Full opinion text
Opinion by Judge TROTT; Dissenting in Part by Judge KOZINSKI;' Dissenting in Part by Judge THOMAS. TROTT, Circuit Judge: I BACKGROUND On April 29, 1981, petitioner Warren Wesley Summerlin killed Brenna Bailey when she went to his residence on behalf of her employer to attempt to collect a delinquent debt. Summerlin bashed in Ms. Bailey’s head and skull, probably with a hatchet, wrapped her partially nude body in a bedspread, and discarded her remains in the locked trunk of her car. He was arrested a few days later, charged, and convicted under Arizona law of first degree murder and sexual assault, and sentenced by Superior Court Judge Philip Marquardt to death pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-703 (1982). The judge based his sentencing decision on two statutory grounds: (1) that the defendant had a prior felony conviction involving the use or threatened use of violence on another person, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), amended by A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2) (1993); and (2) that Summerlin committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed and affirmed his convictions and his sentence. State v. Summerlin, 138 Ariz. 426, 675 P.2d 686 (1983) (In Banc). After four unsuccessful post-conviction attempts in state court to overturn his conviction, he filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court in Arizona. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The district court rejected the petition as amended, but, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1), issued a certificate of probable cause enabling Sum-merlin to appeal. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) does not apply to this case because Summerlin’s petition was pending in district court prior to its enactment. See Lopez v. Thompson, 175 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir.1999). We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and 2254. II THE ISSUES Summerlin raises six cognizable grounds on appeal: 1. That his court-appointed public defender emerged from her one-night romantic relationship with the prosecutor with a fatal conflict of interest that adversely affected her representation of Summerlin at a critical stage of the proceedings; 2. That he was the victim of constitutionally deficient representation during the guilt phase of his trial by the attorney appointed to substitute for his public defender; 3. That he was the victim of constitutionally deficient representation in connection with the determination of his death sentence; 4. That the combined constitutional deficiencies of his trial attorney prejudiced his defense; 5. That the trial judge’s alleged use of and addiction to marijuana during pre-trial, trial, and sentencing proceedings, as evidenced by the judge’s admission of addiction and felony conviction in 1991 of a marijuana crime, deprived Summerlin of due process of law. 6. That the Arizona death penalty statute is unconstitutional in that it permits a judge rather than a jury to determine the elements necessary for a death sentence, in violation of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). We conclude that only Summerlin’s fifth claim regarding the trial judge has merit, and we reverse in this respect and remand for further proceedings as required by this opinion. As to his other claims, we affirm the judgment entered by the district court. Ill THE PLEA AGREEMENT AND THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST A. On November 17, 1981, Summerlin entered into a global plea agreement with the State known as an Alford plea. This arrangement enabled him without admitting guilt (1) to plead guilty to second degree murder and aggravated assault, and (2) to be sentenced accordingly. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). The plea carried with it a stipulated sentence for the murder of Ms. Bailey of twenty-one years, of which he would be required to serve fourteen. The global agreement also called for Summerlin to plead guilty to aggravated assault in a different case with a maximum sentence of fifteen years. Furthermore, under the agreement Summerlin admitted to violating his probation in yet another case charging burglary. Finally, the agreement stipulated that Summerlin’s sentences on the three charges would run concurrently. The hitch in this favorable agreement was that it was conditional. Judge David G. Derickson reserved the right to reject the provision for a stipulated sentence, in which case Summerlin could either (1) allow his plea to stand and be sentenced to a term of up to thirty-eight-and-one-half years, according to Judge Derickson’s sole discretion, or (2) withdraw from his plea of guilty and have the matters proceed to trial and disposition. At the time this plea was negotiated, Summerlin was represented by court-appointed Maricopa County public defender, Jane Roe. Prosecuting the case for the State was John Doe, a Maricopa County prosecutor. On the day he entered it, Summerlin properly answered all the questions required to validate his Alford plea. He had second thoughts a few days later, however, and formally sent to the court a pro se motion to withdraw from his plea and to fire his public defender. In a court appearance on December 15, 1981, scheduled to address his motion, Summer-lin openly registered dissatisfaction with the plea, the stipulated sentence, and Jane Roe’s handling of his case. As to the plea itself, Summerlin made his intentions crystal clear: The Court: But you’re saying you want to withdraw your plea of guilty? You want to withdraw your plea of guilty? The Defendant: Yes. Yes, sir. The Court: Do you understand that that would involve you going to trial on the original charges in this case and the probation violation? There aren’t going to be any agreements between the State and the defense on what the sentence might be if you’i'e convicted. Do you understand that? The Defendant: Yes, I understand that. After hearing his complaints, Judge Derickson denied Summerlin’s motions, but took the occasion to inform Summerlin that it was his intention on the upcoming sentencing date of December 18, 1981, not to. accept the stipulated sentence, and that therefore Summerlin would have the option either to withdraw from the plea, or to allow it to stand and be sentenced accordingly. Summerlin plainly understood the import of the judge’s message, stating, “So, you’re saying, on the 18th, if I want to withdraw from the plea agreement, I can? Is that what you’re saying?” Jane Roe responded: “So, you can either go with what he gives you more than that or get out of the plea and go to trial.” Realizing that her client’s intention to withdraw from the agreement would once again make him eligible for the death penalty, Jane Roe promptly attempted to have the case transferred to another judge who might look more favorably on the deal. On Friday, December 18, 1981, the presiding judge denied her forceful motion to disqualify Judge Derickson on the ground of prejudice towards her client and allowed Judge Derickson to continue with the case. That same evening, Jane Roe attended a Christmas party. She and prosecutor Doe left the party together and spent private time that night in what Doe later acknowledged under oath to have