Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT ROTH, Circuit Judge: The appellants, a group of former mail room employees of the New York Times Company (the “Times”) brought an employment discrimination action against the Times; its publisher, Arthur 0. Sulzberger, Jr.; New York Mailers’ Union No. 6; and George McDonald, the president of the Union. The appellants were members of the Union while employed by the Times. All the appellants, female and male, Hispanic and non-Hispanic, alleged discrimination by the Times on the basis of sex. In particular, they alleged sex-based discrimination with respect to compensation and assignment of work and also retaliation; the female appellants also alleged sexual harassment. In addition, the Hispanic appellants alleged discrimination and harassment because of race, color, and national origin. In response to the Times’ pre-trial motions, the District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint in its entirety. The court reached the merits of the claims in only a few instances. Most counts were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies or to their lateness in filing charges. The male appellants’ sex discrimination claims were dismissed for lack of standing to sue under Title VII and NJLAD. The District Court granted summary judgment for appellees on the remaining counts. We conclude that the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed in its entirety. With respect to the first issue before us, the standing of the male appellants to sue for sex discrimination, we will reverse. We do so based on our determination that “indirect” victims of discrimination have standing to sue under Title VII if they allege a claim of injury-in-fact that is redressable at law. As to most of appellants’ other claims of sex and race discrimination and retaliation, we find either that the District Court applied an incorrect legal standard in finding that it lacked jurisdiction or that it misinterpreted the significance of certain evidence in the record that we find probative of discrimination. We will reverse the dismissal of these claims. We will, however, affirm the dismissal of the claims of sex discrimination and sex-based retaliation under section 1981 because section 1981 does not reach these forms of discrimination. We also will affirm the dismissal of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”) claims against the Union and the Times because the appellants failed to exhaust the Union’s internal grievance procedures. In addition, we will affirm the dismissal of the discrimination and retaliation claims brought against the Union because the Union was not the appellants’ employer and the appellants failed to exhaust the Union’s grievance procedures. Finally, we will affirm the District Court’s decision to deny the appellants’ further discovery, but we will reverse the sanctioning of appellants’ counsel for requesting reconsideration of the discovery decision. I. Factual Background The genesis of this case is a controversy between the New York Times and its union shop, on the one hand, and female and Hispanic workers on the other. Before the late 1970s, the Times’ mail room employees had been almost exclusively non-minority male. Even at present, women constitute only a fraction of the Times’ mailers. Indeed, the Union and the Times do not dispute the appellants’ claim that the Union admitted them reluctantly, under order of a review board. This dispute is a part of a lengthy history of competition among laborers for jobs in the New York metropolitan area newspaper industry. In particular, there has been a longstanding disagreement between labor and management concerning the use of substitute workers to assemble the newspapers. The success or failure of collective bargaining efforts to resolve this conflict is central to the allegations in this action. During the relevant period, the Union represented mail room employees at the Times, the New York Daily News, and the New York Post. A. Terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Baar Award In 1959, after a series of disputes between management and labor, an arbitration board, the Baar Commission, developed new practices for hiring and promotion of mailers at various New York City newspapers. These practices were set forth in the “Baar Award.” The Baar Award was designed to ensure the orderly hiring of extra workers when there was not sufficient regular staff to perform necessary daily tasks. In 1984, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) and the Baar Award, the Times and the Union, along with other area publishers, agreed to a mail room staffing scheme. Under this plan, the mail room was to be staffed by two groups of workers: “situation holders,” who were scheduled to work five shifts per week, and “extras,” who were substitute workers. Extras were hired according to seniority at daily “shapes.” Management determined extras’ seniority on the basis of an annual review of their work records. This review was conducted each year on February 15. Seniority was determined by evaluating the mailer’s position on the publisher’s “priority list.” The priority list divided mailers into five categories, “A” through “E.” When first hired, extras were placed into category “E.” Extras might advance from category “E” to “D” on the priority list by working at least fifteen shifts per quarter of each year. Although extras might work shifts for any publisher who was a party to the CBA, extras would not appear simultaneously on more than one employer’s hiring list. Moreover, continuous employment with a single publisher increased the likelihood of advancement on the priority list. Extras, who transferred from one publisher to another, received credit for shifts worked for the prior employer during the year; transfers were, however, placed at the bottom of the appropriate priority list category of the new employer. In this way, extras who expressed interest and were successful in obtaining employment at daily shapes— preferably continuous and regular employment with a single publisher — could advance along the priority list from category “E” to categories “D” and “A-B.” If the annual review of an extra’s work record showed that he or she had worked at least 180 shifts during the preceding year, the individual would be placed into category “A” or “B” on the priority list. If, however, an extra failed to meet the requirements for advancement to “A” or “B” for two out of three successive years, that individual was demoted, or “delisted.” Delisted mailers could reapply to work as mailers for publishers that were signatories to the CBA. Their status on a publisher’s list would not, however, reflect credit for shifts worked prior to delistment. A four-person board, comprised of two representatives each from the Times and the Union, reviewed complaints arising from the delistment or transfer of extras. If this review board could not agree on the propriety of an extra’s delistment or transfer, the complaint was referred to an arbitrator for resolution. B. The Appellants’ Claims of Sex and Race Discrimination The appellants have been employed in the Times’ mail room as extras. As such, they were subject to the terms of the CBA and the Baar Award. During the mid-1980s, the appellants were placed on the “D” priority list. Although the priority list system allegedly is a facially neutral process for assigning work to mail room employees, the Amended Complaint alleges that, during their employment at the Times, the appellants experienced sex and race-based discrimination on a daily basis, which greatly limited their ability to advance on the list. The alleged discrimination occurred with respect to compensation, terms, and other conditions of employment; it included sexual and racial harassment and retaliation for the filing of the instant lawsuit and charges before the EEOC. The allegations of the Amended Complaint, recounted in the light most favorable to the appellants, are outlined below. 