Full opinion text
ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING JOINT PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND AMENDED OPINION ORDER The panel has voted to deny appellees’ joint petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, filed April 21, 2003. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35. The opinion filed March 31, 2003, is amended as follows: At slip op. 4495, line 9, replace the sentence beginning “It is undisputed” with the following: It is undisputed that per location pricing has no cost-based justification, compare Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 368 (economic necessity justified allegedly exclusionary conduct), and Qwest has not suggested how per location pricing enhances efficiency or improves the products offered to consumers, see Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. At slip op. 4503, line 3, italicize “any.” At slip op. 4503, line 5, replace the phrase “but the second is erroneous.” with “; the second overstates MetroNet’s burden.” At slip op. 4503, line 8, insert the phrase “due to per location pricing” between the words “profitability” and “was”. At slip op. 4503, line 13, replace the sentence beginning “As to the second requirement” and the accompanying citation with the following: As to the second requirement, MetroNet need not prove that all of its financial woes were caused by per location pricing; rather, it must show that the financial harm attributable to per location pricing — apart from the financial harm due to other causes — was alone sufficient to drive it out of the market. See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 545-46. At slip op. 4503, line 18, insert the phrase “and other resellers” after “driving it”. At slip op. 4503, line 32, add the following sentence after “this evidence of the injury to MetroNet is weak.”: “So too is the evidence of injury to other resellers.” At slip op. 4504, line 1, replace the phrase “has had the effect of driving Me-troNet away” with “alone had a sufficiently, adverse financial impact to drive MetroNet and other resellers away.” Also, add the following: Id. at 546 (“When a firm’s power to exclude rivals from a facility gives the firm the power to eliminate competition in a market downstream from the facility, and the firm excludes at least some competitors ... a finding of monopolization, or at least attempted monopolization, is appropriate ...” (emphasis in original)). Qwest came forward with some evidence of other reasons for Me-troNet’s unprofitability, but this evidence is insufficient to resolve the issue in Qwest’s favor on summary judgment. The panel having adopted these amendments, appellees’ joint petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, filed April 21, 2003, is DENIED. OPINION FISHER, Circuit Judge. This antitrust case involves the market for small business local telephone services in the Seattle/Tacoma area. Defendant-Appellee Qwest, formerly known as “U S West,” owns the local telephone network in 14 western states, including Washington. In addition to selling basic flat-rate business lines, Qwest also sells “Centrex,” a product offering volume discounted phone line access and calling features (e.g., voice mail and call forwarding) to businesses with more than 20 phone lines. Plaintiffs-Appellants MetroNet Services Corp. and MetroNet Telemanagement Corp. (“Me-troNet”) purchase Centrex from Qwest and resell it to small businesses in the Puget Sound region with 20 or fewer phone lines. By aggregating the phone lines of these small businesses, MetroNet is able to meet the Centrex 21-line minimum and pass on Centrex volume discounts to MetroNet’s customers. In 1997, Qwest changed the pricing structure of the features component of Centrex in order to eliminate resale of both the access and features components. By requiring that each location receiving discounted Centrex features have at least 21 lines, Qwest’s new pricing scheme rendered MetroNet’s customers ineligible for the volume discount on features. MetroNet claims that Qwest’s imposition of “per location pricing” violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by illegally maintaining a monopoly over the market for small business local telephone services in Seattle/Tacoma, and by denying MetroNet access to an essential facility. MetroNet appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Qwest, arguing that the district court ignored conflicting evidence, improperly weighed evidence and failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, MetroNet. MetroNet also appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to enforce a written but unsigned settlement agreement with Qwest. We hold that at this stage in the proceedings, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was in error. Although it is indeed a close question, we hold, viewing the record in the light most favorable to MetroNet, that MetroNet has created triable issues of fact sufficient to proceed on its antitrust claims. We affirm the district court’s denial of MetroNet’s motion to enforce its settlement agreement with Qwest. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Qwest sells two types of business phone services relevant to this antitrust suit: flat-rate local exchange lines called “1FB lines,” and “Centrex.” Centrex consists of two components: multiple telephone line access that allows a company’s employees to make internal calls using a four-digit extension and external calls via the Qwest central office switch (the access component), and calling features such as call forwarding, call waiting and call hold (the features component). The access component of Centrex is regulated by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (“WUTC”), while the features component is not. Although each component is priced separately, Qwest sells them as one bundled product, requiring customers who buy one component to buy the other as well. Qwest originally developed Centrex for the large business market as an alternative to the private branch exchange (“PBX”), a switch owned by large businesses and located on their property. Centrex obviated the need for such a switch and provided significant volume discounts to businesses with more than 20 phone lines. Small businesses with 20 or fewer lines could not take advantage of Centrex volume discounts; instead, they could purchase Cen-trex without the discount, or purchase 1FB fines from Qwest and features for an additional fee. As early as 1985, MetroNet and other resellers began purchasing volume discounted Centrex fines from Qwest and reselling them to aggregations of small businesses, each with 20 fines or fewer. The resellers thereby allowed small businesses to take advantage of the volume discounts previously available only to large businesses. MetroNet reaped profits by reselling Centrex at a price above what it cost MetroNet to purchase Centrex from Qwest but below what MetroNet’s customers would have had to pay for 1FB fines plus features. “Per location pricing” By 1991, Qwest had taken note of the significant resale market for Centrex created by the differential pricing of Cen-trex and 1FB fines. Qwest sought to introduce a new version of Centrex, Cen-trex Plus, with a pricing structure designed to “eliminate