Full opinion text
DOWD, District Judge: I. Introduction This appeal follows the conviction of the six appellants, Gloria Diaz (“Diaz”), Jose Bias Lopez (“Lopez”), Sergio Echevarria (“Echevarria”), Eladio Munoz (“Munoz”), Orestes Hernandez (“Orestes Hernandez”) and Ismael Camacho (“Camacho”) in a single jury trial that focused on three separate terrifying kidnapping and extortion episodes in the Miami area spread over a seventeen month period. The ensuing sentences ranged from a low of 188 months for Lopez to a high of 1145 months for Camacho. The trial was based on the fourth superseding indictment. The eleven counts included the crime of conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act violation, a series of substantive Hobbs Act violations, a series of carjackings in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and a series of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violations (hereinafter § 924(c)). The pivotal event from a prosecutorial standpoint was the arrest of Ilvigio Hernandez (“Ilvigio”) on January 12, 1996 following the failed attempt by Echevarria, Munoz, Orestes Hernandez and Camacho to extort money from the family of Jose and Idania Arias by the method of kidnapping. Ilvigio was an active additional participant in the Arias kidnapping and was to become the primary witness for the government in its successful prosecution. As the law enforcement effort continued after the Arias kidnapping, the authorities learned of an earlier, unreported kidnapping of Nelson and Mercedes Martin on June 26,1995. The investigation of the Arias kidnapping eventually led to the arrest of Eche-varria and Munoz. The remaining active members of the kidnapping gang — Orestes Hernandez and Camacho — then joined with two other persons, Vlademir Negrin (“Negrin”) and Carlos Escandell (“Escan-dell”), and engaged in a similar episode involving Rosa and Armando Gonzalez in November of 1996. After many months, arrestee Ilvigio broke his silence and became the government’s primary witness as to the January 1996 Arias crime. His cooperation included the disclosure that the remaining two appellants, Diaz and her husband Lopez, had served as “tipsters” in identifying targets for robbery and extortion plots. The testimony of Ilvigio, bolstered by the vivid descriptions of the victims Idania Arias, Jose Arias, Joseph Arias, Nelson Martin, Mercedes Gomez Martin, and Armando Gonzalez, and aided by cellular telephone records, served to corroborate the identifications and testimony of Ilvigio as to the Arias and Martin crimes. All six appellants — the alleged “tipsters” Diaz and Lopez and the remaining four, Echevarria, Munoz, Orestes Hernandez, and Camacho — were tried jointly and convicted of a series of charges, which featured Hobbs Act violations. II. The Kidnapping Episodes Three separate episodes underlie the charges in this case. First was the robbery and extortion of Nelson and Mercedes Gomez Martin on June 26, 1995. The second episode included the kidnapping and extortion of Jose-and Idania Arias and their children on January 11, 1996. The final episode involved the November 4, 1996 attempted robbery of Rosa Gonzalez, Armando Gonzalez’s housekeeper and the kidnapping and extortion of Armando Gonzalez on November 13, 1996. The Arias and Gonzalez episodes also involved carjacking, and firearms were used in all three episodes. Although not physically involved in the robberies and extortions, Lopez and Diaz served as “tipsters.” They were Santería priests and used their positions to gain confidential information regarding the financial status of their followers, called “godchildren.” This information was then passed on to Orestes Hernandez who in turn, along with Echevarria, Camacho, Munoz, and Ilvigio, targeted the individuals beginning in December 1994. Both the Martins and the Ariases were godchildren of Lopez and Diaz. A. The Nelson and Mercedes Martin Episode Munoz, Echevarria, Orestes Hernandez, and Camacho kidnapped Nelson Martin on June 26, 1995. Munoz owned and drove the car used to kidnap Nelson, while Eche-varria was one of two or three men who pulled Martin from his car. Nelson Martin and his wife Mercedes Gomez Martin owned Rosa Medical Center and Family Assistance Network. (R.378, at 1005 & 1008). Nelson Martin had gone to the mall to get his hair cut when, upon returning to his car, he was approached by two or three men who were wearing badges, carrying guns, and screaming “FBI, FBI.” (R.370, at 853-54). Martin was dragged from his car at gunpoint and thrown in the back of a green Cadillac where duct tape was wrapped around his eyes, mouth, head, hands, and ankles. (Id.). ' When they got Martin in the car, Munoz punched Martin in the face twice and told him that he had “a lot of fucking problem with [him], that he had been after [him] for a long time.” (R.370, at 856-57). The kidnappers took Martin’s watch and money while driving for about half an hour. (R.370, at 868-69). Although Martin’s eyes were taped, his profuse sweating had created a little space from which he could see. (R.370, at 867). Upon arriving at their destination, the kidnappers carried Martin up a flight of stairs and threw him on a bed. (R.370, at 869-70). Martin was unable to walk because his feet were still bound. (R.370, at 869). A few minutes later, Martin heard a blow torch being ignited and then felt the heat and was burned on his face, ears, and scalp. (R.370, at 870). The kidnappers continued to beat Martin even while he was being burned and demanded to know the whereabouts of his money. (R.370, at 871). After about five minutes, the kidnappers took the tape off his mouth, and Martin lied to them and told them he had money in his wife’s closet at his house so they would stop torturing him. (R.370, at 871-72). After obtaining Martin’s alarm code and keys to his house, three of the kidnappers went to Martin’s house and ransacked it looking for the money. (R.370, at 873). They stole everything from his closet but did not find any money. Upon their return, Martin was hit for lying. (Id.). While this was going on, Martin’s wife, Mercedes Gomez Martin, and daughter arrived at home. Upon seeing the ransacked house, Mercedes began to page her husband. (R.378, at 991-92). The kidnappers returned her page sometime later, and they demanded $75,000 in return for her husband. (R.378, at 993). The kidnappers mentioned that Mercedes had a clinic, told her they knew about her businesses, and stated that this was their “job.” (R.378, at 996). They threatened Mercedes to keep her from going to the police, saying her daughter would be next if she did, and it would be worse. Mercedes worked over the next sixteen hours to come up with $75,000. Martin was moved several times during this period of time. Mercedes was given a drop-off site the next day, which the kidnappers moved several times. (R.378, at 996-98). While Mercedes waited in the empty lot to drop off the money as instructed, a green Cadillac appeared. Echevarria, Camacho, and Martin got out of the back. Mercedes later identified Echevarria as the person to whom she gave the money. (R.378, at 1020-21). She also identified Camacho as the person “fiddling with the trunk” of the green Cadillac. (R.378, at 1021-22). The Martins did not report the kidnapping and extortion to the police for fear of their children’s lives. (R.370, at 877). They did, however, report the stolen car and guns. (R.370, at 878). During the two years prior to the kidnapping, Mercedes Gomez Martin had been visiting Gloria