Full opinion text
DUBINA, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves a challenge to an ordinance regulating the solicitation of funds by charitable organizations in the City of Clear-water, Florida (“Clearwater”). Plaintiff Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. (“Scientology”) claims that the ordinance deprives it of rights and liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Scientology appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants (collectively “the City”) and denying summary judgment to Scientology. Church of Scientology Flag Servs. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 756 F.Supp. 1498 (M.D.Fla.1991). We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part and remand. I. BACKGROUND Scientology, a worldwide organization, maintains one of the largest centers of its activities in Clearwater. The history, organization, doctrine and practices of Scientology have been thoroughly recounted in numerous judicial decisions. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 684-86, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2141, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 L.Ed.2d 427 (1969), and on remand, United States v. Article or Device Hubbard Electrometer, 333 F.Supp. 357 (D.D.C.1971); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 644 P.2d 577, 580-81, pet’n denied 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 103 S.Ct. 1196, 75 L.Ed.2d 439 (1983). We need not reiterate this background because the district court found that no genuine factual issues existed to dispute Scientology’s claim of being a bona fide religion. See 756 F.Supp. at 1502-04. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Scientology on that issue. Id. at 1532; accord Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1160; Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 600-01. As the City has neither appealed from that order nor argued that Scientology is not entitled to protection under the religion clauses of the First Amendment, we must assume that the district court was correct. In addition, without deciding the question ourselves, we note that research has not uncovered any holdings that Scientology is not a religion for First Amendment purposes. But cf. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d at 1316-18 (upholding Tax Court determination that Church of Scientology was not entitled to religious tax exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) for certain years because its revenues inured to the benefit of individuals and non-religious entities). II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1983 the City enacted Ordinance No. 3091-83 (the “1983 Ordinance”). The 1983 Ordinance imposed substantial recordkeeping and disclosure requirements for all charities and religious organizations soliciting funds in Clearwater. Scientology filed an action in the district court seeking an injunction against its enforcement. That action was consolidated with a similar case brought by Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. (“Americans United”). Before the district court could rule on the law’s validity, however, the City enacted Ordinance No. 3479-84 (the “1984 Ordinance”), repealing and modifying the 1983 Ordinance in part. Clearwater, Fla., Code Ordinances, tit. VIII, § 100 (1984) (hereinafter “Code § —”). Both plaintiffs filed new lawsuits to challenge the revised ordinance and its 1983 predecessor. In the second Scientology suit, the district court ruled the 1983 Ordinance unconstitutional on its face and permanently enjoined the City from enforcing it. The court further ruled the 1984 version facially valid, without reaching the question of its validity as applied to Scientology and Americans United. The City appealed the former ruling and Scientology and Americans United were permitted to file interlocutory cross-appeals of the latter. We vacated the former as moot, reasoning that challenges to the repealed 1983 Ordinance posed no live controversy suitable for judicial resolution. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 604-06 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986) (hereinafter Scientology-Clearwater I), overruled Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2301, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). We dismissed the interlocutory cross-appeals as improvidently granted, finding nothing in the record to support (or controvert) a conclusion that the plaintiffs possessed a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to confer standing. Scientology-Clearwater I, 777 F.2d at 607. But see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7-8, 108 S.Ct. 849, 855, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (holding that allegations of complaint should be accepted as true and construed in favor of standing when there is no factual record). We also affirmed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. 777 F.2d at 608. Scientology continued to prosecute its second action challenging the 1984 Ordinance. Scientology also petitioned for leave to amend the complaint in its first pending action to challenge the new 1984 law. The district court apparently did not rule on that petition but rather proceeded to address the merits in the second Scientology case. Upon granting summary judgment to the City in that second case, from which this appeal followed, the district court dismissed with prejudice the earlier action for want of prosecution. The court also denied Scientology’s request for attorney fees in the first action. In Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir.1993) (hereinafter Scientology-Clearwater II), this panel vacated the district court’s denial of attorney fees in the first filed action. Having found that Scientology had standing to sue in the second action, the district court further found the 1984 Ordinance constitutional, both on its face and as applied to Scientology, and therefore granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and denied Scientology’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Scientology then perfected this appeal. III. THE ORDINANCES The 1984 Ordinance, like its 1983 predecessor, is designed to regulate the solicitation of contributions within Clearwater by “charitable organizations,” a term that includes religious groups. Code § 100.01(1). The regulated “solicitation óf funds” is defined to mean: any request, within the City of Clearwater, for the donation of money, property, or anything of value ...; or the selling or offering for sale of any property, real or personal ..., whether of value or not, including but not limited to, goods, books, pamphlets, tickets, publications or subscriptions to publications, upon the representation, express or implied, that the proceeds of such sale will be used for a charitable purpose. Code § 100.01(2) (emphasis added). “Expressly excluded from the meaning of ‘solicit funds’ ... is any offer of membership in any charitable organization.” Id. As Scientology points out, virtually any sale of religious literature carries the implied representation that the proceeds will be used to further the seller’s purposes or, at least, to “benefit” the organization. (Appellant’s Br. at 