Full opinion text
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. Keith Crenshaw, Timothy McGruder, and Kamil Johnson were convicted of murder in aid of racketeering and sentenced to imprisonment for life without release. They appeal their convictions, arguing that the evidence against them, which consisted mostly of the testimony of their gang leader, his relatives, and the defendants’ putative get-away driver, was insufficient to support their convictions. They also contend that the statute under which they were convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000), is unconstitutional because it overreaches Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Crenshaw also contends that the district court erred in allowing evidence of his past crimes. We affirm. On July 20, 1996, in St. Paul, Minnesota, four-year old Davisha Brantley-Gillum was returning home from a day at a neighborhood festival, Rondo Days, in a car with her mother and several other women and children. They stopped at an Amoco filling station to put air in the tire of their car. The driver of the car, Lashawn Slay-den, was associated with a gang called the Bogus Boys, and two cars full of Bogus Boys had also pulled into the Amoco lot. Some men standing behind a fence at the edge of the Amoco property began shooting into the car where Davisha was sitting. A bullet passed through Davisha’s head and killed her. Police were unable to solve the crime until August 23, 2001, when police arrested Terrón (“Rico”) Williams, and indicted him for a ten-year conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack, which exposed him to a sentence of thirty years to life imprisonment. Williams was the leader of the St. Paul branch of the Rolling 60s Crips, a Los Angeles-based street gang. He had joined the Rolling 60s Crips as a teenager in California. He came to Minnesota in 1987 to work in the Rolling 60s’ drug business there, and rose to head the local organization, which grew to around 200 people, selling up to ten kilos of cocaine a month. Williams’s brother and lieutenant, Greg (“Baby G”) Hymes, was also arrested and indicted, on a charge exposing him to about fifteen to twenty years in prison. Williams gave a statement to the police naming Crenshaw, Johnson, and McGru-der as the people who were involved in the Davisha Gillum case. Williams also named Maalik Harut, who then confessed to police that he had been the get-away driver and who named the defendants in this case as the other participants. Harut was charged with conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, which carries a maximum ten-year sentence. Williams, Hymes, and Harut entered plea agreements in which the government agreed to move for reductions in their respective sentences if they testified truthfully in the prosecution of the defendants in this case. Crenshaw, Johnson and McGruder were indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, for committing murder in aid of racketeering activity. Section 1959 provides: (a) Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished- (1) for murder, by death or life imprisonment, or a fine under this title, or both .... (Emphasis added). The state law alleged to have been violated was Minn.Stat. § 609.185, subd. (a), which provides: Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life: (1) causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another .... At trial, the chief dispute was the identity of the shooters. The primary evidence linking Crenshaw, Johnson, and McGruder to the crime was the testimony of Terrón Williams; his brother, Greg Hymes; their sister, Diane Williams; Hymes’s fiancee, Lavern Christopher; and Maalik Harut. Even Harut has family ties with Terrón Williams, since Williams has either one or two children -with Harut’s sister. Terrón Williams identified McGruder and Johnson as Rolling 60s members and Crenshaw as a hanger-on, or someone who was “around us... all the time.” Williams testified that the Rolling 60s were involved in hostilities with the Bogus Boys and that Williams had issued an order for all Rolling 60s members to shoot Bogus Boys on sight and shoot to kill. Williams, Hymes, Diane Williams, and Christopher all testified that the three defendants, together with Harut, showed up at Greg Hymes’s apartment (either inside the apartment or in the parking lot) after the shooting and bragged about having shot at the Bogus Boys. Diane Williams, Hymes, and Christopher said the defendants bragged that they had stood on something and shot at Bogus Boys through a fence. According to Terrón Williams, the four thought they had hit someone because they heard screaming. Diane Williams and Terrón Williams also testified that at least two of the defendants came to a party in downtown St. Paul later the same night and continued bragging. Harut testified that on the night of July 20, 1996, he had been driving around with the three defendants, looking for Bogus Boys. When they spotted some Bogus Boys at the Amoco station, Harut drove down Sherburne Avenue, behind the station. He waited in the car on Sherburne Avenue while the other three ran between some houses toward the Amoco station. He heard shots and the other three came back to the car saying, “We shot them.” McGruder expressed disappointment that his gun didn’t shoot. Harut drove away. He turned down an alley, where he believed the defendants dumped one or two of the guns. There were three eyewitnesses to the shooting and two eyewitnesses to the getaway, but none of them ever identified any of the three defendants as the shooters. Indeed, two eyewitnesses to the shooting, Jayne Sommerfeld and Michael Biebl, picked other people’s photographs out of photo spreads. Sommerfeld was not shown a photo spread that contained pictures of any of the defendants. Biebl viewed a photo spread that contained pictures of McGruder and Crenshaw, but he picked out another man-as looking like one of the shooters and he picked out Terrón Williams as someone he had seen that night. Two eyewitnesses said that the shooters were six feet tall or 6'1". There was evidence that Johnson is 5'7", and Crenshaw’s lawyer argued to the jury (who saw Crenshaw at trial) that Cren-shaw is no more than 5'7". The only physical evidence was the gun casings and bullets found at the scene. There were casings and bullets from at least two different guns. One set was likely to have come from a Heckler and Koch .38 caliber pistol, which is a very rare gun. Kamil Johnson’s girlfriend, Patricia Banks, had such a gun until it disappeared from her apartment sometime in 1996. Banks testified that Johnson stayed at her home and would have had access to the gun. (Greg Hymes testified that he also dated Patricia Banks.) Maalik Harut testified that in the summer of 1996 he had seen Johnson with the Heckler and Koch gun. Harut said he had seen Johnson give the gun to “Six-six,” a senior member of the Rolling 60s. Harut said that Johnson was eager to get the gun back because he had taken it from his girlfriend’s home, and that Johnson later told Harut he got the gun back. The bullet that killed Davisha Gillum matched Black Talon ammunition that police found at Banks’s