Full opinion text
CARNES, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of the negotiations between the USX Corporation (“USX” or “the Company”), formerly known as United States Steel, and the United Steelworkers of America (‘the Union’) leading to the 1983 Collective Bargaining Agreement governing operations at the USX steel mill in Fairfield, Aabama (“the Fairfield Works”). The plaintiffs-appellees, who are or were Union members and employees at the Fairfield Works, brought this suit against USX, the administrator of the United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund (“the Fund”), and the Union, alleging that the Union negotiators covertly requested and received pension benefits from the Company to which they were not entitled and that, as a result, the Union negotiators agreed to concessions that damaged the plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on several of the plaintiffs’ claims, and certified its decision for appeal. We review that decision, along with several of the court’s rulings on discovery matters. In part I, we discuss the facts and prior proceedings of the case as background. In part II, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and explain why we reverse that ruling. More specifically, we discuss the standard of review in subpart A, then we analyze the plaintiffs’ RICO claim in subpart B and, in sub-part C, their breach of contract claim against USX under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (1978 & Supp.1993). In part III, we review various rulings of the district court on discovery. After explaining in part IV our lack of jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision not to certify a plaintiff class as to the claim for equitable relief, we conclude in part V. I. BACKGROUND The Fairfield Works steel mill in Jefferson County, Alabama, had been closed, and its approximately 2,600 employees laid off, for over a year when, in September 1983, USX and the Union sought to reach an agreement under which the mill could be reopened. William Miller, USX Vice President for Labor Relations, headed the USX negotiating team. The Union was represented by Ther-mon Phillips, a member of the Union’s International Executive Board and Director of District 36 (which includes Alabama) and by E.B. Rich, a sub-director of District 36. Both Phillips and Rich had left USX to work for the Union years before; neither had been with the Company long enough to qualify for a pension. The plaintiffs allege that shortly after the negotiations began, Rich took Miller aside and gave him a note demanding that the Company grant retroactive leaves of absence to a few specified Union representatives (including themselves), so that the years they had spent working for the Union would be counted for pension purposes as years spent with USX and they would therefore become eligible for USX pensions. According to the plaintiffs, the Union negotiators surreptitiously informed Miller that their agreement to any concessions at Fairfield was conditioned on their receiving Company pensions. The final Fairfield Works Agreement (“the Agreement” or “FWA”), reached on Christmas Eve, 1983, did include sizable concessions, although the Union argues that USX acceded to numerous Union demands before the Agreement was reached, and USX argues that in return for Union concessions it committed itself to making substantial capital investments to modernize the mill. Under the Agreement, more than 500 jobs were eliminated; local working conditions rules (governing such matters as job assignments and crew sizes) were abolished altogether, giving the Company sole discretion in determining job assignments; all pending complaints, grievances, and arbitration cases were dismissed; maintenance and janitorial jobs were contracted out; and salary guarantees and certain types of incentive pay were dropped. Towards the end of the negotiations, one USX official estimated that the Agreement would yield savings of 23.5 million dollars per year. The plaintiffs assert that Rich and Phillips refused to sign the final agreement until USX covertly agreed to their pension demands. Miller testified in deposition that the Union negotiators signed the Agreement after he told them that he was under the impression that their pension request “would be considered favorably” but that he “could not assure them of that.” In 1984, after the Agreement went into effect, Rich contacted USX numerous times to inquire about the status of the pension request. In the fall of 1984, the USX Corporate Policy Committee approved a unilateral change in policy to allow approval of indefinite retroactive leaves of absence for former employees who had left to work for the Union. J. Bruce Johnston, Executive Vice President of Employee Relations, proposed the change, writing to the Committee that “it is in the Company’s interest to foster and promote the goodwill of former employees who were granted leaves of absence to work for the [Union].” Shortly thereafter, the Company approved pensions for six of the Union officials that Rich had named during the negotiations (referred to by some as the “Fairfield Six”), including Rich and Phillips themselves. Thus, Rich and Phillips received for themselves and for others that which they had covertly demanded during the negotiations. In November 1984, USX began paying the Fairfield Six their pensions, which were awarded retroactively to February 29 of that year. However, USX did not directly inform the potential beneficiaries, other than the Fairfield Six, of the change in its leave-of-absence policy. In March 1985, Johnston did write a letter to Union president Lynn Williams, informing him that “United States Steel’s procedure was revised so that Leaves of Absencé applied for by International Union Representatives may be permitted for longer periods than those established in the Labor Agreement, in designated circumstances, at the discretion of the Company on a case-by-case basis.” The letter also stated that, “[p]ursu-ant to the above policy, we have approved requests for Leaves for six (6) International Union Representatives.” The Union apparently did not inform any of its other representatives or members of the change in policy, so that the Fairfield Six were the only ones who received pensions under the new policy. In May 1988, after several other Union representatives heard rumors of the benefits the Fairfield Six were receiving, and applied for similar pensions, the United States Steel Fund sent a letter to the Fairfield Six informing them that it would begin depositing their benefits into escrow accounts. According to the letter, recent decisions by the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits “raised serious challenges concerning the legality of approving special, retroactive leaves of absence which enable union officials to receive credit for pension purposes for extended periods they spend in the service of the Union.” The letter explained that “in light of current legal developments,” continued payment of the benefits could subject the Fairfield Six, USX, and the Fund “to criminal