Full opinion text
OPINION PAEZ, Circuit Judge: In 1996, the Alaska legislature enacted sweeping reforms to its campaign finance system. Corruption and the appearance of corruption had led to low voter turnout and widespread disillusionment with the electoral system. Determined to close loopholes left open by previous attempts to establish meaningful reform, the new act restricted not only contributions to candidates, but also contributions to political parties, including “soft money.” Unsurprisingly, these new restrictions have been hotly contested in both state and federal courts. Although the term “soft money” is often used interchangeably with the phrase “not for the purpose of influencing the election or nomination of a candidate,” as we hold today, political parties frequently spend soft money precisely to influence the election or nomination of a candidate. This practice creates a linguistic conundrum in which contributions that are not for the purpose of influencing elections are in fact used to influence elections. In discussing soft money throughout this opinion, we treat it as all money contributed to a political party not expressly earmarked to influence the nomination or election of a candidate. Party activists Kenneth P. Jacobus, Wayne Ross, and Scott A. Kohlhaas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of the new limitations on contributions to political parties. The district court ruled that Alaska’s $5,000 limit on individual contributions and its ban on corporate and labor union contributions were unconstitutional insofar as they applied to contributions that were not for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of particular candidates (soft money). The district court also held unconstitutional Alaska’s $5,000 limit on the value of professional services that individuals might volunteer to political parties. Alaska appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment against it. We hold that these issues are still justi-ciable, despite recent changes in Alaska law, and we reverse the rulings of the district court holding Alaska’s limitations on soft money unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001), suggests, soft money presents a danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption because political parties trade influence and access to candidates for soft money dollars, and candidates trade influence and access for the indirect benefits that they receive from soft money contributions to their party. In addition, candidates’ heavy involvement in soft money fundraising and the creation of “tallying” and other methods for tracking soft money contributions secured by particular candidates indicate that soft money is indeed used to circumvent hard money contribution limits. Because the limitations on soft money contributions imposed here reflect Alaska’s concern about these same dangers, we uphold the limits on soft money contributions. We affirm, however, the district court’s ruling striking down as unconstitutional Alaska’s limit on the value of volunteer professional services that an individual may donate to a political party. By including donations of professional services in the definition of contribution that is subjected to the $5,000 limit, Alaska restricted First Amendment association rights in a way that was different in kind, not just different in degree, from the contribution limits that the Supreme Court found constitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Although this provision does not operate as an absolute bar to an individual’s association with a party through volunteering, we nonetheless hold that Alaska failed to demonstrate that there is an actual danger or appearance of corruption if contributions of volunteer professional services go unrestricted. I. Background Prior to 1996, Alaska campaign finance law consisted of reporting requirements and limitations on certain expenditures and on direct contributions to candidates. 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 76 § 1 codified at former Alaska Stat. § 15.13.010 et seq. Notwithstanding these restrictions, by 1996 there was considerable concern regarding actual and apparent corruption in Alaska politics, and, as concluded by the Josephson Institute in a report commissioned by the Alaska State Senate, “the level of trust and confidence in the integrity of the legislature is disturbingly low.” As a result, in 1996 the Alaska legislature enacted a comprehensive reform of Alaska’s campaign finance laws, Senate Bill 191, 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 48 (“the Act”), declaring, “It is the purpose of this Act to substantially revise Alaska’s election campaign finance laws in order to restore the public’s trust in the electoral process and to foster good government.” 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 48 § 1(b). As originally enacted, the Act created an interlocking system designed to restrict the influence of money on politics and prevent easy evasion of the barriers set up by the reforms. First, it banned expenditures advocating the support or defeat of a candidate by corporations, unions, and other business associations. Secondly, it restricted contributions not only to candidates, but also to political parties, political action committees (“PACs”), and other entities, banning contributions from some sources altogether and placing limitations on the size of contributions from other sources. The Act also regulated a number of more minor aspects of campaign finance, restricting the timing of contributions; preventing candidates from putting campaign funds to certain uses; and erecting various penalties for violations of campaign finance law. Most significant for purposes of this appeal were the Act’s restrictions on donations to political parties, which limited contributions from individuals to not more than $5,000 per year, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.070(b)(2) (1998) (amended 2002), and banned contributions by corporations, business associations, and unions, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(f) (1998). The Act did not explicitly condition the limitation or prohibition on contributions to political parties upon the use to which the political party intended to put the contribution. Additionally, the Act also limited the extent to which individuals could volunteer professional services for which they would ordinarily be paid, treating such volunteer activity as a contribution subject to the limitation on the monetary value of contributions. Alaska Stat. § 15.13.400(3) (1998) (amended 2002). In 1997, major aspects of the Act were challenged in Alaska state court, eventually reaching the Alaska Supreme Court. In State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union (Ak-CLU), the Alaska Supreme Court issued a compendious opinion interpreting the Act. 