Full opinion text
KANNE, Circuit Judge. This case involves a number of facial constitutional challenges to Assembly Bill 441 (“AB 441”), which repealed and recreated Wisconsin’s abortion informed consent statute, Wis. Stat. § 253.10, to require physicians who perform abortions to meet with their patients at least twenty-four hours before the abortion procedure to provide the patients with specific oral and printed information. The district court found most of the provisions of AB 441 constitutional after severing certain provisions and construing others as not requiring physicians to provide certain information to women who are pregnant as a result of sexual assault or incest or to women whose fetuses have been diagnosed with a lethal anomaly. Plaintiffs now appeal this decision. Plaintiffs contend that a number of AB 441’s provisions are unconstitutional because they either (1) are impermissibly vague or (2) place an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. Defendant McCann also appeals, challenging the district court’s ruling that certain information need not be provided to sexual assault or incest victims. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part. I. History A. AB 441 In 1996, Wisconsin enacted AB 441, which repealed and recreated Wisconsin’s abortion informed consent statute, Wis. Stat. § 253.10. AB 441 contemplates a number of comprehensive changes to the informed consent structure maintained under the previous informed consent statute. Similar to the previous informed consent statute, under AB 441, an abortion may not be performed by a physician unless the patient has given her voluntary and informed written consent. See id. § 253.10(3)(a). Consent to an abortion is considered “voluntary” under AB 441 only if it “is given freely and without coercion by any person.” Id. § 253.10(3)(b). For a woman’s consent to be considered “informed,” AB 441 requires that two tiers of information be provided to her at least twenty-four hours before the abortion is to be performed. Under the first tier, either the physician who will perform the abortion or any other “qualified physician” must meet with the woman in person and orally provide her the information set forth in § 253.10(3)(c)l. Under the second tier, the information set forth in § 253.10(3)(c)2 must also be orally provided to the woman ’ in person at least twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled abortion, although this information may be conveyed by qualified persons other than the physician performing the abortion or a qualified physician. The person providing the latter information must also give the woman specified state-provided printed materials. See id. §§ 253.10(3)(e)2.d, (3)(d). Both tiers of information must be conveyed to the woman “in an individual setting that protects her privacy, maintains the confidentiality of her decision and ensures that the information she receives focuses on her individual circumstances.” Id. § 253.10(3)(c)3. In that setting, the provider^) of the information must also afford the woman an adequate opportunity to ask questions. See id. § 253.10(3)(c)4. In addition, prior to the performance of the abortion, the woman must certify in writing that (1) she received the information required under AB 441; (2) the information was provided in the appropriate setting; and (3) all of her questions were answered in a satisfactory manner. See id. § 253.10(5)(c)5. AB 441’s twenty-four hour waiting period and informed consent requirements may be waived in the case of a “medical emergency.” Id. § 253.10(3)©. A “medical emergency” is defined as: [A] condition, in a physician’s reasonable medical judgment, that so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a 24-hour delay in performance or inducement of an abortion will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of one or more of the woman’s major bodily functions. Id. § 253.10(2)(d). If the physician determines that a medical emergency exists, the physician must inform the woman-, prior to the abortion if possible, of the medical indications supporting the physician’s “reasonable medical judgment” that an immediate abortion is necessary and, if possible, obtain the woman’s written consent prior to the abortion. See id. § 253.10(3)(f). AB 441 makes certain accommodations for women seeking abortions who became pregnant as the result of sexual assault or incest. See id. § 253.10(3m). A woman who is the victim of sexual assault may bypass AB 441’s twenty-hour waiting period and undergo an immediate abortion if she satisfies certain reporting requirements. See id. § 253.10(3m)(a), Similarly, if the woman is a victim of incest, the twenty-four hour period can be reduced to two hours if she satisfies comparable reporting requirements. See id. § 253.10(3m)(b). AB 441 also provides that a physician must comply with the same informed consent and waiting period requirements if the woman seeking the abortion is a minor. See id. §§ 253.10(3)(a), (3)(c)7. However, in addition to the minor’s informed and voluntary consent, the physician must also obtain the voluntary and informed consent under § 253.10 of one of the minor’s parents or a qualified parent substitute before the physician may perform the abortion. See id. § 253.10(3)(c)7; see also id. § 48.375(4)(a)(l). As with adult women, a minor’s informed consent may be waived if the physician determines that a “medical emergency” exists as defined under AB 441. AB 441 contains three enforcement mechanisms. Section 253.10(5) provides that any person who violates § 253.10(3), § 253.10(3m)(a)2, or § 253.10(3m)(b)2 “shall be required to forfeit not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000.” In addition, AB 441 provides that a person who violates those same provisions may be liable to the woman upon whom the abortion was performed for compensatory damages, punitive damages ranging from $1000 to $10,000, and attorneys’ fees. See id. § 253.10(6). Finally, a physician who violates § 253.10(3) may also be subject to professional discipline, ranging from limitations on to revocation of his or her license. See id. § 441.07(l)(f); § 448.02(3)(a); § 457.26(2)(gm). B. Procedural History Plaintiffs are physicians who provide abortions and organizations that operate facilities where abortion services are provided. Defendants are a number of various state government officials who are charged with implementing and enforcing AB 441. On May 1, 1996, one day after AB 441 was signed into law, plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from all provisions of AB 441, both on their own behalf and on behalf of their patients seeking abortions. Plaintiffs alleged that AB 441 violated their rights and the rights of their patients as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring defendants from enforcing AB 441. The district court granted the temporary restraining order on May 6, 1996, which the parties agreed to extend until the district court ruled on plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion was subsequently converted to a motion for permanent injunction, which the district court heard in June 1996. Before the district court, plaintiffs facially challenged the constitutionality of AB 441 on three grounds. First, plaintiffs alleged that a number of AB 441’s provisions were unconstitutionally vague. Second, plaintiffs contended that AB 441 was unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), because AB 441 had both the purpose and the effect of imposing an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to abortion, thereby violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, plaintiffs raised two First Amendment challenges to AB 441, alleging that AB 441 violated their First Amendment right to Free Speech by requiring physicians to purchase and distribute state-mandated information with which they may be ideologically opposed, and that AB 441 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it requires physicians to distribute religious information to women seeking an abortion. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin AB 441 in its entirety, finding that AB 441 as a whole did not violate a woman’s constitutional right to seek an abortion. However, the court did find certain provisions of AB 441 unconstitutional and severed them from the statute. In addition, the district court found that AB 441 was constitutional only if the “medical emergency” provision contained in § 253.10(2)(d) is construed to provide that physicians may perform emergency abortions when there is a “significant threat to a woman’s health” and only if certain of the informed consent requirements set forth in § 253.10(3)(c)2 are construed as not requiring physicians to give specific information to women who are pregnant as a result of sexual assault or incest or to women whose fetuses have been diagnosed with a lethal anomaly. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s conclusions that AB 441 is not unconstitutionally vague and that AB 441 does not have the effect, or purpose of imposing an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion. Defendant McCann cross-appeals, challenging the district court’s severance of § 253.10(3)(c)l.g and its construction of § 253.10(3)(c)2.b. II. Standard of Review We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.1998). We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 394 (7th Cir.1998); Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change, 137 F.3d at 507; see also Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499-U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (concluding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law). Furthermore, in interpreting AB 441, we apply Wisconsin law and Wisconsin principles of statutory construction. See K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cir.1992) (“When interpreting state laws, federal courts use the same principles as state courts do.”). III. Vagueness Analysis Plaintiffs submit that the district court erred in determining that AB 441 was not unconstitutionally vague. Although plaintiffs argued before the district court that a number of AB 441’s provisions were im-permissibly vague, those challenges relevant to this appeal can be reduced to three main claims. First, plaintiffs argue that AB 441’s “medical emergency” provision is unconstitutionally vague because it relies on an objective standard for evaluating a physician’s decision to perform an emergency abortion. Second, plaintiffs contend that the differing medical emergency provisions set forth in AB 441 and § 48.375(4)(b)l of Wisconsin’s parental consent law create two conflicting standards applicable to minors’ abortions. Finally, plaintiffs argue that some of the informed consent requirements contained in § 253.10(3)(c) are unconstitutionally vague because they require abortion providers to disclose broad categories of information to patients but fail to specify the exact content of what must be discussed in order to satisfy AB 441 and thereby avoid liability. Before we address each challenge, it is necessary to set forth the legal framework for evaluating vagueness challenges. The void for vagueness doctrine rests on the basic principle of due process that a law is unconstitutional “if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 44, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (“Due process requires that a State provide meaningful standards to guide the application of its laws.”). In Grayned, the Supreme Court explained the rationale underlying the void for vagueness doctrine: Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (footnotes omitted). These principles are not to be mechanically applied, however, as “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments “with criminal rather than civil penalties because the consequences of imprecision” are more severe. Id. at 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186. The most important factor affecting the degree of clarity necessary to satisfy the Constitution is whether constitutional rights are at stake. See id. at 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186. When a law threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, such as the present case, the Constitution demands that courts apply a more stringent vagueness test. See id. Thus, there are two means by which a statute can operate in an unconstitutionally vague manner. First, a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide “fair warning” as to what conduct will subject a person to liability. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357,103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary-people can understand what conduct is prohibited.”); see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186. Second, a statute must contain an explicit and ascertainable standard to prevent those charged with enforcing the statute’s provisions from engaging in “arbitrary and discriminatory” enforcement. See Gmyned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (reasoning that in order to avoid vagueness a statute proscribing penalties for unlawful conduct “must provide explicit standards for those who apply them” so as to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”). A. AB 441’s Medical Emergency Provision A state abortion statute that interferes with a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion procedure must contain a valid medical emergency exception to ensure that the statute is not applied in a manner that would constitute a significant threat to a woman’s health. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-80, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Consistent with Casey’s mandate, AB 441 contains a medical emergency exception that excuses physicians from complying with the statute’s informed consent requirements and the twenty-four hour waiting period if a “medical emergency” exists. See Wis. Stat. § 253.10(3)(f). AB 441 defines a “medical emergency” as: [A] condition, in a physician’s reasonable medical judgment, that so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant .woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a 24-hour delay in performance or inducement of an abortion will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of one or more of the woman’s major bodily functions. Id. at § 253.10(2)(d). By requiring that a physician exercise “reasonable medical judgment,” AB 441 employs an objective standard for evaluating a physician’s decision to perform an emergency abortion. Furthermore, because AB 441 has no overarching scienter requirement, a physician is liable for any violation of AB 441, including the medical emergency provision, without regard to his or her good faith attempt to comply with AB 441’s provisions. Plaintiffs raise three separate vagueness challenges to AB 441’s medical emergency provision. First, they argue that the provision must contain either a subjective standard or an objective standard combined with a scienter requirement in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. An objective standard alone, plaintiffs submit, is always void for vagueness in the abortion context. Second, plaintiffs contend that the medical emergency provision’s objective standard fails to provide them with “fair warning” as to what conduct will subject them to liability under AB 441 because physicians may disagree as to what constitutes a “medical emergency” and, therefore, physicians will not be able to discern which emergency situations constitute a significant threat to a woman’s health. Finally, plaintiffs argue that AB 441’s “reasonable medical judgment” standard is inadequate to prevent against the risk of “arbitrary and discriminatory” enforcement of AB 441’s liability provisions. Plaintiffs fear that an objective standard, as opposed to a subjective good faith) standard, puts physicians at risk that their emergency medical judgments will be second-guessed by those charged with enforcing and applying AB 441’s provisions. As best as we can discern, we are the first court to squarely address on the merits the issue of whether an objective standard in a medical emergency exception to an abortion informed consent statute is unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that an objective reasonableness standard does not render AB 441’s medical emergency provision void for vagueness. 1. An Objective Standard Is Not Per Se Unconstitutional We begin by addressing plaintiffs’ threshold argument that an objective standard renders the medical emergency provision unconstitutionally vague as a matter of law. Plaintiffs rely primarily on Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 140 L.Ed.2d 496 (1998), a recent decision from the Sixth Circuit, for the proposition that, in the absence of a scienter requirement, an objective standard contained in a medical emergency exception to an abortion statute renders that statute void for vagueness. In Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of an Ohio abortion statute that subjected physicians to both criminal and civil liability for performing post-viability abortions, except when the physician “in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment” determined that a medical emergency existed. Id. at 204. The Sixth Circuit characterized this provision of the Ohio statute as imposing a “dual” subjective and objective standard on a physician’s medical emergency determination, meaning that a physician must have believed the abortion was necessary and that belief must have been objectively reasonable to other physicians. See id. This “dual” standard did not require a finding of scienter before a physician could be held criminally or civilly liable; rather, like AB 441, physicians faced liability for good faith medical determinations, if it was later determined that the physician’s medical judgment was unreasonable. See id. In striking down the statute as unconstitutionally vague, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979), which the Sixth Circuit construed as strongly suggesting that a scienter requirement is necessary to avoid vagueness in statutes that subject a physician to liability for erroneous medical determinations. See id. Based on this reading of Colautti, the Sixth Circuit reasoned: The determination of whether a medical emergency or necessity exists, like the determination of whether a fetus is viable, is fraught with uncertainty and susceptible to being subsequently disputed by others. Moreover, the lack of scien-ter is-compounded by the fact that this Act requires that a physician meet both an objective and a subjective standard in order to avoid liability. While we need not decide whether employment of an objective standard with a scienter requirement would be constitutional, an objective standard without one is especially troublesome in the abortion context. In an area as controversial as abortion, the need for a scienter requirement is, as the Supreme Court [in Co-lautti\ pointed out, particularly important. In this area where there is such disagreement, it is unlikely that the prosecution could not find a physician willing to testify that the physician did not act reasonably. Under the Act, a physician who performs a post-viability abortion ... may be held liable, even if the physician believed he or she was acting reasonably, and in accordance with his or her best medical judgment as long as others later decide that the physician’s actions were nonetheless unreasonable. The objective standard combined with strict liability for even good faith determinations, “could have a profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions,” ... when the woman’s life or health is threatened. The uncertainty induced by this statute therefore threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 205 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit concluded that, without a scienter requirement, the Ohio statute did not adequately notify a physician that certain conduct was prohibited and, therefore, physicians would be less willing to perform abortions. See id. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the “combination of the objective and subjective standards without a scienter requirement renders [the medical emergency exception] unconstitutionally vague, because physicians cannot know the standard under which their conduct will ultimately be judged.” Id. Plaintiffs submit that Voinovich should convince us to reach the conclusion that AB 441’s medical emergency provision is unconstitutionally vague because. it contains an objective standard rather than a subjective standard and provides for the imposition of liability without a finding of scienter. We decline to do so for two reasons. First and foremost, we respectfully disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s assessment of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Colautti to the extent that the Sixth Circuit construed Colautti as requiring, or at least strongly suggesting, that an abortion statute imposing an objective standard on a' physician’s medical determinations would be found unconstitutionally vague without a scienter requirement. In Colautti the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania abortion statute that required a physician who performed . or induced an abortion to make a determination, “based on his experience, judgment or professional competence,” that the fetus was not viable. 