1. Compensation!Assignment of Work During their employment by the Times, appellants allege that sex and race-based discrimination repeatedly limited or impeded their ability to advance on the priority list and, thus, to obtain work and earn wages at rates comparable to those of males and/or non-Hispanic white workers. During the period from the mid-1980s through and beyond August of 1992, the appellants claim to have experienced discrimination in compensation and work assignment prospects. They allege that policies regarding seniority and hiring from the priority list repeatedly were manipulated in ways that limited the employment opportunities of female and Hispanic workers. They claim, for instance, that hiring for work shifts commonly stopped just before the names of women on the priority list were reached. The exclusion of women from employment caused them to lose hundreds of hours of work and wages and also to lose seniority. In addition, if hiring was stopped at the point where females showed up on the list, males who were listed among those females would not be hired. In other instances, appellants claim, the seniority system and Baar Award were violated altogether. On these occasions, men, who had less seniority on the priority list, were hired for work shifts instead of more experienced women. Appellants claim that this type of “leap-frogging” occurred repeatedly over time, including on the following dates: August of 1986, when approximately 275 Daily News mailers, the vast majority of whom were male, were placed ahead of female mailers on the Times’ priority list; March through June of 1998, when fifteen Post workers were placed ahead of female mailers on the Times’ priority list; and October of 1990, when sixteen Daily News situation holders who were on strike from their paper were placed ahead of Times’ mailers, including the appellants, causing the appellants to be unemployed for three weeks. Appellants contend that on these occasions and at other times men, who had or should have had less seniority than women on the list, were hired as substitute workers. Appellants also claim that, in numerous other ways, women were made to work under conditions that were different from and less favorable than the terms and conditions under which men, in particular non-Hispanic men, worked. Appellants charge that' the Times discriminated against them when assigning jobs. Appellants claim that women more often worked in unpleasant parts of the work place and performed the least desirable work. For example, rather than working on the presses or insert machines, women often worked in the hand insert section, or the “rock pile,” an assignment that required constant standing, disposal of waste, and restricted movement. Women also routinely were assigned to perform objectionable tasks such as serving coffee to management and other personnel; men, including men with less seniority than women, were not asked to perform such chores. Women frequently were assigned to perform tasks that required them to work under close scrutiny of supervisors, while men were assigned jobs that allowed more autonomy. Appellants further charge that they were discriminated against in their benefits and compensation. Appellants also allege that women were required to clean up at the end of them shifts, whereas most men were not, and that women were consistently treated differently and worse than male employees with respect to work breaks. Women’s bathroom breaks were counted as their coffee breaks, while men were permitted to take both coffee and bathroom breaks. Women were required to complete an entire work shift in order to be paid for the full shift, whereas men were paid for working the full shift even though they did not complete it. Women were not given “bonus” jobs, as were male workers. Regular situation holders frequently were hired for overtime shifts when extras were available for work, thereby allegedly decreasing work opportunities for female mail room workers. Appellants also claim that only women were required to work mandatory overtime when hired, sometimes five shifts in a row, so that they became exhausted and were discouraged from seeking work. Also they assert that women were denied medical and other benefits. Finally, the appellants make specific allegations concerning the Union. They claim that the matriculation of women into the Union was improperly delayed for arbitrary and discriminatory reasons. Even after they were matriculated, the appellants allege that the leadership of the Union denied them the right to speak at Union meetings and otherwise to participate fully in the Union on the same terms as other members. In addition, the appellants contend that Union leaders ignored their complaints of harassment and discrimination, including complaints that the terms of the Baar Award often were violated or manipulated in a manner that diminished their employment opportunities. 2. Sexual and Racial Harassment In their EEOC charges and the addenda thereto, the appellants claimed that they had been subjected to “an abusive atmosphere” because of sex. In the original and amended complaints, under a heading entitled “hostile work environment,” the appellants alleged that crude language and behavior were directed at the female appellants by male co-workers. Appellants further stated that if they complained about such treatment, they were confronted with “ridicule” or “hostility.” In addition, they alleged that a hostile work environment was created by “photographs of nude women and pornographic magazines [which] were displayed and directed at women.” The allegations regarding sexual harassment were described most explicitly in depositions and affidavits that appellants proffered in response to appellees’ motions to dismiss their claims and/or for summary judgment. In these documents, appellants claimed that their workplace was an environment in which sexually harassing language and acts routinely were inflicted upon appellants by male employees of the Times and/or Union members. Appellants claimed that neither supervisory personnel at the Times nor Union officials proscribed such harassment, punished its perpetrators, or otherwise discouraged it. In particular, appellants alleged that the Times and the Union were aware of and allowed male employees to engage in the following conduct: the display of pictures of nude or lingerie-clad women throughout the work place, but especially in female workers’ line of vision; the throwing and display of pictures of naked men near the door of the women’s restroom, again, directly within women’s line of vision; the verbal harassment of female workers; the “mooning” of female workers; and the hiring of a female stripper, who performed in the workplace during work hours, removing all of her clothing, with the exception of her “G string.” With respect to the alleged verbal harassment, male employees