Diaz. (R.378, at 1011). This relationship continued up until about a month or a month and a half before the kidnapping when Mrs. Martin and Diaz had a falling out over the presence of an old girlfriend of Nelson Martin’s at Diaz’s home. (R.378, at 1016-17). During their relationship, however, Mrs. Martin advised Diaz about her multiple businesses, including her health care businesses and health care clinics. Diaz then passed this information on to Orestes Hernandez and instructed him to rob Mrs. Martin. (R.382, at 1235-39). B. The Jose and Idania Arias Episode Idania Arias also was a client/follower of Diaz and Lopez. In October 1995, Idania Arias met Diaz for the first time. Beginning with their first meeting, at which Diaz was going to read Idania Arias’s tarot cards, Diaz made reference to her financial status and her businesses. (R.392, at 1765-66). As their relationship progressed, Idania Arias told Diaz about her medical supply business, her billing service, and the medical center. (R.392, at 1766). In December 1995, Diaz again read Idania Alias’s tarot cards and said that Arias’s house needed a “cleansing.” (R.392, at 1769). Lopez and Diaz then went to the Arias home, sacrificed a rooster and a hen, and then spread herbs in the rooms to cleanse them of evil spirits. (R.392, at 1770). During this cleansing, Lopez and Diaz commented on how nice Idania Arias’s house was and that she must be making very good money. (R.382, at 1251-52; R.392, at 1770). Idania Arias was questioned as to the location of her valuables, to which she responded they were everywhere. (R.382, at 1251-52). Diaz then passed this information on to Orestes Hernandez who shared the information with Munoz. (R.378, at 1180-81). On January 11, 1996, Munoz, Echevarria, Orestes Hernandez, and Ilvigio began stalking the Arias family again. (R.382,' at 1248^49). They called Diaz to try and locate Idania Arias. (See GX:216 A-C). After calling Idania Arias’s billing service business and going to her clinic, they finally located her after going to her home where they observed her leaving with her four-year-old son Anthony. (R.382, at 1254-55). They followed her to the library, where she picked up her eight-year-old son Joseph, and then back to her house. As she pulled into her driveway, Echevarria’s white Jaguar pulled up behind her. (R.382, at 1255). Echevarria, Ilvigio, Orestes Hernandez, and Munoz got out and approached her with guns drawn. (R.388, at 1671). Idania Arias handed them her keys and told them to take what they wanted to which they responded that they wanted her and her children. Idania Arias and her two children were forced into the white Jaguar. (R.388, at 1672). Munoz stayed behind in order to steal Idania Arias’s black Lexus. (R.382, at 1255). Idania Arias’s eyes, hands, and ankles were duct taped. Duct tape was also placed on the eight-year-old Joseph. Echevarria, who was driving, took them to International Alignment — a paint and body shop. (R.382, at 1260-61; R.388, at 1678; R.392, at 1895). When they got there, they drove inside to wait for Munoz. Ida-nia Arias continually asked why she was being kidnapped, but they did not answer and told her to quit asking questions. She was told that “El Negro” (Munoz) would tell her why she was there when he arrived. (R.382, at 1261-62). The kidnappers asked about Mr. Arias’s whereabouts. (R.388, at 1682). According to Idania Arias, the kidnappers appeared to know everything about her clinic, her billing company, and her medical supply business. (Id.). After about forty-five minutes, there was another cellular telephone call .from Orestes Hernandez’s telephone to Lopez and Diaz’s home telephone. (GX:216 A-C). Ilvigio then beeped Camacho. When Camacho returned the call, he was instructed to come to the shop because they had some kidnapping victims. (R.382, at 1262). Cellular telephone records from the time period when the Arias family was in the body shop revealed the multiple telephone calls and also revealed that the kidnappers tried to reach Mr. Arias at the medical clinic. (GX:216 A-C). The men forced Idania Arias to- call her husband and tell him that she and the children had been kidnapped, and if he ever wanted to see them alive, he would have to meet the kidnappers at the clinic with $500,000. (R.388, at 1683-84). Jose Arias was warned not to call the police. (Id.). The kidnappers intended on also seizing Jose Arias to insure that he did not go to the police. (R.382, at 1268). On his way to the clinic, however, Jose Arias called the police and never made it to the clinic. (R.402, at 1999). The kidnappers returned from the clinic empty-handed. Munoz told Idania Arias they wanted $500,000 ransom. (R.388, at 1688). They explained to her that this was “their job” and that usually they burn, torture, and shock their victims. (R.388, at 1680, 1688-89). Idania Arias was hit, and the kidnappers threatened to kill her children if she did not raise the money. Idania Arias then was released to raise the ransom. The children were kept at the warehouse over night and then were taken to the Jamaica Inn around 5:00 a.m. the next morning. Ilvigio rented a room at the motel, and he and Munoz took the children there to wait for the ransom. (R.382, at 1274.1280). Ilvigio kept Idania Arias’s beeper so she could maintain contact with him regarding her progress in raising the $500,000. (R.388, at 1690-91). Following her release, Idania Arias went to her parents’ home where she was met by the Metro Dade Police. (R.388, at 1698-99). Upon meeting them, she was so terrorized that she did not believe they were really police officers. (R.388, at 1699). After she accepted that her husband had contacted the police, she cooperated and went to the police station where an undercover telephone was set up for Idania Arias to phone the kidnappers. (R.388, at 1699-1701). Idania Arias would page her beeper and Ilvigio would call her back immediately. The cellular telephone records for January 11 and 12, 1996 reflect multiple calls between Orestes Hernandez’s cellular telephone, Ilvigio’s cellular telephone, and the undercover telephone. (R.388, at 1703-04). Following the advice of the police, Ida-nia Arias told the kidnappers that she could raise only $250,000. (Id). Ilvigio and Munoz agreed to accept this amount, and Idania Arias arranged for a controlled delivery to the kidnappers of a package purporting to be the ransom money. (R.382, at 1274; R.388, at 1704-05). The drop-off site was changed a number of times until the kidnappers finally decided on the cemetery, where Idania Arias was told to drop the money behind a white and red car. (R.388, at 1705-08). Both Ilvigio and Idania Arias testified that, while driving to the drop off site, Idania demanded to know the location of her children. (R.382, at 1290; R.388, at 1708-09). Ilvi-gio informed her that they were in Room 43 at the Jamaica Inn. (R.382, at 1290). Ilvigio, Munoz, Echevarria, Orestes Hernandez, and Camacho waited in two separate vehicles parked across the street from the cemetery. (R.382, at 1288-89). The men saw Arias approach the area as instructed and drop the purported money behind the white and red car. (R.382, at 1289). However, at that point they also saw the police converge upon the occupant of the car, Humberto Munoz (no relation to Eladio Munoz). (Id). Realizing that Idania Arias had gone to the authorities, the kidnappers left the area. Later, Munoz drove Ilvigio home where, approximately five minutes after Ilvigio arrived, he was arrested. (R.382, at 1291). When Ilvigio