Full opinion text
OPINION WELLFORD, Circuit Judge. This criminal prosecution pertains to one of six defendants who were tried on charges of conspiracy to conduct and participate in a Detroit-based racketeer influenced and corrupt organization. Appellant Jack W. Tocco (“Tocco”) was convicted on two counts of conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (“RICO”) — one for engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity and one for collection of an unlawful debt (Counts One and Two) — and one count of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“Hobbs Act”) (Count Six). Both Tocco and the government now appeal — Tocco from the jury convictions, the government from the sentence imposed by the trial judge. A. Background On March 14, 1996, Tocco was charged in a twenty-five (25)-count indictment along with sixteen (16) co-defendants on charges relating to the activities of a group called “Cosa Nostra,” also known as “the Outfit” or, as is known to the general public in the United States, “the Mafia.” Cosa Nostra allegedly is made up of “families” in various cities, including Detroit, and allegedly is involved in illegal activities such as extortion, illegal lotteries (“numbers”), bookmaking, loansharking, and acquiring undisclosed and illegal investments in gambling casinos. The indictment herein alleged that Tocco had been involved in the Detroit branch of the national Mafia organization, and that he had been the “Boss of the Detroit Cosa Nostra Family” since about 1979. The district court severed the trial of Tocco and his five co-defendants from the trials of the others named in the indictment. On January 27, 1998, trial commenced against Tocco and his co-defendants. Approximately three months later, on April 29, 1998, the jury convicted Tocco on the two RICO conspiracies and the Hobbs Act conspiracy mentioned above. It acquitted him on ten counts of extortion or attempted extortion. On October 23, 1998, the district court denied the government’s request for a forfeiture judgment against all the defendants. On November 13,1998, the district court sentenced Tocco to twelve months and one day in prison, departing downward ten levels from the applicable guideline range, and recommended that Tocco’s sentence be served in a community correction center. Tocco filed a timely appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction, and the government timely appealed Tocco’s sentence. B. Voir Dire Tocco first challenges the adequacy of the jury voir dire. A district court’s manner of conducting voir dire is not reversible unless the court abused its discretion. See United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1071-72 (6th Cir.1993). It is well-settled that the district court enjoys broad discretion in establishing its voir dire procedures. See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 657-59 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991)), vacated on other grounds, 114 F.3d 84 (6th Cir.1997); see also Deel v. Jago, 967 F.2d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir.1992) (same). Tocco claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the district court declined to permit specific questions during voir dire on the subject of Mafia prejudice. Tocco’s counsel filed a motion requesting that the prospective jurors be asked whether they possessed any strong opinions about the Mafia, or whether they believed that Italian-Americans were more likely to be members of organized crime. The motion was accompanied by Detroit newspaper articles referring to “Detroit’s Mob” and the Detroit Mafia. Tocco claims that the district court’s denial of that motion constituted reversible error because of the very high-profile nature of the case and the substantial unsympathetic publicity in the media. The government argues that the district court was not compelled to allow questions on the specific issue of Mafia prejudice, and that the questions posed to the prospective jurors were adequate to ensure Tocco a fair and impartial jury. The district court asked the prospective jurors to answer the following in the juror questionnaire: 41. You are being asked to participate in jury selection process that will select a jury to try a criminal case in which the government prosecutors charge several defendants with involvement in a racketeering conspiracy. The government alleges that the defendants are participating in a conspiracy call [sic] “Cosa Nostra” or the “Mafia.” To the best of your knowledge, have you heard anything about this case? _ yes _ no. The district court informed counsel that it would question individual jurors more specifically about the matter if the juror’s answer to that question was affirmative. Otherwise, the court refused to ask the jury pool more specific questions pertaining to the Mafia. While we are aware that the district court has broad discretion in such matters, we are mindful that this case attracted much media attention. This court has indicated that the district court is in the best position to determine the appropriate areas of inquiry in such cases. [W]ide discretion [is] granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and in other areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias. Particularly with respect to pretrial publicity, we think this primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense. The judge of that court sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect, and brings to his evaluation of any such claim his own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might influence a juror. Lanier, 33 F.3d at 657 (citing Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991)). The Supreme Court and this circuit have set out the principles involved in determining whether the failure to ask specific questions amounts to “an unconstitutional abuse of discretion”: There is no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups.... [TJhere is no per se constitutional rule in such circumstances requiring inquiry as to racial prejudice .... Only when there are more substantial indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case does the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request to examine the jurors’ ability to deal impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (citations omitted). It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815, 830 (6th Cir.1983). It suffices “if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). See also Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 843-44 (6th Cir.1999). Having said all that, we still believe the district court would have been well-advised to allow more detailed questioning to reveal an individual prospective juror’s prejudice, if any, against Cosa Nostra and the obvious Italian heritage of the defendants and the Sicilian or Italian connection with the Mafia. We decided similar issues concerning voir dire method and jury selection in a highly publicized case, United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983) (en banc). The court majority, in considering challenges to the sufficiency of voir dire in the criminal trial of a recent Tennessee governor, concluded that no reversible error occurred, although the trial judge probably did not employ the