apartment. Black Talon is a rare type of ammunition that a friend gave Banks for use in the Heckler and Koch gun. On this evidence, the defendants were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without release. I. McGruder and Johnson argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1959 is unconstitutional both facially and as applied because the regulated activity lacks the requisite connection to interstate commerce. Johnson filed a motion in the district court to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 1959 is unconstitutional. McGruder did not join the motion in the district court, but raises the constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal. Thus, we review Johnson’s constitutional claim de novo, see United States v. Gary, 341 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir.2003), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 1128, 157 L.Ed.2d 949, 2004 WL 47213 (Jan. 12, 2004) (No. 63-7814), but technically should consider McGruder’s appeal under the “plain error” standard, see United States v. Letts, 264 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 908, 122 S.Ct. 1211, 152 L.Ed.2d 148 (2002). The anomaly of considering the same issue under two different standards of review is immaterial because our conclusion is the same under either standard. Congress enacted § 1959 to complement the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, by making it a federal crime to commit violent acts for the purpose of maintaining or increasing one’s position within a RICO enterprise. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 380-81 (2d Cir.1992). Section 1959 limits the definition of enterprise to entities “engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). The statute does not require the violent acts themselves to have any connection to interstate commerce other than that they were committed for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a position within the enterprise. We first note that the “as applied” constitutional challenge raised by McGruder and Johnson is really not a constitutional objection at all, but is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict. The defendants argue that, even if the statute is facially constitutional, this particular application of the statute is unconstitutional because there was not proof of a sufficient connection between the murder and interstate commerce. However, the connection to interstate commerce was explicitly presented to the jury as one of the elements in the government’s case. Thus, “a claim of an insufficient connection to interstate commerce is a challenge to one of the elements of the government’s case and is therefore considered a claim about the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir.2001). We will consider in section II.B.(3) whether there was adequate proof that the enterprise was engaged in or its activities affected interstate commerce. In them facial challenge to § 1959, McGruder and Johnson rely primarily on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of one section of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A). The Court summarized the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and identified three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under that clause: 1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 2) the instrumen-talities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though a particular threat may come only from intrastate activities; and 3) those activities that “substantially affect[]” interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Court ultimately-concluded that § 922(q) implicated the third category, but struck down the statute because the government failed to establish that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce. In particular, the Court noted that gun possession was not inherently related to “commerce” and that § 922(q) did not contain a jurisdictional element to ensure, on a case-by-case basis, that the unlawful activity affected interstate commerce. Id. at 561-62, 115 S.Ct. 1624; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (striking down a portion of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994). The defendants argue that Lopez requires us to strike down § 1959 because the regulated activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Initially, we must determine whether the substantial effects test even applies to § 1959. The government argues that the jurisdictional element contained in § 1959 renders the test unnecessary because it ensures that the enterprise in each case is engaged in or affects interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). Although Lopez and Morrison acknowledge that the presence of a jurisdictional element lends support to the facial constitutionality of a statute, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62, 115 S.Ct. 1624; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740, those cases do not suggest that a jurisdictional element obviates the need for applying the substantial effects test. Nor do we read those cases to say that the presence of a jurisdictional element per se demonstrates that a statute meets the substantial effects test. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (“[A] jurisdictional element would lend sttpport to the argument that [the challenged statute] is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce....”) (emphasis added). But see United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 717 (2d Cir.1997) (“The substantial effect requirement is satisfied when criminal statutes contain a jurisdictional element....”). Indeed, the district court in this case instructed the jury that it need only find that the enterprise had a “minimal” effect on interstate commerce in order to convict the defendants. Requiring the government to prove a minimal effect on interstate commerce in particular cases does not seem adequate by itself to establish that the regulated activity on the whole “substantially affects” interstate commerce. Cf United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2001) (“Allowing the government to meet the interstate commerce requirement [in a prosecution under federal arson statute] through only a nominal showing of a connection to interstate commerce would do as much to ‘completely obliterate’ the distinction between national and local authority as if no jurisdictional requirement existed at all.”) cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1058, 122 S.Ct. 1920 (2002). The fact that § 1959 sometimes may be applied to enterprises “engaged in” interstate commerce also does not make the substantial effects test inapplicable. We have recognized that the use of language similar to “engaged in, or the activities, of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce” indicates that Congress intended a statute to extend to the outer limits of the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir.1995) (“The phrase ‘in or affecting commerce’ is a term of art that indicates a congressional intent to invoke the full extent of its commerce power.”). Lopez illustrates