Full opinion text
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge MICHAEL wrote the opinion, in which Judge K.K. HALL joined. Judge LUTTIG wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. OPINION MICHAEL, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Willie Lloyd Turner is a Virginia prisoner who was convicted of murder and first sentenced to death in 1979. In 1986, after state and federal collateral review, the United States Supreme Court vacated his sentence and remanded for resen-tencing. In 1987, a Virginia jury again sentenced him to death. In 1992, after unsuccessful direct and collateral review in the Virginia courts, Turner petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied that relief. Turner v. Williams, 812 F.Supp. 1400 (E.D.Va.1993). Turner appeals, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing (1) his claims attacking the application of a statutory aggravating factor that permits imposition of death upon a finding that the defendant’s conduct was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,” and (2) his several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I On the morning of July 12, 1978, Turner entered Smith Jewelers, owned and operated by W. Jack Smith, Jr. in City of Franklin, Virginia. Turner went in the store with a sawed-off shotgun wrapped in a towel. Without saying a word, Turner displayed his shotgun and motioned to Smith. Smith immediately began stuffing money into a jewelry bag. While he was filling the bag, Smith inconspicuously activated the store’s silent alarm to the police department. Meanwhile, Turner directed the several customers and employees present to line up behind the store counter, kicking a customer in the process. Shortly after Smith triggered the alarm, a police officer, Alan D. Bain, Jr. arrived at the store and told Smith that his alarm was activated. Turner pointed his shotgun at Officer Bain’s head and ordered him to remove his revolver from its holster and put it on the floor. Turner then grabbed Officer Bain’s revolver off the floor, jabbed his shotgun at the officer, and directed him to the back of the store with the others. Turner, now brandishing his shotgun in one hand and Bain’s revolver in the other, fired the revolver into the back wall of the store. He threatened to “start killing” if another police officer showed up. At this point, without any provocation, Turner pointed the revolver at Smith and fired. The bullet struck Smith in the head. Smith yelled, slumped over the counter and fell to the floor, unconscious, gurgling, and bleeding from the head. The shot caused bleeding and bruising on Smith’s brain surface, but was not fatal. At this point, Officer Bain began talking to Turner. He offered to take Turner out of the store if he would agree not to shoot anyone else. While Bain talked to Turner, two customers were able to escape from the store. Turner then said, “I’m going to kill this nigger squealer,” JA 314, referring to Smith, who was not African American. Turner then immediately reached over the counter with the revolver and fired two close-range shots into the left side of Smith’s chest. The shots caused Smith’s body to jump. (One of the bullets penetrated his heart, food and wind pipes before ultimately lodging in his spine; the other bullet passed through his lung and out his- back. Medical testimony established that either of the two shots to the chest would have been fatal.) Immediately after these shots, Officer Bain was able to shove Turner and grab his weapons. Bain then forced Turner to get down on the floor and called for help. On December 4, 1979, Turner was convicted for murdering Smith, and on December 6, 1979, a jury in Northampton County recommended that he be sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certio-rari. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d 36 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Turner v. Virginia, 451 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 2347, 68 L.Ed.2d 863 (1981). Turner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Southampton County, Virginia. That petition was denied, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The United States Supreme Court again- denied his certiorari petition. Turner v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983). Turner next sought relief in the federal courts. On July 27, 1983, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The petition was denied, and our court .affirmed. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir.1985). Turner then filed another certiorari petition in the United States Supreme Court, which was , granted. On April 30, 1986, the Supreme Court vacated Turner’s death sentence (but not his conviction) because the trial court had refused to question prospective jurors about possible bias resulting from the fact that Turner was African American and his victim was white. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986). The Supreme Court remanded the case, which ultimately went to the circuit court of Southampton County for a new sentencing hearing. Turner was represented at resentencing by court-appointed lawyers, J. Lloyd Snook, III and Thomas L. Woodward, Jr. The resen-tencing hearing (a jury proceeding) occurred on January 7-9 and 12, 1987. The Commonwealth finished its case on Friday, January 9, and the defense rested on Monday, January 12, without putting on any mitigating evidence. The jury was then instructed. Under Virginia’s death penalty scheme, the jury may fix the sentence at death if it finds either one of two aggravating factors: (1) “that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society” (the “future dangerousness” factor), or (2) “that his conduct in committing the offense ... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim” (the “vileness” factor). Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1990). Turner’s jury was given limiting instructions that defined the “aggravated battery” and “depravity of mind” components of the .vileness factor. ■ On January 12, 1987, Turner’s resentenc-ing jury returned a verdict fixing his sentence at death based solely on the vileness factor. His sentence was upheld on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the United States Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition. Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 364 S.E.2d 483, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988). Turner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Southampton County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims. On September 11-13, 1989, the state court held an evidentiary hearing on some of his ineffective assistance claims; all other claims were dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. On May 23, 1990, the court issued a letter order that adopted the Commonwealth’s proposed findings of fact and rejected Turner’s ineffective assistance claims. On July 5, 1990, the court issued a formal order incorporating the letter order and dismissing Turner’s habeas petition. On April 30, 1991, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Turner’s habeas appeal. Turner v. Williams, No. 901335 (Va. Apr. 30, 1991). That court rejected his ineffective assistance claims on the merits and concluded that his other claims were procedurally defaulted. Turner next sought collateral review in the federal courts. On December 10, 1991, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Commonwealth moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On February 1, 1993, the district court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed his petition. Turner v. Williams, 812 F.Supp. 1400 (E.D.Va.1993). The court found that most of Turner’s claims were procedurally barred and rejected the others on the merits. Turner now appeals to this court. Turner’s claims on this appeal can be grouped in two general categories. First, he raises several challenges to the application of the vileness factor. Second, he says his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance in several respects. The Commonwealth responds that all of Turner’s claims are barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), because they would require us to announce new constitutional rules of criminal procedure on collateral review. The Commonwealth next asserts that Turner’s challenges to the application of the vileness factor, as well as one of his ineffective assistance claims, are procedurally barred. We must first address these arguments to determine whether we can even reach the merits of Turner’s claims. II In Teague v. Lane, a plurality of the Supreme Court adopted the second Justice Harlan’s retroactivity approach and held that a “new rule” of federal constitutional law will not be applied or announced on collateral review unless the rule falls within one of two narrow exceptions. See generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 299-316, 109 S.Ct. at 1068-78 (plurality opinion). Shortly thereafter, Teag-ue ’s retroactivity approach was adopted by a majority of the Court and held to apply to capital cases. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). The new rule principle is predicated on interests in comity and in the finality of criminal convictions. Gilmore v. Taylor, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2116, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993). The principle announced in Teague serves to ensure that gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when entered. This is but a recognition that the purpose of federal habeas corpus is to ensure that state convictions comply with the federal law in existence at the time the conviction became final, and not to provide a mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judgments based upon later emerging legal doctrine. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2827, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Generally, there are two types of Teague eases. In the first type, the petitioner seeks to rely on a decision announced after his conviction became final. In the second type, the petitioner relies on a decision announced before his conviction became final. In the latter, “it is necessary to inquire whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” Stringer v. Black, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct.1130, 1135, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992); see also Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1132 n. 12 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1289, 122 L.Ed.2d 681 (1993). The policy behind the new rule principle is desirable; but applying that principle leaves something to be desired, for “[i]t is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule....” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (plurality opinion). In Teague, the plurality said: In general, ... a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. T<5 put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Id. (citations omitted); see also Penny, 489 U.S. at 314, 109 S.Ct. at 1077; Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1260, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1216, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990); Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234, 110 S.Ct. at 2827; Stringer, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 1135; Graham v. Collins, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 892, 897, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); Gilmore, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2116; Caspari v. Bohlen, — U.S. —,—, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). Subsequent cases have added more words (if not guidance) to the new rule inquiry. See, e.g., Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, 110 S.Ct. at 1217 (a case announces a new rule when the rule “was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds”); Parks, 494 U.S. at 488, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 (a case does not announce a new rule if “a state court considering [petitioner’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [petitioner] seeks was required by the Constitution”); Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234, 110 S.Ct. at 2827 (a “gradual development ] in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree” is a new rule); Graham, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 898 (a case announces a new rule “unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final “would have felt compelled by existing precedent’ to rule in his favor”).. In its most recent new rule case, the Court set forth the following three-pronged approach: In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief, a federal court should apply Teague by proceeding in three steps. First, the court must ascertain the date on which the defendant’s conviction and sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second, the court must [s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed, and determine whether a state court considering [the defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution. Finally, even if the court determines that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule, the court must decide whether that rule falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle. Bohlen, — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 953 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Guided by Teague and the cases it has spawned, we will proceed through the Bohlen formula. Turner’s conviction and sentence became final in 1988, when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari in Turner II. We must therefore determine whether a state court considering Turner’s claims in 1988 would have felt compelled to conclude that the rules he seeks were required by the Constitution. To do this, we address the Commonwealth’s Teague challenges in turn, and we ultimately conclude that Turner does not seek new rules. A. The Applicability of Teague v. Lane to Turner’s Claim that the Commonwealth Applied the Vileness Factor in an Unconstitutional Manner Turner contends that Virginia’s facially vague vileness factor was not constitutionally applied in his case. Specifically, he says that the limiting definitions of “depravity of mind” and “aggravated battery” given to his jury were inadequate because they did not sufficiently cure the vague language of the vile-riess factor. Further, he says the Supreme Court of Virginia, which applied the same limiting construction, did not cure that infirmity with an adequate review of his sentence. He thus seeks the benefit of a rule that a vague aggravating factor must be supplemented with constitutionally sufficient limiting instructions or