Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT RENDELL, Circuit Judge: In August of 1985, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Fredric Jermyn of the murder of his' mother, and sentenced him to death. In his habeas petition, Jermyn raises numerous claims, focusing upon his history of mental illness, his trial counsel’s self-professed ineffective representation, and the gulf between the evidence presented at trial and the evidence presented at a hearing conducted in 1995 as part of Jermyn’s state court pursuit of collateral relief (“PCRA”). At his PCRA hearing, several lay and expert witnesses described the horrible physical and mental abuse Jermyn suffered as a child at the hands of his father, the impact this abuse had on his adult life and his mental illness, and the role his mother played in the household. Reviewing the fourteen claims Jermyn presented as part of his federal habeas petition, the District Court granted him penalty-phase relief requiring the Commonwealth to provide Jermyn with a new penalty-phase hearing, or to sentence him to life imprisonment. Jermyn appeals, asking that we overturn his conviction. The Commonwealth cross-appeals, arguing that the District Court erred in granting a new penalty-phase hearing. After considering -all the arguments presented, we conclude that the District Court properly denied,Jermyn’s claims challenging the validity of his conviction. Jermyn has not demonstrated that the Pennsylvania courts’ adjudication of Jermyn’s guilt-phase claims “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the ■ Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented....” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, we will deny Jermyn relief on his appeal insofar as he sought a new trial on the issue of his guilt. While we will affirm the District Court’s disposition of those guilt-phase claims essentially for the reasons set forth in its exhaustive opinion in this matter, see Jermyn v. Horn, Í998 WL 754567 (M.D.Pa. Oct.27, 1998), we will address three of the guilt-phase claims that present more complex issues and therefore require discussion. Specifically, we will consider: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective in presenting Jermyn’s insanity defense; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to'request a competency hearing or evaluation; and (3) whether Jermyn’s due process rights were violated by the trial court’s permitting him to be tried while incompetent, and its failure to order a competency evaluation or hearing on its own motion. We also will deny the Commonwealth’s cross-appeal, as we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Jermyn is entitled to a new penalty hearing based upon his claim that his counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial, although our reasoning differs from that of the District Court. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in all respects. I. A. The Murder On the afternoon of January 1, 1985, police found Jermyn’s mother dead in' her bedroom. The door to her bedroom was locked from the inside and the police used a screwdriver to enter. The police came to the house after Jermyn called complaining of a “stink” coming from his mother’s room. An autopsy revealed that Jermyn’s mother had been beaten unconscious, but had died from smoke inhalation from her mattress which had been set afire. For many years before the murder, beginning after the death of his father, Jer-myn had lived with his mother. He was diagnosed by the Veterans’ Administration (“V.A.”) in 1976 as a paranoid schizophrenic, and accordingly disabled. The V.A. paid him benefits, although at times Jermyn was employed and owned his own small business. Towards the end of 1984, Jermyn’s relationship with his mother deteriorated. Later evidence suggests that the relationship deteriorated in part because Jermyn failed to take his anti-psychotic medication, which had been consistently prescribed for him. See Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 15 Crim. 1985, slip op. at 26 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Jan. 4, 1996) (hereinafter “PCRA Op.”). As a result'of their deteriorating relationship, Jermyn’s mother revoked her will so that it no longer named Jermyn as her sole heir and executor. The new will bequeathed her house and her estate to hex-niece, Sharon Isralow, unless she chose not live in the house and Jermyn’s mother died from natural causes. In that case, Jermyn was entitled to half the proceeds from the sale of the home. B. Pretrial Proceedings We will recount portions of the pretrial proceedings in detail because they are relevant to Jermyn’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a competency evaluation or hearing, and his claim that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial in failing to order a hearing on its own motion. After the murder, Jermyn was arrested on January 4, 1985, and taken into custody. Before being arrested, he was interrogated by the Police. On one occasion, a Police officer insinuated that Jermyn had killed his mother. According to the testimony the officer gave at trial, Jermyn responded: “Well, if you feel frog-gy go ahead and arrest me.” While in pre-trial custody, Jermyn, who is diabetic, refused to take his medication, and the trial court signed three orders for involuntary medical treatment to test his blood sugar levels. App. at 26-28. Jermyn’s first attorney was Edward Guido, Esq. of the Cumberland County Public Defender’s Office. After the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty, Guido noticed an insanity defense, and listed an individual named John Hume, M.D., as a potential witness who could be called testify on the issue of Jermyn’s sanity at the time of the crime. Trial Tr. V.l, at 209a. The following day, April 10, 1985, Guido filed a motion for a continuance because “the defendant has retained Dr. John M. Hume to assist in the preparation of a potential psychiatric defense,” but “[t]o date, no psychiatric evaluation has been conducted on the defendant to specifically determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial, or to specifically determine whether the defendant was criminally responsible for the commission of the crimes charged.” Id. at 213-14a (emphasis added). The trial court granted the continuance. Id. at 225a. During the same time period, Cumberland County filed a motion to vacate Guido’s appointment because Jermyn had sufficient funds to pay for his own defense, and the Court granted that motion on May 7, 1985. Jermyn acted pro se for approximately one month. On or about June 11, 1985, Jermyn retained Gary Lysaght, Esq., the attorney who represented Jermyn at trial and whose ineffectiveness is at issue before us. On June 14, 1985, Lysaght filed a supplemental notice of an insanity defense, but the second notice did not include Dr. Hume’s name as an individual who might be called to testify. It did, however, list Paul Phillips, M.D., who eventually evaluated Jermyn on the issue of his insanity and testified on his behalf during the guilt phase of his trial. In