439 U.S. at 391, 99 S.Ct. 675 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the physician determined that “the fetus [was] viable” or if “there [was] sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable,” then the physician was directed to utilize a statutorily prescribed abortion technique. Id. at 381, 99 S.Ct. 675. Violations of the statute subjected a physician to both strict civil and criminal liability. Id. at 381 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 675. The Supreme Court struck down the Pennsylvania statute as unconstitutionally vague not because it lacked a scienter requirement, but rather because it was unclear whether the statute imposed “a purely subjective standard,, or whether it impose[d] a mixed subjective and objective standard” on the physician’s viability determination. Id. at 391, 99 S.Ct. 675. The Court concluded that the determination that the fetus “[was] viable” was to be based upon the attending physician’s “experience, judgment or professional competence,” a subjective standard, but it could not ascertain whether the “sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable” determination was to be governed by a subjective or objective standard. Id. While the Court in Colautti did state that the vagueness of the statute was compounded by the fact that it subjected physicians to potential criminal liability without a finding of fault, the Court specifically declined to decide “whether, under a properly drafted statute, a finding of bad faith or some other type of scienter would be required before a physician could be held criminally responsible for an erroneous determination of viability.” Id. at 396, 99 S.Ct. 675. In effect, the Supreme Court did not hold in Colautti that an abortion statute utilizing an objective standard without a scienter requirement is unconstitutionally vague. See Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof'l Corp., — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 140 L.Ed.2d 496 (1998) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[W]e have never held that, in the abortion context, a scienter requirement is mandated by the Constitution.”). Instead, the Court only indicated that a scienter requirement could perhaps save an already vague statute from being voided on vagueness grounds; it never indicated that the absence of a scienter requirement itself creates vagueness when it does not otherwise exist. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 396, 99 S.Ct. 675; Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 216 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principle invoked by the Court in Colautti simply is that a scienter requirement can mitigate the vagueness of an otherwise vague law— not that the absence of a scienter requirement will ‘create’ vagueness where it does not otherwise exist[ ].” (citation omitted)); see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186 f[T]he Court has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, we find no compelling indication in Colautti that the Court struck down the statute because it believed imposing an objective standard on a physician’s medical decisions was unconstitutional per se in the abortion context. To the contrary, the Court found the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutionally vague because the statute failed to identify clearly the overall standard that controlled a physician’s viability determination; that is, the Court could not determine whether the statute imposed a purely subjective standard or one that contained both subjective and objective elements. In fact, the Court seemingly left open the possibility that a mixed standard (combining both subjective and objective elements), if clearly articulated, could be found constitutional without some finding of fault. Because we find nothing in Colautti suggests that a properly worded mixed standard is per se void for vagueness in the abortion context, we are not willing to infer that the Court would find an objective standard per se unconstitutional. Although the Court did appear to recognize that the incorporation of an objective element could pose some hazards, see Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390-97, 99 S.Ct. 675, we nevertheless believe that had the Court concluded it was the objective portion of the statutory standard at issue in Colautti that caused the statute to fail for vagueness, it would have indicated that reason as the basis on which it was voiding the statute. In other words, if an objective standard per se creates vagueness in the abortion context, then the Court likely would have invalidated the statute on that, ground alone. We believe the central principle established' in Colautti is that an abortion statute that imposes liability on a physician for erroneous medical determinations is void for vagueness only if it leaves physicians uncertain as to the relevant legal standard under which their medical determinations will be judged. This interpretation is consistent with the standard by which vagueness challenges are to be examined. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (reasoning that the absence of any ascertainable standard to which a person must conform his conduct is what offends the Due Process Clause). Second, we also note that the standard employed in the Ohio statute considered in Voinovich was a dual objective-subjective standard. As such, the Sixth Circuit had no occasion to pass on the constitutional sufficiency of an objective standard alone. Therefore, we consider much of the court’s analysis on this point as dicta. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit in Voinovich held that it was the combination of objective and subjective elements without a scienter requirement that rendered the Ohio medical emergency provision unconstitutionally vague; the rationale being that physicians could not know the standard under which their medical emergency determinations will ultimately be judged. AB 441, by contrast, creates no such uncertainty because it makes clear that the standard to which it will hold physicians’ decisions is an objective one. We must now determine whether AB 441’s “reasonable medical judgment” standard provides “fair warning” to Wisconsin physicians of the relevant legal standard under which their emergency medical determinations will be judged and whether that standard is adequate to prevent those charged with enforcing and applying AB 441 from engaging in “arbitrary and discriminatory” enforcement of its provisions. 2. AB Hi’s Medical Emergency Provision Provides “Fair Warning” We turn first to the issue of fair warning. Unlike the statutes at issue in Colautti and Voinovich, AB 441’s medical emergency provision makes clear that the operative legal standard is an objective one. Thus, physicians are fully aware that they will be judged solely on an objective basis in making the determination that a medical emergency exists. Furthermore, the “reasonable medical judgnent” standard clearly is an ascertainable and comprehensible standard that provides physicians with more than “fair warning” as to what conduct is expected of them in order to avoid the imposition of liability under AB 441 because this is the same standard by which all of their medical decisions are judged under traditional theories of tort law. As the district court noted, physicians have a duty to exercise due care, ie. act reasonably, in treating all their patients and this duty extends to a physician’s decision to perform an emergency abortion. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis.2d 419, 543 N.W.2d 265, 270-72 (Wis. 1996) (explaining that physicians in Wisconsin have a duty to exercise due care, the standard for which must be established by a determination of what is reasonable to expect of a physician given the state of medical knowledge at the time of the treatment at issue); Department of Regulation & Licensing v. State Med. Examining Bd., 215 Wis.2d 188, 572 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Wis. Ct.App.1997) (explaining that the standard for determining if a physician failed to exercise due care is whether the physician used the degree of skill and care that a reasonable physician would use in the same or similar circumstances). Plaintiffs offered evidence at trial that showed that there could be differences of opinion among physicians about whether certain medical conditions would be considered serious enough to fall within AB 441’s medical emergency provision. As a result, plaintiffs arg-ue that the provision fails to give physicians fair warning. While it is certainly true that physicians may disagree as to whether a specific situation rises to the level of posing a significant threat to a woman’s health sufficient to necessitate an immediate abortion, the fact that one physician would choose to perform the emergency abortion under those circumstances while others would not, does not necessarily mean the former physician is acting unreasonably. In any given medical situation there is likely to be a number of reasonable medical options and disagreement between doctors over the appropriate course of action does not, of course, render one option reasonable and another unreasonable. As the district court noted, “[i]f there are two- reasonable options, in this case either performing an emergency abortion immediately or waiting 24 hours, the doctor who chooses either of those reasonable options will have acted within her reasonable medical judgment.” Karlin, 975 F.Supp. at 1222. Furthermore, assessing the, seriousness of a risk to a patient’s health and the necessity of immediate treatment is something that physicians are called upon to do routinely under an objective standard knowing that if they make an objectively erroneous determination they may be subject to civil liability. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that a state abortion statute should not unduly limit a physician’s discretion in making medical determinations. See, e.g., Colautti 439 U.S. at 396-97, 99 S.Ct. 675 (reasoning that a physician must be afforded adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment). AB 441, however, does not take away a physician’s discretion to make emergency medical determinations. Rather, it allows a physician to exercise the broad discretion traditionally relied upon in such situations — it simply provides that the physician’s decision must be objectively reasonable. AB 441 does not tie the hands of the physician by specifying those medical conditions that would be considered serious enough to warrant an emergency abortion. That decision is left to the discretion of the attending physician to determine based on the individual circumstances of the woman’s medical condition. While physicians may feel more secure in determining that a medical emergency exists under AB 441 if they know that their emergency medical decisions need only satisfy a subjective good faith standard, a state’s decision to hold a physician’s emergency medical determination to an objective standard alone does not render the medical emergency provision im-permissibly vague. There is no showing in other emergency contexts that an objective standard impermissibly limits a physician’s discretion in making similar decisions. Plaintiffs fail to offer any compelling reason why the abortion context should be any different. Accordingly, we conclude that AB 441’s “reasonable medical judgment” standard provides “fair warning” to physicians of the conduct that will subject them to liability under AB 441. 3. AB kkl’s Medical Emergency Provision Provides for “Fair Enforcement” Plaintiffs also argue that AB 441 fails to provide an adequate standard to guide those charged with the enforcement of its provisions. Plaintiffs contend that an objective standard, while appropriate in the tort context, is inappropriate under AB 441 because, in addition to traditional civil liability, AB 441 imposes professional discipline and quasi-criminal penalties in the form of forfeiture upon physicians who make unreasonable emergency medical determinations. For this reason, plaintiffs submit that AB 441’s objective standard is inadequate to restrain prosecutors and state licensing authorities from engaging in “arbitrary and discriminatory” enforcement of AB 441’s provisions. We disagree. A statute or statutory provision that proscribes penalties for violations is impermissibly vague when it fails to provide a definite standard of conduct, thereby giving prosecutors, courts, and jurors unfettered freedom to act on nothing but their own preferences and beliefs. See Smith, 415 U.S. at 575, 578, 94 S.Ct. 1242. To avoid a finding of vagueness in the abortion context, a statute that imposes liability for violations of its provisions must provide an explicit standard for those who enforce or apply the statute’s provisions so as to prevent them from engaging in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390-94, 99 S.Ct. 675. It is certainly a stretch to argue that AB 441 fails to provide an explicit standard for those who apply it. AB 441 clearly indicates that those charged with enforcing AB 441’s provisions must assess a physician’s conduct under an objective standard. Such a standard does not permit those charged with enforcing AB 441’s provisions to bring arbitrary actions because enforcement actions can properly be brought only when it is reasonably believed that a physician made an objectively unreasonable decision to perform an emergency abortion. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (stating that a statute imposing criminal penalties is unconstitutionally vague only if it fails to provide “minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,” thereby allowing arbitrary enforcement by the government). Just as AB 441’s “reasonable medical judgment” standard clearly provides the standard to which physicians must conform their conduct, that same standard provides the guideline pursuant to which prosecutors, state licensing authorities, and civil plaintiffs can seek to hold physicians liable for erroneous emergency medical determinations. Accordingly, we conclude that AB 441, by employing an objective standard, does not impermissibly delegate the decision to prosecute, to seek to hold liable, or to impose liability to prosecutors, state licensing authorities, courts, and juries for “resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294. It appears that plaintiffs are really arguing that AB 441’s objective standard places physicians at greater risk that their emergency medical judgments will be second-guessed by prosecutors and state licensing authorities. Plaintiffs contend that the fear of being second-guessed for good faith, albeit medically unreasonable, emergency medical determinations will chill physicians from performing emergency abortions that they otherwise would have performed, thereby infringing on