Full opinion text
MESKILL, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants Gary and Maryanne Ehrlich (the Ehrlichs) experienced an ordeal that few airline passengers have the misfortune to endure. While traveling from Baltimore, Maryland to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) to catch a connecting flight to London, the Ehrl-ichs’ plane suffered an abnormal landing. On approaching JFK, their aircraft overshot the runway and was abruptly stopped by an arrestor bed before the plane would otherwise have plunged into the waters of nearby Thurston Bay. According to the Ehrlichs, both appellants sustained physical and mental injuries during the course of that incident. They subsequently commenced an action to recover damages for those injuries pursuant to the international treaty commonly known as the Warsaw Convention. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (entered into force in the United States in 1934) (Warsaw Convention), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 note. Defendants-appellees American Airlines, Inc. (American Airlines), American Eagle Airlines, Inc. (American Eagle), and Simmons Airlines, Inc. (Simmons Airlines) (collectively the airline defendants) moved for partial summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,. Amon, J., granted their motion on the ground that they could not be held liable under the Warsaw Convention for mental injuries that were not caused by physical injuries. See Ehrlich v. American Airlines, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21419, at *10 — *11 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002). This appeal asks us to resolve whether passengers can hold carriers liable in accordance with the Warsaw Convention for mental injuries that accompany, but are not caused by, bodily injuries. For the reasons that follow, we hold that they may not and affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment. BACKGROUND On May 8, 1999, Gary and Maryanne Ehrlich boarded American Eagle Flight No. 4925 in Baltimore, Maryland. They intended to travel to JFK, where they were scheduled to connect to an American Airlines flight to London. When their flight reached JFK, the plane approached the airport at a high rate of speed, overshot its designated runway, and was abruptly stopped from potentially plunging into Thurston Bay by an arrestor bed. The passengers subsequently evacuated that aircraft by jumping approximately six to eight feet from its doorway. The Ehrlichs contend that they suffered bodily injuries during the course of both the abnormal landing and the ensuing evacuation. Gary Ehrlich allegedly sustained knee injuries, while Maryanne Ehrlich purportedly sustained injuries to, inter alia, her neck, back, shoulder, hips, and right knee. Since the abnormal landing, Maryanne Ehrlich has also allegedly developed hypertension and a heart problem. In addition to these bodily injuries, the Ehrlichs further contend that they sustained mental injuries. According to the evidence presented to the district court, both Gary and Maryanne Ehrlich suffered from a fear of flying after the accident. Moreover, Gary Ehrlich apparently experienced nightmares after which he awoke in the middle of the night recalling the abnormal landing and evacuation. Similarly, Maryanne Ehrlich reports that she periodically has trouble sleeping as a result of the accident. On September 27, 1999, the Ehrlichs commenced the instant action against American Airlines, American Eagle, and Simmons Airlines in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, in an effort to recover damages for their aforementioned physical and psychological injuries. After deposing the Ehrlichs, the airline defendants moved for partial summary judgment. They asked the district court to dismiss the Ehrlichs’ claims for mental injuries on two grounds. First, the airline defendants argued that the Ehrlichs had failed to prove that they had sustained such injuries. Second, the airline defendants contended that, even if the Ehrlichs had suffered those injuries, the damages in question did not flow from their bodily injuries and that carriers were liable under the Warsaw Convention only for psychological injuries that were caused by bodily injuries. The Ehrlichs vigorously opposed that motion. They argued that they had, in fact, sustained mental injuries. They also took the position that carriers could be held hable under the Warsaw Convention as long as a mental injury accompanied a physical injury, regardless of whether the two distinct types of injuries shared a causal relationship. Finally, although they never filed a formal cross-motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the matter, the Ehrlichs asked the court to grant them partial summary judgment on the issue of carrier liability. In essence, the Ehrlichs argued that, under the International Air Transport Association Inter-carrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (Intercarrier Agreement), the airline defendants were strictly liable for damages up to the equivalent of $140,000 and that the airlines bore the burden of proving that they had taken all necessary measures to avoid damages sustained in excess of that sum. The district court heard oral argument on May 31, 2001, at which time the court granted the Ehrlichs’ so-called “cross-motion” for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Intercarrier Agreement. Ehrlich, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21419, at *3. However, the court initially reserved decision on the airline defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. In June 2002, after further considering the issue, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the airline defendants. See id. at *1. On reviewing the applicable case law, the court determined that, “[ujnder the Warsaw Convention, a plaintiff may only recover for emotional damages caused by physical injuries.” Id. at *10. This proved to be a critical conclusion, as the court found that the Ehrlichs had offered no evidence demonstrating a causal connection between their mental and physical injuries. Id. at *10 — *11. Because the district court concluded that the Ehrlichs had “not raised a genuine issue of fact regarding a causal connection between their alleged bodily injuries and their mental suffering,” the court granted the airline defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the Ehrlichs could “not recover for their emotional trauma resulting solely from the aberrant landing and evacuation.” Id. at *11. Shortly thereafter, the Ehrlichs sought to certify the issue for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court denied their motion and set a trial date for the remaining Warsaw Convention issues pertaining to liability for bodily injuries. However, the parties managed to resolve those issues before trial. On October 31, 2002, the Ehrlichs stipulated to the discontinuance of their action with prejudice against American Airlines and Simmons Airlines. At the same time, American Eagle filed an Offer of Judgment in which it presented the Ehrlichs with the opportunity to take a judgment in the amount of $100,000 against that airline. Several days later, the Ehrlichs accepted American Eagle’s offer on the condition that their acceptance was “without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to appeal from” the order of partial summary judgment. The district court issued a Judgment that conformed to both American Eagle’s offer and the Ehrlichs’ conditional acceptance thereof. The court entered a judgment in the amount of $100,000 against American Eagle in complete satisfaction of the Ehrlichs’ claims for bodily injury. The court also entered a judgment in favor of the airline defendants pursuant to its earlier order granting their motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the Ehrlichs’ claims for mental injuries; the judgment entered by the district court was expressly without prejudice to the Ehrl-ichs’ right to appeal from that partial summary judgment decision. This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion for partial summary judgment, Juliano v. Health Maintenance Org. of New Jersey, 221 F.3d 279, 286 (2d Cir.2000), but we only undertake to do so when, as here, a final decision has rendered the case appealable. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 313 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.2002). Similarly, “[t]he proper interpretation of the Warsaw Convention is an issue of law, which we review de novo.” Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir.2000). II. The Warsaw Convention System The Ehrlichs seek to hold American Eagle liable for their mental injuries pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. As we exhaustively explained more than a decade ago, [t]he Warsaw Convention was drafted when the airline industry was in its infancy. It was the product of two international conferences — the first held in Paris in 1925 and the second in Warsaw in 1929 — and four years of work by the interim Commité International Technique d’Experts Juridique Aériens (CI-TEJA) formed at the Paris Conference. The Convention had two primary goals: first, to establish uniformity in the aviation industry with regard to “the procedure for dealing with claims arising out of international transportation and the substantive law applicable to such claims,” as well as with regard to documentation such as tickets and waybills; second — clearly the overriding purpose — to limit air carriers’ potential liability in the event of accidents. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir.1991) (Lockerbie) (internal citations omitted). Over time, the Warsaw Convention fostered a system of liability consisting of a series of laws, treaties, and individual contracts that governs the international transportation of persons, baggage, and goods by air. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir.2001); Wallace, 214 F.3d at 296. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention itself sets forth the conditions pursuant to which an air carrier “can be held liable for injuries to its passengers.” Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180, 180 (2d Cir.1991). If a passenger’s injuries fall within the scope of Article 17, he “is either entitled to recovery under the Convention or not at all.” Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir.2003). The Ehrlichs contend that, under Article 17, passengers may hold carriers liable for their mental injuries whenever they sustain physical injuries regardless of whether their psychological damages were caused by bodily injuries. However, these arguments implicate not only the Warsaw Convention itself but also the most recent addition to its derivative liability regime, namely the treaty commonly referred to as the Montreal Convention, see Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999 (entered into force on Nov. 4, 2003) (Montreal Convention), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 (2000), and, to a more significant extent, the negotiations that led to the adoption of that treaty. In the proceedings below, the Ehrlichs sought to support their interpretation of Article 17 by relying, in no small measure, on the views expressed by various delegates at the International Conference on Air Law held in Montreal, Canada (Montreal Conference) in May 1999; the delegates at the conference negotiated and signed the Montreal Convention. However, although President Clinton submitted the Montreal Convention to the Senate for ratification on September 6, 2000, see President’s Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air with Documentation, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.2013 (Sept. 11, 2000), the district court refused to give authoritative weight to the statements of the Montreal Conference delegates because the Senate had not ratified the Montreal Convention when the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the airline defendants. See Ehrlich, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21419, at *6 n. 2. As the district court correctly acknowledged, “[a]n unratified treaty has no force until ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.” Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Int’l Swiss Inv. Corp., 895 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir.1990)). Cf. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 162 (2d Cir.2003) (“A State only becomes bound by — -that is, becomes a party to — a treaty when it ratifies the treaty.”). After the district court arrived at its decision, the legal landscape on which the Warsaw Convention once stood changed dramatically. Shortly before the parties in this appeal appeared for oral argument in August 2003, the Senate ratified the Montreal Convention on July 31, 2003. See 149 Cong. Rec. S10,870 (daily ed. July 31, 2003). The Montreal Convention was designed to “enter into force on the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification” with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Montreal Convention, arts. 53(5), (6). On September 5, 2003, after we heard oral argument in this appeal, the United States deposited the applicable instrument of ratification. See Press Statement, United States Department of State, Ratification of the 1999 Montreal Convention (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://unvw.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/psl2003/ 23851pf.htm; Press Release, United States Department of Transportation, United States Ratifies 1999 Montreal Convention, Putting Treaty Into Effect (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://www.dot.gov/ affairs/dotl0303. him. As the thirtieth nation to ratify the treaty and to deposit an instrument of ratification with the ICAO, the United States triggered the conditions set by Article 53 of the Montreal Convention. See Press Release, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensation for Accident Victims Set to Enter Into Force (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://umw.icao.int/icao/en/nr/ 2003lpio20031k.htm. In accordance with Article 53(6), the Montreal Convention therefore entered into force on November 4, 2003. See Media Note, United States Department of State, Entry Into Force of the 1999 Montreal Convention (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http:llwww.state.gov/rl pa/prs/ps/2003/25920.htm; see also International Civil Aviation Organization, Treaty Collection, at http://unm.icao.int/icao/ en/leb/ mtl99.