of the Times and/or Union members yelled at and otherwise subjected women to demeaning or threatening language. Appellant Ellen V. Sims alleged that she repeatedly was told, “a woman’s place is in the kitchen” and that she was asked, “[Wjhat are you doing here[?] [D]on’t you got a home to go to[?]” When in 1998 two female appellants asked a foreman if they could use the restroom, they allegedly were told to “piss under the machine.” During the Christmas season in 1991, Times’ foreman Upton allegedly stated to appellants Nancy J. Simatos, Hilary Mendelson, and Lillian Sullivan, “If you want to be here to do a man’s work, then work like a man.... ” One female appellant who needed assistance with her work from a male worker was told repeatedly to “get Jesus to help her,” rather than him. Other male employees are alleged to have made the following remarks to various appellants: “[Management] never should have let women work here [the mailroom]”; “we don’t want women here”; “they should never let women in the workplace — their place is in the kitchen”; “run without them [women] and you’ll have no problems on the machine”; “if you want a man’s pay, you’ll have to do a man’s work”; and “why don’t you get out of our shop”. Male employees also allegedly referred to women as the “bottom of the barrel.” Moreover, appellants claim that male employees of the Times and/or Union members frequently made offensive comments about women’s anatomy. Foreman Larry Levinson allegedly made comments to appellant Sims “about the size of women’s breasts” and “women’s buttocks.” Another employee yelled to an appellant who had been asked her priority number during a hiring session, “Is that your number or your bust size?” Appellant Anna Marie Trause’s breasts were called “bouncy,” and her mail coworkers nicknamed her “Bouncy.” Again, referring to Trause’s breasts, supervisor Ackerman would “turn around to the guys” and comment “moo, moo ... do you want some milk?” Ackerman repeatedly made this taunt concerning Trause’s breasts over the course of the work day, with other male workers responding with laughter. Supervisor Zimmerman allegedly told Trause and other women to “go back to your hands and knees, that’s where you belong to begin with.” Appellant Anjelino was told that she “looked like a man.” In addition to these comments and to the discriminatory assignment of work, the Hispanic appellants claim that they were subjected to racially harassing statements. These statements included being told on several occasions, “Go back to Puerto Rico if you can’t run the machine.” On numerous occasions, the Hispanic appellants allegedly were told: “[Sjpeak English, no Spanish.... We’re in America,” or “Habla Ingles?” Moreover, they claim to have been constantly taunted with comments like, “You guys make good rice and beans, right?” As a result of such verbal and sexual harassment, the appellants were often emotionally distraught at work, many times, to the point of tears. 3. Retaliation The appellants assert that this conduct increased after they complained about their mistreatment. For example, in a letter to appellee Sulzberger, dated January 30, 1992, appellants’ counsel set out the basis for this suit. Shortly thereafter, a copy of the letter was allegedly posted on two employee bulletin boards, with derogatory phrases written across the letter such as: “Dykes unite,” “Eat Shit,” “Ass Holes,” “Burger King is hiring,” “Scabs,” and “Anti-Union.” One of the bulletin boards on which the defaced letter was placed was enclosed in glass and locked; only Times’ supervisors had keys to it. The retaliation became harsher after the administrative complaints and the suit were filed in May and June of 1992. For example, on June 25, 1992, just after suit was filed, the president of the Union allegedly read off the list of plaintiffs’ names at a union meeting. Another Union official, Tommy Murphy, allegedly told some of the female appellants, “If you think you’re being discriminated against now, wait until we get through with you.” Moreover, appellants claim that appellees accelerated the practice of allowing men, who had not met the requirements for progressing on the priority list, to leap-frog over the appellants. Finally, in August of 1992, all but one of the appellants were delisted from the priority list although other mailers who had not complied with the terms of the Baar Award were not. Appellants assert that the delistment was improper under the terms of the Baar Award. However, rather than helping the appellants, the Union delayed their appeal of the delistments. Even after the delistment of the appellants, the Times and the Union allegedly continued to retaliate against them for complaining about their mistreatment. Although many jobs were open, the Times usually hired new personnel, including non-Union workers, rather than the delisted appellants. When appellants were finally rehired, they were assigned to the worst available jobs. Co-workers continued to harass them verbally; some appellants also claim to have been physically threatened by co-workers. When appellants complained repeatedly about this mistreatment, the Union failed to address or to ameliorate it. C. The Appellees ’ Rebuttal In response to the appellants’ allegations, the Times argues that at all relevant times it complied with the Baar Award’s policies on delistment. The Times asserts, for instance, that the appellants’ claims that extras were not hired according to seniority is wrong, that “most plaintiffs freely admitted” as much, and that the appellants “generally conceded” that the least desirable jobs were assigned to those with the least priority. The Times also claims that the appellants’ complaint regarding the “leapfrogging” of 275 Daily News and Post workers over them in 1987 was settled on appeal by an arbitrator, who ruled against the appellants. Moreover, the Times and Union argue that contrary to the appellants’ contentions, all extras who failed to meet the Baar Award criteria for remaining on the Times’ priority list were delisted in 1989, 1991, and August 1992. Therefore, they claim, the delistment of the appellants was not a result of discrimination, but rather, of their failure to meet neutral criteria for continued employment as extras. The Union also submits that five of the delisted appellants were reinstated after their claims were reviewed by the arbitrator. Moreover, the Times claims that, even if true, the appellants’ allegations that they were subjected to discriminatory treatment with respect to “taking of breaks, using the restrooms, getting coffee for other employees” and other situations “amounted to no more than slight annoyances” based on the appellants’ “subjective beliefs.” The Times and the Union argue that the appellants never complained about these incidents, either to the Times management or through the Union’s grievance procedures. The Times disputes the appellants’ claims that “inappropriate pictures of undressed or partially • undressed women” were posted in the workplace. In addition, the Times notes that none of the appellants allege that such pictures were posted after mail room operations moved to a new plant. The Times argues that, due to the date of the move, these claims are untimely. In addition, the Times notes that the appellants never complained about these postings, either to the Times management or through the Union’s grievance procedures. Regarding the sexually and racially