or reduce” the “arbitrage” between Centrex and 1FB fines. Under the old Centrex product, Qwest charged Centrex customers, including resellers like MetroNet, based on the number of phone lines included in the Cen-trex package, regardless of whether those fines ran to a single location or multiple, separate locations. This policy of “system pricing” allowed resellers to obtain the volume discounts of a single large business by aggregating the telephone fines of several variously located small businesses. With the introduction of Centrex Plus, however, Qwest intended to shift from system pricing to “per location pricing,” requiring customers to have more than 20 fines at each location in order to receive a volume discount for the service to that location. Because the resellers’ customers have 20 or fewer fines, Qwest’s shift to per location pricing would eliminate the resellers’ ability to pass on the Centrex volume discount. Qwest had to seek WUTC approval for the new pricing structure because per location pricing was to apply not only to the unregulated features component of Centrex, but also to the regulated access component. The WUTC conditionally approved per location pricing of Centrex Plus on November 18, 1993, and finally approved it on November 30, 1994. However, a year and a half later, on April 11, 1996, the WUTC abolished per location pricing and ordered that' system pricing be reinstated. See Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. U S West Communications, Inc., 169 P.U.R. 4th 417, 1996 WL 350826 (Wash.U.T.C., Apr.ll, 1996). The WUTC found that “the existing arrangements are discriminatory and in practice operate to benefit [Qwest].” Id. Qwest viewed the WUTC order as “exasperating dramatically the existing revenue arbitrage situation” and appealed. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the WUTC order. US West Communications, Inc. v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 134 Wash.2d 74, 949 P.2d 1337, 1364 (Wash.1997). In December 1996, with system pricing back in place, Qwest concluded that: The current Washington tariff structure for Centrex Plus, [1FB], and features offers a profitable, relatively low risk opportunity for Centrex resellers to win significant market share of 1FB customers (mainly small business) in Washington. In essence, it appears that resellers can operate with positive margins while reselling [Centrex] at anywhere from 10 to 35 percent discounts to [1FB lines], not including features. Qwest estimated that it was losing more than $300,000 in revenues per month to MetroNet and other resellers, and that the revenue loss was having a “significantly negative” impact on profitability. In addition to these financial concerns, Qwest was greatly troubled that the loss of its direct relationship with customers due to resale would deprive it of the opportunity to cross-sell additional products and services. Qwest concluded that “no existing or forthcoming product ... effectively addresses Centrex resale competition,” and set about developing strategies to win back market share. On April 18, 1997, Qwest filed a “price list” with the WUTC reinstating per location pricing for the deregulated features component of Centrex. This later imposition of per location pricing is the subject of the present suit. As a result, the small business customers of resellers such as MetroNet had to pay dramatically higher prices for Centrex features. MetroNet’s chief executive officer, Kenneth Seeley, estimated that the cost of Centrex features increased 400 percent for his customers. MetroNet expert Dr. Nina Cornell reported that resale customers had to pay nearly six times more for Centrex features than did medium-sized businesses (who presumably qualified for the per location volume discount). According to Me-troNet, per location pricing also caused a slow but sure decline in MetroNet’s profitability. It is unclear from the record whether this decline in profitability actually resulted in a net loss in 1999 and 2000. MetroNet’s CEO Seeley claimed that Me-troNet lost money in 1999 and 2000. However, MetroNet’s bookkeeper testified that MetroNet was profitable in 1999. The bookkeeper did not address overall profitability in 2000, but testified that for the first nine months of that year, MetroNet’s revenues from the resale of Centrex exceeded MetroNet’s cost of purchasing Centrex from Qwest. Qwest contends that the number of Cen-trex telephone lines resold by MetroNet continued to grow for a year after the adoption of per location pricing, and that this fact demonstrates that MetroNet did not suffer any harm from per location pricing. Qwest also contends that any decline in MetroNet’s profitability was due not to per location pricing, but rather to the entry of new competitors after passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the precipitous drop in 1FB rates imposed by the WUTC in 1998, the advent of competing modes of access such as T-l and DSL and heavy personnel turnover at MetroNet. Qwest also contends that regulation by the WUTC and the requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 prevent it from controlling prices and excluding resellers such as MetroNet. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (“1996 Act”), mandates a fundamental restructuring of the local telephone markets in all 50 states, including Washington. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). Prior to passage of the 1996 Act, local exchange carriers (“LECs”) like Qwest held exclusive state-granted franchises in their respective local telephone markets. Id. Thus, Qwest had a 100 percent share in the market for local telephone services in its 14-state region, including Washington. The 1996 Act formally abolished these exclusive franchises by prohibiting states from enforcing laws that impede competition and by imposing a host of duties on incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) such as Qwest. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253. Most importantly, the 1996 Act imposed a duty on ILECs to share their networks with new local telephone providers, known as competitive local exchange carriers (“CLECs”). Id. § 251(c). “Under this provision, a requesting [CLEC] can obtain access to an [ILEC’s] network in three ways: It can purchase local telephone services at wholesale rates for resale to end users; it can lease elements of the [ILEC’s] network ‘on an unbundled basis’; and it can interconnect its own facilities with the [ILEC’s] network.” AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 371, 119 S.Ct. 721; 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2-4). Both interconnection and unbundled access must be provided “at any technically feasible point” in the carrier’s network, and on “rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2-3). ILECs may not impose unreasonable conditions or limitations on the resale of telecommunications services to CLECs. Id. § 251(c)(4). When a CLEC seeks access to an ILEC’s network through any of the three routes described above, the incumbent can negotiate an agreement without regard to the duties imposed by § 251. Id. § 252(a)(1); see also AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 372-73, 119 S.Ct. 721. However, if negotiations break down, either party may petition the relevant state commission — in this case the WUTC — to arbitrate the dispute, and the state commission must ensure that any resolution meets the requirements of § 251 and its implementing regulations. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(1) & (c); see also AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 373, 119 S.Ct. 721. The 1996 Act charged the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) with issuing implementing regulations, but left the determination of rates in the hands of state commissions such as the WUTC, subject to the broad pricing standards set forth in the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(d), 252(d). New Entrants The parties do not dispute the terms of the 1996 Act — only its practical effect on the market for small business local phone services in Seattle/Tacoma. It is undisputed that since passage of the 1996 Act, Qwest’s market share has declined by 4.2 percent, from 100 to 95.8 percent. Relying solely on MetroNet’s draft marketing plan for 2000, Qwest argues that the 1996 Act has ushered in an era of significant and effective competition. The draft report, prepared by sales manager Robert Beckett and quality assurance manager Brian Tatman, stated that “MetroNet ... has seen the number of competitive providers go from solely U S West to over 17 in the past three years.... The flood of competition has produced a never ending push for customers to switch services to a new provider.” “MetroNet has lost an average of 220 lines per month, with a total loss of 5721 since January 1998.” According to the draft report, 86 percent of the losses went to Qwest affiliates, 14 percent to CLECs. MetroNet disputes the validity of the statements made in the report. MetroNet cites Tatman’s deposition testimony that the draft marketing plan was hastily prepared, based on few hard facts, and never finalized. MetroNet also cites the testimony of Gregory Bogus, its chief operating officer, who stated that the increase in competition after passage of the 1996 Act was confined mainly to the large business telephone market — not the small business market in which MetroNet competes — and that the effect on MetroNet was marginal. MetroNet contends that the requirements set forth in the 1996 Act and its implementing regulations have not yet become a reality in the state of Washington. MetroNet points out that the 4.2 percent market share of Qwest’s competitors is hardly evidence of robust competition. No single competitor has more than one percent of the market for small business local telephone services. In addition, Metro-Net’s experts claim that various circumstances have kept the central provisions of the 1996 Act from coming to fruition. Me-troNet expert Cornell claims that litigation over implementation of the 1996 Act has created a significant ongoing barrier to the realization and use of the rights granted by the act. According to MetroNet expert Kenneth Wilson, Qwest has refused to open its network to local competition on rates, terms and conditions that are just and reasonable, and has refused to provide interconnection at any technically feasible point. He further claims that Qwest has imposed limitations on the use and combination of unbundled elements. According to Wilson, the resale of Centrex is the only area in the market where Qwest faces significant competition. Wilson further claims that due to Qwest’s continued control of the small business local telephone services market, there is no practical alternative to purchasing 1FB or Centrex lines from Qwest, or Centrex lines from resellers like MetroNet. New Products Qwest disputes Wilson’s claim by arguing that small business customers could also obtain local telephone service by purchasing T-l lines or DSL lines instead of Centrex or lFBs. Qwest argues that Me-troNet lost customers because it did not offer these and other services. According to MetroNet’s marketing manager and former sales manager, MetroNet was losing customers to competitors at least in part because it was not offering products such as DSL lines and T-l lines. However, MetroNet claims that facility-based CLECs offering these products only serve high-density metropolitan areas and focus on large, not small, business customers. Qwest also argues that MetroNet lost customers due to the introduction of Cen-trex 21 in 1997. Centrex 21 was targeted at “small to medium business customers” and was designed “to fill the product continuum gap that currently exists between Basic 1FB service and Centrex Plus.” Centrex 21 bundled analog or digital line, access with calling features such as call waiting, caller ID and call forwarding. Instead of the Centrex Plus minimum of 21 lines per location, Centrex 21 had a 3 lines per location minimum, up to 60 lines total. Thus, Centrex 21 offered small business customers direct discounts on what was essentially a non-per location basis. Regulation by the WUTC As a provider of telecommunications services in the state of Washington, Qwest is subject to regulation by the WUTC. The WUTC is authorized to regulate in the public interest the rates, services, facilities and practices of Qwest and other telecommunications companies. Wash. Rev.Code § 80.01.040(3). Qwest’s rates must be “fair, just, reasonable and sufficient,” and its service must be “rendered and performed in a prompt, expeditious and efficient manner.” Id. § 80.36.080. Qwest must file its tariff schedules with the WUTC, and is prohibited from changing a tariff unless it gives 30 days notice to the WUTC and the public. The WUTC can suspend the proposed changes within the 30 day period, or at any time before they are due to go into effect. Id. § 80.36.110(1). Qwest may file a tariff that decreases any rate with 10 days notice without receiving a special order from the WUTC, if the filing does not contain a compensating increase in any rate and if the company agrees for a period of one year not to seek an increase in any rate to recover for revenue lost as a result of the decrease. Id. § 80.36.110(2). The WUTC may on its own initiative or upon complaint hold a hearing to determine whether the rates being charged are “unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discrimina- . tory or unduly preferential, or in anywise in violation of law,” or “are insufficient to yield reasonable compensation for the service rendered.” Id. §§ 34.05.413, 80.36.140. If the WUTC finds in the affirmative, it may impose just and reasonable rates. Id. § 80.36.140. The WUTC has the power to classify a telecommunications company’s services as competitive if the service is subject to effective competition. The prices for competitive services must cover their costs. The WUTC does not have the power to investigate prices for competitive services on its own motion, but it may investigate them upon complaint. Id. § 80.36.330(4). Changes in the price of competitive services can become effective 10 days after the list is submitted to the WUTC. Id. § 80.36.330(2). The prices Qwest charges for 1FB lines and for the access component of Centrex are regulated by the WUTC. The price of the features component of Centrex, however, is not, because the WUTC has deemed features a competitive service. MetroNet contends that Qwest exercises effective