Full opinion text
OPINION MOORE, Circuit Judge. These seven defendants were all indicted under a single conspiracy count and individual drug and firearm counts. The government alleged that each of the defendants was a member of a group known as the Short North Posse, a group allegedly formed in 1989 in the Short North area of Columbus, Ohio to control local sales of cocaine base by excluding from the area drug dealers who were not residents of the Short North. A jury convicted each of the named defendants on the conspiracy count and on individual drug trafficking counts, and convicted a number of the defendants on firearm counts. We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE In 1990, after a friend was shot in a drug trafficking incident, Robert Dotson and Marshon Mays decided to band together to form a group that would offer protection to its members in the area directly north of downtown Columbus, Ohio. This area was known as the Short North, and the group dubbed itself the Short North Posse (“SNP”) or the 4th Street Posse. The government alleges that the goal of the group was to prevent anyone not living in the Short North from selling cocaine base (“crack cocaine” or “crack”) there without permission. The government contends that the Short North Posse achieved this goal through threats and intimidation. The state and federal governments conducted an extensive undercover investigation, headed by Agent Rodney Russell of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, that included a large number of controlled buys of crack cocaine. In March 1995 the grand jury handed down a 185-count indictment against forty-one defendants. Count 1 of the indictment alleged that all forty-one of the defendants: did knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree together with each other, and with diverse other persons, both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and more than 5 grams of cocaine base, commonly referred to as crack, Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) and 841(b)(l)(B)(iii). J.A. at 125 (Indictment). The seven defendants here on appeal pleaded not guilty, and their cases were consolidated for trial. The bulk of the government’s evidence consisted of testimony from cooperating witnesses, most of whom were alleged members of the SNP who had pleaded guilty. Other relevant evidence came from undercover officers and non-SNP drug dealers or users. The other counts charged individual defendants with, among other things, drug trafficking and firearms violations, including possession with intent to distribute crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, distributing crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and using or carrying firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury convicted all seven of these defendants of the conspiracy charged in Count 1. Each of the defendants was also convicted of separate drug trafficking and firearms crimes. Defendant Curtis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack (Count 102) and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count 103). Defendant Chad Gibbs was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack (Count 46) and of distributing crack (Counts 91, 109, 148, 154, 160, 184, and 185). Defendant Needum was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack (Counts 47 and 102), distributing crack (Counts 92 and 96), and using or carrying a firearm during and in ■ relation to a drug trafficking crime (Counts 97 and 103). Defendant Anthony Gibbs was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack (Counts 55, 132, and 182), using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count 133), and distributing crack (Count 119). Defendant Woods was convicted of distributing crack (Count 125), possession with intent to distribute crack (Count 146), and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count 147). Defendant Hough was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack (Count 81) and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count 82). And finally, defendant Berry was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack (Count 151). The jury acquitted an eighth defendant, Jimmie Reed, of the conspiracy charge (Count 1). See Trial Tr. at 4041. Each of these seven defendants filed a timely notice of appeal, and their cases were consolidated on appeal before this court. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. ANALYSIS A. Sufficiency of the Evidence The defendants challenge for sufficiency of the evidence both the conspiracy count and certain of their individual drug-counts. Each is discussed separately and in turn below. 1. Standard of Review “When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all inferences in the government’s favor in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1005 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 567 (6th Cir.1994)). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We need not “exclude every reasonable hypothesis but guilt.” United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir.1997). 2. Conspiracy Count a. Existence of a Conspiracy Each defendant challenges the existence of the alleged conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 to distribute crack cocaine as prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 841. In order to show a conspiracy under § 846, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, “(1) an agreement to violate drug laws, (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy, and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 148 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1134, 117 S.Ct. 999, 136 L.Ed.2d 879 (1997). The government argues that the SNP is a drug conspiracy. The defendants concede that they were street-level crack dealers, but they contend that the SNP was merely a neighborhood identification of a loose-knit group of friends and acquaintances, most of whom grew up in the Short North area. The SNP was not a gang, they claim, and more importantly, it was not a drug conspiracy. There was no business-like distribution network, hierarchy of leadership, or organization of members. The different members of the SNP claim to have sold their drugs independently of one another, choosing their own locations, price points, and working hours. The government is left, argue the defendants, with a claim akin to an antitrust-like restraint of trade. An agreement need not be express to form a conspiracy, however, and the fact that the SNP had no hierarchy and was not run like a business does not make the finding of a conspiracy legally impossible. “A tacit or mutual understanding among the parties is sufficient,” United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916, 918 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1113, 114 S.Ct. 2115, 128 L.Ed.2d 673 (1994), to qualify as an agreement in a conspiracy charge. No formal agreement is required. See Avery, 128 F.3d at 970-71; United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir.1991). The defendants’ focus on lack of hierarchy, formal structure, and developed distribution networks certainly establishes that the SNP was less than a sophisticated narcotics business, but no threshold level of organizational sophistication is necessary to the formation of a conspiracy. A conspiracy requires: “(1) An object to be accomplished. (2) A plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object. (3) An agreement or understanding between two or more of the defendants whereby they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means.” United States v. Bostic, 480 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1973). The government has presented enough evidence in this case for a jury to find that there was a tacit agreement among at least some of the individuals named in the original indictment to prevent drug dealers who did not live in the Short North, or who were not known to drug dealers in the Short North, from selling drugs in the Short North. Although there is little evidence that these drug dealers acted in furtherance of this agreement, such evidence is not necessary to prove such an agreement, and overt acts are not needed to prove a conspiracy under § 846. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994). Moreover, at least one witness testified that he actually saw drug dealers from the Short North beat up a non-resident drug dealer for selling drugs in the Short North. See J.A. at 920 (Test, of Gladden). The government based its claim of a conspiracy on this tacit agreement to keep other drug dealers out of the Short North. The jury could find that the objective of the agreement was to facilitate and .protect the drug sales of the dealers in the Short North. Although the Short North Posse itself may have been formed primarily to protect its members from outsiders, there is enough evidence for a jury to find that there was also an implicit agreement among local drug dealers, whether or not members of the Short North Posse, to exclude outside drug dealers from competing for sales in the Short North. A number of witnesses testified that anyone attempting to sell drugs in the Short North without being a resident of the Short North or without obtaining implicit or explicit permission from the other dealers would be forced out by violence or intimidation. See J.A. at 1007 (Test, of Berger); J.A. at 708-09 (Test, of Clausell); J.A. at 1645-46 (Test, of Crockett); J.A. at 1264 (Test, of Terry); J.A. at 1567 (Test, of Crenshaw). Although the agreement forming the basis of this conspiracy is unusual, and does resemble a restraint of trade, the existence of a drug conspiracy based on monopolistic conduct is not novel. Cf. United States v. Richardson, 130 F.3d 765, 773-74 (7th Cir.1997) (where the objective was monopolizing and controlling sales in a section of Chicago), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 39, 142 L.Ed.2d 31 (1998). We hold that there was sufficient evidence of an agreement between certain drug dealers of the Short North to exclude others from the territory, the object of which was to facilitate the drug sales of resident drug dealers, for the jury to find that a conspiracy to violate the drug laws existed under 21 U.S.C. § 846. b. Individual Membership in Conspiracy Two defendants, Needum and Anthony Gibbs, claim that there was insufficient evidence to show that they were members of the conspiracy. The other defendants adopt in their briefs by reference, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i), the arguments of these two. In order to adopt by reference the arguments of a co-defendant, “the arguments adopted must be readily transferable from the proponent’s case to the adopter’s case.” United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.1996). Although, typically, an argument that a particular defendant did not join an alleged conspiracy is fact-specific and not readily transferable to a co-defendant, and Nee-dum and Gibbs referred in their briefs to the lack of evidence with respect to their own involvement in the conspiracy, the crux of their argument is that the government has failed to introduce any evidence to show that they joined in the agreement to exclude non-resident drug dealers from selling in the Short North. We conclude that such an argument is readily transferable to all defendants. Since the government was thoroughly aware that each of the defendants strongly disputed the existence of the conspiracy, we conclude that the government should have responded at orál argument or in its brief with respect to all of the defendants. “To be found guilty of conspiracy, the government must prove that [the defendant] was aware of the object of the conspiracy and that he voluntarily associated himself with it to further its objectives.” United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir.1991). Once a conspiracy is shown, evidence connecting a particular defendant to the conspiracy “need only be slight.” Avery, 128 F.3d at 971; United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164, 167 (6th Cir.1996); Hodges, 935 F.2d at 773. The defendant “need not be an active participant in every phase of the conspiracy, so long as he is a party to the general conspiratorial agreement.” Hodges, 935 F.2d at 773 (quoting United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1986)). A buyer/seller relationship alone is not enough to establish participation in the conspiracy, but further evidence indicating knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy can be enough to link the defendant to the conspiracy. See United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1100, 117 S.Ct. 786, 136 L.Ed.2d 728 (1997). The government argues that there is plenty of testimony that Needum and Anthony Gibbs frequently sold crack in the Short North area, thereby enabling the jury to find that both of them participated in the conspiracy. The fact that they engaged in drug activity in the Short North area, and according to the government that the SNP controlled crack sales in the Short North, does not show that these particular defendants were members of the conspiracy. See Richardson, 130 F.3d at 775 (concluding that the government would have a weak theory if its argument was “[the conspiracy] had a monopoly on drug sales in the [gang] territory; defendants sold drugs in the territory; therefore defendants ... were members of the conspiracy”). The witness testimony at trial also does not support the conclusion that evidence of membership in the SNP is sufficient to show that a particular defendant joined the conspiracy. Cooperating government witnesses testified that the SNP was primarily a neighborhood affiliation, and one witness testified that selling drugs was not a prerequisite to association with this loose group. See J.A. at 1018-19 (Test, of Berger). Although only “slight” evidence is needed to connect a defendant to a conspiracy, “mere association with conspirators is not enough to establish participation in a conspiracy.” United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224, 1243 (5th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093, 111 S.Ct. 978, 112 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1991). “The distinction is especially important today when so many prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders.” Bostic, 480 F.2d at 968. The government must present sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that the specific defendants were connected to the agreement, i.e., participated