a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion. This argument seems to be derived from such cases as Colautti, see 439 U.S. at 390-97, 99 S.Ct. 675, and Doyle, see 162 F.3d at 469, in which it has been recognized that a statute prohibiting certain conduct so vaguely that it makes physicians afraid to perform constitutionally permissible abortions is quite likely to infringe upon constitutional rights. In this context, however, we disagree with plaintiffs’ argument and conclude that AB 441’s medical emergency abortion will not have the effect of impermissibly chilling physicians from performing emergency abortions in Wisconsin for two reasons. First, as we explained above, we do not believe the medical emergency provision is imper-missibly vague. Second, as we will explain below, any potential chilling effect under AB 441 will be minimal. A physician who violates the operative provisions of AB 441 is subject to civil liability, a “penalty” constituting monetary forfeiture, and professional discipline. Specifically, § 253.10(6) provides that a physician who violates AB 441’s provisions can be held civilly liable to the woman upon whom the abortion was performed for damages arising out of the performance or inducement of the abortion, including compensatory damages, potential punitive damages ranging from $1000 to $10,000, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See Wis. Stat. § 253.10(6). Under AB 441’s “penalty” provision, a physician who does not comply with the provisions of AB '441 “shall be required to forfeit not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000.” Id. § 253.10(5). Finally, a physician who violates AB 441 may also be subject to professional discipline. See id. § 441.07(l)(f); § 448.02(3)(a); § 457.26(2)(gm). These three enforcement provisions closely parallel existing Wisconsin law and regulations pursuant to which physicians may be held liable for the provision of medical services (which necessarily include abortions). These laws and regulations, like AB 441, impose objective standards to which physicians must conform their conduct in order to avoid liability or discipline. Because there is no evidence that physicians are chilled in the performance of emergency services (including emergency abortions) in those contexts, we will not conclude that physicians will be impermis-sibly chilled from performing abortions under AB 441 simply because it employs an objective standard. With respect to AB 441’s provision for civil liability, it goes without saying that a physician is subject to financial liability under traditional theories of tort law if he or she fails to exercise reasonable care. Thus, the fact that AB 441 provides that a physician who makes an unreasonable medical determination can be held civilly hable to the patient for damages arising out of the performance of the abortion cannot be said to impermissibly “chill” physicians in exercising their professional medical judgment that a medical emergency exists because they operate under the spectre of civil liability for unreasonable medical judgments everyday. A close cousin to the recovery of monetary damages under AB 441 is the imposition of a monetary fine under AB 441’s “penalty” provision. This provision would, at first blush, seem to be the most troublesome from a constitutional standpoint because an objective standard is most vulnerable in the abortion context when a statute imposes criminal or quasi-criminal penalties on constitutionally protected activity. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (explaining that statutes imposing strict criminal liability that require no mens rea are generally disfavored). However, we nevertheless conclude that AB 441’s objective standard is adequate to protect physicians against the risk of indiscriminate forfeiture prosecutions. As we discuss in greater detail in Part III.C.2 infra, the forfeiture provision of AB 441 merely levels a monetary fine for violations — there is no risk of incarceration nor is a violator labeled with the stigma of having been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony offense. Thus, the threat of potential financial liability under AB 441’s forfeiture provision is, we believe, qualitatively no different from the threat of civil liability under AB 441. Because we have already concluded that the threat of financial liability under that section cannot be said to increase a physician’s unwillingness to perform emergency abortions because the physician already faces the threat of financial liability at tort law for decisions to perform emergency abortions that are later adjudged to be medically unreasonable, it follows that the imposition of a monetary fine is likely to have no significant chilling effect on the performance of abortions in Wisconsin. Finally, plaintiffs make much of the fact that physicians face professional discipline for violations of AB 441. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 448.02(3)(a) (providing that an investigation of unprofessional conduct may be initiated upon an allegation that a physician has violated the informed consent or waiting period requirements of AB 441). Plaintiffs submit that the threat of professional discipline for good faith, albeit unreasonable, medical determinations would contribute in large part to a physician’s unwillingness to perform emergency abortions. However, we must point out that under existing Wisconsin law physicians are already subject to professional discipline for unreasonable medical decisions in abortion and non-abortion cases alike. Under Wis. Stat. § 448.02 physicians are subject to investigation upon an allegation of “negligence in treatment.” Wisconsin courts have construed this term to mean conduct falling below the civil standard of care for medical negligence, which is the same objective reasonableness standard employed by AB 441. See Department of Regulation & Licensing, 572 N.W.2d at 512-13 (“We do not see any reason to depart from the civil standard for medical negligence when determining whether, for disciplinary purposes, a physician was negligent in treating a patient.”); see also Wis. Stat. § 448.02(3)(b) (“[A] finding by a court that a physician has acted negligently in treating a patient is conclusive evidence that the physician is guilty of negligence in treatment.”). Because the failure to exercise reasonable care under such circumstances renders a physician subject to professional discipline under both existing Wisconsin statutory regulations and AB 441, we see no reason to conclude that the potential for professional discipline contemplated by AB 441 will have any increased chilling effect on the perfor-manee of emergency abortions in Wisconsin. In sum, we hold that AB 441’s “reasonable medical judgment” standard is not void for vagueness for three reasons: (1) the standard clearly conveys to physicians that their emergency medical determinations will be judged on an objective basis; (2) physicians are accustomed to having their medical decisions adjudged under an objective standard; and (3) this same objectivity, we believe, provides an adequate safeguard against any risk of arbitrary and unfair enforcement. B. Contradiction Between Medical Emergency Provisions In a related argument, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of