control over the price for Centrex access despite WUTC regulation, and that Qwest has the ability to exclude competitors such as MetroNet. MetroNet’s expert Cornell claims that Qwest effectively has wide latitude in pricing the access component of Centrex because of the WUTC’s limited statutory authority, its limited resources and the constraints of the regulatory process. She contends that the WUTC’s inability to suspend a proposed price decrease unless that decrease is also accompanied by an offsetting price increase means that Qwest can decrease the price of Centrex access at will. In addition, Qwest can effectively raise the price of access by raising the price of the bundled but unregulated features component. The Drop in 1FB Rates Prior to February 1998, the regulated price of a 1FB line was much greater than the regulated price of a volume discounted Centrex line. It is this disparity in rates that created the business opportunity for resellers like MetroNet. However, in February 1998, the WUTC ordered Qwest to reduce its rates for 1FB lines by more than 31 percent (from $38.10 to $28.60). Shortly thereafter, Qwest also lowered the rate for Centrex access. MetroNet’s Marketing Plan 2000 described these rate reductions as the “greatest blow” suffered by MetroNet. According to MetroNet sales manager Beckett, the drop in 1FB rates was a much more significant blow to Me-troNet’s business than was the entry of competitors. After the sharp reduction in 1FB rates, the number of Centrex lines resold by MetroNet began to decline and the entire sales department resigned. The Settlement Agreement Because MetroNet appeals the district court’s denial of MetroNet’s motion to enforce its purported settlement agreement with Qwest, we set out the facts relevant to the ruling on MetroNet’s motion. About nine months after MetroNet filed its antitrust case against Qwest, the two parties met to settle the case. The settlement meetings took place on September 26 and October 3, 2000. Qwest was represented by Lisa Anderl, its in-house counsel, and Don Taylor, the senior account manager responsible for the MetroNet account. MetroNet was represented by its Chief Operating Officer Greg Bogus and by outside counsel Brooks Harlow. After a day and a half of negotiations, the parties were still far apart on the amount of the proposed settlement. Anderl and Harlow met separately on the afternoon of October B and agreed to seek approval from their respective principals for a settlement in the amount of $2.55 million. Harlow called Anderl later that day stating that he had authority from MetroNet to settle for that amount. An-derl informed him on October 3 or 4 that she also had authority to settle for $2.55 million. Over the next two days, Anderl and Harlow exchanged several drafts of the proposed settlement agreement. Harlow claims that he and Anderl agreed on the final wording of the agreement late on October 5th, and that Anderl told him she had received the necessary approvals from various vice presidents at Qwest. According to Harlow, he and Anderl represented to each other that they had all necessary authority and would be able to obtain signatures on Friday morning, October 6th. When Harlow called Anderl on Friday morning, however, Anderl informed him she was uncertain she could get the necessary signatures from Qwest. Anderl reiterated this uncertainty on October 9th, and on October 10th she informed Harlow that Qwest’s general counsel had decided not to settle the case. Harlow claims that in his prior negotiations with Anderl over other litigation matters and business agreements, Anderl had either acted on her own authority or had made a deal after speaking with an officer of U S West. Qwest claims that following its merger with U S West on June 30, 2000, it implemented a new policy for Qwest and its subsidiaries designating certain officers as the sole authorized signatories able to bind the company or a subsidiary. According to Qwest General Counsel Tempest, “[a]t no time did any of the designated signatories authorized to bind the Qwest Corporation approve the purported settlement agreement [between Qwest and MetroNet].” Procedural History MetroNet filed suit against Qwest on January 5, 2000, seeking money damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Metro-Net asserted three causes of action under Section 2. First, MetroNet claimed Qwest maintained a monopoly over the market for small business local phone services in the Seattle/Tacoma area. Second, Metro-Net claimed Qwest attempted to monopolize that market. Third, MetroNet claimed Qwest denied MetroNet access to an essential facility. On September 26 and October 3, 2000, MetroNet and Qwest met to attempt to settle the case. Qwest withdrew from the proposed settlement agreement on October 10, 2000, and two days later MetroNet moved for an order enforcing the settlement agreement. The district court denied the motion on October 20, 2000, and denied MetroNet’s motion to reconsider on November 13, 2000. Qwest moved for summary judgment on February 13, 2001, and the district court granted Qwest’s motion in its entirety on April 16, 2001. MetroNet now appeals the grant of summary judgment and the denial of its motion to enforce the settlement agreement. ANALYSIS I. Federal Antitrust Claims A. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Id. We may not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter; rather, we may determine only whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 1054. Although we have noted a number of times in the past that “[s]ummary judgment is disfavored in antitrust cases,” High Tech. Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir.1993), such disfavor is limited to “complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent are important, proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and relevant information is controlled by hostile witnesses.” Toscano v. Prof'l Golfers Ass’n, 258 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir.2001). As the district court rightly concluded, this is not such a case. We therefore decline to place a thumb on the scale against granting summary judgment. B. Implied Immunity Qwest contends for the first time on appeal that the 1996 Act preempts MetroNet’s antitrust claims. Ordinarily, we will not consider legal theories made for the first time on appeal. Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001). Subject matter jurisdiction, however, is not waivable and therefore may be challenged at any time. Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2002). The question thus arises whether implied immunity is jurisdictional in nature or whether it is better understood as an affirmative defense subject to waiver. The parties have not briefed this issue and we need not decide it: Qwest’s implied immunity argument fails regardless of whether implied immunity is jurisdictional or an affirmative defense. The Second Circuit recently held that implied antitrust immunity is an affirmative defense subject to waiver and as such “does not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 150 (2d Cir.2003). If that view of implied immunity is correct, then Qwest has waived its implied immunity argument. The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that implied immunity deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction because it vests exclusive preliminary jurisdiction in the relevant regulatory agency. See, e.g., United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485, 52 S.Ct. 247, 76 L.Ed. 408 (1932) (holding that the Shipping Act supersedes the antitrust laws and vests the Shipping Board with “exclusive preliminary jurisdiction”); see also United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734-35, 95 S.Ct. 2427, 45 L.Ed.2d 486 (1975) (“[W]e have implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure that the federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could carry out that responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.”) (emphasis added). On this view, the issue of implied immunity has not been waived and is properly before us. Even if we assume arguendo that Qwest’s implied immunity argument has not been waived, it fails nonetheless. Qwest relies on Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir.2000), in which the court held that “[t]he 1996 Act is ... more specific legislation that must take precedence over the general antitrust laws, where the two are covering precisely the same field.” Id. at 401. Two other circuit courts have expressly disagreed with Goldwasser, concluding that the 1996 Act did not confer implied immunity from suit under the antitrust laws. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 109-13 (2d Cir.2002) (as amended), cert, granted in part sub nom. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1480, 155 L.Ed.2d 224 (2003); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1280-82 (11th Cir.2002). We agree with the Second and Eleventh Circuits that the 1996 Act did not impliedly immunize Qwest from antitrust liability. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that “[rjepeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.” Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The plain language of the statute reveals that Congress intended the 1996 Act to coexist with, rather than preempt, the antitrust laws. “Congress explicitly stated— both through a savings clause directed specifically at antitrust enforcement and through an additional general savings clause — that the 1996 Act does not supplant or change the antitrust laws.” Co-vad Communications Co., 299 F.3d at 1280. The 1996 Act provides: Telecommunications Act of 1996, §§ 601(b)(1), (c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 143 (1996), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152, Historical and Statutory Notes. In light of this express language, we conclude that no “plain repugnancy” exists between the 1996 Act and the antitrust laws. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109 (“The savings clause unambiguously establishes that there is no ‘plain repugnancy’ between the Telecommunications Act and the antitrust statutes [and thus ] that the Telecommunications Act does not provide an ‘implicit immunity’ from the antitrust laws.”); Covad Communications Co., 299 F.3d at 1281 (same). ANTITRUST LAWS ... SAVINGS CLAUSE ... [Njothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws.... FEDERAL STATE AND LOCAL LAW ... NO IMPLIED EFFECT ... This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or Amendments. Even absent the explicit language of the savings clauses, Qwest would not be entitled to implied immunity for its imposition of per location pricing. “Pervasive regulation of an industry alone is insufficient to confer blanket immunity on every action taken within the industry.” Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1056 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75, 93 S.Ct. 1022, 35 L.Ed.2d 359 (1973)). Although we have recognized a limited class of cases in which a regulatory mandate to engage in anticompetitive conduct may confer implied antitrust immunity, no such mandate exists here. Id. at 1057. The 1997 switch from system pricing to per location pricing for Centrex features was freely undertaken by Qwest in an effort to eliminate resale. Where the conduct challenged under the antitrust laws “is the product of the regulated business’ independent initiative and choice, [that conduct] is properly subject to antitrust scrutiny.” Id. Thus, Qwest’s imposition of per location pricing is not conduct entitled to implied immunity. C. Discussion MetroNet contends that the district court overlooked genuine disputes of material fact in ruling that Qwest neither maintained a monopoly nor excluded MetroNet from an essential facility in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. We consider each claim in turn. 1. The Monopolization Claim Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal for a person to “monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. Any person “injured in his business or property” by such monopolization may bring suit for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). In order to prevail on its monopolization claim, MetroNet must prove that Qwest (1) possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, (2) wilfully acquired or maintained that power through exclusionary conduct and (3) caused antitrust injury. See Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ’ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.1997). The district court erroneously concluded on summary judgment that MetroNet could not establish any of these elements. Monopoly power: Monopoly power, commonly referred to as market power, is defined as “ ‘the power to control prices or exclude competition.’ ” Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966)). “Market power can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. Because direct evidence of the power to control prices or exclude competitors is rarely available, courts generally rely on circumstantial evidence of market power. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C.Cir.2001). In order to establish Qwest’s market power by circumstantial evidence, MetroNet must “(1) define the relevant market, (2) show that the defendant owns a dominant share of that market, and (3) show that there are significant barriers to entry and ... that existing competitors lack the capacity to increase their output in the short run.” Rebel Oil, Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1995). Here, the relevant market is not in dispute. The parties have defined it as the market for small business local telephone services in the Seattle/Tacoma area. Thus we turn directly to the issue of Qwest’s market share. The principal competing products in the market are Qwest’s 1FB service and the resellers’ Centrex service purchased from Qwest and resold to small business users. The district court concluded that even though Qwest’s market share exceeds 95 percent, “it is highly unlikely that Qwest’s high market share confers upon it monopoly power.” The court reasoned that the 1996 Act had already removed many of the barriers to entry, and any remaining barriers “will diminish in time as new firms build their infrastructure, gain a toehold in the market, advertise more widely, and gain wider recognition.” On these assumptions, the court predicted that “a 95 [percent] market share now could well evaporate in the coming