Full opinion text
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge: Clarence Ray Allen appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. He asserts numerous claims of constitutional error in both the guilt and penalty phases of his 1982 trial for the Fran’s Market triple-murder and related conspiracy to murder. The evidence of Allen’s guilt for the crimes of conviction is overwhelming. His own testimony provided perhaps the most incriminating evidence of that of the 58 witnesses who testified over 23 days during his jury trial, which ended in convictions for triple-murder and conspiracy to murder seven people, and a judgment imposing a sentence of death. Just as overwhelmingly plain, however, is that Allen’s representation at the penalty phase of his trial fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Trial counsel admits he did nothing to prepare for the penalty phase until after the guilty verdicts were rendered, and even then, in what little time was available, he failed sufficiently to investigate and adequately present available mitigating evidence. We must decide whether, if counsel had adequately investigated, presented and explained the available mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the result of Allen’s penalty phase would have been a sentence other than death. Having carefully and independently weighed the mitigating evidence, “both that which was introduced and that which was omitted or understated,” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), against the extraordinarily damaging aggravating evidence, we are compelled to conclude, as did the district court before us, that it is not reasonably probable that even one juror would have held out for a life sentence over death. Given that Allen had just been convicted by his death-qualified jury of orchestrating — from jail — a conspiracy to murder seven people, and succeeding in the actual killing of three, all to retaliate for their prior testimony against him and to prevent future damaging testimony, and that the potential evidence in mitigation was neither explanatory nor exculpatory and was provided by persons unaware of Allen’s numerous horrendous crimes or who were otherwise impeachable, we must conclude that there is no reasonable probability, i.e., “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), that the jury would have reached a different result. We therefore affirm. I. Background The “sordid events,” Allen, 42 Cal.3d at 1286, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115, underlying this appeal were set in motion in June 1974, when Allen decided to burglarize Fran’s Market in Fresno, California. Ultimately, Allen was convicted of the burglary and related first-degree murder of Mary Sue Kitts, the crime for which he was serving a life sentence when he committed his current crimes of conviction in an effort to silence the witnesses who testified at the 1977 Fran’s Market/Kitts murder trial. A. The Fran’s Market Burglary and Murder of Mary Sue Kitts Allen had known the owners of Fran’s Market, Ray and Frances Schletewitz, for more than a decade. To assist in the burglary, Allen enlisted the help of his son Roger, as well as Carl Mayfield and Charles Jones, employees in Allen’s security guard business and frequent coconspira-tors in prior criminal pursuits. On the night of the burglary, Roger Allen invited the Schletewitz’s 19-year-old son, Bryon, to an evening swimming party at Allen’s house. There, Bryon’s keys to Fran’s Market were taken from his pants pocket while he was swimming. Later in the evening, while Bryon was on a date arranged by Allen with 17-year-old Mary Sue Kitts, son Roger’s live-in girlfriend at the time, Allen, Mayfield, and Jones used Bryon’s keys to burglarize his parents’ market. They removed a safe from the market and divided the $500 in cash and over $10,000 in money orders found inside. With help from his son Roger, his girlfriend Shirley Doeckel, Kitts, and two others — Barbara Carrasco and her stepson Eugene Leland (“Lee”) Furrow — Allen cashed the stolen money orders at southern California shopping centers by using false identifications. While the stolen money orders continued to be cashed, Kitts contacted Bryon Schletewitz and tearfully confessed to him that she had helped to cash the money orders stolen from Fran’s Market by Allen. Bryon confronted Roger Allen with this story, and Roger admitted that the Allen family had burglarized the store. Bryon, in turn, confirmed to Roger that Kitts had been the one to confess the burglary to him. When Roger told his father of Bryon’s accusation based on Kitts’s confession, Allen responded that Bryon and Batts would have to be”dealt with.” Allen next told Ray and Frances Schletewitz that he had not burglarized their store and that he loved Bryon like his own son. He also threatened and intimidated the Schletew-itzes, however, by hinting that someone was planning to burn down their house and by having Roger pay Furrow $50 to fire several gunshots at their home one midnight. Meanwhile, Allen called a meeting at his house and told Jones, Mayfield, and Furrow that Kitts had been talking too much and should be killed. Allen called for a vote on the issue of Kitts’s execution. The vote was unanimous because those present feared what would happen if they did not go along with Allen’s plan. Allen had previously told his criminal accomplices that he would kill snitches and that he had friends and connections to do the job for him even if he were in prison. He had also referred to himself as a Mafia hitman and stated that the “secret witness program” was useless because a good lawyer could always discover an informant’s name and address. Allen kept a newspaper article about the murder of a man and woman in Nevada, and claimed he had “blown them in half’ with a shotgun. Allen thereafter developed a plan to poison Kitts by tricking her into taking cyanide capsules at a party to be held at Doeckel’s Fresno apartment. Allen sent Mayfield and Furrow to get the cyanide and took some heavy stones from his house to weigh down Kitts’s body, which was to be dumped into a canal. He overruled Jones’s suggestion that Kitts merely be sent somewhere until “things died down,” and he dismissed Doeckel’s objection to having a murder committed in her apartment. Shortly before the party began, Allen told Furrow that if he refused to commit the killing, Allen could just as easily get rid of two people as one. Allen left Doeckel’s apartment shortly before Kitts arrived. When Kitts arrived and refused to take the “pills” offered to her, Mayfield and Jones called Allen. Allen told Furrow to kill her one way or another because he just wanted her dead. Later, when Kitts still would not take the cyanide pills, Allen met Furrow outside the apartment and stressed that he “didn’t care how it was done but do it.” Allen added that Furrow would be killed if he tried to leave the apartment. When Furrow and Kitts were finally left alone, Furrow began to strangle Kitts, only to be interrupted by a phone call from Allen asking if he had killed her yet. When Furrow answered no, Allen