AB 441’s medical emergency provision on the ground that it conflicts with the emergency medical provision contained in the parental consent law found _ in Wisconsin’s Children’s Code, Wis. Stat. § 48.01 et seq. Section 48.375 of Wisconsin’s parental consent law provides that a physician may not perform an abortion on a minor unless the physician has obtained the voluntary and informed written consent of the minor and the voluntary and informed written consent of one of her parents or a parent substitute under § 253.10 of AB 441 at least twenty-four hours before the abortion procedure. See id § 48.375(4)(a)l. Under AB 441’s medical emergency provision, a physician is permitted to perform an immediate emergency abortion when a condition arises that “in a physician’s reasonable medical judgment” creates a “significant threat to a woman’s health.” See Karlin, 975 F.Supp. at 1221. However, Wisconsin’s parental consent law also contains a provision permitting a physician to dispense with obtaining the minor’s and parent’s consent and to perform an immediate abortion on the minor woman if the physician determines “to the best of his or her medical judgment based on the facts of the case before him or her, that a medical emergency exists that complicates the pregnancy so as to require an immediate abortion.” Wis. Stat. § 48.375(4)(b)l. Plaintiffs assert that these “conflicting” medical emergency provisions place a physician faced with an emergency medical situation involving a minor in a quandary because the physician will not know whether he or she should look to the parental consent law, which allows physicians to proceed with an emergency abortion if his or her subjective best medical judgment so dictates, or look to AB 441, which permits a physician to perform an emergency abortion only so long as the decision is objee-tively reasonable. Because a physician cannot know the standard under which his or her decision to perform an emergency abortion on a minor will be judged, plaintiffs argue that AB 441’s medical emergency provision is void for vagueness. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the conflicting standards operated to render AB 441 unconstitutional. Recognizing that the two statutes imposed different standards on a physician’s medical determination to perform an emergency abortion on a minor, the district court reasoned that “[i]f a physician is considering an emergency abortion for a minor, she will be immune from liability if she makes a decision based on reasonable medical judgment. Requiring doctors to comply with the stricter standard is constitutional and cures any potential vagueness concerns.” Karlin, 975 F.Supp. at 1228. Although we agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the district court that a physician must comply with AB 441’s objective standard when deciding to perform an emergency abortion on any woman, including a minor, we do so because the two medical emergency provisions do indeed conflict, a conclusion the district court stopped short of reaching. For this reason we go one step further than the district court and recognize that AB 441 has impliedly repealed the medical emergency provision of the parental consent law. Both statutes, on their face, purport to dictate the circumstances under which a minor’s and a parent’s voluntary and informed consent can be waived in the case of a medical emergency. Section 253.10(3)(a) of AB 441 provides that a physician may not perform an abortion on a minor woman unless both the minor and the individual who is required to give consent under § 48.375(4)(a)l have each given their “voluntary and informed consent” to the abortion procedure. See also Wis. Stat. § 253.10(3)(c)7. Similarly, § 48.375(4)(a) of the parental consent law provides that a physician may not perform an abortion on a minor unless the physician has received “under the requirements of s. 253.10, the voluntary and informed written consent of the minor and the voluntary and informed written consent of one of her parents.” (emphasis added). The parental consent law then provides that the obtainment of the minor’s and parent’s informed consent pursuant to § 253.10 can be waived and an emergency abortion performed if the physician believes “to the best of his or her medical judgment based on the facts of the case before him or her” that a medical emergency exists—a subjective standard. See id. § 48.375(4)(b). This stands in direct contrast to AB 441’s medical emergency provision under which a physician can perform an emergency abortion without obtaining the voluntary and informed consent of the minor and her parent only if the physician in the exercise of “reasonable medical judgment” (ie., objectively) determines that a medical emergency exists that creates a significant threat to a woman’s health. See id. §§ 253.10(2)(d), (3)(c); Karlin, 975 F.Supp. at 1221. These statutes have the effect of establishing conflicting standards by which a physician’s decision to waive informed consent and perform an emergency abortion on a minor will be adjudged. However, while plaintiffs are correct that the two statutes operate to impose conflicting standards on a physician’s decision to perform an emergency abortion on a minor, this conflict does not render AB 441 void for vagueness. As we explained in Part III.A, standing alone, AB 441’s medical emergency provision is not vague. Nor does the fact that the parental consent law imposes a different standard on a physician’s decision to perform an emergency abortion automatically cause AB 441’s medical emergency provision to be void for vagueness. Instead, the conflicting provisions in the two statutes concerning emergency abortions for minors creates a question of implied repeal under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has defined “implied repeal” as “[t]he abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the enactment of a subsequent statute ... which contains provisions so contrary to or irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in force.... ” State v. Dairyland Power Coop., 52 Wis.2d 45, 187 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Wis.1971) (citation omitted). Under Wisconsin law, the implied repeal of a statute by a later enactment is disfavored. State v. Black, 188 Wis.2d 639, 526 N.W.2d 132, 134 (Wis.1994). As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has explained: A later and an older statute will, if it is possible and reasonable to do so, be always construed together, so as to give effect not only to the distinct parts or provisions of the latter, not inconsistent with the new law, but to give effect to the older law as a whole, subject only to restrictions or modifications of its meaning, where such seems to have been the legislative purpose. Jicha v. Earns, 39 Wis.2d 676, 159 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Wis.1968) (quoting McLoughlin v. Malnar, 237 Wis. 492, 297 N.W. 370 (Wis.1941) (internal citations omitted)). Thus, we must make every attempt to give effect to both provisions by construing them together so as to be consistent with one another. However, an earlier statute, or provision in such a statute, will not be considered to remain in force if it is so “manifestly inconsistent and repugnant to the later act that they cannot reasonably stand together.” Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis.2d 331, 288 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Wis. 1980) (quoting Lenfesty v. Eau Claire, 245 Wis. 220, 13 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis.1944)). In determining whether the parental consent law has been impliedly repealed, we must first consider whether there is any way to construe the two medical emergency provisions so as not to conflict with one another. Jicha, 159 N.W.2d at 693. The only rational construction that would allow both provisions to survive is one in which AB 441’s medical emergency provision is construed to set forth the standard imposed on physicians performing emergency abortions on adult women and the parental consent law’s medical emergency provision establishes the standard imposed on physicians performing emergency abortions on minor women. Such a construction, however, would ignore the plain wording of both statutes and is inconsistent with the legislature’s professed intent in promulgating AB 441, which we explain below. Whenever a court is confronted with apparently conflicting legislation, its goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislative body and construe the law accordingly. See County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 288 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Wis.1980). In determining the legislature’s intent in enacting AB 441, our first resort is to the language of the statute itself. See State v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 72 Wis.2d 727, 242 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Wis.1976). AB 441 makes clear that its provisions were to reach all women considering an abortion, both minors and adults. See, e.g., - Wis. Stat. § 253.10(l)(b)(4) (stating that it is the intent of the legislature to ensure “that a woman who decides to have an elective abortion gives her voluntary and informed consent to the abortion procedure.”); id. § 253.10(l)(b)l (stating that it is the intent of the legislature to protect “the life and health of the woman subject to an elective abortion and, to the extent constitutionally permissible, the life of her unborn child.”). Nowhere in AB 441 is it provided that certain provisions do not apply, or need not be complied with, if the woman is a minor. To the contrary, AB 441 provides that certain additional conditions must be fulfilled in order to perform an abortion on a minor—the physician must obtain not only the voluntary and informed consent of the minor woman but also the voluntary and informed consent of her parent or parent substitute under the requirements of AB Ul. See id. § 253.10(3)(a). AB 441 does not indicate that its informed consent requirements would be satisfied if the physician only obtained the parent’s consent under the requirements of § 48.375. Rather, AB 441 provides that if the woman is a minor, the person who would be required to give consent under the parental consent law must also give consent under the requirements of AB 441. See id. AB 441 also makes clear that physicians are expected to exercise “reasonable medical judgment” in determining whether to perform an emergency abortion on all women — not just those situations involving adult women. The legislature explicitly expressed that one of its intentions in enacting AB 441 was to foster “the development of standards of professional conduct in the practice of abortion.” Id. § 253(10)(l)(b)2. The medical emergency provision specifically employs the term “pregnant woman” not pregnant adult woman or pregnant non-minor woman. Given that the legislature sought to hold physicians to a higher standard of care under AB 441 by imposing an objective rather than subjective standard on their emergency medical decisions, we find it difficult to imagine that the legislature intended a different standard to apply to minors’ abortions absent some indication in AB 441 that the objective standard was not to apply to minors. We conclude that the legislature intended the objective standard contained in AB 441’s medical emergency provision to apply to all women — adults and minors alike. As such, we cannot ignore the fact that AB 441’s objective standard is manifestly inconsistent with the subjective standard found in the parental consent law’s medical emergency provision. Because “[i]t is a standard rule of construction that when two statutes are manifestly in conflict the earlier statute! ] will be repealed by implication and the last one enacted will be controlling,” State v. Gurnoe, 53 Wis.2d 390, 192 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Wis.1972), we hold that the medical emergency provision of the parental consent law, Wis. Stat. § 48.374(5)(b)l, is impliedly repealed in favor of AB 441’s medical emergency definition, Wis. Stat. § 253.10(2)(d). C. Informational Requirements Plaintiffs next contend that the informed consent requirements of AB 441 set forth in sections 253.10(3)(c)l and 253.10(3)(c)2 are unconstitutionally vague because they require a physician to convey information to a woman seeking an abortion without adequately identifying the exact content of what needs to be conveyed in order to comply with AB 441 and avoid prosecution. Plaintiffs argue that AB 441’s informed consent requirements fail to provide them with “fair warning” as to what conduct will subject them to liability under the statute. To illustrate their allegations of vagueness, plaintiffs submit that AB 441 requires a physician to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the “probable gestational age” of the fetus, the “probable anatomical and physiological characteristics” of the fetus, and the “medical risks” associated with abortion including the risk of “psychological trauma” and any “danger to subsequent pregnancies.” See Wis. Stat. §§ 253.10(3)(c)l.b, d, f. Plaintiffs argue that physicians .have no way of knowing whether their descriptions of the “probable” characteristics of the fetus are adequate or accurate enough to avoid liability under AB 441. Similarly, plaintiffs argue that physicians may differ in their medical judgments about the nature and extent of the risk that an abortion poses to subsequent pregnancies and whether there is any risk of psychological trauma from abortion. Without some sort of good faith standard or scienter requirement, plaintiffs contend that physicians can be held strictly liable under AB 441 despite communicating their best medical judgments to their patients regarding the information AB 441 requires them to discuss because they can be continually second-guessed by prosecutors who would have little difficulty in finding a physician to offer a different assessment. Furthermore, plaintiffs submit that in an area such as this, where professional medical judgments may differ, the Constitution requires a higher degree of precision in giving physicians “fair warning” of what conduct is expected of them, and, without some standard defining the content of what needs to be disclosed under AB 441, the informed consent requirements must be found void for vagueness. It is quite surprising that plaintiffs are raising this vagueness challenge on appeal because the district court construed AB 441’s informed consent requirements in