that when Congress nears the outer limits of its power under the Commerce Clause by regulating intrastate activity that may only “affect” interstate commerce, courts must apply the substantial effects test. Thus, a statute containing the “engaged in, or the activities of which affect” language can survive intact only if it satisfies the substantial effects test. See United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 717 (2d Cir.1997) (applying substantial effects test to § 1959). Wé conclude that the activity regulated by § 1959 substantially affects interstate commerce. The connection between mira state acts of violence committed by RICO enterprises and the enterprises’ interstate commerce activity seems difficult to deny. It is well-established, for example, that drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to allow for regulation by Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir.1998) (“Our circuit has held that intrastate drug activity affects interstate commerce and that Congress may regulate both intrastate and interstate drug trafficking under the Commerce Clause.”); United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir.2000) (describing RICO narcotics trafficking and money laundering offenses as “economic activities that in the aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate commerce”). It seems equally clear that criminal enterprises use violence or the threat of violence in connection with their commercial activities; indeed, a simple review of facts from RICO cases reveals numerous examples. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir.2001) (describing how gang members would assault any non-member who attempted to sell crack); United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 203-04 (1st Cir.1998) (leader of a gang involved in illegal gambling operations, extortion, and other illegal conduct ordered members of his gang to murder non-members who had threatened the gang’s dominance); see also S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 304, repainted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3483 (describing murder and other violent crime as an “integral aspect of membership in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity”). The regulation of violent acts committed as an aspect of membership in RICO enterprises therefore represents one method for Congress to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the enterprises themselves. The jurisdictional element in § 1959 further illustrates the connection between interstate commerce and the activity regulated by the statute. First, it ensures that the enterprise in each case is at least minimally connected to interstate commerce. In addition, the jurisdictional element demonstrates a fundamental difference between § 1959 and the statutes struck down in Lopez and Morrison. The Court struck down the gun possession statute in Lopez largely because it was “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (“The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States”). By contrast, Congress here is regulating activity by gangs and other “enterprises” that are by definition engaged in or have an effect on interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). The fact that this particular provision of the statute deals with the groups’ intra state violent activities does not change the overall inter state character of the regulation. See United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.Sd 579, 588 (8th Cir.2002) (upholding § 1959 against Tenth Amendment challenge and explaining, “RICO criminalizes the furthering of the enterprise, not the predicate acts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 123 S.Ct. 2112, 155 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003); S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 305, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484 (“[T]he need for Federal jurisdiction [over violent acts committed by members of a RICO enterprise] is clear, in view of the Federal Government’s strong interest, as recognized in existing statutes, in suppressing the activities of organized criminal enterprises.... ”). We uphold § 1959 as a permissible exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and reject the constitutional challenges made by McGruder and Johnson. II. Next, we consider the defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. For the most part, the defendants do not contend that there is a lack of evidence, but rather that the inculpatory evidence is too flawed to support their convictions. The defendants argue that the government’s key witnesses on the issue of identity stood to gain by inculpating the defendants, either because the witnesses were themselves hoping for a sentence reduction or because they hoped to benefit Hymes and Williams. The defendants also argue that the identity witnesses’ testimony was so riddled with inconsistencies that their testimony is unsubstantial. A. The principles governing our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction are laid out in two Supreme Court cases. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), stated the substantial evidence standard, laying out both the quantum of evidence required and the method for evaluating the evidence on appeal: “It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of witnesses. The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Id. at 80, 62 S.Ct. 457. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-20, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), made clear that in a criminal case, substantial evidence means evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In habeas review of a state conviction, the Court held that constitutional due process “protects an accused against conviction except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 313-14, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Justice Stewart explained that the Jackson standard was not new, but was consistent with that stated in Glasser. 443 U.S. at 318-19 & n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 2781. In particular, the methodology for evaluating the evidence was unchanged by Jackson: [T]his inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Even though Glasser and Jackson agree that a reviewing court is not to weigh evidence or judge credibility, the court must nevertheless evaluate the evidence to assure that it rises to the minimum level described in Jackson. “Although ordinarily witness credibility is left completely to the jury and is beyond appellate review, we must reverse a conviction if no reasonable person could believe the incriminating testimony.” United States v. Watson, 952 F.2d 982, 988 (8th Cir.1991) (citations omitted); accord United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir.1978) (quoting with approval statement that “Appellate review of credibility is prohibited absent extraordinary circumstances.”). The test for rejecting evidence as incredible is extraordinarily stringent and is often said to bar reliance only on testimony asserting facts that are physically impossible. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.1985) (testimony must assert “facts that [the witness] physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature”); United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1063, 123 S.Ct. 613 (2002); United States v. White, 219 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir.2000) (same); United States v. Hernandez, 13 F.3d 248, 252-53 (7th Cir.1994) (“impossible under the laws of nature for the occurrence to have taken place at all”). Testimony does not become legally unsubstantial because the witness stands to gain by lying; the defendant is entitled to cross-examine such witnesses to expose their motivations, and it is up to the jury to decide whether the witness is telling the truth despite incentives to lie. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966), the conviction depended upon the testimony of Partin, an informer who received both money and clemency for his cooperation. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Partin’s testimony was constitutionally inadmissible because he had motives to lie: “The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury.” Id. at 311, 87 S.Ct. 408; accord, e.g., United States v. Reeves, 83 F.3d 203, 206-07 (8th Cir.1996) (upholding convictions that depended on the testimony of three admitted co-conspirators who had been given reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony); United States v. Lopez, 42 F.3d 463, 466-67 (8th Cir.1994) (upholding convictions based on testimony of a paid informant who had been granted immunity from prosecution). In particular, testimony of accomplices, who often hat pating someone else substantial because interest. We have ¡ plices, who often have an interest in inculpating someone else, is not rendered insubstantial because of the witnesses’ self-interest. We have stated the rule: “[T]he uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it is not otherwise incredible or unsubstantial on its face.” United States v. Resnick, 745 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 599 F.2d 832, 838 (8th Cir.1979) (emphasis added)); accord United States v. Stelivan, 125 F.3d 603, 607 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 13 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Wilkerson, 691 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir.1982); Caton v. United States, 407 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1969) (“The testimony of an accomplice is not necessarily incredible because he expects or hope to receive a lessened penalty or dismissal of the charges against him for turning state’s evidence.”). We are aware of one case in which a witness’s self-interest may have played a role in our holding that inculpating testimony was unsubstantial. In United States v. Waterman, 704 F.2d 1014, 1017-18 (8th Cir.1983), we reversed a mail fraud conviction arising out of an arson for profit scheme. The conviction and several others were supported by the testimony of Gamst, who participated in most of the arsons. However, one count was based on Gamst’s testimony that Waterman told him Waterman had “torched” his girlfriend’s house and had received $17,000 in insurance from the fire. The house had burned, but the company paid out only about $14,000 and did not find evidence of arson. We reversed the conviction on that count because “[t]he only evidence linking Waterman to the fire came from Gamst, whose testimony was, at best, only marginally probative.” Id. at 1018. We held that Gamst’s testimony was not substantial evidence. Although we did not say so in our opinion, our holding was consistent with the common-law rule that a defendant’s out-of-court admissions after the crime are not sufficient to support a conviction unless every element of the crime is corroborated by other evidence. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-91, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); United States v. Todd, 657 F.2d 212, 216 (8th Cir.1981). This rule of law arose from the concern that “the zeal of the agencies of prosecution to protect the peace, the self-interest of the accomplice, the maliciousness of an enemy or the aberration or weakness of the accused under the strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of the confession.” Opper, 348 U.S. at 89-90, 75 S.Ct. 158 (emphasis added). In other words, unsworn confessions have so little probative value and are so easily manufactured by a self-interested witness that we do not even entrust the jury with assessing them unless they are corroborated. Gamst’s recounting of Waterman’s out-of-court admissions was not corroborated and therefore was insufficient as a matter of law to support Waterman’s conviction. Thus, the self-interest of the witness, though not enough in itself to render testimony incredible, combined with extremely low probative value of the testimony to render the testimony unsubstantial according to a common-law rule. Defendants often suggest in particular cases that inconsistencies within the witness’s testimony or between the testimony and the witness’s earlier statements render the testimony incredible on its face. E.g., Stelivan, 125 F.3d at 607; Wilkerson, 691 F.2d at 427 & n. 2. In what may be the high watermark for this kind of argument, the Eleventh Circuit once reversed a conviction that depended entirely on the testimony of the victim about whether she was transported across a state line without her consent. In United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 546-47 (11th Cir.1983), the court said: “Miss Tamara Kay Goshern is the sole witness to lack of consent. Regardless of what she says, her every act and deed, as she described them, shout that when she drove the car across the Florida state line she did it voluntarily.” This court has neither rejected nor espoused Chancey, but we have distinguished it. See United States v. Wright, 340 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Hernandez-Orozco, 151 F.3d 866, 869-70 (8th Cir.1998). Regardless of whether Chancey could be harmonized with our Circuit’s cases assessing sufficiency of the evidence, its holding is limited to the rare case in which there is nothing but a witness’s conflicted testimony to support the conviction. In discussing claims that inconsistencies fatally undermined a verdict, we have identified numerous factors that make it reasonable to uphold a verdict despite inconsistencies in testimony. For instance, where the inconsistencies did not go to the heart of the witness’s testimony regarding guilt or innocence, we have held that the witness’s testimony remains “substantial” despite collateral inconsistencies. See, e.g., United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 865 (8th Cir.1987) (witness’s inconsistencies regarding dates of events “were not such major flaws that his testimony was unbelievable”); Wilkerson, 691 F.2d at 427 (inconsistencies “do not seriously undermine” conclusion of guilt). Where other evidence corroborated the testimony under attack, the testimony remained “substantial” despite the inconsistencies. See, e.g., United States v. Eagle Elk, 658 F.2d 644, 647 (8th Cir.1981). Where the witness’s