harassing language, the Times contends that these claims are not sufficiently specific because the appellants are not “able to attach a date to them.” In addition, the Times claims that “only coworkers” made the comments. Finally, the Times notes that the appellants never complained about these comments, either to the Times management or through the Union’s grievance procedures. The Times and the Union respond to the allegations that the Union violated the LMRA and LMRDA with the argument that they complied with the Baar Award, a claim which “none of the plaintiffs ... disputes.” At the same time, the Times asserts that “the few plaintiffs who attempted to give any examples of alleged breaches of the [CBA] or the Union’s duty of fair representation related nothing but subjective beliefs and/or incidents that were time-barred.” Moreover, appellants did not file the appropriate-grievances with the Union. II. Procedural History A. EEOC Charges and The Complaint Between May 21 and July 30, 1992, the appellants filed charges of sex and/or race, color, and national origin discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC and the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights (“NJDCR”). The charges of the female appellants alleged that 1) they were “subjected to terms and conditions of employment less favorable than that accorded of [sic] male mailers, including but not limited to being denied equal numbers of work shifts”; 2) that they “complained about the discriminatory treatment accorded them”; 3) that “[s]uch discriminatory terms and conditions of employment was [sic] even more intensified and continued throughout [theh*] tenure”; 4) that they were “discriminated against with respect to wages, benefits, abusive atmosphere and other terms and conditions of employment, because of sex and retaliation”; and 5) that “[t]he discrimination ... is a part of a pattern and practice of sex discrimination” that “resulted from a continuing and intentional policy of sex discrimination by respondents, which predates 1980.” The charges of the male appellants included all the allegations made by female appellants, with the exception of the first one. In addition, the male appellants alleged that the men were “discriminatorily treated because [their] priority numberfs] on the workplace seniority list [were] in between the priority numbers of the women mailers. Such discrimination was based on sex.” The charges of the Hispanic appellants included all the allegations made by female appellants (with the exception of the one Hispanic male appellant, whose charges included the allegations made by the male appellants). In addition, the Hispanic appellants alleged that they were accorded less favorable terms and conditions of employment than that accorded “White ... mailers” and that the pattern of discrimination to which they were subjected also was based on “race, national origin and color discrimination by Respondents, which predates 1980.” On September 17, 1992, appellants’ counsel wrote to the EEOC, requesting “right to sue” letters because he had been informed by the EEOC that it could not complete its investigation within 180 days. Each appellant received a “notice of right to sue,” dated October 5, 1992. This action was filed in federal District Court on June 25, 1992. On August 24, appellants’ counsel faxed a copy of the complaint to the EEOC. On September 17, twenty two of the appellants filed new charges with the EEOC. In the second group of charges, the appellants alleged retaliation by appellees as a result of their filing of the initial charges and the instant lawsuit. The EEOC apparently did not issue right to sue letters regarding the allegations of retaliation. The Amended Complaint B. The complaint was amended on October 9, 1992, to allege eight counts of sex, race, color, and national origin discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the NJLAD; violation of 29 U.S.C. § 411 et seq.; and violation of 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Amended Complaint also alleged continuing violations and retaliation, based on the appellants’ delistment in August of 1992 and other adverse employment consequences as a result of their filing of the initial EEOC charges and the original complaint in this action. C. Disposition of The Claims In orders dated May 14, 1993, and September, 10, 1993, the District Court dismissed or limited all counts of the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. The majority of the Title VII and NJLAD sex and race discrimination and retaliation claims were dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for lack of timeliness, including lack of continuing violations; the male appellants’ Title VII and NJLAD claims were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), for lack of standing to sue. Anjelino v. New York Times, 1993 WL 170209 at *5, 8, 10, 11 (D.N.J. May 14, 1993); see also Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Sept. 10 1993). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court limited the surviving sex and race discrimination claims brought under NJLAD to events occurring after June 1990 and the surviving race discrimination claims under Title VII to events occurring after July 1991. The section 1981 sex discrimination claims were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on grounds that they are not cognizable under the statute. Many of the section 1981 race discrimination claims were dismissed for lack of timeliness, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *11. The surviving section 1981 race discrimination claims were limited to events occurring after June 1990. In the Order of May 14, 1993, and in an Order dated August 22, 1996, the court dismissed or limited the appellants’ labor relations claims under section 301 of the LMRA and Title I of the LMRDA. Many claims were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to exhaust and for lack of timeliness. The remaining LMRA claims were limited to events occurring after June 9, 1992. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *14; Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1996). In an Order dated July 8, 1993, the court denied the appellants’ motion for reconsideration of the May 14 Ordei*. Then, on September 10, 1993, the court denied appellants’ motion to review the appropriate statute of limitations under the NJLAD. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. July 8, 1993). On January 29, 1996, the court affirmed the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny discovery to the appellants. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 1996). On May 13, 1996, as a result of appellants’ motion objecting to the discovery decision, the District Court sanctioned their counsel in the amount of $5,000, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, on grounds that the motion was frivolous. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. May 13, 1996); see also Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. May 1,1996). In an Order dated August 22, 1996, the Court granted summary judgment for defendants on the remaining claims of the Hispanic appellants (which had been severed from the claims of the non-Hispanic appellants on October 25, 1995, during the discovery process). These included Title VII sex discrimination claims by three female Hispanics, which related to events occurring after July 1991 and their NJLAD sex discrimination claims for events occurring after July 1990; the Hispanic appellants’ race discrimination claims under section 1981 and NJLAD for events occurring after June 1990 and under Title VII, for events occurring after July 1991; the Hispanics’ national origin claims under Title VII for events occurring after July, 1991; the Hispanics’ retaliation claims under Title VII, NJLAD, and section 1981; and the Hispanics’ LMRA claim for events occurring after June 9, 1992. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Aug. 22,1996). Pursuant to an order dated March 2, 1997, the court dismissed the Amended Complaint in its entirety (i.e., all remaining claims of the non-Hispanic appellants), including the remaining Title VII, NJLAD, and section 301 claims. These claims were dismissed on summary judgment grounds. Anjelino, No. 92-2582 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 1997). III. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the parties’ appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a) and 412, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the pendant state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). As to our scope of review, we will start our analysis with the District Court’s dismissal of certain claims under Rule 12(b)(1). The District Court’s Opinion and Order of May 14, 1993, dismissed many counts of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies and on the bar of the statute of limitations. In dismissing these counts under Rule 12(b)(1), the court did not attach any presumption of truthfulness to appellants’ allegations but instead put the burden of establishing jurisdiction on appellants. See Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *5, citing Mortensen v. First Federal Sav. And Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977), and Millipore Corp. v. University Patents, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 227, 231 (D.Del.1987). There is a fundamental difference between review under Rule 12(b)(1), where existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the court from evaluating the merits of the jurisdictional claim, see Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891, and review under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court is required to accept as true all the allegations of the complaint and all inferences arising from them, see Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Our first task is to evaluate the propriety of employing Rule 12(b)(1) in dismissing the counts that failed to meet exhaustion or timeliness requirements. Our review is plenary. Hornsby v. United States Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir.1986). We conclude that the District Court erred in considering the Times’ failure to exhaust and timeliness defenses as grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although it is a “basic tenet” of administrative law that a plaintiff should timely exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief, the purpose of this rule is practical, rather than a matter affecting substantive justice in the manner contemplated by the District Court. The rule is meant to “provide courts with the benefit of an agency’s expertise, and serve judicial economy by having the administrative agency compile the factual record.” Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir.1997). Failure to exhaust is “in the nature of statutes of limitation” and “do[es] not affect the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Hornsby, 787 F.2d at 89 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-98, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)). The characterization either of lack of exhaustion or of untimeliness as a jurisdictional bar is particularly inapt in Title VII cases, where the courts are permitted to equitably toll filing requirements in certain circumstances. Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1021 (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 482, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986)). Thus, the District Court should have considered the exhaustion and timeliness defenses presented in this case under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than under Rule 12(b)(1). Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1022; accord Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir.1990). As a result, we will test the exhaustion and timeliness defenses under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, as appropriate. Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of appellants’ Title VII, NJLAD, and section 1981 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 is plenary. Ingram v. County of Bucks, 144 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.1998); Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684-85 (3d Cir.1997). To the extent that the court considers evidence beyond the complaint in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is converted to a motion for summary judgement. Rule 12(c); see also Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1021. As with the anti-discrimination statutes, our review of the District Court’s dismissal of appellants’ LMRA and LMRDA claims on grounds of timeliness and failure to exhaust administrative remedies is plenary. Likewise, our review is plenary where the court granted summary judgment on the appellants’ labor claims, pursuant to Rule 56(c). See Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287 (3d Cir.1991). We review the District Court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s decision denying discovery to the appellants, as well as the Court’s imposition of sanctions, under an abuse of discretion standard. See Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 189-90 (3d Cir.1999); Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman v. Charter Tech., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). IV. Discussion A. Matters Dismissed on Preliminary Grounds We will start our consideration of the issues on appeal with the counts dismissed by the District Court on grounds of standing, failure to exhaust, and timeliness. 1. Title VII and NJLAD Sex and Race Discnmination and Retaliation Claims a. Standing of Males to Sue for Sex Discnmination A party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish that he has standing to sue within the meaning of Article III, section two of the Constitution, which limits the courts to hearing actual cases or controversies. Standing is established at the pleading stage by setting forth specific facts that indicate that the party has been injured in fact or that injury is imminent, that the challenged action is causally connected to the actual or imminent injury, and that the injury may be redressed by the cause of action. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Courts assess whether a party has established injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability by considering whether the alleged injury falls within the “zone of interests” that the statute or constitutional provision at issue was designed to protect; whether the complaint raises concrete questions, rather than abstract ones that are better suited to resolution by the legislative and executive branches; and whether the plaintiff is asserting his own legal rights and interests, as opposed to those of third parties. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The requisite injury may be economic or non-economic in nature. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Ass’n. of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). The causation element requires that the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). The redressability prong of the standing test is meant to ensure that the facts involved in a suit are conducive to judicial resolution and are likely to be resolved by court action. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. 752. In dismissing the male appellants’ sex discrimination claims for lack of standing, the District Court reasoned that, to the extent that discrimination had occurred in the Times’ mail room, it had been directed at females; thus, the male workers had not suffered harm and could not assert cognizable claims of sex discrimination. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *10-11. This conclusion was predicated upon the court’s understanding that, as a general matter, men do not have standing to bring claims of sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. at *10 (citing Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S.Ct. 511, 83 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984)). Relying on two Ninth Circuit cases, the court acknowledged, however, that three exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *9-10 (citing Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.1986); Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 709). The court found that a cause of action may lie under Title VII if male employees are subjected to discrimination “because they are men.” Patee, 803 F.2d at 478. Second, reasoning by analogy from the Supreme Court’s associational standing precedent in the context of race discrimination, the court concluded that male employees may sue under Title VII if discrimination directed at women results in a loss of interpersonal contacts or associational rights with women. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *10 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)). Third, based on a ruling by a federal district court in Indiana, the court concluded that a cause of action may lie if sex-based discrimination results in pecuniary injury to both male and female workers. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *10 (citing Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D.Ind.1986)). The District Court concluded that the injuries alleged by the male appellants in this action did not fall within any of these three categories. Therefore, the court held that the male appellants lacked standing to assert claims under Title VII and the NJLAD. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *10. The court did not, however, analyze appellants’ claim that they suffered pecuniary injury because they were numbered on the priority list among women, who were not hired due to sex discrimination because hiring stopped when the women’s names were reached. The court simply concluded, without further comment, that the alleged “multiple discriminatory acts aimed against women directly” were “without consequence to the male employees.” Id. On appeal, the Times agrees in part with the District Court and argues that it is a well-settled proposition that men do not have standing to sue for discrimination against women. The Times rejects, however, the associational and pecuniary theories of male standing to sue for sex discrimination derived from Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10, 93 S.Ct. 364, and Allen, 644 F.Supp. at 1557, and contends that men may sue for sex discrimination only if they experience discrimination because they are men. The Times argues that it was proper to dismiss the male appellants’ claims because these claims are based not on the male appellants’ sex but “on their membership in a group with low-priority list placement that also included the female appellants and others who are not appellants.” The Times does not, however, analyze whether the male appellants could state a colorable claim of injury-in-fact if they were not hired because they were listed among women who were not hired. The appellants argue to the contrary that the male appellants do have standing to sue based on discrimination directed, in the first instance, against female co-workers, because these males would not have been injured but for the Times’ discrimination against the women. When the male appellants appeared at daily “shapes” for hiring, they were “sandwiched among the women on the priority list” and were not hired if the hiring stopped when the names of women on the priority list were reached. Thus, they suffered from the discrimination as well. Appellants assert that their position on standing is supported by our decision in Hackett v. McGuire Brothers Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir.1971). We agree. In Hackett, the plaintiff, because of his race, had been subjected to a separate seniority and vacation schedule, intimidated, harassed, and ultimately discharged. Id. at 444-45. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs Title VII claim for lack of standing because he had become a pensioner after being discharged by the defendant-company; thus, he was no longer an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII. Id. at 445. We reversed and emphasized our obligation to avoid construing the standing doctrine in ways that undermine Congress’ objective in enacting Title VII. The national public policy reflected ... in Title VII ... may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing.... If the plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case or controversy in the Article III sense, then he should have standing to sue in his own right and as a class representative. Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added). In Hackett, we found Article Ill’s case or controversy requirements to have been satisfied by the plaintiffs allegations that demonstrated that he was a “person aggrieved” as required by the statute; he was “aggrieved” because he alleged that the employer had injured him in violation of Title VII while he was employed there. Id. at 445. We concluded that at the pleading stage nothing beyond a colorable allegation of injury is required of the Title VII plaintiff. In Hackett, where the plaintiff claimed pecuniary loss, it was clear that the plaintiff had met his burden. Id. at 446 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). Our decision in Hackett was cited with approval in Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, the seminal associational standing case in the race discrimination context. In Trafficante, the Supreme Court found that two tenants who alleged a loss of the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated community, due to landlords’ alleged discrimination against racial minorities, had standing to sue under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a). Id . at 212, 93 S.Ct. 364. Like our analysis in Hackett, the Trafficante Court’s analysis was textual. The Court rejected an interpretation of Title VIII that would limit persons entitled to sue to “objects of discriminatory housing practices” because it found the definition of “person aggrieved” contained in section 810(a) of Title VIII — “(a)ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice” — to be “broad and inclusive.” Id. at 208, 93 S.Ct. 364. Thus, the Court concluded, “We