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2004) (explaining that the Montreal Convention entered into force on Nov. 4, 2003). In light of these events, we must consider what role, if any, the Montreal Convention and its negotiating history should play in this appeal. Despite its ratification and entry into force, we conclude that the Montreal Convention does not govern the appeal at bar and that we need not give the views expressed by various delegates at the Montreal Conference, especially to the extent that these views relate solely to the Montreal Convention itself, dispositive weight. Ordinarily, a particular treaty does not govern conduct that took place before the treaty entered into force. See Chubb & Son v. Asiana, Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307 n. 4 (2d Cir.2000) (where the actions giving rise to a lawsuit took place in 1995, Montreal Protocol No. 4 did not affect the case despite the Senate’s subsequent ratification of the protocol on September 28, 1998); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 28, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (Vienna Convention) (“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.”); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 322(1) (1987) (same). In this instance, the accident that gave rise to the Ehrlichs’ lawsuit took place on May 8,1999, and they commenced their action against the airline defendants on September 27, 1999. These events oe-curred several years before the Senate ratified the Montreal Convention and before that treaty entered into force. As such, neither the Montreal Convention nor the intentions of its drafters govern this appeal. Although the shared expectations of the contracting parties to the Montreal Convention are not dispositive in the instant appeal, we see no reason why we should turn a blind eye to the views expressed by various delegates at the Montreal Conference where they shed light on the Warsaw Convention. The minutes of the Montreal Conference recorded statements by a delegate from the United States as well as statements from delegates who represented countries that also were parties to the Warsaw Convention. To the extent that these statements may help us better understand the way in which sister signatory nations and our own government’s Executive Branch interpret Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, we may employ such useful secondary sources to ascertain the appropriate meaning of Article 17. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alitalia Airlines S.p.A., 347 F.3d 448, 457 (2d Cir.2003). III. Article 17 of The Warsaw Convention The Ehrlichs contend that, under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, air carriers are liable for mental injuries that accompany, but are not caused by, bodily injuries. The district court disagreed with that proposition and held that the Ehrlichs could “only recover for emotional damages caused by physical injuries.” Ehrlich, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21419, at *10. To determine whether the district court properly construed the reach of the Warsaw Convention, we must interpret that treaty and ascertain the meaning of Article 17. The English translation of Article 17, as employed by the Senate when it ratified the Warsaw Convention in 1934, provides that: The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 49 Stat. at 3018. In Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552-53, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991), the Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of this provision and held that carriers could not be held liable under Article 17 for mental injuries that did not accompany bodily injuries. However, the Court “express[ed] no view as to whether passengers [could] recover for mental injuries that [were] accompanied by physical injuries.” Id. at 552, 111 S.Ct. 1489. To address the issue presented by this appeal, we must reach the question left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Floyd. We need to construe the Warsaw Convention and determine whether carriers may be held liable under Article 17 for mental injuries that accompany, but are not caused by, bodily injuries. In the proceedings below, neither the Ehrlichs, American Eagle, nor the district court addressed the meaning of the language of Article 17 with sufficient specificity. However, after reviewing that provision in accordance with the proper canons of treaty interpretation, we conclude, for reasons that are somewhat different from those of the district court, that Article 17 allows passengers to bring a Warsaw Convention action against air carriers to recover for their mental injuries but only to the extent that they flow from bodily injuries. A. Plain Meaning of Article 17 “When interpreting a treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If the words of the Warsaw Convention are “‘reasonably susceptible of only one interpretation,’ our task of interpretation ends there.” Brink’s Ltd. v. South African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1027 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, 900 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir.1990)). “Where the language of such an international treaty is plain, a court must refrain from amending it because to do so would be to make, not construe, a treaty.” Commercial Union Ins. Co., 347 F.3d at 457. “Because the only authentic text of the Warsaw Convention is in French,” we must first examine the French text of that treaty in order to understand its provisions. Floyd, 499 U.S. at 535, 111 S.Ct. 1489. When read in French, Article 17 provides as follows: Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de morte, de blessure ou de toute autre lésion corpo-relle subie par un voyageur lorsque l’accident qui a causé le dommage s’est produit á bord de l’aéronef ou au cours de toutes opérations d’embarquement et de débarquement. 49 Stat. at 3005. Although the Ehrlichs contend that nothing in Article 17 precludes carriers from being held liable for mental injuries that accompany, but are not caused by, bodily injuries, that argument ignores the phrase “dommage sur-venu en cas de ... lésion corporelle.” This phrase translates as “damage sustained in the event of ... bodily injury.” 49 Stat. at 3018. At least one court, on analyzing the meaning of these words in English, concluded that such language requires a claim for damages under Article 17 to “be predicated upon some objective identifiable injury to the body.” Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 399, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 109, 314 N.E.2d 848, 856 (1974) (emphasis added). In Rosman, the New York Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff could recover under the Warsaw Convention only for the mental anguish that she suffered “as a result of’ a physical injury because such anguish “would have flowed from the ‘bodily injury.’” Id., 34 N.Y.2d at 399, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109, 314 N.E.2d at 856-57. According to that court, “[o]nce th[e] predicate of liability — the ‘bodily injury’ — is established, then the damages sustained as a result of the ‘bodily injury’ are compensable including mental suffering.... [0]nly the damages flowing from the ‘bodily injury,’ whatever the causal link, are compensable.” Id., 34 N.Y.2d at 399-400, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109, 314 N.E.2d at 857. If we were free to construe Article 17 without any reference to its French legal meaning, we might find the Rosman Court’s analysis to be sufficient. However, to interpret Article 17 properly, we must initially consider the French legal meaning of the phrase “dommage survenu en cas de ... lésion corporelle.” See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985). We must do so “not because we are forever chained to French law by the [Warsaw] Convention,” but rather because it is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties. We