years without antitrust involvement.” The district court was equally dismissive of MetroNet’s claim that Qwest could control prices. The court reasoned first that “phone service is not the type of commodity that is susceptible to price increase through output reduction.” The court also reasoned that competition in the wake of the 1996 Act would limit Qwest’s ability to control prices for calling features, and that regulation by the WUTC “mitigates the extent to which Qwest can simply dictate prices for access to phone service.” The district court was correct to focus its attention on Qwest’s ability to exclude competition and control prices, rather than simply on market share. In general, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of market power by showing that the defendant has a 65 percent or greater market share. Image Tech., 125 F.3d at 1206 (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946)). However, in cases involving regulated industries, “[r]eliance on statistical market share ... is downright folly where, as here, the predominant market share is the result of regulation.” Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. NewVector Communications, Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir.1989); see also S. Pac. Communications Co. v. AT & T, 740 F.2d 980, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Reliance on statistical market share is a questionable approach in cases involving regulated industries .... A predominant market share may merely be the result of regulation, and regulatory control may preclude the exercise of monopoly power.”). We have held that “[i]n such cases, the court should focus directly on the regulated firm’s ability to control prices or exclude competition.” Metro Mobile, 892 F.2d at 63; see also S. Pac. Communications Co., 740 F.2d at 1000 (holding that “in such cases market share should be at most a point of departure in determining whether monopoly power exists. Ultimately, a court should focus directly upon the ability of the regulated firm to control prices or exclude competition.”). Although the focus of the district court’s inquiry was correct, the court nonetheless improperly weighed evidence and failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to MetroNet. The court should not have substituted its own speculations about present and future barriers to entry for the evidence in the record. Metro-Net’s expert Cornell stated in her declaration that there are at least three structural barriers to entry that give Qwest a high degree of market power: (1) each end user of telephone services must be physically connected to a local exchange switch, which makes it prohibitively expensive to build a telephone network from scratch; (2) because Qwest owns the only comprehensive local exchange network, both facilities-based providers and resellers need a high degree of cooperation from Qwest in order to access that network; and (3) Qwest’s historical monopoly has created enormous economies of scale that discourage competition and give Qwest an incentive not to cooperate. The district court concluded, based presumably on MetroNet’s year 2000 draft marketing report, that “MetroNet’s expert overstates the case for high entry barriers in this market.” The draft marketing report, which was prepared by sales manager Beckett and quality assurance manager Tatman, stated that “MetroNet ... has seen the number of competitive providers go from solely U S West to over 17 in[the] past three years.... The flood of competition has produced a never ending push for customers to switch services to a new provider.” However, the validity of these statements is contested. Tatman testified on deposition that the draft marketing plan was hastily prepared, based on few hard facts and never finalized. MetroNet COO Bogus testified that the increase in competition after passage of the 1996 Act was confined mainly to the large business telephone market and that the effect on MetroNet was “marginal.” The district court improperly treated the statements in the draft marketing report as though they were undisputed by MetroNet. Qwest argues that the statements in the draft marketing report are sufficient to “render MetroNet’s expert reports to the contrary unreasonable and preclude MetroNet (and Amicus) from arguing that those'reports raise a factual dispute.” The district court’s disregard for the testimony of MetroNet’s experts seems premised on the same argument. We have recognized that “expert opinion ... may defeat summary judgment if it appears that the affiant is competent to give an expert opinion and that the factual basis for the opinion is stated in the affidavit, even though the underlying factual details and reasoning upon which the opinion is based are not.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1435. However, “the inference to be drawn from expert affidavits must ... be sufficient to support a favorable jury verdict.” Id. “ ‘When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 1436 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brawn & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993)). Thus, in antitrust cases, inferences drawn from expert opinions must be economically reasonable in light of “undisputed facts about the structure of the market.” Id. at 1435-36. There is no basis in the record for concluding that the testimony of MetroNet’s experts fails to meet the standard articulated in Rebel Oil. It was improper for the district court to disregard the opinions of MetroNet’s experts without providing a reasoned analysis of how their opinions failed to satisfy the Rebel Oil standard. The court also erred in concluding that Qwest could not control price due to competition in the market for features and WUTC regulation of the price of Centrex access. The court inferred from Metro-Net’s year 2000 draft marketing report that at least 17 competitors had entered the local small business telephone services market in Seattle/Tacoma. As we point out above, however, the draft marketing report cannot be accepted as undisputed evidence. MetroNet has raised a triable issue of fact as to the number and extent of new entrants. Even if the draft marketing report were accepted as true, “[t]he fact that entry has occurred does not necessarily preclude the existence of ‘significant’ entry barriers.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1440. We have previously concluded on several occasions that monopoly power exists despite the presence of new entrants. Id. at 1441 (holding, on appeal from summary judgment, that a juror could reasonably conclude that the entry of two gas stations into the Las Vegas retad gasoline market would be insufficient to offset supracompetitive prices); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 367 (9th Cir.1988) (holding, on appeal of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that the entry of two rivals did not preclude the jury’s finding of monopoly power); Pac. Coast Agric. Exp. Assoc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that Sunkist had monopoly power over the Hong Kong export market for Arizona-and California-grown oranges, where its competitors “were relatively small, with no single competitor controlling over ... 