Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. These appeals present certified questions arising from two actions, Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P. et al. and Houck v. Capital Asset Research Corp., Ltd. et al., which have been consolidated before the district .court for pretrial purposes. The subject matter of both actions concerns the assignment of delinquent municipal tax and utility claims to defendant National Tax Funding, L.P. (“NTF”). We set forth the relevant factual and procedural background below. I. BACKGROUND For years, the City of Pittsburgh (“City”), the School District of Pittsburgh (“School District”), and the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority (“PWSA”) (collectively, the “government entities”) accumulated a backlog of thousands of claims against homeowners who did not fully pay their property taxes or water or sewer bills. In order to eliminate this backlog, the government entities decided to sell the claims and the liens arising therefrom to NTF, which is in the business of purchasing such delinquent claims from municipalities in several states. App. at 135, 514. In September 1996, the City and the School District entered into a Purchase Agreement whereby existing claims and liens for unpaid taxes and sewer charges were assigned to NTF. App. at 517. The Purchase Agreement also called for the City and the School District to sell NTF subsequent claims for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. ' Under the agreement, the City and the, School District retained the right to service the claims, and accordingly they entered into a Servicing Agreement with Capital Asset Research Corp., Ltd. (“CARC”) pursuant to which CARC was to collect the claims for the benefit of NTF.App. at 859. The Servicing Agreement allowed the City and the School District to retain some measure of control over CARC’s collection activities; for example, the agreement required CARC to make monthly reports to the City and the School District and it required CARC to offer homeowners “payment plans” having particular terms. In April 1997, NTF entered into a similar Purchase Agreement with PWSA involving the assignment of unpaid water claims. App. at 886. Like the agreement with the City and the School District, the PWSA Purchase Agreement called for the assignment of not only existing claims but also future claims. Under the agreement, PWSA retained the right to service the claims, and it entered into a Servicing Agreement with CARC similar to the agreement between CARC and the City and School District. App. at 1099. CARC then set about contacting homeowners in order to collect on the delinquent claims. According to defendants, NTF, through CARC, has endeavored to collect from the homeowners the same interest and penalties on the claims which the government entities collect under applicable local law. See app. at 139, 1141, 1146, 1151, 1196, 1198, 1221-23. Specifically, a City ordinance provides for a twelve percent annual rate of interest on unpaid property taxes, along with a one-half percent per month penalty. App. at 1385. Another ordinance provides for a twelve percent annual rate of interest on claims for unpaid sewer charges assigned by the Allegheny County Sanitary Authority (“ALCOSAN”) to the City, along with a one-time five percent penalty. App. at 1128. In addition, a PWSA resolution calls for interest at the rate of one-half percent per month and penalty at the rate of one percent per month on unpaid water and sewer charges. App. at 1119. At approximately the same time as the 1996 assignment, the City amended the ordinance regarding unpaid property taxes so as to permit interest and penalties to be compounded on a monthly basis. See app. at 444, 471-72, 487, 492-93, 502, 506-07. In response to CARC’s collection efforts, some homeowners entered into payment plans permitting them to pay their debts— together with interest and penalty — over a period of time ranging from six. to twenty-four months. Others paid the claims in full immediately. On April 17, 1998, Gladys Houck and others (the “Houck plaintiffs”) filed suit against NTF, CARC and Capital Asset Holdings GP Inc. (“CAH”), the general partner in NFT and CARC, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The action was removed to the district court on May 14, 1998. App. at 49. The complaint, as amended, asserted claims on behalf of homeowners under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, the Pennsylvania Second Class City Treasurer’s Sale and Tax Collection Act, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTP/CPL”), the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Protection Law (“LIPL”), the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and the Pennsylvania Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Law. App. at 107-20. On May 8, 1998, Tito Pollice and others (the “Pollice plaintiffs”) filed an action on behalf of property owners against NTF and CARC in the district court asserting claims under the FDCPA and the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), along with claims for unjust enrichment and fraud. App. at 79-96. The central allegation in both cases, as relevant to these appeals, is that NTF, through CARC, has collected unlawfully high interest and penalties on the assigned claims. We will at times refer to the Houck plaintiffs and the Pollice plaintiffs as “homeowners” or “plaintiffs,” collectively, even though the Pollice class includes property owners who are not homeowners, and we will at times refer to NTF, CARC and CAH as “defendants,” collectively. . On July 20, 1998, the district court consolidated the Pollice and Houck matters for pretrial purposes. Defendants then moved for summary judgment on all claims in both actions, app. at 134-44, while the Houck plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their FDCPA, UTP/ CPL and LIPL claims. The district court ruled on the motions in an opinion and order dated July 29, 1999 and entered, August 2, 1999. See Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 59 F.Supp.2d 474 (W.D.Pa.1999). Relying on the recent decision of the Commonwealth Court in Maierhoffer v. GLS Capital, Inc., 730 A.2d 547 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1999), appeal denied, 749 A.2d 473 (Pa.2000), the district court indicated that the claims and liens in fact could be assigned to NTF under Pennsylvania law. See Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 477 n. 3. The court further indicated that NTF, as assignee of the government entities,- is subject to a statutory provision permitting the collection of interest on municipal tax and utility claims at a rate not to exceed ten percent per year. See Pa. Stat.Ann. tit. 53, § 7143. The court rejected the argument that the City’s status as a home rule municipality conferred the authority to pass ordinances setting higher rates on the claims. See Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 478. The court then addressed the merits of the homeowners’ claims in light of its conclusion that NTF is subject to the ten percent interest cap. The court held that the Houck plaintiffs cannot recover excess interest paid under the LIPL because they have not paid interest as consideration for the “loan or use of money.” In this regard, the court construed the term “use of money” in the LIPL to mean an agreement by a creditor to forbear from immediate action to collect a debt. The court indicated that the payment plans offered by defendants constitute such a