look to the French legal meaning for guidance as to these expectations because the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists. Id. (emphasis added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The “mainstream view” adhered to by courts that have addressed the scope of Article 17 and considered the issue before us “is that recovery for mental injuries is permitted only to the extent the [emotional] distress is caused by the physical injuries sustained.” In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 1999 (Lloyd v. American Airlines), 291 F.3d 503, 509 (8th Cir.) (Lloyd), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 974, 123 S.Ct. 435, 154 L.Ed.2d 331 (2002); see also Ligeti v. British Airways PLC, 2001 WL 1356238, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2001); Alvarez v. American Airlines, 1999 WL 691922, at *3-*5 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 1999); Longo v. Air France, 1996 WL 866124, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996); Wencelius v. Air France, 1996 WL 866122, at *1 (C.D.Cal. Feb.29, 1996); Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F.Supp. 654, 663-68 (N.D.Cal.1994); In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1986, 778 F.Supp. 625, 637 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (Ospina), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.1992); Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F.Supp. 1152, 1155-58 (D.N.M.1973); Rosman, 34 N.Y.2d at 395-400, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106-10, 314 N.E.2d at 854-57. Only two district courts have adopted a contrary interpretation of Article 17. See In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas on June 1, 1999, 118 F.Supp.2d 916, 918-21 (E.D.Ark.2000) (Little Rock), rev’d, Lloyd, 291 F.3d at 509-11; In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1991, 954 F.Supp. 175, 179 (N.D.Ill.1997) (Roselawn). Most of the foregoing cases, like the district court below, did not consider the text of Article 17 to any significant degree. “It seems elementary to us,” however, “that the language employed in Article 17 must be the logical starting point” for any effort to interpret the Warsaw Convention. Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1975). One significant decision among the aforementioned cases did engage in a measure of textual analysis. The mainstream position is “widely attributed” to Jack v. Trans World Airlines, a case decided by a district court in the Northern District of California. See Lloyd, 291 F.3d at 509. However, the Ehrlichs rely on Jack to contend that the phrase “dommage sur-venu en cas de ... lésion corporelle” does not refer to a causation requirement. In Jack, the district court considered whether the plaintiffs could hold carriers liable under the Warsaw Convention for mental injuries that were not caused by bodily injuries. When the court read Article 17, it concluded that the provision did “not state that [emotional distress] damages must be caused by the bodily injury.” Jack, 854 F.Supp. at 665. Instead, the court noted that Article 17 provided “that the carrier is liable for ‘damage sustained in the event of ... bodily injury,’ ” and held that “[e]ausation is not implied in the French phrase ‘dommage survenu en cas.’ ” Id. (citing 2 Grand Larousse De La Langue Francaise 1392 (Librairie LaRousse 1991) (defining “dommage”); 6 Grand Larousse De La Langue Francaise 5864 (Librairie LaRousse 1991) (defining “survenir”)). Despite this conclusion, the district court eventually determined that plaintiffs could recover under Article 17 for emotional distress only where such injuries flowed from physical injuries. Id. at 668. Although we agree, for reasons that will soon become apparent, with the Jack Court’s ultimate conclusion, we reject the court’s incomplete textual interpretation of Article 17. The manner in which the Jack Court construed the words “dommage sur-venu en cas” is certainly a plausible one. However, several considerations lead us to conclude that the French text of Article 17 is equally susceptible to a contrary interpretation. First, whereas the Jack Court examined the definitions of the words “dommage” and “survenu” and determined that neither word implies causation, we are far less certain that the word “survenu” does not refer to some measure of causation. One of the simplest methods “of determining the meaning of a phrase appearing in a foreign legal text” is “to consult a bilingual dictionary.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 536, 111 S.Ct. 1489. However, such dictionaries offer several different meanings for the verb “survenir,” some of which can be understood to impart an element of causation and some of which cannot. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s French-English Dictionary 336 (2000) (defining “survenir” as “to occur, to take place” as well as “to arrive (unexpectedly)”); Collins Robert Unabridged French-English English-French Dictionary 884 (5th ed.1998) (defining “survenir,” inter alia, as to “arise”); Cas-sell’s French-English English-French Dictionary 705 (1962) (defining “survenir” as “[t]o arrive or happen unexpectedly; to befall; to drop in”); see also In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 733 F.Supp. 547, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (“In this Court’s own survey of French-English dictionaries, ‘surve-nir’ was found to be most frequently translated as ‘to happen,’ ‘to arise,’ or ‘to arrive unexpectedly.’ ”), aff'd, Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1280-82. In Lockerbie, we noted that we were “convinced that the proper translation” of the words “ ‘dommage survenu’ ” was “‘damage sustained.’” 928 F.2d at 1281. Nevertheless, we also indicated that, “[wjhatever the shades of meaning in the word ‘survenu,’ ” the way in which the Warsaw Convention uses that term in Article 17 refers to some measure of causation. See id.; see also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1988, 932 F.2d 1475, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1991) {Korean Air Lines Disaster) (“[T]he Article 17 phrase ‘liable for damages sustained’ strongly implies that the carrier’s responsibility ... extends only to the reparation of loss resulting from the death or injury of passengers.”) (emphasis added). Cf. Ospina, 778 F.Supp. at 637 (“[T]he French legal meaning of the phrase ‘dommage sur-venu’ could not apply to mental injury alone, but ... it would apply to mental injury connected with physical harm.”). Given the different meanings that could be ascribed to the word “survenu,” we cannot agree with the Jack Court that the phrase “dommage survenu en cas” definitively excludes an element of causation. Second, even if a causation requirement could not be imputed from the word “sur-venu,” such an element could nonetheless be attributed to the words “en cas de.” In Jack, the district court concluded that causation could not be implied from the French phrase “dommage survenu en cas,” but the court arrived at that determination by referring to the definitions of the words “dommage” and “survenu.” This approach, however, ignores the meaning of the remaining words in the applicable phrase, i.e., “en cas de ... lésion corpo-relie.” In its legal sense, the word “eas” means, inter alia, “cause.” See Cassell’s Frenchr-English English-French Dictionary, supra, at 132; Jules Jéraute, Voca-bulaire Francais-Anglais et Anglais-Francais de Termes et Locutions Juri-diques 