appellate review. Turner bases his claim on Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), decided eight years before his conviction became final. In Godfrey, the Supreme Court vacated a death sentencé that was based on an aggravating factor virtually identical to Virginia’s vileness factor. ■ God-frey’s jury was instructed only with the bare language of the aggravating factor; the jury did not receive any limiting instructions. Id. at 426, 100 S.Ct. at 1763-64 (plurality opinion). Moreover, on direct review the Georgia Supreme Court, in conclusory fashion, held that the evidence supported a finding of vileness; the court did not provide any limiting construction to narrow the statutory language. • Id. at 427, 432, 100 S.Ct. at 1764, 1766-67 (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion began by noting that the language of the vileness factor was vague: There was nothing in the words “ ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman’ ... standing alone, that implie[d] any inherent restraint” on the jury’s discretion to impose the death penalty. Id. at 428, 100 S.Ct. at 1764-65 (plurality opinion). The plurality observed that the Georgia courts did not cure that vagueness through adequate jury instructions or meaningful appellate review. Id. at 429, 432, 100 S.Ct. at 1765,1766-67 (plurality opinion). In vacating Godfrey’s sentence, the plurality emphasized a central tenet of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: The state “must channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.” Id. at 428, 100 S.Ct. at 1764-65 (plurality opinion) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). We read Godfrey to say that the Eighth Amendment proscribes the imposition of a death, sentence based on avague aggravating factor unless the vague factor has been narrowed by a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction, either at sentencing (in the form of a limiting instruction when a jury is involved) or on appellate review. Not just any limiting construction will do; a constitutionally sufficient one is required. See id. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767 (plurality opinion) (“Thus, the validity of the petitioner’s death sentences turns on whether ... the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional construction of the [vileness factor].”) (emphasis added); Jones v. Murray, 976 F.2d 169, 174 (4th Cir.) (“[W]hen limiting instructions are used to cure a defect in a facially vague statute, the instructions must meet the specificity requirements of Godfrey.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 27, 120 L.Ed.2d 951 (1992); Turner, 753 F.2d at 353 (noting that the “constitutional flaw of Godfrey ” was “the Georgia Court’s failure to give a constitutional construction to the vileness criterion”) (emphasis added). A limiting construction that is itself,too vague leaves a defendant in no better position than the petitioner in God-frey — sentenced on the basis of “ ‘standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision-’ ” Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428, 100 S.Ct. at 1765 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n. 46, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935 n. 46, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). “Vague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are defined by reference to other vague terms.” Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F,2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Godfrey thus dictates Turner’s challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of the limiting instructions given to his jury as well as the appellate review of his sentence. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Stringer v. Black, supra, has recently held that the application of Godfrey did not amount to a new rule for purposes of Teague. Stringer addressed, inter alia, whether Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), announced a new rule under Teague. Cartwright involved an Oklahoma death sentence predicated on two aggravating factors, one of which permitted the imposition of a death sentence if the defendant’s murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (the “heinousness” factor). Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1478. ' Cartwright’s sentencing jury was given a limiting instruction beyond the bare terms of the heinousness factor. Id. at 1488. On direct review, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed after -applying a limiting construction to the facts of Cartwright’s case, focusing on the “manner” in which the murder was committed. See Cartwright v. Oklahoma, 695 P.2d 548, 554 (Okla.Crim.App.1985). That court previously had approved jury instructions similar to those given to Cartwright’s jury. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1487-88. In his habeas petition, Cartwright alleged that the Oklahoma courts applied the heinousness factor in an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad manner in his case. Id. at 1478. Specifically, Cartwright claimed; (1) the language of the heinousness factor was vague, and (2) the Oklahoma courts failed to apply a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction (through jury instructions or on direct review of his sentence) to cure the vagueness. Id. The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed. .See id. at 1479 (“the Oklahoma courts failed to apply a constitutionally adequate narrowing construction in this case”), 1491, 1492. The Tenth Circuit’s decision was predicated on Godfrey. See id. at 1489, 1491. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit. . The Court noted the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the Oklahoma courts had not “adopted a limiting construction that cured the infirmity” of the vague heinousness factor. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 360, 108 S.Ct. at 1857. Significantly, the Court thought the Tenth Circuit “was quite right in holding that Godfrey controls this case.” Id. at 363, 108 S.Ct. at 1858-59. Then, four years after it decided Cartwright, the Court decided Stringer v. Black. In Stringer, the habeas petitioner attempted to rely on Cartwright to challenge the constitutionality of his death sentence. Stringer, — IIS. at ——, 112 S.Ct. at 1133. The State of Mississippi invoked Teague, arguing that the petitioner could not rely on Cartwright because that decision was announced after his conviction became final. Id. The Court thus had to decide whether Cartwright announced a new rule, i.e., whether Cartwright’s challenge was dictated by Godfrey. Id. The Court held: “In applying Godfrey to the language before us 'in [Cartwright ], we did not ‘brea[k] new ground.’ [Cartwright ] was, therefore, for purposes of Teague, controlled by Godfrey, and it did not announce a new rule.” Id. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1135-36 (quoting Butler, 494 U.S. at 412,110 S.Ct. at 1216). Stringer thus teaches that Teague does not bar a habeas petitioner’s invocation of God-frey to challenge the constitutional sufficiency of limiting instructions or appellate review if a state uses a vague aggravating factor. See Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 97 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1331-35 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom. Delo v. Newlon, 497 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 3301, 111 L.Ed.2d 810 (1990); Smith v. Dixon, 766 F.Supp. 1370, 1383-86 (E.D.N.C.1991), aff'd, 996 F.2d 667 (4th Cir.1993), rev’d on other grounds, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.1994) (en bane), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129, — L.Ed.2d—(1994); Jones v. Murray, 976 F.2d 169, 173 (4th Cir.) (both parties agreed that the application of Godfrey was not barred by Teague and therefore we did not have to reach the Teague issue; nevertheless, we indicated that challenges to Virginia’s limiting instructions and appellate review were not barred by Teague), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 27, 120 L.Ed.2d 951 (1992). The similarities between Cartwright and the instant case are striking. Like Cartwright, Turner was sentenced on the basis of a vague statutory aggravating factor. Like Cartwright, Turner’s jury was given a limiting instruction and a limiting construction was applied on appellate review. Like Cartwright, Turner argues that the Commonwealth’s limiting construction was constitutionally insufficient; i.e., it did not cure the infirmity of the aggravating factor and thereby failed to guide adequately the jury’s discretion. And, like Cartwright, Turner’s challenge is predicated on Godfrey. Because Stringer expressly held that Godfrey dictated Cartwright’s claim and thus Cartwright did not seek the benefit of a new rule for purposes of Teague, we are compelled to reach the same conclusion here. In sum, we are satisfied that a state court in 1988 would have felt compelled to conclude that Godfrey and Cartwright dictate the rule or result Turner seeks. (Although Cartwright came down shortly after Turner’s conviction became final, Turner may use that decision because Cartwright did not announce a new rule. See generally Stringer, supra.) The Commonwealth nevertheless emphasizes that before Turner’s conviction became final in 1988, our court, in Turner v. Bass, supra, upheld a limiting construction of the vileness factor that was virtually identical to the limiting instruction given to Turner’s jury and applied on direct review of his sentence. Thus, the argument follows, a Virginia court in 1988 would not have felt compelled to declare unconstitutional the specific limiting construction used in his case. Cf. Graham, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 903. And, relatedly, the argument goes, a decision in Turner’s favor would require the creation of a new rule insofar as it would repudiate Turner v. Bass. See id. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 897. Before we address this argument, we note that Turner challenges "the limiting definitions of two components of the vileness factor, “aggravated battery” and “depravity of mind.” In Turner v. Bass, however, we upheld only a (virtually identical) limiting definition of “aggravated battery”; we did not address the sufficiency of the “depravity of mind” limiting definition. See Turner, 753 F.2d at 353. Thus, were we to accept the Commonwealth’s Teague theory here, at most we would be barred from reviewing the sufficiency of the aggravated battery definition. Turning then to the limiting definition of aggravated battery applied in Turner II, the Commonwealth, on the face of it, appears to have a good argument that Turner seeks a new rule vis-a-vis Turner v. Bass. However, the answer is not so simple. The Commonwealth’s theory focuses on the most specific conclusion or holding Turner hopes we reach: that the limiting definition used in his case was constitutionally insufficient. But we cannot ignore the fact that the principle of law (the “constitutional rule[ ] of criminal procedure,” Teague, 489 U.S. at 316, 109 S.Ct. at 1078 (plurality opinion)) from which Turner seeks to benefit is the extant rule propounded in Godfrey and reaffirmed in Cartwright. Cf. Bohlen, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 955 (in its new rule analysis, the Court focused on the more general rule sought — that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to a noncapital sentencing proceeding — as opposed to the specific holding sought by the petitioner, that his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause). Here, we are asked simply to apply, rather than extend, the Godfrey/Cartwright principle. Cf. Stringer, — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1135. Although “it can be a difficult question whether a particular holding presents simply a new setting for an old rule, or announces a new one,” Graham, — U.S. at ——, 113 S.Ct. at 918 (Souter, J., dissenting), we think the former best characterizes Turner’s claim. Penry v. Lynaugh makes the point. In Penry, the petitioner (Penry) claimed he “was sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was not instructed that it could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence in imposing its sentence.” Penry, 492 U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. at 2941. On collateral review, the' Fifth Circuit had rejected Penry’s claim because his jury was allowed to hear all mitigating evidence (mental limitations and abused childhood). See Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir.1987), aff'd, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). The court nevertheless was concerned that, under the Texas scheme, Penry’s jury was not able to consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence. See generally id. at 920-26. The Fifth Circuit concluded that it could not rule in Penry’s favor, “because 'prior Fifth Circuit decisions have rejected claims similar to Penry’s. These prior panel holdings bar a different holding by us.” Id. at 926 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, granting Penry the relief he sought would have required the Fifth Circuit to overrule its precedents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court first addressed whether Penry’s claim was barred under Teague. See generally Penry, 492 U.S. at 313-19, 109 S.Ct. at 2943-47. One would think this was an easy case; granting Penry the relief he sought seemingly would have required the creation of a new rule insofar as it would have repudiated prior Fifth Circuit decisions. And, with those Fifth Circuit cases in the legal landscape, presumably a state court at the time his conviction became final would not have felt compelled to grant Penry the relief he sought. But the Supreme Court held that Penry’s claim was not Teague-barred: He did not seek a new rule because he simply sought the application (not the extension) of a preexisting rule of law in a new factual setting. See id. at 314-15, 318-19, 109 S.Ct. at 2944-45, 2946-47. [T]he facial validity of the Texas death penalty statute had been upheld in [Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) ] on the basis of assurances that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to enable sentencing juries to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present. Penry argues that those assurances were not fulfilled in his particular case because, without appropriate instructions, the jury could not fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood in rendering its sentencing decision. ... [I]n light of the assurances upon which Jurek was based, we conclude that the relief Penry seeks does not “impos[e] a new obligation” on the State of Texas. Id. 492 U.S. at 