ordered him to “do it” and hung up. Furrow then strangled Kitts to death. Warning Jones, Doeckel, and Furrow that they were all equally involved in the murder, Allen had them tie stones to Kitts’s wrapped-up body and, while he watched for traffic, throw it into a canal. After the murder, Allen threatened and bragged to his various cohorts. To Car-rasco, Allen said of Kitts that he had had to “ride her up, wet her down and [feed] her to the fishes.” When Mayfield asked how Furrow was doing, Allen responded that he was “no longer in existence,” explaining that it is easy to go to Mexico, get someone killed, and have the body disposed of for only $50. Allen also told Shirley Doeckel that Furrow was no longer around and repeated his claim that he had killed a woman in Las Vegas. Allen had not actually killed Furrow, however, and would later enlist his help in the 1974 robbery of an elderly couple at their jewelry store. About six months after the murder, when Mayfield asked Allen if he was worried about others talking, Allen said that he was not afraid, that “things would be taken care of’ if that happened, that he would have snitches killed, and that he would take care of “secret witness” informers even if he were imprisoned. Allen told Jones and others that “talking was a spreading disease and that the only way to kill it was to kill the person talking.” Allen would say of his cohorts that “none of [these] people talked” and that, if they did, “he would get them from inside or outside prison.” When Jones’s home was burglarized some time after the murder and Jones told Allen about the burglary, Allen responded that the burglary showed how easily Jones could be reached. Allen later gave Jones a key that fit his residence, and told him in front of his five-year-old son that he knew Jones “would like his kids to grow up without harm.” Allen later brought in new employees, Allen Robinson and Benjamin Meyer, and bragged to Meyer that he “had a broad helping them who got mouthy so they had to waste her” and that she “sleeps with the fishes.” He further warned Meyer, “If you bring anybody in my house that snitches on me or my family, I’ll waste them. There’s no rock, bush, nothing, he could hide behind.” When Meyer asked what would happen if Allen was arrested and could not make bail, Allen replied, “You’ve heard of the long arm of the law before? Well don’t underestimate the long arm of this Indian. I will reach out and waste you.” After holding meetings with his new employees and his son Roger, Allen arranged for the group to rob a K-Mart store in Tulare. Chastising Robinson for making mistakes, Allen told Meyer, “We just might waste him,” and later replaced Robinson with Larry Green as his “inside man.” During an armed robbery of a Visalia K-Mart in March 1977, Green shot a bystander, and police arrested him along with Meyer and Allen. Allen was tried and convicted in 1977 of robbery, attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. His arrest also led to his second 1977 trial, for the Fran’s Market burglary, conspiracy, and the murder of Mary Sue Kitts. Numerous witnesses, including Bryon Schletewitz, Mayfield, Jones, Furrow, Doeckel, Carrasco, and Meyer, testified on behalf of the prosecution. Allen was convicted of burglary, conspiracy, and the first-degree murder of Kitts, and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. B. The Fran’s Market Triple-Murder and Witness Retaliation Scheme While incarcerated at Folsom Prison, Allen called and wrote his second son, Kenneth, to request several copies of a magazine article about Kitts’s murder. He explained that he wanted to send the copies to other prisons to solicit help retaliating against those who had testified against him. In Folsom, Allen met Billy Ray Hamilton, a fellow inmate and convicted robber who was housed nearby and worked with Allen in the prison’s kitchen for two months in mid-1980. Hamilton, nicknamed “Country,” became Allen’s “dog,” running errands and taking care of various problems in return for cash. Another inmate, Gary Brady, would occasionally assist Hamilton. Brady was scheduled to be paroled on July 28, 1980; Hamilton was scheduled for parole one month later. After Hamilton and Brady had been helping him for some time, Allen informed them that he had an appeal coming up and wanted certain people taken “out of the box, killed,” because “they had been onto his appeal,” and “messed him around on a beef.” Allen mentioned the names “Bryant” (Bryon), Charles Jones, and “Sharlene” as witnesses to be killed, and offered Hamilton $25,000 for the job. Allen also confided to another inmate, Joseph Rainier, that he had been convicted of first-degree murder based on the testimony of “the guy who did the actual killing” and that he would like to see this person, as well as four other witnesses, killed. Rainier saw Allen and Hamilton huddled close together and talking on the prison yard bleachers and track every day for the four to six weeks before Hamilton’s release in late August 1980. In response to Rainier’s repeated inquiries about what was going on, Allen stated that Hamilton was “going to take care of some rats for [him].” Allen later elaborated that Hamilton was going to “get paid for the job” and that “Kenny was going to take care of transportation.” Allen said that he could likely “win his appeal” if the witnesses were killed and offered to have witnesses who had testified against Rainier killed as well. Allen asked his eldest son Kenneth, and Kenneth’s wife Kathy to visit him in jail, which they did with their baby on August 15. Allen told Kenneth that both Ray and Bryon Schletewitz were going to be murdered and that the other witnesses against him would also be eliminated so that .he would prevail on retrial if he won his appeal. He added that Shirley Doeckel had agreed to change her testimony if he were granted a new trial. Allen gave Hamilton’s mug shot to Kenneth and explained that Hamilton — whom he referred to as “Country” — would commit the killings and that he expected Kenneth to supply “Country” with guns and transportation. Kenneth agreed to find guns for Hamilton with Kathy’s help, and Kenneth smuggled Hamilton’s photo out of prison in his baby’s diaper. He and Kathy thereafter received a series of letters from Allen detailing the evolving plans. Soon after Hamilton was paroled, Kenneth wired him transportation money and met him at the Fresno bus depot. At Kenneth’s house, Hamilton confirmed that he was there to murder Bryon and Ray Schletewitz, and asked to see the weapons he would be using. He explained that he would not kill Doeckel yet because she was helping him locate the other hit-list witnesses. Hamilton’s girlfriend, Connie Bar-bo, joined Hamilton in Fresno. She told acquaintances that she had a chance to get a few thousand dollars and a hundred dollars worth of “crank” for “snuffing out a life.” On Thursday, September 4, Hamilton went to Kenneth’s house to get a sawed-off shotgun, a .32 caliber revolver, and seven shotgun shells from Kenneth. Hamilton discussed Fran’s Market, stating that he knew there were two safes there, 'One in the