was arrested, he still had Arias’s beeper in his possession as well as the cellular phone used during the ransom negotiations. (R.402, at 2061-69). After Ilvigio confirmed to the police that the kids were in the Jamaica Inn, the children were safely recovered. (R.402, at 2066-67). Following the arrest of Ilvigio, the FBI spent weeks examining telephone records from Ilvigio’s cellular phone. (R.403, at 2284). They discovered that Ilvigio, Eche-varria, Orestes Hernandez, Munoz, and Camacho were communicating constantly with each other during the period of time spanning Idania Arias’s kidnapping. (GX:216 A-C). For each one of the suspects, investigating agents created a photo spread of six people to show Idania Arias and her oldest son, Joseph. (22:2298). Ida-nia Arias ultimately identified Echevarria, Munoz, and Camacho. (R.392, at 1747, 1748, 1750-51). Joseph Arias identified Munoz and Camacho. While Ilvigio was arrested immediately, he was the only kidnapper in custody until late May 1996 when Munoz and Echevarria were arrested. Although he initially denied the charges, Ilvigio later decided to cooperate with the government. Idania Arias later told Diaz and Lopez about the kidnapping and extortion. (R.392, at 1771-73). Diaz’s reaction was strange according to Idania Arias. Instead of crying with Arias, like most people who heard the story, Diaz kept asking if the kidnappers got any money. (R.392, at 1771). Diaz told Arias not to worry about the incident because many people who came to their home were invaded and kidnapped. (R.402, at 1945-46). Arias explained that “they,” presumably referring to Diaz and Lopez, questioned her about the arrests and investigation in the case. (R.392, at 1771-74). Approximately five months after the first kidnapping, on June 15, 1995, a second home invasion of Jose and Idania Arias took place. (R.392, at 1796). Jose and Idania Arias described an entry of four Latin males into their home by climbing over a locked gate on the west side of the house. The entire Arias family, including the children, were in the kitchen having pizza. The masked men armed with guns confronted them. (R.402, at 2001). They said to Jose that they “finally caught him.” (Id.). The men separated Jose Arias from his wife and sons. (Id.). The men demanded to know where the safe was located in the residence and threatened to kill the victims if they did not reveal the location. (R.392, at 1797). The kidnappers stated that the Aliases owned a medical supply company and there must be a safe. (R.392, at 1798). When the Aliases replied that there was no safe, the men began moving furniture, pictures, and other articles looking for one. (Id.). Finally, when they could not find money, the men directed Joseph Arias to go with his father to the bedroom. (R.392, at 1797). As they grabbed Joseph, one man stated, “Give me the older one because he’s the one who’s talking and identifying people.” (Id.). Idania and Anthony Arias were held at gunpoint in the Florida room and were told that Jose Arias was being killed. (R.392, at 1800; R.402, at 2001). Jose and Joseph Arias were in the back bedroom where one of the men threatened to kill the child. (R.402, at 2004-05). Jose Arias was told that his wife was being raped by the kidnappers in the Florida room. (R.402, at 2006). Jose Arias was beaten with the butt of a gun, handcuffed, and tied at his ankles and knees. (R.402, at 2002). The men tied an electrical cord around Joseph’s neck saying that they were going to kill him. (R.402, at 2004-05). They then took the electrical cord they had tied around Joseph’s neck and hung him from a ceiling fan in the bedroom. Joseph Arias was placed on his father’s shoulders underneath the ceiling fan, in an apparent attempt to get Jose Arias to reveal the location of the safe. (Id.). Jose Arias could not move because Joseph would fall and hang. ' (Id.). At one point, the men actually shoved Jose down so that Joseph hung but did not strangle. While Joseph was standing on his father’s shoulders, he overheard one of the invaders say, “Gloria said not to kill them, just hurt them because then we can get more money out of the family.” (R.402, at 2103). At some point during the robbery, Ida-nia managed to flee with Anthony to a neighbor’s house where the police were contacted. (R.392, at 1800-01). The men fled before the police arrived. The circumstantial evidence suggested that two of the men involved in this home invasion were Camacho and Orestes Hernandez. When Idania told Gloria Diaz about this second home invasion, Gloria again responded, “Did they steal a lot of money?” (R.392, at 1802). C. The Gonzalez Episode The final target was Armando Gonzalez who, along with his wife from whom he was separated, owned a gas station and a day care in Miami. (R.427, at 2632). Orestes Hernandez apparently received a “tip” from a “mechanic” who knew Armando Gonzalez and said that he would have a lot of money in a safe in his house. (R.428, at 2802-05, 2868-69, & 2872). Echevarria and Munoz had been arrested following the Arias kidnapping; therefore, Orestes Hernandez and Camacho recruited Vlade-mir Negrin to join their gang. Orestes Hernandez, Camacho, and Neg-rin initially targeted Gonzalez on November 4,1996, but he was not home — only his housekeeper, Rosa Gonzalez was home. (R.427, at 2599-2600). When Rosa answered the door, Camacho said he had a package for Armando. (R.427, at 2600). Camacho then produced a handgun, pointed it at Rosa, and ordered her into the living room. (R.427, at 2602). Camacho and Negrin went inside the house. Negrin also produced a handgun and pointed it at Rosa Gonzalez. Again, duct tape was used to bind her hands. (Id.). Camacho questioned Rosa Gonzalez about the location of the safe. (R.427, at 2603). Rosa denied having any knowledge of a safe, but the men ransacked the house searching for its location. (R.427, at 2603-04). Unsuccessful in locating a safe, the men fled and instructed Rosa not to call the authorities for ten minutes. (R.427, at 2604). Rosa Gonzalez was able to identify Camacho in a composite lineup. (R.427, at 2606-07). Negrin, Orestes Hernandez, and Camacho then decided to kidnap Armando Gonzalez and recruited a friend of Vlademir Negrin, Carlos Escandell, to help. (R.428, at 2798-2800). About nine days after the episode involving Rosa Gonzalez, the four men set out to abduct Armando. They conducted surveillance on Gonzalez and received information from the “mechanic.” (R.428, at 2807-12). At approximately 6:00 a.m. on November 13, 1996, Armando Gonzalez exited his girlfriend’s house and got in his Dodge Ram truck. (R.427, at 2634; R.428, at 2812). Gonzalez was stopped immediately by a white Caprice Chevrolet with flashing blue lights, which he believed to be a police car. Behind the “police car” was a Ford Explorer leased by Orestes Hernandez. (R.427, at 2634-35; R.428, at 2813). Gonzalez pulled his vehicle over and saw several men dressed as police officers jump out of the white Chevrolet. (R.427, at 2634-35). The “police officers” were later identified as Escandell, Camacho, Orestes Hernandez, and Negrin. (R.428, at 2812). The men approached Gonzalez’s car with guns drawn and told him he was under arrest. (R.427, at 2634). Gonzalez was removed from his vehicle, handcuffed, duct-taped, and thrown into the back seat of the Caprice. (R.427, at 2635). Armando Gonzalez was blindfolded with duct tape so he could not see. Negrin took Gonzalez’s truck, and Orestes Hernandez drove behind in his own vehicle. (R.428, at 2814). The kidnappers