liability.” In 1990, as a result of their actions concerning the negotiations and pensions, USX, Rich, and Phillips were convicted of violating 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (1978 & Supp.1993). Subsection (a) of that statute prohibits “any employer” from paying, lending, or delivering “any money or thing of value” to “any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(a)(1) (1978 & Supp.1993). Subsection (b) makes it “unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(b)(1) (1978 & Supp.1993). The appeal of those convictions is pending before this Court. Thirty-eight present and former USX employees brought this suit in the Northern District of Alabama, seeking monetary damages and equitable and declaratory relief for a class of similarly situated workers. The final amended complaint asserted five claims against USX, the Fund, and the Union. Count One alleged that the defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq. Count Two alleged that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, and that the Company breached its contractual duties, in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a). Count Three alleged that USX and the Union committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq., by failing to negotiate in good faith. Count Four alleged that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A §§ 1001 et seq., by failing to notify the plaintiffs or the Department of Labor of the change in the Company’s leave policy. Finally, Count Five alleged violations of 29 U.S.C.A § 186, and sought an order enjoining the defendants from future violations. The district court certified a plaintiff class, with respect to the damages claims only, of all those who were employed by USX in Jefferson County, Alabama, and represented by District 36 of the Union at any time between July 1, 1983, and August 14, 1990. The court, citing “the substantial conflicts within the class” over the plaintiffs’ request that the Agreement be rescinded, declined to certify a plaintiff class with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims to equitable relief. During the course of discovery, the plaintiffs deposed Lynn Williams, president of the International Union, and asked him about the letter he had received from J. Bruce Johnston in March of 1985, informing him of USX’s change in the leave-of-absence policy. Williams testified that he made no inquiry upon receiving the letter, but “had some conversation about it” with the Union’s attorneys. Plaintiffs’ counsel then asked Williams “What did you say and what did they say on that occasion about the March 5, 1985 letter?” The Union’s counsel instructed Williams not to answer on the ground that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege. After the plaintiffs moved for an order compelling Williams to respond to the question, the district court determined that the answer was discoverable and, on January 10, 1991, ordered that Williams answer. The court then certified the Union’s appeal from that order, and we granted the Union’s petition for permission to appeal. Also during the course of discovery, USX objected to some of the plaintiffs’ deposition questions, document requests, and interrogatories, on the ground that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege. When the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel USX to respond, the district court determined that USX, by asserting the defense that it had intended to act in compliance with the law, waived the privilege with respect to those communications bearing on the question of USX’s intent in awarding pension credits to Union officials. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motions to compel USX to produce materials bearing on USX’s knowledge of the legality of its actions. The district court certified USX’s appeal from that order, and we granted USX leave to appeal, consolidating the two discovery appeals into one and giving it number 91-7215. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims under RICO and claims under LMRA § 301 against both USX and the Union, on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the discussions about pension credits had caused them any injury. The district court dismissed the unfair labor practice claim on the ground that the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The district court also granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs ERISA claim against the Union. The district court entered final judgment on those claims as to which summary judgment was granted, with the exception of the claim against the Union for violation of the duty of fair representation under LMRA § 301, which is therefore not before this Court. In appealing that final judgment, the plaintiffs have abandoned the ERISA claim against the Union and NLRA claims. They appeal only the award of sum- . mary judgment on the RICO claim and the § 301 claim against USX for breach of contract; they also appeal a number of discovery orders the district court entered prior to summary judgment. That appeal bears number 92-6218, and has been consolidated with the discovery appeal, number 91-7215. II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT A THE STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a “grant[ ] of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard applied by the district court in the first instance.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir.1993). Summary judgment should be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). There is a genuine issue of material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). In other words, “[i]f a reasonable fact finder could draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment.” Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir.1989). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying for the district court those portions of the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. With regard to issues on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party need not support its motion with evidence “negating the opponent’s claim.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc)). Once the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment. Id. B. THE RICO CLAIM The civil provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (1984 & Supp. 1993), provides that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Thus, to recover on a civil RICO claim, the plaintiffs must prove, first, that § 1962 was violated; second, that they were injured in their business or property; and third, that the § 1962 violation caused the injury. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 913, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992). Those who violate § 1962 are those who engage in, or aid and abet another to engage in, a pattern of racketeering activity if they also do the following: invest income derived from the pattern of racketeering activity in the operation of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce (section 1962(a)); acquire or maintain, through the pattern of racketeering activity, any interest in or control over such an enterprise (section 1962(b)); or conduct, or participate in the conduct of, the affairs of such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (section 1962(c)). Section 1962(d) makes it a crime to conspire to violate sections 1962(a), (b), or (c). Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1495-96 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991). “Racketeering activity” includes violations of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186, which restricts the payments for which a union representative can ask and which his employer can give. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(C) (1984 & Supp.1993); 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (1978 & Supp.1993). 1. Violation of § 1962 USX argues that the plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact about the existence of a violation of § 1962, which is the first element of a civil RICO claim, and the Union has adopted USX’s arguments. First, USX argues that the plaintiffs did not proffer sufficient evidence of the existence of a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Even as to the allegations, according to the Company, the “[p]laintiffs allege nothing more than a single, uncomplicated episode of alleged wrongdoing in the nature of an alleged ‘garden-variety1 act of extortion or bribery,” and a single act cannot constitute a “pattern.” Second, and in the alternative, USX argues that even if the plaintiffs have met their burden of pleading and have proffered sufficient evidence concerning the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity, they have failed to meet their burden with respect to the other elements required under § 1962(a), (b), or (c). We address these two contentions in turn. a. The Pattern of Racketeering Activity A “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of the RICO Act, “requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(6) (1984 & Supp.1993), and the Supreme Court has observed that “two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Instead, “ ‘[i]t is the factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.’ ” Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (emphasis added)). More recently, the Court has expanded on the definition of “continuity” and “relationship.” Borrowing from Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Court has explained that predicate acts are “related” if they “have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern, Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2901, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). As for ‘continuity,’ the Court explained: “Continuity” is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. See Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (CA3 1987). It is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept—and particularly so in the RICO context, where what must be continuous, RICO’s predicate acts or offenses, and the relationship these predicates must bear one to another, are distinct requirements. A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement.... Id. at 241—42, 109 S.Ct. at 2902. We have held that “[a]cts that are part of the same scheme or transaction can qualify as distinct predicate acts,” Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir.1986), as long as “each act constitutes a separate violation of the state or federal statute governing the conduct in question,” United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir.1985) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 917 (1986). “‘If distinct statutory violations are found, the predicate acts will be considered to be distinct irrespective of the circumstances under which they arose.’ ” United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1545 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 971). As the district court properly recognized, that which USX argues is a single episode of bribery could be viewed by a jury as a scheme consisting of multiple violations, sufficiently interrelated and continuous to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Each monthly payment of pension benefits to the Fairfield Six could be interpreted as a “thing of value” for purposes of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186, and therefore as a separate predicate act for purposes of RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 935-36 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that a reasonable jury could find that each monthly lease payment made to secure use of an automobile for a union official for four months constituted a separate predicate act under RICO), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022, 103 S.Ct. 1272, 75 L.Ed.2d 494 (1983). The jury could easily determine from the proffered evidence that the payments are connected by a common scheme, plan, or motive, and therefore satisfy the relatedness requirement. USX made payments to the Fairfield Six over a period of three and one-half years (from December 1984 to May 1988). This case is therefore unlike Aldridge v. LilyTulip, Inc., 953 F.2d 687 (11th Cir.1992), in which we held that a fraud requiring the use of the mails for six months “was accomplished in too short a period of time ... to qualify as a pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. at 593. Furthermore, as the district court observed, a reasonable jury could find that the defendants carried on racketeering activity during the 1983 negotiations, when the Union negotiators made the illegal request, and throughout 1984, when the pensions were established. That period of time is sufficiently long for a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiffs established closed-ended continuity. b. The Other Requirements of § 1962 USX argues in the alternative that even if the jury could find that the defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, the award of summary judgment against the plaintiffs should be upheld because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the additional elements required for criminal liability under the various subsections of § 1962 exist. We disagree. Under § 1962(c) it is unlawful for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” USX argues that a jury could not find a violation of that subsection because USX cannot be both the “person” and the “enterprise” contemplated by § 1962(c). In United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 986 (11th Cir.1982), a panel of this Court held “that a corporation can simultaneously be named as a defendant and satisfy the ‘enterprise’ requirement.” (Emphasis added). USX argues that we should reverse that position. That, of course, we cannot do, because “[t]his panel is bound by the decisions of prior panels of the Eleventh Circuit unless overruled by the en banc court or the Supreme Court.” Pollgreen v. Morris, 911 F.2d 527, 534 (11th Cir.1990). Under Hartley, a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants violated § 1962(c); we therefore need not reach the plaintiffs’ counter-arguments that the jury could find violations of § 1962(a), (b), or (d), or that the jury could find a violation of § 1962(c), even if Hartley is rejected, because the jury could find that the Fairfield Works, or the Union, or District 36 of the Union, or the Fund, was the “enterprise” for RICO purposes. USX also argues that RICO is unconstitutionally vague. In United States v. Van Dorn, 925 F.2d 1331, 1334 n. 2 (11th Cir.1991), this Court found the argument that RICO is unconstitutionally vague to be “completely lacking in merit.” In summary, the plaintiffs have established the first element of a civil RICO claim by producing evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants violated § 1962(c). Thus, the district court correctly declined to grant summary judgment on the first RICO element. We turn now to causation, the second element of a RICO claim, the ground on which the district court did grant summary judgment for the defendants. 