318-19, 109 S.Ct. at 2946-47 (emphasis in original) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (plurality opinion)). The Jurek rule created a standard which the Court simply applied to the facts of Penry’s case, i.e., to his mitigating evidence. See Parks, 494 U.S. at 492, 110 S.Ct. at 1262. Despite the fact that the specific holding announced in Penry was novel and repudiated prior Fifth Circuit decisions, Pen-ry’s claim was not Teague-barred because it did not impose a new obligation on the state; the state already was obligated to apply the Jurek standard. Accord Stringer, — U.S. at-, 112 ’S.Ct. at 1135-40 (Court applying the principle announced in God-frey ). Penry thus demonstrates (and Stringer confirms) the critical distinction between the extension of an existing rule on collateral review and the mere application of an existing normative rule (such as Godfrey/Cart-wright) to a new set of facts. Cf. Stringer, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1135. Our court too has recognized this distinction. In West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262 (4th Cir.1991), rev’d oh other grounds, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992), the petitioner raised a sufficiency of the evidence challenge under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The Commonwealth argued that granting the petitioner the relief he sought would have created a new rule in violation of Teague. West, 931 F.2d at 265. Specifically, the Commonwealth noted that, although Jackson v. Virginia came down before petitioner’s conviction became final, a decision in his favor would have required our court to disregard Virginia’s common law permissive inference that one in unexplained possession of stolen goods is the thief. Id. We rejected the Teague challenge: “Obviously, a federal habeas court cannot be said to apply a ‘new constitutional rule’ whenever it applies the Jackson v. Virginia test to a ‘new set of facts in evidence.” Id. at 266. A divided Supreme Court reversed our West decision on the merits after concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the petitioner’s conviction under the Jackson standard; but the Court did not directly address the Teague issue. See generally Wright v. West, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992). However, in her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor, the author of the plurality opinion in Teague, emphasized: “If a proffered factual distinction between the case under consideration and pre-existing precedent does not change the force with which the precedent’s underlying principle applies, the distinction is not meaningful, and any deviation from precedent is not reasonable.” Id. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2497 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy elaborated: If the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications themselves create a new rule. The rule of [Jackson v. Virginia ] is an example. By its very terms it provides a general standard which calls for some examination of the facts.... Where the beginning point is a rule of this general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent. Id. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Graham, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 918 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “[o]ne general rule that has emerged under Teague is that application of existing precedent in a new factual setting will not amount to announcing a new rule”). In sum, when we apply an extant normative rule to a new set of facts (leaving intact the extant rule) generally we do not announce a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure for purposes of Teague. To be sure, Teague is implicated “by the application of an old rule in a manner that was not dictated by precedent.” Stringer, — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 1135; cf. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414-15, 110 S.Ct. at 1217-18. But when a rule provides a standard that of necessity requires a case-by-case examination, generally the results yielded by that application are not “new rules” because those results do not “break[ ] new ground or impose[ ] a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 (plurality opinion); cf. Penry, 492 U.S. at 315, 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2945, 2947 (emphasizing that the application of the pre-existing rule at issue did not impose a new obligation on the state). Rather, the state courts presumably are aware of the pre-existing rule and it is foreseeable to them that the rule is to be applied. Consequently, although comity interests would have us defer to a state court’s determination that a petitioner seeks the expansion or extension of a pre-existing rule, i.e., a new rule, reflexive deference is inappropriate when we are asked to review a state court’s application of that rule to the specific facts of a new case. Otherwise, we would have to say that Teague altered the standard of review on habeas, which the Supreme Court declined to hold in Wright v. West. See West, - — - U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2497 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In Teague, we refused to give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of new rules of law, but we did not create any deferential standard of review with regard to old rules.”); cf. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 239, 110 S.Ct. at 2830 (“Federal habeas corpus serves to ensure that state convictions comport with the federal law that was established at the time the petitioner’s conviction became final.”). We now return to the instant ease. God-frey held that state courts must supplement facially vague aggravating factors with “constitutionally sufficient,” Walton, 497 U.S. at 655, 110 S.Ct. at 3058, limiting instructions or appellate review. Godfrey and Cartwright, like Jackson v. Virginia, set forth “a general standard which calls for some examination of the facts,” West, — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) — namely, examination of the language of the particular limiting instruction or the appellate review at issue. Although the state courts below may have relied on Turner v. Bass, supra, in concluding that the limiting construction of “aggravated battery” given to Turner’s jury and applied on review was constitutionally sufficient, that conclusion is not subject to a deferential standard of review under Teague. To borrow the language from Penry, Godfrey upheld the statutory vfieness factor on the basis of “assurances” that the sentencer’s discretion would be channelled by constitutionally sufficient standards. Turner “argues that those assurances were not fulfilled in his particular case because, without appropriate instructions [or appellate review, his sentencer’s discretion could not be channelled by clear and objective standards]_ [I]n light of the assurances upon which [Godfrey ] was based, we conclude that the relief [Turner] seeks does not ‘imposte] a new obligation’ on the State of [Virginia].” See Penry, 492 U.S. at 318-19, 109 S.Ct. at 2946-47 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1077 (plurality opinion)). In the final analysis, we hold that, in challenging the Commonwealth’s application of its vileness factor in his case, Turner does not “seek[ ] the benefit of a new rule,” Boh-len> — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 953, for purposes of Teague. Accordingly, Teague does not bar us from reaching the merits. B. The Applicability of Téague v. Lane to Turner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Turner claims that his lawyers at the resentencing proceeding rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Although Strickland was decided four years before Turner’s conviction became final, the Commonwealth contends that Turner’s Strickland claims are Teague-barred. The Commonwealth’s Teag-ue challenge is predicated on its view that, “under the facts of this case ‘reasonable jurists reading the case law that existed’ in 1988 could have concluded that defense counsel were not ineffective_” Appellee’s Br. at 9. As noted above, Teague does not mandate deference to á state court’s application of law to fact. See generally Wright v. West, supra. Rather, mixed questions of law and fact are subject to de novo review on habeas. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450-51,. 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). And, whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance is a mixed question' of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. Teague thus does not mandate deference to the Virginia courts’ application of Strickland to the facts of Turner’s case. We therefore reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Teague bars us from reaching the merits of Turner’s various ineffective assistance of counsel claims. III The Commonwealth next contends that Turner procedurally defaulted on most of his claims. First, it says he procedurally defaulted on his challenges to the application of the statutory idleness factor because the Supreme Court of Virginia found these claims procedurally defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (generally, when a habeas petitioner has defaulted on a federal claim in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal review of the defaulted claim is barred); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038,103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). Second, it says he procedurally defaulted on one of his ineffective assistance claims (challenging counsel’s failure to put on mitigating evidence described in the opening statement) because it was never raised in the state courts. See Bas-sette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.1990) (ineffective assistance claims not raised on state habeas are procedurally defaulted) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 297-99, 109 S.Ct. at 1068-69), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 1639, 113 L.Ed.2d 734 (1991). We will address the Commonwealth’s procedural default arguments in turn and ultimately conclude that Turner has not procedurally defaulted on these claims. A. Challenges to the Application of the Vileness Factor Turner challenges the application of the idleness factor in several respects. In overlapping arguments, he says (1) the limiting definitions (instructions) for “aggravated battery” and “depravity of mind” were constitutionally insufficient, (2) the Supreme Court of Virginia’s-direct review of his sentence was inadequate, (3) the facts of the Smith murder do not support the vileness factor, and (4) the Supreme Court of Virginia generally does not provide capital defendants with meaningful appellate review. These various allegations were scattered throughout claims VII and XIV of Turner’s state habeas petition. The Supreme Court of Virginia, on collateral review, held that these claims were procedurally defaulted, stating: Applying the rule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974) ... to the extent allegations numbered VII, VIII, XIV, XV, and XVI in his petition for writ of habeas corpus advance matters not asserted on direct appeal; and, applying the rule in Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970), to allegations [VII, VIII, XIV, XV, and XVI] ... to the extent that they advance matters asserted on direct appeal, the petition for appeal is denied for reasons of procedural default. Turner v. Williams, No. 901335 (Va. Apr. 30, 1991). Slayton generally says that claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, cannot be raised on state collateral review. Slayton, 205 S.E.2d at 682. Hawks has been read to say that claims raised and decided against petitioner on direct review cannot be raised on state habeas. See Hawks, 175 S.E.2d at 274. Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed these claims either because they were raised and decided on direct appeal CHawks) or because they were not raised on direct appeal (Slay-ton). Slayton is a valid procedural default rule. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-39, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2665-69, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). Hawks, however, is not a true procedural default rule; rather, it is more in the nature of a collateral estoppel rule. Hawks cannot prevent federal habeas review of federal constitutional claims properly raised on direct appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-07, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2595-96, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). Thus, we must ascertain whether Turner raised on direct appeal the aforementioned challenges to the application of the vileness factor. If he did, he is not procedurally barred from raising them here. In his brief to the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal, Turner , argued that the murder of Smith was not vile, i.e., that the murder involved neither depravity of mind nor an aggravated battery. He also argued that imposition of the death sentence for the murder of Smith would be disproportionate to the crime when viewed in comparison to other cases where the death sentence was predicated solely on the vileness factor. Moreover, he attacked the vileness factor (and the Virginia death penalty statute) on its face as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. As for the sufficiency of the limiting definitions given to his jury, Turner’s brief on direct appeal contained a subsection entitled: “This Court must adopt stricter standards for defining and applying the vileness aggravating circumstance.” JA 553. In this subsection, Turner argued: This Court should make clear that an aggravated battery must be one which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is much more vile than the minimum necessary to áccomplish the act of murder, and that “depravity of mind” is a- degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement that far surpasses that inherent in the definition of legal malice and premeditation. JA 553-54 (emphases in original). The highlighted portions above represented his suggested modifications to the limiting definitions given to his jury; without those modifications, he argued, the instructions were constitutionally deficient. See Turner, 364 S.E.2d at 488 n. 2 (“Turner argues that we must apply stricter standards for determining ‘vileness’ or else face the risk of having the present standards declared unconstitutional. We reject this argument.”). Finally, as for Turner’s attack on Virginia’s system of appellate review generally, Turner listed as one of ten questions presented on direct appeal: “3. Does this Court provide