inconsistency could actually be reconciled by interpretation or other reasonable explanation, whether to resolve the apparent conflict or reject the testimony was up to the jury. United States v. Crow, 148 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir.1998) (jury was entitled to “resolve any contradictions in the evidence.”). Where the inconsistency was an omission in one version of the story, rather than an outright contradiction, we have upheld the conviction. See Stelivan, 125 F.3d at 607 n. 4. We have frequently placed importance on the defendant’s opportunity to expose to the jury the inconsistency between a witness’s trial testimony and earlier inconsistent statements. E.g., Stelivan, 125 F.3d at 607 n. 4. See United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir.1999) (“An argument that a witness was incredible as a matter of law is weakened when the defendant cross-examined the witness concerning the alleged lies or inconsistencies and the judge instructed the jurors on the degree of suspicion they should hold .... ”). Thus, in considering the defendants’ attacks on the testimony of the witnesses against them, we pay particular attention to whether other evidence supports the testimony in question, whether the alleged inconsistencies are collateral or central to the elements of the crime, whether the inconsistencies are amenable to explanation, and whether they have been exposed to the jury. Using these guideposts, this case falls well within the zone of evidentia-ry sufficiency. B. The elements of murder in aid of racketeering activity are: (1) there was an enterprise; (2) the enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which includes dealing in controlled substances; (3) the enterprise was engaged in'or its activities affected interstate or foreign commerce; (4) the defendant committed murder; and (5) the defendant committed the murder for a statutorily listed purpose, in this case, for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing his position in the enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1959. We consider the sufficiency of the evidence to prove each element in turn. 0) McGruder argues that there was insufficient evidence that there was an enterprise. The existence of an enterprise “is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). We have identified three characteristics which an enterprise must have: a common purpose shared by the individual associates; some continuity of structure and personnel; and structure distinct from that inherent in the racketeering activity alleged. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir.1987). The distinct-structure element can be shown by patterns of retaliation and intimidation undertaken to protect and defend the enterprise’s business and associates, see United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.1997), and by regular training, oversight, and coordination of associates, see United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507,1520-21 (8th Cir.1995). The evidence at trial showed that the Rolling 60s Crips were a local unit of a larger organization based in California. The Rolling 60s were known among themselves and among others as a “gang.” They engaged in the business of selling cocaine. Membership was ordinarily earned by being “jumped in,” that is, by participating in a formal fight with an established gang member in front of witnesses. There was a hierarchy of members, ranging from the senior “OG’s” or “Inner Circle,” down through the “little homeys” or “shorties.” Members had gang names which were coded to reveal their standing within the gang and their relationship with other members. For instance, the protege of a senior member would take that member’s name, with the prefix “Little.” Members were subject to rules, including the mandatory retaliation rule, which required every member to actively avenge any injury offered a gang member by anyone from another gang. The silence rule required members not to divulge gang activities, or as Greg Hymes put it, “[Njever tell on nobody.” Members gained status or “stripes” by fighting for the gang. If a member failed to fight when duty required, he was subject to punishment by the gang. The St. Paul Rolling 60s were headed by Terrón Williams, who dominated the gang from about 1990 until (at least) the time of his arrest for drug crimes in 2001. Terrón Williams held regular meetings for the membership, which became so large that they had to be held at a football stadium, where up to 200 people would gather to take instruction about the gang’s business and discipline, put money together to buy more drugs, and form social relationships. The gang’s leadership also had meetings, for which Terron’s sister Diane would fix barbecue. There is overwhelming evidence that the Rolling 60s Crips had continuity of leadership and membership, that the members shared a common purpose of selling drugs, and that they engaged in mutual defense and in collateral instructional, organizational, and social activities to support the gang’s business and its continued existence. There was abundant proof that there was an “enterprise” in this case. (2) No one challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that the St. Paul Rolling 60s Crips were engaged in racketeering activity, and there is ample evidence that they sold crack cocaine for at least fourteen year’s. (3) The interstate commerce jurisdictional element of § 1959 is contained in the definition of enterprise, which refers to a legal entity or association “which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). There was proof at trial of actual transactions in interstate commerce, including evidence that the cocaine the Rolling 60s sold in St. Paul, up to ten kilos per month, came from Louisiana and California. Terrón Williams testified that he obtained the cocaine by sending couriers to fetch it or through the mail. This evidence is sufficient to show that the enterprise was engaged in activities that affected interstate commerce. See United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 772-73 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc); United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 253 (D.C.Cir.1997). Johnson argues that the murder, rather than other activities of the enterprise, must be shown to have affected interstate commerce. This is not what § 1959 says. It only requires that the enterprise be engaged in or affect interstate commerce, not that the murder must do so. The murder must, in turn, bear the relationship to the enterprise described in the statute. We conclude below that the murder in this case arose from the defendants’ desire to achieve entrance to or greater status within the enterprise. See section II.B.