forbearance, but it nevertheless concluded that those homeowners who entered into plans cannot recover because they have not paid any additional interest or penalties as consideration for this forbearance. See id. at 482-83. The court then turned to the FDCPA claims (raised by both sets of plaintiffs). Defendants argued (1) that the water, sewer and tax obligations do not constitute “debts” under the FDCPA, (2) that NTF, CAH and CARC are not “debt collectors,” (3) that defendants have not violated the substantive provisions of the FDCPA, and (4) that defendants in any event are protected by the FDCPA’s “bona fide error” exclusion. See id. at 484-85. The court dismissed the claims of both sets of plaintiffs as against NTF and CAH and with respect to defendants’ conduct in collecting the tax claims. The court held that NTF and CAH are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA because “they are not in the business of collecting debts and do not in fact collect debts.” Id. at 486. By contrast, the court concluded that CARC is a “debt collector” subject to liability under the statute and that CARC does not fall within a provision exempting government officers or employees. Relying on our decision in Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.1980), the court further held that the water and sewer obligations constitute “debts” for purposes of the FDCPA but that the tax obligations do not. See Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 485. The court then indicated that CARC has acted in violation of the FDCPA by seeking to collect rates of interest and penalties for the water and sewer claims in excess of that authorized by state law. See id. Finally, the court found material questions of fact regarding the “bona fide error” defense, and it denied the Houck plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. See id. at 486-87. With respect to the Pollice plaintiffs’ TILA claim, defendants argued (1) that NTF and CARC are not “creditors” under TILA, (2) that TILA’s public utility exemption is applicable with respect to the water and sewer claims, and (3) that no “consumer credit transactions” within the meaning of TILA ever took place. The court granted summary judgment in favor of CARC and additionally dismissed the claim with respect to defendants’ conduct relating to the tax obligations. The court indicated that NTF acted as a “creditor” under TILA by entering into payment plans with homeowners, but it concluded that CARC is not a “creditor” because “it is merely an agent, rather than the entity to which the debts are payable.” Id. at 488 n. 14. Influenced again by Staub, the court indicated that the payment plans constitute “consumer credit transactions” under TILA, but only with respect to the water and sewer claims and not the tax claims. See id. at 490-91. The court further held that TILA’s public utility exemption is inapplicable. See id. at 489-90. Finally, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the Pollice plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim. In the district court’s view, this claim is “largely dependant on the argument that the original owners of the liens and claims [the government entities] could not assign their right to charge higher interest and penalties to National Tax.” Id. at 491. The court rejected this argument in light of Maierhoffer, and thus it dismissed the unjust enrichment claim. See id. The Pollice and Houck plaintiffs subsequently moved to alter or amend the July 29, 1999 judgment, but the district court denied their motions in orders dated September 20, 1999 and entered September 21, 1999. The district court then modified the July 29 and September 20 orders to certify various questions for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted petitions for permission to appeal. II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court had jurisdiction over both actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “ ‘As the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.’ ” Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct. 619, 623, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996)). We may address “any issue fairly included within the certified order because it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.” Id. (citation omitted). Our standard of review in this appeal involving only questions of law is plenary. Id. III. DISCUSSION A. State Law Issues We are called upon to determine whether the district court erred in its disposition of the LIPL and unjust enrichment claims. Before doing so, we must address two preliminary questions of Pennsylvania law: (1) the assignability of governmental rights relating to tax and utility claims and liens, and (2) the applicability of the ten percent interest provision under Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 53, § 7143. 1. Assignability Homeowners argue that governmental rights relating to tax and utility claims and liens may not be assigned to private entities under Pennsylvania law. As the district court correctly noted, however, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recently held that municipal claims and the liens arising therefrom are assignable to private entities under a provision of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Law, Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 53, § 7147. See Maierhoffer, 730 A.2d at 549-51 (“[Ujnder [section 7147], a municipality may assign any claim, tax or municipal, to a party that is a stranger to the original transaction-). Section 7147 provides in pertinent part: Any claim filed or to be filed, under the provisions of this act, and any judgment recovered thereon, may be assigned or transferred to a third party, either absolutely or as collateral security, and such assignee shall have all the rights of the original holder thereof. Homeowners argue that Maierhojfer is contrary to prior decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and therefore we should not follow it. In addition, they request that we certify this issue to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, denied a petition for allowance of appeal in Maierhojfer on January 20, 2000. See 561 Pa. 680, 749 A.2d 473 (2000). Accordingly, we believe that the Supreme Court would not accept certification of this issue and thus we will not certify the question and delay these proceedings. We have reviewed Maier-hojfer carefully and have concluded that it was decided correctly. Thus, we follow Maierhojfer in concluding that the government entities had the power to assign their rights relating to the tax, water and sewer claims and liens to NTF, and that NTF as assignee thereby stands in the shoes of the government entities with respect to these claims and liens. Therefore, NTF is enti-tied to collect interest and penalties on the assigned claims to the same extent as the government entities are entitled under relevant state and local law. 2. Applicability of ten percent interest provision Homeowners contend that the combined interest and penalty charges imposed by NTF on the assigned claims are unlawful under the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Law. Section 7143 which is a provision of that law reads in pertinent part: Interest as determined by the municipality at a rate not to exceed ten per cent per annum shall be collectible on all municipal claims from the date of the completion of the work after it is filed as a lien, and on claims for taxes, water rents or rates, lighting rates, or sewer rates from the date of the filing of the lien therefor. Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 53, § 7143 (emphasis added). Like the district court, we conclude that NTF, as assignee of claims belonging to the government entities, is subject to section 7143. The plain language of section 7143 permits the collection of interest on a municipality’s claim for taxes, water rents or rates, or sewer rates, but the rate is limited to ten percent per annum. The term “municipality” includes not only cities, but also school districts and municipal authorities. See Pa.Stat.Anm.tit. 53, § 7101. Thus, NTF, as assignee of the City, the School District, and the PWSA, is entitled to collect interest on the assigned claims up to this ten percent cap. See Horbal v. Moxham Nat’l Bank, 548 Pa. 394, 697 A.2d 577, 583 (1997) (“Under the law of assignment, the assignee succeeds to no greater rights than those possessed by the assignor.”). There can be no dispute that NTF has exceeded the cap. Defendants argue that the City, as a home rule municipality, acted within its power in passing the ordinances setting the interest and penalty rates at issue here. Yet, it is clear that under the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law (the “Home Rule Law”) a home rule municipality may not act in contravention of state laws applicable to municipalities. Under the Home Rule Law, “[a] municipality which has adopted a home rule charter may exercise any powers and perform any function not denied by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by its home rule charter .” 53 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 2961. Further, the Home Rule Law provides that, “[wjith respect to the following subjects, the home rule charter shall not give any power or authority to the municipality contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by statutes which are applicable to a class or classes of municipalities”; among the listed subjects is “[t]he filing and collection of municipal tax claims or liens and the sale of real or personal property in satisfaction of them.” 53 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 2962(a)(1). Clearly, the assessment of interest and penalties on delinquent tax obligations falls within the scope of “collection of municipal tax claims.” Another provision of the Home Rule Law states that “[a] municipality shall not ... [e]xer-cise powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2962(c)(2). Based on the clear language of the Home Rule Law, we conclude that a home rule municipality may not exceed the ten percent interest limit set forth in section 7143. Defendants argue that the interest and penalty rates set by the City with respect to the tax claims are lawful under the following provision of the Home Rule Law: Establishment of rates of taxation. — No provision of this subpart or any other statute shall limit a municipality which adopts a home rule charter from establishing its own rates of taxation'upon all authorized subjects of taxation .... 53 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 2962(f). Defendants contend that “rate of taxation” includes the rate of interest and penalties on delinquent tax obligations. Plaintiffs respond that “establishing the rate of taxation is not the same as assessing a rate of interest on an already delinquent tax.” See reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3856 and 99-3857 at 15. Like the district court, we agree with plaintiffs that a home rule municipality’s authority to set “rates of taxation” does not include the authority to set interest and penalty rates on delinquent taxes, “Rate of taxation” undoubtedly means the rate which is applied to the value of property in order to determine the amount of the tax owed; its plain meaning does not include the rate of interest or penalty on overdue tax obligations. The rate of interest on tax obligations is directly -governed by Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 53, § 7143, which expressly limits “[ijnterest” on “claims for taxes.” Finally, defendants argue that the interest and penalty rates on water- and. sewer claims set by the PWSA resolution do not violate section 7143 because the annual rate of “interest” under the resolution is less than ten percent. As stated, under the resolution, the “interest” charge is one-half percent per month while the “penalty” charge is one percent per month. App. at 1119. Defendants argue that section 7143 by its terms limits only the rate of “interest” and not the rate of “penalty.” The district court rejected defendants’ argument, finding that “this distinction [between interest and penalty] rings hollow when applied to the instant set of facts.” Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 479. The court stated that no municipality “may evade the requirements of the Municipal Claims Act [section 7143] by converting interest in excess of that which is statutorily authorized to a ‘penalty.’” Id. We agree with the district court’s reasoning. There appears to be no actual distinction between the monthly “interest” charge and the monthly “penalty” charge under the PWSA resolution; indeed, there would be no practical difference if the one percent “penalty” rate were labeled an “interest” rate and the one-half percent “interest” rate were labeled a “penalty” rate. In attempting to draw a valid distinction between “interest” and “penalty,” defendants argue that the former “compensates the government for the lost time-value” of unpaid obligations, while the latter “does not necessarily compensate the government for the lost value of money, and generally imposes an added cost on the delinquent party as punishment for noncompliance with the law.” Br. of appellees in No. 99-3998 at 40-41. We, however, find this distinction to be artificial and thus we agree with the district court that a municipality should not be permitted to avoid the ten percent limit by arbitrarily labeling some portion of the monthly charge as “penalty” rather than “interest.” In sum, we conclude that NTF, as as-signee of the government entities, is subject to section 7143 and that it has violated that provision by imposing interest charges on the assigned claims in excess of ten percent per annum. 3. The LIPL claim Homeowners seek relief under the Loan Interest Protection Law (“LIPL”), Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 41, § 101 et seq. Under that law, “the maximum lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of money in an amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or less in all cases where no express contract shall have been made for a less rate shall be six per cent per annum.” Pa.Stat. Ann.tit. 41, § 201. The law further provides that “[i]f any maximum lawful rate of interest provided for in this act is inconsistent with the provision of any other act establishing, permitting or removing a maximum interest rate ... then the provision of such other act shall prevail.” Pa. Stat.Ann.tit. 41, § 604. The LIPL provides a cause of action to recover usurious interest: A person who has paid a rate of interest for the loan or use of money at a rate in excess of that provided for by this act or otherwise by law or has paid charges prohibited or in excess of those allowed by this act or otherwise by law may recover triple the amount of such excess interest or charges in a suit at law against the person who has collected such excess interest or charges .... Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 41, § 502 (emphasis added). Homeowners argue that they have “paid [to NTF] a rate of interest for the loan or use of money ... in excess of that provided for ... otherwise by law” because the interest and penalty rates exceeded the ten percent limit of Pa.Stat. Ann.tit. 53, § 7143. Alternatively, homeowners argue that they have “paid charges prohibited or in excess of those allowed ... otherwise by law.” As set forth in the preceding section, we agree with plaintiffs’ contention that NTF has charged interest and penalties at a rate in excess of the ten percent permitted by section 7143. The district court nevertheless held that homeowners cannot recover under the LIPL because they have not paid the interest and penalties as consideration “for the loan or use of money.” In this regard, the district court recognized a distinction between, on the one hand, charges imposed on account of a debtor’s failure to make timely payment of money when due (“detention”); and on the other, money received ■ by a creditor as consideration for agreeing to refrain from immediately collecting a debt (“forbearance”). Relying largely on cases construing usury statutes from other jurisdictions, the district court indicated that only in the latter situation has there been .a “use of money” under the LIPL. The court then indicated that no forbearance occurred here until NTF, through CARC, entered' into payment plans with some of the homeowners. See Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 482 (“[T]he terms provided in the payment plans should be read as constituting a forbearance under the Pennsylvania usury law. A forbearance is widely considered a ‘use of money’ for the purposes of usury law.”). The district court further concluded, however, that even those homeowners who have entered into payment plans cannot recover under the LIPL. The court reasoned as follows: [W]e believe that an interest rate beyond that-allowed bylaw can only be considered usurious if it exists as consideration for the creditor’s forbearance. While it has been established that the interest rate charged by defendants is beyond that allowed under Pennsylvania law, and that defendants, through the payment plans, are forbearing on collecting the money owed, it has not been shown that the rate being charged is in any way consideration for this forbearance. Thé facts presented illustrate that defendants have received no additional consideration in return for the terms offered under the payment plans. The interest rate charged for late payment is not consideration for the payment plans, but a part of the consideration for the original transaction. Further, defendants are not charging plaintiffs a rate for participating in the plans which is higher than plaintiffs would be charged if they did not participate. This is therefore not the typical forbearance situation, in which the debt- or could not pay his or her obligation upon its due date and the creditor agreed to extend the period of repayment of the debt for additional consideration. . Thus, the facts of this case preclude us from finding that defendants, by offering the payment plans and thus forbearing on the immediate collection of the debt owed, modified the original transaction so as to bring it within the ambit of the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Protection Law. Id. at 483 (citations omitted). Pennsylvania courts have not specifically addressed whether there has been a “loan or use of money” under the LIPL in the detention context. Several cases from other jurisdictions indicate that usury laws apply ohly when a creditor agrees to take interest in exchange for making a loan or promising to forbear from the immediate collection of a debt; there is no usury when a creditor simply charges a debtor for failure to make timely payment of a debt when due. For example, in Smith Machinery Co. v. Jenkins, 654 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.1981), the court considered a promissory note which called for interest at the rate of twelve percent to accrue after maturity. Id. at 694. Reasoning as follows, the court held that the New Mexico usury statute was inapplicable to such postmaturity charges: In the absence of language in the usury statutes that compels a different conclusion, the courts have generally held the limitations on interest rates charged do not apply to postmaturity charges. The rationale is that because postmaturity charges are within the debtor’s control they are penalties for nonpayment rather than charges for the use of money and, therefore, they are not affected by usury laws. Such charges may be deemed usurious, however, when state laws limit interest rates which can be applied on the “detention” as well as the use of money. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 56-8-9 A (1978) indicates the scope of coverage of the usury limits of the New Mexico provisions cited above. [The statute provides:] “(N)o person, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, shall take, reserve, receive or charge any interest, discount or other advantage for the loan of money or credit or the forbearance or postponement of the right to receive money or credit except at the rates permitted in Sections 56-8-1 through 56-8-21 NMSA 1978.” All the terms of the statute denote consensual agreements between the parties, indicating that a withholding or detention by the borrower not consented to by the lender is not within the statute’s purview. The mere fact that the parties have agreed to the rate to be paid after the debt is due does not make an arrangement a forbearance. In the instant case there was no agreement that [the debtor] could defer payment after maturity; the situation was a “detention” of money rather than a “forbearance” and, as such, we do not think the New Mexico courts would hold it is covered by the statute. Id. at 696 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Scientific Prods. v. Cyto Med. Lab., Inc., 457 F.Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.Conn.1978) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that charges at a rate in excess of that prohibited at the inception of a loan are usurious when imposed only on the unpaid balance after the loan has matured .... Here there was no agreement that the [debtor] could defer payment. Many cases have held that since charges of this nature are within the borrower’s control, they are penalties for non-payment, rather than charges for the use of money, and, therefore, not affected by the usury laws.”); Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 104 Idaho 284, 658 P.2d 955, 960 (1983) (“[The creditor] was imposing a late charge on accounts in arrears .... [W]e agree that the usury laws are inapplicable to this type of transaction. The charge was a valid late charge which could have been avoided if [the debtor] had paid its account when due. There was neither an express or an implied agreement to forbear or extend the time for payment.”); Widmark v. Northrup King Co., 530 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn.Ct.App.1995) (“[W]e conclude that the ‘late charges’ assessed by [the creditor] did not constitute a usurious rate of interest. [The creditor] never actually agreed to forego an immediate action on[the debtor’s] account if it became overdue in exchange for a late charge. Unlike typical credit arrangements, [the creditor] did not encourage late payments in order to recover the additional charge .... Consequently, we hold that there was no forbearance here within the meaning of the usury