Full opinion text
STRAUB, Circuit Judge. Shortly before 8:00 p.m. on November 28, 1992, at the corner of East 103rd Street and Second Avenue in Manhattan, Steven Davilla was shot. He died at the hospital four hours later. After approximately a year, petitioner-appellant Richard Cotto was arrested and charged with Da-villa’s murder. In the months before Cotto’s trial began in March 1996, Anthony Echevarria, a neighborhood resident who knew both Cotto and Davilla, told law enforcement officers that he saw Cotto shoot Davilla. When interviewed by detectives shortly after the shooting, Echevarria had given a false name and stated, both orally and in writing, that he could not identify the shooter. A few days before trial, the lead prosecutor informed the defense that Echevar-ria would be called as an eyewitness, scheduled to testify on Monday, March 18th. However, Echevarria called the prosecutor on Sunday, March 17th, stating that he feared for the safety of his family, and would not identify Cotto as the shooter if called upon to testify. The prosecutor called Echevarria to the stand anyway, and indeed Echevarria testified on direct examination that he did not see the shooter. After a Sirois hearing, held outside the presence of the jury, in which the prosecution set forth evidence that Cotto had intimidated Echevarria into changing his story, the police officers were permitted to testify about Echevarrias statements inculpating Cotto the week before, and Cotto was convicted. Echevarria was the only eyewitness to the shooting to testify at trial. In his summation, the prosecutor described Echevarria’s taking of the stand, and, seeking to explain the discrepancies between Echevarria’s in-court testimony and prior out-of-court statements, said: “The defendant is here, he is confronted by the defendant.” Although the prosecutor used the term “confronted” in the physical sense, the question presented by this case is whether Cotto was able to confront Echevarria in the constitutional sense, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Due to the number of issues involved in this case, we set out the following table of contents: CONTENTS BACKGROUND.225 I. The Trial.225 A. The Sirois Hearing.226 B. Remainder of Trial.227 II. Procedural History.227 DTSCTTSSTON.229 I. Legal Standards . to fO CD A. Confrontation Clause. W tO B. § 2254 Analysis. M £0 ZD II. The Admission of Echevarria’s Out of Court Statements CO A. Was the determination that Cotto “procured” Echevarria’s unavailability an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented”? .■. to 00 to B. Was the determination that Cotto forfeited his Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections to the out-of-court statements an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law? CO CO <M C. Did the statements bear sufficient “indicia of reliability”?_ to CO (M III. The Preclusion of Cross-Examination. bo CO 05 A. Procedural Bar . to 00 C5 1. Scope of Certificate of Appealability. CO CO C5 2. Exhaustion Requirement. to CO -3 3. Independent and Adequate State Grounds . to 00 GO a. Standard for Adequacy.239 b. The Circumstances of the Ruling Precluding Cross-Examination in this Case.241 c. Application of the Lee Factors.242 B. The Merits.247 1. The “Unreasonable Application” Standard .247 2. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law on Cross-Examination.248 3. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law on Waiver of Cross-Examination Through Misconduct.249 4. Objective Unreasonableness.251 5. Harmless Error.253 a. Standard of Review.253 b. Application of Van Arsdall Factors.254 IV. Conclusion .258 BACKGROUND Cotto appeals from an October 5, 2001 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Alvin K. Hellerstein, Judge) denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in connection with his April 16, 1996 conviction in the Supreme Court for New York County, following a jury trial, for Murder in the Second Degree, Criminal Use of a Firearm in the First Degree, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. Cotto was sentenced to concurrent prison terms totaling 25 years to life, and is now in state prison pursuant to that conviction. I. The Trial Cotto’s trial began on March 15, 1996. After police witnesses testified to the shooting of Davilla, the crime scene investigation and the arrest of Cotto, Echevarria was called as a witness for the prosecution. Echevarria testified that on the evening of November 28, 1992, he was with Davilla on the corner of 103rd Street and Second Avenue, talking, drinking beer and smoking marijuana. While using a payphone, he saw two people across the street in a park, one of whom ran across the street to the sidewalk on Echevarria’s side. He then heard someone behind him say “What’s up now, money?” and started hearing shots. He testified that he did not see the shooter “[bjecause once the shots started that was it, I ain’t looking at nobody.” At that point in the direct testimony, due to the apparent inconsistency between Echevarria’s trial testimony and his pretrial statements to law enforcement, the prosecutor asked Echevarria if he recalled his prior conversations with him, and defense counsel objected. The jury was then excused, and Echevarria told the court that he had to “think of [his] family.” During the ensuing colloquy, the prosecution maintained that Echevarria had told them earlier that “some men had approached members of his family” and “gave him reason to believe that there was a contract out on them.” In addition, the government alleged, without providing details, that Echevarria’s fiancée had expressed fear for herself and her child and that “someone” had approached his mother and sister and inquired into his whereabouts. At this point, the trial court suggested to the prosecutors that they move for a Sirois hearing — a hearing held in New York criminal cases to determine whether the defendant has procured a witness’s absence or unavailability through his own misconduct, and thereby forfeited any hearsay or Confrontation Clause objections to admitting the witness’s out-of-court statements. See People v. Geraci 85 N.Y.2d 359, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817 (1995). The prosecution agreed and moved for such a hearing. Their motion was granted, and the hearing was held later that week, outside the presence of the jury. A. The Sirois Hearing At the Sirois hearing, the prosecution called Police Officer Wilson Vargas and Detective Hedxan Quinones, who had been present at the March 13 and 14 trial preparation sessions with Echevarria. In each of the sessions, according to these witnesses, Echevarria described the events he saw the night of the shooting, relating that while he was using a telephone on the corner, he saw the defendant cross the street in a crouched manner, holding his hand close to his side. When he reached the corner, the defendant approached Da-villa, said “What’s up now, money?” while pointing a gun at Davilla, and shot him. Davilla fell backward, stumbled and attempted to run away. Cotto followed, continuing to fire shots, then turned around, looked at Echevarria face-to-face, pointed the gun at him without firing, and fled. Vargas