been an episode of “personal involvement ... of a romantic nature.” In a declaration dated October 12, 1984, prepared for state post-conviction proceedings, Jane Roe declared as follows: “I left [the Christmas party] with Mr. [Doe] and we spent time together that night, as a result of which I felt I could no longer ethically represent Mr. Summer-lin.” The day after the Christmas Party, Jane Roe began to grapple with the implications of her relationship with the prosecutor arising from what she had done the night before. According to her testimony in state post-conviction proceedings, her frame of mind was that because of what had occurred between herself and Mr. Doe, she could no longer function as Sum-merlin’s attorney. In her words, “I felt that I should get off this case,” and “that it would be appropriate for another Public Defender to handle the case and take it to trial, since it looked like it might be a trial at that point, because Mr. Summerlin indicated he wanted a trial and Derickson had indicated he was going to reject the plea.” Before we continue our discussion of the content of the record on this issue, however, we must dispose of another matter: whether the district court properly excluded from the record relevant evidence. In support of his conflict of interest claim, Summerlin offered to the district court affidavits executed in 1995 by percipient fact witnesses to (1) the existence of Ms. Roe’s conflict, and (2) the effect that the conflict had upon her. These witnesses were Ms. Roe’s immediate supervisor in the Public Defender’s Office, Bed-ford Douglass, Jr., and two co-workers, H. Allen Gerhardt and Charles Babbit. Sum-merlin offered also an affidavit from Judge Derickson explaining what he would have done at the December 22, 1981 plea-withdrawal hearing had he known of Ms. Roe’s predicament. In an Order dated July 18, 1996, the district court struck these patently relevant affidavits on the ground that they were not made a part of the state court post-conviction hearing during which the conflict of interest problem became an issue. With all respect to the district court, this ruling was erroneous. The lengthy record from the state court hearing held before Judge Marquardt demonstrates that the key conflict of interest question, i.e., whether the conflict adversely affected Ms. Roe’s performance, was not squarely addressed and decided. In fact, Judge Marquardt did not articulate the proper test, as we explain, in Part III B. of this opinion. Taking his lead from the argument of the State that Summerlin’s trial suffered “no prejudice” from the pre-trial conflict of interest on the part of an attorney who then dropped out of the case, Judge Marquardt held in his findings of fact as the sole predicate for his denial of Summerlin’s claim that the “conduct of previous Counsel for the defendant and Counsel for the State did not prejudice the defendant.” Such a finding was not precisely apposite, however, because the proper legal question was not whether the assumed conflict prejudiced Summerlin’s trial, but whether it adversely affected the performance of Jane Roe. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), entitles a habeas petitioner to offer in evidence relevant competent information regarding “the merits of [a] factual dispute [that] were not resolved in the state hearing.” This rule is known as Townsend's “first circumstance;" and Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed,2d 318 (1992), notwithstanding, a preliminary showing of cause for the failure to resolve the factual dispute in state court and prejudice from that failure are not required in order to invoke in federal court the “first circumstance” rule. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1465-66, n. 3 (9th Cir.1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2000). Hence, because Judge Marquardt did not resolve this central constitutional conflict of interest issue, we respectfully conclude that the disputed affidavits should have been allowed in evidence by the district court and considered prior to its ruling. Although the affidavits add little more than highlights and details to the record that was made in state court, they confirm Ms. Roe’s testimony about her own state of mind and resulting behavior. We go now to the evidence. H. Allen Gerhardt was one of Ms. Roe’s colleagues in the Public Defender’s Office. During the time in question, she advised Mr. Gerhardt that “she had become romantically involved with the prosecutor on a pending death penalty case.” Ms. Roe was concerned, said Gerhardt, about “the impact of her actions on her standing in the Public Defender’s Office ... and was troubled by the intense gossip about the incident that was occurring within the Public Defender’s Office.” Ms. Roe and Gerhardt discussed “the possibility of [him] taking the case over in order to avoid revealing the conflict,” but they dismissed this option as “not ... viable.” Ms. Roe expressed similar concerns about the future of her job to another co-worker, Charles Babbit. Her colleagues-she talked with five of them in all-agreed with her that she had to retire from the case, but disagreed that another public defender in their office could take her place. They believed that the entire Public Defender's Office should withdraw from the case, and that the Man-copa County Attorney's Office where Mr. Doe worked should turn the case over to the State Attorney General. Ms. Roe’s supervisor at the time of her romantic entanglement with Mr. Doe was Chief Assistant Maricopa County Public Defender, Bedford Douglass, Jr.. His November 22, 1995, affidavit about this affair says that in December 1981, Ms. Roe informed him that: [S]he had become romantically involved with Deputy Maricopa County Attorney [John Doe], her opponent in a pending death penalty case. Ms. [Roe] told me that her relationship with Mr. [Doe] created a conflict of interest and she requested pemission to withdraw from the case. I remember discussing the case with [Maricopa County Public Defender] Mr. Lee shortly after the conflict was revealed. Mr. Lee was very upset by Ms. [Roe’s] having engaged in an affair with a prosecutor in a capital case which she was defending. It would have been clear to Ms. [Roe] that she probably faced adverse employment consequences as a result of her romantic relationship with a prosecutor on a death penalty case. (emphasis added). Notwithstanding her belief that her behavior and “romantic involvement” with the prosecutor required that she depart from the case on the ground of a personal conflict of interest, Ms. Roe took no immediate steps to accomplish her withdrawal. Neither she nor her office informed either the court or their client of her conclusion that she could no longer be Summerlin’s attorney. Instead, she accompanied him to and represented him at the pivotal hearing in Judge Derickson’s court on December 22, 1981. Given Judge Derickson’s clear signal on December 15, 1981, Sum-merlin was about to make a decision that would cause him to face capital punishment even though that possible punishment had previously been taken off the table. At 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1981, the new date for sentencing, Summerlin appeared again before Judge Derickson. The proceedings opened with Ms. Roe