34-35). In essence, therefore, all speech that is not delivered gratis will subject a charitable organization to regulation. An organization is exempt, however, if it is all-volunteer and/or small in scale. Code § 100.02(1). A similar exemption applies to all-volunteer scholarship organizations. Code § 100.02(2). The 1984 Ordinance is a licensing statute that requires charitable organizations to disclose certain information about themselves, their officers and the methods and purposes of the solicitation. A non-exempt organization that solicits without obtaining an annual registration certificate from the city clerk commits a criminal offense. Code § 100.05(l)(i). To obtain that certificate, an organization must file a registration form with the clerk. The form is a public document, Code § 100.03(7), submitted under oath, which must disclose among other things: (a) The name of the person registering and desiring to solicit funds for charitable purposes. (b) Whether the person registering is a natural person, partnership, corporation, or association and, ... (c) A reference to all determinations of tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code of the United States and law of any state, and the laws of any county or municipality. (d) A brief description of the charitable purpose for which the funds are to be solicited, and a brief explanation of the intended use of the funds toward that purpose. (e) The names, mailing address [es] and telephone number[s] of all individuals authorized to disburse the proceeds of the solicitation. (f) The names, mailing address[es] and telephone number[s] of all individuals who will be in direct charge or control of the solicitation of funds. (g) The time period within which the solicitation of funds is to be made.... (h) A brief description of the methods and means by which the solicitation of funds is to be accomplished. (i) An estimated schedule of salaries, wages, fees, commissions, expenses and costs to be expended and paid in connection with the solicitation of funds and in connection with their disbursement, and an estimated percentage of the total projected collections which the costs of the solicitation will comprise. (j) The names of any other cities in Florida in which the person registering has collected funds for charitable purposes within the past five (5) years.... (m) The names of any officer ... or any current agent or employee engaging in the solicitation of funds who has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude within the past seven (7) years, the nature of the offense, the State in which the conviction occurred, and the year of such conviction. (n) A brief explanation of the reasons, if the person registering is unable to provide any of the foregoing information, why such information is not available. Code § 100.03(1) (emphasis added). This information is virtually identical to the disclosure required under the ordinance upheld against facial attack on free exercise and associational privacy grounds in International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541, 559-61 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (hereinafter ISKCON-Houston), although, as discussed below, there are significant differences between the Clearwater and Houston laws. Unlike the Houston submission, the Clear-water form must be filed even if the organization intends to solicit only from its own members, although the form may omit certain information “regarding the solicitation of funds from members,” provided it so states. Code § 100.02(3). Thus, as we read the Clearwater ordinance, an organization soliciting only from its members may omit the information required by subsections (d) through (i) of Code § 100.03(1). Nevertheless, even when no public solicitation is planned, subsections 100.03(l)(a), (b), (c), (j) and (n) of the code require an organization publicly to disclose significant information, namely the nature and identity of the organization, its tax-exempt status, the detailed criminal histories of its officers and solicitors, the names of other Florida cities in which it has registered and an explanation why any of the foregoing information is unavailable. The City’s law also requires organizations omitting information from the registration form to prepare a sworn “private statement at least annually that contains all of the information” that otherwise would be required in the registration form. Code § 100.02(3)(b). The organization must maintain the records used to complete the private statement for at least three years “and, together with the private statement, make[] them reasonably available for inspection by every member of the charitable organization.” Code § 100.02(3)(c). Wilful failure to prepare a truthful private statement, maintain the records or make the statement and records available to members is a criminal offense. Code § 100.05(l)(k). The same supporting documentation must be maintained when the organization files a public registration form, Code § 100.04, and failure to do so is also an offense, Code § 100.-05(l)(j). At the end of each annual registration period the organization must file a retrospective reporting statement giving “the full amount of money and property collected” in Clearwater and “a complete list of any and all expenses incurred in procuring those funds ... broken down into salaries, wages, fees, commissions, advertising and all other expenses.” Code § 100.03(8). The organization must reveal “the bank, if any, where the proceeds of those solicitations of funds were placed” and the “actual or proposed utilization in approximate amounts of the said proceeds,” id., and maintain supporting documentation for three years, Code § 100.04. Information about solicitations from members may be omitted on the same terms as the omission of similar information from the registration form, namely, upon condition that the organization prepare a “private statement” subject to disclosure along with supporting documentation upon request by a member, failure to prepare or disclose the materials being a criminal offense. Code § 100.02(3). Wilful failure to file truthful registration forms and retrospective annual statements is also an offense. Code § 100.