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999). The court found most provisions of the Act to be constitutional, upholding both the Act’s ban on corporate expenditures relating to candidate elections, id. at 608-10, and its limits on individual contributions and prohibition on corporate contributions to parties and candidates, id. at 614, 620-25. The issue of soft money contributions was not raised before the court. This suit involves a much narrower challenge, focusing on provisions of the Act that regulate contributions to political parties. The plaintiffs in this action are lawyers and party activists who regularly volunteer their services to specific political parties, and law firms wholly owned by the individual plaintiffs (jointly “Jacobus” or “Plaintiffs”). Jacobus brought this suit against the State of Alaska and the Alaska Public Offices Commission (together “Alaska”), challenging two aspects of the Act. First, he claimed that the Act did not limit, or, in the alternative, that it could not constitutionally limit, either individual or corporate soft money contributions to political parties. Secondly, Jacobus challenged the inclusion of volunteer professional services in the definition of contribution, which subjected such volunteer services to the $5,000 limit on individual contributions and the prohibition on corporate contributions. Jacobus initiated this suit in 1997, but the district court stayed the case pending the outcome of AkCLU. The stay was lifted in 2000, after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in AkCLU. 528 U.S. 1153, 120 S.Ct. 1156, 145 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2000). Thereafter, both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Jacobus. In its first order, issued April 10, 2001, the district court found that Alaska’s restrictions on contributions to political parties donated by individuals were unconstitutional to the extent that they limited donations made to a political party “for a purpose other than influencing the nomination or election of a candidate.” Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F.Supp.2d 881, 893 (D.Alaska 2001); see also id. at 889. In other words, while Alaska could restrict contributions to parties to a certain extent, it could not limit contributions of soft money. The district court also found that the Act’s limitation on the provision of volunteer professional services was unconstitutional. Id. at 892. The court initially upheld the ban on corporate contributions to candidates and political parties in its entirety. Id. at 892-93. But in response to Jacobus’s motion to amend or clarify the judgment, the district court issued an amended order on June 6, 2001. Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F.Supp.2d 893 (D.Alaska 2001). In this second order, the district court determined that, like the limit on individual contributions to parties, the ban on corporate contributions was also unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited soft money contributions. Id. at 895-97. Alaska timely appealed the amended judgment. After this case was briefed, the Alaska Legislature revised the campaign finance law under scrutiny in ways significant to this case. 2002 Alaska Sess. Laws 3. The limitation on the value of contributions from individuals to political parties was altered in accordance with the district court’s first ruling, thus removing the limits on soft money contributions by individuals. 2002 Alaska Sess. Laws 3 § 2 (amending Alaska Stat. § 15.13.070(b)(2)). Additionally, the Act was amended so that volunteer professional services are no longer included in the definition of contribution, and hence are no longer subject to limitation. Alaska Stat. § 15.13.400(4)(B)(i) (2003). However, the ban on corporate contributions to political parties and other groups remains unaltered. Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(f) (2003). Thus, we must decide three questions. First, is the present challenge to Alaska’s now-repealed limitation on soft money contributions to political parties from individuals justiciable, and if so, is it constitutional? ■ Second, is a ban on soft money contributions to political parties from corporations constitutional? Third, is the challenge to Alaska’s now-repealed restriction on the provision of volunteer professional services justiciable, and if so, is the provision constitutional? II. Justiciability We first address the question of whether, in light of the Alaska Legislature’s repeal of two out of the three challenged provisions of the Act, this action is moot with regard to these provisions. A case is moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1011 (9th Cir.2001). “ ‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’ ” Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-21, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). However, dismissal of a case “on grounds of mootness would be justified only if it were absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial protection that it sought.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224, 120 S.Ct. 722, 145 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the doctrine of mootness is more flexible than other strands of justiciability doctrine. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., the Court stated that “there are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing [at the time the case is brought], but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The Court explained the practical reasons behind the flexibility of the mootness doctrine: “[B]y the time mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and litigated, often (as here) for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage may prove more wasteful than frugal.” Id. at 191-92, 120 S.Ct. 693. Our circuit, perhaps following the lead of the Supreme Court, has issued somewhat confused pronouncements regarding mootness generally, and mootness in the context of repealed or amended statutes in particular. Thus, we have stated “ ‘if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.’ ” Smith v. Univ. of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir.1994)); see also Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1521 (9th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds by Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996). However, we have also decreed that in cases involving the amendment or repeal of a statute, “mootness ... is not a jurisdictional issue; rather, we may continue to exercise authority over a purportedly moot case where the balance of interests favors such continued authority.” Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 927 (9th Cir.1991). As we have explained, “repeal of the objectionable language [does] not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to decide the constitutional question because of the well-settled principle that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (“[Revision of a statute] is a matter relating to the exercise rather than the existence of judicial power.” (emphasis added)); id. at 289 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1070 (“Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave the defendant free to return to his old ways.