in the conspiracy, to exclude non-resident drug dealers from the Short North. The government need not prove that a particular defendant acted by force, intimidation, or otherwise to prevent a non-resident from dealing drugs in the Short North. Nor must the government prove that a particular defendant explicitly or outspokenly joined in the agreement to exclude non-residents from selling drugs in the Short North. The government must, however, point to evidence showing that a particular defendant had knowledge of the agreement to exclude non-resident drug dealers from the Short North and acquiesced in that agreement. The evidence must at least be sufficient that a reasonable juror could infer knowledge of and acquiescence in the agreement. Such an inference could be drawn from evidence showing at a minimum that a particular defendant was aware of a threat of unwanted competition from non-resident drug dealers and indicated that he had a stake in preventing such competition. Without this or similar evidence of knowledge and acquiescence in the type of agreement the government has alleged as the basis of this conspiracy, no reasonable juror could find that a particular defendant joined the conspiracy that existed here. Evaluating the record independently for evidence of knowledge and acquiescence by any or all of the defendants in the agreement to exclude non-resident drug dealers from selling in the Short North, we conclude that the government’s evidence proves only that Antwan Woods was a member of the conspiracy. In addition to Antwan Woods being an active supplier of crack to a number of individuals in the Short North, having a tattoo indicating his affiliation with the Short North Posse, having a notebook of accounts with SNP written on it, and possessing T-shirts with SNP-related information, there was also direct information indicating Woods’s understanding of and involvement in the agreement to exclude non-resident drug dealers from the Short North. Government witness Gladden testified that he heard from Woods on occasion that certain people could not sell in the Short North. See Trial Tr. at 1491 (Test, of Gladden). Although this evidence is spare, and there is no evidence that Woods ever acted to force any unwelcome dealers out of the Short North, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we hold that a reasonable juror could infer that Woods had knowledge of the agreement and acquiesced in it. As we explained above, under '21 U.S.C. § 846 the government need not prove that Woods acted in furtherance of the agreement. With respect to the other six defendants, the government’s evidence proved simply that these defendants independently sold a lot of drugs. Some bought from each other. Others, though acting independently, associated with each other. Nowhere do we see evidence that any specific defendant agreed to participate in the conspiracy to exclude outsiders so as to further the drug sales of insiders. Due to the fact that the record in this case is so large, the government may file a petition for rehearing identifying any record citations to existing trial testimony that our review has not unearthed that would link a particular defendant to the conspiracy to exclude outsiders in furtherance of insiders’ drug sales. We stress, however, that evidence that a particular defendant was a member of the Short North Posse is not sufficient to show that the defendant joined this conspiracy to exclude outside drug dealers. As explained above, it is clear from the record only that the SNP was a loose neighborhood affiliation of youths, a number of whom sold drugs. One of the common interests of the SNP members was, no doubt, protection of their territory. But the evidence does not support the conclusion that the SNP and the conspiracy proven in this case were synonymous with one another. Evidence that a particular defendant sold crack in the Short North is insufficient to prove membership in the conspiracy. There is' copious evidence to support the conclusion that each one of these defendants sold crack at one time or another in the Short North. If this were enough to show that a particular defendant joined the conspiracy, however, a jury could convict on conspiracy grounds any Short North resident who had been caught or seen selling crack in the Short North without any. evidence of knowledge of the agreement to exclude outsiders. Finally, evidence that the defendants knew each other, grew up together, sold crack in the same area, or on occasion sold crack together fails to prove membership in the conspiracy. Any other conclusion would permit the jury to infer membership in the conspiracy by association of the defendants with one another. We must be careful, especially in multi-defendant drug conspiracy trials, to guard against such findings of guilt by association. “The need for safeguarding defendants from misunderstanding by the jury is peculiarly acute in conspiracy trials.” United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 64 S.Ct. 78, 79, 320, U.S. 773, 88 L.Ed. 462, 463 (1943). Of course, should the government file such a petition with record citations, then the defendants would have an opportunity to respond. We therefore affirm Woods’s conspiracy conviction and vacate the conspiracy conviction of each of the other six defendants. We further vacate the sentences of Anthony Gibbs, Hough, Berry, Chad Gibbs, Curtis, and Needum, and remand for resen-tencing. 3. Drug Counts Four of the defendants, Hough, Chad Gibbs, Needum, and Woods, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to their 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) convictions. The elements of a violation of § 841(a) “are (1) the defendant knowingly; (2) possessed a controlled substance; (3) with intent to distribute.” United States v. Jackson, 55 F.3d 1219, 1225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 926, 116 S.Ct. 328, 133 L.Ed.2d 229 (1995). Hough challenges his conviction on Count 81, which charged him with possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack in March 1994. One witness testified to seeing Hough with four bags of crack cocaine in March 1994. See J.A. at 1286-88, 1291, 1296-97. The witness, Thomas Terry, was a cooperating government witness. No other evidence was presented. “Attacks on witness credibility are simple challenges to the quality of the government’s evidence and not the sufficiency of the evidence.” Sanchez, 928 F.2d at 1457 (quoting United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir.1984)). Although testimony from one eyewitness is spare, the quality of the evidence is a factual matter for the jury to evaluate. Hough’s challenge to the sufficiency of this evidence therefore fails. Chad Gibbs argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on Count 46, which charged him with possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of crack. Again only one witness testified to directly seeing Gibbs sell crack cocaine. See J.A. at 755-57, 773-75 (Test, of Andrew Jackson). Other witnesses partially corroborated this testimony. See J.A. at 501-03, 578 (Test, of Dotson); 912-13, 916-17 (Test, of Gladden); 1065-70 (Test, of Miller); 1281 (Test, of Terry). Gibbs argues that Jackson’s testimony is unreliable, but again, as indicated