wall and the other in the freezer. He left that evening with Barbo, telling Kenneth he was going to murder Ray and Bryon Schletewitz. The two returned at about 9:45 p.m., however, explaining that they had aborted the execution because Barbo objected to killing a 15-year-old Mexican boy who was also in the store that night. The next evening Hamilton took thirteen additional shotgun shells and six more cartridges from Kenneth, and went with Bar-bo back to Fran’s Market. When they arrived at 8 p.m., just before closing time, Bryon Schletewitz and employees Douglas Scott White, Josephine Rocha, and Joe Rios were there. Shortly after entering, Hamilton brandished the sawed-off shotgun and Barbo produced the .32 caliber revolver. Hamilton led White, Rocha, Rios, and Bryon toward the stockroom and ordered them to lie on the floor. He told White to get up and walk to the freezer, warning White he knew there was a safe inside. When White told Hamilton there was no safe there, Hamilton responded, “Get out ‘Briant.’” Bryon Schletewitz then volunteered, “I am Bryon.” Following Hamilton’s demand, Bryon gave up his keys and assured Hamilton he would give him all the money he wanted. While Barbo guarded the other employees, Bryon led Hamilton to the stockroom where, from seven to twelve inches away, Hamilton fatally shot him in the center of his forehead with the sawed-off shotgun. Hamilton emerged from the stockroom and asked White, “Okay, big boy, where’s the safe?” As White responded, “Honest, there’s no safe,” Hamilton fatally shot him in the neck and chest at point-blank range. As Josephine Rocha began crying, Hamilton fatally shot her through the heart, lung, and stomach from five to eight feet away. Meanwhile, Joe Rios had escaped to the women’s restroom. Hamilton found him, opened the restroom door, pointed the shotgun at Rios’ face, and shot him from three feet away. Rios, however, had put his arm up in time to take the blast in the elbow, saving his life. Assuming that Rios was dead, Hamilton and Barbo fled the store, only to be spotted by neighbor Jack Abbott, who had come to investigate after hearing the shots. Barbo retreated back into the store’s restroom, and Hamilton and Abbott traded fire. Although hit, Abbott managed to shoot Hamilton in the foot as he ran to his getaway car. Barbo was apprehended by officers at the scene. Hamilton called Kenneth later that evening, saying he had “lost his kitten” and “things went wrong at the store.” The two met and exchanged cars. Hamilton next drove to the Modesto home of Gary Brady, the Folsom inmate who had been paroled one month before Hamilton. While staying with Brady, Hamilton told him he had “done robbery” and had “killed three people for Ray.” He had Brady’s wife write to Allen requesting the money he was owed for the job. The letter, signed “Country,” gave Brady’s Modesto address as the return address. Shortly thereafter, police arrested Hamilton for robbing a liquor store across the street from Brady’s apartment. The police seized from Hamilton an address book containing a list of names and addresses of the eight people who had testified against Allen at the 1977 Kitts murder trial — Lee Furrow, Barbara Carrasco, Benjamin Meyer, Charles Jones, Carl Mayfield, Shirley Doeckel, and Ray and Bryon Schletew-itz. When investigators visited Kenneth Allen’s home, Kathy Allen gave them Hamilton’s mug shot. After an article about the Fran’s Market triple-murder appeared in the newspaper, Allen asked fellow inmate Rainier, ‘Why don’t you testify against me ... and see if you can help yourself or get some time off?” When Rainier responded that he could not do that, Allen patted him on the back and said, “You wouldn’t want to do that anyway because you do have a lovely daughter.” Shortly after the Fran’s Market murders, Kenneth was arrested on drug charges. The police interviewed Kenneth about the murders. A week later, he contacted the police to offer his testimony in return for protective custody and his choice of prisons. He eventually entered into a plea agreement in which he promised to testify “truthfully and completely” in all proceedings against Hamilton, Bar-bo, and Allen. In June 1981, Allen was charged in the Fran’s Market triple-murder and underlying conspiracy. Kenneth testified at Allen’s preliminary hearing. C. Allen’s 1982 Trial for the Fran’s Market Triple-Murder and Conspiracy Allen was charged with murdering Bryon Schletewitz (count one), Douglas Scott White (count two), and Josephine Rocha (count three), and conspiring to murder Bryon Schletewitz, Ray Schletew-itz, Lee Furrow, Barbara Carrasco, Benjamin Meyer, Charles Jones, and Carl May-field (count four). The information further alleged eleven special circumstances: five under count one, three under count two, and three under count three. The jury heard from 58 witnesses over the 23-day guilt phase of Allen’s trial. Although the prosecutor terminated Kenneth’s plea agreement after discovering Kenneth had written to Allen promising to change his testimony at trial, Kenneth, stating he wanted to testify truthfully, and having been fully advised of his rights and the fact that the previous plea agreement was terminated, testified for the prosecution. In addition, Allen took the stand in his own defense. He denied any involvement in the Fran’s Market murders or in the conspiracy to execute the witnesses who testified against him in his previous trial; however, he admitted on cross-examination that he had told his “good dog” Hamilton to go to Fresno, and that he wrote all of the letters received into evidence and conceded they referred to Hamilton’s impending visit to Fresno. Allen confirmed that parts of those letters referred to Meyer, Mayfield, and Jones, and that a phrase he had used — “taken care of’ — meant “to kill.” He also acknowledged that he had access to mug shots in Folsom Prison, and admitted talking to Hamilton in the bleachers at the prison. After being confronted with a tape recording, he admitted ordering Kathy Allen to call the Schletew-itzes to impersonate Mary Sue Kitts, and to pretend to be the mother of Bryon’s baby so as to induce the family to call off the Kitts murder investigation. Allen’s testimony also confirmed many of the details about his former criminal activities and convictions about which Jones, Mayfield, Furrow, Meyer, Doeckel, and Carrasco had all testified. He denied planning the Kitts murder, but described how he had helped transport and dispose of her body. He also described in great detail his formula for executing “foolproof’ armed robberies of various K-Mart stores, and described in detail his role in the Tulare K-Mart robbery. Finally, Allen maintained that “when a guy puts a rat jacket on himself [i.e., becomes a snitch], killing them would do them a favor.” Allen’s daughter-in-law, Kathy, tried to exculpate Allen and implicate her husband, Kenneth, as the drug-crazed, hallucinogenic mastermind of the Fran’s Market murders. She recalled, however, that Kenneth had discussed getting “guns for witnesses” with his father at Folsom and that Barbo had told her that she and Hamilton could not