12% of the market after [ ] Sunkist’s entry.”). In the present case, recent entrants collectively account for less than five percent of the market, and no single entrant has more than a one percent share. Qwest asks us to infer from this anemic market share that the opinions of MetroNet’s experts on barriers to entry are unreasonable. We decline to do so. There is no evidence that these entrants will continue to wrest market share from Qwest. In concluding that the WUTC could effectively constrain Qwest’s ability to control the price of telephone access, the district court failed to consider the realities of Washington’s regulatory scheme. See S. Pac. Communications, 740 F.2d at 1001 (setting aside the district court’s conclusion on summary judgment that AT & T lacked monopoly power because the district court “fail[ed] to consider the realities of the regulatory scheme_The regulatory agencies are not always able to respond to the alleged abuses immediately and effectively.”). MetroNet proffered evidence that the WUTC’s limited statutory authority, limited resources and the constraints of the regulatory process effectively left Qwest with considerable latitude in setting the price for Centrex access. MetroNet also proffered evidence that for the last 15 years Qwest has been able to evade the WUTC’s instructions to unbundle Centrex access from Centrex features. The key question is whether existing competitors and immediate potential entrants have sufficient capacity to take business away from the incumbent monopolist and thereby constrain the incumbent’s ability to raise prices above competitive levels. See Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1440-41; see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51. MetroNet has proffered sufficient evidence on the continuing barriers to entry to create a triable issue of fact as to the ability of new and existing entrants to constrain Qwest’s market power. Exclusionary conduct: The mere existence of monopoly power does not constitute illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. A plaintiff must also establish that the defendant acquired or maintained the monopoly by engaging in exclusionary conduct “as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571, 86 S.Ct. 1698. “[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.... [H]arm to one or more competitors will not suffice.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58 (emphasis in original). This focus on an anticompetitive effect is essential, because “it is inimical to the antitrust laws to award damages for losses stemming from acts that do not hurt competition.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433. Thus, courts must seek to distinguish between exclusionary conduct that harms consumer welfare and legitimate competitive acts that enhance it. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58. We have held that “Consumer welfare is maximized when economic resources are allocated to their best use .... and when consumers are assured competitive price and quality.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433. “[A]n act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act only when it harms both alloca-tive efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality.” Id. (emphasis in original). In assessing whether Qwest’s imposition of per location pricing has harmed consumer welfare, we are mindful that the antitrust laws protect competition, not particular competitors. We do not suggest that a provider of services must maintain in existence middlemen who deliver no economic value to consumers. MetroNet’s allegation, rather, is that resellers enhance consumer welfare by providing small business consumers with lower-price telecommunications services, and that Qwest is seeking to eliminate this contribution to consumer welfare through per location pricing. The district court concluded that Metro-Net could not establish harm to consumer welfare because market competition prevented Qwest from raising the overall price for Centrex above competitive levels. The court reached this conclusion based on evidence that the overall price of Centrex to consumers dropped significantly. Qwest argues similarly on appeal that the decline in the overall price of Centrex precludes a finding that Qwest raised prices above competitive levels. We must determine whether MetroNet has created a triable issue of fact as to whether per location pricing harmed consumer welfare. Both the district court and Qwest erroneously focus on the overall price of Centrex. It is undisputed that when Qwest instituted per location pricing the price of Centrex features for customers with fewer than 21 lines went up approximately 400 percent, and that it was almost six times greater than the price charged to medium and large businesses. This is prima facie evidence of pricing above competitive levels. MetroNet also proferred evidence that the elimination of resellers would harm allocative efficiency. According to Cornell, resale performs the beneficial function of “forc[ing] the firm whose services are being resold to limit volume discounts to levels that are cost-based. Without resale, the firm might be able to offer volume discounts that were greater than the costs saved and recover the lost revenues from smaller users.” MetroNet contends, and Qwest has not denied, that there is no cost-based or volume-based justification for per location pricing. Courts have recognized that discount resellers such as MetroNet can play an important role in creating and maintaining a competitive marketplace and have held that attempts to eliminate discounters violate the antitrust laws. Cf. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966) (holding that a conspiracy among GM, automobile dealers and their association to deprive franchised dealers of the freedom to sell through discounters was unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 935-37 (7th Cir.2000) (upholding an FTC decision that a conspiracy between Toys “R” Us and toy manufacturers to restrict manufacturers’ sales to low price warehouse club stores violated the antitrust laws). There would be no harm to consumer welfare if customers could switch to a virtually identical product costing the same or less than Centrex without per location pricing. Thus, if customers could purchase 1FB lines and features for approximately the same price they would pay for Centrex access and features without per location pricing, MetroNet would have no claim. But the record suggests the contrary: the price of 1FB lines without features remained significantly above the price of Centrex, even after the WUTC-imposed drop in the price of 1FB lines in February 1998. The record suggests that small business consumers had little or no economically equivalent alternative but to continue purchasing Centrex access and features from resellers such as MetroNet. If true, the increase in the price of Cen-trex features above competitive levels harmed consumers. Given that MetroNet has successfully made out a prima facie case of exclusionary conduct by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, the burden shifts to Qwest to offer a procompetitive justification for per location pricing. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. If the monopolist asserts a procompeti-tive justification — a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal — then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim.... [I]f the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompet-itive benefit. Id. Qwest has not asserted any procompet-itive justification for per location pricing. It is undisputed that per location pricing has no cost-based justification, compare Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 368 (economic necessity justified allegedly exclusionary conduct), and Qwest has not suggested how per location pricing enhances efficiency or improves the products offered to consumers, see Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. Therefore, MetroNet has proffered sufficient evidence to establish exclusionary conduct on the part of Qwest. Antitrust injury: A private party seeking damages under Section 2 must also establish that the defendant caused it antitrust injury. Based on its determination that MetroNet failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to Qwest’s alleged monopoly power or exclusionary conduct, the district court summarily concluded that MetroNet could not establish that it suffered an antitrust injury. Because we have reached the opposite conclusion with respect to Qwest’s alleged monopoly power and exclusionary conduct, we address the merits of the antitrust injury requirement. To satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must show (1) that it suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the injury was caused by an antitrust violation and (3) that the injury was of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see also Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433. Qwest contends that Metro-Net has failed to establish any of these elements. We consider each of them in turn. First, Qwest argues that MetroNet has failed to establish that it suffered injury in fact. MetroNet’s CEO Seeley claims MetroNet began losing money in 1997 and suffered a net loss in 1999 and 2000. However, MetroNet’s bookkeeper testified on deposition that Metro-Net was profitable in 1999. Although the evidence of the financial harm to MetroNet is weak, it is sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Even if MetroNet remained profitable in 1999, the testimony of its CEO indicates an increasing loss of revenue and profits. A showing of harm under Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not require that the plaintiff go bankrupt or experience a net loss. A decline in anticipated profits will suffice. See, e.g., Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir.1983) (“To establish causal antitrust injury, ‘the plaintiff is required to establish with reasonable probability the existence of some causal connection between defendant’s wrongful act and some loss of anticipated revenue.’ ” (emphasis added)); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (“[The plaintiffs] burden of proving the fact of damage under [Section] 4 of the Clayton Act is satisfied by its proof of some damage flowing from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage.” (emphasis in original)). Furthermore, “[w]here, as here, defendants have acted with intent to eliminate competition, the proof of resulting injury need not be overwhelming.” D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir.1982); see also Fox West Coast Theatres Corp. v. Paradise Theatre Bldg. Corp., 264 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir.1958) (“[The fact of] damage need not be made patent item by item as on a balance sheet. The mere unlawful combination over a period of time to eliminate competition is proof of damage.”). Second, Qwest contends that even if Me-troNet has established injury in fact, it has not established causation because any decline in MetroNet’s profitability was due not to per location pricing, but rather to the entry of new competitors after passage of the 1996 Act, the precipitous drop in 1FB rates imposed by the WUTC in 1998, the advent of competing modes of access such as T-l and DSL and heavy personnel turnover at MetroNet. To establish causation, MetroNet need only show that per location pricing was a “material cause” of MetroNet’s injury. See Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 114 n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 1562 (“It is enough that the illegality is shown to be a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff need not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of proving compensable injury. ... ”). We have interpreted this to mean that the plaintiff must “establish with reasonable probability the existence of some causal connection between defendant’s wrongful act and some loss of anticipated revenue.” Blanton, 721 F.2d at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted). MetroNet must therefore show that “the antitrust violation contribute[d] significantly to [its] injury, even if other factors amounted in the aggregate to a more substantial cause.” 2 Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 338a, at 317 (2d ed.2000) (interpreting Zenith). However, MetroNet’s claim fails as a matter of law if MetroNet would have suffered the same injury even without per location pricing. See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 487-88, 97 S.Ct. 690; see also 2 Areeda & Hovenkamp § 338b, at 320-21 (noting that no material cause can be demonstrated where an independent cause fully accounts for the claimed antitrust injury). The other possible causes of MetroNet’s woes do not negate MetroNet’s evidence that per location pricing played a material role in causing its injury. Therefore, Me-troNet has proffered sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to causation. Finally, Qwest contends that Me-troNet has failed to show that its injury is the type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent, such that Qwest’s conduct has harmed consumer welfare. A showing of such injury is distinct from the question of causation. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487-89, 97 S.Ct. 690 (noting that antitrust violations can cause “losses which are of no concern to the antitrust laws” and that “plaintiffs ... must prove more than injury causally finked to an illegal presence in the market”). The antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, not competitors. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962). “To show antitrust injury, a plaintiff must prove that his loss flows from an anticompetitive aspect or effect of the defendant’s behavior.... If the injury flows from aspects of the defendant’s conduct that are beneficial or neutral to competition, there is no antitrust injury-” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433. Where the defendant’s illegal conduct harms the plaintiff without adversely affecting competition generally, we have found no antitrust injury. See, e.g., Pool Water Prods, v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034-36 (9th Cir. 2001). MetroNet’s CEO Seeley claims Metro-Net’s financial losses flowed from Qwest’s imposition of per location pricing. It appears that some customers left MetroNet at least in part because of the higher price for features, although this point is disputed,