, discuss the Bellotti II criteria. But it did so only in demonstration that the judicial bypass provision at issue in Lambert was “substantively indistinguishable” from the bypass in the Ohio notice statute which the Court sustained in Akron II on the grounds that it satisfied the Bellotti II standards, and, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit’s Lambert decision “simply [could not] be squared with [the Supreme Court’s] decision in Akron II.” 117 S.Ct. at 1171-72. The Court emphatically did not apply Bellotti II, as the district court surmised, having concluded that a parental notification statute must satisfy Bellotti II’s requirements for a bypass procedure within a parental consent statute. In fact, in Lambert, the Court went out of its way to repeat both that it had not held in Akron II that a parental notification statute must include a bypass procedure and that it had held only that Ohio’s bypass provision “a fortiori ... satisfied any criteria that might be required for bypass provisions in parental notification statutes” because it “satisfied the four Bellotti criteria required for bypass provisions in parental consent statutes.” Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1171. The Court even chided the Ninth Circuit for invalidating Nevada’s parental notification statute in Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.1991), the decision as to which the Ninth Circuit concluded in Lambert that it was bound, “[d]espite the fact that Akron II involved a parental notification statute, and Bellotti involved a parental consent statute.” Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1171. In doing so, the Court cited and quoted Justice Stevens’ concurrence in the judgment in Bellotti II that Bellotti II did not determine “the constitutionality of a statute which does no more than require notice to the parents, without affording them or any other third party an absolute veto.” Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1171 n. 3 (citing and quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 654 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). In the end, therefore, the district court correctly seemed to recognize that an issue has arisen as to whether, in Casey, the Supreme Court sub silentio overruled its decision in Salerno on the standard of review applicable to facial challenges to statutes regulating abortion, and therefore that a question exists as to whether the plaintiff in a facial challenge to an abortion statute must show that “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, or instead must show only that "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." Casey, 505 U.S. at 895, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The district court erred, however, in reasoning from its conclusion that the Eighth Circuit was correct in Miller that Casey overruled Salerno, that Bellotti II perforce establishes the proper standard of review for facial challenges to abortion regulation statutes and directly controls the inquiry as to the constitutionality of judicial bypass procedures within parental notification (and not just parental consent) statutes. It is plain not only that Bellotti II does neither, but also that the scope of the substantive holding of the Court in that decision will be unaffected by the final resolution of the question of whether the standard of review is that in Salerno or Casey. That is, regardless of the standard of review for facial challenges finally adopted, the Court held in Bellotti II, as we discuss below, only that a parental consent statute must include a judicial bypass procedure, and only established the procedures necessary for a consent statute. Accordingly, the conclusion of law on which the district court's injunction to the Commonwealth rested, namely, that a parental notification statute must include a judicial bypass procedure that satisfies Bellotti II's requirements governing bypass procedures in parental consent statutes in order to be constitutional, was simply in error. III. We ordinarily review a district court's ruling on a preliminary injunction only for abuse of discretion, that is, only in order to determine "whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the presence or absence of irreparable harm and a probability that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits," Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986). Cf. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) (stating that "it is generally inappro~riate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the merits" (emphasis added)); Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 231, 49 S.Ct. 266, 73 L.Ed. 675 (1929) (similar). However, it is only as a prudential matter that we normally so circumscribe our review. In other words, this practice is "a rule of orderly judicial administration," Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757, 106 S.Ct. 2169, and not an "inflexible" "limit on[our] judicial power," id. at 756-57, 106 S.Ct. 2169. Where a district court's decision "rests solely on a premise as to the applicable rule of law, and the facts are established or of no controlling relevance," id. at 757, 106 S.Ct. 2169, we may, even on appeal from the entry of a preliminary injunction, proceed to the merits underlying the district court's judgment. For, in such cases, "[t}he customary discretion accorded to a District Court's ruling on a preliminary injunction yields to our plenary scope of review as to the applicable law." Id. (quoting American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 290 (3d Cir.1984)); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (finding, despite the early stage of the litigation, that the case was ripe for merits review on appeal from stay of preliminary injunction). Appellate adjudication of the underlying legal merits, on an appeal from the issuance of a preliminary injunction, is most clearly justified where not only does the injunction rest entirely upon a pure question of law, but it is plain that the plaintiff cannot prevail as a matter of the governing law. When this is apparent to the court of appeals, a defendant is, as the Supreme Court has observed for more than a century, entitled both to immediate relief and to relief from the expense of further litigation. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (citing Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525, 17 S.Ct. 407, 41 L.Ed. 810 (1897)); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287, 61 S.Ct. 229, 85 L.Ed. 189 (1940); North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Story, 268 U.S. 288, 292, 45 S.Ct. 531, 69 L.Ed. 959 (1925) (“By the ordinary practice in equity as administered in England and this country, an appellate court has the power on appeal from a temporary or interlocutory order or decree to examine the merits of the case if sufficiently shown by the pleadings and the record and upon deciding them in favor of the defendant to dismiss the bill and save both parties the needless expense of further prosecution of the suit.”); City of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 136, 33 S.Ct. 657, 57 L.Ed. 1101 (1913) (explaining that the appellate power to review preliminary injunctions “is not confined to the act of granting the injunctions, but extends as well to determining whether there is any insuperable objection, in point of jurisdiction or merits” to the underlying claim, “and, if so, to directing a final decree dismissing it”); Metropolitan Water Co. v. Raw Valley Drainage District, 223 U.S. 519, 523, 32 S.Ct. 246, 56 L.Ed. 533 (1912) (“For, while at one time there was some difference in the rulings on that subject, it was finally settled by Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 17 S.Ct. 407, 41 L.Ed. 810, that, on appeal from a mere interlocutory order, the circuit court of appeals might direct the bill to be dismissed if it appeared that the complainant was not entitled to maintain its suit.” (parallel citations omitted)). These principles confirm the appropriateness of our proceeding to the underlying merits in this case. Here, the district court’s injunction rests entirely upon that court’s holding, as a matter of pure law, that a parental notice statute must include a judicial bypass in order to be constitutional and that that bypass must be identical to that required in order to sustain a parental consent statute. And the district court fundamentally erred in its resolution of these questions. Furthermore, the facts necessary to resolve these issues are undisputed, as even the plaintiffs-appellees correctly conceded at argument. Consequently, additional proceedings in the district court would serve no purpose whatsoever. While the parties dispute the precise contours of the judicial bypass included within the Commonwealth’s parental notice statute (in pai’ticular, the meaning of the maturity bypass and the scope and efficacy of its requirements for confidentiality and expeditiousness), these disputes turn upon disagreements as to the proper interpretation of the statute, and secondarily upon predictions as to how the statute will actually operate in practice — disagreements resolvable ultimately, not through determinations of fact, but rather only through determinations of, and predictions as to, state law. Because the appellate court does not defer to the trial court on interpretations of state law, see Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), and the parties have already extensively briefed, both before the district court and this court, their respective predictions as to how the statute will actually be applied, further proceedings in the district court would obviously aid neither enterprise. Recognizing that this dispute is ripe for consideration on the merits, the parties themselves agreed at oral argument that further proceedings in the district court are not necessary and that resolution of the merits of the dispute by this court would be appropriate. Therefore, rather than extend this litigation — which is plainly ripe for final adjudication, implicates fundamental constitutional rights as determined by the Supreme Court, and has already been pending for over a year — we proceed to the merits of plaintiffs’ contention that Virginia’s Parental Notice Act, on its face, violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of minor women in the Commonwealth who choose to have abortions. IV. The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), that a woman has a fundamental liberty interest in the decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term, and, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed that a woman has the “right ‘to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion’ ” in making the abortion decision, 505 U.S. at 875, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint op. of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972)). In accordance with its recognition of this fundamental liberty interest, the Court has consistently held that the state may not permit another to exercise, in fact or in effect, an absolute, and therefore potentially arbitrary, veto over a woman’s— even a minor woman’s — decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. Since Roe, the Court has reviewed both parental consent and parental notice statutes challenged on the grounds that they imper-missibly permitted third-party veto of the abortion decision, invalidating several parental consent statutes on the grounds that they did effectively permit such veto of the abortion decisions of mature minors and minors for whom an abortion was in their best interest. The Court first addressed the constitutionality of a parental consent statute in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). Because it conferred on the parent “an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision” of the minor and her doctor to terminate the minor’s pregnancy, the Court struck down a “blanket” parental consent provision that prohibited all minors under the age of eighteen from obtaining an abortion without a parent’s consent. Id. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831. Three years later, in Bellotti II, the Court considered a parental consent statute that required a minor to obtain the consent of both of her parents or of a court before she could have an abortion. Again expressing concern over the possibility of an impermissible, absolute parental veto over the minor’s abortion decision, the principal opinion of the Court held that, if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents’ consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained. 443 U.S. at 643, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted). The principal opinion defined the constitutional requirements for that alternative, or bypass, procedure as follows: A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the “absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto” that was found impermissible in Danforth. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.) (footnote omitted). It then went on to invalidate the Massachusetts consent statute in question because it permitted the court to exercise an absolute veto over the abortion decision of a minor whom the court determined to be “mature and fully competent to make th[e] decision independently,” id. at 651, 99 S.Ct. 3035, a discretion the first of the four Bellotti II criteria forbids. See id. (op. of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 653-56, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the statute was unconstitutional because it subjected the abortion decision of every minor — “no matter how mature” — to “an absolute third-party veto” by either a parent or a judge). Although the Court invalidated Massachusetts’ two-parent consent statute for the reasons stated, a majority of the Court expressed that, because of the value of responsible parental involvement in the minor’s abortion decision, it would have upheld the state’s two-parent consent statute if that statute had included a bypass that satisfied the criteria outlined in the principal opinion: We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents’ consent unconstitutionally burdens a minor’s right to seek an abortion. The abortion decision has implications far broader than those associated with most other kinds of medical treatment. At least when the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at home, both the father and mother have an interest — one normally supportive — in helping to determine the course that is in the best interests of a daughter. Consent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have been recognized as protective of their immaturity. Id. at 649, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.); see id. at 643-44, 99 S.Ct. 3035; id. at 656-57, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (White, J., dissenting) (noting his continuing dissent from the holding of Danforth that a state cannot require a minor to obtain the consent of her parents before undergoing an abortion). And, in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983), the Court did sustain a one-parent consent statute that included a judicial bypass that allowed the minor to obtain an abortion without consent if she proved that she was mature enough to make her own decision or that the abortion was otherwise in her best interests. See id. at 491-93, 103 S.Ct. 2517. The Court similarly upheld a one-parent consent statute in Casey that allowed a bypass of consent if the minor could demonstrate to the court that she “[wa]s mature and capable of giving informed consent and ha[d] in fact given her informed consent, or that an abortion would be in her best interests.” 505 U.S. at- 899, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint op.); id. at 970-71, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Sealia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (upholding the parental consent provision). Thus, although the Supreme Court has held that states 'may permissibly condition a minor’s abortion even on parental consent to the procedure, it has required that parental consent statutes include Bellotti II judicial bypasses in order to ensure that the minor’s decision is not subject to an absolute and arbitrary third-party veto. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint op.) (“reaffirming] ... that a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure”). In contrast to its assessment of parental consent statutes, the Court has consistently recognized that the same potential for absolute veto over the abortion decision that inheres in a parental consent statute does not inhere in a parental notice statute, and therefore that notice statutes are fundamentally different from — and less burdensome than— consent statutes. As Justice Kennedy stated for four Members of the Court in Hodgson, [t]he difference between notice and consent[requirements] was apparent to us before and is apparent now. Unlike parental consent laws, a law requiring parental notice does not give any third party the legal right to make the minor’s decision for her, or to prevent her from obtaining an abortion should she choose to have one performed. We have acknowledged this distinction as “fundamental,” and as one “substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge.” 497 U.S. at 496, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146, 148, 96 S.Ct. 2867, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976) (Bellotti /)). And Justices Stevens and O’Connor have likewise noted that, [ajlthough the Court has held that parents may not exercise “an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto” over [the abortion] decision, it has never challenged a State’s reasonable judgment that the decision should be made after notification to and consultation with a parent. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 445, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, J.) (citation omitted); compare Akron II, 497 U.S. at 511, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (majority) (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 n. 17, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), for observation that “notice statutes are not equivalent to consent statutes because they do not give anyone a veto power over a minor’s abortion decision”), with id. at 526, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“I conclude ... [that] a parental-notice statute is tantamount to a parental-consent statute. As a practical matter, a notification requirement will have the same deterrent effect on a pregnant minor seeking to exercise her constitutional right as does a consent statute.”). The Court has addressed the constitutionality of parental notice provisions in four cases. In the first, H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), it held that a state can, without providing any bypass procedure at all, constitutionally require notice to the parents of an unemancipated minor who has “made no claim or showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with her parents.” Id. at 407, 101 S.Ct. 1164. The Court explained that even if “the requirement of notice to parents [might] inhibit some minors from seeking abortions,” id. at 413, 101 S.Ct. 1164, the requirement extended to “neither parents nor judges a veto power over the minor’s abortion decision,” id. at 411, 101 S.Ct. 1164 (footnote omitted), and therefore was constitutionally permissible: Although we have held that a state may not constitutionally legislate a blanket, un-reviewable power of parents to veto their daughter’s abortion, a statute setting out a “mere requirement of parental notice” does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor. Id. at 409, 101 S.Ct. 1164 (footnotes omitted). Since Matheson, the Court has twice more upheld parental notice statutes. In each of these instances, the statute included the Bel-lotti II bypass procedures required for consent statutes, and the Court simply sustained the statutes on the grounds that a notice statute that satisfies the requirements for a consent statute necessarily satisfies any requirements that might exist for a mere notice statute. In Akron II, the Court sustained Ohio’s single-parent notification statute, which included a judicial bypass that met the Bellotti II consent bypass requirements. Akron II, 497 U.S. at 511-15, 110 S.Ct. 2972. And most recently, in Lambert, the Court summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit decision which invalidated a Montana one-parent notice provision that included a Bellotti II bypass. Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1172; see discussion supra. 'Indeed, in the twenty-five years since Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has invalidated only one parental notice provision — the Minnesota two-parent notification provision at issue in Hodgson — and that was on the narrow ground that the statute failed to provide adequate exceptions to notice in circumstances where a parent was abusive or had not assumed the responsibilities of parenthood. The Court in Hodgson was so fractured as to render its opinions collectively all but impenetrable, with five different Justices filing opinions variously concurring and dissenting in other opinions and parts of other opinions, prompting Justice Scalia to canvass thus the Court’s action in Hodgson (and in Akron II, decided the same day): One Justice holds that two-parent notification is unconstitutional (at least in the present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but constitutional with bypass; four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is constitutional with or without bypass; four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is unconstitutional with or without bypass, though the four apply two different standards; six Justices hold that one-parent notification with bypass is constitutional, though for two different sets of reasons; and three Justices would hold that one-parent notification with bypass is unconstitutional. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 479-80, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). But at the end of the day, one majority of the Court struck down the state’s two-parent notification provision without any bypass, see id. at 455, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J., for the Court), and a different majority sustained the statute with a Bellotti II bypass, which became operative in the event of the notification provision’s invalidation, see Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 461, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (O’Connor, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); id. at 496, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The specific reasoning of the individual Justices was as follows. Four Justices, it is plain, would have upheld Minnesota’s two-parent notice statute without any judicial bypass at all, reasoning that it is “permissible for a State to legislate on the premise that parents, as a general rule, are interested in their children’s welfare and will act in accord with it.” See id. at 485, 489-497, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Four other Members of the Court joined in an opinion written by Justice Stevens that could fairly be understood as holding that all two-parent notice statutes are per se unconstitutional because (with respect to the functioning family) they either “fail to serve any state interest” at all or fail to serve any “legitimate interest,” id. at 450, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J., for the Court), and because (with respect to the dysfunctional family) they actually “disserve[J the state interest in protecting and assisting the minor” by “proving] positively harmful to the minor and her family.” Id. Justice Stevens’ opinion notes that the state defended the statute on the basis of its interest in having the minor make the abortion decision “only after consultation with both parents who should naturally be concerned with the child’s welfare” and “in protecting the independent right of the parents ‘to determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their children,’ ” id. at 451-52, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (citation omitted), and then states, without qualification, that “[njeither of these reasons can justify the two-parent notification requirement,” id. at 452, 110 S.Ct. 2926. Then, after surveying statutes nationwide “governing the health, welfare, and education of children” that authorized a minor to act with notice to or with the consent of a single parent or guardian, and declaring the