best voir dire procedures and we would not recommend the manner of such voir dire. See id. at 819, 822. We have the same reservations, as did the court majority in Blanton (and the writer was one of those judges), about voir dire and jury selection in this case. Nevertheless, the district court sought to ensure the fairness of the jury selection through more general, progressive questioning. After obtaining the prospective jurors’ answers to the “Mafia” question in the questionnaire, the court followed up with each juror individually and asked more specific questions about their knowledge of the case. Of the twelve jurors that ultimately were chosen to sit at trial, seven had heard nothing about the case, and the other five had only had minimal knowledge. The five that had minimal knowledge of the case individually assured the district court that they could, despite that knowledge, render a fair and impartial verdict. Furthermore, the jurors all informed the court of their ability to assume that an accused is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and to accept that a defendant does not forfeit his presumption of innocence if he chooses not to testify. In our view, Tocco was not constitutionally entitled, under the circumstances, to any more specific race-based questioning during voir dire. “The Constitution, after all, does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). This issue regarding voir dire is of serious concern to this court. We believe that the district court’s failure to ask more specific questions regarding Mafia or Italian-American prejudice was a mistake, but not an error compelling reversal under the circumstances. The district court’s voir dire sufficiently explored the prospective jurors’ knowledge about the Mafia-related case and their individual ability to be fair and impartial. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[tjhere is no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups.” Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190, 101 S.Ct. 1629. Based on the foregoing, we believe the procedures for jury selection, viewed in their entirety, afforded Tocco a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, we find that any error committed in failing to allow more specific voir dire questions on Mafia prejudice does not require a reversal of Tocco’s conviction. C. Severance Tocco also argues that the district court erred in failing to sever his trial from that of co-defendants Nove Tocco (“Nove”) and Paul Corrado (“Corrado”). A district court’s decision to deny severance of defendants is reviewed for a “clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Critton, 43 F.3d 1089, 1098 (6th Cir.1995). The defendant “has a heavy burden of showing specific and compelling prejudice” from having a joint trial. United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir.1993). Tocco claims that his trial should have been severed from that of Nove and Corrado because there was no evidence that he was a co-conspirator of those two defendants. He argues that certain tape recorded statements of Nove and Corrado were entered into evidence, and that such evidence never linked him with those defendants. Thus, he claims that the evidence unfairly prejudiced his case, and he should have been given a separate trial. We find that Tocco’s position is an extension of his argument that the evidence was insufficient to find that a conspiracy existed between him and the other defendants. For reasons discussed below, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that such a conspiracy existed. Joint trials are favored in this circuit, and “it is well-settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Edüd 317 (1993). We must presume that juries are “capable of sorting out the evidence and considering the case of each defendant separately.” Harris, 9 F.3d at 501. The fact that the jurors in this case found Tocco not guilty on ten counts and acquitted co-defendants on other counts is some indication that the jury was able to sort out the issues and follow the court’s instructions with respect to each defendant separately. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sever Toe-co’s trial from that of Nove and Corrado. D. Admissibility of Evidence Tocco raises seven alleged errors regarding the district court’s admission of evidence. Generally, a district court’s decision to admit testimony and other evidence is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir.1993). Even if the district court abuses its discretion in this regard, we will not reverse a conviction on that basis unless the “substantial rights” of a party are affected. Id. We will note below the issues to which a different standard of review applies. (1) Testimony of Anthony Polizzi An important part of the government’s case against Tocco was the testimony of Angelo Polizzi (“Angelo”). Angelo testified about statements made to him by his father, Michael Polizzi (“Polizzi”), who died shortly before trial in this case, which the district court held to be admissible as declarations against penal interest. See Fed R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Tocco now argues that the district court erred in allowing Angelo to testify about his father’s statements. We review de novo the issue of whether the district court properly held those statements to be admissible. See United, States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir.1993). The statements challenged by Tocco are in one of two categories: (1) statements that others were involved in the conspiracies and (2) statements about Polizzi’s own involvement in the Frontier Hotel and Casino, which were made after Polizzi had been convicted and sentenced based on that involvement. Without directing the court’s attention to specific statements, Tocco claims that “[w]hile a statement of [Angelo] Polizzi’s father that he, himself, was involved in organized crime may have been a declaration against his father’s penal interest, the statements that others were involved in illegal crime were not declarations against his father’s penal interest.” In support, Tocco relies on Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that the declarations of a criminal that implicate another person are admissible only to the extent that they are self-inculpatory. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599, 114 S.Ct. 2431. In determining whether Polizzi’s statements qualify as declarations against penal interest, we must consider (1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether, from the perspective of the average, reasonable person, the statements were truly adverse to the declarant’s penal interest, and (3) whether corroborating circumstances truly establish the trustworthiness of the statement. United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1009 (6th Cir.1998), cert denied, — U.S.-, 119 S.Ct. 1126, 143 L.Ed.2d 120 (1999). Among other things, Polizzi told Angelo about Tocco’s role in the Cosa Nostra organization, and about the identity of other organization leaders. Polizzi stated that Tocco had been the leader since 1979, and that defendant Zerilli was the leader before him. All were related by blood or marriage. Polizzi had identified Paul Conrado and Nove Tocco as underlings in the enterprise. Angelo at the time himself assumed a role in the conspiracy by making deliveries and collections for his father. Tocco argues that Polizzi’s statements implicating others were inadmissible because they were about others and were not adverse to Polizzi’s own penal interest. We agree that our decision should be guided by Williamson. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest ‘that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true,’ and this question can only be answered in light of the surrounding circumstances.” Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603-04, 114 S.Ct. 2431. The court also noted that statements must be viewed in context. For example: “Sam and I went to Joe’s house” might be against the declarant’s interest if a reasonable person in the declarant’s shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam’s conspiracy. And other statements that give the police significant details about the crime may also, depending on the situation, be against the declarant’s interest. Id. at 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431; see also United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 119 S.Ct. 114, 142 L.Ed.2d 91 (1998). We believe that Tocco’s argument ignores the context in which Polizzi’s statements were made to his son. The statements described Polizzi’s own participation in the RICO enterprise, and inculpated himself and others as participants in the conspiracy. Those statements are not rendered inadmissible simply because they implicate others. Justice Scalia explained a similar situation in his concurring opinion in Williamson: For example, if a lieutenant in an organized crime operation described the inner workings of an extortion and protection racket, naming some of the other actors and thereby inculpating himself on racketeering and/or conspiracy charges, I have no doubt that some of those remarks could be admitted as statements against penal interest. Id. at 606-07, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (Scalia, J., concurring). Here, Polizzi’s statements about the conspiracy linked himself to the others in the conspiracy, and were therefore against his own penal interest. Thus, we decline to hold that those statements were rendered inadmissible by virtue of the fact that others were implicated. See United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1295 (1st Cir.1997) (finding admissible statements that “demonstrate ‘an insider’s knowledge’ of a criminal enterprise and its criminal activities”). Tocco also claims that any statements about Polizzi’s involvement in the Frontier Hotel and Casino case were not against his penal interest because he had been convicted and sentenced for that conduct at the time he made the statements. In other words, Polizzi was already in prison, so no penal interest was at stake. We disagree, because Polizzi’s involvement in the Frontier Hotel and Casino was a predicate act of the RICO conspiracy charged in this case, a conspiracy of which Polizzi was a member and for which he was never tried and convicted. Tocco did not raise an argument that the admission of Polizzi’s statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses testifying against him. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, -, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). Even if we had, the argument would have been unavailing. In Lilly, the Supreme Court concluded that an accomplice’s out-of-court statements that inculpate a defendant cannot be admitted against that defendant unless they bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at---, 119 S.Ct. at 1899-1900. Those guarantees must be inherent in the circumstances of the testimony itself; the fact that other evidence corroborates the testimony in question does not suffice. Id. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1900. We find that the circumstances surrounding Polizzi’s statements in this case indicate that the statements were trustworthy, particularly in light of the fact that Polizzi’s statements were made to his son in confidence, rather than to the police or to any other authority for the purpose of shifting the blame to Tocco. See Bruton v. Phillips, 64 F.Supp.2d 669, 680 (E.D.Mich. 1999) (reasoning that statements made to a perceived ally rather than to police officers during an interrogation are trustworthy, citing Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162,1166— 67 (2d Cir.1994)). Therefore, the admission of Polizzi’s statements would withstand a Sixth Amendment challenge. Accordingly, we reject Tocco’s argument that the district court erred in allowing into evidence Polizzi’s out-of-court statements. (2) Documentary evidence relating to Polizzi We review the admission of exhibits under an abuse of discretion standard. Bonds, 12 F.3d at 554. The government argues that it sought to introduce Angelo Polizzi’s plea agreement and other exhibits relating to this witness “to blunt any cross-examination impeaching of Polizzi’s credibility” with respect to cooperating with the prosecution. The plea agreement provided, among other things, that Angelo Polizzi would “provide truthful and complete information.” Tocco maintains that introduction of this evidence impermissibly constituted a vouching for Polizzi’s credibility, particularly since he was a key witness for the prosecution. We have considered this question previously and have concluded that “[[Introduction of the entire plea agreement permits the jury to consider fully the possible conflicting motivations underlying the witness’ testimony.” United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir.1986). We noted further: While the existence of a plea agreement may support the witness’ credibility by showing his or her interest in testifying truthfully, the plea agreement may also impeach the witness’ credibility by showing his or her interest in testifying as the government wishes regardless of the truth. Id.; accord, United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 898-99 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that prosecutor may elicit testimony regarding plea agreement and may enter agreement into evidence). Tocco counters with reliance upon United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir.1994), which held that the prosecutor’s improper reliance in closing argument on such an agreement amounted to personal vouching for the truthfulness of the witness’ testimony under the circumstances. The prosecutor argued and emphasized in Carroll that the witness who had entered into a similar plea agreement “would be in jeopardy” if he were not testifying truthfully. Id. at 1389. Circumstances were not the same in this case; the prosecutor made no similar closing argument and did not personally vouch for the truthfulness of Polizzi’s testimony. We do not agree with Tocco that Carroll supports reversal by reason of the introduction of the plea agreement as an exhibit. Indeed, the prosecutor may refer to such agreement in appropriate circumstances to deflect defendant’s use of a plea agreement to attack the witness’ credibility. See Mealy, 851 F.2d at 898-99. Thus, we find no error in the admission of these exhibits, and this assignment of