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n., 393 U.S. 199, 203-04, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968))). These concerns are of particular force in a case like the present one, in which the “voluntary cessation” occurred only in response to the district court’s judgment. See Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 928 (noting that likelihood of reenactment is a significant factor in the evaluation of mootness); see also Smith, 233 F.3d at 1194 (indicating that mootness is less appropriate when repeal occurred due to the “prodding effect” of litigation). Thus, although we have an independent obligation to decide whether we have jurisdiction over a case, Clark, 259 F.3d at 1011, mootness is not jurisdictional in cases such as this. Ordinarily, the “party moving for dismissal on mootness grounds bears a heavy burden.” Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 927-28; see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190, 120 S.Ct. 693 (noting that although it is the plaintiffs affirmative burden to establish standing, “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur”); Adarand Constructors, 528 U.S. at 222, 120 S.Ct. 722 (same); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir.1999) (same). Because both parties maintain in supplemental briefing that the case is justiciable, this burden cannot be met. We need not rely upon the parties’ position, however, because even if we were to hold the parties to inflexible compliance with the dictates of mootness, the matter is not moot. Despite superseding events, an issue is not moot if there are present effects that are legally significant. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1194 (requiring that “interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation” (emphasis added)); see also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992); Reich v. Local 396, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 97 F.3d 1269, 1272 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffs will likely experience prosecution and civil penalties for their past violations of the repealed provisions of the Act. Under section 11.81.200 of the Alaska Statutes, an individual can be prosecuted for past violations of a criminal statute despite its subsequent repeal or amendment. See Galbraith v. State, 693 P.2d 880, 881-82 (Alaska Ct.App.1985) (holding that individual was properly sentenced under law in existence at time of offense, despite subsequent amendment). Plaintiffs Jacobus and Ross have violated both the $5,000 individual contribution limit and the restriction on volunteer professional services. As a result, they are vulnerable to civil and criminal prosecution under a number of different provisions. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 15.13.390 (2003) (imposing civil penalties and fines for violation of the Act); Alaska Stat. § 15.56.012 (2003) (making some violations of the Act the “crime of campaign misconduct in the first degree”); Alaska Stat. § 15.56.016 (2003) (making other violations of the Act the “crime of campaign misconduct in the third degree”). Significantly, APOC sent Jacobus a letter indicating that if the law were upheld it reserved the right to prosecute any past violations, although it would not pursue any enforcement action during the pendency of the litigation. In light of the ongoing civil and criminal ramifications of Plaintiffs’ past violations, the claims are not moot. Our justiciability inquiry does not end with the conclusion that the case is not moot. As is frequently the case, we must investigate the question of ripeness in addition to that of mootness. Because the existence of a five case or controversy is dependent upon the likelihood of future prosecution for past violations, we must explore whether the case is currently ripe for decision. The requirement of ripeness is intended to ensure that “issues presented are ‘definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.’ ” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072 (1945)). While a generalized possibility of prosecution does not satisfy the ripeness requirement, a genuine threat of imminent prosecution does. City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1172-73 (9th Cir.2001); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (“When ... there exists a credible threat of prosecution [under a challenged statute], [a plaintiff] ‘should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.’ ”). To distinguish between the two, we have looked to three factors: 1) “whether the plaintiffs have articulated a ‘concrete plan’ to violate the law in question”; 2) “whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings”; and 3) “the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute.” Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139. Here, each of these three factors indicates that this case is in fact ripe for review. First, Plaintiffs have gone far beyond the requirement that they articulate a concrete plan to violate the law, and instead have actually engaged in the illegal behavior at issue. Secondly, while the letter sent to Jacobus does not threaten to initiate enforcement proceedings in so many words, it indicates that APOC is only awaiting the outcome of the litigation to initiate such proceedings. Finally, Alaska alleges that APOC has a general policy of seeking civil fines in response to violations of Alaska campaign finance law. See also, e.g., Definition of Contribution and Reporting Requirements, APOC Advisory Opinion AO97-08-CD (February 27, 1997) (“The Commission views a failure to report such information as a serious violation, and has assessed significant penalties when such activities were not reported correctly or promptly.”); Latchem v. State, 1999 WL 587238 (Alaska Ct.App.1999) (unpublished) (affirming in part and reversing in part a defendant’s criminal convictions for making campaign contributions in the name of another); VECO Int’l, Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 753 P.2d 703 (Alaska 1988) (reviewing civil penalties for failure to comply with reporting requirements). Because Plaintiffs have already violated the laws in question and it appears that they will be subjected to either criminal or civil penalties for doing so, they face “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement” and hence the injury is not “too imaginary or speculative to support jurisdiction.” Auburn, 260 F.3d at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the issues are purely legal and the likelihood of prosecution creates hardship to the parties, the case also satisfies the prudential aspects of ripeness, and is fit for