29 (1953). If “cas” means “cause,” then the phrase “dommage survenu en cas de ... lésion corporelle,” as those words are used in Article 17, would hold earners liable for any “damages sustained in the cause of ... bodily injury.” Such a translation is amenable to an interpretation that would allow passengers to recover for mental injuries only where they were caused by a bodily injury. Notwithstanding this interpretation, we acknowledge that the words “en cas de” do not conclusively impose a causation requirement. Bilingual dictionaries also indicate that the word “cas” often means “circumstance,” “instance,” or “situation.” See Dahl’s Law Dictionary French To English / English To French 45 (2d ed.2001); Cassell’s French-English Englislv-French Dictionary, supra, at 132. When those meanings are ascribed to the word “cas,” we are less certain that the phrase “en cas de” requires a causal link between a mental injury and a bodily injury since we can conceive of a mental injury sustained in the same situation or circumstance as a bodily injury where the former had not been caused by the latter. The case before us is an example of such a scenario. We are also hesitant to credit that the words “en cas de” are the equivalent of a causation requirement because the drafters of the Warsaw Convention employed a different word in a subsequent portion of Article 17 to refer to causation. Article 17 provides that a carrier is liable for damage sustained “if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17 (emphasis added). The word “caused” in the English translation of the Warsaw Convention is taken from the original French text’s use of the word “causé.” See 49 Stat. at 3005. As the district court suggested in Jack, the failure of the Convention’s drafters to use the word “causé” earlier in Article 17 in place of the words “en cas de” may have some significance. See Jack, 854 F.Supp. at 665. One plausible construction in light of this consideration is that the damages recoverable under Article 17 “need not be caused by the bodily injury, and may instead be those caused [solely] by the accident.” Id. Notably, the different meanings that may be attributed to the words “en cas de” have led commentators to disagree about whether those words refer to an element of causation. Some suggest that the language of Article 17 is “more naturally understood to require that any compensable damage be associated with the requisite bodily injury. [That is,] emotional distress should be the subject of compensation only if the distress is precipitated by and flows from a physical injury.” Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery For Emotional Distress Under The Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search For The French Legal Meaning Of Lésion Corporelle, 25 Tex. Int’I L.J. 127, 134 n.49 (1990); see also Rene H. Mank-iewicz, The Liability Regime Of The International Air Carrier 141 (1981) (“[I]f Article 17 covers only ‘bodily injury,’ it does not encompass nervous shock, mental suffering, etc., which is not caused or accompanied by a physical injury.”). Others, however, have reached the exact opposite conclusion. See Georgette Miller, Liability In International Air Transport 121 (1977) (“Article 17 does not literally require a causal link between the damage and the death, wounding, or other bodily injury.... [I]f damage occurs concurrently with death, wounding, or other bodily injury, the requirement of Article 17 is satisfied.”); see also Max Chester, Comment, The Aftermath Of The Airplane Accident: Recovery Of Damages For Psychological Injuries Accompanied By Physical Injuries Under The Warsaw Convention, 84 Marq. L.Rev. 227, 248 (2000) (“The text of the [Warsaw Convention] does not require ... that bodily injuries cause the mental injuries.... Where a plaintiff alleges a physical injury, thus satisfying Floyd, and states that the accident caused a psychological injury, thus satisfying the plain text of the treaty, the only logical conclusion is to permit recovery for the psychological injuries.”). Because a variety of different meanings reasonably can be imparted to the words “dommage survenu” and “en cas de” as they are used in Article 17, we are unable to definitively determine whether those words impose a causation requirement by reference, without more, to their literal meaning. Cf. Jack, 854 F.Supp. at 665 (‘WTiether the recoverable damages — including emotional distress — are those caused by the bodily injury or by the accident itself is unclear under Article 17.”). Where, as here, a provision of the Warsaw Convention “is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation,” we may employ other sources to “ascertain [its] appropriate meaning.” See Commercial Union Ins. Co., 347 F.3d at 457. B. French Legal Materials When we seek to extrapolate the French legal meaning of particular words or phrases in the- Warsaw Convention, we may turn to French legal materials for assistance in determining how French jurists would have understood those words or phrases in 1929. See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537, 111 S.Ct. 1489. In reviewing such materials, we may examine the principal sources that lawyers trained in French civil law would have relied on in 1929: “(1) legislation, (2) judicial decisions, and (3) scholarly writing.” Id. As a general principle, any damage may, under French law, “give[] rise to reparation when it is real and has been verified.” 2 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Treatise On The Civil Law, pt. 1, No. 868, at 471 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 11th ed.1959) (1939); see also Floyd, 499 U.S. at 539, 111 S.Ct. 1489; cf. Miller, supra, at 112 (“Provided the damage is certain and direct, all forms of damage can be compensated to their full extent.”). As such, French law would allow a party to recover for “dommage matériel,” Mankiewicz, supra, at 157, which encompasses “compensation for pecuniary loss resulting from death or injury.” Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1487. That party could also recover for “dommage moral,” Mankiewiez, supra, at 157, which covers compensation for non-pecuniary losses. Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1487. This latter category of loss is “usually equivalent to damages for pain and suffering, grief, shame,' or disfiguration.” Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1282; see also F.H. Lawson, et al., Amos And Walton’s Introduction To French Law 209 (3d ed. 1967) (Dommage moral "includes damage to a person’s honour and consideration, such as damage occasioned by insults, defamation, and seduction. It covers the damage occasioned by deprivations of liberty and invasions of privacy. It also includes the mental suffering occasioned by the death of one’s loved ones and the pain and suffering occasioned by physical injuries to oneself.”). Such damages were recoverable in France when the Warsaw Convention was drafted and signed; as the Supreme Court has recognized, by 1929 “France — unlike many other countries — permitted tort recovery for mental distress.