-05(l)(b). These provisions for retrospective disclosure differ from the Houston ordinance by (1) requiring detailed disclosure of the expenses incurred in the solicitation, (2) requiring disclosure of the bank account in which funds are located, (3) requiring disclosure of every proposed or actual use of the funds, (4) requiring the maintenance of supporting documentation for three years, (5) applying themselves to membership solicitations, and (6) imposing criminal penalties. The Clearwater ordinance defines a number of other criminal offenses, including: . (a) wilful[ly] us[ing]. any solicited funds or soliciting or retaining funds to support or execute any conduct that is criminal or illegal under the laws of the [city, county, state, or federal government]; (e)us[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain money or property by means of any false statement or representation; (d) wilfully concealing the identity of an organization on whose behalf solicitations are being made; (e) knowingly misrepresenting that the proceeds of any solicitation of funds, under current law, would entitle the donor to a Federal or State income tax deduction; (f) promising any person that the proceeds of a solicitation of funds will be refunded upon request, and thereafter wil-fully failing within 60 days to make a refund that has been requested in writing; (g) promising any person that refunds of the proceeds of the solicitation of funds will be made upon request without providing such person, at the time such representation is made, with a written statement of the terms and conditions upon which refunds are made; provided, however, that any statement made in good faith at the time is not prohibited by this section;_ Code § 100.05(1). All offenses under the law are punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment for up to six months. Code § 100.05(2). No such criminal provisions were included in the Houston ordinance. The city clerk has power to review the registration form to determine whether it meets the ordinance’s requirements and may deny registration if she determines that it does not. The clerk testified that she and her staff would exercise their personal judgment, under the direction of the city attorney, to decide whether a given response was adequate. For example, she and the city attorney would determine whether the stated purpose of the solicitation was in fact a charitable one. [R5-110-Tab 2-Exh. A-46-49.] In addition, although the statute provides no guidance on the subject, the city attorney testified that a general statement along the lines of “We are a benevolent society and we will use [the funds] as our governing board decides is within our purposes” wquld not provide adequate .information to satisfy the requirements of Code § 100.03(l)(d). He was unable to say, however, whether a statement like “We are a church and we will use [the funds] for general church purposes” would be sufficiently specific. [R5-110-Tab 2-Exh. B-49.] Whatever level of detail would meet the city officials’ standards concerning disclosure of charitable purpose, we may presume that they require a more specific explanation of how the funds will be used to further the purposes stated. In these respects the Clearwater ordinance confers broader executive discretion than the Houston law, which the Fifth Circuit interpreted as conferring only the ministerial authority to determine “two objective facts: (1) whether information is provided, and (2) whether an explanation for failure to supply the information is provided,” ISKCON-Houston, 689 F.2d at 547. The City of Houston had adopted an interpretation of the law giving the administering official no discretion to evaluate the adequacy of information provided by registrants. For example, any question about the required detail of disclosure concerning the purposes of solicitation would have been resolved in the registrant’s favor. Id. at 555. If the city clerk denies registration, the organization may still continue to solicit in Clearwater. The clerk must initiate a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court to “review” her decision. Code § 100.-03(3). Presumably the court may set aside the denial if it finds the clerk acted improperly, but neither the ordinance nor the Florida declaratory judgment act provides express criteria by which the decision should be judged. The ordinance also permits the court to dispense with the requirement of furnishing information whose disclosure it finds to constitute a “special or unique hardship to the charitable organization.” Code § 100.03(4). Again, no further express guidance is offered. Upon receiving ten “bona fide complaints,” sworn in writing and suggesting that an offense has occurred, the city attorney may investigate. The attorney may subpoena witnesses and documents, including “private statements” and the documentation supporting them. Upon investigation, and having found probable cause to believe that an offense has occurred, the attorney “shall” institute a prosecution. Code § 100.06. We note that these provisions entitle the city attorney to obtain the so-called “private” statements (and all of the supporting records), and presumably treat them as public documents, in the course of an investigation or prosecution to determine whether an organization was entitled to omit the specified information from its public registration form. The ordinance has an express severability clause. 1984 Ordinance § 10. IV. ISSUES We confront several complex issues in this appeal. First, Scientology argues that there are sufficient facts in dispute to preclude summary judgment on its claim that the 1984 Ordinance (like its 1983 predecessor) was enacted for the impermissible purpose of discriminating against it in favor of more popular religious organizations. Second, Scientology contends that, as a matter of law, the disclosure requirements applicable to solicitations of members and the public constitute an impermissible government “entanglement” in matters of ecclesiastical authority and governance in violation of the Establishment Clause. Although Scientology contends that such excessive entanglements may not be justified by resort to the balancing of compelling governmental interests that is applicable in other areas of constitutional law, it further contends that this disclosure of information concerning member solicitation is not narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. Third, Scientology argues that the ordinance is vague and confers overly broad discretion upon the city clerk to deny a registration certificate, thereby imposing an impermissible prior restraint upon its exercise of religion. Finally, Scientology argues that the requirements of providing a refund policy in writing and making refunds within sixty days also represent impermissible invasions of church governance and religious practice. After considering the question of standing, we address these issues in turn. V. STANDING Scientology is a charitable organization as defined under the 1984 Ordinance and is subject to direct regulation thereunder. As already detailed, the regulation is substantial and, accordingly, represents a sufficiently direct injury to Scientology to confer standing. The injury is caused by the City’s ordinance (in other words, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct) and would be redressed by invalidation of the regulatory scheme. Therefore, Scientology meets the “case” or “controversy” requirements for standing imposed by Article III of the Constitution. See California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44-45, 68-69, 76, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 1509, 1521, 1524-25, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974). Moreover, it is well settled that “a party may challenge a licensing statute regardless of whether he or she was denied a permit, or whether one has ever been sought.” Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1982); see also, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). Scientology’s interest in- avoiding challenged regulation is greater than the minimum interest in the outcome of a lawsuit required for standing. Just as the Establishment Clause “does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not,” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 1267, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962), so also does the clause prohibit the casting of official disfavor upon a particular sect even though its members are not directly regulated. Religious groups and their members that are singled out for discriminatory government treatment by official harassment or symbolic conduct analogous to defamation have standing to seek redress in federal courts. Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1279-80 (5th Cir.1981); see also, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3326, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (noting that stigmatic injury associated with invidious official conduct is cognizable for standing purposes if the plaintiff is directly affected). The question of standing is distinct from the broader issues concerning the merits of Scientology’s case. Therefore, we would not require Scientology to prove that it is a bona fide religion entitled to First Amendment protection in order to obtain standing, any more than we would require a contract claimant to demonstrate that it is a party to a valid agreement before invoking jurisdiction in an ordinary private law dispute. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1689 n. 30, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982) (finding standing to challenge regulation, but noting “[njothing in our opinion suggests that appellants could not ... put the Church to the proof of its bona fides as a religious organization”). Moreover, in our view the facts considered by the district court, 756 F.Supp. at 1509-11, provide much more than “a sufficiently strong demonstration that [Scientology] is a religion to overcome any prudential standing obstacles to consideration of [its] Establishment Clause claim” and its free exercise claim, Valente, 456 U.S. at 244 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 1683 n. 16, assuming for present purposes that such a prudential obstacle exists. Nevertheless, we do not accept the district court’s application of the “zone of interests” requirement for standing to raise a First Amendment challenge under § 1983, see 756 F.Supp. at 1509-12. The requirement that “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question,” Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (emphasis added) (hereinafter ADAPSO), was first developed as a limitation on judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The APA provides that a plaintiff must be adversely affected by challenged action “within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The Supreme Court has used a similar standard to determine whether particular federal statutes create actionable “rights” under § 1983, which creates a federal cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” The Court has undertaken the same zone of interests inquiry to determine whether a particular constitutional provision creates rights intended by Congress to be enforceable under § 1983. The zone of interest requirement is a prudential standing doctrine, not mandated directly by Article III. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752, 760, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Whatever the nature of the inquiry in the absence of congressional legislation, the Court’s precedents show that the zone of interests analysis under § 1983 is limited to ascertaining whether the substantive constitutional or statutory provision confers rights intended by the legislature to be enforceable under the remedial statute. See also Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 1328, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (zone of interests test is an “element of statutory standing”). The test does not require the plaintiff to show an identifiable “legal interest” that may entitle him to relief. ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 153-56, 90 S.Ct. at 830-31; see also Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400, 107 S.Ct. 750, 757, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987); Valente, 456 U.S. at 254 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. at 1689 n. 30. The test requires only that the relationship between the plaintiffs alleged interest and the purposes implicit in the substantive provision be more than “marginal[ ].” Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. Therefore the district court erred when it investigated the merits of Scientology’s claim by evaluating whether it is in fact a religion. Moreover, it is clear that the First Amendment creates enforceable “rights” under § 1983. Any citizen’s interest in preventing violations of those rights is more than marginally related to the constitutional provision, which protects the public at large as well as the individual plaintiff from government invasion of religious, political and intellectual activity, although requirements other than the zone of interests test may preclude a finding of standing. Cf. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 478-87, 102 S.Ct. at 762-67 (holding citizens’ generalized interest in preventing establishment of religion by federal government insufficient to confer standing without allegations that tax funds were improperly collected or expended by Congress). See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, the complaint on its face alleges interests within the zone arguably protected by the constitutional provision. Since we have already held that all other requirements are satisfied, Scientology has standing. VI. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if no genuine dispute remains as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As with all questions of law, we review the district court’s order granting summary judgment under the de novo standard of review. See Woodruff v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 954 F.2d 634, 636 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam). The moving party bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). With these principles in mind, we address the contentions of the parties. VII. DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE Under the Establishment Clause jurisprudence which has followed Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), courts undertake a three-part analysis of challenged legislation. “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ...; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111 (citations omitted). Only if all three criteria are satisfied may the law be upheld. As the district court correctly recognized, “the three-part Lemon test remains the basic standard of judicial review in Establishment Clause cases.” 756 F.Supp. at 1513; see, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695-96 & n. 11, 109 S.Ct. at 2146-47 & n. 11. A. Standard of Judicial Review Judicial review of governmental purpose is deferential. “A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate.” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2586, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Thus, a statute is invalid only if it “does not have a clearly secular purpose.