Minnesota statute an “oddity” by comparison, id. at 454, 110 S.Ct. 2926, the opinion concludes: These statutes provide testimony to the unreasonableness of the Minnesota two-parent notification requirement and to the ease with which the State can adopt less burdensome means to protect the minor’s welfare. We therefore hold that this requirement violates the Constitution. Id. at 455, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (citations omitted); see also id. at 481, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Today, the Court holds that a statute requiring a minor to notify both parents that she plans to have an abortion is not a permissible means of furthering the [state’s interest in encouraging a minor to seek the advice of her parents when making the abortion decision.]”). It is apparent, however, that, although Justice O’Connor provided the fifth vote for the majority that invalidated the Minnesota notice statute without a bypass, she did not subscribe to the precise reasoning in Justice Stevens’ opinion. In her separate opinion in which she sets forth her own reasoning for invalidating Minnesota’s two-parent notice statute, Justice O’Connor contrasts the Minnesota statute with .the statute in Arkansas, which, she noted, provided for exceptions to its two-parent notice requirement that would permit notice bypass in instances of abuse and permanently absent parents. See id. at 459-60, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (“Subdivision 2 is the most stringent notification statute in the country. The only other State that defines the generic term ‘parents’ as ‘both parents’ is Arkansas, and that statute provides for numerous exceptions to the two-parent notification requirement and permits bypassing notification where notification would not be in the best interests of the minor.” (citations omitted)). She then identifies the specific flaws in the statute that prompted her vote to strike down the statute as first, that its exception to notification for abused or neglected minors was “less than effectual” because “in reality, [it was] a means of notifying the parents,” and, second, that the statute required two-parent notice when “only half of the minors in the State of Minnesota reside with both biological parents” and “[a] third live with only one parent.” Id. Justice O’Connor thus makes clear that she struck down the statute, not because a state may never require notice to both a mother and a father, but, rather, because of the “broad sweep” of Minnesota’s statute in particular, and “its failure to serve the purposes asserted by the State in too many cases.” Id. at 460, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); see also id. at 459, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (“I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that Minnesota has offered no sufficient justification for its interference with the family’s decisionmaking processes created by subdivision 2 .... ” (emphasis added)); id. at 479, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Sealia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that he understood Justice O’Con-nor’s opinion as holding “that two-parent notification is unconstitutional (at least in the present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but constitutional with bypass” (emphasis added)). That this was Justice O’Connor’s understanding also of Justice Stevens’ opinion, and thus was the narrow grounds upon which Justice Stevens’ opinion rests, is conclusively confirmed by the fact that Justice O’Connor ultimately voted to sustain the Minnesota statute, with a judicial bypass. Id. at 461, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part). Obviously, if Justice O’Connor had believed that a state never has a legitimate interest in notice to both parents — as Justice Stevens’ opinion could be read to hold, and as, from his opinion in dissent, he appears to believe, see id. at 455-58, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Stevens, J., dissenting) — she could not have sustained the provision with the bypass. In fact, the Court as a whole could not have upheld the Minnesota statute with the bypass, as it did, if five Justices had actually held that the state has no interest whatsoever in requiring that two parents be notified of their minor daughter’s abortion decision. See id. at 461, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part) (upholding the two-parent notice statute with bypass); id. at 497, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Sealia, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, a bypass cannot save a statute that is not reasonably related to any legitimate state interest in the first place. Id. at 457, 110 S.Ct. 2926. Therefore, it is evident that the Court in Hodgson did not hold that a two-parent notice requirement is per se unconstitutional; in fact, a majority of the Court held that a two-parent notice requirement generally furthers important and legitimate state interests. It is equally evident that the Court did not hold that a parental notification statute— even a two-parent statute — must include a judicial bypass in order to be constitutional. As noted, Justices Kennedy, White, Rehnquist and Scalia would have sustained the statute even without the bypass and actually did (together with Justice O’Connor) sustain the statute with the bypass. Justice O’Con-nor voted to invalidate the statute without the bypass, but only because it failed adequately to provide exceptions to notice for the abusive parent and the parent who failed to accept the responsibilities of parenthood. And she ultimately voted to uphold the statute, not because all two-parent notice statutes require a Bellotti II bypass and the modified Minnesota statute contained such a bypass, but, rather, because the statute’s Bellotti II bypass necessarily cured the defects she identified in Minnesota’s notice statute. See Akron II, 497 U.S. at 511, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (“As we hold today in Hodgson v. Minnesota, it is a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent statutes that a bypass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will suffice also for a notice statute.” (citations omitted; emphasis added)). That the Court did not strike down the statute because it lacked a judicial bypass, but, rather, because of the overbreadth of the statute’s notice requirement, even appears upon a careful reading of Justice- Stevens’ opinion. As that opinion recites its holding at the beginning of its analysis: “It is equally clear that the requirement that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest.” Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J., for the Court) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added); see also id. at 424-25, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (“No exception [to the notice requirement] is made for a divorced parent, a noncustodial parent, or a biological parent who never married or lived with the pregnant woman’s mother.”); id. at 445-46, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (noting that biological parents’ “interest in controlling the education and upbringing of then- children” rises to “the level of a liberty interest” only “through the assumption of personal, financial, or custodial responsibility”). Indeed, the very same day that Hodgson was decided, the Court in Akron II, avoiding the notice bypass issue in the same way that it had in Hodgson, expressly confirmed, in an opinion in which Justice O’Connor herself joined, that it had yet to decide whether the Constitution requires that a parental notice statute include a judicial bypass: [Although our cases have required bypass procedures for parental consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental notice statutes must contain such procedures. See Matheson, [450 U.S. at 413 & n. 25, 101 S.Ct. 1164], (upholding a notice statute without a bypass procedure as applied to immature dependent minors). We leave the question open, because, whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment, requires notice statutes to contain bypass procedures, [the Ohio parental notice statute’s] bypass procedure meets the requirements identified for parental consent statutes.... Akron II, 497 U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. 2972; see also Lambert, 117 S.Ct. at 1171 (reaffirming that, in Akron II (and therefore presumably in Hodgson as well), the Court had “declined to decide whether a parental notification statute must include some sort of bypass provision to be constitutional”). And the question of whether a bypass is necessary within a parental notice (as opposed to consent) statute still remains open today. V. Turning now to this question for the first time in our Circuit, we conclude, based upon the substantial authority from the Court emphasizing the fundamental differences between consent and notice statutes, that the Constitution does not require for "mere notice" statutes the full panoply of safeguards required by the Court in Bellotti II for parental consent statutes. In particular, we conclude that a parental notice statute that includes the exceptions to notice identified in Hodgson is, without more, facially constitutional. That is, provided that a parental notice statute does not condition the minor's access to abortion upon notice to abusive or neglectful parents, absent parents who have not assumed their parental responsibilities, or parents with similar relationships to their daughters, we do not believe that more is required in order to withstand a facial challenge to its constitutionality. For a parental notice statute-unlike either a spousal notice or a blanket parental consent statute-has neither "the purpose [n]or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion," Casey, 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint op.), and therefore cannot reasonably be said to unduly burden the minor's abortion right, see id. A. 1. A parental notice statute-one-parent or two-parent-that excepts from its requirements notice to the abusive or neglectful parent, or the parent who has not assumed responsibility for the minor, indisputably furthers legitimate and important state interests. Such a notice statute serves the compelling state interest in securing inviolate the right of a mother and a father to rear their child as they see fit, and to participate fully in that child's life, as free from governmental interference as constitutionally permissible. It is a fundamental premise of our society that "{tjhe child is not the mere creature of the State" and that "those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for," the challenges and decisions of life. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 637, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.); see also Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 445, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J.) (stating that as “ ‘a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed[,]’ ” “[p]arents have an interest in controlling the education and upbringing of their children”) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983)). As the Court observed in Matheson, “constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.” 450 U.S. at 410, 101 S.Ct. 1164 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968)); see also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.) (“[D]eeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition[] is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one’s children.”). And as Justice Kennedy has stated, [t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 484, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Indeed, the parental right to shape and direct the life of one’s child during that child’s minority is itself a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Constitution: The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential, basic civil rights of man.... It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Id. at 447, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 639 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.) (“The Court’s opinions [in] Pierce [v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)] [Wisconsin v.] Yoder, [406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)] Prince [v. Com. of Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)] and Ginsburg ... all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse interference by the State.”); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 410, 101 S.Ct. 1164 (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.” (citations omitted)); see also Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 484, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). And this parental liberty interest is, the Court has recognized, fully consistent with the minor’s liberty interest in the abortion decision. See, e.g., id. at 444 n. 31, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (op. of Stevens, J.) (“Properly understood ... the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.”) (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.)). In fact, this fundamental parental interest, derivatively asserted by the state on behalf of the parent, is at its zenith when the decision as to which parental involvement is urged is one — like the abortion decision — with profound and enduring consequences not merely for the physical well-being of the child, but for the child’s spiritual, moral, and emotional development. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 637-38, 640, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.); see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[E]ven if [the abortion decision] is the most important kind of a decision a young person may ever make, that assumption merely enhances the quality of the State’s interest in maximizing the probability that the decision be made correctly and with full understanding of the consequences of either alternative”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint op.) (explaining that waiting period required by informed parental consent provision legitimately provided “the parent or parents of a pregnant young woman the opportunity to consult with her in private, and to discuss the consequences of her decision in the context of the values and moral or religious principles of their family”); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 480, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (describing abortion decision as a “grave” one, and observing that “a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support”) (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 641, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (opinion of Powell, J.)). Because parents do have a fundamental liberty interest in the parent to child relationship, see id. at 484, 110 S.Ct. 2926— an interest that is not only compatible with, but also supportive of, the minor’s liberty interest in her pregnancy- — the state plainly furthers a legitimate constitutional end when it affirmatively encourages continued parental involvement with the minor child by requiring that mothers and fathers know of the most profound choices their children confront, see id. As importantly, the requirement that responsible parents be apprised of their minor daughter’s decision to obtain an abortion furthers the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the minor’s abortion decision is fully informed. That the states may constitutionally enact reasonable regulations to ensure informed consent, even for adult women, is beyond question. As the Court observed in Casey: What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. ... Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or-the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose. 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (joint op.) (emphasis added). It was precisely because of the importance of this state interest that the Court upheld, as not “unduly burdensome” on the abortion right, Pennsylvania’s informed consent provision, which permitted women to obtain abortions only after being given truthful and nonmisleading information regarding the nature of the abortion procedure. The requirement that women contemplating an abortion be provided such information, reasoned the Court, merely “facilitate[d] the wise exercise of th[e] [abortion] right.” Id. at 887, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Of course, the state has an even stronger interest in ensuring that the consent of minors is informed because minors are more likely than adults to proceed uninformed. See, e.g., id. at 899, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (explaining that informed consent provisions “have particular force with respect to minors”). As the Court has often recognized, “at the same time [that the teenager] is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult,” she is, due to her “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence ... less able to evaluate the consequences of ... her conduct.” Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 459, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment in part) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988)); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (op. of Powell, J.) (noting that “minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them” and therefore that the state validly may limit their freedom to choose). The parents, on the other hand, “possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions” and the “natural bonds of affection” lead them to act in their children’s best interests. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 495, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979)). Certainly, therefore, the state may conclude that a minor’s abortion decision will be more informed and better considered if her parents know of her impending decision and thus are able to assist her in making that grave decision. As Justice Kennedy has written: A free and enlightened society may decide that each of its members should attain a clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound philosophic choices confronted by a woman who is considering whether to seek an abortion_ The State is entitled to assume that, for most of its people, the beginnings of that understanding will be within the family, society’s most intimate association. It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and mature....