leave any witnesses. Kathy admitted that she had previously testified for Allen, had tried to falsify evidence about the murders, and had transmitted messages to Hamilton for Allen. Three prison inmate witnesses, John Frazier, Henry Borbon, and Andrew Thompson testified that Hamilton, Allen, and Brady could not have met together in the Folsom yard. Thompson nevertheless admitted that he called Allen “Dad” and would lie to protect him. Borbon’s testimony was impeached by that of other witnesses. After three days of deliberation, on August 22, 1982, the jury found Allen guilty as charged. Allen then admitted that he had previously been convicted of murder, confirming three of the eleven special circumstance allegations that had been bifurcated from the trial pursuant to California Penal Code § 190.1(b). Eight days later, the penalty phase began. The State’s evidence showed that Allen had masterminded eight prior armed robberies: (1) the August 12, 1974, armed robbery at Safina Jewelry in Fresno, which yielded $18,000 worth of jewelry; (2) the September 4, 1974, armed robbery of Don’s Hillside Inn in Porterville in which $3,600 was taken from the safe and hundreds of dollars in cash and credit cards were taken from patrons at the scene; (3) the February 12, 1975, residential armed robbery of William and Ruth Cross, an elderly Fresno couple, in which a coin collection valued at $100,000 was taken; (4) the June 18, 1975, attempted robbery at Wickes Forest Products in Fresno, resulting in Allen’s arrest; (5) the October 21, 1976, armed robbery at Skagg’s Drug Store in Bakersfield, in which one of Allen’s associates accidentally shot himself; (6) the November 20, 1976, armed robbery at a Sacramento Lucky’s market, in which grocery clerk Lee McBride was shot and sustained permanent damage to his nervous system; (7) the February 10, 1977, robbery at a Tulare K-Mart, in which more than $16,000 in cash was taken; and (8) the March 16, 1977, Visalia K-Mart robbery, during which Larry Green held a gun to the head of one employee and shot another in the chest, permanently disabling him. Prosecution evidence also showed that while in the Fresno County jail on June 27, 1981, Allen called a “death penalty” vote for inmate Glenn Bell, an accused child molester. According to the evidence, Allen directed an attack during which inmates scalded Bell with two gallons of hot water, tied him to the cell bars and beat him about the head and face, and thereafter shot him with a zip gun and threw razor blades and excrement at him while he huddled in his blanket in the corner of the cell. The evidence also established that Allen repeatedly threatened that anyone who “snitched” on the Allen gang would be “blown away” or killed. Allen had also thwarted prosecution of the attempted robbery at Wickes Forest Products by threatening the chief prosecution witness and his family. Allen’s prior convictions of (1) conspiracy, first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and (2) first-degree robbery, attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon were introduced. The parties also stipulated to the consideration by the jury of the guilt-phase testimony by Ray Schletewitz, Mayfield, Jones, Furrow, and Meyer concerning (1) the prior conspiracy to murder and the first degree murder of Kitts; (2) the 1974 robbery at the Safina Jewelry Store; (3) the 1977 burglary and robbery of the Tu-lare K-Mart; and (4) the 1977 assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery, and attempted robbery of the Visalia K-Mart. Allen put on two witnesses. His former girlfriend, Diane Appleton Harris, testified to his good character, explaining that Allen had helped her financially both before and after her marriage to Jerry Harris. Harris further testified that Allen had helped rush her to the hospital on one occasion, that he was good to children, and that he wrote poetry. But, Harris admitted that Allen had also threatened to kill her husband. The second witness, San Quentin inmate John Plemons, testified that he had instigated the assault on accused child molester Glenn Bell in the Fresno County jail, and that Allen had nothing to do with it. Plemons’s testimony was rebutted by Correctional Officer Delma Graves, who testified that Bell told her immediately after the incident that Allen had instigated the assault. After deliberating for less than one day, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied Allen’s “statutory motion for a new trial” and sentenced him to death. D. Appellate and Habeas Proceedings The California Supreme Court affirmed Allen’s conviction and sentence on December 31, 1986, Allen, 42 Cal.3d at 1222, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115, and summarily denied his December 1987 and March 1988 supplemental habeas petitions. Allen filed a federal habeas petition on August 31, 1988, and moved for an evidentiary hearing. The district court then stayed the proceedings for exhaustion of all claims. The district court reopened Allen’s federal habeas proceedings in September 1993. Allen moved for an evidentiary hearing, which was granted in part. In April 1997, the magistrate judge presided over a six-day evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase. On March 9, 1999, the magistrate judge issued Findings and Recommendations denying Allen’s habeas petition. Following objections to the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendations, the district court conducted a de novo review of the case in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), holding argument on April 26, 2001. On May 11, 2001, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order adopting in full the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendations and denying Allen’s petition. Allen timely filed a notice of appeal and, on July 5, 2001, the district court issued a Certificate of Appealability, certifying both guilt- and penalty-related issues. II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review We review Allen’s pre-AEDPA petition de novo. “In particular, claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact and are reviewed de novo.” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942, 123 S.Ct. 342, 154 L.Ed.2d 249 (2002). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, present only where we have a “ ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Syrax, 235 F.3d 422, 427 (9th Cir.2000)). “Although less deference to state court factual findings is required under the pre-AEDPA law which governs this case, such factual findings are nonetheless entitled to a presumption of correctness unless they are ‘not fairly supported by the record.’ ” Id. at 835 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1996)). Thus, we owe the state court’s factual findings less deference here than in a case governed by AEDPA; however, such factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness as long as they are fairly supported by the record. Id. III. Guilt-Phase Claims Allen collaterally challenges his conviction on numerous grounds. As explained below, however, to the extent that any claim of error in the guilt phase might be meritorious, we would reject that error as harmless because the evidence of Allen’s guilt is overwhelming. Because of the compelling nature of the guilt-phase evidence, for purposes of decision, we address the evidence of guilt before turning to Allen’s claims of trial error. A. Evidence of Mien’s Guilt Allen’s own son Kenneth directly tied Allen to the Fran’s Market triple-murder and conspiracy, testifying as to Allen’s plotting and recruiting of Hamilton, Kathy, and himself. Brady corroborated Kenneth’s testimony, explaining that Allen attempted to recruit both Hamilton and Brady to kill those who had testified against Allen, and describing how he housed Hamilton immediately after the triple-murder. Extensive evidence corroborated Kenneth’s and Brady’s testimony and supported the jury’s guilty verdict. Joe Rainier testified that Allen told him Hamilton was going to take care of “some rats” for him, that Hamilton would be paid for the job and that “Kenny [would] take care of transportation.” Rainier also testified that he saw Allen and Hamilton talking together in the prison yard every day for the four to six weeks preceding Hamilton’s release. Even Kathy Allen, one of Allen’s biggest supporters, testified that when she and Kenneth visited Allen, she heard Allen mention “guns for witnesses.” In addition, the police found the list of witnesses against Allen in Hamilton’s possession and a mug shot of Hamilton — to which Allen had access in prison — in Kenneth and Kathy’s home. Most damning of all, though, was the evidence that came directly from Allen. He admitted writing letters to Kenneth and Kathy about “Country” Hamilton coming to town. In those letters, Allen implied or spoke directly about the harm he hoped would befall the witnesses against him. On August 26, 1980, for example, Allen wrote “Hey, I hear a ‘country’ music show is coming to ‘town’ around September 3rd.” Kenneth testified that “show” meant murder. The letter went on, “ ‘Remember’ September 3? Around that date ya all plan on listening to a lot of good ol’ ‘country’ music, okay? Just for me. You know how I like ‘country.’ ” The following day, Allen wrote another letter, entitled, “Happy days ahead.” This letter stated, “Now remember around September 3rd, have everything ready so ya all can go to that ‘country’ music show. I know ya all really ‘enjoy yourselves.’ I know you kids never liked ‘country’ music before, but I bet when you hear that dude on lead guitar, you will be listening to it at least once a week. Ha-ha.” Allen further asked Kenneth to “give his best” to Carl Mayfield: “Tell him I am thinking of him and I hope to see him one day, but I am sure he knows that already.” Allen also called Shirley Doeckel a “snitch bitch” and wished her “many, many more” problems. He wrote of “his dog,” Hamilton, leaving Folsom and wanting to find and meet “Chuckettea” (a.k.a. Chuck Jones). Allen also wrote that Hamilton wanted to meet “Mr. Jones and Mr. Mayfield and a few other good friends” and that “he might move out close to Raisin City,” home of Ben Meyer. Allen further admitted asking Hamilton to go see Kenneth and Kathy in Fresno; at first he claimed that he had merely asked Hamilton to visit his children and grandchildren, but he eventually admitted that Hamilton was to unload a “hot gun” from Kenneth and Kathy. The jury was also able to examine several of Allen’s poems, some of which emoted over and identified with the life of a contract hit man, including the following “Allen Gang” poem: Ray and his sons are known as the Allen Gang. Sometimes you have often read how we rob and steal and for those who squeal are usually found dying or dead. The road gets slimmer and slimmer and at times it is hard to see, but we stand like a man robbing every place we can, because we know we’ll never be free. Someday it will be over and they will bury us side by side. To some it will be grief, but to us it’s relief knowing we finally found a safe place to hide. Allen’s testimony was fraught with damaging inconsistencies and implausible explanations. He admitted lying and telling his associates that Lee Furrow had been killed in Mexico. He implausibly asserted that he had not directed or been involved in killing Mary Sue Kitts, but that he had only “assisted in the disposal of her body.” Allen also testified that he “barely even knew ... Billy Ray Hamilton” and that he only “talked to him maybe three or four times,” although he referred to Hamilton numerous times as “his good dog” (which, as he testified, meant “close acquaintance”) in his letters to Kenneth and Kathy. Allen testified inconsistently as to whether he went to San Diego to cash money orders stolen from Fran’s Market and whether the Schletewitzes had come to his house to pressure him to pay money that he owed them. After having his memory refreshed by a tape recording, Allen also admitted lying about having had Kathy Allen “call the Schletewitzes and act as if she were Mary Sue Kitts.” Questioned repeatedly about the inmate photos in his cell, Allen finally asserted that he was “planning on writing a book about twelve convicts that [he] got acquainted with in Folsom.” Allen further testified about much of his prior criminal history, including his knowing solicitation of someone — Larry Green- — -that he considered to be “a very dangerous man” and knew “might kill somebody” to commit burglaries. Finally, Allen provided illuminating testimony regarding his hatred of snitches. Among many other statements, Allen explained: “[W]hen a guy puts a rat jacket on himself, killing them would do them a favor.” B. Guilt-Phase Claims None of Allen’s claims has merit. Even if we were to find any of his claims meritorious, we would not find that such error “had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we address each only briefly. 1. State’s Alleged Reliance on False Testimony Allen claims that the State’s reliance on false testimony to establish and maintain his conviction entitles him to relief. ‘[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have [ajffected the judgment of the jury.’ United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). Premised upon Kenneth Allen’s recantation after judgment and Gary Brady’s alleged perjury, this claim falls of its own weight. a. Kenneth Allen’s Recantation Kenneth Allen’s later recantation of his trial testimony does not render his earlier testimony false. See Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233, 105 S.Ct. 34, 82 L.Ed.2d 925 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Re cantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion.”); see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 483 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Appellate courts ... look upon recantations with extreme suspicion.”); 58 Am.Jur., New Trial § 345 (“recantation testimony is generally considered exceedingly unreliable”). Here, Kenneth’s recantation testimony is even more unreliable because his trial testimony implicating Allen is consistent with the other evidence, while his recantation is not. For example, Kenneth now denies that he discussed killing witnesses with Allen during their visit at Folsom Prison on August 15,1980. At Allen’s trial, however, Kenneth’s estranged wife Kathy, who testified on Allen’s behalf and admitted trying to fabricate evidence to exculpate Allen, testified that she overheard Kenneth and Allen discussing “getting guns for witnesses” at that Folsom Prison meeting. Kenneth now also claims that Allen only sent Hamilton to Kenneth’s house to give Hamilton an opportunity to look for a job. Allen testified at trial, however, that Allen sent Hamilton to Fresno to help Kenneth dispose of a “hot” gun and that Hamilton was only stopping in Fresno on his way to San Diego. Kenneth’s recantation also conflicts with all the other evidence pointing to Allen’s involvement in planning the murders. For example, there are contradictions between Kenneth’s recantation and: (1) Allen’s numerous letters to Kenneth reminding him of Hamilton’s visit to Fresno; (2) the list of witnesses from Allen’s first trial found on Hamilton when he was arrested; and (3) Kenneth’s possession of a mug shot of Hamilton. No reasonable juror could find the current story credible when it is only Kenneth’s trial testimony that makes sense in light of all the other evidence. Moreover, Allen asserts no evidence, even assuming that Kenneth’s trial testimony was false, that the State “knew, or should have known” that it was false. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir.2002) (“It is a prosecutor’s duty to refrain from knowingly presenting perjured testimony....”) (internal quotation marks omitted). b. Gary Brady Although Allen points out minor inconsistencies in Brady’s testimony at pretrial proceedings, at Allen’s trial, at another trial, and at Brady’s deposition, Allen fails to establish that Brady’s testimony at Allen’s trial was untruthful. Indeed, Brady has testified consistently as to the material facts. In People v. Marshall, for example, Brady testified that Allen asked Brady and Hamilton to kill some people who had testified against him. 13 Cal.4th 799, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 (1996). Then in his deposition, Brady again confirmed that Allen offered to pay Brady and Hamilton for killing the witnesses to the former proceeding. Brady’s trial testimony was also subjected to substantial impeaching evidence, such as Brady’s substance abuse problem, prior felony convictions, blackouts, agreements with prosecutors by which charges were dropped against Brady and his wife in exchange for Brady’s testimony, and his admission to the witness protection program. Inconsistencies between Brady’s direct testimony at trial and his preliminary hearing testimony were also pointed out to the jury. Allen fails to establish either that Brady’s testimony was false or that the State had any reason to believe it was false. 2. Coerced Testimony of Kenneth Allen We reject Allen’s argument that the prosecutor “coerced” Kenneth’s testimony, and that such “coercion” entitles him to relief. Allen argues that the terms of the State’s bargain with Kenneth Allen, and its withdrawal of that bargain, led Kenneth to adhere to the testimony he gave at the preliminary hearing, rather than tell the truth. This claim fails because the plea agreement was proper, the jury was fully informed, and the agreement had been withdrawn before Kenneth testified. An agreement that requires a witness to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea is proper so long as “the jury is informed of the exact nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with care.” United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir.1988). Here, the jury was thoroughly informed, through direct and cross-examination, of the plea agreement, Kenneth’s subsequent letter, the prosecutor’s withdrawal of the plea offer, and Kenneth’s belief that it remained valid. The jury was also instructed to view accomplice testimony with “distrust” and to credit it only if corroborated. Moreover, Allen has presented no evidence supporting a finding of coercion by the State. 3. Jury Instruction — CALJIC No. 2.11.5 The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11.5 that it “must not discuss or give any consideration as to why the other person or persons are not being prosecuted in this trial or whether they have been or will be prosecuted.” Allen claims that this instruction directed the jury not to consider whether Kenneth and Kathy Allen might be tried for the crimes and hence precluded it from considering whether Kenneth testified to protect his wife and himself from prosecution. A challenged instruction violates the federal constitution if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). Even if the trial court was mistaken to give this instruction, any mistake was cured by the instructions read as a whole. See infra p. 858. Here, the jury was specifically instructed regarding witness bias, interest, or other motive. It was also instructed that Kenneth was an accomplice whose testimony should be viewed with distrust, examined with care and caution, and corroborated. In light of the trial court’s instructions read as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood CALJIC No. 2.11.5 to bar consideration of Kenneth’s motives for testifying. See People v. Fauber, 2 Cal.4th 792, 863, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249 (1992) (giving CALJIC No. 2.11.5 was harmless error given the totality of the instructions). 4. Prosecutorial Misconduct Allen contends that various incidents of prosecutorial misconduct rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. To the extent his claims of prosecutorial misconduct are not barred or factually or legally deficient, they do not constitute error of such degree as to have substantially and injuriously affected the verdict. a. Due Process Right to Immunization of Defense Witnesses Allen asserts a due process right to judicial immunity for his defense witnesses, independent of prosecutorial misconduct. This assertion is a “new constitutional rule[ ] of criminal procedure,” which is barred by Teague v. Lane. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). New constitutional rules of criminal procedure are inapplicable to “cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. When Allen’s conviction became final on October 5, 1987, only one court had recognized judicially conferred immunity in select circumstances. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.1980). The remedy Alen seeks was thus hardly compelled by precedent. See United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 891 n. 2 (9th Cir.1983) (expressly declining to reach the merits of Virgin Islands’ concept of judicially conferred immunity); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal.3d 957, 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608 (1989) (recognizing Virgin Islands as “the one case which has clearly recognized [judicially conferred immunity]”). b. Selective Immunization of Witnesses There is no evidence to support Alen’s claim that the prosecutor selectively granted immunity. Alen argues the prosecutor had no good reason to deny immunity to Billy Ray Hamilton, whose conviction and death sentence were on appeal at the time, or to Connie Barbo. Alen has not demonstrated that the prosecutor intentionally distorted the judicial fact-finding process by denying immunity to a potential witness whose testimony would have been relevant to the defense. Lord, 711 F.2d at 890-91. Alen presented no evidence that the prosecutor’s denial of immunity to Barbo or Hamilton was motivated by a desire to distort the fact-finding process. Moreover, Allen fails to show how either Bar-bo’s or Hamilton’s testimony would have exculpated him. c. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Information The State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when it failed to disclose evidence that would have impeached the credibility of both Brady and Kenneth. Specifically, Allen claims the prosecutor failed to disclose (1) Brady’s cooperation with authorities and testimony in People v. Marshall, 13 Cal.4th 799, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 (1996), a case similar to Allen’s; (2) information about Brady’s previous insanity finding and Brady’s early case-related conversations with authorities; and (3) the existence of a letter written by Kenneth’s wife Kathy, instructing Kenneth how to change his testimony at Hamilton’s trial. The constitutional guarantee of due process imposes upon the State the affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory information. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The failure to disclose this information “amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial,” and requires reversal “only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The testimony of Brady and Kenneth was substantially impeached. The jury heard about Brady’s substance abuse problem, numerous prior felony convictions, blackouts, agreements dropping charges against Brady and his wife in exchange for his testimony, and his placement in the witness protection program. The jury was also fully apprised of Kenneth’s failed plea bargain and inconsistent statements. The additional impeachment evidence identified by Allen is simply cumulative of other impeachment evidence. d. Misconduct in Closing Argument Although some of the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument were improper, none of them, considered separately or cumulatively, prejudiced Allen. Improper prosecutorial argument violates rights under the federal constitution if it “ ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). It”is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecutor’s comments regarding Allen’s courtroom demeanor were permissible because Allen chose to testify. See United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 n. 3 (9th Cir.1987) (“When a defendant chooses to testify, a jury must necessarily consider the credibility of the defendant. In this circumstance, courtroom demeanor has been allowed as one factor to be taken into consideration.”). The prosecutor’s description of what Allen’s victims would say from beyond the grave did not deny Allen due process because it was intended to summarize the evidence presented. See Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that prosecutor’s creation of a fictitious character based on the dead victim and delivering closing argument in the voice of that character is not a denial of due process because his statements were supported by the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom). Finally, however, the prosecutor’s suggestion that Allen and his counsel conspired to retaliate against witness Joseph Rainier was misconduct. However, given the trial court’s instruction that statements by counsel were not evidence, and given the weight of the evidence against him, the prosecutor’s comments did not deprive Allen of a fair trial. 5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Guilt Phase Allen’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail either because counsel did not act deficiently or because counsel’s actions did not prejudice him. Two requirements must be met to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, “the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The proper inquiry under this prong is whether counsel’s performance was “reasonable[ ] under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. However, “the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, “the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. a. Failure to Seek Second Counsel Although use of second counsel in defending capital cases is now recommended by the American Bar Association, this recommendation did not go into effect until 1985. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 5-6.1 (3d ed.1992). Thus, use of second counsel was not the prevailing standard at the time of Allen’s trial in 1982. Moreover, “[t]rial counsel cannot be said to be constitutionally ineffective for deciding not to bring in co-counsel, unless there is some reason ... why the first lawyer is unable to provide adequate representation.” Pitsonbarger v. Gramley, 141 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir.1998). The record does not demonstrate that counsel was or should have been aware at the outset that he could not try this capital case on his own. While it might have been wise to seek second counsel, his failure to do so did not constitute deficient performance. b. Opening Statement Counsel’s opening statement contained promises of the production of certain evidence and witnesses ultimately left unfulfilled at trial, and opened with a recitation of Allen’s “Hit Man” poem: I am a contract man, some people say, Dusting off people for those who pay, Waiting in a room to get a call, Knowing when it comes someone will fall. Some people say I’m cold and mean, Wasting someone I’ve never seen. But filling a contract comes real high, I give no thought for who will die. I travel a lot, always alone, Not knowing the feeling of having a home. Of all the people I’ve blown away, I’ve never heard one of them pray. I know one day the time will come, I’ll be blown away by a contract’s gun. Counsel’s decision to introduce Allen’s “Hit Man” poem during the opening statement was a strategic decision, intended to preempt the State from obtaining the most damaging use of a poem that would inevitably be introduced. Because counsel’s strategic choice is presumed sound, counsel’s performance was not deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, even if counsel’s conduct was arguably deficient, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, Allen cannot establish prejudice. c. Failure to Impeach Prosecution Witnesses Nor was the impeachment of Kenneth and Brady deficient or prejudicial. With respect to Brady, counsel elicited a host of impeachment evidence, including Brady’s drug and alcohol use, memory loss, cooperation with law enforcement, and discrepancies between his trial testimony and his previous statements. Counsel similarly introduced evidence of Kenneth’s drug use and conflicting stories to the police about the triple-murder, as well as testimony contradicting Kenneth’s claim that he never announced an intention to kill the witnesses against his father. Not only was counsel’s impeachment of Brady and Kenneth adequate, but any failure to elicit additional evidence was inconsequential, especially in light of the evidence of guilt. d. Failure to Call Witnesses Counsel’s decision not to call inmate Michael Brooks, several prison employees, Barbo, and Hamilton as witnesses was a strategic decision, not deficient performance as Allen asserts. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, Allen must “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Brooks and the prison employees would have testified that Allen was a loner and was not generally seen with Brady and Hamilton. Such testimony, however, was belied by the testimony of Kenneth, Brady, and Rainier, as well as by Allen’s own letters referring to Hamilton as his “good dog.” Barbo would simply have testified that she was unaware of Allen’s involvement, which would have been little assistance to the defense. Further, the statements given by Hamilton, which Allen contends should have been admitted, actually implicate Allen. Therefore, Allen has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s trial strategy was sound. Id. e.Failure to Introduce Other Exonerating Evidence Similarly, counsel’s decision against introducing evidence suggesting that the Fran’s Market triple-murder resulted from a botched robbery attempt was a strategic decision, not deficient performance as Allen suggests. Doing so could not have effectively countered the evidence demonstrating that the murders were planned. Although emphasis on shifting the blame from Allen to Kenneth and Kathy may have been wise, counsel’s strategic decision not to do so is at least presumed sound, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and Allen has not overcome that presumption. f. Allen’s Testimony and Closing Argument We reject Allen’s claim that counsel’s decision to put Allen on the stand was deficient. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt introduced by the State, counsel may have reasonably believed that placing Allen on the stand was the only way to potentially rebut much of this evidence. Allen adamantly testified that he was not part of any conspiracy to commit murder. This testimony could come from no one but Allen. Moreover, at the time, counsel could not have predicted just how damaging placing Allen on the stand would be. Thus, counsel’s strategic choice is presumed sound. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Allen cites Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 838 (9th Cir.1997), for the proposition that counsel erred in placing him on the stand. In Johnson, we determined that counsel should have prevented the defendant’s “incredibly lame” testimony by keeping him off the stand. Id. Johnson is inapposite, however, because there, the defense would likely have secured a not-guilty verdict if only the defendant had not taken the stand and obviously lied. Allen would not have enjoyed a similar security in not testifying. In addition, while Allen’s counsel was not as artful as he could have been in eliciting Allen’s testimony, his performance was not unreasonable. Finally, none of Allen’s overstated complaints about his counsel’s closing statement, such as that counsel “hardly referred to [Allen’s] testimony and never argued its truth,” undermines our confidence in the jury’s guilty verdict. IV. Penalty-Phase Claims A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Penalty Phase A defendant “ha[s] a right — indeed, a constitutionally protected right — to provide the jury with ... mitigating evidence.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We have explained that, “[t]o perform effectively in the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel must conduct sufficient investigation and engage in sufficient preparation to be able to ‘present! ] and explain!] the significance of all the available [mitigating] evidence.’ ” Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 927 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 399, 120 S.Ct. 1495). Defense counsel’s use of mitigation evidence to complete, deepen, or contextualize the picture of the defendant presented by the prosecution can be crucial to persuading jurors that the life of a capital defendant is worth saving. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2542-44, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2003, at 32-38, 46, 49 (attributing in part the decrease in imposition of the death penalty to defense attorneys’ increasing skill and resourcefulness in presenting mitigation evidence). We must assess whether the decision of Allen’s counsel not to investigate or present certain mitigating evidence was “the result of reasonable professional judgment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, in light of all of the circumstances,’’applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,” Silva, 279 F.3d at 836. If we determine that counsel’s performance was deficient, Allen still “bears the highly demanding and heavy burden [of] establishing actual prejudice.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 394, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (internal quotation marks omitted). 1. Deficient performance Counsel’s untimely, hasty, and incomplete investigation of potential mitigation evidence for the penalty phase fell outside the “range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance of investigating mitigation evidence, holding that counsel erred by inadequately investigating signs of a defendant’s very troubled childhood. Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2536-38. The Wiggins Court noted relevant ABA Guidelines, which provide that investigations into mitigating evidence “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” Id. at 2537 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989) (emphasis added)). The Court emphasized that an investigation into potential mitigating evidence should be thorough: In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation ... a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. ... Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy. Id. at 2538. The failure to timely prepare a penalty-phase mitigation case is also error. In Williams, the Supreme Court found constitutional error where counsel waited until one week before trial to prepare for the penalty phase, thus failing to adequately investigate and put on mitigating evidence. 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Silva, 279 F.3d at 841. In addition, legal experts agree that preparation for the sentencing phase of a capital case should begin early and even inform preparation for a trial’s guilt phase: Counsel’s obligation to discover and appropriately present all potentially beneficial mitigating evidence at the penalty phase should influence everything the attorney does before and during trial.... * * * The timing of this investigation is critical. If the life investiga