adequate appellate review of death sentences?” JA 544. Listed as an assignment of error was an allegation “[t]hat the failure of the Virginia courts to afford adequate appellate review of death sentences means that death sentences are being imposed in Virginia in an arbitrary and capricious manner, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” JA 545. In sum, Turner’s various challenges to the application of the vileness factor were raised on direct appeal and therefore the Supreme Court of Virginia (on collateral review) must have dismissed these claims under Hawks, not Slayton. Accordingly, because Hawks does not bar us from reviewing the merits of federal constitutional claims properly raised on direct appeal, we reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Turner is proeedurally barred from raising these claims on federal habeas. B. Ineffective Assistance Challenge We also reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Turner proeedurally defaulted on his ineffective assistance claim arising from counsel’s failure to put on the mitigating evidence described in the opening statement. Turner’s state habeas petition alleged that “[cjounsel failed to present mitigating evidence ... despite defense counsel’s opening statement to the jury that several witnesses would testify on Mr. Turner’s behalf.” JA 591. The state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing in part to address counsel’s failure to put on mitigating evidence. After the hearing, Turner submitted to the court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, wherein he argued that the “broken promises made by Mr. Snook to the jury in his opening statement” were “independently prejudicial.” JA 1315. He continued: “We cannot but conclude that to promise even a condensed recital of such powerful evidence, and then not produce it, could not be disregarded as harmless. We find it prejudicial as [a] matter of law.” Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1988) (emphasis added). In that case, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of habeas corpus based on facts nearly identical to those here. Id.; see also JA 1397. The Commonwealth responded to this argument in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. JA 1432 (¶26). Then, in his (habeas) Petition For Appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Turner argued: Even if counsel knew that he could keep his promises (as Mr. Snook could not have known), it still would be “prejudicial as [a] matter of law” to “promise even a condensed recital of such powerful evidence, and then not produce it.” Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1988). JA 1595-96 (footnotes omitted). In an accompanying footnote, Turner noted that “[ojther courts have found counsel ineffective based in part on the failure to deliver evidence promised in opening statements.” JA 1596. We conclude that Turner has fairly presented this ineffective assistance claim in the state collateral proceedings and therefore hold that he is not barred from raising it on federal habeas. Having concluded that Turner’s claims are not proeedurally barred, we now turn to the merits. rv As noted above, Turner raises numerous challenges to the application of the vileness factor, several of which are interrelated. He first says the jury instructions inadequately defined the vileness factor. More particularly, he says that the limiting definitions for “aggravated battery” and “depravity of mind” were constitutionally insufficient. The jury was instructed that “an aggravated battery is a battery which qualitatively and quantitatively is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.” JA 517-P. The jury also was instructed that “depravity of mind is a degree of moral turpitude and and [sic] psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.” JA 517-Q. The court further defined malice and premeditation. Turner says that these definitions are incomprehensible and that they fail to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. See Arave v. Creech, — U.S.—,—, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) (the language of a limiting construction must be determinate and “must ‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty’ ” (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983))). We have on several occasions upheld limiting definitions that were identical or virtually identical to those challenged here. See, e.g., Jones, 976 F.2d at 174—75 (holding that identical limiting definitions of depravity of mind and aggravated battery “were specific and provided adequate guidance to the jury” as required by Godfrey). Recognizing that “the proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision,” Walton, 497 U.S. at 655, 110 S.Ct. at 3058, we believe the limiting definitions here are sufficiently clear and objective. And, as we have previously observed, the limiting definitions adequately narrow the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty because a juror of ordinary sensibility would not find that all murders involve depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. “The instructions clearly direct the jury away from that result by requiring that something extra be present, i.e., either force greater ‘than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder’ or ‘a degree of psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.’ ” Jones, 976 F.2d at 174-75. We therefore reaffirm our prior holdings, which we think are amply supported by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Creech. In Creech, the death sentence was based in part on Idaho’s utter disregard factor: “[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life.” — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1538 (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987)). Idaho had adopted a limiting construction, whereby the utter disregard factor was “meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.” Id. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1539. The Supreme Court held that this construction satisfied constitutional requirements. Id. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1541. Surely the limiting construction applied in Turner’s case is as clear and objective as, and satisfies the narrowing requirement as well as, the construction upheld in Creech. See also Walton, 497 U.S. at 654, 110 S.Ct. at 3057-58 (upholding Arizona court’s limiting construction which said a murder was “especially cruel” if “the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim’s death,” with mental anguish including “a victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate”) (internal quotation marks omitted); compare Shell v. Mississippi, 554 So.2d 887, 905-06 (Miss.1989), rev’d per curiam, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (holding unconstitutional a limiting construction of Mississippi’s heinousness factor); Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1488, aff'd, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (holding .unconstitutional a limiting construction of Oklahoma’s heinousness factor). Turner also claims that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s appellate review of his sentence was inadequate because that court “allowed the death sentence to stand even though ... the crime was less culpable than the conduct in other death penalty cases or in many