Full opinion text
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge TRAXLER and Judge GREGORY joined. OPINION KING, Circuit Judge: Glennis and Clifford Bolden appeal their multiple convictions and separate sentences in the Western District of North Carolina, resulting from charges arising out of a complex Medicaid fraud scheme. In their appeals, the Boldens challenge their 1998 convictions for money laundering and a related money laundering conspiracy, and Ms. Bolden challenges several of her convictions for the submission of false claims to the Government. They also challenge their sentences in several respects. As explained below, we affirm their convictions, but we reverse in part and vacate and remand their sentences in part. I. A. The Boldens were indicted in December of 1997 by a grand jury in Asheville, North Carolina, and a superseding indictment was returned in October of 1998. The indictment alleged that, from 1989 until 1995, the Boldens planned and perpetrated an elaborate fraud scheme, improperly obtaining tens of thousands of dollars from North Carolina’s Medicaid program (“Medicaid”). This fraud scheme was carried out through their operation of Emerald Health Care-Taylorsville (“Emerald Health”), a nursing facility owned by Henry Lane, Ms. Bolden’s father. The fraud scheme had numerous components, but the object of each was the same: the illegal extraction of monies from Medicaid for the benefit of one or both of the Boldens. In November of 1998, after a nine-day jury trial in Asheville, the Boldens were convicted of multiple offenses. In particular, each was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud (in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 371); two counts of submitting false claims to the Government (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287); six counts of filing false income tax returns (in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)); six substantive counts of money laundering (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)); and a separate count of money laundering conspiracy (in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)). Ms. Bolden was also convicted on eighteen separate false claims charges. On August 30, 1999, a probation officer submitted pre-sentence reports (the “PSRs”) to the district court on the Bol-dens. The parties then submitted objections to the PSRs and, on October 7, 1999, the court conducted sentencing hearings. Ms. Bolden received 140 months in prison, and Mr. Bolden was sentenced to a term of fifty-seven months. In addition, Ms. Bol-den was fined $1,700, and Mr. Bolden was fined $800. The Boldens were each required to make $146,719 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service. Following sentencing, the Boldens filed timely notices of appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. B. In their appeals, the Boldens raise multiple challenges to their convictions and sentences. In seeking reversal of their convictions, they assert the following (the “Conviction Issues”): (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on the money laundering counts; (2) that their convictions for money laundering conspiracy are flawed because: a. the charge of money laundering conspiracy, in Count Thirty-Seven of the indictment,, was legally deficient; b. the court committed reversible error in its instructions by constructively amending the money laundering conspiracy charge; and c. the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for money laundering conspiracy; and (3) with respect to Ms. Bolden, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions on the eighteen separate false claims charges. The Boldens also raise assertions of error with regard to their sentences (the “Sentencing Issues”), specifically maintaining that: (1) the court erred in grouping their fraud and money laundering convictions; (2) the court failed to make adequate factual findings on the sentencing issues in dispute; and (3) to the extent the court’s factual findings were adequate, they were clearly erroneous. Before turning to their contentions, we review the factual underpinnings for the Boldens’ convictions and sentences. II. Between 1989 and 1995, Ms. Bolden served as Emerald Health’s Director of Operations and as Supervisor of its Ventilator Unit. As Director of Operations, she approved Emerald Health’s payments to vendors, authorized its capital purchases, transferred funds between its bank accounts, and directed its efforts to obtain reimbursements from Medicaid. In sum, she was responsible for most of the administrative and financial decisions of Emerald Health. Beginning in 1990, and until his resignation in early 1993, Mr. Bolden worked as Emerald Health’s Director of Maintenance. In that capacity, he ordered supplies and supervised Emerald Health’s housekeeping and maintenance staff. A. The Boldens utilized their relationships with Emerald Health to manipulate North Carolina’s Medicaid reimbursement system. The North Carolina Division of Medical Assistance (the “DMA”) administers Medicaid, a healthcare program for low-income individuals partially funded by the federal government. Pursuant to its mandate, Medicaid reimburses nursing facilities, such as Emerald Health, for their treatment and care of Medicaid patients. In making such reimbursements, Medicaid initially disburses “prospective payments” to nursing facilities that treat and care for Medicaid patients. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 26H.0101. The “prospective payment rate” on which such payments are based is an estimate of the costs a nursing facility likely incurred in treating a Medicaid patient for one day. Medicaid has established three separate prospective payment rates, corresponding to the three levels of care provided by nursing facilities — intermediate nursing care, skilled nursing care, and ventilator care. Id. r. 26H.0102. Each prospective payment rate consists of two components, called “direct” and “indirect” components. The direct component consists of those nursing facility costs attributable specifically to patient care, such as nursing, food service, housekeeping, and laundry. Id. The indirect component consists of nursing facility costs related to property ownership, administration, and maintenance. Id. In order to receive its prospective payments, a nursing facility periodically submits bills to Medicaid (the “Medicaid Bills”). The Medicaid Bills specify the number of days each Medicaid patient resided in the nursing facility and the level of care each received. After receiving and approving a nursing facility’s Medicaid Bills, Medicaid makes the prospective payments. At the end of each fiscal year, in order to ensure that the prospective payments were proper, Medicaid requires each nursing facility to file an annual cost report (the “Cost Report”). Id. r. 26H.0104. A Cost Report details both the direct and indirect costs a nursing facility actually incurred in treating and caring for Medicaid-eligible patients. If a nursing facility’s actual direct costs are less than the direct cost component of the prospective payments it has already received, the facility is obliged to repay the difference to Medicaid. If, however, the nursing facility’s actual direct costs exceed the direct cost component of the prospective payments the facility has received, Medicaid issues a “settlement payment” to the facility. Id. r. 26H.0102. In contrast to direct costs, Medicaid does not make settlement payments, or require repayment, for the