can give vitality to [the Act] only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute.” Id. at 212, 93 S.Ct. 364. Subsequently, in Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., 584 F.2d 1285 (3d Cir.1978), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), we affirmed our view that the statutory language, “person claiming to be aggrieved,” implied a Congressional intent to be liberal in allowing suits that effectuate the purposes of anti-discrimination statutes. In Novotny, we allowed a male plaintiff, who claimed to have been discharged for failing to adhere to a company policy of sex discrimination against women, to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 1240-45. Our holding in Novotny was predicated upon the similarity in purpose and semantic structure between Title VH’s enforcement provision and section 1985. Many courts have expressly followed our reasoning and/or precedent concerning the significance of the language “person aggrieved” in construing Title VII’s standing requirements in the race discrimination context. Our case law also addresses the causation element of standing. In Rosen v. Public Service Elec. and Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.1972), we considered causation in our analysis of standing in a Title VII case. Rosen involved a retiree who challenged his former company’s policy of linking an employee’s sex with his or her required retirement age for full pension benefits. The trial court had found that when the plaintiff retired, he lost standing. Id. at 92-94. Our standing analysis was based on the plaintiffs status as an active employee at the time that the suit was commenced, id. at 94, and the pecuniary nature of plaintiffs alleged injury. We observed that we had to determine whether “there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.” Id. (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942). Because the plaintiffs alleged harm from the company’s sex-based policies was not theoretical but involved actual economic harm, we concluded that he had been “subject to the discriminatory provisions of the pension plans under consideration.” He would, therefore, be- allowed to assert his claim. Id. In Hospital Council v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir.1991), we again-discussed causation as a part of our analysis of standing. Hospital Council involved alleged threats by a city and county to discriminate against an association of non-profit, tax-exempt hospitals in matters relating to taxation, zoning, and public contracts if the hospitals did not make “voluntary” payments in lieu of taxes. 949 F.2d at 85. Although the complaint of the hospitals had alleged past and imminent harm, id., the District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing on the theory that the alleged harm was not “real injury” that was “fairly traceable” to defendants’ actions, but “purely hypothetical.” Id. at 86. We reversed, explaining that The complaint alleged a classic form of qualitatively concrete injury — direct financial harm. The complaint alleged that members had been subjected to and were threatened with discrimination in the initiation of tax exemption challenges, the handling of zoning matters, and the awarding of public contracts. It is obvious that discrimination of this type is likely to cause direct financial harm to the victims. Id. at 87. Accord Allen, 644 F.Supp. at 1553-57 (finding that males who had been terminated after firm-wide downsizing had standing to sue under Title VII, where they argued that management had closed the facility in question because it primarily employed women, whose jobs were deemed expendable). Because the male appellants here have pled specific facts to demonstrate a concrete injury as well as a nexus between the alleged injury and the sex-based discrimination, even though that discrimination was aimed in the first instance at others, we conclude that they have established standing. Their allegations that sex discrimination adversely affected their being hired as extras, as well as their seniority on the priority list, demonstrate actual injury. We hold that indirect victims of sex-based discrimination have standing to assert claims under Title VII if they allege colorable claims of injury-in-fact that are fairly traceable to acts or omissions by defendants that are unlawful under the statute. That the injury at issue is characterized as indirect is immaterial, as long as it is traceable to the defendant’s unlawful acts or omissions. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. 2405; Hospital Council, 949 F.2d at 87. We will, therefore, reverse the District Court’s finding that the male appellants lack standing to assert their Title VII claims. The foregoing analysis is equally applicable to the District Court’s dismissal for lack of standing of the male appellants’ NJLAD claims. This result is suggested by the substantive law construing various aspects of the NJLAD that has been developed by the New Jersey courts, including the state law on standing. See, e.g., Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 660 A.2d 505, 507-09 (1995) (holding that relatives and friends of person who brought employment discrimination claim under NJLAD had standing to bring retaliatory discharge claim against them common employer); see also Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., Inc., 117 N.J. 539, 569 A.2d 793, 798-99 (1990) (explaining that New Jersey supreme court has adopted methodology of proof used in Title VII cases for NJLAD cases); Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 561 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1989) (noting that LAD standards “have been influenced markedly by experience derived from litigation under federal anti-discrimination statutes”). This result is also suggested by the structural similarities between Title VII and the New Jersey anti-discrimination law, as discussed more fully infra in Section IV.B. b. Failure to Exhaust i. Sexual Harassment Claims The District Court’s dismissal of the female appellants’ hostile work environment sexual harassment claims was based on its determination that their EEOC charges did not state a complaint of sexual harassment. As the court framed the issue, its concern with the charges related to “whether appellants’ EEOC complaint was worded sufficiently to place the EEOC on notice of appellants’ hostile work environment claims.” Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *9. Because appellants referred in their initial EEOC charges to an “abusive atmosphere” rather than to a “hostile work environment,” the District Court concluded that the appellants’ charges were too vague to give notice of sexual harassment claims. Id. Based on its view that an appreciable difference exists between the terms “abusive atmosphere” and “hostile work environment,” the District Court dismissed the sexual harassment claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. The legal precedent cited by the court was Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1212 (3d Cir.1984) and Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.1976). The court construed these cases as supporting its view that the phrases “abusive atmosphere” and “hostile work environment” are sufficiently different to warrant the dismissal of the appellants’ sexual harassment claims. Anjelino, 1993 WL 170209 at *9. We do not agree, however, either with the interpretation given by the District Court to Howze and Ostapowiez or with the result at which the District Court arrived. Our disagreement is best explained by starting with our discussion in Ostapowiez of why a preliminary EEOC claim is necessary. Ostapoivicz was a Title VII class action in which an employer was found to have engaged in sex discrimination in job classifications, resulting in women being laid-off from work, while men with less seniority were either retained or recalled to work at an earlier date than the women. 