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2489-90, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d at 1321. Nevertheless, the City cannot overcome the first Lemon prong merely by articulating a legitimate purpose. “[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us” to an enactment’s “pre-eminent purpose.” Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 194, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam). Inquiry into legislative purpose begins with interpreting the law itself. “The plain meaning of the statute’s words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history [or explained by the interpretation of a responsible administrative agency], can control the determination of legislative purpose.” Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 594, 107 S.Ct. at 2583 (citations omitted). If the legislature’s stated purpose is not actually furthered by the enactment then that purpose is disregarded as being insincere or a sham. Id., 482 U.S. at 586-87, 107 S.Ct. at 2579. Even if the proffered purpose is not a sham, the court must evaluate the effect of the statute’s provisions and “consider[] the historical context of the statute ... and the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage ...,” id., 482 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. at 2583 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 59-60, 105 S.Ct. at 2491; Valente, 456 U.S. at 253-55, 102 S.Ct. at 1688-89; see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment challenge invokes inquiry into “historical background” and “specific sequence of events” preceding enactment); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1920, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); cf. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 606, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3107, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (applying the effects criterion of Lemon by evaluating the “particular contexts” in which the government acts). A statute in which an impermissible purpose predominates is invalid even if the legislative body was motivated in part by legitimate' secular objectives. Thus, for example, even if the ordinance in fact furthers a secular purpose, the “actual purpose” may in certain cases be found by asking “whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion,” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1368, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56, 105 S.Ct. at 2489-90. If the “pre-eminent purpose” is illicit then the law is void. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. at 194. Although the Court stated in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988), that a statute is void only if “motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose,” 487 U.S. at 602, 108 S.Ct. at 2570 (emphasis added), we do not believe that this statement was intended to overrule the “predominate” standard of Aguillard, the “clearly secular” standard of Jaffree or the “preeminent” standard of Stone. First, the statement in Kendrick was dictum. “[T]he [statute] was motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose.” Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 602, 108 S.Ct. at 2571 (emphases added). Second, we do not believe the Court would have overruled the principle of deferential yet searching analysis applied to questions of legislative purpose so recently (in Aguillard and Jaffree) and so broadly (for example, in Underwood and Metropolitan Housing) without explicitly acknowledging its intention to do so. Instead, the Court simply cited Donnelly and Stone with apparent approval. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 602, 108 S.Ct. at 2570. Third, the Court’s statement in Stone that “Kentucky’s statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms had no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional,” 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. at 193 (emphasis added), does not represent a holding that any secular purpose is sufficient to validate an enactment. Cf. Stone, 449 U.S. at 43-47, 101 S.Ct. at 195-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that teaching children about the secular significance of the Ten Commandments is a sufficient legislative purpose). Finally, adopting the standard suggested by the Kendrick dictum would make Lemon’s purpose criterion a virtual dead letter, for “[r]arely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern ...," Metropolitan Housing, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 563. Inexplicably, the City continues to argue that its purpose in enacting the ordinances is irrelevant to Scientology’s allegation of an Establishment Clause violation. (Appellees’ Br. at 48). As discussed above, the Supreme Court has unmistakably rejected this contention, most recently in Hernandez, in which the Court invoked the test of whether the challenged law “was born of animus to religion in general or Scientology in particular.” 490 U.S. at 696, 109 S.Ct. at 2147. The cases relied upon by the City, Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 1944-45, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (upholding against equal protection challenge city decision to close swimming pools rather than operate them on racially integrated basis), and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682-84, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (upholding against free speech challenge federal statute prohibiting burning of draft card), are obviously distinguishable, as neither involved a claim arising under the Establishment Clause. Contrary to the dictum of Palmer that judicial invalidation of a law on the basis of improper legislative purpose might be “futil[e]” because the statute “would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons,” 403 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 1945, the requirement that a court entertaining an Establishment Clause challenge must consider “the specific sequence of events leading to [re-]passage of the statute,” Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. at 2583, embodies a sensitivity to the political realities of the legislative process that is amply refined to discern such a crude attempt to circumvent federal judicial determination. Furthermore, Palmer’s holding simply has not withstood the test of time, even in the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection context. See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (sex discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (race discrimination); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (race discrimination under Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). “Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law’s defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor.” Underwood, 471 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. at 1920. The Court’s 1968 decision in O’Brien, holding in the free speech context “that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive,” 391 U.S. at 383, 88 S.Ct. at 1682, may also effectively have been overruled in relevant part. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), and Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), the Court held that improper retaliatory purpose would invalidate action directed against a government employee’s protected speech. In Metropolitan Housing, 429 U.S. at 270 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. at 566 n. 21, and Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576, both decided on the same day, the Court applied identical standards of proof to a zoning action allegedly motivated by racial considerations and an employment action allegedly motivated by a purpose to chill free speech, the same standard that it would later apply in Underwood to determine racially discriminatory legislative purpose. See also Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-74 (11th Cir.1982) (applying identical Mt. Healthy standards to free speech and equal protection challenges to government employment action). These decisions, which treat the evaluation of governmental purpose in challenges under the First Amendment as identical to the inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, suggest that action by any branch of government may be invalid if the challenger shows the action was partly motivated by purposes offensive to the Free Speech Clause and the defender cannot prove that illicit motivation was not in fact the cause of the action. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-80, 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1364-65, 1372, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983). If Hernandez, Aguillard, Jaffree, Stone and Lemon were not enough to show that the City’s contention is meritless, our holding in American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1110-11 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam), that improper religious motive invalidates official action challenged under the Establishment Clause, would suffice. We readily conclude that a predominantly or preeminently sectarian purpose will invalidate an otherwise permissible law under the Establishment Clause. We therefore turn to consider the allocation of proof in applying the purpose criterion of Lemon, and conclude that the frequently invoked Mt. Healthy standard is the most appropriate. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-54, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1792-93, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying Mt. Healthy to private intentional sex discrimination case under Title VII); id., 490 U.S. at 258-60, 109 S.Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring) (same); NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2475, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983) (applying Mt. Healthy to discriminatory anti-union discharge case); Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563-64 (11th Cir.1985) (anticipating Hopkins); Hayes v. Shelby Mem. Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Mt. Healthy to Pregnancy Discrimination Act). To be sure, the competing interests implicated in an Establishment Clause case may differ from those in free speech cases, as well as those involved in discrimination cases under the equal protection aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment, the disparate treatment aspect of Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Nevertheless, the Establishment Clause requirement that a statute must have a “clearly secular” purpose, over which any sectarian motivation does not “predominate,” is consistent with the allocation of proof adopted by the Court in Hopkins, Underwood, Transportation Management, Metropolitan Housing and Mt. Healthy and by our court in Hayes. Just as the plurality in Hopkins and Justice White were “not inclined to say that the public policy against firing employees because they spoke out on issues of public concern [in violation of the First Amendment] or because they affiliated with a union is less important than the policy against discharging employees on the basis of their gender,” 490 U.S. at 254,109 S.Ct. at 1793, we are not inclined to conclude that the constitutional prohibition of laws tending to establish one or more official religions is less important than any of those policies just addressed. “Each of these policies is vitally important, and each is adequately served by requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence [that the defendant would have reached the same result in the absence of improper motivation].” Id. (rejecting proposal to require defendant’s proof by clear and convincing evidence). When a plaintiff shows by direct evidence that a sectarian or religious purpose was a substantial or motivating factor, the burden shifts to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that action challenged under the Establishment Clause would have been undertaken even in the absence of such improper considerations. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. at 2583 (citing Metropolitan Housing); cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 451-52, 91 S.Ct. 828, 837, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (requiring challenger to show the absence of legitimate purpose when there is no direct evidence of sectarian motive). B. Discussion The district court’s opinion did not expressly address Scientology’s claim of discriminatory purpose, see 756 F.Supp. at 1505, 1516, although the City concedes that the claim was vigorously argued throughout the course of this litigation. Having granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, however, the district court did deny Scientology’s motion to alter or amend the judgment on the basis of this issue. [R7-168-1; R6-147-4-9.] Scientology points to various materials, including newspaper articles, that it submitted to the district court and which it argues tend to show sectarian motivation. Even if they would have been inadmissible at trial (and we do not hold that they would have been), such materials were appropriately submitted by the non-moving party in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (non-moving party opposing motion for summary judgment with hearsay documents need not “produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment”); see also Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1015 & n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (“The claim by [the moving party] that the letter is inadmissible hearsay does not undercut the existence of any material facts the letter may put into question.”). Construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as they must be in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), these materials provide explicit evidence that the city commission conducted its legislative process from beginning to end with the intention of singling out Scientology for burdensome regulation. The record shows a widespread political movement, apparently driven by an upsurge of sectarian fervor, intent on driving Scientology from Clearwater. It also shows that various members of the commission had made their affiliation with that movement known to the public in the plainest terms possible, not only in the official legislative record leading to adoption of the ordinances but also in documents concerning unrelated government activity and in extemporaneous remarks. The city commission hired a Boston lawyer named