above, this is not a sufficiency of the evidence argument. Needum challenges his conviction on Count 102. This conviction was for a baggie of crack found in the living room of Robert Curtis’s apartment during the execution of a search warrant in May 1994. One government witness testified that Needum lived across the street from Curtis’s apartment and frequented it. See J.A. at 1125-26 (Test, of Officer Corbin). But this witness also testified that a number of individuals frequented this apartment. The government cites testimony showing that Needum had unlimited access to Curtis’s apartment, see Trial Tr. at 1420 (Test, of Gladden), that Needum entered Curtis’s apartment on May 10, 1994, to obtain a pistol that he used to rob Agent Russell, that the pistol was found during the execution of the search warrant, see J.A. at 1733-36, 1844 (Test, of Russell), and that Needum left Curtis’s apartment minutes before the search warrant was executed. See J.A. at 1128-31, 1135-37 (Test, of Corbin); 1449-50 (Test, of D’Ale-sio); 1833-34 (Test, of Russell). Furthermore, Curtis and Needum frequently sold crack in the court outside of Curtis’s apartment. See J.A. at 509-10, 579-80, 583-84 (Test, of Dotson); 649-54, 695-96 (Test, of Clausell). The government argues that this evidence is sufficient to show that Needum had constructive possession over the baggie of crack found during the search warrant. “Constructive possession requires that a person knowingly have power and intention to exercise control over an object.” United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 1987, 131 L.Ed.2d 873 (1995). See also United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir.1998). Constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973). The government does not offer any evidence that Curtis and Needum owned or possessed narcotics collectively or that Needum had ever entered Curtis’s apartment to obtain crack. There is also no evidence that Needum had any intent to exercise control over this particular bag of crack. Unlimited access to a particular area, however, is sometimes enough. Cf. Kincaide, 145 F.3d at 782 (holding that “[p]roof that ‘the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located’ is sufficient to establish constructive possession” (citation omitted)). The fact that Needum frequently sold crack with Curtis outside the apartment and on one occasion entered the apartment to obtain a weapon to use in a robbery, coupled with the fact that the baggie of crack was in plain sight in the living room and Needum had been in the apartment minutes before, is enough for the jury reasonably to conclude that Nee-dum had constructive possession over this baggie of crack. The government reads Curtis’s brief to challenge his conviction on Count 102 as well. While we do not find such a claim in Curtis’s brief, we note that there is clearly sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Curtis had constructive possession of the baggie of crack found in his apartment during the police search. Needum also challenges his conviction on Count 47, which, like Chad Gibbs’s conviction above, rests solely on Andrew Jackson’s testimony. See J.A. at 776-78, 848-49 (Test, of Jackson). The government cites a number of witnesses who corroborate Jackson’s testimony. As indicated above, credibility of witnesses goes to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency. Finally, Woods challenges his conviction on Count 146 for possession with intent to distribute crack. Count 146 was for 28.6 grams of crack found in a green handbag in the pink bedroom of Woods’s house during the execution of a valid search warrant. Woods argued that he lived in the black bedroom. Two other people, Woods’s mother and Sean Dardin, lived in the house. Witnesses testified that Dardin was also a crack dealer. See J.A. at 619-20 (Test, of Dotson); 963-64 (Test, of Gladden). Woods argues that because Dardin was a crack dealer and was upstairs during the search near the pink bedroom, while Woods was downstairs during the search where no drugs were found, there is insufficient evidence to find that he was in constructive possession of the crack in the pink bedroom. Woods cites United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir.1994), for support. There, however, the police failed to show that the defendant had sold cocaine out of the duplex in question before, or that she had any association with the sole occupant of the upstairs room where the drugs were found.' Here, under Woods’s theory, both Woods and Dardin could argue that they were not the occupants of the pink bedroom, that the drugs belonged to the other, and therefore insufficient evidence exists to convict either. As made clear above, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict a person of constructive possession. Moreover, exclusive possession is not required. See Craven, 478 F.2d at 1333. Finally, Agent Russell testified that he saw Woods carrying a green handbag that matched the handbag police found at Woods’s residence. See J.A. at 1764, 1766-67 (Tr. at 3083, 3085-86). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Woods of constructive possession of this crack. 4. Firearm Convictions Five of the defendants, Hough, Needum, Curtis, Anthony Gibbs, and Antwan Woods, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for their convictions for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in light of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), which was decided subsequent to their convictions. In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that “use” under § 924(c)(1) requires active employment of the firearm, which “includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm.” Id. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. In order to reverse on a sufficiency of the evidence claim after Bailey, this court, in addition to considering the “use” prong of § 924(c)(1), may also consider whether under the “carry” prong of § 924(c)(1) a reasonable juror would have to conclude that the firearm was carried during and in relation to the predicate offense. See United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2348, 141 L.Ed.2d 2718 (1998); United States v. Taylor, 102 F.3d 767, 769 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 125, 118 S.Ct. 327, 139 L.Ed.2d 254 (1997). A defendant carries a firearm when he conveys or moves the firearm, including via a vehicle, and when there is “personal agency and some degree of possession” over the firearm. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1917, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (holding that “carry” includes driving a car with guns locked in the glove compartment or the trunk). Finally, there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant was using or carrying the firearm “during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Hough argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him under § 924(c)(1) in Count 82. Government witness Thomas Terry testified that he saw Hough in March 1994 with a .38 caliber pistol tucked in his pants while he was holding bags of crack. See J.A. at 1286-88, 1291, 1296-97 (Test, of Terry). Because the firearm was tucked in Hough’s pants, the jury would have to have found that Hough was carrying it under § 924(c)(1). The jury could also reasonably find that the presence of the firearm was “during and in relation to” the selling of the crack. We hold therefore that the Bailey decision has no effect on Hough’s conviction. Needum contends that the evidence was insufficient with respect to Count 97, on which he was convicted of a § 924(c)(1) violation for using a firearm to rob Agent Russell of $420 after selling him crack on May 10, 1994. Although Needum used the firearm to rob Agent Russell, he did not use the firearm during and in relation to the sale of crack. Russell returned to his car after buying crack from Needum, but Needum summoned him back. Needum then sold Russell a few more pieces of crack. Needum called Russell back a second time, however, offering to find him more crack. This time, Nee-dum entered Curtis’s apartment, retrieved the gun, and then returned and robbed Russell. See J.A. at 1731-34. To be during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime, “the Government must prove that the firearm furthered the purpose or effect of the crime and that its presence or involvement was not the result of coincidence.” United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir.) (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848, 117 S.Ct. 136, 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996). The government contends that enticing Russell to return to buy more drugs is enough to make the use of the firearm for robbery a use during and in relation to the drug sale. We disagree. Attracting a person with the allure of a drug sale and then robbing the person is not enough to qualify as use of a firearm in relation to a drug sale. Here, despite the temporal proximity of the drug sale to the robbery, the firearm was used in relation to the latter, not the former. Section 924(c)(1) also applies to the use of a firearm in relation to “a crime of violence,” but the government did not charge Nee-dum with robbery here. There is no evidence that Needum actively employed a firearm in relation to the sale of crack to Agent Russell on May 10, 1994. We therefore reverse Needum’s § 924(c)(1) conviction on Count 97. On remand the government may seek an enhancement for constructive possession of the firearm in relation to the sale of crack to Russell under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2Dl.l(b) (1995). See Welch, 97 F.3d at 150. Curtis and Needum both contest their § 924(c)(1) convictions on Count 103. This Count was based on the presence of a loaded pistol found on the top shelf of a group of shelves in Curtis’s apartment during the execution of the aforementioned search warrant. A baggie of crack cocaine was found on the bottom shelf of the same group of shelves. The government argues that both Curtis and Needum had constructive possession of the firearm, under the same theory that they had constructive possession of the crack. While constructive possession may support a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 201.1(b), it is not alone sufficient to qualify as using or carrying the firearm for purposes of § 924(c)(1). The government argues that the presence of the firearm in plain view qualifies as a “display” of the firearm under Bailey. The display, however, must be during a drug transaction. See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146, 116 S.Ct. 501. There was no evidence that a transaction was taking place when the search warrant was executed. There was also no evidence that Curtis or Needum sold drugs in Curtis’s apartment that would permit the jury to infer circumstantially that the firearm was displayed or otherwise used during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. We therefore reverse Needum’s and Curtis’s § 924(c)(1) convictions on Count 103, but again on remand the government may seek enhancement of their sentences for constructive possession of the firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b). Anthony Gibbs contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under § 924(c)(1) in Count 133. The government indicates that Counts 132 and 133 relate to a drug transaction Gibbs had with Robert Phillips. After selling crack to Phillips, Gibbs robbed him of his money. See J.A. at 1115-17 (Test, of Phillips). Although Phillips could not identify Gibbs, police officer John Corbin arrived at the scene during the robbery and identified Gibbs. See J.A. at 1168-71 (Test, of Cor-bin). Based on this testimony, which the jury found adequate to convict, a reasonable juror would have to conclude that Gibbs carried the firearm during the drug transaction, because moments later he used the gun to rob Phillips. The men were in Phillips’s car, so Gibbs must have had the firearm on his body during the drug sale. Finally, Woods challenges his § 924(c)(1) conviction on Count 147, which was based on the guns found in his house during the execution of the search warrant on September 2, 1994. The government concedes that this conviction was based on the fortress theory of § 924(c)(1) that did not survive the Supreme Court’s narrowing in Bailey of the term “use,” and that the conviction should therefore be reversed. We reverse Woods’s conviction and remand for the district court to assess the possibility of sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 201.1(b). B. Bailey Jury Instruction The jury requested during deliberations “a definition of used and carried a firearm.” J.A. at 1966 (Bench Conference). The district court gave the jury an instruction of “use” that read, in part, “the firearm was in the defendant’s possession or under the defendant’s control at the time that a drug trafficking crime was committed.” J.A. at 1965 (Bench Conference). The defendants claim that their firearms convictions should be reversed because this jury instruction was in error in light of Bailey. Because the instruction would allow a jury to find that the defendant used the firearm without any active employment, the'instruction was clearly erroneous in light of the subsequent decision in Bailey, which the government concedes. This court has issued a number of opinions dealing with jury instructions that were rendered erroneous by Bailey. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281, 117 S.Ct. 2467, 138 L.Ed.2d 223 (1997); United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Moore, 76 F.3d 111 (6th Cir.1996); Taylor, 102 F.3d at 769-71. In both Anderson and Taylor, this court applied plain error analysis because the defendants failed to object to the jury instructions, even though at the time the instructions were given this court had accepted the fortress theory of § 924(c)(1) liability. The other two cases focused simply on the question of whether it was possible that the jury instruction led the jury to base the conviction on impermissible grounds, without specifically stating the level of review. Here, - Hough and Curtis did object to the jury instructions at trial, and their convictions should be reviewed under a harmless error analysis. The other defendants did not independently object, but the district court had previously agreed to accept an objection by one of the defendants as an objection by all. We analyze whether the erroneous jury instruction prejudiced each of the defendants. Under harmless error analysis, reversal is warranted only if the instruction affected a substantial right of the defendants. See Fed. R.Crim. P. 62(a). Hough and Anthony Gibbs were both indicted for carrying firearms on their persons during crack cocaine transactions. The erroneous jury instruction defining “use” could not have affected their convictions because no properly instructed reasonable juror could have found that the defendants did not carry the firearms. Had we not reversed for insufficiency of the evidence Needum’s conviction on Count 97, which relates to his robbery of Agent Russell after retrieving a pistol from Curtis’s apartment, we would have to reverse Needum’s Count 97 conviction on this ground. Even if a jury could find that robbing a person with a gun obtained after the drug transaction was completed could still be during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, the erroneous instruction allowed the jury to base its conviction on the theory that Needum constructively possessed the firearm while he engaged in the drug sale with Russell. Needum was therefore prejudiced by this jury instruction. Had we not reversed Needum’s and Curtis’s convictions on Count 103, regarding the gun found on the same set of shelving as the baggie of crack in Curtis’s apartment, we would have to reverse the Count 103 convictions on this ground. Again, the jury could have based its conviction on constructive possession of the firearm rather than on the government’s theory that they actively displayed the firearm during and in relation to an underlying drug trafficking offense. Needum and Curtis were therefore prejudiced by this instruction. Finally, Woods’s conviction on Count 147, which the government concedes should be reversed for insufficient evidence, would also have to be reversed on this ground. Again, the jury instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to convict based on the now-defunct fortress theory of § 924(c)(1) liability. Therefore we uphold the § 924(c)(1) convictions of Hough on Count 82 and Anthony Gibbs on Count 133. We reverse the § 924(e)(1) convictions of Needum on Counts 97 and 103, Curtis on Count 103, and Woods on Count 147. C. Variance Anthony Gibbs argues that there was a variance between the government’s conspiracy indictment and the evidence actually presented at trial. His contention is that the government alleged the existence of a street gang in the indictment, which the evidence at trial did not prove. Obtaining a reversal of a conviction because of a variance between the indictment and the evidence requires satisfaction of a two-prong test: “(1) the variance itself must be demonstrated; and (2) the variance must affect some substantial right of the defendant.” United States v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 999, 1002 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 532, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988). “A variance occurs when the evidence offered at trial differs materially from the charge in the indictment.” United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied sub nom. Escamilla v. United States, 507 U.S. 1041, 113 S.Ct. 1874, 123 L.Ed.2d 493 (1993). Whether, based on the evidence presented at trial, a conspiracy has been proven is a question of fact for the jury. The indictment states that the basis for the conspiracy charge was the defendants’ agreement to exclude persons who were not affiliated with or members of the Short North Posse from selling drugs in the Short North. The government’s opening statement is vague as to the specific theory of the drug conspiracy, but it does argue that a number of drug dealers from the Short North were part of a tacit agreement to exclude non-resident drug dealers from selling in the Short North. As we held above, the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the conspiracy alleged in the government’s indictment. The crux of the defendants’ argument is really the question of whether the government presented sufficient evidence to establish different defendants’ membership in the conspiracy. This issue was addressed above. Furthermore, to the extent the defendants are arguing that the government presented evidence of multiple conspiracies, the jury instructions reduced the chance that any substantial rights were affected. Here, the district court specifically instructed the jury that “the government must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. If the government fails to prove this, then you must find that defendant not guilty of the conspiracy charged, even if you find that he was a member of some other conspiracy.” J.A. at 1945-46 (Jury Charge). We hold that these instructions provided sufficient safeguards to ensure that the jury’s conviction was based on the conspiracy charged in the indictment. D. Admission of Photographs Defendants Woods and Chad Gibbs object to the district court’s decision to allow the introduction into evidence of a number of photographs of gang-related imagery. The first group consists of photographs of two T-shirts found in Woods’s bedroom during the execution of the search warrant for his house. The second consists of photographs of graffiti-covered buildings in the Short North area. The graffiti included references to the SNP. The defendants argue that these photographs were more unfairly prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” We review a district court’s Rule 403 ruling for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir.1997); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993). “Under such a standard of review, this court takes a maximal view of the probative effect of the evidence and a minimal view of its unfairly prejudicial effect, and will hold that the district court erred only if the latter outweighs the former.” Sassanelli, 118 F.3d at 498. See also Bonds, 12 F.3d at 567. As the Supreme Court has stated, A district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the probative value of common membership in any particular group, and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 and ultimately, if the evidence is admitted, for the trier of fact. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). “Unfair prejudice ‘does not mean the damage to a defendant’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.’ ” Bonds, 12 F.3d at 567 (quoting United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 333 (6th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). Both of the T-shirts found in Woods’s bedroom contained references to the “Short North” and the “4th Street Posse.” Woods claims the admission of the T-shirts was unfairly prejudicial to his trial because one shirt also included the language “Death Row” and “Caps get peel’d” and the other contained a drawing of a tombstone and references to shootings. Although the violent nature of some of the language of the T-shirts might be prejudicial, we do not believe it constituted unfair prejudice, and Woods’s possession of the T-shirts was highly probative of the government’s claim that he was a member of the SNP. “Gang affiliation is particularly relevant, and has been held admissible, in cases where the interrelationship between people is a central issue.” United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Story v. United States, 519 U.S. 967, 117 S.Ct. 392, 136 L.Ed.2d 307 (1996). See also United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1563-64 (10th Cir.1992) (connecting information that a defendant was a member of a gang to evidence that the gang’s sole purpose was drug trafficking), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S.Ct. 1855, 123 L.Ed.2d 478 (1993). Although we concluded above that the SNP and the conspiracy were not one and the same, the government’s initial theory was that all drug dealers who were members of the SNP were in the conspiracy, and the T-shirts were direct evidence that Woods was a member of the SNP. We hold that the probative nature of this evidence outweighs the danger of any unfairly prejudicial effects. We think the photographs of the graffiti-covered buildings in the Short North were more unfairly prejudicial than probative of any material fact. Although the buildings were painted with SNP graffiti, they also had writings such as “cop killer,” “slob killer,” and “Crips.” The government claims that this evidence “was directly relevant to the factual issue of whether a conspiracy to distribute drugs in the Short North existed.” Br. of Appellee at 71-72. We do not agree. Not one witness at trial disputed the fact that the SNP existed, which is the only fact that the graffiti could support. Nothing about the graffiti provided direct or even circumstantial evidence that the SNP was a conspiracy to facilitate drug sales. The government also presented no evidence that linked any of the defendants to the particular graffiti in the photographs. Moreover, the jury could have improperly attributed the violent references in the graffiti to the defendants, without any evidence that one of them painted those messages. Because the photographs were probative only of a single undisputed fact, that the SNP existed, and contained a number of potentially unfairly prejudicial messages, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by admitting them into evidence over the objection of Chad Gibbs. In order to obtain reversal of any of the convictions on this basis, however, these photographs must survive a harmless error analysis under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). Unlike the Rule 403 analysis that considers the unfairly prejudicial effect of the particular piece of evidence at issue, harmless error analysis requires this court to consider whether the particular evidence prejudiced the outcome of the trial and resultant convictions. We hold that the photographs of graffiti on buildings that happened to include references to the SNP were unlikely to have had any substantial effect on the defendants’ convictions. E. Dismissal of Defense Witnesses Woods and Chad Gibbs each argue that the district court improperly-excused two defense witnesses from testifying. Each witness invoked through counsel his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Woods attempted to call Curtis West as a defense witness with respect to Count 125, which related to a sale of crack Woods made to Agent Russell on July 15, 1994. The district court excluded West from testifying after his attorney told the court that West would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. See J.A. at 1913— 14 (Bench Conference). Chad Gibbs argues that he sought to call West and Karlos Davis as defense witnesses. The district court excused Davis after Davis’s attorney confirmed that Davis would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to all questions. See J.A. at 1894-1902 (Bench Conference). There is some evidence in the record that Gibbs was going to call West to testify, see J.A. at 1913-14, but no evidence that he sought to call Davis. Both West and Davis had previously pleaded guilty in federal court to drug trafficking crimes. “A defendant’s right to force a witness to testify must yield to that witness’ assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, where it is ‘grounded on a reasonable fear of danger of prosecution.’ ” United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir.1978)), cert. denied sub nom. Crehore v. United States, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 256, 142 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The trial judge has broad discretion to determine whether or not the claim to the privilege has merit. Id. However, “the law of this circuit requires the subpoenaed witness ‘to take the witness stand and assert the [Fifth Amendment] privilege in response to particular questions.’ ” United States v. Makar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1495 (6th Cir.1986) (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Stephens, 492 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852, 95 S.Ct. 93, 42 L.Ed.2d 83 (1974)). A witness cannot meet the reasonable-fear-of-prosecution prong by simply making a blanket assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. However, in certain circumstances, when it is clear that the witness intends to invoke the privilege with respect to any question asked, “a particularized inquiry by the court would [be] futile.” United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 587 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 1049, 127 L.Ed.2d 371 (1994). Here the district judge properly found that each witness had a reasonable fear of prosecution in state court or in federal court for federal crimes not encompassed by their plea agreements. Under Ohio law, state prosecution following federal prosecution is not barred by double jeopardy. See State v. Fletcher, 26 Ohio St.2d 221, 271 N.E.2d 567 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Ohio, 404 U.S. 1024, 92 S.Ct. 699, 30 L.Ed.2d 675 (1972). It is beyond dispute, however, that the district judge committed error when he permitted the witnesses to claim their Fifth Amendment privileges without taking the stand, regardless of whether permitting the witnesses to assert a blanket privilege would have been acceptable once they took the stand. The district court therefore committed error. Woods’s attorney made a proffer of the evidence that West would offer in favor of Woods’s case. See J.A. at 1897-98, 1915. We hold that this proffer brought the issue of the scope of West’s Fifth Amendment privilege to the attention of the district court and therefore review the district court’s error with respect to Woods under the harmless error standard. See Fed. R.Crim. P. 52(a). Woods proffered that West would testify that Woods was not the source of the crack that formed the basis of Woods’s 21 U.S.C. § 841 conviction on Count 125 of the indictment. See J.A. at 1915. Under Ohio law, if a person is convicted or acquitted of a federal drug crime, that person may not be prosecuted in state court for the same act. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.50 (Banks-Baldwin West 1997 & Supp. 1999). Although West had pleaded guilty to drug trafficking crimes in federal court, see United States v. West, No. 96-3595, 1997 WL 640133, *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 15,1997)(unpublished disposition), it is not clear whether that guilty plea included the act about which Woods wanted West to testify. More importantly, at the time West was called to testify, he was in the process of attempting to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at *2. We cannot conclude that West’s attempt to withdraw his guilty plea was meritless at that time, and thus we believe it likely that West would have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to knowledge of any specific drug transactions, as the district court concluded. Therefore, we cannot conclude that any evidence that might have been admitted would have had an effect on Woods’s conviction. We therefore hold that the district court’s error was harmless. Although Chad Gibbs argues that he sought to call both Davis and West as defense witnesses, he did not object to the district court’s decision to excuse West and Davis from testifying and did not offer to proffer testimony with respect to either. We therefore review the district court’s error with respect to Chad Gibbs under the plain error standard. See Fed. R.Crim. P. 52(b). Gibbs does not state what exculpatory evidence, if any, these potential witnesses would have offered to which they would not have claimed their Fifth Amendment privilege, or to which they would not have had a Fifth Amendment privilege. The burden is on the defendant to show prejudice under the plain error test. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Gibbs has not done so. F. Requested Jury Instructions Defendant Chad Gibbs argues that the district court committed reversible error by failing to include certain requested jury instructions of various defendants in the charge to the jury. “We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately submitted the issues and applicable law to the jury.” United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1512 (6th Cir.1991). “A... refusal to deliver the requested instruction is reversible only if that instruction is (1) a correct statement of the law, (2) not substantially covered by the charge actually delivered to the jury, and (3) concerns a point so important in the trial that the failure to give it substantially impairs the defendant’s defense.” Id. See also United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 389-90 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 67, 142 L.Ed.2d 53 (1998); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 372 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 40, 142 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998). Gibbs’s claims are without merit. He argues first that the district court improperly charged the jury with respect to the conspiracy charged and the issue of multiple conspiracies. The district judge gave detailed instructions on the issue of multiple conspiracies. See J.A. at 1945-47 (Tr. at 3966-68). The instructions included the language: “the government must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.” J.A. at 1945. Furthermore, the district court told the jurors that “the government must convince you that each of the members agreed to participate in what he knew was a group activity directed toward a common goal.” J.A. at 1946. Gibbs fails to show how the proposed instructions were not substantially covered by the district court’s instructions. Gibbs also fails to explain how the district court’s answer to the jury’s question regarding the conspiracy instructions did not satisfy the Williams test. See J.A. at 1978-94. Gibbs argues next that the district court erred when it refused to include two proposed instructions that named specific witnesses and explained why their testimony should be given less weight than other witnesses’ testimony. Without these, argues Gibbs, the district court failed to caution the jury with respect to cooperating government witnesses. We disagree. The district court instructed the jury: You have heard that the government has promised certain witnesses that they will not be prosecuted for further narcotics or narcotics-related weapon offenses in exchange for their testimony against the defendants. It is permissible for the government to make such a promise. But you should consider testimony pursuant to a plea agreement or grant of reduced criminal liability with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. Consider whether the testimony may have been influenced by the government’s promise. Do not convict the defendant based on the unsupported testimony of such a witness, standing alone, unless you believe his testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. J.A. at 1956 (Tr. at 3985). These instructions are adequate; the district court does not need to provide cautionary instructions that specifically name witnesses. Gibbs’s final argument with respect to jury instructions is that the district court failed to ensure Gibbs a fair trial when it denied defendant Berry’s jury instruction on intent. See J.A. at 274, 276-79 (Donneto Berry Req. for Specific Jury Instructions). Berry’s instructions would have instructed the jury that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is a specific intent crime. The district court instructed the jury that: For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) First, that the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed more than five grams of the controlled substance described in the indictment on or about the time alleged. (2) Second, at the time of such distribution, the defendant knew that this substance was cocaine base. J.A. at 1951-52 (Tr. at 3977-78). In a specific intent crime, “[t]he defendant must ... act with the purpose of violating the law.” United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir.1998). In a general intent crime, the defendant need only “intend to do the act that the law proscribes.” Id. (quoting United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1576-77 (11th Cir.1994)). “The ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’ language in § 841(a) refers to the possessor’s awareness that he is in possession of a controlled substance and not to his intention to distribute the substance sometime in the future. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires both general criminal intent and the specific ‘intent to distribute’ before a violation is proven.” United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 670 (6th Cir.1977). We view jury instructions in their entirety to determine if the law is conveyed properly. Id. It is clear from the instruction given to the jury that in order to convict, the jury must find that Gibbs knowingly possessed crack and intentionally distributed it. We hold therefore that there was no error in this instruction. G. Motion for Severance Two defendants, Anthony Gibbs and Woods, argue that the defendants should have been severed and granted separate trials to avoid prejudice. The other defendants adopt this claim by reference. The district court refused to sever the trial. We review a district court’s refusal to sever a trial for abuse of discretion. See Welch, 97 F.3d at 147; United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S.Ct. 993, 136 L.Ed.2d 873 (1997). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), “[t]wo or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.” However, if a defendant can show prejudice by joinder in the indictment and join-der for trial, the district court may, in its discretion, grant separ