stole Gonzalez’s wallet, cash, jewelry (including a gold Star of David), and watch. (R.428, at 2820-21). Gonzalez was driven to Camacho’s house where his truck was parked inside the garage. (R.428, at 2815-16, & 2818). He was severely beaten, and his pants were lowered so that the men could use a blow torch on his genitals. (R.428, at 2822). Both his buttocks and thighs were burned. Several times the men inserted the blow torch in Gonzalez’s rectum and lit it. (Id.). The kidnappers also used a stun gun on Gonzalez’s arms. (Id.). They applied the torch to Gonzalez’s eyes, actually burning the duct tape that covered them. (Id.). The kidnappers demanded the alarm code to the house that Gonzalez was sharing with his girlfriend. (R.427, at 2639). Gonzalez gave the men the code, and they ransacked the house stealing jewelry, men’s clothing and $30,000 in cash receipts from his gas station. (R.427, at 2639 & 2642). The kidnappers told Gonzalez many things about his family and his business, including where his girlfriend worked, that one of his sons drove a black jeep, and where his other son attended school. (R.427, at 2638; R.428, at 2820). When the men returned, they placed Gonzalez in the back of his Dodge truck and dropped him at an unknown location. (R.427, at 2642). Gonzalez was left tied in the back seat of his truck and told not to contact the' police because they would be watching his family. (R.427, at 2638 & 2642). Gonzalez did not go to the police. (R.427, at 2669). Only when Escandell was arrested in connection with another kidnapping attempt did Gonzalez’s kidnapping get reported by Escandell. On January 10, 1997, Gonzalez was interviewed and shown a photo lineup by Detective LeFebvre. (R.427, at 2715-16). Gonzalez positively identified Negrin. (R.427, at 2716-17). Photographs of Orestes Hernandez and Camacho were not shown to Gonzalez, but Gonzalez did state that the man who did most of the talking had a stutter, and Orestes Hernandez has a stutter. (R.427, at 2637, 2717 & 2723; R.428, at 2801 & 2898). On January 11, 1997, Negrin was arrested at his home. (R.427, at 2717). He gave consent to have his apartment searched. (R.427, at 2718). Gonzalez’s Star of David medal, as well as a large amount of other jewelry and walkie talkies, were found in his apartment. (R.427, at 2718-22). A stun gun was found in his car. (R.427, at 2721). III. The Counts, Verdicts, and Sentences The fourth superseding indictment did not list Ilvigio and Escandell as they had already entered guilty pleas to an earlier indictment. Count I charged all six appellants with engaging in a conspiracy from June 26, 1995 until November 18, 1996 to interfere with commerce by extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. All six appellants were convicted on Count I. Count II charged all appellants, except Lopez, with a substantive Hobbs Act violation in connection with Nelson Martin. The remaining five appellants were convicted on Count Two. Count III charged the four appellants'— Echevarria, Munoz, Camacho and Orestes Hernandez — with a § 924(c) violation in connection with the Nelson Martin abduction. All four were convicted. Count IV charged all six appellants with a substantive Hobbs Act violation in connection with the kidnapping and attempted extortion of Idania Arias and her two children. All six appellants were convicted. Count V charged all six appellants with carjacking as it related to Idania Arias. Diaz and Lopez were acquitted. Appellants Echevarria, Munoz, and Orestes Hernandez were convicted. Count VI charged appellants Echevar-ria, Munoz, Camacho and Orestes Hernandez with a § 924(c) violation in relation to the Arias abduction and each was convicted. Count VII charged appellants Camacho and Orestes Hernandez with a substantive Hobbs Act violation by engaging in a robbery as it related to the home invasion of the Gonzalez house on November 4, 1996. Both were convicted. Count VIII charged appellants Camacho and Orestes Hernandez with a § 924(c) violation as it related to the invasion of the Gonzalez home on November 4, 1996. Camacho was convicted and Orestes Hernandez was acquitted. Count IX charged appellants Camacho and Orestes Hernandez with a substantive Hobbs Act violation as it related to the abduction of Armando Gonzalez on November 13, 1996. Both were convicted. Count X charged appellants Camacho and Orestes Hernandez with carjacking as it related to the Dodge Ram driven by Armando Gonzalez. Both were convicted. Count XI charged appellants Camacho and Orestes Hernandez with a § 924(c) violation as it related to the abduction and carjacking of Armando Gonzalez. Both were convicted. Echevarria was sentenced to a total of 465 months, a three-year period of supervised release, and $146,250 in restitution. Munoz was sentenced to a total of 705 months, a three-year period of supervised release, and $146,250 in restitution. Camacho was sentenced to a total of 1145 months, a three-year period of supervised release, and $192,050 in restitution. Orestes Hernandez was sentenced to a total of 665 months, a three-year period of supervised release, and $45,800 in restitution. Lopez was .sentenced to 188 months, a three-year period of supervised release, and $5,200 in restitution. Finally, Diaz was sentenced to a total of 293 months, a three-year period of supervised release, and $5,200 in restitution. Appellants timely appealed their convictions and sentences. In sum, appellants challenge the following: (1) the application of the Hobbs Act and the sufficiency of the evidence as to their culpability for the Hobbs Act conspiracy and the four substantive Hobbs Act counts dealing with the kidnappings, extortion, and robberies as set forth in Counts II, IV, VII, and IX; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence as to the carjacking counts; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence as to the carrying and use of a firearm counts; (4) procedural and pretrial issues including denial of a severance, mistrial, in-court and out-of-court identifications, and enforcement of the district court’s sequestration order; and (5) the sentences with respect to Echevarria, Orestes Hernandez, and Lopez. The Court will address these issues separately, paying careful attention to distinguish which appellants appeal on which grounds. IV. Application of the Hobbs Act and Sufficiency of the Evidence as to the Conspiracy and Hobbs Act Convictions All six appellants, either by virtue of their own brief or adoption of the briefs of their co-appellants, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to their culpability for the conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act and the four substantive Hobbs Act violations. The Court will address both the conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act and the substantive violations as they relate to Echevarria, Munoz, Camacho, Orestes Hernandez, and Diaz collectively. Both the conspiracy conviction and the substantive Hobbs Act conviction of Jose Bias Lopez will be addressed separately as the Court finds that his role in the commission of these crimes raises issues not shared by the other co-appellants. A. Standard of Review and Law Applicable to all Six Appellants Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support appellants’ convictions is a question of law subject to de novo review. U.S. v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir.1990). The Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that the evidence established appellants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices are made in the government’s favor. U.S. v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir.1995); U.S. v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 661 (11th Cir.1983). The Hobbs Act prohibits robbery or extortion, and attempts or conspiracies to commit robbery or extortion, that “in any way or degree obstructf ], delay[ ], or affect[ ] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce.” U.S. v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir.) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928, 120 S.Ct. 323, 145 L.Ed.2d 252 (1999). To prove a Hobbs Act conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) & (b)(1), the government must prove that: (1) two or more persons agreed to commit a robbery or extortion encompassed within the Hobbs Act; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiratorial goal; and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in helping to accomplish the goal. U.S. v. To, 144 F.3d 737, 747-48 (11th Cir.1998); U.S. v. Thomas, 8 F.3d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir.1993). A Hobbs Act conspiracy was established in U.S. v. Farrell, 877 F.2d 870 (11th Cir.1989), by proof of a potential impact on interstate commerce in an extortion-kidnapping plot. The Farrell court, in discussing the interstate commerce nexus, opined: The Hobbs Act applies to extortion wherein the perpetrator “... in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity of commerce.... ” Only a de minimis nexus with interstate commerce is required. Where attempted extortion or conspiracy to extort are charged, the interstate nexus may be demonstrated by evidence of potential impact on interstate commerce, or by evidence of actual, de minimis impact[.] Potential impact is measured at the time of the attempt, i.e., when the extortion demand is made, based on the assumed success of the intended scheme. A sufficient potential impact exists when there is evidence of “a plan to embark upon a course of extortionate behavior likely to have the natural effect of obstructing commerce.” Farrell, 877 F.2d at 875 (internal citations omitted) (emphases added). Unlike a conspiracy charged under the Hobbs Act, which only requires proof that defendants’ scheme would have affected interstate commerce, a substantive Hobbs Act violation requires an actual effect on interstate commerce. See Kaplan, 171 F.3d at 1354. However, the requisite effect on interstate commerce need not be substantial — all that is required is minimal impact. See id. Moreover, the effect on interstate commerce is not limited to only adverse effects. See id. at 1357. While the Hobbs Act usually is applied to robberies of businesses, criminal acts directed toward individuals also may violate the Hobbs Act. Robberies or extortions perpetrated upon individuals are prosecutable under the Hobbs Act when any one of the following three conditions are met: (1) the crime depletes the assets of an individual who is directly engaged in interstate commerce; (2) the crime causes the individual to deplete the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce; or (3) the number of individuals victimized or the sums involved are so large that there will be a cumulative impact on interstate commerce. See, e.g., U.S. v. Stephens, 964 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.1992); U.S. v. DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.1986), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 928, 120 S.Ct. 323, 145 L.Ed.2d 252 (1999); U.S. v. Farrell, 877 F.2d 870 (11th Cir.1989); U.S. v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir.1994). B. Conspiracy to Violate the Hobbs Act Involving Camacho, Orestes Hernandez, Munoz, Echevarria, and Diaz Both Diaz and Camacho appeal their convictions of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortions from June 26, 1995 to November 13, 1996; Echevarria, Orestes Hernandez, and Munoz adopt then-arguments pursuant to F.R.App. P. 28(i). Specifically, appellants argue there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants had any knowledge of the goal of the conspiracy or that they voluntarily joined the conspiracy. (See Camacho Br., at pp. 17-23; Diaz Br., at pp. 9-12). The Court disagrees. The record lacks any evidence supporting a finding that these two elements were not met. The goal of the conspiracy was to extort money from individuals identified as targets through various tips. The evidence reveals that Echevarria, Camacho, Munoz, and Orestes Hernandez invested a substantial amount of time in targeting each individual victim beginning with the initial tips provided by Diaz. Diaz relayed the tips to Orestes Hernandez who, in turn, shared the information with Echevarria, Camacho, and Munoz. In addition, there is no evidence that appellants did not participate voluntarily. There is no evidence that any appellant was forced to participate. Further, at no time did any appellant indicate a desire to disengage from the conspiracy. Although mere presence is insufficient to prove membership in a conspiracy, the Court disagrees with appellants’ argument that they were merely present at various times throughout the course of the conspiracy. Appellants cite U.S. v. Thomas, 8 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir.1993), as support for their argument that mere presence or knowledge does not support the conclusion that they voluntarily participated in the agreement or the accomplishments of its goals. See id. at 1558. The conspiracy in Thomas involved an alleged scheme to rob a bank and to dynamite the sheriffs office in Danielsville, Georgia. Johnny and Lisa Reese were convicted of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act. On appeal, they argued there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. The evidence against Johnny Reese amounted to the following: Johnny Reese was in the car on March 5, 1991 when it broke down near the bank; he stood in front of the hardware store while two others entered the bank; when everyone came out of the bank, they all walked to a restaurant; Johnny Reese was present while another person disclosed the plan; and, according to one of the members of the conspiracy, he was never identified as a participant in the conspiracy during any of the conversations among the conspirators. The evidence against Lisa Reese revealed the following: Lisa Reese was in the car on March 5, 1991 when it broke down; she went into the bank and requested information about opening an account, asked if the bank had a public restroom, and picked up some bank brochures; and, one member of the conspiracy testified that “the girls” made sketches of the bank and that this statement referenced Lisa Reese and another woman. In taped conversations, Lisa Reese’s statements reflected her distaste for the planned bank robbery. Lisa Reese testified at trial that she did not take the plans to rob the bank seriously, and she denied making any sketches. Thomas, 8 F.3d at 1556-60. Unlike the evidence in Thomas, the evidence regarding participation in the case before the Court is substantial. Ilvigio’s testimony is rife with information regarding each appellant’s role in the various kidnappings and attempted kidnappings. Ilvigio first became a part of the conspiracy through a coworker — Munoz. During a trip in December 1995 for the trucking company they worked for, Munoz and Ilvigio discussed both the kidnappings and robberies Munoz had done in the past and future “jobs.” (R.378, at 