and Quinones further testified that during the two sessions, Echevarria was seated in a chair, was not in handcuffs, did not appear nervous, demonstrated a positive frame of mind, engaged in conversation without any sign of discomfort, and was not promised anything for his trial testimony. Officer Vargas testified additionally that he and a prosecutor met with Echevarria again on March 20th, two days after Eche-varria testified that he could not identify the shooter. At the meeting, Echevarria indicated that he was afraid “something might happen to [his] family” if he testified and that “there would probably be a contract” out on him. In addition, the government introduced the audiotape recording of the two messages left by Echevarria on the lead prosecutor’s voicemail on March 17, expressing concern about testifying. Detective Quinones further testified that he had spoken with Echevarria’s mother and sister before the Sirois hearing. Echevarria’s sister told Quinones that a few days earlier, unidentified people from her neighborhood had approached her and asked her exactly where Echevarria was being housed in Riker’s Island. She told the detective that the “word out on the street” was that her brother “was talking.” She added that she knew that Cotto’s family had “killed a family a while ago” and that if anyone talked against his family, he or she would be killed. The prosecution also called Echevarria’s mother as a hearing witness. She testified that her daughter told her that someone had stopped her in the street and had asked whether her brother was incarcerated. Echevarria’s mother testified that her daughter said she was scared and afraid for her brother — a sentiment she had never previously expressed. When called by the prosecution at the Sirois hearing, both Echevarria and his sister denied making these statements. Echevarria’s sister denied that she had been harassed, and denied telling Detective Quinones or her mother about a conversation with the harassing party. Echevarria himself reiterated his trial testimony that he could not identify the shooter, and explained his voicemail message by stating that he did not want to testify at trial because he did not want to miss an upstate parole hearing. At the conclusion of the Sirois hearing, the trial court decided, in an oral ruling that was followed by a written opinion, People v. Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d 790, 169 Misc.2d 194 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1996), that Cotto had procured Echevarria’s unwillingness to testify, and therefore his statements to the prosecutor and police officers from the week before trial would be admissible as evidence of Cotto’s guilt. In addition, the trial court ruled that the defense would be precluded from cross-examining Echevar-ria, concluding that “no truth-serving function would be served” by allowing him to be cross-examined on any subject. B. Remainder of Trial After the Sirois hearing, the jury returned to the courtroom, and the two police officers who met with Echevarria during his trial preparation sessions testified that Echevarria had identified Cotto as the shooter during those sessions. One of the officers also indicated that when the prosecutor asked Echevarria why he had not previously identified Cotto as the shooter in his statements to the police shortly after Davilla’s shooting in 1992, and Echevarria replied that he was scared to do so. Another police officer testified that in the ambulance after the shooting, Davilla had identified Cotto as the shooter. The police officer’s testimony was corroborated by the emergency medical technician in the ambulance, who also heard Davilla identify someone named “Richie” as the shooter. Kenny Cobb, another civilian witness to testify at trial, testified that he had also been with Davilla, Echevarria and other people on the corner that evening, heard the shots, jumped inside a building, and came back out when the shots had stopped. Cobb saw someone running from the park who he could not describe, asked Echevarria what wgs going on and Eche-varria told him “they were shooting.” Cobb testified that he left the scene immediately afterwards because he had drugs in his pocket. In his testimony, he did not identify the shooter, or say that Echevar-ria told him who the shooter was. The defense did not call any witnesses. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Cotto of all the charges. On August 22, 1996, the trial court sentenced Cotto to an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life. II. Procedural History On direct appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, Cotto argued that his confrontation rights were violated by: (1) the trial court’s finding that he had procured Echevarria’s unavailability through misconduct, and the resulting admission of Echevarria’s out-of-court statements; (2) the trial court’s preclusion of all cross-examination of Echevarria; and (3) the admission of Davilla’s statement in the ambulance, identifying Cotto as his shooter, as an excited utterance. On June 5, 1997, the Appellate Division affirmed Cot-to’s conviction, concluding that the trial court’s Sirois ruling was supported by sufficient evidence, and that Davilla’s statement was properly admitted as an excited utterance. The Appellate Division also ruled that the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria was proper, finding in the alternative that the issue was unpreserved. See People v. Cotto, 240 A.D.2d 193, 658 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1st Dep’t 1997). Cotto then applied for and obtained leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Before the Court of Appeals, Cotto raised essentially the same claims as he had in the Appellate Division. On July 1, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed Cotto’s conviction in a 5-2 decision. People v. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d 68, 73-75, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394, 396-97 (1998). The majority agreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusions that the trial court’s Sirois ruling was supported by sufficient evidence, and that Davilla’s statement was properly admitted as an excited utterance. In addition, the majority agreed that the preclusion of cross-examination claim was unpreserved, declining to address the merits of this claim. The dissent rejected all of these conclusions, arguing that the admission of Echevarria’s out-of-court statements as well as the complete preclusion of cross-examination violated Cotto’s confrontation right, and that Davilla’s statement did not have sufficient “indicia of reliability” to be admissible. See id at 80-92, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394 (Smith, J., dissenting). On March 11, 1999, Cotto filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court. In his petition, Cotto alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a number of objections, including an objection to the trial court’s complete preclusion of cross-examination against Echevarria. In a decision and order dated May 25, 1999, the trial court denied Cotto’s petition in its entirety. Cotto applied for leave to appeal