July 1985, Lysaght filed a motion seeking dismissal of the criminal complaint pursuant to Pa. R.Crim. P. 1100, claiming that Jermyn’s right to trial within 180 days of the complaint had been violated. At a hearing on the motion, Guido testified as to the reasons for the delay, and in particular, the reason that he sought a continuance in April. During the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Lys-aght (the examiner) and Guido (the witness): Q. Mr. Guido, I believe you became involved in the case somewhere around January 8, 1985. At that time is it fair to say that you had requested Dr. Hume to perform some kind of initial comprehensive psychiatric examination during the month of January, and in fact he did conduct such an examination and relay that to you? Is that a fair statement? A. That’s correct. Although I would indicate that Dr. Hume did not feel that he could form any opinion on the basis of just one meeting with Mr. Jermyn and felt that additional meetings would be necessary. Q. Now did Dr. Hume at that time cause you to believe through such an examination that Frederic Jer-myn was in fact competent to stand trial? A. I think that what Dr. Hume gave to me would be privileged on behalf of my client, and I am wondering if Mr. Jermyn is willing to waive that privilege right now. I am not sure I am at liberty to answer that. Q. Was Frederic Jermyn ever judicially adjudged to be incompetent to stand trial. A. Not that I am aware of. Q. Now sir, between January 16 and April 17 was there any further correspondence between you and Dr. Hume? A. I believe there was no correspondence. There was substantial telephone contact where I attempted to reach him. He was a very difficult man to reach during that period of time. Q. Now on April 17th, one day after your request for a continuance ... A. It was one week after my request. My request was made April 10th. Q. Excuse me, one day after the hearing on your motion for continuance, you then sent another letter to Dr. Hume requesting him to perform more testing, is that correct? A. I would have to check my file. That sounds correct. I may have also told him or I should have told him that the case was continued. (Attorney Lysaght gives Mr. Guido paper to examine.) That’s correct. Q. So on April 17th, one day after the hearing on your continuance, you sent a letter to Dr. Hume requesting more of an examination of your client. A. That’s correct, only because he had not been responding to my telephone request to him to get up to see Mr. Jermyn, and, as I recall, I think you would have to have Dr. Hume here, as I recall, he or his office informed me that he would not be available during the week of April 29th, if I am not mistaken. I may be mistaken on that. And Dr. Hume and I did meet in my office, we did meet in my office on "one occasion I believe before April 17th, because I was taken off the case shortly after April 17th, so it would have to have been before April 17th. Q. Now is it true that Dr. Hume again saw Frederic Jermyn on the 24th of April to perform yet another examination at your request. A. That’s my understanding. With a follow-up report not reaching me until the 21st of May. Trial Tr. V.l, at 339-41a. Thus, the record reflects the fact that Dr. Hume evaluated Jermyn prior to trial to determine his competency to stand trial and his sanity, and it also confirms that Guido had received at least one written report from Hume that presumably addressed those issues. Ultimately, the Court denied the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1100, and the matter proceeded to trial. C. The Trial The trial began in August. The prosecution presented testimony for one and a half days. The defense case lasted a little more than three hours. The entire penalty phase, including evidence, closing arguments and the jury charge took less that two hours, including a twenty minute recess. During the guilt phase, the Commonwealth connected the bruises on Jermyn’s mother’s body to a studded armband Jer-myn had been seen wearing on the night of December 31, 1984, the night before his mother was found dead, and provided expert testimony to prove that her bed had been set on fire intentionally. The Commonwealth contended that the new will, and the decision to evict Jermyn, was Jer-myn’s motive for murder, and also presented two witness who testified that Jer-myn told them that he had killed his mother. According to Eugene Gramm, Jermyn had talked of his intention to kill his mother after receiving the eviction notice, and the day after her murder had tried to tell him that he had killed her. Dean Barnes, whom Jermyn met in prison, testified that Jermyn told him that he was glad he “torched that bitch.” Barnes also testified that Jermyn told him that he intended to support his insanity defense by telling the jury that his mother came from satan, and by reading a poem to the jury. The Commonwealth entered the poem into the record. Jermyn’s unsuccessful defense was based on two arguments. Counsel contended that Jermyn’s mother, a heavy smoker, had accidentally started the fire while Jermyn was out on New Year’s Eve. He argued, in the alternative, that if Jer-myn had killed her, he had been insane at the time. Jermyn put on seven witnesses in support of his two defenses. The first witness, William McBride, supported the accidental death theory, and testified briefly that people do set fire to their bed by smoking. Trial Tr. V.2, at 678a-682a. The second and third witnesses, Richard Rosario and Rhonda Sue Fettrow, testified in aid of impeaching the credibility of Gramm and Barnes. Id. at 683a-693a. The fourth witness was Gloria Seilor, a friend of Jermyn’s whom he thought of as his girlfriend. Seilor testified briefly about Jermyn’s “odd” beliefs and “odd” poetry. According to Seilor, Jermyn was not “normal.” For example, Seilor explained that Jermyn believed he was Jupiter, the Roman god, while she was Juno, Jupiter’s wife, and that he thought he had supreme or supernatural powers. Id. at 693a-703a. The defense called Reverend Falk as Jermyn’s fifth witness. On direct examination, Reverend Falk began by explaining that he knew Jermyn as a friend during the third, fourth and fifth grades. See id. at 704a. Their friendship ended when Jer-myn left home to attend the Scotland School in about the eighth grade. Falk explained that Jermyn was sent away to school because he had gotten into trouble for bringing pornographic pictures to school, and hypothesized that Jermyn was sent away because “Mildred was having a hard time handling him with Fred, Senior’s physical situation being what it was.” Id. at 708a. Jermyn’s counsel asked Reverend Falk whether Jermyn’s childhood had been “unusual” in any way. Falk answered, explaining the Jermyn had seemed rejected, and had spent a lot of time in his room. Falk also testified that Jermyn’s father was “kind of scary” but that Falk was not afraid of him. Id. at 705a. Falk said that he did not feel that Jermyn was “unusual” as a child. Id. Describing Jermyn’s relationship with his parents, Falk explained that “[i]t was a constant state of who was going to win any particular argument, or whatever was going on at the house, whose personality was going to prevail, that kind of thing, which was usually his mother.” Id. at 706a. Counsel asked Falk about Jermyn’s relationship with his father and whether Jermyn’s father ever beat or abused Jermyn. Falk answered that “[i]t was a tense relationship with his father and Fred told me that his father beat him, you know, on a weekly basis,” id. at 707a, and also explained that he had seen marks on Jermyn’s back on two occasions and that Jermyn had pointed out to him what Jermyn’s father had used to hit him, see id. at 708a. Falk also testified that for a while, Jermyn did not eat with his parents because “his father was mad at him for some reason.” Id. Falk said that he never saw Jermyn’s father act violently towards Jermyn. Falk also answered “not around me” when asked by counsel if he was aware of whether Jermyn’s father provided Jermyn with a gun when he was a child. Id. at 709a. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Falk whether, “[i]n your role as a pastor, it is uncommon for young children, going through from say fifth grade on until the eighth grade, to fight with their parents?” Falk answered,- “I think it’s a natural .thing for all children to push the limits of the authority of the parent, yeah.” Id. at 710a. Jermyn’s counsel did not ask any questions on redirect. Dr. Phillips, a psychiatrist, testified next. Lysaght had retained Dr. Phillips to provide his opinion concerning Jermyn’s insanity at the time of the offense. While it is not clear from the record the exact date that he was retained, our review of the proceedings confirms that Lysaght contacted him at least by June 14, 1985, about two months before the trial began, because Dr. Phillips was listed in the-supplemental insanity notice that Lysaght filed with the court shortly after Jermyn retained his services. Trial Tr. V.l, at 302a-303a. Dr. Phillips explained that Jermyn was, in his opinion, a chronic paranoid schizophrenic. Dr. Phillips based his diagnosis on a consultation with Jermyn, and the corroboration provided by Jermyn’s V.A. records that stretched from 1976 to 1984 and included the records of periodic reevaluations. Dr. Phillips confirmed that the V.A. records “consistently documented and ... supported the diagnosis of a chronic paranoid schizophrenia.” Trial Tr. V.2, at 715a. Dr. Phillips described the relevant criteria -for a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and noted that Jermyn met each criterion, including a .history of hallucinations, delusions, and grandiose thoughts beginning in his mid-twenties. He also provided his opinion that it is difficult to “fake” mental illness to receive V.A. benefits, and reminded the jury again that several V.A. physicians over a period of - time had diagnosed him consistently with the disease. Id. at 724a~729a. He also confirmed that Jermyn received total disability from the V.A. based on its determination that he was totally unable to work. Id. at 725a. Jermyn’s counsel then asked Dr. Phillips whether Jermyn’s paranoid schizophrenia meant that Jermyn would have understood the nature and quality of his acts at the time he killed his mother. Dr. Phillips answered that: He told me ... a lot of things, but specific to this question, he told me that at the time of the alleged incident he believed that he, this is a very strange thought, he described himself as the .fidget of god. . I spelled it F-I-D-G-ET, and I had to ask him what did he mean by that because I didn’t know what a fidget of god is, and he stated that that is, as best as I could understand it, someone who has a very special relationship with God, could be equal to God at sometimes, but that he had these superior powers, he was above earthlings, and that he felt that his mother was the devil and that he was justified in, because he had said he was innocent, and I said innocent means you didn’t do anything at all. He said, “Well, there is justifiable homicide if God is killing the devil is essentially what it amounted to.” Trial Tr. V.2, at 728a. On cross-exaniination, the prosecutor challenged Dr. Phillips’ diagnosis by noting that some psychiatrists consider paranoid schizophrenia to be a “myth,” and by suggesting that Jermyn was an highly intelligent individual capable of manifesting the symptoms necessary to receive government benefits for schizophrenia. After Dr. Phillips agreed that Jermyn was an intelligent individual and acknowledged that a leading psychiatric textbook stated that “some psychiatrists call schizophrenia a myth or metaphor,” id. at 735a, 752a-61a, Dr. Phillips nevertheless reaffirmed his diagnosis with reference again to the V.A. records. He also restated his opinion that Jermyn could have been legally insane when he killed his mother, noting that “he has the capacity to have times when he seriously can have problems telling what is right and what is wrong. He has the morality at times which is above society.” Id. at 767a. On cross-examination, Dr. Phillips also discussed evidence in the V.A. records that Jermyn regularly refused to take his anti-psychotic medication. Id. at 759a, 762a. During cross-examination, the Commonwealth also asked Dr. Phillips what sources of information he used in forming his opinion as to Jermyn’s mental illness. The following exchange took place: Q. Is there anything else — well specifically ... A. No, that’s a good question. There were other things, I did have some other reports, in particular there was a psychiatric report by Dr. Hasselbacher who saw Mr. Jermyn for a social security evaluation that was part of the records. That occurred, I believe, sometime in 1983. And I also saw a report from Dr. John Hume who was, I believe, requested by the defense to see him [Jermyn] for the question of competency to stand trial. I may be overlooking something, but I had a lot of records. Q. So at least with regard to this case, you know Dr. Hume, a psychiatrist, saw the defendant, and you did get a report from him, and that was whether or not he was competent to stand trial. A. That was the primary goal of the report, yes. Trial Tr. V.2, at 739-740a. On redirect examination, Dr. Phillips agreed with counsel that at least “eight to ten” mental health professionals diagnosed Jermyn with a psychosis rather than a mere personality disorder, and conveyed again that it was difficult to “fake” psychosis in order to receive disability benefits from the V.A. Id. at 772a. Counsel did not ask Dr. Phillips to explain specific entries in the V.A. records that supported his diagnosis, and he did not attempt to rebut the assertion that schizophrenia is a myth and not a real disease. He also did not make any reference to Dr. Hume’s report. Additionally, throughout Dr. Phillips’ testimony, Jermyn's counsel did not ask him any questions about Jermyn’s childhood, even though counsel knew that Dr. Phillips had discussed those matters with Jermyn prior to trial. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Dr. Phillips whether he chronically violated rules at home, and Dr. Phillips testified: “My understanding is he was a difficult child.” Id. at 764a. Jermyn took the stand as the last witness- in his defense. He answered a few foundational questions before his counsel asked him whether “this experience” had been stressful. Id. at 781a.' Jermyn answered “No.” Id. Counsel asked whether the experience caused him to write some poetry. Jermyn answered “Yes,” and counsel invited Jermyn to read the poetry to the jury. The Commonwealth objected, and the objection was sustained. Id. Trial counsel rested, and the court instructed the jury- to- ignore Jermyn’s testimony in whole. The defense’s entire presentation lasted a little more than three hours. That evening, the jury found Jermyn guilty of murder. See id. at 888. The penalty phase took place the next morning. During the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth relied upon the evidence presented during the guilt phase, and presented only a closing argument. Jermyris counsel recalled Seilor, presented Scott Spraglin, a Cumberland County Prison official, and entered Jermyn’s V.A. records into evidence accompanied by an index prepared by counsel. Both witnesses testified that Jermyn should not be sentenced to death because he would be a positive member of the prison population. Seilor added to her prior testimony, discussing Jermyn’s relationship with his mother; “in some ways I thought there was a closeness, although they said they didn’t speak.” Trial Tr. V.3, at 1075a. Jermyn also spoke to the jury, and voluntarily read a poem to the jurors. Well, I see that you have decided that I am insane, That or guilty doesn’t matter, but you must make plain which it is. In the future you must make a choice, What you want to listen to, mine or Satan’s voice. I killed Satan, I admit that, so is that a crime? Earth it is, live with it all through the rest of time. You, in essence, are admitting you prefer his ways over God’s. If that is so, no need for you to pray. If, on the other hand, you find that I am insane, I judge that your society is actually insane. It never dawned on you that I might really be the way I really am And truth is just exactly what I say. Did you ever stop to think from where all mankind originates, That one of you might think on this and try to tell you straight. Of course not. So what have you, war, disease and pain and fear, And enjoy them people. Enjoy them, people. I could help, but you don’t want to hear. Destroy each other. Though I care, you’ve made it clear that you don’t care for God or any arts of Him, you don’t care. Trial Tr. V.3, at 1085a-1086a. In closing arguments, Jermyn’s trial counsel reminded the jury of the evidence of Jermyn’s mental illness. The great majority of his argument, however, focused upon Jermyn’s childhood, the lack of love he received from his parents, and the strange relationship that grew between Jermyn and his mother. Fred Jermyn and his parents, from the time he was a small child, never got along. There was never love in that family. You have heard about his father when he was five beating him as a child, you heard about his mother. Ladies and gentlemen, Fred was sent away from his home when he was thirteen years old to the Scotland School for boys because his parents did not want to cope with him. They had their own lives and their own problems. His father took a loaded 38 pistol one time and said to Fred, right before Fred was thirteen years old, his father took a loaded 38 pistol and gave it to Fred and said, “Here, Fred, blow your brains out.” His mother made many statements to him as a child, “Fred, why don’t you just kill me now,” but yet Mrs. Jermyn lived with her son, that strange relationship, for all those years, ever since 1976, they would live in the same house together and only one time did she ever try to kick her son out of the house. That relationship had to be something that you and I will never understand. Id. at 1089a. Here we have a situation where two people who don’t get along but yet they live together for all this time, a mother who has rejected her son at the age of thirteen, a mother who has always been afraid of her husband, a mother who cannot understand her son, a mother who always expected too much of her son, and a son who was hard to love to begin with because of whatever reason. Id. at 1090a. There is no excuse for murder. But if a child is abused, if a child is unloved, if a child is being rejected, once again, by his mother, thirteen years old, even if that is the most errant child in the world, even if the child deserves discipline, there is discipline and there is direction that don’t exceed our common bounds of decency. Id. at 1092a. When your mother kicks you out of the house when you are a young kid, when your mother beats you or acquiesces to beating, your mother yells at you so she doesn’t get yelled at by her husband who is a drunk. Ladies and gentlemen, ... when you consider his upbringing, when you consider what his mother did to him when he was young, when you consider that his mother all of a sudden does the same thing she did to Fred Jermyn when Fred was thirteen, she said, “Get out of the house and go away,” when you consider what [ejffect that might have had on this brain at the time, it’s mitigating, its quite possible, and it’s probable that that was too close, that struck too close to the core of what Fred Jermyn was and Fred Jermyn had to fight within himself for his whole life. Id. at 1093-1094a. In closing, the prosecutor — as had been a theme in his questioning — argued that Jermyn had faked the symptoms of mental illness. The prosecutor also attacked counsel’s effort to blame Jermyn’s mother, and told the jury there was no evidence of the incident with the gun. Now one interesting thing we heard a comment this morning about some incident with the 38. Now would that have been something that psychiatrists would have wanted to know, an important event in this man’s life? Well I’ve read this book [the V.A. records] and I have looked at these documents, you read it and you see where that inference is or why it just surfaced today, or is that just another one of the things that has come from his mouth to justify what he did. Id. at 1103a. The court instructed the jury, reminding them that they were the factfinders and should ignore what the court and counsel had told them about the facts if they recalled the facts differently. The jury found one aggravating factor, namely, that the murder had been committed while Jer-myn was also committing a second felony, arson endangering persons. The prosecution stipulated to one mitigating factor: that Jermyn had no significant history of prior criminal convictions. The jury found two other mitigating factors: that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that there was other mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense. The jury sentenced Jermyn to death. See id. at 1113-14. Jermyn’s conviction was upheld on direct review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Com,- monwealth v. Jermyn, 516 Pa. 460, 533 A.2d 74 (1987). D. Collateral Proceedings The procedural history of Jermyn’s appeal is ably described by the District Court. Jermyn v. Horn, 1998 WL 754567, at * 1-4. In brief, his direct appeals were denied, and he proceeded to seek collateral relief, which was ultimately denied by the Pennsylvania' Supreme Court on his second PCRA petition in 1998, thereby exhausting his state remedies. Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 551 Pa. 96, 709 A.2d 849 (1998). An evidentiary hearing on Jermyn’s second PCRA petition was held by the original trial court in 1995. Jermyn presented eight witnesses: Sharon Isralow, his cousin and the beneficiary under his mother’s will; Sharon’s mother, Esther Isralow; Jermyn’s trial lawyer, Gary Lysaght, Esq.; the lawyer’s trial investigator, Nicholas Ressetter; Dr. Phillips; and three clinical psychologists. The Commonwealth did not present any testimony or evidence, which the PCRA court explained was “not surprising given the credibility of the Isra-lows and the experts.” PCRA Op. at 30. The court limited the hearing to evidence supporting Jermyn’s claim that his counsel had been ineffective at sentencing for failing to investigate and present evidence of his childhood. The Isralows testified about extraordinary abuse perpetrated by Jermyn’s far ther, including beatings, the constant threat of beatings, and other emotional abuse. Sharon Isralow told the PCRA court that Jermyn’s father used to beat him with a cat-o’-nine tails, a steel crutch, and his hands. She also testified that Jermyn’s father showed him no affection, and eventually banished him from his presence. The family, would use the kitchen door to enter the house, but Jermyn would have to come in the front door and immediately go up the stairs to an attic room to avoid confrontation with his father. He was not permitted to eat meals with his father. On occasion when Sharon Isralow and her mother came to visit, and Jermyn was in the fifth or sixth grade, he was chained to a dog leash near a red dog-food bowl that had human food in it. ■ According to Sharon Isralow, Jermyn did not provoke his father’s behavior. He was “helpless and out of control in that situation.” Eventually, Jermyn’s relationship with his father deteriorated to the point that Jermyn’s mother placed him in the Scotland School, a residential school for “orphans” or “unwanted' children,” to get Jermyn out of the family home. Jer-myn’s father did not visit him at the school, and his father died while Jermyn was living there. The PCRA court’s opinion described the content and credibility of the Isralows’ testimony: [Sharon] Isralow, who works, for the . United States State Department, is an intelligent, sensitive and credible witness. She testified to personal knowledge that petitioner’s father was a mean, , cruel, vicious, intimidating bully who hated petitioner. On many occasions she observed the father’s degrading and humiliating treatment of his son. She never saw the father show any affection to his son. Isralow’s testimony is replete with her recollections of specific incidents showing horrendous mistreatment and abuse of petitioner by his father. Decedent, while generally protective of her son, was unable to protect him from his father’s fury. In 1962, when petitioner was 14, decedent arranged'for him to enter the residential Scotland School for Veterans’ Children in Franklin .County, Pennsylvania. Petitioner never saw his father again. Petitioner lived at the Scotland School until he graduated in 1967. From 1962 when he entered the Scotland School, until his father died in the late 1960’s, petitioner never went home. However, his mother did visit him at the school. Isralow’s perception was that petitioner was the lighting [sic] rod for his father’s cruelty, and that his mother was worn down and unable to protect him when he was in the father’s presence. When he was younger she observed that petitioner was withdrawn. As he got older he was delusional, and his conduct became bizarre. He became dysfunctional, reclusive and unproductive. Isra-low visited petitioner at the Scotland School and later lived with petitioner and his mother for a year in 1974 before she graduated from college. She kept in contact with her aunt thereafter, and was aware that petitioner kept his mother’s house in shambles. As the years passed, Isralow observed that petitioner’s conduct become more bizarre, cold, and calculating. He became more delusional. The testimony was supported by Esther Isralow, age 80, the mother of Sharon Isralow, who was also a credible witness. Esther Isralow was aware that her sister was unable to protect petitioner from her husband’s abuse. She testified that her sister tried to appease her husband, but that it never changed his conduct towards his son. PCRA Op. at 25. The Scotland School records corroborate the Isralows’ discussion of Jermyn’s home life, and, in fact, Jermyn’s counsel’s closing arguments during the penalty phase of Jermyn’s trial. A report written in June 1962, explains: “His wife [Jermyn’s mother], who is much older than he is, (in fact looks more like his mother) is a pathetic figure. She and the boy are obviously very much afraid of this ‘cripple.’ She tried to explain his violent temper, and his hatred and mistreatment of the boy tacitly, but was quickly squelched.” App. 24. Another letter in the school records explained: “Mrs. Jermyn suffers with this situation. She is torn between loyalty and need for both the father and son but is unable to move away from her husband.” Id. Dr. Phillips and other mental health experts testified that Jermyn’s childhood experiences were replete with physical and psychological abuse. Several of them opined that this was one of the more severe, if not the most extreme, example of childhood abuse and neglect they had seen. Moreover, all of the experts concluded that Jermyn’s childhood experience contributed significantly to his mental illness which they diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia. They further agreed that Jermyn’s illness impacted upon his thought processes when he killed his mother, and there was testimony to the effect that he was insane at the time. See, e.g., App. 10, at 63, 117, 147. According to Dr. Phillips, Jermyn told him during his initial consultation that his mother was the devil. App. 10, at 20. Nonetheless, he also expressed love for his mother. When asked about that inconsistency, Dr. Phillips explained that “a schizophrenic has the unique-virtually unique capacity to love and hate the same object at the same time.” App. 10, at 21. Dr. Phillips further stated that when he originally evaluated Jermyn for trial, Jer-myn told him about his abused childhood, App. 13, at ¶ 4, and he gave Dr. Phillips detailed examples of the physical abuse that his father had inflicted upon him. Dr. Phillips also testified that he relayed the information he knew about Jermyn’s childhood to his counsel, and attempted to explain to him the significance of his childhood in understanding why Jermyn acted the way that he did. According to Dr. Phillips, Jermyn’s counsel failed to appreciate the significance of Jermyn’s background in explaining