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 539, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (internal citations omitted). More than two decades ago, one expert commentator on the Warsaw Convention, Dr. Rene Mankiewicz, contended that, “in 1929, French law had recognized for many years the right of a plaintiff to recover for mental suffering alone ... even though it was not caused by a physical injury.” Mankiewicz, supra, at 145. However, the Supreme Court reviewed that commentator’s argument in Floyd and refused to construe French law in such a broad fashion. See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 539-40 & n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1489. The Court noted that Dr. Mankiewicz cited two eases in support of his argument. Id. at 540 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1489. The first “involved recovery by a stepdaughter for emotional distress resulting from the death of her stepmother and the other involved recovery for injury to honor arising from adultery.” Id. (citing Mankiewicz, supra, at 145). Despite these and other similar authorities, the Court explained that it had “been directed to no French case prior to 1929 that allowed recovery” for a mental injury “caused by fright or shock ” in the absence of an incident in which someone “sustained physical injury.” Id. at 539-40, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (emphasis added). In other words, when the Court sought to examine whether French law in 1929 allowed parties to recover for purely mental injuries, the Court limited the scope of French materials that it would consider as part of its analysis; the Court refused to rely on French judicial decisions that did not involve a mental injury caused by fright or shock. The Floyd Court’s limited approach to the scope of applicable French judicial authorities teaches that we may not broadly canvas French law to determine when a party could generally recover for a mental injury. Instead, our review of French law must be guided by French judicial decisions that narrowly address the specific type of mental injury at issue in the particular appeal before us. We are aware that, under certain circumstances, French law allows parties to recover for “dommage moral” even if they have not suffered a physical injury. See Mankiewicz, supra, at 145 (citing the aforementioned decisions of the highest French court in 1923 and 1857); see also Dahl’s Law Dictionary French To English/English To French, supra, at 112 (In accordance with the principle of dommage moral, “courts, for example, have taken account of the sentimental loss resulting from the disappearance of a family portrait; the affront to the religious sensibilities of a Jewish society caused by a breach of their butcher of his contractual undertaking not to sell non-kosher meat; the damage to the reputation of an actress by the theater’s failure to display her name in letters of the agreed size.”); 11 International Encyclopedia Of Comparative Law § 9-39, at 16-17 and nn.114-15 (Andre Tunc ed., 1986) (citing, as the first personal injury cases permitting recovery for non-pecuniary damages, an 1833 French decision in which “counsel for the plaintiff took as an illustration of dommage moral for which recovery should be permitted the grief of a family upon the death of one of their members,” and an 1881 Belgian decision in a wrongful death case); Lawson, supra, at 209 (“dommage moral” covers, as one example, “damage occasioned by insults”). However, the circumstances and mental injuries in the foregoing situations are not analogous to the mental injuries implicated by the instant appeal. We have been directed to no French case prior to 1929 that allowed a party to recover for his own mental injuries caused by fright or shock suffered during an accident where they did not flow from physical injuries sustained by that same party. If anything, commentators appear to indicate that, under French law, parties could recover in such a context for their own pain and suffering but only where such damages were attributable to their physical injuries. See, e.g., Lawson, supra, at 209 (Dommage moral “includes ... the pain and suffering occasioned by physical injuries to oneself”) (emphasis added); see also Miller, supra, at 112 (“There is nothing in French law prohibiting compensation for any particular kind of damage, be it mental injury, suffering due to the death of a member of the family, or pain and suffering due to a physical injury”) (emphasis added); id. at 114 (explaining that the damages recoverable in personal injury cases in common law courts are similar to those recoverable in France because a victim can recover for “pain and suffering due to the injury”) (emphasis added). We also note that one leading treatise on French law that dates back to the early Warsaw Convention era, and which was repeatedly cited by the Supreme Court in Floyd, see 499 U.S. at 538-39, 111 S.Ct. 1489, does not mention the type of mental injuries allegedly sustained by the Ehrl-ichs among its “principal” examples of “dommage moral.” See 2 Planiol & Ripert, supra, No. 868A, at 472-73. Rather, the treatise cites the following examples as the “principal” applications of the concept of “reparation for moral damage”: (1) [ijnjuries to honor, as in cases of defamation ... or in cases of seduction of a minor ...; (2) [ijnjuries to sentiments of affection: in the case of accidental death, the near relatives of the victim are indemnified, not in their quality as heirs, but as relations suffering personally from the loss of affection of the victim ...; (3) [vjiolation of obligations arising out of marriage: for example in case of adultery, of refusing to receive the woman into the conjugal domicile ...; (4) [vjiolations of rights by the paternal power: when a teacher treats children contrary to good morals or decency ... or when third parties influence the child against obedience to its parents; (5) [ijnjuries to professional interests, forbidden by a syndicate. Id. Absent from that list are mental injuries caused by fright or shock and sustained by an individual during an accident over the course of which he also suffered unrelated physical injuries. With these considerations in mind, we are not persuaded that French jurists in 1929 would have read the phrase “dom-mage survenu en cas de ... lésion corpo-relle” in a manner that would have held a carrier hable for a passenger’s mental injury in the absence of a causal relationship between such pain and suffering and a physical injury. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that our understanding of French law is limited by the treatises and judicial decisions available to us. Accordingly, although the Ehrlichs have made no effort to suggest that French law would require a different construction of Article 17, we do not rest our interpretation of Article 17 solely on our understanding of French legal materials. Instead, we also turn to additional sources to determine the meaning of that provision. C. The Negotiating History of The Warsaw Convention By construing the phrase “dommage survenu en cas de ... lésion corporelle” to mean that carriers may be held liable only for mental injuries that flow from bodily injuries, we interpret the scope of Article 17 in a manner that is consistent with the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention. In particular, that interpretation comports with the shared expectations of the parties that signed the Warsaw Convention. To ascertain the meaning of a treaty, “ ‘we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.’ ” Saks, 470 U.S. at 396, 105 S.Ct. 1338 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943)). These sources confirm that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention did not intend to expose carriers to liability for mental injuries that were not caused by bodily injuries. “The treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was first drafted at an international conference in Paris in 1925.” Saks, 470 U.S. at 401, 105 S.Ct. 1338. Article 5 of the draft protocol that emerged from the Paris conference (hereinafter the Paris Protocol) provided in pertinent part as follows: “Le transporteur est responsable des accidents, pertes, avaries et retards.” Ministére des Affaires Étrangéres, Conference Internationale de Droit Privé Aérien (27 Octobre-6 Novembre 1925), at 79 (1926). When that text is translated into English, Article 5 of the Paris Protocol specified that: “The carrier is liable for accidents, losses, breakdowns, and delays.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 542, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This “expansive provision,” which broadly held “carriers liable in the event of an accident, would almost certainly have permitted recovery for all types of injuries, including emotional distress.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The delegates at the Paris conference appointed a committee of experts, the CI-TEJA, “to revise its final protocol for presentation” at a second conference to be held in Warsaw. Floyd, 499 U.S. at 542-43, 111 S.Ct. 1489; see also Day, 528 F.2d at 34-35 (“The Paris conference appointed a small committee of experts ... to prepare a draft convention for consideration by the delegates at Warsaw.”). In response, the CITEJA produced a preliminary draft of the Warsaw Convention. See Minutes, Second International Conference On Private Aeronautical Law, October lp-12, 1929, Warsaiv 257-68 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975) (Warsaw Conference Minutes) (reprinting the preliminary draft). As part of this effort, the CITEJA divided Article 5 of the Paris Protocol into three separate subsections, “with one addressing damages for injury to passengers, the second addressing damages for injury to goods, and the third addressing losses caused by delay.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 543, 111 S.Ct. 1489; see also Warsaw Conference Minutes, supra, 264-65 (setting forth Article 21 of the CI-TEJA’s preliminary draft of the Warsaw Convention, which divides the subject matter first broached in Article 5 of the Paris Protocol’s liability provision among subsections (a), (b), and (c)). The general CITEJA article that delineated these subsections, Article 21, introduced the phrase “dommage survenu.” See Burnett, 368 F.Supp. at 1157 (reprinting the French text of Article 21). Similarly, “[t]he CITEJA subsection on injury to passengers introduced the phrase ‘en cas de ... lésion corporelle.’ ” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 543, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (internal citations omitted); see also Burnett, 368 F.Supp. at 1157. In essence, Article 21, as developed by the CITEJA, provided in pertinent part: “Le transporteur est res-ponsable du dommage survenu pendant le transport: (a) en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lésion corporelle subie par un voyageur.” See Burnett, 368 F.Supp. at 1157 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). The CITE-JA submitted its revisions to the second international conference that convened in Warsaw in 1929. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 401, 105 S.Ct. 1338. The delegates at the Warsaw conference further divided the subject matter enumerated in the subsections of the CITEJA liability provision among three separate articles. See Warsaw Conference Minutes, supra, at 205-06. Of these three new provisions, Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention addressed injuries to passengers. See id. at 205. The aforementioned phrases introduced by the CITEJA were retained in Article 17 and were ultimately adopted by the Warsaw conference delegates. See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 543, 111 S.Ct. 1489; see also Warsaw Conference Minutes, supra, at 205-06. Cf. 49 Stat. at 3005 (setting out the text of Article 17 in French and including the aforementioned phrases therein). “Although there is no definitive evidence explaining why the CI-TEJA drafters chose this narrower language” over the expansive terminology employed in the earlier Paris Protocol, the Supreme Court has determined that “it is reasonable to infer that the Conference adopted the narrower language to limit the types of recoverable injuries.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 543, 111 S.Ct. 1489. In other words, the Warsaw conference delegates did not employ the broad phrase “[l]e transporteur est responsable des accidents” from the Paris Protocol, and instead adopted the narrower phrase “[l]e transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de ... lésion corporelle,” in order to limit the scope of a carrier’s liability. As such, we conclude that they did not intend the latter phrase in Article 17 to allow passengers to expansively recover for mental injuries that accompanied, but were not caused by, bodily injuries. To conclude otherwise, we would need to believe that the contracting nations that signed the Warsaw Convention rejected the broad liability provision from the Paris Protocol yet nonetheless intended to allow passengers to recover for harms that were not recognized by many of the signatory nations. Many of the nations that signed the Warsaw Convention, such as Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and Sweden, did not recognize a cause of action for non-pecuniary harm in 1929. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 223, 116 S.Ct. 629, 133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996); see also Floyd, 499 U.S. at 544 & n. 10, 111 S.Ct. 1489; J. Kathryn Lindauer, Note, Recovery For Mental Anguish Under The Warsaw Convention, 33 J. Air L. & Com. 333, 339 (1975) (“At the time of the [Warsaw conference] negotiations, recovery for mental anguish was virtually unheard of as a legal cause of action.”)- Moreover, “in common-law jurisdictions mental distress generally was excluded from recovery in 1929.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 544 n. 10, 111 S.Ct. 1489. The Warsaw Convention “was intended to act as an international uniform law, and therefore must be read in the context of the national legal systems of all of its members.” Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir.1977) (internal citation omitted). Since a remedy for mental injuries was unknown to many, if not most, jurisdictions in 1929, the drafters of the Warsaw Convention most likely would have felt a need to make an unequivocal reference to that type of liability if they had intended to allow passengers to recover for such injuries. See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545, 111 S.Ct. 1489. However, the drafters made no such unequivocal reference to liability for mental injuries that were not caused by bodily injuries. Rather, “there is no evidence that the drafters or signatories of the Warsaw Convention specifically considered liability for psychic injury.” Id. at 544, 111 S.Ct. 1489. When we take into account the absence of an unequivocal reference to that type of liability in tandem with the decision by the Warsaw conference delegates to employ the phrase “dom-mage survenu en cas de ... lésion corpo-relle” to limit a carrier’s liability, we are not persuaded that the nations that signed the Warsaw Convention in 1929 intended to permit passengers to hold carriers liable for mental injuries that accompanied, but were not caused by, bodily injuries. For the same