this decision to the Appellate Division, First Department, but this application was denied on August 12, 1999. On January 5, 2000, Cotto filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis in the Appellate Division, First Department, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which was denied on September 21, 2000. On November 13, 2000, Cotto filed a habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the Southern District of New York. In this petition, Cotto raised five claims: (1) the admission of Echevarria’s out-of-court statements, based on the trial court’s ruling after the Sirois hearing, violated his Confrontation Clause right; (2) the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria also violated his Confrontation Clause right; (3) the admission of Davilla’s statement as an excited utterance was improper, and also violated the Confrontation Clause; (4) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (5) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On October 4, 2001, the District Court denied Cotto’s petition in an oral ruling. The District Court concluded that all grounds for relief had been fairly presented to the New York courts, but that petitioner had pfocedurally defaulted his claim regarding the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria by failing to make a sufficiently specific objection at trial. The District Court ruled against petitioner on his ineffective assistance claims and concluded that the state courts’ Sirois rulings, as well as the ruling on the admission of Davilla’s statement, were not unreasonable applications of clearly established Supreme Court law. The District Court granted a certificate of appealability on two claims: “(1) Whether the ruling of the New York Supreme Court, admitting into evidence witness Anthony Echevar-ria’s out-of-court identification of Petitioner, violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights”; and (2) “Whether said ruling, precluding cross-examination of Echevarria by defense counsel, violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.” DISCUSSION I. Legal Standards A. Confrontation Clause The fundamental constitutional right in this case is established by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment which provides “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ” U.S. Const, amend. VI. The primary purpose of this guarantee is to secure for the defendant the opportunity of cross-examination. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Because “[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested,” id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, “[t]he opportunity for cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause, is critical for ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). Thus, there is a strong presumption that any testifying witness should be subject to cross-examination, and that out-of-court statements should not be used against a criminal defendant in lieu of in-court testimony subject to the scrutiny of cross-examination. As the Supreme Court explained in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985), “[t]here are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal.” Confrontation Clause claims generally fall into “two broad, albeit not exclusive, categories: ‘cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination.’” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 737, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam)). Petitioner brings both types of claims in this case. B. § 2256 Analysis This court reviews a district court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus de novo. See Loliscio v. Coord, 263 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir.2001). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the standard governing federal habeas review depends on whether petitioner’s claim has been previously “adjudicated on the merits” by a state court. The statute reads: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As we have previously stated, “[t]he necessary predicate to this deferential review is, of course, that petitioner’s federal claim has been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by the state court. If a state court has not adjudicated the claim ‘on the merits,’ we apply the pre-AEDPA standards, and review de novo the state court disposition of the petitioner’s federal constitutional claims.” Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir.2001). We have further held that “[a] state court ‘adjudicates’ a petitioner’s federal constitutional claims ‘on the merits’ when it (1) disposes of the claim ‘on the merits,’ and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment.’ ” Norde v. Keane, 294 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir.2001)). To determine whether a state court has disposed of a claim on the merits, we consider: “(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and (3) whether the state court’s opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination on the merits.” Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93 (quoting Sellan, 261 F.3d at 314). There is no dispute that the first issue certified for appeal was “adjudicated on the merits” in the state courts. The Court of Appeals held that Echevarria’s out-of-court statements were properly admitted because the government had met its burden of proving that Cotto had intimidated Echevarria, thus procuring his “unavailability” at trial. See Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 76-77, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. We therefore analyze this issue under the deferential AEDPA standard of review. It is less clear whether there was an “adjudication] on the merits in State court proceedings” as to the second issue certified for appeal—the preclusion of cross-examination claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Respondent argues that there was no adjudication on the merits because the Court of Appeals deemed the claim unpreserved, and therefore habeas review is unavailable, while Cotto argues in his brief that the trial court’s ruling was such an adjudication. First, respondent’s claim that habeas review is unavailable in the absence of an adjudication on the merits has no basis in law or logic. If there is no adjudication on the merits, then the pre-AEDPA, de novo standard of review applies. See Eze v. Senkowski 321 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir.2003). The question is whether the rulings of either the trial court or the Appellate Division constituted an “adjudication on the merits.” Certainly, the trial court’s ruling was, implicitly or explicitly, a determination that precluding Cotto from cross-examining Echevarria did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because of his misconduct, and the ruling was not on a procedural ground. Cf. Channer v. Brooks, 320 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir.2003) (according deference under § 2254(d) to trial court’s determination that “the trial outcome was fair”). Although neither party raises the possibility, the Appellate Division decision may also constitute an “adjudication of the merits” of