laws.”); see also 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 122 (1982) (“[Usury statutes] apply only to those contracts which in substance involve a loan of money or forbearance to collect money due, and so, where there is no loan or forbearance, there can be no usury .... A charge imposed because of the late payment of a debt comes within the definition of interest under a usury statute only where it is paid as consideration for the creditor’s forbearance of asserting his right of collection.”). Of course, cases from other jurisdictions are not controlling with respect to the meaning of a Pennsylvania statute. Nevertheless, in the absence of Pennsylvania case law directly on point, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow the approach taken by these other courts. The phrase “paid a rate of interest for the loan or use of money” under section 502 of the LIPL implies that there is some consensual arrangement between the parties; that is, an agreement by the lender or creditor to make a loan, or to grant the debtor the “use” of money by promising to forbear from taking immediate action to collect a debt, in exchange for interest. We believe there has been no “loan or use of money” under section 502 when a debtor simply detains money which the creditor wishes to receive immediately. In re Kenin’s Trust Estate, 343 Pa. 549, 23 A.2d 837 (1942), supports our conclusion. In that case, a trustee failed to make proper delivery of trust proceeds. The Supreme Court addressed the question whether “damages for the [trustee’s] detention of funds” should be measured by the legal rate of interest set forth in the Act of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622, a predecessor to the current LIPL. Id. at 844. As paraphrased by the court, P.L. 622 “fix[ed] at 6% the lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of money, in all cases where no express contract shall have been made for a less rate.” Id. at 844 n. 4. The court indicated that the statute was inapplicable, and instead held that damages should be measured by “what the money so detained would have produced if it had been delivered to those entitled to it.” See id. at 844-45. The court commented as follows: The Act of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622 ... does not rule the question of “damages for detention”. The word “use” when referring to money is often employed as a synonym for “loan”. Money is not “used” within the meaning of this act when it is detained under the circumstances here present. Id. at 844 n. 4 (emphasis added). Homeowners present a somewhat complex argument in an attempt to demonstrate that Kenin is not controlling here. They point out that Pennsylvania law draws a distinction between (1) “interest as such or interest eo nomine,” which is recoverable “when a fixed sum is due from a date certain,” and (2) “damages for detention or delay,” which are recoverable “when the amount or onset of the obligation is not certain.” Reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 8; see American Enka Co. v. Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (3d Cir.1982); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 292-95 (3d Cir.1981); Frank B. Bozzo, Inc. v. Electric Weld Div. of Fort Pitt Div. of Spang Indus., Inc., 345 Pa.Super. 423, 498 A.2d 895, 898-901 (1985); 20 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia Interest and Usury §§ 4, 6-8 (1990). In the former situation — where there has been a failure to pay a fixed or liquidated sum due on a certain date — the party to whom the sum is owed may as a matter of right recover prejudgment interest at the legal rate of six percent running from the date the sum is due. See American Enka, 686 F.2d at 1056-57; Peterson, 661 F.2d at 293; Miller v. City of Reading, 369 Pa. 471, 87 A.2d 223, 225 (1952) (“[I]t is the law of Pennsylvania that a debtor who defaults in the payment of the principal of an obligation when due and payable becomes liable for interest from the date of such default at the legal rate of 6% per annum until payment is made, irrespective of the rate prescribed in the obligation itself for the period prior to maturity .... [I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a liquidated claim carries interest at the legal rate from the time the debt becomes due.”); Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa.Super. 14, 473 A.2d 584, 594-95 (1984) (“In claims that arise out of a contractual right, interest has been allowed at the legal rate from the date that payment was wrongfully withheld, where the damages are liquidated and certain, and the interest is readily ascertainable through computation.”); see also Pa.Stat.Ann.tit. 41, § 202 (setting the “legal rate of interest” at six percent per annum). In the latter, situation — where the breach involves something other than an obligation to pay a liquidated sum on a certain date — recovery of delay damages “will not be a matter of right, ... [but] will be an issue for the finder of fact, the resolution of which depends upon all the circumstances of the case.” Frank B. Bozzo, 498 A.2d at 900 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). According to the homeowners, there has been a “use of money” under the LIPL when money is detained in the former situation; that is, prejudgment interest is due for the debtor’s “use of the liquidated amount due the creditors from the date due.” Reply br. of appellants/cross-appel-lees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 8. Homeowners contend that this case falls into the former category, i.e., interest as such, because it involves their failure to pay liquidated sums for tax, water and sewer obligations which were due on a certain date; they further contend that interest is recoverable but only at the legal rate of six percent per annum unless otherwise permitted by law. They argue that Kenin falls under the latter category, i.e., damages for detention or delay, and therefore is not applicable here. Despite the homeowners’ argument, we adhere to our belief that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that there has been no “loan or use of money” within the meaning of Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 41, § 502 in the absence of a loan or an agreement by the creditor to forbear. Plaintiffs’ argument revolves around the concepts of prejudgment interest and damages for delay, both of which are awarded by a court to compensate a prevailing party for the lost time-value of money running from the date of the opposing party’s breach of contract or breach of duty. See American Enka, 686 F.2d at 1056 (“Common law pre-judgment interest is based on the principle of compensation and the understanding that a plaintiff wrongfully deprived of a sum of money is not made whole unless the delay in recovery is accounted for.”). We are not concerned here, however, with the proper amount of prejudgment interest which defendants might be awarded by a court. Rather, we are called upon to address whether homeowners may employ section 502 to recover interest and penalties already paid to NTF. We believe they cannot in the absence of a loan or a forbearance. Further, we note that case law indicates that a creditor may collect interest at a rate higher than six percent In situations involving the failure to pay a liquidated sum, if the parties have agreed to such higher rate. See Miller, 87 A.2d at 225-26; Daset Mining, 473 A.2d at 595. If such agreements are permitted, then it is apparent that there has been no “use of money” within the meaning of sections 201 and 502 of the LIPL-otherwise, such agreements would be usurious. We further agree with the district court’s conclusion that the payment plans constitute a forbearance giving rise to the “use of money” for purposes of the LIPL. See 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 131 (1982) (“The forbearance, or giving time for the payment, of a debt is, in substance, a loan, and when there is an existing and matured debt, a charge made by the creditor for his binding promise to forbear for a definite period to collect it, greater than that allowed by law, will subject the debt forborne to all the penalties prescribed by the law for usury.”). A letter from CARC to the Pollices stated as follows with regard to the payment plans: The full amount of the [assigned] Claims is due immediately. Please make your check payable to National City Bank of Pennsylvania as custodian for NTF.... In the event you are currently unable to satisfy this obligation in full, you may pay the Claims over a longer period of time in accordance with the installment purchase payment plan (the “Payment Program”).... The longer you wait to pay the Claims, the more you accumulate in additional interest, penalties, filing fees and costs (including attorney’s fees). Interest and penalties are added to the total amount of the Claims at a rate, not to exceed, 1.5% per month (compounded monthly). There are two different payment plans, 1) Water[and] 2) City, School and Sewer. Under the Payment Program(s), you may choose to pay the Claims over time in monthly installments.... Payments will be calculated to ensure that the full amount of the Claims, plus all interest, penalties and costs, will be paid in full with the last payment you agree to make.... ... If you successfully complete the Payment Program, and the total amount of Claims, plus all acquired[sie] interest, penalties and costs are paid in full, the liens securing Claims against the Property will be removed and marked satisfied. If you default under the Payment Program, the money you have previously paid will not be returned, but will instead be applied against the Claims.... App. at 97. A payment plan enrollment form included with the letter provided as follows: I understand that if I do default in the payment of installments as provided above ... all payments that I have made under the Payment Program will be applied pro rata to the principal, interest and penalty due on the claims and thereafter NTF or agents may take legal action against me or the Property to satisfy the outstanding amounts owed on the Claims.... App. at 98. Thus, by virtue of the payment plans, NTF has agreed to forbear from taking immediate action to collect on the assigned claims. The district court concluded, however, that “an interest rate beyond that allowed by law can only be considered usurious if it exists as consideration for the creditor’s forbearance.” Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 488 (emphasis added). The court stated that “it has not been shown that the rate being charged is in any way consideration for this forbearance” because “defendants are not charging plaintiffs a rate for participating in the plans which is higher than plaintiffs would be charged if they did not participate.” Id. We agree with the district court. “ ‘Usury’ has been variously defined as contracting for or reserving something in excess of the amount allowed by law for the forbearance of money, the exaction of more than lawful interest in exchange for the loan or use of money, directly or indirectly, and as an excessive charge for the loan or forbearance of money.” 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 4 (1982). Thus, “[i]n general, the elements of usury consist of an unlawful intent, money or its equivalent, a loan or forbearance, an understanding that the loan shall or may be returned, and the exaction for the use of the loan of something in excess of what is allowed by law.” Id. § 119. Here, no price in the form of heightened interest or penalties has been extracted or charged in exchange for the right to enter into a payment plan — rather, it appears undisputed that those homeowners who have entered into payment plans have been charged the same interest and penalty rates as those who did not enter into a plan. See br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 9, 28-30; substituted br. of appellants/eross-appel-lees in No. 99-4049 at 7. Thus, NTF simply has continued to collect what it would have sought to collect had the homeowners not entered into payment plans. “The prime purpose of [usury] statutes is the protection of weak and needy borrowers from extortion and outrageous demands of unscrupulous lenders who are ready to take undue advantage of the necessities of others.... ” 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 88 (1982). Here, NTF has made no “outrageous demands” for additional interest or penalties in exchange for agreeing to forbear. Accordingly, the purposes of the usury law are not implicated. Homeowners contend that NTF has received consideration that is non-monetary in form; specifically, they assert that the payment plans require homeowners to agree to be personally liable for the delinquent obligations and to be liable for attorneys’ fees. Homeowners argue that usurious “interest” can “take many forms other than money.” Substituted br. of appellants/cross-appellees in No. 99-4049 at 33. They argue that “collateral consideration for a forbearance, in addition to the interest rate itself, should be taken into account” and that “requiring a personal obligation as a consideration for a loan, may be sufficient additional consideration when added to interest, to exceed the maximum allowable rate.” Substitute reply br. of appellants in No. 99-4049 at 24. We do not question the proposition that non-monetary as well as monetary consideration may be taken into account in determining if a creditor has extracted an unlawful amount of value in return for a loan or a forbearance. See 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 154 (1982) (“Usury may be paid and received in property as well as in money. In order to determine whether the interest received by a lender, in the form of property, is usurious, the medium of payment is reduced to its equivalent in dollars ... and if the value of the medium when so ascertained is more than the lawful rate on the debt or obligation on which the interest is paid, it amounts to the collection of usury.”); see also Hartranft v. Uhlinger, 115 Pa. 270, 8 A. 244, 246 (1887) (“It is, indeed, wholly immaterial under what form or pretense usury is concealed, if it can by any means be discovered, our courts will refuse to enforce its payment.”); Smith v. Smith, 45 Pa.Super. 