2. Causation In awarding summary judgment to the defendants on the RICO claim, the district court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged bribery of the Union negotiators caused injury to the plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had produced no evidence that the alleged bribes caused any of the concessions in the 1983 Fairfield Works Agreement [FWA], and therefore they could not recover: Considering [the] evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the jury could find the pension issue was the subject of secret discussions several times during the FWA negotiations and that Rich considered the pensions a condition of settlement, but USX did not promise to favorably consider the pension request until after the FWA was completed and typed and when Rich and Phillips refused to sign. There is also some evidence from which the jury could infer that USX “committed” to providing the pensions, and that USX intended to influence Rich and Phillips in some manner. There is no indication or evidence that the negotiators on either side were swayed by their outstanding request for pensions while they negotiated the terms of the agreement. In light of the undisputed evidence that the FWA never changed after USX promised to consider the pension issue, the jury could not reasonably infer that USX’s promise influenced the negotiators to make concessions in the FWA More importantly, in view of the additional undisputed evidence that the concessions resulted from the need to make the Fairfield Works profitable before it was reopened, the jury could not soundly infer that it was more likely that the concessions resulted from the bribery of Union officials than from economic necessity. From the evidence plaintiffs presented, a jury could only speculate about USX’s motives in giving pensions to Union officials. There is no evidence from which the jury could conclude USX obtained the FWA concessions as a result of paying Union officials pensions. Plaintiffs’ invitation to assume that the concessions must have been the result of bribery is not sufficient where the concessions could just as likely have resulted from the need to make Fairfield economically viable. The district court’s assertion, that there was substantial evidence that the concessions were caused by adverse economic conditions in the steel industry at the time, apparently refers to the deposition testimony of the negotiators: that the pension question had not influenced the Agreement; that the USX negotiators had said USX could not afford to reopen the plant without concessions; and that the Union negotiators did win a less concessionary agreement than the Company had initially been willing to accept. We begin our analysis by observing that the plaintiffs need not prove that the matter involving the personal pension benefits caused all of the concessions in the Agreement, or that the prevailing economic conditions had no effect on the negotiations. It is well-established that RICO plaintiffs must prove proximate causation in order to recover. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 1317-18, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); see also Reverend Father O’Malley v. Reverend Father O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir.1989). In other words, “[cjausation principles generally applicable to tort liability must be considered applicable” in RICO cases. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 (4th Cir.1988). A proximate cause is not, however, the same thing as a sole cause. Instead, a factor is a proximate cause if it is “a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation.” Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir.1990). It is beside the point whether the depressed condition of the steel industry also contributed to the concessions. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 268 (5th ed. 1984) (“If the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from liability merely because other causes have contributed to the result, since such causes, innumerable, are always present.”) Moreover, there were many different concessions worth varying amounts in the Agreement. The proximate cause question is whether Rich and Phillips’ pursuit of the pensions was responsible for changing the amount of any concessions to which the Union agreed, not whether it was responsible for the Union’s having to make any concessions in the first place or most of the concessions in the final analysis. For example, if the Agreement cost the Union membership X million dollars in total concessions, but would have cost only X million minus 100,000 dollars in concessions but for the personal pension matter, then that matter caused the membership 100,000 dollars in injury. The district court appears to have recognized as much, noting that “[plaintiffs’ return to work under less favorable conditions constituted an injury to their business or property sufficient to satisfy RICO requirements, if plaintiffs could show they would have returned to work under a less concessionary agreement absent the RICO violations.” We agree with that proposition. To avoid summary judgment, therefore, the plaintiffs must point to evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Rich and Phillips’ pursuit of pensions for themselves and their friends caused some part of the total dollar amount of concessions in the Fairfield Works Agreement. The district court concluded that “the jury could not reasonably infer that USX’s promise influenced the negotiators to make concessions in the FWA,” because any deal on the pensions came after the Agreement was in final form (although before it was signed). The court seems to have assumed that the plaintiffs must prove that USX’s ultimate agreement to provide the pension benefits caused the concessions. However, the mere request for unearned pension benefits constituted a violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(b) and therefore was racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C). That request, it will be recalled, was first made early in the course of the negotiations. Accordingly, the element of causation is satisfied if the Union negotiators were influenced to make any amount or degree of concessions in the subsequent rounds of negotiations by their desire to convince the Company to agree to their outstanding illegal request coupled with the Company’s failure to reject the pension request from the beginning. Under the federal standard for the sufficiency of evidence, a plaintiff may prove causation by circumstantial evidence. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1142 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 686, 70 L.Ed.2d 650 (1981). “Inferences from circumstantial facts may frequently amount to ‘full proof of a given theory, and may on occasion even be strong enough to overcome the effect of direct testimony to the contrary.” Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1977). Here, although there may be no direct evidence that the Union negotiators made concessions to obtain personal pension benefits, there is a great deal of circumstantial evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to that conclusion. We are particularly reluctant to disregard inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence as to the negotiators’ motive. This Circuit is “mindful that ‘summary procedures should be used sparingly ... where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.’ ” Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1502 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, 394 U.S. 700, 704, 89 S.Ct. 1391, 1393, 22 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107, 106 S.Ct. 1513, 89 L.Ed.2d 912 (1986). In the following paragraphs, we discuss the facts which a reasonable jury could rationally find from the evidence at the time summary judgment was granted, and the evidence from which these facts could be found. Then, we will discuss the cumulative effect of these facts and the conclusion that rationally could be inferred from them. As we said in Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir.1993), “what we state as ‘facts’ in this opinion for purposes of reviewing the rulings on the summary judgment motion[ ] may not be the actual facts. They are, however, the facts for present purposes, and we set them out below.” Gaining the personal pension benefits was of paramount concern to Rich and Phillips in the Fairfield negotiations, and it was a condition of their agreement to any settlement. Emmett Bruce Thrasher, director of another International Union district, testified at the criminal trial that Rich had told him that achieving the pension benefits would be a prerequisite of the Union negotiators’ consent to any agreement in the Fairfield negotiations. USX’s Vice President for Labor Relations, William Miller, took notes at an October 27, 1983, meeting during the negotiations which also refer to Rich’s demand for pension benefits as “a condition of settlement” of any agreement at Fairfield. Rich and Phillips brought their personal pension demand up more than once, and it was discussed intermittently throughout the negotiation process. Miller testified that Rich first raised the matter after one of the early negotiating sessions by saying “I want this taken care of’ while handing Miller a piece of paper on which the demand for pension credit for Fairfield Union officials was written. On December 22, 1983, two days before the end of the negotiations, Miller met in Pittsburgh with other high-ranking USX officials and listed the pension credits for the Union officials as one of the items still on the table. Miller testified that he reported that, “Mr. Rich and Mr. Phillips had continued to talk about the matter in the context of ... other corporations and what they were doing.” Furthermore, when Miller asked J. Bruce Johnston, USX Executive Vice President for Employee Relations, for instructions on how to respond to Rich and Phillips’ ultimatum on the pension question, Johnston responded with a very detailed set of conditions under which USX would agree to the pension request. (Johnston testified that he told Miller not to guarantee anything, but the notes Miller took during the conversation contain no such instruction.) It is permissible to infer that Johnston would not have produced such a detailed list of conditions for the pension benefits if the subject of the pension benefits had been mentioned only once months earlier and then dropped; therefore, the benefits had been discussed several times over the course of the negotiations while the concessions were being hammered out. The subject of personal pensions for Rich and Phillips was always discussed between them and the USX negotiators in secret. Rich first raised the issue by slipping Miller a handwritten note after a negotiating session. Phillips testified that thereafter, when the USX negotiators discussed the subject, they never did so in the hotel conference room where the formal negotiations were held, but only in a small room across the hall or in the hallway or lobby. After the concessions were negotiated, Rich and Phillips refused to sign the Agreement until they received assurances that their pension requests would be considered favorably. Miller testified in deposition that Rich and Phillips refused to sign the Fair-field Agreement until they had received an answer to their request for pension credit, and that as far as USX was concerned, “their signatures were essential.” Only after he told them that he thought their pension request “would be considered favorably” did they sign, Miller testified. The words and actions of USX officials indicate that the Company itself believed that it had made a commitment to provide the pension benefits as part of the Fairfield Works Agreement. Johnston’s signature appears on the recommendation for pensions for the Fairfield Six, which states that the “pensions ... are recommended in accord with the December 2k, 1983 agreement between the Company and the USW at Fair-field Works.” (Emphasis added). According to the original proposal, the pensions were to start on September 1, 1984. A September 25, 1984, letter to Johnston from J.D. Short, USX’s Vice President for Employee Benefits, refers to a change in the starting date to February 29,1984, “as I understand the commitment was made that” the pensions would be effective as of March 1. The pension requests submitted by each of the Fairfield Six bear the notation “Per 12-24-83 Agreement.” Furthermore, when other Union officials applied for similar pensions, Johnston wrote Union president Lynn Williams that the policy was being cancelled — but that the Fairfield Six would continue to receive their payments. That action and the documents quoted above indicate that USX’s supposedly unilateral change in policy was actually the result of a commitment to provide pensions to the Fairfield Six, a commitment given in exchange for concessions from Rich and Phillips. The defendants tried to keep the existence of the Fairfield Six’s pensions secret. In 1986, two years after he had begun receiving his pension, Rich told two other Union representatives that the pension matter had not been resolved in the