indirect cost component of a nursing facility’s prospective payments. Id. In other words, unlike with direct costs, Medicaid does not make settlement payments to nursing facilities that expended more in indirect costs than was provided for in their prospective payments. By the same token, to the extent a nursing facility does not spend the portion of its prospective payments dedicated to indirect costs, it is under no obligation to repay Medicaid. Therefore, to the extent a nursing facility can characterize its costs as direct costs, the greater its Medicaid reimbursement. B. In carrying out their fraud scheme, the Boldens manipulated Medicaid’s reimbursement system in several respects in order to inflate the Medicaid payments received by Emerald Health. Of importance here, the scheme included the following: (1) Ms. Bolden, as Emerald Health’s agent, entered Emerald Health into lease agreements which were used for fraudulent purposes (the “Lease Transactions”); (2) the Boldens implemented a plan to circumvent Medicaid’s “related party” regulations (the “Related Party Transactions”); (3) Ms. Bolden utilized Emerald Health to bill Medicaid for patients no longer in the nursing facility, and she miscategor-ized the levels of care provided to various patients on the Medicaid Bills, as well as on the Cost Reports (the “False Patient Billing”); (4) Ms. Bolden used Emerald Health funds to purchase an automobile for her personal use (the “Automobile Purchase”); (5) Ms. Bolden misclassified employees’ salaries as direct costs on the Cost Reports (the “False Salary Classifications”); and (6) Ms. Bolden submitted improper expenses to Medicaid for equipment purchased by Emerald Health from a medical supplies company called Aequitron (the “Aequitron Invoices”). These separate aspects of the fraud scheme are further explained below. 1. The Lease Transactions Beginning in 1991, Ms. Bolden caused Emerald Health to enter into certain lease transactions that were used for fraudulent purposes. She perpetrated this aspect of the scheme with the assistance of Buford “Sonny” Nelson. She and Nelson used Nelson Enterprises, which was Nelson’s office supplies business, to arrange leases between Emerald Health and several leasing companies for the purpose of extracting monies from Medicaid. In a typical lease transaction, Nelson would contact a leasing company (the “Lessor”) and, on behalf of Nelson Enterprises, represent that he had a customer, Emerald Health, that was interested in leasing nursing facility equipment. Thereafter, the Lessor would enter into a lease agreement with Emerald Health. Pursuant to the agreement, the Lessor would agree to purchase the equipment from Nelson Enterprises and lease it to Emerald Health. In each transaction, the equipment was to be delivered directly from Nelson Enterprises to Emerald Health. When they initiated the Lease Transactions, Ms. Bolden and Nelson had no intention of providing equipment for Emerald Health. Instead, Nelson Enterprises would simply invoice the Lessors, indicating that the leased equipment had been delivered to Emerald Health. Before disbursing its payment to Nelson Enterprises, a Lessor would contact Emerald Health to confirm receipt of the equipment. Ms. Bolden would assure the Lessor that Emerald Health had received and accepted the leased equipment. The Lessor would then disburse its payment to Nelson Enterprises. Instead of delivering the leased equipment to Emerald Health, however, Nelson would either send it a portion of the equipment ordered or none at all. Nelson would then divide the payment received from the Lessor between himself and Ms. Bolden. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, Emerald Health was obligated to make lease payments to the Lessor. For example, in July of 1993, Nelson brokered a lease between Emerald Health and a company called North Star Leasing (“North Star”). Prior to arranging the North Star lease, Ms. Bolden borrowed $11,800 from Nelson for the down payment on a vehicle for Mr. Bolden. Nelson then brokered the North Star lease, in the sum of $23,500, for the purpose of financing Emerald Health’s purchase of bathtub equipment from Nelson Enterprises. After receiving an invoice from Nelson Enterprises and confirming with Ms. Bolden that the bathtub equipment had been delivered to Emerald Health, North Star disbursed a $23,500 payment to Nelson Enterprises. Nelson kept $11,800 as repayment of his earlier loan to Ms. Bolden, paid himself $2,700 as a broker’s fee, and gave Ms. Bolden the remaining $9,000. This transaction obligated Emerald Health to make monthly payments of approximately $1,000 to North Star for three years for bathtub equipment it never received. Between 1991 and 1993, Ms. Bolden and Nelson involved Emerald Health in seven Lease Transactions. In the end, Nelson Enterprises received over $200,000 from seven Lessors. Only $23,000 of that sum was applied to actual equipment delivered to Emerald Health. The remaining $177,000 was divided between Nelson and Ms. Bolden. Nelson received approximately $33,000 and Ms. Bolden received approximately $144,000, $11,800 of which was used to purchase the automobile for Mr. Bolden. Ms. Bolden classified Emerald Health’s lease payments as indirect costs on its 1991 and 1992 Cost Reports. On the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports, however, over $33,500 in payments on the Lease Transactions were misclassified as direct costs, thereby increasing Emerald Health’s Medicaid receipts for 1993 and 1994. 2. The Related Party Transactions As part of the scheme, the Boldens circumvented Medicaid’s regulations on related party transactions. In submitting Cost Reports to Medicaid, a nursing facility must disclose whether any of its costs resulted from transactions with “related parties,” i.e., individuals or businesses having immediate family relationships with the facility. N.C. Admin. Code tit. 10, r. 26H.0104. For related party transactions, Medicaid reimburses a nursing facility for only the related party’s actual costs for goods or services provided to the facility. In 1993, Mr. Bolden resigned from Emerald Health, due to disagreements with his father-in-law, and established a nursing supplies business called Carolina Supply Company (“Carolina Supply”). That same year Nelson Enterprises failed, and Ms. Bolden decided to extract extra monies from Medicaid by having Emerald Health purchase supplies from Carolina Supply at inflated prices. Due to Medicaid’s limitations on related party transactions, she concealed Emerald Health’s purchases from Carolina Supply by having Nelson create a sham “business” to act as an intermediary between Carolina Supply and Emerald Health. Nelson then established a bank account for the sham business, which was called Industrial Consumer Products (“Industrial”). Carolina Supply would bill Industrial for various supplies it purportedly shipped to Emerald Health, and Industrial would in turn bill Emerald Health, at inflated prices, for those same supplies. Although the supplies were rarely delivered as ordered, Emerald Health would pay the Industrial bills, and Industrial would in turn pay the Carolina Supply bills. Nelson characterized his role in the Related Party Transactions as “just selling paper.” Emerald Health sometimes paid Industrial’s invoices even though no supplies were delivered to Emerald Health. In other instances, Nelson submitted Industrial invoices which Emerald Health did not pay, and for which no supplies were delivered (the “Fictitious Invoices”). The Fictitious