(v), infra. This proof satisfies the requirements for conviction under § 1959. See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948, 122 S.Ct. 2639, 153 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 538 (6th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 930, 122 S.Ct. 292 (2001); United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 117-19 (2d Cir.2000). We dealt with the constitutional argument of whether Congress could enact § 1959 pursuant to its Interstate Commerce power in section I, supra. (4) All three defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence to show that they were the people who committed the murder. There are three sorts of evidence connecting the defendants to the murder: the testimony of those who heard them bragging about shooting at the Bogus Boys the night of July 20, 1996; the testimony of Maalik Harut that he drove them to Sherburne Avenue, waited for them there, and then drove them away; and the evidence that Johnson had access to the Heckler and Koch gun that was likely to have been the murder weapon. All three defendants contend that the failure of the eyewitnesses to identify the defendants in or out of court renders the government’s case insufficient. There is no requirement of eyewitness identification to support a conviction. The defendants were able to expose to the jury that the eyewitnesses failed to identify the defendants and that two of the eyewitnesses picked out other people from photo spreads, even though one witness viewed a spread that contained pictures of McGruder and Crenshaw. The government countered with the argument that Anthony Shelby, one of the people identified, was in the hospital at the time of the shooting. The government also argued to the jury that Shelby and Michael Odell Johnson, another person picked out of the photo spreads, bore strong resemblances to McGruder. Only the jury could resolve these fact questions and we may not disturb its finding. Crenshaw and Johnson also stress the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Michael Biebl and Randy Crooms, that the men they saw were 6' or 6'1" tall, whereas Johnson is 5'7". Crenshaw’s lawyer also argued to the jury that Crenshaw was “probably five-foot-seven, if that.” The government tried to explain Biebl’s testimony by pointing out that he saw the shooters as they were standing on something behind the fence. At any rate, we may not reverse a conviction because eyewitnesses estimated the shooters were a height that does not match the height of the defendants. The jury could have concluded that the eyewitnesses were mistaken about the men’s height. Johnson argues that another eyewitness, Erik Saari, told police that the shooters appeared to hold the guns in their right hands, whereas Johnson is left-handed. Saari did not even testify at trial, and the jury apparently did not place importance on his statement as reported by another witness. The government also contends that Biebl said he saw a silver gun with a black grip, and for him to have seen the color of the grip from his vantage point indicates that the shooter holding the Heckler and Koch must have been left-handed. This possible conflict depends on inferences from vague testimony and it was for the jury to choose between the witnesses or to reconcile their stories. All three defendants argue that the witnesses whose testimony linked them to the crime were biased or had a personal interest in inculpating them. Terrón Williams, Greg Hymes, and Maalik Harut all were counting on their assistance to the government in this case to induce the government to plea bargain and to move to reduce their sentences. Diane Williams was sister to Terrón Williams and Hymes, and Lavern Christopher was Hymes’s fiancee. Each had powerful incentives to inculpate the defendants whether or not the defendants were guilty. The defendants argued as much throughout the trial, from beginning to end. Yet, as we have discussed at length in section II.A. above, the fact of the witnesses’ bias and self-interest does not make their testimony incredible or unsubstantial as a matter of law. The district court instructed the jury to consider the witnesses’ self-interest resulting from plea bargains and their desire to obtain sentence reductions by their testimony. The court also interrupted Harut’s testimony to caution the jury: “This gentleman is a snitch.” We are flatly prohibited from discarding their testimony on the grounds of bias and interest alone when the jury has seen fit to accept some or all of it. See, e.g., Reeves, 83 F.3d at 206-07; Lopez, 42 F.3d at 466-67. McGruder also argues that the witnesses’ testimony was inconsistent with each other. The inconsistencies he points out do not go to the heart of their testimony, but are instead minor discrepancies about events some six years before trial or else are subject to an explanation reconciling the inconsistencies. For instance, he argues that Greg Hymes said Maalik Ha-rut had also shot at the Bogus Boys, but Hymes explained that he merely assumed Harut had been shooting with the others. Crenshaw also draws our attention to inconsistencies: First, he points out that Terrón Williams, Diane Williams, and Maalik Harut have inconsistent stories about how and where Terrón Williams learned that the defendants shot at the Bogus Boys. Terrón Williams said he was in the parking lot of the Hanover Town-homes the night of July 20 when the defendants and Harut pulled up and told him about the shooting at the Amoco. Diane Williams said that at the time the defendants walked into Greg Hymes’s apartment at Hanover, Terrón Williams was still at Diane’s apartment in Woodbury, waiting for a ride. Diane said she informed Terrón about the shooting at a party downtown later that night. Maalik Harut testified that Terrón Williams was present inside Greg Hymes’s apartment in Hanover when Harut and the three defendants entered and told of the shooting. An inconsistency about how Terrón Williams learned of the shooting does not go to the heart of anyone’s testimony connecting the defendants to the murder. Crenshaw also argues that Harut’s testimony about the order and timing in which he drove various places the night of July 20 is impossible, since the various trips he described would have taken too much or too little time to put him at the crucial places at the times he claimed he was there. Again, these discrepancies do not prove that Harut could not have been at the Amoco at 10:45, the time of the shooting, and so they provide no basis for reversing-the conviction. Crenshaw also contends that testimony of Terrón Williams’s wife, Twana, shows signs of having been concocted. It is enough to say that the convictions do not depend on Twana Williams’s testimony, since Twana did not claim to have heard any admissions by the defendants. The defendants do point out three inconsistencies that are not collateral, but go directly to defendants’ guilt for murder in aid of racketeering activity. First, Maalik Harut testified before the grand jury that he did not believe Johnson had a gun the night of July 20 and that he did not see guns that night. At trial, Harut said Johnson did have a gun that night. Second, on August 23, 2001, when he was arrested for drug dealing, Terrón Williams told police that Johnson was not a member of the Rolling 60s in 1996. At trial, Terrón Williams said Johnson was a member in 1996. Third, Diane Williams and Lavern Christopher both told police in 1997 that two men came to the Hanover apartments and bragged about a shooting; they did not mention Johnson’s name at