reasons, we would adhere to that interpretation of Article 17 even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that French law in 1929 did permit parties to recover for the type of mental injuries at issue in this appeal. The Supreme Court has not “forever chained [the Warsaw Convention] to French law.” Saks, 470 U.S. at 399, 105 S.Ct. 1338. As we mentioned earlier, courts must “give the specific words of the treaty a meaning-consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.” Id. Although the Court has explained that the French legal meaning of the words in Article 17 offers “guidance as to these expectations,” id. (emphasis added), the Court has also held that it is implausible to believe that the contracting parties to the Warsaw Convention, through their mere use of the French language, expected to adopt French legal principles. See Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 223, 116 S.Ct. 629. In Zicherman, the Court sought to interpret the meaning of the French word “dommage” in Article 17. See id. at 221-24, 116 S.Ct. 629. Over the course of its analysis, the Court found it unlikely that the contracting parties to the Warsaw Convention would have understood that term to require compensation for harm recognized by France but not recognized elsewhere. See id. at 223, 116 S.Ct. 629. As such, the Court did not construe “dommage” to mean the harm specifically com-pensable under French law. See id. at 223-24, 116 S.Ct. 629. Cf. Floyd, 499 U.S. at 539-40, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (declining to read into the Warsaw Convention a claim for purely “psychic injury that evidently was possible under French law in 1929 [but that] would not have been recognized in many other countries represented at the Warsaw Convention”). In essence, “[t]he Supreme Court ... has counseled against adopting an interpretation of the Convention that would have been discordant or offensive to the majority of [its] signatories.” Katsuko Hosaka v. United Airlines, 305 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1284, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). Applying that principle to the instant appeal, we find it unlikely that the contracting parties to the Warsaw Convention expected that their use of the French phrase “dommage sur-venu en eas de ... lésion corporelle” would have held carriers liable for non-pecuniary harm that may have been recognized in France but that was not recognized by many of the other signatory nations. This conclusion is especially compelling when we take into account how the drafters of the Warsaw Convention came to settle on that phrase. The more expansive Paris Protocol liability provision was submitted to the CITEJA so that it could “produce a provision more readily acceptable to those nations whose law was not so liberal” as that of France. Burnett, 368 F.Supp. at 1157. The nations that negotiated the Warsaw Convention therefore did not intend to strictly bind themselves to French legal principles of liability; indeed, the Warsaw conference delegates eventually adopted the “narrower language” introduced by the CITEJA to limit the types of injuries that were recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. Floyd, 499 U.S. at 543, 111 S.Ct. 1489. In sum, the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention demonstrates that the phrase “dommage survenu en cas de ... lésion corporelle” should be read to impose a causation requirement. Article 17 therefore permits passengers to hold a carrier liable for a mental injury only to the extent that it was caused by a physical injury. D. Pm'pose Where, as here, the literal meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, “we may look to the purposes of the treaty to aid our interpretation.” Katsuko Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 996; see also Commercial Union Ins. Co., 347 F.3d at 457 (“[W]e strive to conform our reading [of a treaty] to the treaty’s original intent and purpose.”). In this instance, our interpretation of Article 17 accords with the Warsaw Convention’s “primary purpose of ... limiting the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation industry.” Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546, 111 S.Ct. 1489. “Whatever may be the current view among Convention signatories, in 1929 the parties were more concerned with protecting air carriers and fostering a new industry rather than providing a full recovery to injured passengers.” Id. By reading Article 17 in a narrow fashion to preclude a physical injury from exposing a carrier to liability for unrelated mental injuries, we respect that legislative choice. E. Avoidance of Anomalous and Illogical Results Another consideration also leads us to conclude that carriers are not liable under Article 17 for mental injuries that accompany, but are not caused by, bodily injuries. Whenever possible, interpretations of a treaty that produce anomalous or illogical results should be avoided. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 171, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999) (rejecting an interpretation of the Warsaw Convention that would have yielded anomalous results); see also Distribuidora Dimsa S.A. v. Linea Aerea Del Cobre S.A., 768 F.Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y.1991). Cf. National Foods v. Rubin, 936 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir.1991) (‘When we interpret a statute, we should avoid ... unreasonable results if we can.”); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 919 (1st Cir.1987) (“It is settled beyond peradventure that legislation ‘should be interpreted to avoid ... unreasonable results whenever possible.’ As one respected scholar has observed, ‘[i]t has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is a reason for rejecting that interpretation.’”) (internal citations omitted); Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 766 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“It is well-understood that statutes must be construed so as to avoid illogical or unreasonable results.”). If we construed Article 17 in a manner that allowed a passenger to hold a carrier liable for his mental injuries regardless of whether they were causally connected to a bodily injury, that interpretation would yield “illogical results.” Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *5. The interpretation of Article 17 favored by the Ehrlichs would give rise to anomalous and illogical consequences because “similarly situated passengers [would be] treated differently from one another on the basis of an arbitrary and insignificant difference in their experience.” Id. For example, a passenger who sustained a mental injury but no bodily injury would be unable to look to Article 17 for relief whereas a co-passenger who suffered the same mental injury yet fortuitously pinched his little finger in his tray table while evacuating and thereby suffered an unrelated bodily injury would be able to hold the carrier liable under the Warsaw Convention. Such considerations led the district court in Jack to “read a causal component” into the words “dommage survenu en cas de,” notwithstanding its determination that those words did not imply a causation requirement. See Jack, 854 F.Supp. at 665, 668. Although we disagree with the Jack Court’s interpretation of the words “dom-mage survenu en cas de ... lésion corpo-relle,” we agree with the court that “[t]he happenstance of getting scratched on the way down the evacuation slide [should]