the cross-examination issue. The Appellate Division ruled that “the court’s ruling barring cross-examination of the witness was appropriate under the circumstances presented since the witness’s testimony was at complete variance with his prior statement to the People.” Cotto, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 279. Alternatively, the Appellate Division ruled “[i]n any event, we find the issue unpreserved.” Id. If Cotto had been denied leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division’s ruling would certainly have been an “adjudication on the merits” under § 2254(d). See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (“‘Adjudicated on the merits’ has a well settled meaning: a decision finally resolving the parties’ claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other ground.”). The Court of Appeals, however, did review Cotto’s case, and adopted the holding that the issue was unpreserved, see Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394, arguably eliminating the force of the Appellate Division’s ruling on the merits. See Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381, 1385 (7th Cir.1997) (“Although the state’s trial court rejected on the merits the arguments that [petitioner] presented for the first time on collateral attack, the court of appeals relied entirely on [procedural grounds], and the disposition of the last state court to issue an opinion determines whether the state has invoked a ground of forfeiture.”); cf. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (explaining that “if the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits,” any procedural bar is removed). We are inclined to conclude that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the preclusion of cross-examination claim was unpre-served means that the claim was not “adjudicated on the merits” in the state courts. However, because the Appellate Division’s ruling that such preclusion was proper, as well as said ruling by the trial court, indicates “merits” consideration, we will assume without deciding that there was an “adjudication on the merits” in the state courts, and first analyze whether habeas relief is warranted under the deferential § 2254(d) standard. II. The Admission of Echevarria’s Out of Court Statements Although the Sixth Amendment generally bars the admission of out-of-court statements without an opportunity for cross-examination, see Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-19, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), the Supreme Court has also recognized that in limited circumstances, a defendant’s intentional misconduct can constitute a waiver of his Confrontation Clause right. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (defendant waives his right to be present at his trial if he engages in disruptive and disrespectful behavior requiring his removal from the courtroom). Although it is clear that one can waive Sixth Amendment protections, the boundaries of the waiver rule are not well established. See John R. Kroger, The CONFRONTATION Waiver Rule, 76 B.U.L.Rev. 835, 870-77 (1996) (noting that the confrontation waiver rule “implicates six major legal issues that each court must resolve,” and noting that four of these issues “provoke sharp disagreement among the federal circuits”). This court, as well as a majority of our sister circuits, have applied the waiver-by-misconduct rule in cases where the defendant has wrongfully procured a witness’s silence through threats, actual violence or murder. See, e.g., U.S. v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (collecting cases). With specific regard to the admission of out-of-court statements, the Supreme Court has held that “the Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant’s inability to confront the declarant at trial.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). Petitioner challenges the admission of Echevarria’s out-of-court statements on three separate grounds. First, he claims that the trial court’s determination that petitioner “procured” Echevarria’s unavailability by intimidating him constituted a decision “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” at the Sirois hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Second, he argues that the determination of the trial court that he waived his right to confront Eche-varria on the substance of the out-of-court statements was an unreasonable interpretation of the bounds of Supreme Court doctrine concerning the right of cross-examination — in other words, an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Finally, he argues that the admission of hearsay statements lacking “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was “contrary to the clearly established” law set forth by the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A. Was the determination that Cotto “procured” Echevarria’s unavailability an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented”? As recounted above, the evidence presented at the Sirois hearing consisted of the testimony of the following witnesses: Officer Vargas, Detective Quinones, Echevarria, Echevarria’s mother, Miriam, and Echevarria’s sister, Opelita. In addition, the government introduced the two voice-mail messages to the lead prosecutor left by Echevarria on the eve of his testimony. Officers Vargas and Quinones testified to Echevarria’s statements at the previous week’s trial preparation sessions, as well as their conversations with Echevarria and his family about the alleged threats. Echevarria’s mother also testified that her daughter had informed her about being stopped on the street and asked about her brother’s testimony, but Echevarria’s sister and Echevarria himself denied that any threats were made. In its written opinion following the Si-rois hearing, the trial court concluded: “I credit the testimony of Vargas, Quinones and Miriam Echevarria as being consistent with both the objective evidence and the common sense inferences which arise from it, and [as] thoroughly consistent with one another’s testimony in every essential detail.” Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 793. The trial court went on to discredit the testimony of Anthony Echevarria and his sister Opelita as inconsistent with the other evidence. Id. at 793-94. The trial court based its determination that threats were made to Echevarria’s family and that, as a result, Echevarria “changed his testimony and became unavailable to the People due to intimidation that was either initiated or approved by-defendant,” on a thorough set of findings of fact entitled to deference on federal habeas review. Id. at 796. Specifically, the trial court heard the voicemail messages left for the prosecutor by Echevarria expressing an unwillingness to testify, and concluded that “the panic in his voice in itself renders incredible Echevarria’s proffered reasons for expressing concern for his family.” Id. at 795. After observing Echevarria at the hearing, the trial court indicated that he “appeared to be anxious, uncomfortable and forced in his responses, a demeanor inconsistent with truthfulness and consistent with a state of mind demonstrating a fear of harm to his family or to himself if he should testify against Richard Cotto.” Id. at 794. In concluding that the threats were traceable to Cotto, the court found that Cotto “had the opportunity to arrange for Echevarria’s intimidation” because he was out on bail both prior to and during the trial. Id. at 795. The court also relied on: (1) the timing of the threats, coming immediately after it was revealed that Echevarria would testify against Cotto; (2) the conclusion that defendant was “the only person who stood to benefit” if Echevarria refused to testify; and (3) Cotto’s alleged threat to Echevarria immediately after the murder, as recounted to the police by Echevarria—as circumstantial evidence of Cotto’s involvement in the threats. Id. at 795-96. The dissenting judges in the New York Court of Appeals voiced concern that Cotto could be deemed to have waived his constitutional right to confront Echevarria on the statements based on “vague allegations of ‘word on the street.’ ” Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 84, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. Indeed, de novo review might well lead to the conclusion that even if Echevarria and his family were sincerely afraid, the relatively weak evidence connecting Cotto to the intimidation of Echevarria’s family was insufficient to permit the admission of the out-of-court statements. Nonetheless, the degree of deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires a different conclusion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the fact-findings of the trial court are subject to a “presumption of correctness,” a presumption that is particularly important when reviewing the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. See Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2001). As the Court of Appeals noted in upholding the trial court’s determination, the “credibility clash” presented at the hearing “has been resolved by findings of the Trial Judge (who observed the witnesses)—affirmed by the Appellate Division—that the People’s evidence was credible, the contrary evidence not.” Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 76, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. On habeas review, the petitioner has the burden of “rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Given the extremely narrow scope of our review, we cannot reverse the trial court’s finding that Cotto was behind the intimidation of Echevarria as an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). B. Was the determination that Cotto forfeited his Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections to the out-of-court statements an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law? Petitioner also claims that the determination of the trial court, as upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, that he had waived his Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections to the out-of-court statements constituted an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Specifically, petitioner argues that the state court unreasonably extended the forfeiture-by-misconduct principle “to a new context where it should not apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We disagree, and reject his claim. First, the state court’s application of this principle here is not at all an extension to a “new context.” Indeed, witness intimidation is the paradigmatic example of the type of “misconduct” that can lead to the forfeiture of confrontation rights. See, e.g., Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 651 (collecting cases). Second, petitioner’s claim that the state court unreasonably applied the caselaw on the evidence required to support a finding of forfeiture also must fail. Petitioner argues that the evidence in this case is considerably less direct than that previously deemed sufficient to constitute a forfeiture of confrontation rights in prior cases by this court and other circuits. See U.S. v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir.1982) (prosecution produced tape recordings in which defendant threatened murdered witness); U.S. v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992) (prosecution introduced a letter with defendant’s fingerprints telling the witness to lie; witness also confirmed that defendants had threatened him); U.S. v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 815 (2d Cir.1994) (informant testified that defendants had personally ordered witness’s murder); see also U.S. v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278 (1st Cir.1996), aff'g in relevant part, U.S. v. Houlihan, 887 F.Supp. 352, 363-65 (D.Mass.1995) (informant testified that defendants had offered him money to kill potential witness), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118, 117 S.Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); U.S. v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960, 118 S.Ct. 390, 139 L.Ed.2d 305 (1997) (eyewitness testified that she saw defendant and co-conspirator kill witness). Petitioner’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence does have some force. Certainly, confrontation rights may only be waived by a defendant through a “knowing and intentional relinquishment.” Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 651 (quoting Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279); cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (“There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But there is no Supreme Court caselaw definitively establishing the circumstances sufficient, or the standard of proof applicable, in analyzing waiver cases under the Confrontation Clause. Cf. Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(6) Advisory Committee’s Notes to 1997 amendment (“Every circuit that has resolved the question has recognized the principle of forfeiture by misconduct, although the tests for determining whether there is a forfeiture have varied.”) (citing cases). And petitioner offers no compelling reason why the evidence of “intentional relinquishment” cannot be circumstantial, as was the case here. In fact, our own circuit’s requirement on the standard of proof applicable at a federal Mastrangelo hearing — that the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant procured the witness’s unavailability — is actually less stringent than the New York standard, which requires a showing of intimidation by clear and convincing evidence. Compare Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (preponderance of the evidence standard) with Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d at 362, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817 (clear and convincing standard). Finally, the “objectively unreasonable” standard of § 2254(d)(1) means that petitioner must identify “some increment of incorrectness beyond error.” See Fuller v. Gorczyk, 273 F.3d 212, 219 (2d Cir.2001); Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000). Given the extensive federal precedent recognizing that the admission of out-of-court statements is appropriate when a defendant has intimidated a witness, and the absence of “clearly established” Supreme Court law limiting the