that time. At trial, of course, both women said four men came to the apartment and one was Johnson. The testimony at trial on each of the points at issue is corroborated by evidence other than the testimony of the witness who made an inconsistent statement. First, there is evidence other than Harut’s testimony that Johnson did have a g-un on July 20. Testimony of the government’s firearms expert Kurt Moline, gave rise to a reasonable inference that the bullet that killed Davisha Gillum was fired from a Heckler and Koch ..38 caliber. Patricia Banks testified that she had such a gun, that Johnson had access to it, and that it disappeared from her apartment sometime in 1996. One of the eyewitnesses to the shooting said one of the shooters had a silver gun with a black handle. Banks’s gun was silver with a black handle grip. At least two guns were fired at the Amoco, and several witnesses said they heard McGruder complain that his gun had jammed. Terrón Williams, Diane Williams, Gregory Hymes and Lavern Christopher all testified that Johnson bragged about having shot at the Bogus Boys. Johnson’s lawyer cross-examined Harut about the inconsistency in his statements about whether Johnson had a gun, and the lawyer argued the point in closing, thus highlighting it for the jury twice. Second, Harut corroborated Terrón Williams’s testimony that Johnson was a member of the Rolling 60s. Moreover, on scrutiny, the alleged inconsistency is not about whether Johnson was associated with the Rolling 60s, but only about his status within the gang. Johnson’s lawyer cross-examined Harut and Williams about whether Johnson was a “wannabe” or a full member. Their apparent admission that Johnson was a “wannabe” is not inconsistent with the conclusion that Johnson was shooting at Bogus Boys in obedience to Williams’s “shoot on sight” order. Third, Diane Williams and Lavern Christopher’s story that four men, rather than two men, came to the Hanover Apartments bragging about shooting the Bogus Boys is corroborated by abundant evidence that three men participated in the shooting and one drove get-away. Michael Biebl said he saw three men participate in the shooting. Randy Crooms said he saw three people running between houses to get to the car waiting for them on Sher-burne, and the three were tucking guns into their waistbands. Crooms said that when the three got in the passenger side and back seats, the car took off. Harut said that Johnson was in his car that night and that Johnson ran through the yards to the Amoco station and, after the gunshots sounded, returned with the others. Johnson’s lawyer brought out on cross-examination and in closing that Diane Williams and Lavern Christopher had first told police only two people came to the apartment bragging. Johnson’s lawyer also made the point on closing that none of Terrón Williams’s family mentioned Johnson as having been involved until after Terrón Williams had been arrested. In sum, each of the three assertions that was the subject of inconsistent earlier statements was corroborated by other evidence and was pointed out to the jury. One of the claimed inconsistencies, about whether Johnson was a full member or a “wannabe,” was not crucial to a determination of guilt. Accordingly, the inconsistencies give us no warrant to disturb the jury’s verdict. Finally, we observe that this is not a case like United States v. Waterman, 704 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir.1983), in which the conviction hinged solely on evidence of the defendants’ out-of-court admissions to another. These convictions are supported by the testimony of Harut, the get-away driver, that he and the defendants were driving around looking for Bogus Boys, that they found Bogus Boys at the Amoco station, that Harut pulled around the corner and let the defendants out, that gunshots resounded, and that the defendants came running back to the car. Also helping to establish identity of the shooters was the evidence tending to link Johnson to the Heckler and Koch .38 caliber. There was sufficient evidence of the identity of the shooters to sustain the jury’s verdict. (5) The defendants contend that there was not sufficient evidence that they committed the murder with the intent requisite under § 1959. Section 1959 covers violent crimes committed either in hope of pecuniary gain from an enterprise or for the purpose of achieving acceptance or promotion within the enterprise. There was a great deal of general testimony that fighting the Rolling 60s enemies was a way of achieving acceptance and status within an extremely hierarchical organization. Members gained “stripes” by fighting for the gang, and everyone was expected to participate in avenging injuries to other Rolling 60s members. Failure to stand and fight led to discipline or expulsion. There was also particular testimony that the Rolling 60s rank and file had been ordered to carry out a war against the Bogus Boys. The Bogus Boys were moving in on Rolling 60s territory. The Bogus Boys had stolen Terrón Williams’s cars and had shot at him in his yard. In the summer of 1996, the problem with the Bogus Boys was discussed at the Rolling 60s meetings, and Terrón Williams had issued a “shoot on sight” order. Williams testified that Johnson and McGruder were members of the Rolling 60s and that Crenshaw had previously been a member of two other gangs, but had begun associating with the Rolling 60s after becoming acquainted with a Rolling 60s “OG,” Roosevelt Sanders. Maalik Harut said that on the night of the shooting, he and the defendants were driving around looking for Bogus Boys. Harut said all three defendants had guns. When they saw two cars full of Bogus Boys at the Amoco, Harut let the defendants out of the car on a street behind the station, and they ran through yards toward the station. The blue Cadillac in which Davisha Gillum sat was driven by the girlfriend of a Bogus Boy, and the shooters rained a barrage of fire at the car, not only killing Davisha, but wounding her mother and another woman. There were six bullet holes in the car, one bullet in the trunk, and the seventh bullet, which killed Davisha Gillum, had to have gone in the window. Moreover, as soon as the shooting was over, the defendants reported the shooting, with apparent elation, to the Rolling 60s hierarchy, Terrón Williams and Greg Hymes. This supports the inference that the defendants were seeking to gain status by committing acts of violence against their gang’s enemies. There was ample evidence from which a jury could infer that, if Crenshaw, Johnson and McGruder were the shooters, they shot with intent to gain status or admission in the Rolling 60s. III. Johnson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We review the district court’s denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Placensia, 352 F.3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir.2003). The standard for granting a new trial is not as stringent as that for granting acquittal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. United States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir.2003). The district court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government in considering a new trial motion. United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir.2002). A district court may not grant a new trial unless the evidence “weighs heavily enough against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Placensia, 352 F.3d at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir.1980) (“serious miscarriage of justice”). “Motions for new trials based on the weight of the evidence are generally disfavored.” Campos, 306 F.3d at 579. The district court’s authority to grant a new trial should be exercised “sparingly and with caution.