his adult behavior, and never questioned him about it. App. 10, at 29; App. 13, at ¶ 13. Nonetheless, Dr. Phillips testified that he expected to be asked at trial about the psychiatric importance of Jermyn’s childhood in understanding Jermyn’s mental illness and adult behavior, and also to be called to testify during the penalty phase. App. 13, at ¶¶ 15, 22. Dr. Phillips submitted a declaration in the PCRA proceedings in which he stated that “[t]here certainly was overwhelming mitigating evidence about [Jer-myn’s] childhood physical torture and emotional abuse, and the effects of this background on his overall functioning and mental state as an adult.” App. 13, at ¶ 22. However, counsel did not call Dr. Phillips as a witness in the penalty phase, and counsel failed to introduce any mitigating evidence concerning Jermyn’s childhood abuse during that portion of the trial. Jermyn’s trial counsel, Gary Lysaght, Esq., also testified at the hearing and filed an affidavit. Lysaght explained that at the time of the trial he was out of law school less than two years, this was his first capital case, and the first case he had tried which involved mental health issues. App. 20, at ¶ 3; App. 9, at 123. He indicated that he did not hire an independent investigator and that he had several other cases and clients that consumed a large amount of his time prior to Jermyn’s trial. App. 20, at ¶ 3. He testified that “I was overwhelmed at the time, and that’s an accurate assessment of my state of mind and my degree of preparation.” App. 9, at 141. Lysaght testified that, in preparing for trial, he learned that Jermyn was abused during his childhood. He also confirmed that Dr. Phillips tried to discuss with him the significance of his childhood experiences, how they impacted upon Jermyn’s adult functioning, and why those experiences mitigated against the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 151, 709 A.2d 849; App. 20, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 12. However, Lysaght explained in his PCRA affidavit that he “did not pay appropriate attention to what [Dr. Phillips] was telling me.” App. 20 at ¶ 5. Lysaght confirmed that he engaged in “minimal preparation for capital sentencing before the trial.” Id. at ¶ 11. He explained that when the guilty verdict came in, he was “devastated,” and that he “had no idea how to actually conduct a capital sentencing hearing.” Id. Lysaght confirmed that Dr. Phillips had told him prior to trial that he was willing to testify at the penalty phase concerning Jermyn’s abusive childhood and its mitigating effects and impact on his adult life. However, as noted, counsel did not call Dr. Phillips as a witness during the penalty phase, and Lys-aght admitted that there was no tactical reason for proceeding through the penalty phase without testimony from Dr. Phillips on this issue. App. 9, at 132. According to Lysaght, it was not until the end of the sentencing hearing that he realized the importance of Jermyn’s childhood to his defense, which was why he made reference to the problems, as he then knew of them, in his closing argument. App. 20, at ¶ 12. However, he had not presented any evidence of the facts he recited in his closing argument; instead, he offered evidence from people he barely knew, much less prepared. See App. 9, at 132, 135; App. 20, at ¶ 9. He explained that after the guilty verdict came in, he “scrambled around and put on brief testimony from Señor and Spraglin.” App. 20, at ¶ 11. Counsel also testified that there was no tactical reason for his failure to investigate Jermyn’s chüdhood, and admitted that he had made no effort to contact any members of Jermyn’s family. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. He confirmed that he knew Sharon Isra-low was Jermyn’s cousin and the named beneficiary in the victim’s will. Id. at ¶ 8; App. 9, at 127-28. When counsel later found out the substance of the testimony the Isralows could have provided, he was “shocked,” describing it as a “bombshell.” App. 9, at 125. Counsel also admitted that he knew that the Scotland School was for “orphans” or “unwanted children,” and that Jermyn was sent there by his parents, but did not investigate further or present evidence to that effect. App. 9, at 128-29. Lysaght’s law clerk, Nicholas Ressetter, also testified during the PCRA proceeding, and filed an affidavit. He explained that Jermyn’s lawyer and he “lacked direction,” and they talked to only a few witnesses including Señor, Falk and Spraglin. See App. 21, at ¶¶ 21-22. He also confirmed that Lysaght had not planned for the penalty phase. Rather, “the verdict came in on a Friday late afternoon, and Gary more or less told me to try and arrange for some mercy witnesses to be there the next morning, Saturday, which I did into the night.” App. 9, at 167. In his PCRA affidavit, Reverend Falk confirmed that Jermyn told him that his father abused him as a child, but that he had no first-hand knowledge of the extent of the abuse. He explained to the PCRA court that he only had one brief conversation with Lysaght or someone from his office before testifying at the trial, and that he indicated at that time that he would not be the best witness about Jer-myn’s childhood because he could not recall all that Jermyn had told him. See App. 22, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 9. On cross-examination, counsel for the Commonwealth asked Jermyn’s lawyer whether Jermyn had told him about the chüdhood abuse. Jermyn’s counsel answered, explaining the difficulties he had faced communicating with Jermyn: I don’t recall, Mr. Eakin. Fred — you do not have — I did not have a normal conversation with Fred Jermyn during the preparation of this trial. If you ever try to have a conversation with him— well, forget that. But it was difficult for me to communicate with Fred given the extent of his problem, let’s say. I don’t want to characterize it as insanity or mental health. App. 9, at 154. On redirect, Jermyn’s PCRA counsel asked Jermyn’s trial counsel to elaborate. Q. You indicated you never had a normal conversation with Fred. Was that because of his mental problems? A. I would not say — perhaps I used a too strong a word. Q. Yeah. A. Never is an absolute, but very infrequently during my jaühouse visits to him or during court sessions or during court recesses or in the preparation of this. It was very difficult, if not impossible, for me to have what I would perceive as a logical, orderly, help me out with this, Freddie, type of conversation. Q. And my question is, was that because of his mental problems? A. I don’t know that I am competent to say whether it was because of his insanity or because he was— Q. Your perception as a lawyer, you had a client— A. I had a client that it was extremely difficult for me to relate to and me to join with, bond to, and proceed in an orderly and directional fashion • towards our goal of successfully 'presenting a defense and avoiding the imposition of the death penalty, be it through my inability to relate to him or his inability to relate to me, but, yes, I put it to his mental condition. Q. That’s