Fairfield negotiations, so that they need not apply for pensions. There is evidence that Phillips emphatically denied that pension credits were even discussed at the Fairfield negotiations. Although Union president Williams received a letter from USX in 1985 stating that USX had changed its leave-of-absence policy to allow Union representatives longer leaves of absence “at the discretion of the Company on a case-by-case basis,” the Union never approached the Company about granting more such leaves of absence and seems not to have informed any of its representatives of the opportunity. Furthermore, in its answer to a lawsuit filed by Emmett Bruce Thrasher, also a Union representative, the Union denied the allegation that Rich, Phillips, and others had received pensions as part of the Agreement. In another lawsuit brought by William Sommerville, also a Union representative, Union attorney Bernard Kleiman swore in an affidavit that Rich, Phillips, and two others of the Fairfield Six had not retired from USX as of January 30, 1986, although USX records clearly indicate that, for pension purposes, they had retired. USX, like the Union, told no other Union representative about the change in its pension policy, although a number of other Union representatives would appear to have qualified for it. During the negotiations, Miller asked Schick, USX’s General Manager of Labor Relations, to prepare information on the Fairfield Six and to keep the matter confidential. Ed Owens, a USX official at the Fairfield plant, was asked to prepare pension documents for the Fairfield Six and not to “publicize” it; according to USX, those documents have now disappeared. A jury could find it strange that those who insist that their conduct was proper and their intent pure went to such great lengths to hide it all from the light of day. From such secrecy much may be inferred. Giving the Fairfield Six the pensions Rich and Phillips demanded during contract negotiations cost the Company a substantial sum of money, and the Company would not have agreed to that private concession without a concession from the Union side in return. Johnston, testifying about a request that International Union president Lynn Williams made during the same period that USX extend pension benefits for workers at another plant, said that he told Jim Short: “I’m sure not going to voluntarily give away millions of dollars that we might not have to give away in a year in which we are losing money at an awesome rate.” He also recalled that “all during ’83 and ’84 we had a very correct and very tough and very hardnosed arm’s length relationship with the Steelworkers.” It strains credulity to suggest that a company committed to the profit motive, in a period in which it was in dire financial straits, would in a “very hardnosed arm’s length relationship” give away, for nothing in return, unearned pension benefits that cost USX hundreds of thousands of dollars. Instead of receiving personal pension benefits for themselves and their friends, Rich and Phillips could have demanded and obtained from USX a reduction in the Union’s concessions of an amount equal to the cost of the pensions. That conclusion follows as a matter of economics from the nature of the collective bargaining process. There is no reason why a company that would agree to give up a dollar in unlawful pension benefits to union officials would not instead agree to accept one dollar less in concessions from the Union. Indeed, assuming that freedom from the risk of detection and prosecution is worth something to corporations and their officials, it is reasonable to infer that the Company would have been willing to forego more than one dollar in concessions for every dollar it could have avoided paying out in illegal benefits. In summary, negotiating their personal pensions was of paramount concern to Rich and Phillips, and they considered it to be a condition of settlement. The issue was discussed intermittently throughout the negotiations about concessions, and always in secret. Rich and Phillips refused to sign the negotiated agreement until they received assurances that their pension requests would be considered favorably. The Company and its officials believed that it was committed to pay the pension benefits as part of the Fair-field Works Agreement. All of the defendants tried very hard to keep the pensions secret. The pensions cost the Company a substantial sum of money, and it would not have agreed to them without receiving something in return. Finally, instead of using their position as Union negotiators to gain the pensions for themselves and their friends, Rich and Phillips could have secured a reduction in concessions equal to or greater in value than the pensions. From all of those facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that the pursuit of personal pension benefits by Rich and Phillips, coupled with the Company’s failure to reject the idea from the beginning, caused the Agreement to contain more concessions from the Union than it would have contained if Rich and Phillips had been completely loyal to the rank and file Union membership. The district court observed that “USX did not promise to favorably consider the pension request until after the FWA was completed and typed and when Rich and Phillips refused to sign.” Because the Agreement’s text did not change after USX promised that the request “would be considered favorably,” the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not show that the Union negotiators made any concessions to secure their pensions. The district court erred by placing too much reliance upon the timing of the Company’s formal promise of the illegitimate pensions. As we have explained above, there was ample evidence that, even without a formal agreement, the combination of illicit behavior by Rich, Phillips, and the Company caused the amount of the concessions actually negotiated to be more than they would otherwise have been. Moreover, the district court placed too little weight on the value of the signatures of Rich and Phillips to the negotiated Collective Bargaining Agreement. Even though the agreement had already been negotiated and the concessions agreed upon, Rich and Phillips had something that the Company needed and was willing to trade for — their signatures as the Union’s negotiators. USX was willing to trade a promise to grant the pension benefits (saying the requests “would be considered favorably”) in exchange for those signatures, and that trade was made. Instead of trading their signatures for personal pension benefits, which the Union concedes “may well” have been worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, Rich and Phillips could have traded their signatures for the benefit of all of the workers whom they represented — refusing to sign until the Company agreed to reduce the amount of concessions granted by the same hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, even focusing exclusively upon the conclusion of the collective bargaining process, a rational jury could infer that, as a result of their demand for personal pension benefits, the Agreement was more concessionary than it would have been otherwise. The district court should not have granted summary judgment for the defendants on the causation issue. 