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have examined the evidence scrupulously in addressing Johnson’s argument that the evidence was insufficient. In particular, we have scrutinized the evidence of the identity of the shooters. We acknowledge that the only physical evidence, that concerning the Heckler and Koch pistol, does not definitively tie Johnson to the crime, since the testimony established only a probability that a Heckler and Koch was used in the shooting and there was only circumstantial evidence that Johnson had the gun that night. The other evidence linking Johnson to the crime was the testimony of witnesses who had reasons of self-interest for inculpating Johnson and the other defendants. Further, of those witnesses, at least Maalik Harut and Terrón Williams were criminally responsible for the murder. Lavern Christopher and Diane Williams initially told police that they heard only two people confess to the crime, neither of whom was Johnson. Moreover, all of the witnesses who inculpated Johnson have shown a willingness to lie. Nevertheless, the district court, not we, viewed the testimony, and it denied the motion. See Ortega v. United States, 270 F.3d 540, 547 (8th Cir.2001) (district court is in best position to determine whether verdict is against the weight of the evidence). Notwithstanding all the weaknesses that we have explored, there was a considerable amount of evidence that, if believed, connected Johnson to the crime. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Johnson was not entitled to a new trial. IV. Crenshaw argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of two of his prior convictions, a 1994 conviction for reckless endangerment with a firearm and a 1995 conviction for second-degree assault. Evidence of the prior crimes was admitted on two separate occasions during the trial. First, immediately prior to the conclusion of the government’s case, the government offered as an exhibit a certified copy of Crenshaw’s 1995 guilty plea to the second-degree assault charge. Second, during the cross-examination of Cren-shaw’s primary alibi witness, Twanda McCoy, the government was permitted to ask questions about both the 1994 and 1995 convictions. Crenshaw’s counsel objected on both occasions. The government argues that the 1995 conviction is relevant to Crenshaw’s motive or intent in committing the alleged acts in this case and therefore relevant under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Alternatively, the government contends that the questions posed to McCoy about the 1994 and 1995 convictions were proper for showing her bias by demonstrating that she had stayed loyal to Cren-shaw despite his numerous acts of violence. At trial, the district court relied on Fed.R.Evid. 611 in admitting this line of cross-examination; however, the district court’s Rule 611 ruling was apparently influenced by the fact that the evidence of the 1995 conviction had already been admitted under Rule 404(b). A. We will first consider the admissibility of the prior crimes evidence under Rule 404(b). We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 277 (8th Cir.1996). While we have interpreted Rule 404(b) to be a rule of inclusion, see United States v. Sykes, 977 F.2d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir.1992), this interpretation does not give the government the unhindered ability to introduce evidence of prior crimes. Instead, the evidence of prior crimes must be 1) relevant to a material issue; 2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the charged crime; 3) supported by sufficient evidence; and 4) such that its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. See United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir.2002). The district court never clearly articulated the basis upon which it admitted the certified copy of Crenshaw’s 1995 conviction during the government’s casein-chief. Before trial, the government had offered a variety of hypothetical uses under Rule 404(b) for this evidence, but gave no concrete reason for admission. The district court appropriately reserved its ruling on admissibility until the government actually tried to introduce the evidence at trial. The district court also informed the government that, before using the evidence at trial, it would need to identify a basis under Rule 404(b). At trial, the government successfully introduced evidence of Crenshaw’s incarceration for the 1995 conviction during the testimony of one of its witnesses, Sergeant Thomas Dunaski, stating that the evidence was necessary to show that Crenshaw became close to Roosevelt Sanders, a Rolling 60s member, while they were in prison together. However, the government agreed to some limitation on its use of this evidence and did not attempt to introduce the conviction itself during the examination of Sergeant Dunaski. It was not until the end of the government’s case-in-chief that it finally offered a certified copy of the 1995 conviction, to explain “the sentence [Crenshaw] was serving at Faribault just prior to his release.” The district court admitted this evidence over Crenshaw’s objection without requiring the government to articulate a reason under Rule 404(b). On appeal, the government argues that the 1995 conviction is relevant under Rule 404(b) to the issue of motive because Crenshaw met and formed a relationship with Rolling 60s gang member Roosevelt Sanders while serving time for that conviction, and this relationship led to Cren-shaw’s eventual involvement with the gang. To the extent the district court admitted the 1995 conviction under Rule 404(b) on the basis of its relevance to Crenshaw’s motive, we conclude that the court abused its discretion. We recognize that Cren-shaw’s incarceration in 1995 is marginally relevant to his motive for committing the alleged acts in this case; indeed, it would be difficult for the government to establish Crenshaw’s involvement in the Rolling 60’s gang without evidence of the relationship that Crenshaw and Sanders developed while in prison. However, there is a significant difference between admitting evidence of events occurring during a defendant’s incarceration and admitting evidence of the criminal activity giving rise to that incarceration. The former has some probative value in a case such as this one; the latter seems purely prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 956 F.2d 1388, 1397 (7th Cir.1992) (affirming admission of evidence of prior imprisonment when used to explain defendant’s motive in selling cocaine, explaining, “The chance that t