353 (1911) (indicating that usury law was applicable where “the defendant [borrower], in consideration of the loan, ' agreed to give to the plaintiff [lender] something more than the interest fixed by law as the compensation due to the plaintiff, to wit, four atlases.”). We believe, however, that the usury analysis should take into account only those items (be they monetary or non-monetary in form) which actually are paid as consideration for the loan or forbearance. We have concluded that the interest and penalties paid by those who entered into payment plans have not been paid as consideration for NTF’s forbearance; thus, the interest and penalties should not be considered in the usury analysis, regardless of the fact that other things of value (such as personal liability or liability for attorneys’ fees) may have been given as consideration. Therefore, we reject the position that Judge Oberdorfer takes in his partial dissent. In sum, we conclude that homeowners (including those who entered into payment plans) have not “paid a rate of interest for the loan or use of money” under Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 41, § 502 when paying the interest and penalties at issue. Homeowners argue that they are nevertheless entitled to recover under section 502 because they have “paid charges prohibited or in excess of those allowed ... otherwise by law.” We reject this argument. The term “charges” in section 502 must refer to something other than “interest,” as the word “interest” is listed in section 502 separately from the word “charges.” See section 502 (“A person who has paid a rate of interest for the loan or use of money ... or has paid charges ... may recover triple the amount of such excess interest or charges.... ”). Homeowners have paid “interest,” but such interest has not been paid “for the loan or use of money.” See br. of appellees in No. 99-4049 at 38-39. If we were to read “charges” to include interest that is not paid “for the loan or use of money,” then the “loan or use of money” language in section 502 would be superfluous. We thus conclude that homeowners are without a remedy under the LIPL, and we will affirm the dismissal of the Houck plaintiffs’ LIPL claim. 4. Unjust enrichment The district court viewed the Pollice plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim as “largely dependant on the argument that the original owners of the liens and claims[the government entities] could not assign their right to charge higher interest and penalties to National Tax.” Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 491. In light of the Maier-hoffer ruling on assignability, the court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim. While the district court viewed this claim as limited to what may be termed a “non-assignability” theory, the Pollice plaintiffs’ complaint appears broad enough to encompass a claim based on an “illegal rate” theory — i.e. that the defendants have been unjustly enriched by virtue of their collection of interest and penalties beyond that allowed by Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 53, § 7143. See app. at 93. The district court did not address such a theory. Under the circumstances, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor and allow further proceedings with respect to the unjust enrichment claim. The district court should consider whether the Pollice plaintiffs have waived the illegal rate theory by choosing to proceed on a non-assign-ability theory. The district court also may consider any other defenses to an unjust enrichment claim which have been properly preserved by defendants. B. FDCPA Issues 1. Whether the water, sewer and tax obligations constitute “debts” The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., provides a remedy for consumers who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors. See Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir.1987). “A threshold requirement for application of the FDCPA is that the prohibited practices are used in an attempt to collect a ‘debt.’” Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e-f. The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).- Like the district court, we conclude that homeowners’ water and sewer obligations meet the definition of “debt”; indeed, these obligations constituted “debts” from the time they initially were owed to the government entities, and they retained that status after their assignment to NTF. At the time these obligations first arose, homeowners (“consumers” of water and sewer services) had an “obligation ... to pay money” to the government entities which arose out of a “transaction” (requesting water and sewer service) the subject of which was “services ... primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Defendants, relying on a statement in our Zimmerman decision, argue that the water, sewer and tax claims are not “debts” because there was no “offer or extension of credit” to homeowners. See Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168 (“We find that the type of transaction which may give rise to a ‘debt’ as defined in the FDCPA, is the same type of transaction as is dealt with in all other subchapters of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, i.e., one involving the offer or extension of credit to a consumer”) (emphasis added). As the district court noted, see Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 484 n. 9, this statement from Zimmerman has been widely disavowed by several other courts of appeals, which have taken the broader view that the FDCPA applies to all obligations to pay money which arise out of consensual consumer transactions, regardless of whether credit has been offered or extended. See, e.g., Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 114 n. 4 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that several circuits have “disavowed” the “dicta” in Zimmerman that the FDCPA applies only to transactions involving the “offer or extension of credit”); Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 n. 1 (11th Cir.1997) (rejecting Zimmerman “[t]o the extent that it read an extension of credit requirement into the definition of debt”); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, 111 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (7th Cir.1997) (rejecting Zimmerman and indicating that “[a]s long as the transaction creates an obligation to pay, a debt is created”); see also Wayne Hill, Annotation, What Constitutes “Debt” for Purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 121, 131, 2000 WL 150759 (2000) (“The term ‘debt’ as used in the [FDCPA] has been construed broadly to include any obligation to pay arising out of a consumer transaction.”). We are not bound by the “disavowed” statement in Zimmerman, as it was dictum. In our view, the plain meaning of section 1692a(5) indicates that a “debt” is created whenever a consumer is obligated to pay money as a result of a transaction whose subject is primarily for personal, family or household purposes. No “offer or extension of credit” is required. Accordingly, homeowners’ original obligations to pay the government entities for water and sewer service constituted “debts,” even though the government entities did not extend homeowners any right to defer payment of their obligations. We further agree with the district court’s conclusion that homeowners’ property tax obligations do not constitute “debts” under the FDCPA. In Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, we specifically held that a per capita tax obligation is not a “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA. Id. at 276-79. We stated that “at a minimum, the statute contemplates that the debt has arisen as a result of the rendition of a service or purchase of property or other item of value. The relationship between taxpayer and taxing authority does not encompass the type of pro tanto exchange which the statutory definition [of ‘debt’] envisages.” Id. at 278; see also Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511, 512 (2d Cir.1998) (following Staub and stating that in the tax situation “[t]here is simply no ‘transaction’ ... of the kind contemplated by the statute”). Staub is controlling here. Simply put, property taxes are not