cases in which the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.” Appellant’s Br. at 50. He further “argues that the Virginia system does not provide capital defendants meaningful appellate review, even in cases in which the results appear arbitrary.” Id. at 57. However, because we have held that the Virginia courts applied a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction for the vileness factor in Turner’s ease, it is clear from the Supreme Court’s cases that these additional claims carry no constitutional weight. For instance, in Walton, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the state court’s limiting construction and then disposed of arguments similar to those raised by Turner here: Walton nevertheless contends that the heinous, cruel, or depraved factor has been applied in an arbitrary manner and, as applied, does not distinguish his case from cases in which the death sentence has not been imposed. In effect Walton challenges the proportionality review of the Arizona Supreme Court as erroneous and asks us to overturn it. This we decline to do, for we have just concluded that the challenged factor has been construed by the Arizona courts in a manner that furnishes sufficient guidance to the senteneer. This being so, proportionality review is not constitutionally required, and we “lawfully may presume that [Walton’s] death sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly’ imposed—and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” 497 U.S. at 655-56, 110 S.Ct. at 3058-59 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306, 308, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1774-75, 1775, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (“Our decision in Walton thus makes clear that if a State has adopted a constitutionally narrow construction of a facially vague aggravating circumstance, and if the State has applied that construction to the facts of the particular case, then the ‘fundamental constitutional requirement’ of ‘channeling and limiting ... the senteneer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty,’ has been satisfied.” (citation omitted) (quoting Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 362, 108 S.Ct. at 1858)); Creech, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1544 (“our decisions do not authorize review of state court cases to determine whether a limiting construction has been applied consistently”). In any event, the Supreme Court of Virginia’s review of Turner’s sentence was adequate. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to trigger the vileness factor. See Turner, 364 S.E.2d at 488-89. Moreover, pursuant to Virginia law, the court determined that the sentence (1) was not “imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,” and (2) was not “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Id. at 490 (quoting Va.Code Ann. § 17-110.1(0 (Michie 1992)). The court conducted a proportionality review based on the records of all Virginia capital felony cases and found that Turner’s murder was “just as brutal” as the murders in other cases where the death sentence was imposed. Id. The court concluded “that juries in this jurisdiction generally approve of the death penalty for offenses comparable to the murder committed by Turner.” Id. at 491 (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196, 203 (1987) (“vileness” found in murder of store employee shot three times during struggle with robber; Barnes held “that a killing inflicted by multiple gunshot wounds may constitute an ‘aggravated battery’ ... where there is an appreciable lapse of time between the first shot and the last, and where death does not result instantaneously from the first”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 763, 98 L.Ed.2d 779 (1988)). In short, the Supreme Court of Virginia “plainly undertook its proportionality review in good faith,” and “[t]he Constitution does not require us to look behind [its] conclusion.” Walton, 497 U.S. at 656, 110 S.Ct. at 3058. Turner’s general attack on the Virginia system of appellate review is equally unpersuasive; the Virginia system does provide for meaningful review and its results are fairly consistent. Turner’s final claim is that, even if the vileness factor has been constitutionally-defined, the facts of his case do not fit within that factor, ie., the vileness factor does not apply to him. A challenge to a state court’s application of an aggravating factor, however, raises primarily a question of state law: “[F]ederal habeas review of a state court’s application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating circumstance is limited, at most, to determining whether the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.” Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780, 110 S.Ct. at 3102. “A state- court’s finding of an aggravating circumstance in a particular case ... is arbitrary or capricious if and only if no reasonable senteneer could have so concluded.” Id. at 783, 110 S.Ct. at 3103. The “standard of review is the ‘rational factfinder’ standard established in Jackson v. Virginia.” Id. at 781, 110 S.Ct. at 3101— 02; see also Creech, — U.S. at—, 113 S.Ct. at 1544; Richmond v. Lewis, — U.S. —,—, 113 S.Ct. 528, 536, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). We conclude that a rational senteneer could have found that the murder of Smith involved either depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. Turner emphasizes that his murder cannot possibly be considered an aggravated battery because he rapidly fired two successive shots into Smith’s chest, either one of which may have been fatal. However, Turner shot Smith in the head before he fired the two shots into Smith’s chest. And, between the shot to the head and the shots to the chest, enough time elapsed for Officer Bain to talk to Turner and for two customers to escape from the store. As the Supreme Court of Virginia emphasized on direct review in Turner I: “After being wounded [in the head] by Turner, Smith slumped helplessly behind the counter. Unlike Godfrey’s victims, Smith did not die instantaneously from a single discharge of a firearm.” Turner, 273 S.E.2d at 45. Thus, a rational factfinder could have found an aggravated battery here and therefore we reaffirm our conclusion in Turner I, where “[w]e rejected] Turner’s contention that his crime was not so vile as to justify the imposition of death.” Turner, 753 F.2d at 353. In sum, we hold that the vileness factor was constitutionally applied in Turner’s ease. V Turner contends that his appointed lawyers, J. Lloyd Snook, III and Thomas L. Woodward, Jr., rendered ineffective assistance. He challenges Snook’s assistance in six respects: (1) his investigation of mitigating evidence, (2) his supervision and preparation of the mental health expert, (3) his failure to interview prosecution witnesses, (4) his informing the venire that a prior jury sentenced Turner to death for the same crime, (5) his failure to present any mitigating evidence, and (6) his failure to put on the evidence described in the opening statement. We evaluate ineffective assistance claims under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, supra. Under Strickland, an ineffective assistance claim has two components. First, defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. Second, defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. When