541 F.2d at 396-97. In Ostapowiez, we set out the procedures for filing discrimination claims and the reasons for following these procedures: When an “aggrieved person” files a claim with the EEOC, the agency notifies the employer and conducts an investigation. If the charge reasonably appears to be true, the EEOC attempts conciliation. If conciliation does not succeed, the EEOC notifies the aggrieved party of his or her right to bring suit. The preliminary step of the filing of the EEOC charge and the receipt of the right to sue notification are “essential parts of the statutory plan, designed to correct discrimination through administrative conciliation and persuasion if possible, rather than by formal court action.” Id. at 398. Because the aim of the statutory scheme is to resolve disputes by informal conciliation, prior to litigation, suits in the district court are limited to matters of which the EEOC has had notice and a chance, if appropriate, to settle. Id. at 398. In Ostapowiez, the defendants claimed on appeal that the District Court had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the right to sue letter, upon which the plaintiff relied in filing suit, and the EEOC’s initial report in the case only concerned employees in the company’s shipping division. The plaintiff worked in a different division. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff filed additional EEOC charges that related to the division in which she worked. Id. at 399. Several months after the additional charges were filed, the plaintiff and certain of her coworkers requested and received right to sue letters from the EEOC. In the suit against the employer, the plaintiff and other members of the class referred to both the initial and subsequent EEOC charges. On these facts, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the scope of the initial charges deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the ease. We found that the additional charges, which were filed during the pendency of the administrative proceedings, “may fairly be considered explanations of the original charge and growing out of it.” Id. In this way, we affirmed that the “parameters of a civil action in the District Court are defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination, including new acts which occurred during the pendency of proceedings before the Commission.” Id. at 398-99 (citing Gamble v. Birmingham Southern R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.1975); Oubiehon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.1973)). Because the EEOC had cognizance of the full scope of the situation during its settlement efforts, the purpose of the notification requirement had been served. In Hicks v. ABT Assoc. Inc., 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir.1978), we arrived at the same conclusion concerning the nature of the filing requirement and its effect on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in discrimination suits. In Hicks, the plaintiff had filed claims of race discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC. His subsequent law suit also contained a claim for sex discrimination. The District Court dismissed this claim on the ground that it was jurisdictionally barred because Hicks had not filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC. Hicks claimed that he had attempted to amend his charge but that the EEOC had refused to accept the amendment. In view of this factual disparity, we reversed, holding that a court could hear a claim of sex discrimination where it was unclear whether the EEOC had improperly refused to amend charges, and commenting that the “charges are most often drafted by one who is not well versed in the art of legal description.... [T]he scope of the original charge should be liberally construed.” Id. at 965. We pointed out that the purpose of the filing requirement is to enable the EEOC to investigate and, if cause is found, to attempt to use informal means to reach a settlement of the dispute. Id. at 963. If the complaint is not well founded or if reconciliation is not successful, a right to sue letter is issued to the complainant. Thus, the effect of the filing requirement is essentially to permit the EEOC to use informal, non-judicial means of reconciling the differences between the charging party and an employer. Id. (citing Ostapowicz). Once again, in Howze, a Title VII suit in which the plaintiff alleged that she had been denied a promotion due to racial discrimination, we reversed the District Court’s determination that the plaintiff could not amend her complaint to include a claim of retaliation. 750 F.2d at 1209-12. The defendant argued that the plaintiff should not have been given leave to amend her complaint because no evidence had been presented that the retaliation claim was ever submitted to the EEOC. Id. at 1212. The court found, however, that, as in Ostapowicz, the plaintiffs “new retaliation claim may fairly be considered [an] explanation ] of the original charge.... ” Id. (citations omitted) (relying on Hicks to hold that EEOC investigation does not set outer limits on the scope of the civil complaint.) Moreover, the EEOC completed its investigation and determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the employer had discriminated against Howze before it issued its right to sue letter. In light of the precedent established by Ostapowicz, Hicks, and Howze, we do not find, as the Times claims, that these cases support its position that the appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedy on the sexual harassment claim. We conclude to the contrary that appellants’ notification of their charges was sufficient because the terms “abusive,” “hostile,” “environment,” and “atmosphere” have been used interchangeably to describe sexual harassment. In particular, appellants support the sufficiency of their charges with references to recent Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions concerning sexual harassment. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 66-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir.1997); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir.1995); Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 445-47, 449 (3d Cir.1994). We agree with the appellants that the terms are interchangeable. This interchangeability convinces us that the harassment charge was within the scope of the complaints before the EEOC. See Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 396-97; Howze, 750 F.2d at 1212; Hicks, 572 F.2d at 964-65. The foregoing analysis also applies to the dismissal of the female appellants’ NJLAD sexual harassment claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This result is suggested by the similarities between the procedural requirements of Title VII and NJLAD, and the work-sharing agreements between the two agencies, pursuant to which the NJDCR deferred