error, therefore, does not support a reversal of Tocco’s conviction. (3) Vitello’s testimony about labor racketeering The district court permitted Vitello to testify about Vito Giacolone’s taking care of labor problems in Toledo. Tocco claims that allowing the “labor racketeering” testimony impermissibly “enlarged the scope of the indictment” and strayed away “from the elements of the charges.” We are hard pressed to see any unfair prejudice inherent in this brief testimony. We agree with the district court that the evidence related to the charged conspiracy. Tocco requested no limiting instruction, and we cannot conclude that the district court’s decision constituted reversible error. (4) Investigative reports by the Nevada Gaming Commission Through Clifton Copher, chief of the enforcement division of the Nevada State Gaming Control Board, the government introduced records of the Board, also called “investigative summaries,” into evidence. The government claims that these documents pertained to the application for a gaming license for the Edgewater Casino and corroborated and placed into context the conversations of co-conspirators that had been intercepted. Also, the records were relevant to the defendants obtaining a hidden interest in the Nevada gambling industry. Tocco objected to the admission of the documents on the basis that they contained opinions and were speculative. The district court overruled that objection, finding that the documents were admissible as business records. After the witness was dismissed, the district court granted Tocco’s request to redact certain portions of the reports. Six weeks later, the parties placed into the record an agreed-upon redaction of only one of the reports. In this appeal, Tocco claims that the district court erred in admitting the Board’s records into evidence. Upon examination, we agree with the government that much of the documentary evidence was not hearsay because it was based on facts that the Board had received from information supplied by the applicants. The objectionable portions which might arguably be hearsay were redacted by agreement of the parties. Furthermore, the exhibits were admissible for a non-hearsay purpose — they showed the predicate act of the defendants obtaining a hidden interest in the Edgewater, and they assisted in showing why the Gaming Board granted the applicants only a temporary gaming license. Thus, we are not persuaded that the district court should have excluded these documents as inadmissible hearsay, and in view of the court’s action in allowing redactions to particular objectionable portions, no error in this regard has been established. (5) Judgments of conviction At trial, the district court allowed the government to admit into evidence the certified convictions against certain of Tocco’s co-defendants. Tocco generally objected to the admission of that evidence, but at no time did he specifically complain that this was an improper use of offensive collateral estoppel. Because we find that the admission of those convictions was permissible, we will assume for purposes of our analysis that the issue was properly preserved for review. Tocco argues that the government is not permitted to rely on the judgments of conviction to prove the predicate acts of a RICO charge. Such use of those eonvictions, he claims, constitutes improper offensive collateral estoppel, relying on the reasoning in United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir.1994). In Pelullo, however, the district court held that the previous conviction of the defendant established the existence of a predicate act under RICO, and the court instructed the jury to recognize the predicate act as a matter of law. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 889-90. The instant case is different, because the district court here entered into evidence the convictions of Tocco’s co-defendants, who had the opportunity to show the jury that he was not involved in their crimes. Furthermore, the court did not give a “collateral estoppel” instruction as the court did in Pelullo. The government explained that “[wjhether or not Mr. Tocco was connected to that is a jury-question for the jury to determine.” Also, there was other evidence that corroborated the information about the convictions in question. Thus, because no collateral estoppel effect was given to the challenged evidence, Tocco’s argument is unfounded. (6) FBI Agent Ruffino as an expert witness The district court allowed one of the case agents, Samuel J. Ruffino, to testify as an expert on organized crime. Tocco claims that allowing that testimony constituted error because he received insufficient pretrial notice that Ruffino would be testifying in that capacity, and because Ruffino should not have been permitted to testify both as a fact witness and an expert witness. We review the district court’s admission of expert testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,---, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174-75, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). After the jury had been selected but before the trial began, the government moved to have Alfonso D’Arco qualified as an expert to testify about the nature, organization, rules, and structure of the national Cosa Nostra enterprise. Though the district court initially agreed to allow that testimony, it reversed itself two days later with the agreement that it would consider a renewed motion later in the trial. On March 2, 1998, the government renewed its motion to qualify D’Arco, and it also informed the court of its intent to call Ruffino if D’Arco was not allowed to testify. About ten days later, more than a month before he testified, the government formally notified the court and all the defendants that it intended to call Ruffino as its expert on “the structure, the organization, the rules, the interpi'etation of phrases, and jargon that’s been used in [the] trial, on the tapes, the hierarchy and the roles of individuals.” Thus, Tocco knew before trial that some form of “organized crime” expert would testify, and he knew one month before the actual testimony that Ruffino would be the expert. Tocco did not request a continuance, nor did he claim that he did not have sufficient time to examine the witness prior to his testimony. We conclude that, under these circumstances, this notice concerning Ruffino was adequate and sufficient. Tocco also claims that the district court erred in admitting Ruffino’s testimony as an expert witness because of the undue prejudice involved in Ruffino testifying as both a fact witness and an expert witness. We rejected a similar argument in United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676 (6th Cir.1996), where the defendant argued that a police officer should not be able to testify in a single case as both a fact witness and an expert witness. We noted that although “there is a significant risk that the jury will be confused by the officer’s dual role,” we are not willing to adopt a per se prohibition of the practice of allowing an officer to testify in two capacities. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 682-83. If the district court and the prosecutor take care to assure that the jury is informed of the dual roles of a law enforcement officer as a fact witness and an expert witness, then the officer’s “expert” testimony may be proper. See id. at 683. In this case, Ruffino’s dual roles were emphasized to the jury by the fact that he testified at two different times — once early in the trial as a fact witness, and again at the conclusion of trial as an expert witness. Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury, both before he gave his opinion and again in the jury charge, that it should consider Ruffino’s dual roles in determining what weight, if any, to give Ruffino’s expert testimony. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Ruffino to testify in both capacities. Ruffino’s testimony was certainly relevant and reliable under the principles of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). This type of evidence regarding the inner-workings of organized crime has been held to be a proper subject of expert opinion because such matters are “generally beyond the understanding of the average layman.” Thomas, 74 F.3d at 682; see also United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1264 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936-37 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1148-49 (3d Cir.1990). Further, to the extent that Tocco challenges Ruffino’s qualifications on the subject about which he testified, we reject any such contention in light of the undisputed facts. Ruffino has extensive experience in the investigation of organized crime in the Detroit area, including 22 years with the FBI, 17 of which were spent in organized crime investigations, and his role since 1990 as the Cosa Nostra coordinator for the Detroit division, and as liaison with other FBI offices and FBI headquarters. Thus, he was amply qualified to opine about the machinations of organized crime. In summary, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing agent Ruffino to testify as an expert and that his testimony met the standards of relevance and reliability. Furthermore, the dual role played by Ruffino as both a fact witness and an expert did not, under the circumstances, preclude his testimony because the transition from one role to another was separated by time and was explained to the jury. (7) Co-conspirator statements Tocco contends that the district court erroneously admitted tapes (wire intercepts) of conversations between Nove Tocco and Paul Corrado because they were not “in furtherance of the conspiracy” charged. Rather, Tocco claims, those tapes contained nothing more than idle, malicious gossip and inflammatory statements which unduly prejudiced his case. If the conversations admitted were “nothing more than idle chatter or casual conversation about past events,” they were not properly admissible. United States v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 951-52 (7th Cir.1989). The court in Doerr acknowledged that “statements ‘in furtherance’ of a conspiracy can take many forms,” such as keeping co-conspirators advised, or concealing aspects of the scheme. Id. at 951. The statement may also be “susceptible of alternative interpretations.” Id. at 952; see also Shores, 33 F.3d at 444. Shores goes further to indicate that a statement may be admissible as “in furtherance of a conspiracy” even if “not ‘exclusively, or even primarily, made to further the conspiracy.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir.1987)); see also United States v. Hitow, 889 F.2d 1573, 1581 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir. 1982). We are satisfied, after examining the record, that the great bulk of the admitted evidence tended to demonstrate (1) that the conspiracy in question existed; (2) that those whose statements were overheard were members of the conspiracy that included Tocco; and (3) that the statements were, in fact, made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy at issue” according to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The provision applies when “a court is satisfied that the statement actually falls within the definition of the rule.” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). “[T]he existence of the conspiracy and [defendant’s] involvement in it are preliminary questions of fact that under [Fed.R.Evid.] 104, must be resolved by the court.” Id. Bourjaily held also in considering this issue “that there is little doubt that a co-conspirator’s statements could themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy.” Id. at 180, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Here, Nove Tocco’s and Paul Corrado’s conversations are probative of the existence of a conspiracy in which defendant Tocco was involved, and other evidence was probative on this matter as well. It was not error to consider that the controverted statements were made in the course and scope of the conspiracy. We are concerned, however, with certain remarks of a racial nature that were made in the conversations that should have been excised from the tapes. For example, one of the comments on the tapes was that “I think you might win up here [in Detroit] with a nigger trial, nigger jury.” Also, a statement was made that “they seem to have success over there [in New York City] because there’s so many Italians and American people, the Wasps or whatever, are so used to being around other Italians, they’re accepted.” Although we agree that those particular denigrating comments were unfairly prejudicial, they were only a very minor portion of the total discussion on the tapes. Accordingly, the district court did not commit reversible error in refusing to strike the tapes in total as urged by defendant Tocco, though it would have been advisable to strike the parts that we have mentioned. We note that a case relied upon by Tocco, United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.1991), found that certain co-conspirator statements were improperly admitted against defendant, but that the error did not affect the “substantial rights” of the defendant and was therefore not reversible. Johnson, 927 F.2d at 1003. Here, as in Johnson, the prosecution presented substantial other evidence “from which the jury might have concluded” defendant’s guilt, and his conviction will not be reversed based on the admission of the co-conspirator’s statements. Id, In sum, none of the evidentiary issues raised by Tocco require this court to reverse his conviction. E. Prosecutorial Misconduct Tocco moved for a mistrial based upon several aspects of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and the district court denied that motion. We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Canoll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir.1994). “An abuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id. When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine first whether the statements were improper. See United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1177 (6th Cir.1986). If they appear improper, we then look to see if they were flagrant and warrant reversal. See United States v. Carrolhl, 26 F.3d 1380, 1388 (6th Cir.1994). To determine flagrancy, the standard set by this Court is: 1) whether the statements tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; 2) whether the statements