1187-88). It was during this trip that Ilvigio agreed to join the conspiracy. Upon arrival back in Miami, he and Munoz planned to contact Munoz’s friends in order to do a “job” together. (R.378, at 1196). Munoz’s friends were Echevarria (a.k.a.Tatieo) and Camacho (a.k.a.Pepe). On December 24, 1995, after arriving in Miami on the 23rd, Munoz picked up Ilvigio to meet with Camacho. (R.378, at 1197). Camacho, Munoz, and Ilvigio went to Echevarria’s home where they discussed the robberies and kidnappings. They then met up with Orestes Hernandez (a.k.a. Orestico or El Gago). (R.382, at 1223). Ilvigio’s involvement began with the attempted robberies and kidnappings of four individuals. They targeted individuals by the name of Tony, Alex, Orestes, and an unnamed woman. These incidents occurred toward the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996. Two of these individuals — Tony and Orestes — previously had been robbed by Munoz, Orestes Hernandez, Echevarria, and Camacho. (R.382, at 1230-31). It was during this same period of time that Mercedes Gomez Martin was targeted for the second time. The evidence presented at trial revealed that Diaz provided tips to Orestes Hernandez regarding both the Martins and the Arfases. (R.378, at 1180-81; R.382, at 1235-36, 1239-40). In return, Diaz received a good sum of money. (R.382, at 1239). In addition, on January 11, 1996 when Mercedes Gomez Martin was targeted, Orestes Hernandez, Echevarria, Munoz, and Ilvigio went to see Diaz at her house to get addresses for Mrs. Martin. (R.382, at 1244). Finally, Ilvigio was able to identify Diaz in court. (R.382, at 1247). Although Ilvigio did not participate in the original robbery and extortion of the Martins, he was an active member of the conspiracy along with Orestes Hernandez, Munoz, Echevarria, and Camacho, when Mercedes Gomez Martin was targeted the second time on January 11, 1996. They used Camacho’s car and, while in the car, Camacho discussed mistakes made during the prior kidnapping of Nelson Martin back in June of 1995. (R.382, at 1237). Diaz argues on appeal that there was no evidence supporting the jury’s finding that she voluntarily participated in the conspiracy because the only evidence against her came from Ilvigio’s testimony, which appellants claim constituted double hearsay. The Court disagrees. Ilvigio’s testimony regarding the four unsuccessful surveillances, the second attempt involving Mercedes Gomez Martin, and the statements made by individual members of the conspiracy was not hearsay. Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), statements of coconspirators of a party made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy are, by definition, not hearsay. The district court determined that a conspiracy existed and that these statements were made in furtherance of that conspiracy. (R.428, at 3369). Accordingly, Uvigio was not precluded from testifying about what a coconspirator told him regarding a conversation with another coconspirator. See U.S. v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 869 (5th Cir.1999) (citing U.S. v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1216-19 (7th Cir.1985)). In sum, contrary to appellants’ arguments, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants knew of the conspiratorial goal and that they participated voluntarily. Accordingly, appellants’ convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortions are affirmed. C. Substantive Violations of the Hobbs Act Involving Camacho, Orestes Hernandez, Munoz, Echevarria, and Diaz Appellants argue that the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show that the kidnappings, extortions, and robberies affected interstate commerce, and, as a result, their Hobbs Act convictions must be reversed. The main argument advanced by appellants is that the robberies were of three individuals — not businesses. Accordingly, they argue that the requisite effect upon interstate commerce was not demonstrated. Whether or not the extortions and robberies affected interstate commerce requires an individual analysis of the three episodes. 1. The Martin Episode To find a substantive Hobbs Act violation with regard to the kidnapping and extortion of Nelson and Mercedes Gomez Martin, the Court must find that an extortion occurred and that there was an effect on interstate commerce. Appellants do not dispute that an extortion occurred. Rather, they argue that the extortion of the Martins had no effect on interstate commerce. The Court disagrees. At the time of the extortion, the Martins owned Rosa Medical Center (R.378, at 1005). The Martins were licensed to run the center, which was a corporation designed- to address the general medicine needs of its patients. Rosa Medical Center had physicians on staff who cared for private patients. Following service of treatment, the Martins would bill private insurance companies located out-of-state for payment. The insurance companies would pay the Martins who, in turn, would pay the physicians. According to Mrs. Martin, the physicians of Rosa Medical Center had on hand various equipment to treat their patients. Specifically, Rosa Medical Center had equipment for electrocardiograms, ultrasound, and physical therapy. (R.378, at 1006). Mrs. Martin testified that she purchased all of the equipment and that some of the equipment was purchased from outside the state of Florida. (R.378, at 1007). As a result of the extortion, the Martins were forced to close the clinic for several days. (R.378, at 1112-13). As a result, seven to ten patients could not be seen, which was unusual. (R.378, at 1114). In addition, billings decreased and less work was accomplished. (R.378, at 1117). Although the Martins were not directly engaged in interstate commerce, Mr. Martin was the president and Mrs. Martin was the administrator of a corporation, Rosa Medical Center, which was directly engaged in interstate commerce. Moreover, the extortion of the Martins resulted in an actual effect on, interstate commerce in that the center was shut down for several days, during which time no patients were seen, resulting in no billing to or payment from the out-of-state insurance companies. The inability to see patients, which would generate income for Rosa Medical Center, establishes that the extortion of the Martins (individuals) caused them to deplete the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce. Although Rosa Medical Center was only closed for several days, the Court concludes that such closing is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement for a Hobbs Act violation given that the effect on interstate commerce need only be minimal so long as it is actual. The Court cautions that its decision should not be interpreted to mean that any extortion of an individual who is an officer of a corporation that results in the closing of the corporation will be sufficient to establish a substantive Hobbs Act violation. Even proof that the corporation was directly engaged in interstate commerce, like Rosa Medical Center, is not enough on its own. What sets this case apart is the fact that the role of the Martins with regard to their business, which was directly engaged in interstate commerce, was not coincidental. Rather, the Court is convinced by the evidence presented at trial that appellants targeted the Martins because of their interest in Rosa Medical Center. In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that this case is distinguishable from