stating her appearance for her client. As promised a few days earliei*, Judge Derick-son advised Summerlin at the hearing of his decision not to be bound by the sentencing part of the plea agreement, and that if Summerlin allowed his pleas to stand, he was facing up to thirty-eight and one-half years in prison for the three offenses. After some confusion during which Summerlin — who is unable to read — told Judge Derickson on two occasions that he did not understand the Judge’s explanation of the sentence he now might face, Ms. Roe privately conferred with her client. Their discussion ended with Ms. Roe’s statement to the court, “I believe he understands, your Honor.” Summerlin’s immediate response was, “No, I don’t understand,” to which Ms. Roe replied, “Then what is your question?” At this point, Summerlin asked about the number of years he might face on the three charges. Judge Derickson explained again the sentence Summerlin would face if he permitted his plea to stand. To this Summerlin said that he finally understood, adding, “Okay. I would like to withdraw from my plea agreement. Is that what you want me to say?” Judge Derickson appropriately told Summerlin that he did not “want” Summerlin to say that, he simply wanted to make sure that Summerlin understood what would happen if he permitted the plea to stand. This exchange prompted another confidential discussion between Summerlin and Ms. Roe, followed by Summerlin’s statement that, “It says, if this plea agreement should be changed in any way, I can withdraw.” “Yes, that’s the question he asked you,” Ms. Roe replied. Summerlin then withdrew from the agreement. The court immediately reinstated his pleas of not guilty to the two consolidated cases, vacated its findings in the pending probation violation matter, and ordered that the matters be sent to the presiding judge for trial setting. Summerlin’s courtroom decision to withdraw his plea made him eligible for a conviction of first degree murder and a sentence of death. At this point in the hearing, Summerlin moved once again for new counsel. Ms. Roe remained silent. Judge Derickson denied his motion, stating that “the record may further reflect that you failed to establish any grounds upon which counsel should be changed.” Judge Derickson, of course, was unaware of Ms. Roe’s own determination that she no longer was fit to represent the client she had accompanied to court. In an affidavit dated November 22, 1995, Judge Derickson averred that he did not know of the affair at the time of the withdrawal of the plea, and that [h]ad I been made aware of the sexual relationship between Mr. Summerlin’s attorney and the prosecutor in that case, I would have granted his request to change counsel. Furthermore, considering the circumstances, it would have been appropriate to continue the proceedings, rather than to proceed either with sentencing or rejection of a plea, to give time to Mr. Summerlin’s new counsel to familiarize him or herself with the case. On December 28, 1981, six days after Summerlin withdrew his plea, Ms. Roe finally broached the problem with Mr. Doe. On behalf of her client, she wanted Doe to stay on the case because he favored disposing of it with a lesser plea. He could discern no reason to step down as the prosecutor. After his discussion with Ms. Roe about their predicament, John Doe arranged for a hearing on December 28, 1981, before another judge at which Ms. Roe planned to move to withdraw as counsel and to permit the rest of the Public Defender’s Office to withdraw also. When she arrived for the hearing, Mr. Doe was already present. She had not advised her client of the reasons for the hearing or what she intended to do. The courtroom hearing began with the judge directly asking Mr. Summerlin if he wanted Ms. Roe removed from his case, and he said he did. To Ms. Roe’s surprise, the judge granted the motion with no further inquiry and appointed George Klink, a private practitioner, as new counsel. The evidence suggests that the prosecution alerted the judge in an ex parte exchange of the purpose of the hearing. Given that she was off the case, Ms. Roe did not advise Summerlin of her conflict of interest because she saw “no reason to beat a dead horse.” Summerlin continued to be unaware of the problem. Ms. Roe eventually told Mr. Klink why she had to get off Summerlin’s ease, but she did not tell her ex-client. Neither did Mr. Klink. Mr. Klink wanted Mr. Doe to remain on the case notwithstanding the alleged impropriety because he believed that Mr. Doe was still inclined to engage in plea bargaining, but that a new prosecutor would not. Nevertheless, Summerlin at all times stood fast: he would not accept a plea bargain. Approximately six weeks later, during the week immediately preceding February 19, 1982, the Arizona Attorney General’s Office took over and prosecuted Summer-lin’s case on the ground of a conflict of interest between Doe and Ms. Roe. The Attorney General made it plain that the case would not be settled by way of a lesser plea, and Mr. Summerlin’s cases went in succession to jury trial in Judge Philip Marquardt’s court, first the aggravated assault case, and then the murder case. He suffered convictions on both. Sitting without a jury, Judge Marquardt then determined that Summerlin’s sentence should be death. The Public Defender reassigned Ms. Roe to the office’s juvenile division, which a co-worker described as “an employment action widely regarded as a demotion within the office.” B. The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of counsel, unhindered by any conflicts of interest with her client. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). This right contemplates counsel who is in a position both professionally and personally to represent her client with undivided loyalty. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981); Stoia v. United States, 109 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.1997). It extends not just to trials, but also to pretrial negotiations, such as the proceedings we examine in this case. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, 98 S.Ct. 1173; Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1988) (“Exploring possible plea negotiations is an important part of providing adequate representation of a criminal client, and this part is easily precluded by a conflict of interest.”). The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility as it read prior to and during Summerlin’s trial sheds clarifying light on this right in connection with this case: Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1982) (“Rule 5-101(A)”). The reason for this rule was well stated in ABA CPR Ethical Consideration 5-1: The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client. See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.1980). Although courts have identified conflicts of interest most often in cases involving representation of multiple clients, we have also applied the concept to other areas explicitly covered by Rule 5-101(A). For example, we concluded in Hearst that an attorney’s book contract to write about his client’s case created an actual personal and financial conflict of interest on the part of the lawyer; and we remanded for further explanation of the undeveloped facts. Id. at 1199. About the difference between a personal conflict and the multiple representation conflict in Cuyler v. Sullivan, Judge Choy said, “Sullivan’s lawyer’s conflict was based on multiple representation, whereas Hearst’s was based on private financial interests. The differences . are immaterial.” Id. at 1193. Likewise, in United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 601-02 (9th Cir.1984), we held that the Cuyler test governed a conflict allegedly arising from counsel’s desire to keep material adverse information about himself from the court. The reason behind our conclusion that such a situation constitutes a personal conflict of interest is “because the potential for diminished effectiveness in representation is so great.” Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 581. To secure relief based on a lawyer’s conflict of interest, however, “a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708. “An actual conflict exists if the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client’s interests.” Stoia, 109 F.3d at 395 (internal citation omitted). “[EJxistence of an actual conflict cannot be governed solely by the perceptions of the attorney; rather the court itself must examine the record to discern whether the attorney’s behavior seems to have been influenced by the suggested conflict.” Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir.1994). Once an actual conflict is shown, a defendant need not establish prejudice, but he must demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected the lawyer’s representation of his client. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708; Hoffman, 733 F.2d at 601; Brown v. United States, 665 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir.1982). The First Circuit has fashioned a useful two-part test for determining whether an actual conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. A defendant (or a petitioner) so claiming must demonstrate (1) that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic of sufficient substance to be a viable alternative might have been pursued; and (2) that this alternative was inherently in conflict with or not taken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or interests. United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir.1985); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir.1993); see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784-785, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (rejecting conflict claim where “determining that there was an actual conflict of interest require[d] the attribution of [counsel’s] motivation for not making the lesser culpability argument to the [alleged conflict],” when the record demonstrated that the argument was not viable). Finally, “when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173. C. As with an ineffective assistance of counsel habeas claim based on Strickland, we need not decide whether an actual conflict of interest existed in this case if we are satisfied that even if it did, the conflict did not “adversely affect” Ms. Roe’s representation of her client. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir.1995). Accordingly, and setting aside the question of whether the problematic relationship itself created a conflict of interest with her client, we assume here without deciding that Roe’s frame of mind that she could “no longer ethically represent Mr. Sum-merlin” did amount to an actual personal conflict, and we move on to the dispositive second stage of the inquiry. The task faffing to a petitioner of demonstrating an adverse effect as a result of an actual conflict has been described as a “substantial hurdle.” Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.1994). “To overcome this hurdle, a petitioner must show that some effect on counsel’s handling of particular aspects of the [case] was ‘likely’,” United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir.1992), and that it “significantly worsened] counsel’s representations of the client.” Mett, 65 F.3d at 1535. An instructive example of how this inquiry works in the case of an alleged personal conflict of interest can be found in Mett. In that case, defense counsel had represented the prosecutor in an unrelated criminal case. Mett claimed that this fact alone might have caused his attorney to “go easy” on the prosecutor who, after all, had been his client. Mett, 65 F.3d at 1536. We held that such a general allegation-which is similar to the claim that Roe was disposed to go easy on Doe because of their personal relationship-was insufficient to establish an adverse effect, absent a specific showing that counsel’s performance was inadequate. Similarly, in Maiden, 35 F.3d at 481-82, we assumed a personal conflict because defense counsel had prosecuted the defendant for an unrelated crime three years earlier, but after carefully examining the record for any such evidence, we found an absence of adverse effect arising from that circumstance. In this case, we have a very limited period to examine. Summerlin made it clear on December 15, 1981, that he wanted out of the plea agreement, and Judge Derickson signaled his intention not to accept the stipulated sentence on which the plea agreement depended. Jane Roe tried to salvage the favorable plea by attempting to disqualify Judge Derickson and to have the matter transferred to another judge. Her valiant gambit failed, and the liaison then occurred that created the assumed conflict. Four days later, she appeared in court with her client, and this is the critical event that we must examine in context to determine the existence of any adverse effect from what happened four days earlier between herself and Doe. We note (1) that Summerlin does not complain about anything that was said by Ms. Roe during their brief private discussions in open court on December 22, 1981; and (2) there is no evidence that Roe and Doe discussed the case during their nocturnal interlude or that Roe revealed any confidences. Our examination of the record leaves us unable to find anything that Jane Roe might have done or failed to do during the withdrawal-of-plea hearing that was in any way linked to the supposed conflict, or that might have affected the course of the proceedings. The stark fact is that there was nothing that Jane Roe could have done. Judge Derickson had made it irrevocably clear just a few days earlier that he was going to reject the stipulated sentence, and Summerlin had made it equally clear that he was not going to stick with a plea that called for 38-1/2 years of incarceration. These dice were cast in stone, and they played out on the 22nd as the script had already been written on December 15, 1981, before any supposed conflict arose. Jane Roe had done her best for her client in negotiating a favorable life-saving plea, but Summerlin stubbornly rejected her advice and turned his back on both the plea and his attorney. However, assuming again a personal conflict of interest, we do see a deficiency in Doe’s professional conduct: the law required her promptly to report her predicament to Judge Derickson. Instead of discharging her clear professional obligation “to advise the court at once of the problem,” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1173, she remained silent on the issue and continued to represent Summerlin without first resolving her dilemma. State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973) (In Banc) (cited with approval in Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485, 98 S.Ct. 1173), dealt with a conflict of interest arising from representation of multiple defendants, but its message clearly applies to all conflicts of interest: An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. He has an obligation to bring the fact of this conflict to the attention of the court at the earliest possible time after the conflict is discovered. The trial court should give great weight to a representation by counsel that there is a conflict, particularly in the case where the counsel has been appointed by the court rather than retained by the defendants. 