Invoices were used solely to increase Emerald Health’s Medicaid reimbursements. When supplies were delivered, Emerald Health was usually charged 40% to 70% more than Carolina Supply’s actual costs. For example, in 1993, Carolina Supply purchased washcloths, bath towels, bibs, and fitted sheets at an approximate cost of $5,700. In September of 1993, Industrial charged Emerald Health approximately $15,500 for those items, which Emerald Health paid. Industrial, on November 19, 1993, issued a $13,000 check to Carolina Supply for those same items. Nelson thus profited by about $2,500, while Carolina Supply made more than $7,000. In carrying out the Related Party Transactions, Industrial submitted a total of eight invoices to Emerald Health. Two such invoices, totalling about $7,000, were never paid. Between September of 1993 and March of 1994, Emerald Health paid Industrial approximately $54,300 on the remaining six invoices, and Industrial made corresponding payments to Carolina Supply, the related party, of almost $47,000. The cost of the supplies actually delivered to Emerald Health was about $31,000. Ms. Bolden classified the eight invoices as direct costs on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports, failing to reveal that they were Related Party Transactions. 3. The False Patient Billing As part of the fraud scheme, Ms. Bolden also caused Emerald Health to systematically charge Medicaid for patients who were no longer in its nursing facility due to their hospitalization, discharge, or death. For example, Emerald Health billed Medicaid for its care of patient Beulah Wallace from April 1, 1994, until April 27, 1994. Ms. Wallace, however, died on April 3, 1994. Emerald Health similarly billed Medicaid for its care of patient Ardna Church from June 1,1994, until September 22, 1994, but Ms. Church had been discharged from the facility on June 16, 1994. As a result of the False Patient Billing, Ms. Bolden was convicted on eighteen false claims charges, and Medicaid was overcharged by more than $63,000. 4. The Automobile Purchase In September of 1993, Nelson assisted Ms. Bolden in concealing the use of Emerald Health funds to purchase an automobile for her personal use. In this aspect’of the fraud scheme, Ms. Bolden first issued an Emerald Health check for approximately $18,000, payable to NationsBank. Nelson, purporting to act on behalf of Emerald Health, took the check to NationsBank in Statesville, North Carolina, where he purchased a cashier’s check in that sum, payable to Nelson Enterprises. Nelson next drove to nearby Newton, and, using the cashier’s check, purchased a $17,000 cashier’s check from Southern National Bank, payable to State Employees Credit Union. Nelson retained $1,000 as his “fee” and used the $17,000 cashier’s check to purchase a vehicle for Ms. Bolden. These transactions served to conceal Ms. Bolden’s use of Emerald Health’s funds to purchase her personal automobile. The $18,000 Emerald Health check to Nations-Bank was reflected as an indirect cost on the 1993 Cost Report. 5.The False Salary Classifications As part of the fraud scheme, Ms. Bolden misclassified several employees’ salaries as direct costs on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports. Specifically, she improperly classified her own salary, as well as those of an Emerald Health administrative assistant, two of its accounting clerks, a physician assistant, and a maintenance employee, as direct rather than indirect costs. For example, Ms. Bolden designated Lori Gann as a “medical records clerk,” rather than an accounting clerk, in order to mis-classify Gann’s salary as a direct cost on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports. By mis-classifying these salaries, Ms. Bolden overstated Emerald Health’s direct costs on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports by over $190,000. 6. The Aequitron Invoices On several occasions, Ms. Bolden caused Emerald Health’s financial records to overstate expenses by making duplicative accounting entries, thereby double and triple-expensing certain purchases from a medical supplies company called Aequi-tron. In one instance, Emerald Health received invoices from Aequitron for medical supplies it had purchased, for approximately $2,000. Ms. Bolden misclassified these purchases as direct costs on Emerald Health’s accounting ledger and on the 1993 Cost Report. She then obtained duplicate invoices from Aequitron and ex-pensed them a second time, again misclas-sifying the duplicates as direct costs on Emerald Health’s accounting ledger and on the 1993 Cost Report. On another occasion, Emerald Health purchased ventilator equipment from Ae-quitron, which invoiced the equipment for approximately $64,000. Upon receiving the ventilator equipment, Ms. Bolden had a Lessor pay Aequitron for it, and Emerald Health then leased the equipment from the Lessor. Ms. Bolden recorded the $64,000 Aequitron invoice on Emerald Health’s accounting ledger to reflect that Emerald Health had engaged in three such transactions. She then reported the three “purchases” of ventilator equipment as direct costs on the 1994 Cost Report. C. In sum, the Boldens manipulated Medicaid’s reimbursement system in several respects in order to inflate the Medicaid payments received by Emerald Health. Ms. Bolden caused Emerald Health to misrepresent the number of Medicaid patients it treated and cared for, to conceal the Related Party Transactions on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports, and to abuse the Medicaid reimbursement process by classifying its indirect costs as direct costs on those Cost Reports. By improperly classifying indirect costs as direct costs, Ms. Bolden succeeded in eliminating the repayments Emerald Health would have been obliged to make to Medicaid for 1993 and 1994. During fiscal years 1990, 1991, and 1992, Emerald Health’s actual direct costs were substantially less than the direct cost component of the prospective payments it received from Medicaid. As a result, Emerald Health was required to repay Medicaid the sums of $138,687, $102,501, and $318,695 for those years. By contrast, in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, it received settlement payments from Medicaid, amounting to $529 in 1993 and $163 in 1994. With this background in mind, we turn to the issues raised by the Boldens in this case. III. THE CONVICTION ISSUES As explained above, the Boldens, in their separate appeals, challenge their money laundering and related conspiracy convictions. In addition, Ms. Bolden asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict her on the eighteen separate false claims counts. We begin our analysis of their contentions on the Conviction Issues by examining the applicable standards of review. A. The Standards of Review First, in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, a verdict must be upheld if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); see also United States v. Bennafield, 287 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir.2002). Second, we review de novo a challenge to the validity of an indictment. United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir.1997). Finally, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s rulings on jury instructions. United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir.1995). In reviewing the adequacy of instructions, we “accord the district court much discretion and will not reverse provided that the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately state the controlling law.” Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 985 (4th Cir.1994). B. The Money Laundering Convictions The Boldens first challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for money laundering. Each of their six money laundering convictions, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), arose out of the Related Party Transactions. Three of those convictions resulted from checks written by Emerald Health to Industrial, and the other three involved checks written by Industrial to Carolina Supply (collectively, the “Industrial Check Transactions”). As explained below, sufficient evidence supports the money laundering convictions. 1. The Money Laundering Issues In the common understanding, money laundering occurs when money derived from criminal activity is placed into a legitimate business in an effort to cleanse the money of criminal taint. The money laundering statute, however, as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), proscribes a much broader range of conduct, specifically prohibiting four distinct types of money laundering activity. In order to contravene § 1956(a)(1), a defendant must, first of all, know that the property involved in a “financial transaction” represents the “proceeds” of some “specified unlawful activity.” If this “proceeds” element is satisfied, a money laundering violation occurs when a defendant conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction: (1) intending to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity (“promotion money laundering”); or (2) intending to engage in conduct contravening §§ 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code; or (3) knowing that the financial transaction is designed to conceal the nature of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity (“concealment money laundering”); or (4) knowing that the transaction is designed to avoid a state or federal transaction reporting requirement. The money laundering counts charged the Boldens with involvement in both promotion money laundering and concealment money laundering. The instructions advised the jury that, in order to convict on those charges, it was obliged to find the Boldens involved in both promotion money laundering and concealment money laundering. Accordingly, by its guilty verdict on the six money laundering counts, the jury found that they had each engaged in both types of money laundering. The Boldens maintain that their money laundering convictions must be vacated for two reasons. First, they contend that the financial transactions on which their money laundering convictions are based, i.e., the Industrial Check Transactions, did not involve the “proceeds” of the mail and wire fraud that constituted the “specified unlawful activity” alleged in the indictment. Second, they assert that the Industrial Check Transactions failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of either promotion money laundering or concealment money laundering. For the reasons explained below, we reject each of these contentions. 2. The “Proceeds” Element The Boldens first contend that the evidence failed to prove that the money laundering offenses involved the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity spelled out in the indictment. In particular, it charged their involvement in a mail and wire fraud scheme — an offense which qualifies as a “specified unlawful activity” under the relevant money laundering statute. The Boldens assert, however, that the mail and wire fraud activity consisted only of the submission of the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports, and that it was not until the submission of those Reports that their fraud scheme generated proceeds. According to the Boldens, the Industrial Check Transactions — the financial transactions underlying the money laundering convictions — could not have involved the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity because they occurred prior to the submission of the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports. Contrary to the Boldens’ contention, the money laundering statute does not require the underlying criminal activity be completed prior to the money laundering transactions. See United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826, 829 (4th Cir.2000) (“Funds are criminally derived if they are derived from an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense.” (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added)). Thus, the key inquiry is not whether the specified unlawful activity was completed prior to the alleged money laundering transaction. Instead, we must determine whether the specified unlawful activity generated proceeds prior to the money laundering, and whether the money laundering actually involved those criminally-derived proceeds. We begin our analysis by noting that certain criminal activities can produce proceeds long before their completion. A mail fraud scheme, such as the Medicaid fraud scheme of the Boldens, is the prototype of an activity that can generate proceeds before the mailings take place. See United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694, 705 (7th Cir.1998) (“A mail fraud scheme ... can create proceeds long before the mailing ever takes place.”). Indeed, as the Tenth Circuit recognized in United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir.1995), a “ ‘scheme to defraud’ has a wider meaning than an individual act of fraud.” A mail or wire fraud scheme often encompasses a range of activities that occur prior to, and culminate in, mail and wire submissions. Accordingly, in order to sustain the Boldens’ money laundering convictions, there must simply have been sufficient evidence for the jury to “have inferred that the [proceeds] came from a fraudulent scheme and that the use of the mails furthered that scheme.” Mankarious, 151 F.3d at 703. The Boldens’ scheme to defraud Medicaid cast a wide net, and it was not limited to the submission of the Cost Reports. The scheme included, inter alia, the False Patient Billing; the Lease Transactions; the creation and use of a sham company, Industrial; the submission of the Industrial invoices to Emerald Health; the receipt of the prospective payments; and the inclusion of the Related Party Transactions as direct costs on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports. The Cost Reports were simply used to justify the prospective payments that Emerald Health had already received. Accordingly, the mail and wire submissions were merely the culminating acts in a scheme that had begun long before. And although their fraud scheme may not have been consummated until the submission of the Cost Reports, the Boldens had completed a substantial part of the scheme prior to the Industrial Check Transactions. For our purposes, the relevant fact is that the fraud scheme produced proceeds through the prospective payments prior to the financial transactions — the Industrial Check Transactions — on which the money laundering convictions were based. The 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports merely justified Emerald Health’s receipt of those prospective payments. See United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1361 (5th Cir.1996) (concluding that fraud scheme “produces proceeds at the latest when the scheme succeeds in disgorging the funds from the victim and placing them into the control of the perpetrators”); United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 800 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding for purposes of money laundering statute “that the money became the proceeds of fraud as soon as it entered the hands of members of the scheme”). The prospective payments constituted the proceeds used by the Boldens in the Industrial Check Transactions. Accordingly, the contention that the money laundering offenses were not conducted with the “proceeds” of the fraud scheme must fail. 3. The “Promotion” and “Concealment” Issues Similarly unavailing is the contention that the Industrial Check Transactions failed to constitute either promotion money laundering or concealment money laundering. According to the Boldens, the Industrial Check Transactions were only used to carry on the legitimate business of Carolina Supply, and they thus did not qualify as promotion or concealment money laundering. Indeed, several courts have vacated money laundering convictions where the financial transactions were utilized for legitimate purposes. See e.g., United States v. Olaniyi-Oke, 199 F.3d 767, 770 (5th Cir.1999) (concluding there was no evidence that computers purchased in financial transaction charged as money laundering were to be used for “anything other than fully legal personal use”); United States v. Calderon, 169 F.3d 718, 721-22 (11th Cir.1999) (determining there was no evidence “that Appellant’s conduct furthered the alleged underlying narcotics trafficking”). For the reasons explained below, we reject this contention. a. Promotion Money Laundering Under the evidence, the Industrial Check Transactions were designed to avoid disclosing the Related Party Transactions to Medicaid, allowing the Boldens to evade Medicaid’s regulatory requirements and charge Medicaid inflated costs. Further, Emerald Health’s payments to Industrial compensated Nelson for his part in the scheme, encouraging his continued participation therein. Finally, Carolina Supply used the money it received from Industrial to purchase and deliver part of the supplies Industrial billed to Emerald Health. These partial deliveries provided an aura of legitimacy to Emerald Health’s payments to Industrial, allowing the Boldens to further conceal their scheme. Thus, the circumstances underlying the Industrial Check Transactions are sufficient to justify the finding that the Boldens committed promotion money laundering. In other decisions, we have ruled similarly. For example, in United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214 (4th Cir.1998), we found the evidence sufficient to sustain convictions for promotion money laundering. There, the defendants had obtained loans from a insurance company by misrepresenting that the funds would be used to finance accounts receivable for physicians. The funds were instead employed to promote risky non-medical businesses. In their scheme, the defendants created a sham business for the purpose of handling the loans. The insurance company wired loan proceeds to the sham business, which transferred those proceeds to the non-medical businesses. We found the transactions to constitute promotion money laundering, in contravention of § 1956(a)(1)(A)®, because, as Judge Hamilton explained, “the transfer of money from [the sham business] to the non-medical businesses was integral to the success of the overall scheme.” Id. at 221. In this case, Industrial was a sham business, used solely to deceive Medicaid on the Related Party Transactions, and it was thus “integral to the success” of the scheme. b. Concealment Money Laundering The evidence also established that the Industrial Check Transactions constituted concealment money laundering, pursuant to § 1956(a)(1)(B)®. On this point, the Boldens maintain that, while the Industrial Check Transactions were designed to avoid the requirements of the Medicaid regulations, they were not designed to conceal the fact that Emerald Health had obtained prospective payments from Medicaid. On this basis, they assert that their convictions for concealment money laundering are invalid. Viewed in the proper light, however, the Industrial Check Transactions concealed the fact that the payments Medicaid made to Emerald Health were being used in the Related Party Transactions. As related above, supra Part II.B.2, the Boldens and Nelson created Industrial to hide the fact that Emerald Health was ordering supplies from Carolina Supply, a related party. The Industrial Check Transactions concealed this arrangement and enabled Medicaid to be billed at inflated prices for the supplies ordered from Carolina Supply. Those transactions also concealed the fact that the money flowing into Carolina Supply, and ultimately to the Boldens, was derived from Medicaid funds. The creation and use of sham businesses is highly relevant to the proof of concealment money laundering. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir.1995), observed that the use of “a third party, for example, a business entity or a relative, to purchase goods on one’s behalf or from which one will benefit usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal.” And in United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir.1998), the Ninth Circuit, in an analogous situation, concluded that a defendant who concealed his ownership in a business from a bankruptcy trustee, through the use of “nominees who held themselves out as owners of the stores,” had committed concealment money laundering. The court reasoned that the use of nominees “prevented the bankruptcy trustee from knowing that [the defendant] was the legitimate owner of the stores.” Id. at 1340. Likewise, the Boldens’ use of Industrial concealed the fact that Emerald Health was billing Medicaid (at inflated prices) for the Related Party Transactions. In sum, the evidence sufficiently proves the allegations of concealment money laundering. C. The Conspiracy Issues The Boldens also challenge, on three separate bases, their convictions for money laundering conspiracy, as charged in Count Thirty-Seven of the indictment. They contend, first, that Count Thirty-Seven was fatally defective; second, that the jury instructions on money laundering conspiracy amended the indictment; and third, that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of money laundering conspiracy. 1. In analyzing the sufficiency of Count Thirty-Seven, we look first to the requirements of an indictment. A valid indictment must: (1) allege the essential facts constituting the offense; (2) allege each element of the offense, so that fair notice is provided; and (3) be sufficiently distinctive that a verdict will bar a second prosecution for the same offense. United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir.1995) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974)); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) (“The indictment ... shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”). As a basic proposition, an indictment is sufficient “ ‘if it alleges an offense in the words of the statute.’ ” United States v. Brandon, 298 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Wicks, 187 F.3d 426, 427 (4th Cir.1999)). The Boldens contend that Count Thirty-Seven, which alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), was defective in three respects: (1) it failed to allege any overt acts; (2) it failed to identify the specified unlawful activity that produced the proceeds they conspired to launder; and (3) it failed to specify the offense defined in § 1956(a)(1) or § 1957 that the Boldens conspired to commit. We examine each of these three contentions in turn. a. The first of these specifications, that Count Thirty-Seven is defective for failing to allege overt acts, is baseless. The Boldens were charged with and convicted of money laundering conspiracy, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and § 1956(h) does not require an overt act to be either alleged or proven. As we observed in United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 669 (4th Cir.2001), “a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), as opposed to a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, does not explicitly require proof of an overt act.” In addressing a similar challenge to the drug conspiracy statute, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994), held that an overt act is not an element of 21 U.S.C. § 846. As the Court observed, Congress explicitly required the commission of an overt act as an element of the conspiracy defined in 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the Court concluded that Congress must be presumed to have acted deliberately in failing to include similar language in § 846. Id. at 14, 115 S.Ct. 382. The drug and money laundering conspiracy statutes-— § 846 and § 1956(h)— are drawn in similar terms, and neither requires an overt act. See United States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.2001) (“The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) is nearly identical to the language of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which the Supreme Court held ... does not require proof of an overt act.”); see also United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 164 (5th Cir.1998) (“Section 846 has language virtually identical to the language of § 1956(h).”). Thus, because an overt act is not an element of a § 1956(h) offense, there was no need for the grand jury to make such an allegation in Count Thirty-Seven. b. The Boldens next assert that Count Thirty-Seven failed to identify the “specified unlawful activity” that produced the proceeds they conspired to launder. We have observed that “[t]he core of money laundering ... is the laundering transaction itself,” and that “details about the nature of the unlawful activity underlying the character of the proceeds need not be alleged.” Smith, 44 F.3d at 1265. In any event, Count Thirty-Seven spelled out the unlawful activity that produced the proceeds the Boldens conspired to launder. Count Thirty-Seven incorporated and realleged the overt acts alleged in Count One, which charged the Boldens with violating the general conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371). Those overt acts included allegations that the Boldens established Industrial to “avoid the federal rules governing related party transactions,” that Industrial’s invoices were included on the Cost Reports, and that, “as a result, Carolina Supply and [Industrial] generated profits from Medicaid reimbursement to the facility.” Count One also alleged that Ms. Bolden “caused the submission of electronic billings to the Medicaid program which resulted in the interstate wiring of claims and payments between Raleigh, North Carolina and Dallas, Texas.” In this context, the Boldens had ample notice of the details of the specified unlawful activity (mail and wire fraud) that generated the proceeds they conspired to launder, and any contention to the contrary must be rejected. c. Finally, the Boldens contend that Count Thirty-Seven is fatally flawed because it failed to specify a specific statutory object of the conspiracy, that is, which one of five offenses — the four defined in § 1956(a)(1) or § 1957’s single offense — ■ they conspired to commit. Count Thirty-Seven was not required to allege the specific type of money laundering the Boldens conspired to commit; it was simply alleging a multiple-object conspiracy. Courts have uniformly upheld multiple-object conspiracies, and they have consistently concluded that a guilty verdict must be sustained if the evidence shows that the conspiracy furthered any one of the objects alleged. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991); United States v. Hudgins, 120 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir.1997). For example, the Third Circuit upheld a conviction where the indictment alleged a conspiracy with three statutory objects — including violations of § 1956(a)(1) and § 1956(a)(2). See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (3d Cir.1994). The court observed that the convictions could be sustained if the defendants “knowingly and intentionally committed acts furthering any of the three objects of the conspiracy.” Id. at 1202. Pursuant to the foregoing, this contention must also be rejected. 2. The Boldens next contend that the trial court constructively amended Count Thirty-Seven by impermissibly broadening the identity of the members of the conspiracy. That charge alleged that the Boldens “did knowingly [conspire] with one another, to commit money laundering offenses.” As such, it omitted an allegation commonly made in such charges, that the defendants conspired “with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury.” The Boldens contend that, because such an allegation was not made in Count Thirty-Seven, the jury was obliged to find that the Boldens had conspired with each other, and the court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury on this point. A defendant may only be tried on charges alleged in an indictment, and only “the grand jury may broaden or alter the charges in the indictment.” United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). An indictment is constructively amended “when the essential elements of the offense ... are altered to broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what is contained in the indictment.” United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 634 (11th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 710 (4th Cir.1994) (“A constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government, [the court], or both, broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury”). Where an indictment has been constructively amended, we have found reversible error, and we “conclusively presume that the defendant has been prejudiced by the constructive amendment.” Floresea, 38 F.3d at 711. In support of their constructive amendment claim, the Boldens rely almost exclusively on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Keller, 916 F.2d 628, where two defendants were indicted for conspiracy, and the indictment failed to allege that there were unnamed coconspirators. An initial instruction permitted the jury to convict Keller if the jury found he had conspired with anyone, while the indictment, like our Count Thirty-Seven, alleged that he had conspired only with his codefendant. The court gave a supplemental instruction, using a hypothetical conspiracy example, emphasizing that Keller could be convicted if the jury found he entered into an unlawful agreement with anyone. The jury then convicted Keller and acquitted his code-fendant. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that, where an indictment alleges “that only two individuals conspired, ... an essential element of the offense is the identity of the individuals who agreed.” Id. at 634. The court observed that, “[w]hile the initial instruction standing alone may not have been enough to constitute an amendment, the trial court exacerbated the problem with its supplemental instructions in response to the jury’s question.” Id. at 636. Contrary to the Boldens’ contention, the instruction did not fatally amend Count Thirty-Seven. Even if a coconspirator’s identity is an essential element of the conspiracy charge (but see United States v. Am. Waste Fibers Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 1044, 1046 (4th Cir.1987)), the jury, by convicting the Boldens of the money laundering conspiracy alleged, necessarily found that they had conspired with each other, as Count Thirty-Seven alleged, and as the instruction permitted. 