review. See San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1132-33 (9th Cir.1996); see also Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141-42. HI. Alaska’s Regulation of Contributions of Soft Money We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir.2001). We agree with the district court that there are no genuine issues of material fact, Jacobus, 182 F.Supp.2d at 884, and thus, the only question before us is whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Delta Sav. Bank, 265 F.3d at 1021. We hold that the burden on individuals’ association rights that resulted from Alaska’s soft money limits was justified by the dangers of corruption and the appearance of corruption posed by large donations to political parties, and by the danger that soft money donations to parties would be used to circumvent hard money limits. Although the district court correctly concluded that the Act’s contribution limits cover soft money contributions, it erred in holding that it was unconstitutional to limit such contributions. Additionally, we uphold Alaska’s prohibition on corporate soft money contributions. Although a ban on contributions poses a more significant First Amendment burden than does a limitation, Alaska is entitled to regulate corporate participation in politics in order to prevent corporations from parlaying state-created economic advantages into advantages in political debate. A. Statutory Interpretation Jacobus argues that, by its terms, the Act does not regulate soft money at all. He points to the definition of contribution in the text of section 15.13.400(3)(A), which states that a contribution is a donation “that is made for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate.” In interpreting a state statute, we regard the construction rendered by the state’s highest court as authoritative. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir.1997). “If there is no such decision available, then we must predict how the highest state court would decide the issue.... ” S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 473 (9th Cir.2001). Here, the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the Act, and has construed it to include restrictions on contributions of soft money. In AkCLU, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that although “federal law allows corporations and other entities to make unlimited contributions to political parties to use in general party activities,” 978 P.2d at 608, “[t]he Act, by contrast, bans such contributions,” id. at 608 n. 67. This statement was not accompanied by detailed reasoning, but it is clear and does not readily admit of alternate interpretations. The district court found that the Alaska Supreme Court had not considered the question of whether the Act regulated contributions for general party activities. Instead, the district court declared that, in making the statement quoted above, the Alaska Supreme Court was “simply noting the difference in the laws as they pertained to bans on [corporate] independent expenditures.” Jacobus, 182 F.Supp.2d at 885 n. 4. We disagree with this assessment of the Alaska Supreme Court’s statement. Although the Alaska Supreme Court’s comments occurred in the course of upholding Alaska’s ban on corporate expenditures, its conclusion that Alaska law does not allow unlimited contributions for general party activities describes “the difference in the laws as they pertainf ] to” a soft money ban, not an independent expenditure ban. As the Alaska Supreme Court explained, AkCLU had argued that the expenditure ban “cannot satisfy federal law because Alaska does not permit alternative participation by business and labor entities[, such as] ... contributions to political parties to use in general party activities.” AkCLU, 978 P.2d at 608 (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court agreed that the Act prohibited corporations from making unlimited contributions for use in general party activities. While brief, the Alaska Supreme Court’s discussion constitutes a definitive statement, one that we cannot disregard. B. Constitutionality of Limits on Individuals’ Soft Money Contributions Having concluded that the Act’s contribution limits extend to soft money contributions, we now uphold the constitutionality of these limits and reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jacobus. In contrast to the district court, we believe that “Buckley’s holding seems to leave the political branches broad authority to enact laws regulating contributions that take the form of ‘soft money.’ ” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 1. First Amendment Principles Underlying Restrictions on Contributions of Soft Money Campaign finance reform presents “a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation.” Id. at 400,120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring). On the one hand, “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection to [discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates] in order to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, a failure to regulate the arena of campaign finance allows the influence of wealthy individuals and corporations to drown out the voices of individual citizens, producing a political system unresponsive to the needs and desires of the public, and causing the public to become disillusioned with and mistrustful of the political system. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 897. In upholding the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (FECA’s) contribution limits in its seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court considered the nature, source and parameters of the constitutional right to contribute money in elections. The Court erected a fundamental legal and conceptual divide between contributions and expenditures, id. at 12-59, 96 S.Ct. 612, “[generally ... upholding] as constitutional the limitations on contributions to candidates and striking] down as unconstitutional limitations on independent expenditures.” FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 491, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985). Although the Court has since upheld expenditure restrictions in the limited context of corporations, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990), “[l]ater cases have respected this line between contributing and spending.” Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 437, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (listing cases). In Buckley, the Court explained that campaign finance reform affects two different rights protected by the First Amendment: the right of expression (a speech right) and the right of association. Limitations on contributions affect the right of association, but unlike expenditure limits, do not primarily implicate the contributor’s speech rights. Contribution limits do not significantly burden speech because the communicative content of the act of contributing is largely symbolic, and therefore is not diminished by limits on the amount of the contribution: A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Contribution limits do, however, burden the right of association. Id. at 24, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by ... contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association.”). As the Court explained: Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act’s contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a candidate or committee. Id. at 22, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court noted, however, that the Act’s contribution limits “leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates.” Id. In contrast, limitations on expenditures “represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech” as well as association. Id. at 19, 96 S.Ct. 612. Because expenditure limits implicate both speech and association rights, they are subject to more rigorous restriction. 2. The Appropriate Standard for Evaluating Restrictions on Contributions of Soft Money As a result of the foregoing analysis, the Court has indicated that the appropriate constitutional standard for limits on contributions is somewhat more relaxed than that applied to limits on expenditures. See FEC v. Beaumont, — U.S. -, -, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 2210, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (“[RJestrietions on political contributions have been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment....”); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. 897 (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.” (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986))); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981). Although freedom of association is a fundamental right, it is not absolute. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. Thus, the standard applied by the Court in assessing the constitutionality of contribution limits established that “[e]ven a ‘significant interference with protected rights of political association’ may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Id. (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975)) (some internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has applied this standard in every case in which it has considered restrictions on contributions. See, e.g., Beaumont, — U.S. at-, 123 S.Ct. at 2210; Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 897; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612. In fact, in Colorado Republican II the Court specifically rejected the contention that party contributions merited a stricter standard of scrutiny, concluding that “[w]e accordingly apply to a party’s coordinated spending limitation the same scrutiny we have applied to the other political actors, that is, scrutiny appropriate for a contribution limit.” 533 U.S. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-582, slip op. by Leon, J., at 13-15 (D.D.C. 3-judge court 2003) (stating the holding of the court); id., slip op. by Kollar-Kotelly, J., at 489-90; but see id., slip op. by Henderson, J., at 258-59. Nonetheless, Jacobus challenges this standard as applied to contributions of soft money, because limits on soft money limit the parties’ speech, and therefore the parties’ ability “to function and grow.” This argument is foreclosed by Buckley. Buckley acknowledged the effect of contribution limits on the speech rights of the donee, as opposed to the contributor, noting that “contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters,” but “the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. The fact that some contributions ultimately are used for political speech did not convince the Court that contribution limits implicate speech rights significantly: the Court did not see any real danger that contribution limits would “reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression,” because “[t]he overall effect of [ ] contribution ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression.” Id. at 22-23, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court deemed the donee’s speech rights adequately protected as long as limits are not so severe as to prevent candidates and political committees from “amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Id. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Jacobus has wholly failed to explain why this framework does not apply here. Thus, limitations on contributions of soft money will be sustained as long as the state demonstrates a sufficiently important governmental interest and the limits employed are closely tailored to achieve that interest. 3. Sufficiently Important Government Interests As the following discussion establishes, preventing corruption, avoiding the appearance of corruption, and averting the circumvention of provisions intended to combat corruption are sufficiently important governmental interests to justify Alaska’s former limits on soft money contributions. There is ample support for this conclusion in both recent case law and in the practical realities of modern party fundraising. Despite criticism in the literature and by some courts, the only interests that the Court has thus far found sufficiently important to justify limits on contributions have been those related to the danger of corruption. See FEC v. Nat’l Conserva tive Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (“We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are [sic] the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”). The Court originally emphasized the quid pro quo aspect of corruption. See, e.g., id. at 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (“Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612 (explaining that because contributions are necessary to conduct a successful campaign, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined”). However, the Court’s definition of corruption has since expanded to include more subtle and insidious types of inappropriate influence. Thus, the Court subsequently explained that “[i]n speaking [in Buckley] of ‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse’ in addition to ‘quid pro quo arrangements,’ we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 441, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (defining corruption broadly as “not only [ ] quid pro quo agreements, but also undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”). The Court has recognized three means by which the danger of corruption can have a destructive impact on the political system. First, corruption itself undermines democracy when political victories occur not because of the wishes of the public or the independent judgment of the people’s elected representatives, but because of the influence of money. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612. Second, the appearance of corruption may cause “confidence in the system of representative Government ... to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612); see also id. at 388, 120 S.Ct. 897 (noting further that the “impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” is “[o]f almost equal concern” to corruption itself). The Court cautioned: Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance. Democracy works “only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.” Id. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 897 (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961)). Third, and most recently, the Court has also recognized that “circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.” Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 199, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (“[I]t is clear that this [anti-circumvention] provision is an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this Court in Buckley”). Thus, Alaska can establish a sufficiently important governmental interest if it is able to show that any one of the three theories of corruption identified by the Court is implicated by the unrestricted flow of soft money contributions. The Supreme Court in Colorado Republican II was not faced with the issue of the constitutionality of soft money limitations. Nonetheless, by recognizing that political parties serve as a conduit from contributors to candidates, the Court effectively resolved the question of whether corruption constitutes a sufficiently important governmental interest in the context of the regulation of soft money. There is no reason to expect that the dangers described in Colorado Republican II will be avoided simply because powerful donors are making soft money contributions to parties, rather than parties contributing to candidates. While our conclusion that soft money poses a significant danger of corruption is explained in more depth immediately below, we note that it is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted campaign finance law with an eye toward the actual functioning of the system of campaign finance. See Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 443, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (“Congress drew a functional, not a formal, line between contributions and expenditures”); see also id. at 438, 450-52, 452 n. 14, 121 S.Ct. 2351; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47, 96 S.Ct. 612. Likewise, the genesis of Alaska’s Act was the failure of its original, more formalistic, finance reform laws to counter corruption and the appearance of corruption. As APOC has recognized through its advisory opinions, regulations, and in the course of this litigation, the Act similarly mandates a functional rather than formal approach to campaign finance reform. a) Preventing Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption In light of modern campaign practices, it is not necessary that money funneled through political parties be specifically designated for the election or nomination of a candidate to have a corrupting influence. Colorado Republican II offers a compelling account of the danger of corruption inherent in unlimited soft money contributions to parties, one that accounts for “how the power of money actually works in the political structure.” 533 U.S. at 450, 121 S.Ct. 2351. Parties centralize fundraising for a broad set of candidates and programs, and therefore act as magnets for special interest groups who are looking for the most efficient ways to “ad-vane[e] their narrow interests.” Id. at 451, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (alteration marks omitted). [M]any PACs ... contribute] to both parties during the same electoral cycle, and sometimes even directly to two competing candidates in the same election. Parties are thus necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party’s message or to elect party candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors. Id. at 451-52,121 S.Ct. 2351 (footnotes and citation omitted). Such practices lead to two types of inappropriate influence by large soft money contributors. First, such contributions create the danger that the parties themselves will become beholden to special interests. As the Supreme Court noted in Colorado Republican II, these obligations are of concern because of the parties’ unique ability to reward major benefactors with access to lawmakers and candidates: “the record shows that even under present law substantial donations turn the parties into matchmakers whose special meetings and receptions give the donors the chance to get their points across to the candidates.” 533 U.S. at 461, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also id. at 461 n. 25, 121 S.Ct. 2351; Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Large and repeat donors sometime [sic] get more access than other donors, and donating soft money can be a more effective means for getting access than hard money”). Like direct influence-peddling by candidates, this kind of access-peddling creates a danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption. Second, candidates and officeholders who are party members may become directly beholden to the party’s donors, even if the benefit that they receive from a large donation to the party is indirect. Contributing to parties is an extremely efficient way for a special interest group “to produce obligated officeholders,” because it allows such a group to obligate anyone and everyone in a political party, rather than limiting its influence to specific candidates. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 452, 121 S.Ct. 2351. Candidates and officeholders are likely to feel obligated to major party donors because they are already beholden to the party as a result of the benefits that flow from party membership. See Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 648, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A party shares a unique relationship with the candidate it sponsors because their political fates are inextricably linked. That interdependency creates a special danger that the party — or the persons that control the party — will abuse the influence it has over the candidate by virtue of its power to spend.”). The Court in Colorado Republican II even noted that influence within the party itself was a significant benefit for which candidates and officeholders might be willing to trade influence over the legislative process. See 533 U.S. at 460 n. 23, 121 S.Ct. 2351. As Colorado Republican II recognized, special interests contribute to candidates competing against each other in the same election “because they want favors” from whomever is elected. 533 U.S. at 451 n. 12, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also id. at 451-52 & nn. 13, 14, 121 S.Ct. 2351. Because a modern election campaign simply cannot be conducted without significant sums of money, candidates become beholden to the sources of any contributions that aid their campaign, whether given directly or indirectly. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy.”). The Alaska Legislature focused on this issue in passing the Act, finding that “organized special interests are responsible for raising a significant portion of all election campaign funds and may thereby gain an undue influence over election campaigns and elected officials.” 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 48 § 1(a)(3). Amicus curiae Republican National Committee notes that some political parties have functions other than simply electing candidates to office. Although this position is contrary to that taken by its state affiliates in previous litigation, see, e.g., Colorado Republican I & II, it may well be accurate. However, even where contributions to a political party are expressly earmarked for the purpose of administrative costs or off-year issue advocacy, and even if political parties do not use donations for these purposes to shift funds into election campaigns, the perception of corruption decried by the Supreme Court may still persist when contributors provide large sums of money to political parties, regardless of the purpose and ultimate use of the funds. As noted above, this perception of corruption was a matter of particular concern to Alaska legislators in enacting the Act. 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 48 § 1(b). b) Preventing Circumvention of Hard Money Limits In Colorado Republican II, the Supreme Court recognized a closely-related additional governmental interest that might justify contribution limits — the interest in preventing “circumvention of contribution limits designed to combat the corrupting influence of large contributions to candidates.” 533 U.S. at 456 n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also id. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351; Beaumont, — U.S. at -, 123 S.Ct. at 2207 (“[R]ecent cases have recognized that restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits for ‘circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.’ ” (quoting Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 456 & n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2351) (second alteration in original)); Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 197-99, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (holding that limits on contributions to multicandidate committees are “an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this Court in Buckley ”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-36, 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. As the Supreme Court found in Colorado Republican II, faced with federal limits on direct contributions to candidates, powerful donors have used “contributions to a party ... as a funnel from donors to candidates.” 533 U.S. at 461, 121 S.Ct. 2351. This response shows how soft money contributions are used to circumvent contribution limits. Under [FECA], a donor is limited to $2,000 in contributions to one candidate in a given election cycle. The same donor may give as much as another $20,000 each year to a national party committee supporting the candidate. What a realist would expect to occur has occurred. Donors give to the party with the tacit understanding that the favored candidate will benefit. Id. at 458, 121 S.Ct. 2351. This practice is so common, the Court went on to note, that “[although the understanding between donor and party may involve no definite commitment and may be tacit on the donor’s part,” the National Democratic Party has developed a “manner of informal bookkeeping” known as “tallying” to ensure that the amount of money that a candidate receives from the party corresponds to the amount that the candidate raised for the party. Id. at 459, 121 S.Ct. 2351. The theory that soft money contributions are a means of circumventing limits on contributions to candidates is bolstered by the extensive role that candidates play in party fundraising. Many of the “party-building” activities claimed by Jacobus to be unrelated to electing candidates are easily targeted to a particular candidate, such as the promotion of a Get Out the Vote initiative in a candidate’s district, or sponsorship of a legislative initiative that a candidate has made part of his or her campaign platform. Thus, these activities provide a low effort, low-risk way to circumvent contribution limits. See Republican Party v. Pauly, 63 F.Supp.2d at 1016 (“The [Republican Party of Minnesota] often provided administrative and strategic support to the candidates. The party coordinated candidate appearances and voter registration drives, and helped to recruit volunteer assistance.”). In sum, “parties ... function for the benefit of donors whose object is to place candidates under obligation.” Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 455, 121 S.Ct. 2351. Prevention of the corruption and appearance of corruption that result from this inescapable reality is a sufficiently important governmental interest to support limiting soft money contributions. 4. Close Tailoring Jacobus argues that even if Alaska has established a sufficiently important interest in limiting soft money contributions, the Act is not closely tailored to serve the State’s purpose. In the context of contribution limits, the requirement of “close tailoring” does not require “the least restrictive alternative.” See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 199 n. 20, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (“Congress was not required to select the least restrictive means of protecting the integrity of its legislative scheme.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that courts must not “second guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.” FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982). a) Overbreadth Jacobus argues that limits on soft money contributions are overbroad because not all of these contributions will be spent in ways that benefit the candidates, either directly or indirectly, and thus, we should not assume that they will create a danger of quid pro quo corruption. The Supreme Court dismissed a similar argument in Buckley, declaring that “[n]ot only is it difficult to isolate suspect contributions, but, more importantly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated.” 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. More recently, the Court has also emphasized the breadth of response justified to avoid circumvention of direct contribution limits. In Colorado Republican II, the Republican Party suggested that a better alternative to limiting coordinated expenditures by parties could be found in the FECA provision that treated contributions to parties as contributions to the candidate if they were “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to[a] candidate.” 