circumstances that constitute forfeiture by misconduct, we cannot conclude that the New York Court of Appeals’ determination was an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law. C. Did the statements bear sufficient “indicia of reliability”? Petitioner also argues that the admission of Echevarria’s statements violates the clearly established Supreme Court holding of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), because Echevarria’s statements lacked indicia of reliability. In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the state bears the burden of proving that hearsay statements bear “sufficient indicia of reliability” to withstand scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 816, 110 S.Ct. 3139. Following Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1990), the Court explained that the “indicia of reliability” requirement is met in either of two circumstances: “where the hearsay statement ‘falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,’ or where it is supported by ‘a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’ ” Id (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). In Dhinsa, we held, however, that a defendant who engages in misconduct waives any Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of hearsay testimony from a witness whose unavailability was “procured” by the defendant. See Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 655. Nonetheless, relying on our decision in Aguiar, petitioner argues that the due process clause independently protects against the admission of unreliable hearsay statements even when any Confrontation Clause challenge has been waived. See Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (“[w]e may assume that the admission of facially unreliable hearsay would raise a due process challenge”). Indeed, as part of the Sirois hearing, the prosecution argued for admission on the ground that the statements had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” and the trial court agreed. The Appellate Division upheld this ruling, calling the statements “highly reliable.” Cotto, 240 A.D.2d at 193, 658 N.Y.S.2d 278. In concluding that the statements had “sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy due process,” the Court of Appeals relied on the following factors: (1) “Echevarria’s statements were repeated only days after they had first been made, were (according to the affirmed findings) lucid and credible, and described in detail defendant’s actions both before and after the shooting”; (2) the statements “were made on two separate occasions, and recounted in the testimony of two witnesses subject to cross-examination, thus making it unlikely that Echevarria was misunderstood”; and (3) “the testimony indicated that Echevarria received no special treatment from the police and had no motive to change his original story and put himself or his family at risk.” Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 77-78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that these factors constitute “sufficient indicia of reliability” is properly considered a mixed question of law and fact, analyzed under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1). Cf. Lilly v. Virginia„ 527 U.S. 116, 135-37, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion) (examining reliability issue in Confrontation Clause context). As we explain more fully below in considering the second issue certified on appeal, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion on this third factor that Echevarria had “no motive” to change his original story. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the statements were “sufficiently reliable” to be presented to the jury, as supported by the other two factors considered, is not objectively unreasonable. In sum, we conclude that the determination that petitioner procured Echevarria’s unavailability was not an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” at the Sirois hearing, and the legal conclusion that Echevarria’s out-of-court statements should then be admitted was neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application of’ clearly established Supreme Court law. III. The Preclusion of Cross-Examination A. Procedural Bar As to the second issue certified for appeal, whether the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria violated the Confrontation Clause, respondent argues that we cannot consider this issue because (1) it lies outside of the certificate of appealability issued by the District Court; (2) petitioner failed to exhaust this claim on direct appeal; and (3) petitioner is procedurally barred from raising this claim because he failed to make a timely objection at trial. For the reasons that follow, we reject respondent’s arguments, and conclude that it is appropriate to consider the merits of petitioner’s claim. 1. Scope of Certifícate of Appealability As a threshold matter, we must determine the scope of the certificate of appeal-ability (COA). Respondent argues that we cannot consider the question of whether Cotto’s cross-examination claim is procedurally defaulted because the District Court did not explicitly include its procedural default ruling in the COA. Although the COA fails to expressly include the District Court’s procedural default finding, we may construe the filing of a notice of appeal to be a request to this Court for a COA on all issues raised in the appeal. See El Rhagi v. Artuz, 309 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam) (petitioner’s notice of appeal construed as “an application for a COA on the procedural-bar issue”); Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(2) (authorizing the Court of Appeals to construe the notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability). We may therefore amend the COA to include the procedural-bar issue, even if the District Court declined to include the procedural-bar question in its initial COA, if Cotto makes the necessary showing “that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). Because we conclude that Cotto has made the necessary showing in this case, see infra, we hereby amend the COA to include the procedural-bar issue. 