3. Finally, the Boldens contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for money laundering conspiracy. On this issue, they first assert that the Industrial Check Transactions cannot be part of a money laundering conspiracy because they did not involve the “proceeds” of the specified unlawful activity. Independently, the Boldens contend that, even if the Industrial Check Transactions involved those proceeds, the transactions were not for the purpose'of promoting or concealing the specified unlawful activity. As explained in Part III.B, supra, these contentions are without merit. The Bol-dens also maintain that the overt acts in Count One, incorporated and realleged in Count Thirty-Seven, do not involve money laundering conduct and that the evidence was therefore insufficient to convict. On the contrary, as we explained in Part III. C.l.a, supra, an indictment for money laundering conspiracy need not allege an overt act. In these circumstances, this contention must also be rejected. D. The False Claims Evidence Ms. Bolden challenges eighteen of her twenty convictions for violating the false claims statute (Counts Three through Eleven, Thirteen through Nineteen, Twenty-One, and Twenty-Four). She contends that the evidence was insufficient on the essential element of her “knowledge” that the claims submitted to Medicaid were false. Her convictions resulted from eighteen separate Medicaid Bills, between December 1993 and April 1995, for Emerald Health’s supposed care of patients who had died, had been hospitalized, or had been discharged. The false claims statute, codified at § 287 of Title 18, criminalizes the submission of a false claim to the United States, or any department or agency thereof, if the defendant knows that such claim is “false, fictitious, or fraudulent.” Thus, we must uphold such a conviction if the evidence shows the submission of a false claim and if the defendant “acted with knowledge that the claim was false ... and with a consciousness that he was either doing something which was wrong, or which violated the law.” United States v. Maher, 582 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir.1978) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 634 (4th Cir.1981) (upholding false claim conviction even though there was “evidence that the government got its money’s worth”). Although the jury was required to find, in order to convict Ms. Bolden, that she had knowingly submitted the eighteen false claims to Medicaid, it was entitled to do so on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Indeed, “[t]he question of one’s intent is not measured by a psychic reading of [the defendant’s] mind but by the surrounding facts and circumstances; i.e., circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir.1978). On the evidence presented, the jury could conclude that Ms. Bolden “knowingly” submitted the eighteen false claims to Medicaid. She controlled Emerald Health’s Medicaid Bills, and Emerald Health was strapped for funds. Ms. Bolden was aware that Emerald Health’s patient census was incorrect, and she nonetheless instructed Emerald Health’s employees to submit the Medicaid Bills. According to Ms. Cox, the accounts receivable clerk, “many times [Emerald Health] would get behind on the census” and “most of the time [they] would go ahead and ... submit a bill to Medicaid.” Ms. Cox informed Ms. Bolden that Emerald Health’s patient census was inaccurate, yet Ms. Bolden instructed her to go ahead and bill Medicaid because it was necessary “to get money into the facility,” and Emerald Health could, in any event, “send in a recoupment if [it] billed something in error.” Even if Ms. Bolden had contemplated correcting these Medicaid Bills, such an effort would not have been a valid defense to the charges. Under § 287, the Government was obliged to establish only her knoioing submission of the false claims. The jury was entitled to conclude, on the evidence of Ms. Cox and the related circumstances, that Ms. Bol-den knowingly submitted false claims to Medicaid. See United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 962 (5th Cir.1983) (“Where sufficiency is at issue, a finding that an accused acted recklessly may be enough to sustain a jury verdict, because a jury may properly infer the requisite intent.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir.1982) (concluding that evidence of defendant’s pervasive involvement in operations of corporation involved in transactions in question was sufficient “for a reasonable juror to infer that [defendant] knew of ... the conspiracy”). Ms. Bolden also contends that her submission of false claims to Medicaid were simply mistakes, due to poor bookkeeping and accounting practices. She presented this explanation to the jury as a defense, however, and it was rejected. Viewed in the proper light, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Ms. Bolden on each of the false claim charges. IV. THE SENTENCING ISSUES Having resolved the issues related to the Boldens’ convictions, we turn to their sentences. In that respect, they first contend that the court erred in grouping their fraud and money laundering offenses. They then assert that the sentencing court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Finally, they maintain that, if the court made adequate findings under Rule 32(c)(1), it erred in its calculation of fraud losses, and in its application of adjustments to Ms. Bolden for offenses involving “abuse of position of trust” and “vulnerable victim[s].” A. The Standards of Review In assessing challenges to a sentencing court’s application of the Guidelines, we review factual determinations for clear error and legal issues de novo. United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1190 (4th Cir.1995). The grouping of multiple convictions, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, “involves a legal interpretation of guidelines terminology, [and] we review [grouping issues] de novo.” United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir.1990). A sentencing court’s factual findings in its application of the Guidelines, made under Rule 32(c)(1), are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Souther, 221 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir.2000). When a sentencing court has failed to resolve a disputed fact on which it relied at sentencing, we remand for resentencing. United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 245 (4th Cir.1991). A finding of fraud loss is a factual issue, which we review for clear error. United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 671 (4th Cir.2001). Finally, whether a defendant occupies a position of trust is a factual determination reviewable for clear error. United States v. Glymph, 96 F.3d 722, 727 (4th Cir.1996). B. The Grouping Issue The Boldens contend that the sentencing court erroneously grouped their fraud and money laundering convictions. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) of the Guidelines, all “counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single group.” In construing § 3D1.2(d), we have concluded that fraud and money laundering offenses should only be grouped when they are “ ‘closely related.’ ” United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 792-93 (4th Cir.1990)). According to the Boldens, their fraud and money laundering offenses are not so closely related as to warrant grouping. We disagree. In Porter, we first considered whether fraud and money laundering may be so closely related as to warrant being “grouped together.” 909 F.2d 789. Porter had obtained the proceeds of an illegal gambling operation and laundered those proceeds by purchasing a home. We declined to group his offenses because the money laundering was not “in any way integrated” with the fraud scheme, i.e., the gambling operation. Id. at 793. The only connection between the gambling operation and his money laundering activity was that Porter had laundered the proceeds of the scheme. We concluded that, in such a situation, the fraud and money laundering offenses were not so “closely related” as to justify grouping. Id. We observed, however, that the grouping of such offenses would be appropriate where an enterprise generated monies through illegal activities and “simultaneously laundered those monies as part of the same continuing transaction or common scheme.” Id. In Walker, we approved the grouping of fraud and promotion money laundering offenses because the money laundering activities were an essential aspect of the fraud scheme. 112 F.3d at 167. Walker, an insurance salesman, had diverted funds from his customers to his personal use and made fictitious interest payments to his customers with the proceeds. In so doing, he both concealed and promoted the fraud scheme. In making the fictitious interest payments, he used the proceeds of his fraud scheme to avoid suspicion that fraudulent activity was afoot and to encourage customers to continue paying their premiums. Id. The Walker principles are applicable here. The Boldens were found to have engaged in both promotion and concealment money laundering, and the Industrial Check Transactions not only concealed the Related Party Transactions from Medicaid, they promoted those transactions as an essential component of the fraud scheme. By obtaining funds from the Industrial Check Transactions, the Boldens were able to provide Emerald Health with a portion of the supplies reflected on the Industrial invoices. These actions gave an aura of legitimacy to their criminal endeav- or and enabled their scheme to continue. As such, the money laundering and the Related Party Transactions were not only closely related, they were inextricably intertwined. In every aspect of the fraud scheme, the Boldens’ goal was the same: the improper extraction of monies from Medicaid. Their money laundering activities were essential to achieving that goal, and their money laundering and fraud activities were part of a continuous, common scheme to defraud Medicaid. Thus, the fraud and money laundering offenses are “closely related” and, in the context of the Guidelines, were properly “grouped together” by the sentencing court. See United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir.1997) (approving grouping when defendant had “embarked upon his money laundering scheme with the intent of promoting his mail fraud swindle”); United States v. Landerman, 167 F.3d 895 (5th Cir.1999) (upholding grouping when money laundering was used to promote and enhance fraud scheme). In these circumstances, the contention that the court erred on the grouping issue must be rejected. C. The Rule §2 Issues The Boldens next contend that their sentences should be vacated because the court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1). Specifically, they assert that the court failed to make adequate factual findings on the issues in dispute. In a sentencing hearing, the court, under Rule 32(c)(1), is to “rule on any unresolved objections to the [PSR].” On controverted matters, the court is to make either “a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary.” Pursuant to Rule 32(b)(6)(D), the sentencing court may, once objections are resolved, “accept the [PSR] as its findings of fact.” A sentencing court’s findings on controverted matters ensure a record “as to how the district court ruled on any alleged inaccuracy in the PSR [and] allow[s] effective appellate review of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Walker, 29 F.3d 908, 911 (4th Cir.1994). We have concluded, however, that the “court need not articulate [findings] as to disputed factual allegations with minute specificity.” United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 73, 76 (4th Cir.1988). In fact, the court may simply adopt the findings contained in a PSR, provided that it makes clear “which disputed issues were resolved by its adoption.” Walker, 29 F.3d at 911 (citing United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 245 (4th Cir.1991)). In the Boldens’ sentencing hearings, the court satisfied Rule 32 on nearly all factual disputes. Two of those matters, however, warrant further scrutiny from the Rule 32(c)(1) standpoint: (1) Mr. Bolden’s fraud loss calculation and (2) Ms. Bolden’s “vulnerable victim” adjustment. 1. At Mr. Bolden’s sentencing hearing on Oct. 7, 1999, the court first ruled on several of his objections. It then stated: “[Mr. Bolden’s] remaining objections are overruled; and the Court determines that the [PSR] is fully supported by the evidence and the government’s filing is correct and adopted by the Court.” Although the adoption of Mr. Bolden’s PSR is sufficient to permit review of his sentence in most respects, it is insufficient on whether the Lease Transactions were properly included in his fraud loss calculation. Neither the PSR nor the “government’s filing,” i.e., the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, contained factual assertions sufficient to justify inclusion of the Lease Transactions in that calculation. Mr. Bolden unsuccessfully sought to exclude approximately $82,000 (attributable to the Lease Transactions) from his fraud loss calculation. He contends that the court failed to find that he directly participated in the Lease Transactions or that those transactions were in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activity. In calculating fraud loss, a sentencing court must first apply the principles of “relevant conduct.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Pursuant thereto, specific offense characteristics, such as the fraud loss properly attributable to a defendant, must be determined on the basis of (1) the acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by a defendant; and (2) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). The fact that Mr. Bolden was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, which included the Lease Transactions, does not necessarily mandate a finding that the losses from those transactions constitute relevant conduct attributable to him. Notwithstanding the verdict, the court was obliged to make individualized findings on fraud loss. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed: A jury verdict convicting the defendants of participation in a single conspiracy does not obviate the need for ... individualized findings by the sentencing court. Such a verdict speaks to the scope of the defendant’s agreement only in very general terms: It does not address the question of which specific actions demonstrated at trial were in furtherance of that single conspiracy or were foreseeable to