U.S. v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir.1994), which, although not controlling, is relied, upon by appellants for the proposition that the extortion of the Martins amounted to the extortion of individuals with only a speculative, indirect nexus to interstate commerce. The defendant in Collins robbed an individual at gunpoint in the victim’s home. Items taken by the defendant included cash, jewelry, clothes, and a Mercedes-Benz with its cellular phone. The defendant was convicted of a substantive Hobbs Act violation in connection with this robbery and appealed arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the robbery obstructed interstate commerce. U.S. v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 98 (5th Cir.1994). The government in Collins argued that the victim, an employee of a national computer company, was prevented from attending a business meeting and from making business calls on his cellular phone as a result of the robbery. On appeal, the court found no actual direct affect on a business caused by the robbery of the individual employee. The victim’s linkage to his business, which was directly engaged in interstate commerce, was much too indirect to present a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to justify federal jurisdiction. Id. at 100. Whereas the robbery of the individual in Collins caused only a speculative, indirect effect on a business engaged in interstate commerce, the extortion of the Martins caused an actual, direct effect on a business engaged in interstate commerce. This, coupled with the fact that appellants directly targeted the Martin because of their business, establishes the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court finds there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the evidence established appellants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. The Añas Episode The substantive Hobbs Act violation with regard to the Ariases occurred as a result of appellants’ attempted extortion of $250,000. The fact that no money actually changed hands is immaterial because the Hobbs Act also proscribes an attempt to interfere or affect commerce by extortion. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Accordingly, to prove a Hobbs Act violation with regard to the Ariases, the Court must find that the attempted extortion would have depleted the assets of the Ariases, assuming they are directly engaged in interstate commerce, or caused the Ariases to divert assets that would otherwise be expended in interstate commerce. At the time of the kidnapping and attempted extortion, the Ariases owned three businesses — Arias Medical Equipment, J&A Electronic Billing Services, and First Option Medical Center. Arias Medical Equipment was a provider of medical services to people who were sick at home. It sold and rented medical supplies including, inter alia, walkers, canes, bathing devices, bandages, and hospital beds — some of which were purchased from out-of-state or out-of-country. J&A Electronic Billing Services provided electronic billing for clinics and doctors. Equipment used in this business included computers, printers, and telephones. All of the computers and printers were manufactured out-of-country. Finally, First Option Medical Center was a clinic that utilized medical equipment, some of which, was made out-of-country. The clinic received payments both from private national insurance companies located outside of Florida and from Medicare and Medicaid. Compared to the Martins’ businesses, the nexus between the Ariases’ businesses and interstate commerce is much more substantial. A significant amount of equipment used in the billing services business and the medical supplies business was purchased or manufactured outside of Florida. In addition, the clinic received payments from private insurance companies and the federal government that originated outside the state of Florida. Given this strong connection to interstate commerce, the Court finds that the Ariases were directly engaged in interstate commerce. As a result, to uphold the Hobbs Act convictions, the Court must find that the attempted extortion would have depleted the Ariases’ assets. Appellants argue that there was no testimony that payment of $250,000 would deplete the assets of the Ariases. This argument relies on a definition of “deplete” that is limited to “eliminate.” The Court’s interpretation of “deplete,” however, is not so narrow. According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the definition of “deplete” encompasses appellants’ definition of “to eliminate or exhaust,” but also includes “to lessen in number, quantity, content, or force or in vital power or value as a result of such lessening.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 605 (1981). Based on this definition of deplete, a payment of $250,000 would serve to deplete or lessen in number the Ariases’ assets. Accordingly, the Court finds there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants violated the Hobbs Act in attempting to extort $250,000 from the Ariases. 3. The Gonzalez Episode Camacho and Orestes Hernandez were convicted on Count VII for Hobbs Act attempted robbery of Rosa Gonzalez on November 4, 1996 and on Count IX for extortion of Armando Gonzalez on November 13,1996. The crime that occurred on November 4, 1996 was attempted robbery because no money was received. Camacho and Orestes Hernandez argue on appeal that there was no Hobbs Act attempted robbery of Rosa Gonzalez because there was no evidence that interstate commerce was potentially affected and appellants never demanded money. With regard to the extortion of Armando Gonzalez, they argue that there was no effect on interstate commerce. The evidence produced at trial indicated that Camacho and Negrin made their way into the Gonzalez house armed with guns. Although they did not demand money, they did question Rosa Gonzalez about the location of the safe. (R.427, at 2603). After she denied any knowledge of a safe, Camacho and Negrin ransacked the house searching for one. (R.427, at 2603-04). It follows logically that they were searching for the safe to get to the money. Regardless, the Hobbs Act applies to extortion of property in general; therefore, it is immaterial that no money was demanded because the safe constitutes property. Accordingly, Camacho’s and Orestes Hernandez’s convictions will be upheld so long as there was a potential effect on interstate commerce. The money appellants were after was not the money of Rosa Gonzalez. Rather, appellants sought the location of Armando Gonzalez’s safe. Determining whether there was an effect on interstate commerce requires an examination of Armando Gonzalez and his businesses and their nexus, if any, to interstate commerce. This analysis also applies to determine whether the extortion of Armando Gonzalez on November 13,1996 constituted a Hobbs Act violation. Accordingly, the Court will examine the remaining two counts together. The evidence at trial revealed that Armando Gonzalez was part owner of West Star Oil — a gas station with a convenience store. Both the gasoline used at the station and the grocery items sold at the convenience store were shipped from out-of-state. (R.427, at 2644-45). In addition, Gonzalez and his wife owned Dolphin Day Care, which purchased many of its supplies from out-of-state (R.427, at 2647). Appellants originally demanded $250,000 from Gonzalez. However, after raiding his girlfriend’s house, they recovered only $30,000 in receipts from West Star Oil. Like the