were isolated or among a series of improper statements; 3) whether the statements were deliberately or accidentally before the jury; and 4) the total strength of the evidence against the accused. United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 394 (6th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 247 (6th Cir.1996)); Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1385 (citing United States v. Leon, 534 F,2d 667, 679 (6th Cir.1976)). To reverse a conviction because of an improper non-flagrant statement, a reviewing court must determine that: 1) the proof of the defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; 2) the defense counsel objected; and 3) the trial court failed to cure the impropriety by failing to admonish the jury. Monus, 128 F.3d at 394; Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1385-86 (citing United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 757 (6th Cir.1979)). United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 549-50 (6th Cir.1999); see also Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Seira v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1355-56 (6th Cir. 1993)). We will not overturn a verdict unless the prosecutorial misconduct is “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial, ... or so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant.” Pritchett, 117 F.3d at 964 (citations omitted). Tocco raises seven categories of government misconduct that, taken together, allegedly require reversal. For the following reasons, we are not “firmly convinced that a mistake has been made,” nor are we persuaded that there has been a denial of a fair trial by the actions of the prosecutor. See Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1383. We turn to the specifics of the alleged misconduct. (1) Blurt-outs Tocco claims that the prosecution improperly orchestrated questions and answers that intentionally brought before the jury opinions of experienced FBI agents that Tocco and others were “known members of the Cosa Nostra family.” Tocco promptly objected to such “blurt-outs” at trial, and the district court forcefully sustained those objections and admonished counsel in that respect. At the end of the first day of trial, the court expressed its preference that the terms “La Cosa Nostra” or “Mafia” not be used unless the defendants’ participation in that group was first established. The court further stated that “it’s not going to be any kind of a terminal problem if [the improper terminology] slips out.” Later in the trial, when government agent Stejskal was asked why he was engaged in a surveillance of Tocco, he said because “Jack Tocco was considered to be a member of the Detroit family of La Cosa Nostra.” Tocco did not object at that time, but he objected when Stejskal subsequently stated that Raffaele Qusarano was a member of the Detroit family. The district court sustained the objection, then later warned that there should be no “more conclusory testimony about we knew that these men were such and such.” When Tocco moved for a mistrial on the basis of the improper comments, the district court denied the motion and explained that it had effectively sustained any objections in that regard and that a new trial was not warranted. Tocco did not request any curative instruction on the issue. We agree, as the district court recognized, that any testimony that Tocco was a “known” member or “boss” of La Cosa Nostra was improper. The impropriety, however, was not flagrant, nor was it so pervasive as to “permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Rather, when Tocco objected to the improper remarks, the district court promptly sustained any objections and the government complied with the court’s admonishments. Furthermore, the government was charged with proving its allegation that Tocco was a member of La Cosa Nostra, so every reference to the group can not be deemed to have been improper. The improper witness comments constituted a very small part of the total evidence against Tocco. The district court did not decline any precautionary instructions suggested by Tocco. In conclusion, we deem Tocco’s concerns to be legitimate, but, on balance, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a new trial based on the improper episodes. See United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916, 920-21 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that the chailenge was legitimate, but finding that the episodes did not warrant a mistrial). (2) “Vouching” for the credibility of Angelo Polizzi Tocco claims that the government improperly “vouched” for the credibility of Angelo Polizzi by entering into evidence Polizzi’s plea agreement and related documents which stated that he had to testify truthfully in order to obtain lenity. Whether improper vouching amounts to prosecutorial misconduct and whether it renders the trial fundamentally unfair are mixed questions of law and fact reviewable de novo. Francis, 170 F.3d at 549. Tocco argues that this situation is like that described in Carroll, supra, where this court held that the government may not “vouch” for the credibility of its witnesses by disclosing to the jury the witness’s obligation under his plea agreement or by prosecutor comments suggesting that a witness will be punished by not testifying truthfully. Such a practice, we found, “improperly place[s] the prestige of the government, and even of the court, behind the credibility of the [witnesses] by stating that, if the government or the judge did not believe that the witnesses were being truthful, the witnesses would be in jeopardy.... This constitutes improper vouching.... We cannot overstate the extent to which we disapprove of this sort of improper vouching by prosecutors.” Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1389. In this case, the government introduced into evidence documents related to the benefits that Angelo received for his cooperation with the government. Those documents were redacted to exclude the phrase that Angelo “provided truthful and very valuable testimony.” In his examination of Angelo, the prosecutor never referred to the parts of the documents that explained the benefits that were conferred in exchange for Angelo’s testimony. Tocco fails to point out any comments made by the prosecutor to the effect that the government and the court would prosecute Polizzi for perjury and revoke his plea agreement if he did not testify truthfully. Nor did the prosecutor indicate that he had any other independent means of discerning Polizzi’s truthfulness. Thus, the only basis for Tocco’s claim is the unredacted portions of Polizzi’s plea agreement and related documents, the admissibility of which we have discussed and affirmed above. There being no improper prosecutorial statements, we must reject Tocco’s contention of improper vouching. See Francis, 170 F.3d at 549-50 (reasoning that court must first determine whether the prosecutor’s statements are improper). (3) Impermissible comments on the exercise of Tocco’s right to seek counsel Tocco claims that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecution elicited testimony during trial from various witnesses indicating that Tocco had requested to see an attorney, that he had