514 P.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). The evidence in the record implies, and a reasonable person could rationally infer, that Ms. Roe’s failure to notify the court of her problem as mandated by Arizona law and the Sixth Amendment was the direct product of her conflicted state of mind. Manifestly, she did not desire to damage her own career any more than she already had. Instead of advising the court “at once” of her plight, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1173, she failed to discharge this obligation. Had she promptly disclosed to Summerlin and to the court her situation, there is no doubt whatsoever — as Judge Derickson confirms in his affidavit — that she would have been removed from the case before the hearing, which would have been continued, and a new lawyer appointed. This regrettable slip on Jane Roe’s part raises the question of whether the self-reporting lapse itself necessarily adversely affected her representation of Summerlin. On examination, we believe it did not. We take our lead in this regard from United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d 855 (9th Cir.2001). Baker’s defense lawyer had been charged with and pled guilty to a federal crime in another federal district, but failed to disclose that little fact to the district court in which he was appearing or to his client. The lawyer, in fact, was “actively seeking [in his case] to obtain a reduction of his own sentence by cooperating with the prosecution.” Id. at 860. Defendant Baker subsequently argued that his lawyer had a conflict because he had reason to throw over his client in order to help his own case by currying favor with the Department of Justice. In rejecting this argument, we recognized in the strongest possible terms that the lawyer had violated his professional duty by failing to disclose this potential conflict to the court and his client: “Despite [the lawyer’s] deplorably unprofessional conduct in advising neither his client nor the court of his own conviction and sentence, [defendant’s] bare allegation suggests, at most, the mere possibility of conflict, not that counsel actively represented, conflicting interests.” Id. at 860 (emphasis added). It is evident from Baker that the simple failure timely to disclose a conflict and to ask to be removed cannot without more be itself the adverse effect under Cuyler, or else all conflicts would automatically result in adverse effects by virtue of the fact that the lawyer failed simply to disclose the conflict and ask to be removed. By this reasoning, the separate requirement of adverse effect announced by the Supreme Court in Cuyler and assiduously applied by our cases would be eliminated. Finding an actual conflict effectively would be the end of the inquiry. See Hoffman, 733 F.2d at 601-602 (“Despite the impropriety of [the lawyer’s] failure to inform the court [of his suspension], as a matter of law we conclude that Hoffman was not denied his right to counsel because of a conflict of interest.”). Finally, it is patently demonstrable that Summerlin ultimately suffered no adverse effect from Roe’s problem because any possible deficiencies in her performance were cured by her successor, George Klink. The fallout from the December 22 hearing was that Summerlin voluntarily withdrew his guilty plea, and so lost the opportunity to avoid a death sentence. But, according to Summerlin’s new counsel, the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office left the plea offer open, and new counsel approached Summerlin about changing his mind and re-entering the same plea. George Klink testified at the state court evidentiary hearing that he discussed the matter both with prosecutor John Doe and with his client, but Summerlin remained adamant about going to trial: Q. (By counsel for Summerlin) So you and the County Attorney engaged in plea bargaining after you got on the case? A. (By Mr. Klink) Well, .as I recall, [John Doe] indicated that an offer would remain open. I believe it was Mr. Sum-merlin’s wish that no plea negotiations or no plea offers be accepted. On cross examination, Klink made the same point: Q. (By counsel for the State) Mr. Klink, early in your direct testimony you indicated something about a plea bargain was still open with the County Attorney. Do you recall that portion of your testimony? A. (By Mr. Klink) Yes, I do. Q. And, however, you said that the defendant was unwilling to enter any plea agreement? A. That’s correct. Q. Was that something that he advised to you and said that he would not enter into any plea agreement? A. That’s correct. It was my view that the impedement (sic) to entering into a plea agreement was the defendant and not the state. Q. And were you aware that there had been a previous plea agreement between the state and the defendant? A. You mean when [Jane Roe] and [John Doe] were handling the case? Q. Yes. A. Yes, I was aware of that. Q. And were you also aware that the defendant himself had filed pro per motions to withdraw from that plea agreement? A. I was. Q. So then you pick up the case after-wards and he still continued to be negative about any plea agreement? A. Oh, yes, there is no question about that. Q. And that didn’t change when the case was transferred for prosecution to the Attorney General’s Office? A. No. Thus, notwithstanding Judge Derickson’s averment that had he known of Jane Roe’s problem he would have continued the hearing, her participation in the withdrawal-of-plea hearing had no practical effect on Summerlin’s situation. Despite Klink’s entreaty, Summerlin remained determined to go to trial, and he got his wish. In this respect, the district court said, “Petitioner’s claim in the [motion for a new trial] that there ‘was a possibility that [Roe] could persuade him to reconsider withdrawing the plea or that other counsel may have been able to talk petitioner out of his desire to withdraw is simply speculation, unsupported by the record.’ ” Our way here is illuminated by our decision in United States v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir.1987). In that matter, we concluded that the original defense lawyers had a conflict because they represented multiple defendants with conflicting interests. ^Ve found also an adverse effect because during the course of negotiating a global settlement, the conflicted lawyers generated a culpability list pursuant to which Allen would be punished more severely than other defendants who were arguably more culpable. Allen’s interests were adversely affected, we held, because his lawyer’s suggestion to the prosecutor that his culpability was greater than certain other defendants denied Allen a more favorable plea bargain: “No one should be represented by an attorney who is making him the ‘fall guy’ by design.” Id. at 1497 (quoting United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 454 (2d Cir.1973) (alteration omitted)). After Allen refused the plea, however, the conflicted lawyers were replaced by unconflicted counsel. We held that this change of representation cured the adverse effect because the new independent counsel “repeatedly suggested to Allen that he cooperate and reduce his liability, and that Allen adamantly refused,” because he was “apparently more interested in complete exoneration than turning evidence against his fellow defendants.” Id. Instead, he went to trial and got convicted. Allen is on all fours with our case. The only arguable effect of Roe’s supposed conflict here was that by not immediately retiring from the case, she allowed Sum-merlin to withdraw his plea without giving him unconflicted advice. But Roe was soon replaced by Klink, and Klink — like Allen’s conflict-free lawyer — intervened and counseled him to no avail to accept the plea he had given up. On this point, the district court found that “[Summerlin] was unwilling to enter any plea agreement.” This fact is clearly supported by the record. Given this scenario, neither any reluctance by the County Attorney to go forward with a plea that Summerlin did not want nor the Attorney General’s withdrawal of it six weeks later is of any consequence. If refusal to accept the plea on the advice of independent counsel cured the adverse effect in Allen, Klink’s advice and efforts must also have cured any possible adverse effect here. There is no material difference between the two cases. Accordingly, although no one would condone Jane Roe’s entanglement with the prosecutor, we conclude that Summerlin has fallen short of demonstrating that any personal conflict under which she may have been laboring serves as a reason to undo his conviction and sentence. IV EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION Summerlin claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of his trial proceedings, in violation of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2062, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). He argues that his trial lawyer, George Klink, failed adequately to investigate and to present his “only viable defense”: that Summerlin had an organic brain dysfunction and an “impaired ability to premeditate or to exercise self-control.” He argues also that had counsel done his job properly, he would have discovered and then used on his behalf the following: 1. Evidence from Summerlin’s family relating to his mental condition, history of severe physical abuse and mistreatment during childhood, electroshock therapy, the forced inhalation of ammonia fumes, and juvenile history — including the fact that he was once hit by a bus. 2. Summerlin’s records from schools, camps, and friends regarding physical abuse and juvenile detention. 3. Prior records from the state of Florida and the U.S. Government, and information from his parole officer. 4. Information pertaining to his two marriages from his wives about psychological and sexual problems. 5. Information about his alleged various head injuries. Summerlin claims that this trove of information could have been introduced in evidence both to defend against the charge of first degree murder and the death penalty. The district court examined this multi-part issue in considerable detail and concluded that it had no merit. We agree not only with the district court’s conclusions, but with the manner in which it carefully analyzed the record. Because we cannot improve on the court’s analysis and explanation, we respectfully republish in large measure its analysis as our own, but without the customary method of specific attribution. A. PSYCHIATRIC DEFENSES In June 1981, prior to Mr. Klink’s assignment as defense counsel, Summerlin was examined by two court-appointed psychiatrists, Drs. Maier Tuchler and Otto Bendheim, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11. Each found him competent to stand trial and legally sane under the M’Naghten standard. Although there was no evidence of mental disease or defect, Dr. Tuchler observed that dyslexia and illiteracy made Summerlin “functionally mentally retarded.” He further found that Summerlin’s impulse control was extremely impaired due to an explosive-type personality disorder and that he had an anti-social personality. Around this same time, Dr. Leonardo Garcia-Bunuel, a psychiatrist who treated Summerlin at the Maricopa County Jail, contacted defense counsel Ms. Roe regarding a possible diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy. Summerlin had described to Dr. Garcia-Bunuel details of the murder, particularly experiencing an intense perfume odor, and this led Dr. Garcia-Bunuel to suspect that he may have had a temporal lobe seizure at the time of the killing. Subsequently, in August 1981, Ms. Roe arranged for neurological testing by Dr. Mark Winegard. An electroencephalogram (EEG) showed some slowing in Sum-merlin’s posterior temporal area, but was insufficient to support a diagnosis of epilepsy. CAT scans and a second EEG performed in October 1981 were normal. As a result, Dr. Garcia-Bunuel withdrew his concerns. Ms. Roe secured also a psychological evaluation of Summerlin from Dr. Donald Tatro in November 1981. Although concluding there was no evidence to support an insanity defense, Dr. Tatro found indications of organic brain impairment, borderline personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder. In his opinion, Sum-merlin “is deeply emotionally and mentally disturbed, unaware of the motives underlying much of his behavior, and unable, because of his problems, to exercise normal restraint and control, once his highly unstable and volatile emotions are aroused.” Summerlin argues that Mr. Klink’s representation during trial was constitutionally deficient because he failed independently to investigate potential psychiatric defenses and failed to follow up on, or utilize, psychiatric evidence already available to him. According to Summerlin, once Drs. Tuchler, Bendheim, and Tatro reported that Summerlin was legally sane, Mr. Klink “never really considered mounting a ‘state of mind’ diminished capacity defense at trial in order to reduce the level of offense by negating mens rea Specifically, he says Mr. Klink should have presented evidence of (1) psychomotor epilepsy and (2) his impulsive personality to show in the guilt phase of the trial that the killing was not premeditated. We note parenthetically that because Arizona has long rejected the affirmative defense of diminished capacity, see State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050-51 (1997) (In Banc), Summerlin could not have offered during the guilt phase of his trial evidence of a mental disease or defect to show that he was incapable of forming a requisite mental state for the charged offense. B. PSYCHOMOTOR EPILEPSY Before she developed a conflict of interest, Ms. Roe thoroughly investigated Dr. Garcia-Bunuel’s suspicion of epilepsy. She obtained neurological