3. Union Liability Under RICO The Union argues in the alternative that the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Union should be affirmed because the Union is not liable under RICO for the acts of its representatives. The Union argues that because it is the victim of the racketeering activity of its negotiators, it should not be held liable for their violations. The plaintiffs argue that the Union can be liable under RICO, not only under the principle of respondeat superior, but also because “the Union not only learned of its employees’ illegal acts and failed to take action, but also willfully participated, conspired, aided and abetted, ratified and actively concealed the illegal acts of Rich and Phillips,” while under a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of its members. They contend that the Union is not a victim; the victims, they maintain, are the “rank-and-file” workers. We will address in turn the theories that the parties have put forward. a. Liability of “Victim” Enterprise Under RICO . According to the Union, “Congress did not intend RICO liability to attach to legitimate enterprises that are used as passive instruments for the racketeering activities of employees or others,” but instead intended to protect those enterprises. The Union argues that, in response to Congress’ intention, “the cases ... hold that where an individual violates RICO by using an enterprise as the instrumentality of his racketeering activities, liability attaches to the wrongdoing individual, not to the enterprise.” The district court determined that there was no support in the record for the Union’s claim that it was a victim. The only injury alleged was the injury to the Union member plaintiffs; the Union produced no evidence that the Union itself had been victimized. The court therefore held that the Union had failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and refused to grant summary judgment on the basis that the Union was a victim of racketeering activity and therefore could not be held liable for that activity. However, we need not address the question of whether the Union presented adequate evidence of its victimization, because we reject the Union’s argument that “[t]he law in this Circuit is fully consistent with” the cases refusing to hold RICO enterprises liable for the violations of their subordinates. Our review of the cases cited by the Union reveals that although some courts have recognized a narrow exception to vicarious liability under RICO, that exception has been created in order to preserve the non-identity rule (that under § 1962(c), the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise cannot be one and the same). As discussed in subpart B.l.b, above, this Circuit has unequivocally rejected that rule. The cases that the Union cites for the proposition that an enterprise is not liable under RICO for the acts of its employees which abuse the enterprise all trace their roots to Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 3291, 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985). In Haroco, the Seventh Circuit held that the American National Bank could not be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), because that subsection “requires separate entities as the liable person and the enterprise which has its affairs conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Id. at 400. The Haroco court reasoned that the “non-identity” requirement of § 1962(c) would not allow corrupt corporations to escape all RICO liability, because § 1962(a) contains no such requirement; under that subsection, “the liable person may be a corporation using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its operations.” Id. at 402. As a result, the “corporation-enterprise” is “liable under RICO when the corporation is actually the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not when it is merely the victim, prize, or passive instrument of racketeering.” Id. In Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917, 109 S.Ct. 3241, 106 L.Ed.2d 588 (1989), “to avoid holding vicariously liable a corporation that was the victim of a RICO violation,” the Seventh Circuit held that a corporation will be held vicariously liable for the RICO violations of its employees “only when 1) the corporation has derived some benefit from the RICO violation and 2) imposing vicarious liability is not inconsistent with the intent of Congress.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Following the reasoning laid out in Haroco, the court held that “[vicarious liability ... has only limited application to civil RICO.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has voiced concern “that respondeat superior might be used to circumvent § 1962(c)’s requirement that the person conducting the racketeering activities be separate from the enterprise through which those activities are conducted.” Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir.1989). Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit has approved vicarious liability when holding the employer liable would not violate the non-identity rule: “Responde-at superior is ... entirely appropriate under both subsections (a) and (b)” of § 1962, because those subsections contain no non-identity requirement. Liquid Air Corp., 834 F.2d at 1307. Similarly, respondeat superior will make liable under § 1962(c) a corporation whose officers conspire to conduct the affairs of another corporation through a pattern of racketeering, because the second corporation then serves as the RICO “enterprise.” Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1281. Despite the inclusion of some broad language, the cases cited by the Union stand only for the proposition that, in order to preserve the non-identity rule, vicarious liability should not be imposed under § 1962(c) where the employer is also the RICO enterprise. Thus, although the First Circuit in Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.1986), stated broadly that “the concept of vicarious liability is directly at odds with the Congressional intent behind section 1962(c),” id. at 32, the actual holding of that case was merely that “section 1962(c) does not extend liability to the enterprise,” id. at 30 (emphasis added). That was reemphasized in a recent First Circuit opinion which viewed Schofield as holding merely that “[sjection 1962(c) does not recognize corporate liability on the enterprise’s part under a theory of respondeat superior.” Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir.1991) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit declined to apply respondeat superior to a corporate defendant for the actions of its chief financial officer, quoting Schofield: “Both the language of [§ 1962(c) ] and the articulated primary motivation behind RICO show that Congress intended to separate the enterprise from the criminal ‘person’ or ‘persons.’ ” Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir.1987). The D.C. Circuit, in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 140 (D.C.Cir.1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1991), adopted Haroco’s view of subsections (a) and (c) of § 1962: Through section (a), Congress provided for punishment of organizations which in fact gain from their wrongdoing by focusing on profits gleaned from illegal activities, thus “sparing” organizations that do not so profit. Section (c) likewise immunizes organizations which are merely “victims,” but this result depends on the requirement of non-identity of person and enterprise which also places some corrupt organizations beyond reach. Because of its adoption of the Schofield court’s non-identity rule analysis, the Yellow Bus Lines court sided “with those courts that forbid identity of person and enterprise under § 1962(c).” Id. The Third Circuit, in Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir.1987), reviewed a complaint in which Petro-Tech sought to recover from Western on six counts under civil RICO; Western was named as the RICO enterprise in only some of the counts. The Third Circuit held that imposing “respondeat superior and aiding and abetting liability” on a corporate defendant named as the RICO enterprise under § 1962(e) “would disrupt the intended operation of § 1962(c), by making the § 1962(c) enterprise ... liable.” Id. at 1359. However, in regard to those counts in which Western was not the § 1962(c) enterprise, “theories of respondeat superior and aiding and abetting liability are not out of place,” because the non-identity rule was not involved. Id. at 1361-62. The Third Circuit has also held that injunctive relief may be granted against an employer found to be a RICO enterprise, even if damages may not. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, 871 F.2d 401, 405 (3d Cir.1989). The Ninth Circuit recently noted that there is “general agreement that respondeat superior liability is inappropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(e) when the enterprise and person are not distinct.” Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.1992). However, reasoning that “[r]e-spondeat superior and agency liability will encourage employers to monitor more closely the activities of their employees and agents to ensure that these agents are not involved in racketeering activities,” id. at 1155, the Brady court held that “an employer that is benefitted by its employee or agent’s violations of section 1962(c) may be held liable under the doctrines of respondeat superior and agency when the employer is distinct from the enterprise,” id. at 1154. The Sixth Circuit was recently faced with the question whether “ordinary principles of respondeat superior” applied to the Mutual Life Insurance Company (MONY), a group of whose employees violated § 1962(c) by selling fraudulent life insurance policies. Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 380 (6th Cir.1993). The Davis court rejected the argument that “as a matter of law, a corporate principal may not be vicariously liable for its agents’ actions in violation of section 1962(c).” Id. at 378. Finding that the cases declining to apply vicarious liability were “intertwined with the widely-embraced principle that a corporation may not be named as both a defendant ‘party1 and as the RICO ‘enterprise,’ ” id., the Davis court held that those cases are not controlling “where the corporate defendant charged with vicarious liability is separate from the RICO ‘enterprise.’ ” Id. at 379. Instead, Davis held that: The rule to be drawn from these cases is that plaintiffs may not use RICO to impose liability vicariously on corporate “enterprises,” because to do so would violate the distinctiveness requirement. No such prohibition, however, prevents the imposition of liability vicariously on corporate ‘persons’ on account of the acts of their agents, particularly where the corporation benefit-ted by those acts. Such a prohibition, if it existed, would prevent corporate persons from ever being found liable under RICO, since corporate principals may act only through their agents. Such a rule would be manifestly contrary to the intent of Congress, and we decline to adopt it. Id. Because the RICO enterprise involved in Davis was the association of MONY employees who were engaged in the fraud, the non-identity rule was not threatened, and the court upheld the jury’s finding that MONY was liable for the acts of its agents. See id. at 377-78. Our review of the law of other circuits thus reveals that the RICO exception to the application of vicarious liability is a narrow one, created to preserve the non-identity rule, and it therefore protects only those employers who are also the RICO enterprise for purposes of § 1962(c). We, of course, have squarely rejected the non-identity rule, observing that liability for the acts of one’s agents “is simply a reality to be faced by corporate entities. With the advantages of incorporation must come the appendant responsibilities.” United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 989 n. 43 (11th Cir.1982). The narrow exception to vicarious liability recognized by some circuits in order to preserve the non-identity rule is, therefore, inapplicable. Even if we had adopted' the non-identity rule, however, the Union still would not be exempt from liability in this case. Although the plaintiffs have alleged that the Union is a RICO enterprise for purposes of § 1962(c), they also allege that the Fairfield Works and the Fund are enterprises as well. The non-identity rule would not be threatened by holding the Union liable for its agents’ corruption of the mill or the Fund. b. Respondeat Superior Liability Under RICO The plaintiffs argue that the Union can be held liable under general agency principles and the respondeat superior doctrine. The district court ruled against the plaintiffs on this issue, reasoning that the Union was not liable under agency principles because “the plaintiffs do not claim the Union negotiators, acting with apparent authority, made misrepresentations to them upon which they relied.” The plaintiffs argue, correctly, that there is no requirement of reliance for a principal to be liable under RICO for the acts of its agent. Since the district court entered its order, this Court spelled out the elements of re-spondeat superior liability for RICO violations in Quick v. People’s Bank of Cullman County, 993 F.2d 793 (11th Cir.1993). Although we have rejected the “non-identity” rule, we have expressed concern that enterprises that are merely victims of the RICO violations perpetrated by their employees should not be held liable for the acts of their employees under respondeat superior. In Quick, 993 F.2d at 797-98, we held that respondeat superior liability may be applied under § 1962(b) only to those enterprises that derive some benefit from the RICO violation. The Quick court also outlined the “general agency principles” to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case of vicarious liability under RICO has been made out: Under general agency r