what I’m getting at. You had VA records that indicated a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia? A. Yeah. Q. Dr. Phillips told you your client is.a paranoid schizophrenic? A. Yes. Q. You believed that? A. I believe that Freddie is severely mentally disturbed if not insane. I don’t know whether we are using these terms interchangeably. I don’t know whether I can testify to labeling him insane, but-1 thought he was nuts. Q. And you saw that yourself when you dealt with him? A. Yeah, I saw bizarre behavior, whether it was acting out, what caused it, whether it was real, whether it was imagined, whatever, it was very difficult to deal with his behavior because it was abnormal and it was bizarre. And I didn’t feel that it was helping me to try and help him, and it was probably because of his mental illness. App. 9, at 155-57. The PCRA court denied each of Jer-myn’s claims, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. On his federal ha-beas petition, the District Court addressed fourteen separate claims. As we previously mentioned, the District Court denied relief on all of the .guilt-phase claims, but granted Jermyn relief pertaining to the penalty phase based on the conclusion that Jermyn’s trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate, develop and pres^ ent mitigating evidence of the history of Jermyn’s family relationships and childhood. Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, the District Court-entered an order granting Jermyn a certificate of appeala-bility (“CAPP”) pertaining to the remaining claims the Court rejected as grounds for habeas relief. See .Order of 12/10/98 (“A Certificate of Appealability is issued with respect to Claims II-VII, IX, and XI-XIV”). However, as we have indicated, we will address only three of Jermyn’s guilt-phase claims that we believe require further explication. We also will discuss in some detail Jermyn’s Sixth Amendment claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to present evidence concerning Jer-myn’s childhood, as the Sixth Amendment claim forms the basis for our grant of a new penalty hearing. II. Before we reach the merits of Jermyris claims, we must first address the Commonwealth’s argument that Jermyn is not entitled to raise those claims at this juncture because they are procedurally barred. The Commonwealth contends that the District Court erred in reaching the merits of Jermyris claims because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied relief on the procedural ground that the claims had been waived under state law and Jermyn had not demonstrated a “miscarriage of justice” that excused the waiver. The Commonwealth maintains that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of the miscarriage of justice standard to Jermyris claims provides us with an adequate and independent state ground to deny federal habeas relief. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 588-89, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). The Commonwealth’s argument is grounded on the principles of waiver and procedural default. To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and prove, inter alia, that the claims raised in the PCRA petition have “not been previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9543(a)(3). Because an issue is waived under the PCRA “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so ... in a prior state post-conviction proceeding,” id. § 9544(b), Pennsylvania courts will not address the merits of a claim that is presented in a second or subsequent petition for post-conviction relief “unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 709 A.2d at 855-56 (quoting and citing Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 534 Pa. 483, 633 A.2d 1098, 1099 (1993)); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988) (establishing “miscarriage of justice” standard). The doctrine of procedural default, in turn, prevents a federal habeas court from addressing a question of federal law decided by a state court “if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). We have previously explained that a state procedural rule is “adequate” only if the rule is “consistently or regularly applied.” Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Johnson, 486 U.S. at 588-89, 108 S.Ct. 1981); Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir.1996). “[T]hese conditions must have existed at the time of the state court procedural default.” Cabrera v. Barbo, 175 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir.1999). In the instant case, the District Court rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of the miscarriage of justice standard to Jermyn’s claims provided an adequate and independent ground for denying habeas relief. Relying on our previous decision in Banks, the District Court observed that “in death penalty cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not strictly enforce the waiver rule ... [and] it will often reach the merits of a claim regardless of whether a state procedural default would normally apply.” Jermyn v. Horn, 1998 WL 754567, at *4. Thus, according to the District Court’s reasoning, even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied relief in the instant case based on its application of the miscarriage of justice standard, the state procedural rule that it applied is not “adequate,” and therefore, it would not bar federal habeas review on the merits of Jermyn’s claims. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that our decision in Banks is controlling on this issue. There we engaged in a thorough review of Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinions to determine whether that court consistently or regularly declines to reach the merits of claims raised in second or subsequent PCRA petitions that may not meet the court’s criteria that there be a “ ‘strong prima facie showing ... that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.’ ” Banks, 126 F.3d at 211 (quoting Commonwealth v. Beasley, 544 Pa. 554, 678 A.2d 773, 777 (1996)). We concluded that, as of the date of Banks’ procedural default in 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had often reached the merits of issues raised in second PCRA petitions in capital cases notwithstanding the failure of the petitioner to satisfy the “miscarriage of justice” standard. Id. Accordingly, we held that the relevant case law indicated that “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not apply the Pennsylvania procedural bar rules consistently in death penalty cases.” Id. at 213. In light of our holding in Banks, we conclude that the District Court properly found that the state court’s application of the miscarriage of justice standard to Jermyn’s claims did not provide an- adequate and independent state ground for denying relief on the merits. Banks analyzed the consistency and regularity of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of state procedural bars up to the date of the petitioner’s default in 1995, and found that the cases were inconsistent. Here, Jermyn’s procedural default occurred in 1993., two years before Banks’ default. Thus, our previous analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent is directly applicable here, and we must conclude, as we did in Banks, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not consistently applied its procedural bar rules at the time that Jermyn procedurally defaulted his ineffectiveness claim. Accordingly, we reject the Commonwealth’s procedural default argument, and we will proceed to the merits of Jermyn’s claims. III. A. Applicable Legal Principles 1. Our Standard of Review under AEDPA In deciding this appeal, we must apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which states in relevant part: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.... 