testing and pursued this possible diagnosis with Dr. Ben-dheim, as revealed in the following letter the doctor sent to Judge Deriekson in December 1981: We again discussed the possibility of psychomotor epilepsy, especially in view of Dr. Garcia-Bunuel’s findings that this man had very vivid olfactory (smell) hallucinations preceding outbursts. I went over this whole situation again and told Miss [Roe] that the neurologists have been unable to find psychomotor epilepsy, although there was some slowing of the wave patterns in the temporal lobes, where psychomotor epileptic attacks usually originate. While a positive electroencephalogram, which was not obtained here, would make a positive diagnosis, an essentially negative EEG does not entirely rule out the possibility of epileptic-type seizures, and for this reason I see absolutely no harm and potentially quite a bit of benefit to place this defendant on anti-epileptic, anti-seizure type medication, even though the diagnosis has not been established. During post-conviction hearings, Ms. Roe testified that she met with trial counsel Mr. Klink on two or three occasions and spent a number of hours discussing her pre-conflict of interest investigative efforts, including a possible insanity defense. She stated that she discussed this aspect of the case with Mr. Klink “in depth,” including the examinations and conclusions of all five doctors. Mr. Klink testified that after consulting with Ms. Roe, he made a tactical decision to not pursue an insanity defense due to the lack of evidence. As for the possible diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy, Mr. Klink did not follow up on Dr. Garcia-Bunuel’s earlier suspicion because the doctor had changed his opinion and was out of the country at the time of trial. Instead, Mr. Klink made a decision to defend his client by arguing that the facts and circumstances of the prosecution’s case did not support a verdict of first-degree murder. Summerlin himself desired this fact-based defense. In assessing an attorney’s performance, a reviewing court must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Having reviewed the entirety of the record, we conclude — as did the district court — that Mr. Klink’s performance was reasonable under the circumstances. In deciding whether to pursue evidence of Summerlin’s mental state, Mr. Klink was entitled to rely on the opinions of the mental health experts who had already examined Summerlin. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.1995). At the time, none of the doctors, including Dr. Garcia-Bunuel, was able to positively diagnose Summerlin as suffering from psychomotor epilepsy. It was thus reasonable for Mr. Klink not to investigate this possibility further. Likewise, in view of the doctors’ inability to make a diagnosis, Mr. Klink’s tactical decision to forgo presenting what little evidence he had of epilepsy was certainly within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1525 (9th Cir.1991) (“It is also acceptable trial strategy to choose not to call psychiatrists to testify when they can be subjected to cross-examination based on equally persuasive psychiatric opinions that reach a different conclusion.”). C. IMPULSIVITY At trial, counsel’s main defense theory was lack of premeditation. Mr. Klink argued to the jury that the killing may have been the result of a “violent, sudden reaction” to Brenna Bailey’s visit to collect on an overdue bill. Yet, he presented no evidence to support this theory, despite having the reports of Drs. Tuchler and Tatro which described Summerlin’s impulsive personality, reports which would have been admissible under State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580, 582-88 (1981) (In Banc); Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir.1986) (“The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the tendency to act on impulse is probative of an absence of premeditation.”) (citing Christensen, 628 P.2d at 582-83). At the evidentiary hearing in state court, Mr. Klink was not asked why he failed to present this evidence or whether he was even cognizant of the Christensen decision, which had been handed down more than a year before Summerlin’s trial. Nonetheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Klink’s representation in this regard was deficient, Summerlin has failed to establish prejudice. The trial court instructed the jury on both first and second degree murder and explained that a finding of premeditation differentiated the former from the latter. “To prove premeditation, the state was required to show only that [the defendant] had had time to reflect after forming the intent to kill; any length of time would have been sufficient, even if it was ‘as instantaneous as [the time] it takes to form successive thoughts in the mind.’ ” Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir.1995) (citing State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 692 P.2d 272, 276 (1984) (In Banc)). In its closing argument, the State asserted that evidence of sexual assault established premeditation because Summerlin would have had to get up after assaulting the victim to retrieve the hard, blunt object then used to fracture her skull. The prosecutor also emphasized that the numerous blows to the victim’s head showed that Summerlin had had time to reflect on his actions. After carefully reviewing the record, the district court concluded that there is no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted Summerlin of first degree murder had Mr. Klink introduced evidence of Summerlin’s impulsive personality. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”). We agree. The doctors would not have been allowed to testify that Sum-merlin was in fact acting impulsively at the time of the murder. The testimony would have been limited to a general description of Summerlin’s behavioral tendencies and thus would have had only marginal probative value in determining whether Sum-merlin lacked premeditation at the time of the offense. See Christensen, 628 P.2d at 583-84. In addition, the State presented considerable evidence of sexual assault, and the jury found Summerlin guilty on that charge. Furthermore, uncontrovert-ed testimony established that the victim had been hit repeatedly and forcefully on different sides of her head. Summerlin’s “excessive and purposeful actions demonstrate more than just a ‘reactionary’ homicide.” State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d at 694; cf. State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz. 258, 762 P.2d 545, 550 (1988) (In Banc) (holding that nature, severity, and placement of injuries, several of which would have individually caused death, demonstrated premeditation); State v. Sellers, 106 Ariz. 315, 475 P.2d 722, 723 (1970) (In Banc) (same). D. THE PENALTY PHASE Although a defense of diminished capacity may not be used during the guilt phase of a murder trial to defeat a required mental state, proof of diminished capacity is admissible in Arizona as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing. See A.R.S. 13-703(G)(1). In this respect, Summerlin complains that the information referred to in the previous section of this opinion was underdeveloped by his lawyer during the sentencing phase and could have been used to