obligations “arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family,' or household purposes.” The Houck plaintiffs contend that the property tax obligations are “debts” because they arise out of the “transaction” in which each property owner acquired his or her property. See reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 47-48. We reject this argument. Unlike a sales tax, for example, which arguably arises from the sale transaction, the property taxes at issue here arose not from the purchase of property but from the fact of ownership. In Beggs, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected an argument similar to that of the Houck plaintiffs regarding a tax on automobiles. See Beggs, 145 F.3d at 512. The court stated that “the tax is not levied upon the purchase or registration of the vehicle per se, but rather upon the ownership of the vehicle by the citizen”; thus, the court held that there was no “transaction” for purposes of the FDCPA. Id. (emphasis added). We agree with this reasoning. In attempting to distinguish Staub, the homeowners argue that the tax obligations changed in character and became “debts” when they were assigned to NTF. We disagree. Although the tax claims were transferred to a private entity, the homeowners’ obligation to pay the claims still did not “aris[e] out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Rather, the obligation to pay arose from the levying of taxes upon the ownership of property. After assignment of the claims to NTF, there still had not been a “transaction” involving the homeowners; their obligation to pay NTF still arose from the levying of taxes. The Houck plaintiffs contend that the creation of the payment plans distinguishes this case from Staub — that is, the payment plans for the tax obligations represent “transactions” giving rise to “debts” covered by the FDCPA. See reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 44-45, 49. While we do not doubt that the payment plans are “transactions,” we do not believe the plans serve to bring defendants within the coverage of the FDCPA with respect to the tax obligations. The FDCPA is aimed at the conduct of debt collectors who are seeking to collect “debts.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (statement of congressional findings and purpose); Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1167. For purposes of the FDCPA, we view the payment plans simply as one aspect of defendants’ course of conduct in attempting to collect the original water, sewer and tax obligations which were owed to the government entities and then assigned to NTF; that is, all of defendants’ debt-collection activity (including the creation of the payment plans and subsequent conduct) has been directed toward the collection of the original obligations, not any obligations which may have arisen from the payment plans. As we have concluded, in their original form, the water and sewer obligations were “debts” under section 1692a(5) but the tax obligations were not. Accordingly, we hold that the FDCPA is inapplicable to all of defendants’ conduct relating to the tax obligations, including conduct occurring after the creation of the payment plans. In sum, we will affirm the dismissal of the FDCPA claims with respect to the tax obligations, and we further will affirm the district court’s determination that the water and sewer obligations constitute “debts” under the FDCPA. 2. Whether NTF and CAH are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA The district court accepted defendants’ argument that NTF and CAH “cannot be considered ‘debt collectors’ because they are not in the business of collecting debts and do not in fact collect debts.” Pollice, 59 F.Supp.2d at 486. The court agreed with defendants’ contention that CARC is “the sole defendant which has contracted with the [government entities] to service and collect the claims owned by [NTF].” Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the FDCPA claims against NTF and CAH. Id. at 491. The Houck plaintiffs argue on appeal that NTF and CAH, along with CARC, are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA. The FDCPA’s provisions generally apply only to “debt collectors.” Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir.2000). Creditors—as opposed to “debt collectors”—generally are not subject to the FDCPA. See Aubert v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 137 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir.1998) (“Creditors who collect in their own name and whose principal business is not debt collection ... are not subject to the Act.... Because creditors are generally presumed to restrain their abusive collection practices out of a desire to protect their corporate goodwill, their debt collection activities are not subject to the Act unless they collect under a name other than their own.”); Staub, 626 F.2d at 277 (“The [FDCPA] does not apply to persons or businesses collecting debts on their own behalf.”); Hon. D. Duff McKee, Liability of Debt Collector to Debtor under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 41 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 159, at § 3 (1997) [hereinafter McKee] (“[interestingly, the term ‘debt collector’ does not include the creditor collecting its own debt.”). The FDCPA contains a detailed definition of “debt collector.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The term means “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” Id. The definition excludes several categories of persons, including officers or employees of government. See id. We conclude that NTF is a “debt collector,” and accordingly the district court should not have dismissed the FDCPA claims against it. Courts have indicated that an assignee of an obligation is not a “debt collector” if the obligation is not in default at the time of the assignment; conversely, an assignee may be deemed a “debt collector” if the obligation is already in default when it is assigned. See Bai ley v. Security Nat’l Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384, 387-88 (7th Cir.1998); Whitaker v. Ameritech Corp., 129 F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir.1997); Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 106-07 (6th Cir.1996); McKee § 3 (“[0]ne who acquires the debt after it is in default is deemed a debt collector, and is subject to the provisions of the Act. Conversely, the assignee of a debt who acquires it before default is considered the owner of the debt and may pursue collection without concern for the limitations of the FDCPA.”). Here, there is no dispute that the various claims assigned to NTF were in default prior to their assignment to NTF. Further, there is no question that the “principal purpose” of NTF’s business is the “collection of any debts,” namely, defaulted obligations which it purchases from municipalities. As mentioned, the district court was influenced by the fact that only CARC contracted to undertake debt-collection activity in connection with the assigned claims. We believe, however, that NTF may be held vicariously liable for CARC’s collection activity. Although there is relatively little case law on the subject of vicarious liability under the FDCPA, there are cases supporting the notion that an entity which itself meets the definition of “debt collector” may be held vicariously liable for unlawful collection activities carried out by another on its behalf. In Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir.1994), the court indicated