533 U.S. at 462, 121 S.Ct. 2351. The Court rejected this proposal, stating that it “ignores the practical difficulty of identifying and directly combating circumvention under actual political conditions.” Id. It elaborated upon this difficulty as follows: Donations are made to a party by contributors who favor the party’s candidates in races that affect them; donors are (of course) permitted to express their views and preferences to party officials; and the party is permitted (as we have held that it must be) to spend money in its own right. When this is the environment for contributions going into a general party treasury, and candidate-fundraisers are rewarded with something less obvious than dollar-for-dollar pass-throughs (distributed through contributions and party spending), circumvention is obviously very hard to trace. Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained that the earmarking provision would only reach the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions through to candidates. To treat the earmarking provision as the outer limit of acceptable tailoring would disarm any serious effort to limit the corrosive effects of ... “ ‘understandings’ regarding what donors give what amounts to the party, which candidates are to receive what funds from the party, and what interests particular donors are seeking to promote.” Id. (quoting FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1241 (10th Cir.2000) (Seymour, Chief Judge, dissenting)). The district court’s judgment here reduces the Act to little more than an earmarking scheme, which suffers from the same limitations identified by the Supreme Court. In fact, Colorado Republican II strongly suggests that the Court would have accepted limits on contributions to political parties as a narrower (and therefore presumably constitutional) solution to the danger of circumvention of individual contribution limits. See 533 U.S. at 464-65, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (“The choice is between limiting contributions [to political parties] and limiting expenditures whose special value as expenditures is also the source of their power to corrupt. Congress is entitled to its choice.”). If there is a danger or a perceived danger that large contributions to political parties will circumvent direct limitations and influence candidates because candidates are obligated to their parties, then candidates may become obligated to large party donors whether or not those donations directly benefit them. If there is a danger or perceived danger that the parties themselves will deliver influence or access in exchange for money, then Alaska cannot be required to regulate only some of that money, and therefore only some of the danger. b) Amount of the Limit A contribution limit level will be accepted unless it is “so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“[I]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.”). In Buckley, the Supreme Court approved the limits established by FECA: a $1,000 individual contribution limit and a $5,000 political committee contribution limit. As the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, Alaska’s $5,000 individual contribution limit to political parties is well within these limits. See AkCLU, 978 P.2d at 624-25. 5) Additional Considerations Amicus Republican National Committee (“RNC”) argues strenuously that the constitutionality of political party donation limits depends upon how the donated funds are used. The basis of this claim is the theory that Buckley established “an express advocacy test” that only allows contributions to be limited where they will be used for speech advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 & n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612. In accepting this argument, the district court cited the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, which is one of the few cases published to date to address the constitutionality of limitations on soft money contributions. 141 Wash.2d 245, 4 P.3d 808, 819-24 (2000) (en banc). In Washington State, the court concluded that contributions to political parties for purposes of issue advocacy could not be regulated, declaring that Buckley established that “issue advocacy is beyond the reach of government regulation.” 4 P.3d at 819; see also Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir.1991) (noting in the course of considering regulation of expenditures that Buckley “limit[ed] the scope of the FECA to express advocacy”); Maine Right To Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F.Supp. 8, 10-12 (D.Maine) (same), aff'd by 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1996); West Virginians For Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F.Supp. 1036, 1039 (S.D.W.Va.1996) (stating in the context of reporting requirements that “[i]t is clear from the holdings in Buckley and its progeny that the Supreme Court has made a definite distinction between express advocacy, which generally can be regulated, and issue advocacy, which generally cannot be regulated.”). This seriously flawed interpretation reflects a basic misreading of Buckley. Buckley distinguished between express advocacy and issue advocacy in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness that might chill protected speech, not to establish a constitutional limit on the legislative ability to regulate issue advocacy. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“We agree that in order to preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds, [it] must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office”) with Washington State, 4 P.3d at 816 (“[Buckley’s ] narrowing construction was necessary because if the limitations applied to issue advocacy, then FECA would unconstitutionally restrict such speech.”). The fact that Buckley went on to conclude that the provision was unconstitutional, even after excluding issue advocacy from its reach, provides further proof that the narrowing construction did not constitute a determination that restrictions on issue advocacy were per se unconstitutional. See 424 U.S. at 44, 96 S.Ct. 612 (“We then turn to the basic First Amendment question whether[the provision], even as thus narrowly and explicitly construed, impermissibly burdens the constitutional right of free expression.”). Thus, Buckley did not establish that regulation of issue advocacy was unconstitutional. Additionally, the express advocacy test erected by the Court in Buckley related only to expenditures and reporting requirements, not to contributions. Id. at 44, 78-80, 96 S.Ct. 612. Indeed, in considering parallel provisions, identically worded, in the definitions of contribution and expenditure, the Court construed the terms differently, reserving the express advocacy test for the regulation of expenditures, while interpreting the regulated contributions more expansively, to include donations “made directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee, ... made to other organizations or individu