defend against the State’s attempt to have him sentenced to death. The first problem we encounter with this claim is that Summerlin himself restricted and limited his own defense at the aggravation/mitigation pre-sentencing hearing. Although counsel is in charge of the legal aspects of a defense, we do not believe that he may not be influenced in this respect by the wishes of his client, especially when the issue is whether counsel’s representation was deficient. This is what occurred when George Klink attempted to call Dr. Tatro as a mitigation witness on behalf of his client: THE COURT: All right. Come forward and be sworn, please. Your client wants to ask a question. MR. KLINK: Well, your honor, may we approach the bench? THE COURT: All right. (An off the record discussion at the bench ensued, outside the hearing of the court reporter.) THE COURT: At the request of defense counsel and his client, the client would like to have a couple of minutes to talk over the calling of this witness. MR. KLINK: All right, your honor. With the consent of the defendant, the defendant has no witnesses in mitigation at this time and— THE COURT: This will be— MR. KLINK: — and we’ll rest. MS. GIFFORD (The Prosecutor): Your honor, it’s my understanding — at least my impression — that this is the defendant’s decision that he does not wish certain witnesses to be called. Could we have that reflected on the record, perhaps, because— THE COURT: I think it has been, and Mr. Summerlin, I’ll address you directly, to make sure that — for any error that might possibly be claimed at this time— to make sure that you understand that you are facing a potential decision between either life imprisonment or the death penalty, and this is the time in which you must decide whether you present any mitigation witnesses on your behalf. This is your entitlement. Your lawyer has told me that at this time you do not wish to, and he is telling me that you do not wish to call any mitigation witnesses. If this is correct I’ll accept your decision. But I want it to be very clear that this is the time, and only time, that you’ll be able to have to do this. So you don’t even need to respond to me. You understand what I’m telling you? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (emphasis added). Mr. Klink then outlined for Judge Mar-quardt the evidence on which he planned to rely on behalf of his client: a video tape of Summerlin, the extensive presentence investigation report prepared by the deputy probation officer, and Dr. Tatro’s redacted psychiatric report. Moreover, as Mr. Klink explained at the post-conviction hearing, he planned to capitalize on aspects of the prosecution’s two psychiatric witnesses’ testimony to emphasize mitigating aspects stemming from his client’s serious personality disorders, i.e., Summer-lin’s propensity to fly into a rage with minimal provocation and then to lose control over his behavior. This is how Mr. Klink explained his strategy to the trial court: THE COURT: Again, my question to you, after you’ve talked to your client— do you have — is it still your decision— and it’s strictly your decision — whether to call witnesses or not? MR. KLINK: Yes, your honor. We have noted in the presentence report Dr. Tatro’s evaluation of the defendant is included and attached thereto. And therefore, in consulting with the defendant, we have, decided, and I believe that is his decision, as well as mine, in consultation with him, to rely on the report that has been — -the evaluation of Dr. Ta-tro that has been attached to the presen-tence report. THE COURT: I have that available, and have spent quite a bit of time with that. An examination of the Presentence Investigation Report on which Mr. Klink relied as evidence reveals considerable information in possible mitigation of Sum-merlin’s behavior. Summerlin’s wife described him as a man with a “quick and severe temper” pi*one to violent rages when feeling threatened or pressured. Moreover the report chronicles in great detail Summerlin’s placement for incorrigibility in the Florida State School for Boys, as well as his extensive adult criminal record. Under Social History, the report recreates the relevant part of Sum-merlin’s life, including the following: 1) His father’s lengthy incarceration during Summerlin’s childhood for armed robbery; as well as the fact that his father was shot to death in another armed robbery. 2) His parent’s troubled divorce. 3) His mother’s alcoholism and lack of training and guidance for her son. 4) His mother’s wanton behavior with a series of men. 5) The fact that his mother beat him so severely and consistently that he preferred juvenile detention to home. 6) His illiteracy and dyslexia, and his lack of secondary education. 7) His two failed marriages. 8) His neck and back injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 9) His profound neurotic hostility against women. 10) The effect of his upbringing on his antisocial behavior. Dr. Tatro’s detailed report is also quite penetrating and revealing in presenting a sexually sterile Summerlin as a damaged victim of his childhood with resulting serious personality disorders beyond his control. Furthermore, Dr. Tatro administered psychological tests to Summerlin that indicated (1) the presence of organic brain dysfunction consistent with his history of impulsive overreacting, and (2) severe, deep-seated personality conflicts going back to his early childhood that explained his behavior, functional paranoia, and “organically diminished capacity for self-control.” Dr. Tatro summed up his findings with this concluding information: Although his paranoid attitudes and emotions are plentiful, there was nothing he said or reported to indicate that they have ever reached delusional proportions. He spoke of no plots, or bizarre happenings. While he certainly feels persecuted, subjected to critical scrutiny, and subject to various malignant influences, he retains a basically logical attitude about these feelings, and is able to question their validity and to regard them as possible, even probably, unwarranted in many instances. His defective sense of identity, extreme ambivalence, great emotional [undecipherable], explosive rages, and inability to enter into enduring trusting relationships, all in the absence of any of the more usual symptoms of psychosis, such as delusion, hallucination, and disorganized thinking, are consistent with a diagnosis of Borderline personality disorder (DSM III, 381, 83). The Borderline personality disorder is described as being marked by a profound identity disturbance, great inability in a variety of areas of functioning, such as interpersonal relations, mood, and behavioral reactions, which frequently take the form of intense anger, either directed against others or towards one self, or both. Great impulsivity and unpredictability is one of the hallmarks of this disorder. In addition, to this primary diagnostic pattern, there are also features associated with a Paranoid personality disorder, and indications of an organic brain impairment, which is probably responsible for the defendant’s developmental reading disorder, and which may very well underlie some of the difficulty he has with keeping his impulses under control. In my opinion, while Mr. Summerlin’s mental condition does not support