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), that the two clauses, “contrary to” and “unreasonable application,” have independent meaning. Id. at 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Hameen v. Ferguson, 212 F.3d 226, 234-35 (3d Cir.2000). As we explained in Harneen, the Supreme Court held in Williams that “under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Harneen, 212 F.3d at 235. We conclude that the Supreme Court has not addressed a case involving a “set of materially indistinguishable facts” on the issues we address here, and it did not reach a conclusion that is opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law. Therefore, we will review Jermyn’s claims through the lens of thé “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1). In Williams, the Supreme Court explained that “[u]nder the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In determining whether the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, the federal habeas court “should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495. “[U]nder the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ‘a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.’ ” Harneen, 212 F.3d at 235 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411,120 S.Ct. 1495). 2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In this case, the District Court granted relief on Jermyn’s claim that he was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence to the jury during the sentencing proceedings. Jermyn also claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s presentation of the insanity defense and counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing or evaluation from the trial court. Our analysis of Jermyn’s ineffectiveness claims are governed by the Supreme Court’s clearly established precedent of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To successfully present a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, Jermyn must establish first that counsel’s performance was deficient. “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The petitioner must demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” meaning “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing counsel’s performance, “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable. “That is to say, the ‘defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. This standard “is not a stringent one;” it is less demanding than the preponderance standard. Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir.1999). Strickland explains that “[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Similarly, “when a defendant challenges a death sentence, ... the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent that it independently weighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. Moreover, in assessing prejudice in the context of a determination regarding a defendant’s competency, the question is whether there was a reasonable probability that he would have been found incompetent to stand trial. Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 106 (3d Cir.1999). In determining whether the result of the proceeding might have been different, we must consider “the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (concluding that the state supreme court unreasonably applied Strickland because it “failed to evaluate the totality of the mitigating evidence — both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced at the habeas proceeding — in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation”). 3. Competence to Stand Trial A defendant has a due process right not to be tried while incompetent. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have “a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and must possess “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam). Due Process requires the trial court to inquire sua sponte as to the defendant’s competence in every case in which there is a reason to doubt the defendant’s competence to stand trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 173, 95 S.Ct. 896 (finding that Illinois statute, which required a court to grant competency hearing sua sponte if there was “reasonable cause to believe” that the defendant was incompetent, comported with due process, and that trial court’s failure to hold hearing despite indicia of incompetence violated defendant’s right to fair trial); Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. 836 (stating that failure to .hold competency hearing violated due process where state statute required trial court to order hearing where there was “reason to doubt” defendant’s competency, and the evidence was sufficient to put the trial court on notice of potential problem); United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 680 (3d Cir.1998) (finding that federal competency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, “requires a record-based judicial determination of competence in every case in which there is reason to doubt the defendant’s competence to stand trial,” and noting that “the Due Process Clause ... requires no less”); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 987 (3d Cir.1976) (“Although § 4244 does not say so explicitly, due process requires that the trial court inquire sua sponte into the defendant’s competence if there is reason to doubt it.”). Moreover,, counsel’s failure to request the trial court to order a hearing or evaluation on the issue of the defendant’s competency, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7402(c), (d), could violate the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel provided there are' sufficient indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the defendant’s competency, and there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been found incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised and fully considered. E.g., Hull, 190 F.3d at 106 (noting that defendant could establish the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim if there were sufficient indicia of incompetence and counsel failed to request a competency hearing). B. Jermyn’s Guilt Phase Claims As we have explained, Jermyn’s appeal relates to the District Court’s disposition of several of his guilt-phase claims, while the Commonwealth’s appeal challenges the Distric