2. Exhaustion Requirement Respondent further argues that petitioner is barred from raising the cross-examination claim on federal habeas review because the claim was not fairly presented to the state courts. It is well-established that “a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886)). This exhaustion requirement is rooted in considerations of comity, and is codified by statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c). See Strogov v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 191 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1264, 120 S.Ct. 2723, 147 L.Ed.2d 987 (2000); Dorsey v. Kelly, 112 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir.1997). A petitioner satisfies the “fair presentation” aspect of the exhaustion requirement by presenting the essential factual and legal premises of his federal constitutional claim to the highest state court capable of reviewing it. Ramirez v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y., 280 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.2001). Respondent argues that Cotto’s claim was not “fairly presented” because on direct appeal, petitioner “explicitly eschewfed] reliance on the federal constitution.” Respondent points out that in his briefs to both the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that the problem with the complete preclusion of cross-examination of Echevarria was that the trial court “explicitly abandoned] state law in favor of the federal rule.” We disagree with respondent’s characterization of petitioner’s argument on direct appeal, and agree with petitioner and the District Court that the claim was fairly presented to the state courts. First, we reject respondent’s suggestion that petitioner “explicitly eschewed” reliance on federal constitutional law; rather, petitioner questioned the state court’s decision not to follow Geraci, the seminal opinion of the New York Court of Appeals relating to the forfeiture of federal confrontation rights through misconduct. Indeed, Geraci’s discussion of the “constitutional right of confrontation” is supported by cites exclusively to federal cases. Geraci 85 N.Y.2d at 366, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817. As we have previously recognized, “a state defendant may fairly present to the state courts the constitutional nature of his claim, even without citing chapter and verse of the Constitution” so long as he relies “on pertinent federal cases employing [the relevant] constitutional analysis” or alleges “a pattern of facts” that clearly implicates a specific constitutional provision. See Strogov, 191 F.3d at 191 (quoting Daye v. Attorney Gen., 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir.1982) (in banc)). Second, unlike other cases when we have ruled that a habeas claim was not fairly presented to the state courts, the cross-examination claim was explicitly advanced in petitioner’s brief to the Court of Appeals. In the relevant section of petitioner’s Court of Appeals brief, petitioner mentions in the first sentence “the right to cross-examine,” and the second and third sentences of this section of petitioner’s brief both reference “confrontation rights.” Indeed, as respondent pointed out in its own Court of Appeals brief, Geraci itself analyzed the loss of “the valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right.” (Brief at 34; quoting Geraci 85 N.Y.2d at 367, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817). In light of these facts, we reject the notion that the New York Court of Appeals was not adequately apprised that Cotto’s challenge to the “full-scale abrogation of [his] confrontation rights,” as he put it in his brief to that court, was based on the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, the Court of Appeals’ dissent, with its discussion of how the trial court’s ruling “deprived the defendant of his right of confrontation,” belies respondent’s argument that the court was unaware of the federal constitutional basis of Cotto’s cross-examination claim. 3. Independent and Adequate State Grounds Under the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, the Supreme Court “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). “This rule applies whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural.” Id. Although the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine first arose in the context of direct appeals to the Supreme Court from state court judgments, the Supreme Court has applied it as well “in deciding whether federal district courts should address the claims of state prisoners in habeas corpus actions.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546.) In the habeas context, however, the doctrine is prudential rather than jurisdictional. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522-23, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991); Spence v.Super., Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2000) (“The doctrine of procedural default is based on considerations of comity and finality, and not on a jurisdictional limitation on the power of a federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to look beyond a state procedural default and consider the merits of a defaulted claim that asserts a constitutional violation.”). Here, in considering the claim that the trial court “improperly precluded [Cotto] from any cross-examination of Echevarria,” the Court of Appeals concluded that this contention “was not raised by objection before the trial court and is thus unpreserved for our review.” Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. As a result, the Court of Appeals declined to address the merits of Cotto’s claim that complete preclusion of cross-examination was improper, based on its implicit conclusion that Cotto did not comply with the contemporaneous objection rule codified in N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 470.05(2) at trial. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d at 78, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394. The question, then, is whether this case falls within “the small category of cases in which [the] asserted state grounds are inadequate to block adjudication of the federal claim” or “in which the exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate” to bar consideration of the federal constitutional claim. Lee, 534 U.S. at 376, 381, 122 S.Ct. 877. a. Standard for Adequacy In this case, there is no question that the claimed procedural bar constitutes an “independent” state ground of decision; the dispute is over whether the asserted bar is “adequate” to preclude federal habeas review. “[T]he question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude ... consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question.” Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)); Lee, 534 U.S. at 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 (it is not within the state’s prerogative to decide whether a state rule is sufficient to bar consideration of a federal claim; adequacy itself is a federal question). Before accepting a procedural bar defense, a federal court must examine the adequacy of the alleged procedural default. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 77. For although the procedural bar rule rests on considerations of comity, “[s]tate courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims.” Id. (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982)). As we explained in Garcia: [A] procedural bar will be deemed adequate only if it is based on a rule that is firmly established and regularly followed by the state in question. When a federal court finds that the rule is inadequate under this test the rule should not operate to bar federal review. Nonetheless, the principles of comity that drive the doctrine counsel that a federal court that deems a state procedural rule inadequate should not reach that conclusion lightly or without clear support in state law. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Since Garcia, our last extended discussion of the adequacy doctrine on federal habeas review, the Supreme Court has clarified the nature and scope of the adequacy inquiry. In Lee, the Supreme Court made clear that although “[ordinarily, a violation of ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ state rules ... will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim,” there are “exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” 534 U.S. at 376, 122 S.Ct. 877. In determining that Lee’s case fit “within that limited category,” id,., the Court relied on three considerations: (1) whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court, and whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court’s decision; (2) whether state caselaw indicated that compliance with the rule was demanded in the specific circumstances presented; and (3) whether petitioner had “substantially complied” with the rule given “the realities of trial,” and, therefore, whether demanding perfect compliance with the rule would serve a legitimate governmental interest. Although these three factors were not presented as a “test” for determining adequacy, we use them as guideposts in “evaluat[ing] the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case.” 534 U.S. at 381-85, 122 S.Ct. 877. Most importantly, Lee clarified, over strong dissenting objections by three Justices, that the adequacy of a state procedural bar is determined with reference to the “particular application” of the rule; it is not enough that the rule “generally serves a legitimate state interest.” 534 U.S. at 387, 122 S.Ct. 877. After Lee, then, respondent’s argument that it is “firmly established and regularly followed” that New York’s contemporaneous objection rule applies to all trial-related proceedings, including Sirois hearings, misses the point. Cotto does not claim that New York’s contemporaneous objection rule is generally “inadequate” to preclude federal habeas review, but rather that the rule is “misapplied in his case in particular.” Garcia, 188 F.3d at 79. More precisely, the relevant question here is not whether New York’s contemporaneous objection rule applies to Sirois hearings, whether the Court of Appeals “right[ly] or wrong[ly]” decided that the claim was un-preserved under state law, or even whether the Court of Appeals’ decision has a “fair or substantial basis in state law.” El Rhagi, 309 F.3d at 107 (quoting Garcia, 188 F.3d at 77-78). Rather, the question is whether application of the procedural rule is “firmly established and regularly followed” in the specific circumstances presented in the case, an inquiry that includes an evaluation of the asserted state interest in applying the procedural rule in such circumstances. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 386-87, 122 S.Ct. 877 (questioning whether the dissent “would fully embrace the unyielding theory that it is never appropriate to evaluate the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case”). b. The Circumstances of the Ruling Precluding Cross-Examination in this Case As described above, after Echevarria testified that he did not see who shot Davilla, the trial court excused Echevarria and the jury, and discussed with the parties the appropriate step to take, including the possibility of a Sirois hearing. The ensuing discussion of whether or not to have such a hearing included the following colloquy: Defense Counsel: I mean we are now going to pile on witnesses that we can’t cross-examine. It just seems it’s a bit over much ... I can only say that we have an investigator on this case, our investigator does all our investigation and we had decided given Mr. Echevarria’s prior record, that there was no need for any further investigation that we would rely completely upon what we had learned using that prior record in order to impeach him and discredit his testimony. The Court: Certainly he has quite a record .... Anything else ... ? Defense Counsel: No, Judge, I think that Geraci went into some lengths in discussing that this State will hold the highest standard for this kind of hearing which would be clear and convincing proof, that indeed the person was somehow connected and did waive by his misconduct the right to cross-examine a witness. In this case where the — as I see it, each of the eyewitnesses is non identifying until such point that the District Attorney’s office get a hold of them and to not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background and to allow them to put in this statement is really totally completely unfair. The Court: OK. Thank you. I’m going to let the People have a chance at a hearing to try to meet their burden of providing clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Cotto is responsible for Echevarria’s refusal to testify as he has in the past. I think that’s the appropriate step for me to take now. (Tr. 385-87) (emphasis added). At the close of the Sirois hearing a few days later, the trial court made both factual and legal findings, concluding: I am following what I believe to be the line of cases emanating from Reynolds v. United States in 1878 and continuing through Geraci which I think under the circumstances indicates that when the Court finds the defendant has committed misconduct which results in the unavailability of witness he forfeits his right for confrontation as for all purposes as to that witness. I will not permit cross of Mr. Echevarria by the defense as to his testimony thus far because the jury will have before it Echevarria’s live direct testimony as well as his conflicting out-of-court statement to the police, none of which the defense will be cross-examining about. (Tr. 1085-86.) When the trial court had finished summarizing its ruling, defense counsel said: “Can I just get some clarification on the limits of cross-examination. When Police Officer Vargas and Detective Quinones take the stand, my understand [sic] being is that I cannot question them at all about the res gestae of the statement, I guess, of the statement, I would say.” Respondent argues — and the Court of Appeals apparently agreed — that because defense counsel did not specifically object at that time, after the trial court’s Sirois ruling, that cross-examination of Echevarria was completely precluded, the claim was unpre-served for review. c. Application of the Lee Factors The question, then, is whether the requirement of an additional objection was “firmly established and regularly followed” in these circumstances. The Supreme Court has noted that the contemporaneous objection rule rests on “the general principle that an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review.” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (quoting Douglas, 380 U.S. at 422, 85 S.Ct. 1074). Like the Lee and Osborne courts, that overall principle, along with the three factors relied upon in Lee, guides our judgment in this case. i. Whether the Procedural Violation Actually Affected the Trial Court Ruling In reaching the conclusion that the procedural bar was inadequate in Lee, the Supreme Court relied in part upon the fact that the lack of compliance with the procedural rule at issue was not mentioned in the trial court as a reason to deny Lee’s motion for continuance. This rationale— whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court — is less applicable in this case because the lack of a contemporaneous objection would not, almost by