Michael Flynn to coordinate the publicly televised hearings that eventually led to adoption of the 1983 and 1984 Ordinances. [Rl-18-Exh. S.] As reported in the Clear-water media and well known to the commission and the public, Flynn had dedicated much of his career to fighting Scientology. It was Flynn who first suggested adoption of a charitable solicitation ordinance, the avowed purpose of which was to target Scientology. [Id. Exh. K.] In his written report Flynn appealed to the prejudices of his clients when he observed that such an ordinance would require lengthy and costly litigation to defend but that “Scientology has rarely been successful in any judicial system in the world, including numerous cases in the U.S., in using its religious front to conceal its activities.” [Id. Exh. K-2.] (He did observe that Scientology was likely to achieve preliminary success in such litigation, noting “the only analogy I can give is it’s like dealing with the Nazis. They will litigate right to the bunker.” [Id. Exh. N1-13J) Flynn told the commission that a primary purpose of the statute was the collection of data to support the City’s position (since abandoned for purposes of this case) that Scientology is not a bona fide religion and therefore is not entitled to exemption from the payment of property taxes. [Id. N-1-9.] Although proper enforcement of property tax laws is a legitimate local governmental interest, the highly charged political context in which it was pursued created a risk that the taxation purpose was a mere pretext. Certainly, the City had no interest in depriving Scientology of its privilege to pay the lower non-profit rate for United States mail bulk postage. [Id. Exh. N-3.] Nor did the City have any interest in confounding Scientology’s state and federal income tax exemptions. [E.g., id. Exh. 0-8-9.] Rather, viewed in the light most favorable to Scientology, these statements of purpose reveal an underlying objective to employ the tax laws to discriminate against Scientology, a purpose that is patently offensive to the First Amendment. See Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374 (11th Cir.1991). As late as June 1983, commission members continued to express concern over suggestions that the proposed ordinance would “create a hardship for legitimate organizations,” including other “churches,” [Rl-18-Exh. ZZ-33 to 34, 36,] and ordered further consideration of the matter by City Attorney Thomas Bustin. [Id. Exh. CCC, EEE (transcript of consultation between Bustin and Episcopal and Jewish representatives).] Viewed in the light most favorable to Scientology, we may interpret this response as a sign of deference to the main-line denominations. Yet when identical concerns had been raised by Scientology at a public meeting, [id. Exh. HH-49, 52-57,] the commission’s entire response had been limited to an argumentative discussion in which members of the body debated the constitutionality of the ordinance with Scientology’s advocate. [Id. at 57-64.] Clearwater did not invite Scientology representatives to consult with Bustin. According to City Manager Anthony Shoemaker, “Why should we? We’ve heard their objections over and over again.” [Id. Exh. FFF-3.] Scientology also points to a number of changes embodied in successive drafts of the 1983 Ordinance, changes inserted at the instance of more popular denominations and other charities. [See id. Exh. DD, FF, HH.] For example, the 1983 Ordinance was redrafted to remove any requirement that charitable organizations report or retain records concerning the identity of individual donors, [id. Exh. ZZ-4,] a provision that mainline charities and churches suggested might discourage contributions. Similarly, the exemption for small-scale solicitations was adopted in response to more respected religious groups’ concern for affiliated charities based outside Clearwater whose local activities were likely to be regular but small in scope. [Id. Exh. EEE; see generally id. Exh. Ill — 30; id. Exh. JJJ.] Such tinkering creates a significant “risk of politicizing religion,” Valente, 456 U.S. at 253-55, 102 S.Ct. at 1688-89, a danger that for purposes of summary judgment appears to have been realized in the present case. Mayor Kathleen Kelly and others frequently voiced concern that main-line denominations opposed to the ordinance might express their dissension by refusing to comply with its provisions; no such solicitude was ever expressed concerning Scientology’s objections. [Rl-18-Exhs. MMM, III — 6—15.] In voting against the 1983 Ordinance, Commissioner James Berfield noted one of the competing concerns before the body as “Will the ordinance be so cumbersome on the legally recognized religions and charitable organizations that it will be burdensome to them?” [Id. Exh. 000-6.] Voting in favor of the ordinance, Commissioner William Justice observed: [A]fter the amendments, I talked to a number of people in churches and charitable organizations, and they convinced me that [the 1983 Ordinance] would not work any hardship on them. They felt it was a good ordinance. Any [sic] of the ministers — I won’t say all of them but many of them — ministers whom I’m very familiar with and trust their opinion said it would not affect their organization either way and they would be glad to show their records. Consequently, I changed my opinion and I will vote for the ordinance. [Id. Exh. 000-9-10.] In response to concerns over the cost of litigation to defend the ordinances, Commissioner James Calderbank noted in 1981 the relatively large size of the City’s budget and further observed “[a]nd I think number two, even emotionally, we are representatives of the citizens ([then-Commissioner] KELLY agreeing here) and I think in the last few elections, [Commissioner] Rita [Garvey] was the first one, and [then-Mayor] Charlie [LeCher], that I heard years ago say, We’ve got to find a legal route.” [Id. Exh. N-1-17.] This reference to the continuing political movement against Scientology during election campaigns is amply corroborated by un-rebutted newspaper clippings contained in several volumes of the record. Then-candidate Calderbank declared in 1980 that “I will explore every avenue and support every legal means of encouraging the Scientologists to leave_ I am a doer, not a talker.” [Id. Exh. D-7.] In 1981 candidate Calderbank “said that Scientology ‘has to be treated like a cancer — first you arrest its growth, then remove it from the city ... or nullify its existence.’ ” [Id. Exh. D-13 (ellipses in original).] During his successful 1983 re-election campaign Calderbank again emphasized his opposition to Scientology, although he remained careful to articulate his respect for the law. Mayor LeCher, successfully seeking re-election in 1981, characterized Scientology as a “dark cloud ... that is upon us.” [Id. Exh. D-16.] Candidate Rita Garvey, successfully seeking election to the commission in 1980, entertained a “position on Scientology [that] is forceful but balanced with a concern that the rule of law be followed. Mrs. Garvey says that Scientologists lie, steal and cheat. She feels the community must work to destroy the organization at the top.” [Id. Exh. E-2.] Then-Commissioner Richard Tenney, unsuccessfully seeking re-election in 1980, “said his campaign will focus on one issue — forcing Scientology to leave town.” [Id. Exh. D-8.] Candidate Justice, successfully seeking election to the commission in 1983, stated his position that the City should “[u]se every legal means to show that they [Scientology] are a fraud.” [Id. Exh. D-33.] During a press conference Flynn and another person engaged in a colloquy to the effect that enacting a charitable solicitation ordinance would drive Scientology out of Clearwater. [Id. Exh. N-7.] Mayor LeCher gave a television interview concerning the hearings in which the following exchange took place. Interviewer: ... Respond to the argument that at least some of the church members raise that this is, in essence, an organized effort to run [Scientology] out of town. LeCher: It is an organized effort of the City of Clearwater, ... [ellipses in original] Where ever I go they say, “What about the Scientologists?” They seem to care more [about] that than the boat, than the pier, or the hotel, or whatever. It has been proven that street corner confrontation in politics no longer work in this issue. So we believe that government should be of laws. And we are trying to carry out the wish of the people. Again, if there is nothing there then there is nothing there. And [the Scientologists] should want to come to a conclusion on this issue.... Interviewer: Would you like to see them run out of town? LeCher: The county has a lawsuit with them. I don’t really care to comment publicly how I honestly feel with the threat of any possible litigation. But I would like to say that I yearn for the olden days when the Fort Harrison Hotel was full of Canadian tourists spending lots of money in the city of Clearwater. Interviewer: ... Is anyone other than the Scientologists being brought before these hearings? LeCher: Not that I know of. I don’t know anyone else that is claiming to be a religion that is not. [Id. Exh. Q-2 to 3; see also id. Exh. W-13, ¶ 21.] As late as August 1983, Mayor Kelly was reported to have expressed “frustration]” that the First Amendment restricted the City’s ability to prevent Scientology from distributing literature in public fora, while Calderbank called for increased police patrols to deal with this problem. [Id. Exh. FFF-3.] The City also considered but rejected proposals to employ its power of eminent domain to condemn Scientology property “even though the condemnation might put the organization out of business.” [Id. Exh. 0-16.] In response to concerns over the cost of acquiring and renovating the former hotel which Scientology had purchased in downtown Clearwater, Commissioner Calderbank observed: “There are other locations that they own that might be more practical.” [Id. Exh. P-18 (emphasis added).] A newspaper article reported that Mayor LeCher had expressed reservations that “even if the move were successful, it would not guarantee Scientology will leave the city.” [Id. Exh. P-30.] As late as December 1983, City Manager Shoemaker stated in an official memorandum that “I think total condemnation of all the Scientologist’s [sic] property in the city might be a workable solution to this problem facing the City. This might even give them the needed boost to decide to relocate.” [Id. Exh. QQQ-1.] In considering Flynn’s proposal to create a special taxing zone in the downtown area and prohibit real estate conveyances to tax exempt owners, commissioners expressed concern that the impact of the action be limited to Scientology. [See id. Exh. P-25; id. Exh. KK-35-37.] The City may have tried to conduct a second round of hearings to sanitize the legislative record and suggest a neutral motivation. [E.g., id. Exhs. ZZ, III, JJJ.] Whatever weight may be accorded this fact, the new legislative record is insufficient to warrant summary judgment in the face of all that had gone before. [See also id. Exh. LLL (commission delayed vote on 1983 Ordinance pending receipt of “important” information from disenchanted ex-Scientologists to “help bolster Clearwater’s legal position”).] Although it may not prove directly probative, we also note a Clearwater newspaper’s 1983 opinion that “[t]his charitable solicitation ordinance was conceived as a means of attacking the Church of Scientology, and nothing the city does now can remove that defect.” [Id. Exh. UU; see generally id. Exh. DDD.] There is sufficient evidence supporting that conclusion to shift to the City the ultimate burden of showing, under all the circumstances, that it would have enacted the ordinance even without impermissible motive. The same evidence precludes judgment as a matter of law for the City. We therefore reverse the district court’s order of summary judgment in the City’s favor. The district court’s order denying summary judgment for Scientology is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings concerning the Lemon purpose criterion. If the district court concludes that the City was improperly motivated then the entire ordinance will be invalid. No further proceedings are necessary concerning. Lemon’s excessive entanglement analysis, however, in view of our discussion that follows. VIII. EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT The three-prong Lemon inquiry also asks whether the challenged conduct “foster[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. at 2111 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). Later decisions have clarified this aspect of the Establishment Clause in part. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 110 S.Ct. 688, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990), the Court held that the required recordkeeping and disclosure associated with administering neutral collection of sales taxes on transfers of religious and other materials did not excessively entangle the government in church affairs. “[GJenerally applicable administrative and recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious organizations without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.” 493 U.S. at 395, 110 S.Ct. at 698. Such “routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no ‘detailed monitoring and close administrative contact’ between secular and religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.” Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-97, 109 S.Ct. at 2147 (citations omitted); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found, v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963-64, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (holding that requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act foster no impermissible entanglement). A. Contentions of the Parties Scientology argues that the effect of the 1984 Ordinance is to mandate disclosure of its entire operation. By requiring disclosure of the purpose for which funds are and have been solicited and the uses to which funds will be and have been put, the ordinance in effect makes the entire functioning of the church a matter of public record, either directly through reporting in the registration form and retrospective filing or indirectly by means of the “private” statement and disclosure of supporting records. This effect is heightened by the further requirements of particular disclosures, such as the amount of funds spent on salaries,