Arfases, Gonzalez’s business made regular and systematic purchases from out-of-state thereby establishing a greater connection to interstate commerce. The Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that, as part owner of West Star Oil, Gonzalez was directly engaged in interstate commerce through his business. The fact that Gonzalez was not sole owner is immaterial. Accordingly, to find a Hobbs Act violation, the Court must conclude that the attempted robbery on November 4, 1996 would have depleted, and that the extortion on November 13, 1996 did deplete, Armando Gonzalez’s assets. The broad definition of “deplete” discussed previously with regard to the Arfases, again, supports this finding. Based on appellants’ original demand after kidnapping Gonzalez, they were seeking $250,000 in ransom. It is unquestionable that this amount would lessen in quantity or number Gonzalez’s assets. Moreover, because there was no testimony that appellants were seeking a different amount when they first ransacked Armando Gonzalez’s house on November 4, 1996, the jury could infer that this was the amount appellants were searching for as they ransacked the house looking for the safe. Although appellants originally demanded $250,000 for Gonzalez’s release, they ultimately settled on $30,000 in garage receipts, which they stole from Gonzalez’s girlfriend’s house. This provides, an additional effect on interstate commerce. Even if there was insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Gonzalez was directly involved in interstate commerce, the extortion of $30,000 in garage receipts constitutes a diversion of assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce. Finally, Camacho and Orestes Hernandez appeal on individual grounds. First, Camacho challenges his Hobbs Act conviction for attempted robbery on November 4, 1996 based on the lack of an identification at trial. Although Rosa Gonzalez was able to identify Camacho in a composite lineup, she was unable to identify him at trial. This failure, however, does not result in insufficient evidence because it does not negate the remaining evidence against him. The failed attempt to identify Camacho was made in the jury’s presence, and the jury was able to consider this when determining Camacho’s guilt or innocence. Regardless, the government’s case did not rely solely on the identification of Camacho by Rosa Gonzalez. At trial, Escandell testified about the attempted extortion involving Rosa Gonzalez because Camacho, Negrin, and Orestes Hernandez carried on conversations regarding the failure of the extortion in the presence of Escandell after he had joined the conspiracy. (R.428, at 2804-06). Second, Orestes Hernandez argues that the government failed to prove that he participated in the extortion of Armando Gonzalez. The Court disagrees. Based on the testimony of Escandell and Armando Gonzalez, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Orestes Hernandez participated in the kidnapping and extortion of Armando Gonzalez on November 13, 1996. (R.427, at 2634-49; R.428, at 2813-28).' In conclusion, based on the foregoing, the Court finds, after a de novo review of the record, that there was sufficient evidence to convict appellants of the four substantive Hobbs Act extortion violations. The required nexus to interstate commerce only needs to be minimal and, in all four instances, the extortion or attempted extortion affected interstate commerce either by depleting assets of an individual directly engaged in interstate commerce or by diverting assets that would otherwise be expended in interstate commerce. Accordingly, the convictions of Echevar-, ria, Munoz, Camacho, Orestes Hernandez, and Diaz for Hobbs Act robbery and extortion of the Martins on June 25, 1995, and of the Ariases from January 11, 1996 to January 12, 1996, are upheld. The convictions of Camacho and Orestes Hernandez for Hobbs Act attempted robbery of Rosa Gonzalez on November 4, 1996, and Hobbs Act extortion of Armando Gonzalez on November 13,1996, also are upheld. D. The Sufficiency of the Evidence as to the Lopez Convictions for Conspiracy and the Hobbs Act Conviction as to the Arias Kidnapping Lopez’s counsel moved for acquittal based on Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 as to Counts I, IV, and V. The district court demonstrated a concern as to the proper ruling on the motion as it is apparent from a review of the record that the prosecution’s case against Lopez was less compelling than its case against the other five appellants. The district court reserved its ruling and asked for briefs. The government filed its brief on May 18, 1996 shortly before oral argument, and the district court denied Lopez’s Rule 29 motion without any explanation. Lopez was found guilty of Counts I and IV and not guilty of Count V. Ilvigio provided the most damaging testimony against Lopez, although his association with the conspiracy was short lived as he was arrested on January 12, 1996 following the bungled Arias kidnapping. Ilvigio’s knowledge of Lopez stems from his involvement in the conspiracy beginning in December of 1995. Upon return from his and Munoz’s trucking trip, Munoz introduced Ilvigio to Camacho, Echevarria and Orestes Hernandez. During the process of meeting Orestes Hernandez, Ilvigio was introduced to his godfather, Jose Bias Lopez, on December 24, 1995. Ilvigio and the other active members of the gang began to engage in surveillance of potential targets for kidnapping and robbery on December 26, 1995. The first four targets identified as Alex, Tony, a woman on Mango Hill, and a person named Orestes were the subjects of unsuccessful surveillance. Ilvigio testified that the “tipster” as to each of these targets was Lopez but that the information came through Orestes Hernandez who would on several occasions place a call to Lopez to confirm locations of the targets. The government contends that Ilvigio’s testimony was sufficient to connect Lopez to the conspiracy as charged in Count I. The government’s case in support of Lopez’s conviction on Count IV charging the Hobbs Act violation as to the Arias family relies primarily on Pinkerton liability. See Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). We begin our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence issue mindful of the instruction of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322—25, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) that the evidence will be deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction unless we find that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and further mindful of the admonition that “[m]ere knowledge of a conspiracy in association with the conspirators is insufficient evidence to support a conspiracy conviction! ]” as enunciated in U.S. v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 549 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied, 720 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir.1983). The analysis also involves the provisions of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) dealing with admissibility of coconspirator statements, as well as the teachings of U.S. v. Iacovetti, 466 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir.1972), indicating that the uneorrob-orated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to support a conviction if it is not, on its face, incredible or otherwise insubstantial. The district court found, and we agree, that the declarations of Orestes Hernandez concerning the identifica