consulted an attorney, and that he consulted an attorney in the company of co-conspirators. This, Tocco argues, constituted “an impermissible comment on the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right.” We find this argument to be without merit. First, it seems that Tocco did not object to most of this evidence at the time it was admitted. Rather, counsel for Anthony Tocco objected to the possible prejudice of surveillance evidence that Tocco went to Peter Bellanca’s law offices. He feared that such evidence would prejudice his client, Anthony Tocco. The district court rejected that argument because the evidence tended to show Tocco’s association with an illegal casino matter. It was not offered for any improper purpose. Assuming that Anthony’s objection preserves the issue for Tocco in this appeal, we find that the evidence of Tocco’s visit to Bellanca’s law office — or evidence that Tocco sought out or consulted the advice of an attorney generally — simply does not invade the attoimey-client relationship, nor does such evidence impinge on the exercise of Tocco’s constitutional right to consult with an attorney. The mere act of hiring an attorney is simply not probative of Toceo’s guilt or innocence under these circumstances. (4) Admitting evidence of an unrelated murder Tocco argues that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the government introduced evidence that the cousin of the bookmaker Yatooma was murdered. The government claims that it had offered that evidence to explain when and why Yatooma’s bookmaking business suddenly increased sharply. Yatooma testified that his cousin’s bookmaking customers started dealing with him after his cousin died. Tocco did not object to that evidence. When asked in cross-examination whether the defendants were involved in the murder, Yatooma responded, “Oh, no, sir, no.” Though the court gave an instruction for the jury to disregard such testimony, Tocco now claims that the prejudice from that evidence was too prejudicial for a curative instruction to mitigate. We disagree. The prosecution did not imply that the murder was related to defendant Tocco, and the evidence did not by its own nature imply such a conclusion. The witness specifically denied that Tocco or any other defendant was involved, and the district court issued a curative instruction on the matter. Under these circumstances, we find no basis for concluding that there was prosecutorial misconduct. (5) Arguing facts not in evidence Tocco argues that the prosecution twice argued facts that were not in evidence during closing argument, in that the prosecuting attorney embellished the testimony of Silverio Vitello. The prosecutor first argued that after Vitello saw Tocco, Vitello’s union problem was taken care of, and second that “Tocco worked that union problem out for [Vitello].” When Tocco objected to the second comment (he did not object to the first), the prosecutor explained that he was arguing his recollection of Vitello’s testimony. Vitello actually testified that when he had problems Tocco referred him to Tony Lapiana, who had previously helped him handle union grievances. We have examined this contention in light of the record and, again, find no justifiable basis for concluding that this episode amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. At most, as the district court apparently concluded, the prosecutor argued a mistaken recollection of the facts and the jury was reminded that it was the determiner of the true facts from the evidence. Under the circumstances, Tocco is not entitled a new trial based on this assignment of error. (6) Shuffling of documents in Exhibit 116 Tocco argues that the prosecutor added pages to Exhibit 116, a Nevada Gaming Commission record, after the exhibit had been entered into evidence. Tocco alleges that an egregious error was committed when the prosecutor was allowed to refer to the pages that had been added during his closing argument. He claimed that the prosecutor impermissibly “shuffled” the exhibit to include the investigative summaries that were not a part of the exhibit when it was admitted. From our review of the record, it is apparent that the reference to the pertinent pages of Exhibit 116 did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Tocco has failed to show that the portions to which the prosecutor referred were not included in the exhibit during trial, and that reference to those portions prejudiced him in any way. The district court was in the best position to assay the merits of the parties’ arguments and to determine exactly what was included in Exhibit 116 according to the redaction agreement of the parties. From this record, we are not persuaded that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct with respect to its reference to Exhibit 116. (7) FBI escort of cooperating witness to witness stand/testifying about witness’s fears At trial, FBI agents escorted the first government witness, Angelo Polizzi, into the courtroom and all the way to the witness chair, which Tocco claims indicated to the jury that government witnesses were in danger from the defendants. Tocco objected, and the district court directed that there be no more escorting of witnesses to the stand. Tocco argues that the district court committed reversible error in failing to grant him a mistrial because of the FBI escort of Polizzi. The agents that escorted Polizzi were in plain clothes and without weapons. There were no prosecutorial comments relating to the escort and the need for witness protection. Though witness endangerment could have possibly been inferred, the district court resolved the issue by disallowing such escorts for the other witnesses. We find no error, much less any “egregious” error, in the action taken by the district court and denial of the motion for mistrial based upon this alleged misconduct. In sum, we find that none of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, alone or collectively, justify a new trial in this case. F. Insufficiency of the Evidence We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, considering “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807-08 (6th Cir.1996). A defendant making such a challenge bears a very heavy burden. United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 560, 145 L.Ed.2d 435 (1999). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (citation omitted). The jury may draw any reasonable inferences from direct, as well as circumstantial, proof. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 944 (2d Cir.1993). Once a conspiracy has been proven, only slight evidence is necessary to implicate a defendant as a participant in that conspiracy if the evidence shows the connection beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Braggs, 23 F.3d 1047, 1051 (6th Cir.1994). At the conclusion of the government’s proof, Tocco moved for acquittal “relying on the brief filed by co-defendant [Anthony Tocco].” We have not been furnished in the substantial joint appendix a copy of that motion, so we look to Tocco’s appellate brief for his position with respect to this “heavy burden” of persuasion. In an opinion filed July 30, 1998, the district court simply concluded as to this defendant that “[ajdequate evidence was adduced at trial to support the jury’s verdict on all charges,” and, therefore, denied Tocco’s motion for acquittal and for a new trial. Here, Tocco again argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on all three counts of which he was found guilty. Proof of a charge under § 1962(d) requires proof that the association or enterprise existed and that the named defendants were associated with and agreed to pai'ticipate in the conduct of its affairs, which affect interstate commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity (Count One) or through the collection of an unlawful debt (Count Two). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir.1985). These elements are separate and distinct. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524. Evidence used to show the existence of the enterprise may also support the participation element. Id. The RICO statute defines an enterprise as “including] any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). (1) Counts One and Two — Proof of the Enterprise Tocco first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of an enterprise. The existence of an enterprise is shown “by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associations function as a continuing unit.” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524. “Continuity of structure exists where there is an organizational pattern or system of authority that provides a mechanism for directing the group’s affairs on a continuing, rather than ad hoc, basis.” United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 856 (8th Cir.1987). The government claims that it presented sufficient evidence to show the existence of an enterprise, which was the Detroit organized crime family called La Cosa Nostra. The majority of this proof, the government notes, came through the testimony of Angelo Polizzi and Ruffino, and through the recorded conversations admitted at trial. The testimony showed a highly structured organization with Tocco as the boss. According to the testimony, there were ten to twelve partners, all associated by blood or by marriage, including Michael Polizzi and Anthony Corrado, and several lower-level members, including Paul Corrado and Nove Tocco. Tocco argues that the evidence fails to show an ascertainable structure distinct from any structure inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity. Tocco’s position, however, ignores the testimony of Angelo Polizzi, who testified as to statements made by his father regarding his involvement in La Cosa Nostra and the expert testimony of Ruffino, who testified about the general structure of La Cosa Nostra and other details involved in organized crime. As the Eighth Circuit has recognized, “the command system of a Mafia family is an example of th[e] type of structure” that is distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.1982)). Thus, the government submitted sufficient evidence to show that an enterprise existed. (2) Count One — Pattern of Racketeering Tocco claims that the evidence did not show a pattern of racketeering. To show a pattern of racketeering activity conspiracy, a defendant need not personally agree to commit two predicate acts; rather, he need only “kn[ow] about and agree[ ] to facilitate the scheme.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997). Further, a defendant need not know about every member and component of the enterprise; he need only know “the general nature of the enterprise and that the enterprise extends beyond his role.” United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 577 n. 29 (3d Cir. 1991). Tocco argues that the government failed in its burden of showing a pattern of racketeering with respect to himself because the evidence showed no more than a series of unrelated acts by people not acting in concert with each other, although many knew each other. Tocco argues that he had no knowledge of many of the acts committed by the others in the purported conspiracy. The testimony at trial belies Tocco’s assertions. Angelo Polizzi, if believed, provided evidence to show the criminal enterprise in operation, with Tocco as a “boss” thereof. The tapes of Corrado and Nove Tocco, if believed, supported allegations of family connections and relationships, and a pattern of criminal activity. In Salinas, supra, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is no requirement of some overt act or specific act in the [RICO] statute before us.... [Section 1962] is even more comprehensive than the general conspiracy offense in § 371.” Id. at 63, 118 S.Ct. 469. “[S]o long as the purpose of the agreement is to facilitate commission of a crime, the actor need not agree ‘to commit’ the crime.” Id. at 65, 118 S.Ct. 469 (quoting the American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 10, p. 117 (I960)). We believe that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that defendant Tocco agreed to “facilitate ... some of the acts leading to the substantive offense[s]” charged. Id. Indeed, Angelo Polizzi testified that Tocco was the boss of the organization. Even if the proof did not show that all the substantive offenses related to the RICO conspiracy actually occurred, “[i]t is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues, for the conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and so punishable in itself.” Id. The testimony confirmed the general nature of the enterprise, and that Tocco knew that the enterprise extended beyond his role therein. (3) Count Two — Collection of an Unlawful Debt Tocco argues that Count Two is duplicitous of Count One, because Count Two charges another RICO conspiracy which has as its object the collection of an unlawful debt. It is true that Count Two relies on the same enterprise as is involved in Count One, but the crime charged in Count Two is not part of the predicate acts in Count One. These counts are not duplicitous, but they are related. In a collection of an unlawful debt conspiracy, the government need only show an agreement as to one act of collection, whereas a pattern of racketeering activity RICO conspiracy requires an agreement to commit at least two predicate acts. See United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 751 (1st Cir.1994); Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 576. The predicate acts in count one involved Tocco’s part in an illegal gambling business (sports betting and numbers) by bankrolling the operation. The overt acts charged in Count Two were periodic distributions of funds realized from this operation to the charged partners or co-conspirators. Therefore, the separate counts were justified in this case. The unlawful collection involved in Count Two was shown through the testimony of Angelo Polizzi, who explained that the proceeds of his father’s illegal gambling business were pooled by the enterprise and then filtered to the partners in the form of weekly draws and year-end bonuses. The unlawful debt is the gambling proceeds. The government notes that only the partners who received these payments, including Tocco, were charged in Count Two. Under these circumstances, the testimony of Angelo is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the elements of Count Two have been supported by the eviden