Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT AMBRO, Circuit Judge. Table of Contents I. Background .... 382 A. The 1934 Communications Act and Early Broadcast Ownership Regulation. 382 B Deregulation Initiatives 383 C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 .. 384 D. Regulatory Review Since 1996.. 384 E. The Commission’s 2003 Report and Order ... 386 F The Order’s Modification of Broadcast Media Ownership Rules ... 386 1. Local Television Ownership ... 386 2. Local Radio Ownership ... 387 3 & 4. Newspaper/Broadcast and Radio/Television Cross-Ownership .. 387 5. National Television Ownership... 388 6. Dual Network Rule ... 388 G. Procedural History of the Current Appeals ... 388 H. Subsequent Legislation. .. 389 II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review ... 389 A. Standard of Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act 389 B. Standard of Review Considerations Under Section 202(h) ... 390 1. “Determine whether any such rules are necessary in the public interest.”. rH 05 CO 2. “Repeal or modify any regulations it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” ^ 05 CO C. Conclusion. LO 05 CO III. Mootness and the National Television Ownership Rule. .395 IV. Cross-Ownership Rules . CO CD -q A. Regulatory Background and the 2002 Biennial Review CO CO -3 B. The Commission’s decision not to retain a ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership is justified under § 202(h) and is supported by record evidence. 00 05 CO 1. Newspaper/broadcast combinations can promote localism. 00 05 CO 2. A blanket prohibition on newspaper/broadcast combinations is not necessary to protect diversity. 399 C. The Commission’s decision to retain some limits on common ownership of different-type media outlets was constitutional and did not violate § 202(h). 400 1. Continuing to regulate cross-media ownership is in the public interest. 400 2. Continuing to regulate cross-media ownership does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 401 3. Continuing to regulate cross-media ownership does not violate the First Amendment. 401 D. The Commission did not provide reasoned analysis to support the specific Cross-Media Limits that it chose. 402 1. Overview of the Commission’s Diversity Index Methodology-403 2. The Commission did not justify its choice and weight of specific media outlets. 404 3. The Commission did not justify its assumption of equal market shares. OO O 4. The Commission did not rationally derive its Cross-Media Limits from the Diversity Index results. 05 O 5. The Commission should provide better notice on remand. rH rH V. Local Television Ownership Rule . CM rH A. Regulatory Background and the 2002 Biennial Review. CO rH B. We uphold several threshold challenges to the Commission’s overall regulatory approach. 1. Limiting local television station ownership is not duplicative of antitrust regulation. 2. Media other than broadcast television may contribute to viewpoint diversity in local markets. 3. Consolidation can improve local programming. H-i CJT 4. The Commission adequately noticed its decision to allow triopolies. CD rH C. We uphold the Commission’s decision to retain the top-four restriction. CD rH D. We remand the specific numerical limits for the Commission’s further consideration. E. We remand the Commission’s repeal of the Failed Station Solicitation Rule. O oq VI. Local Radio Ownership Rule. to H A. Regulatory Background and the 2002 Biennial Review. CO H B. We uphold the Commission’s new definition of local markets. CO CO 1. The Commission justified using Arbitron Metro markets .... to CO 2. The Commission justified including noncommercial stations . to Ü1 C. We uphold the Commission’s transfer restriction. CO Oí 1. Transfer restriction is “in the public interest.”.427 2. Transfer restriction is reasoned decisionmaking.427 3. Transfer restriction is constitutional.428 D. We affirm the attribution of Joint Sales Agreements.429 1. Attribution of JSAs is “necessary in the public interest.”.429 2. Attribution of JSAs is reasoned decisionmaking. 429 3. Attribution of JSAs is constitutional..430 E. We remand the numerical limits to the Commission for further justification.430 1. The Commission’s numerical limits approach is rational and in the public interest .431 2. The Commission did not support its decision to retain the existing numerical limits with reasoned analysis.432 a. The Commission did not sufficiently justified “five equal-sized competitors” as the right benchmark.432 b. The Commission did not sufficiently justified that the existing numerical limits actually ensure that markets will have five equal-sized competitors.433 c. The Commission did not support its decision to retain the AM7FM subcaps.434 VII. Conclusion.435 In these consolidated appeals we consider revisions by the Federal Communications Commission to its regulations governing broadcast media ownership that the Commission promulgated following its 2002 biennial review. On July 2, 2003, the Commission announced a comprehensive overhaul of its broadcast media ownership rules. It increased the number of television stations a single entity may own, both locally and nationally; revised various provisions of the regulations governing common ownership of radio stations in the same community; and replaced two existing rules limiting common ownership among newspapers and broadcast stations (the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule and the radio/television cross-ownership rule) with a single set of “Cross-Media Limits.” See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 2003 WL 21511828 (2003) (the “Order”). Several public interest and consumer advocacy groups (collectively, the “Citizen Petitioners”) petitioned for judicial review of the Order in various courts of appeals, contending that its deregulatory provisions contravened the Commission’s statutory mandates as well as the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (the “APA”). Associations of networks, broadcasters, and newspaper owners also challenged the Order, arguing that pro-regulatory revisions as well as the absence of further deregulation violate the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (the “1996 Act”), the APA, and the United States Constitution. The Judicial Panel on Multidistriet Litigation, acting pursuant to the random selection procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a), consolidated the petitions in this Court. On September 3, 2003, we stayed implementation of the rules pending our review. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the power of the Commission to regulate media ownership. In doing so, we reject the contention that the Constitution or § 202(h) of the 1996 Act somehow provides rigid limits on the Commission’s ability to regulate in the public- interest. But we must remand certain aspects of the Commission’s Order that are not adequately supported by the record. Most importantly, the Commission has not sufficiently justified its particular chosen numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership, and cross-ownership of media within local markets. Accordingly, we partially remand the Order for the Commission’s additional justification or modification, and we partially affirm the Order. The stay will continue pending our review of the Commission’s action on remand. I. Background A. The 1934 Communications Act and Early Broadcast Ownership Regulation In 1934 Congress authorized the Commission to grant licenses for private parties’ exclusive use of broadcast frequencies. Recognizing that the finite radio frequency spectrum inherently limits the number of broadcast stations that can operate without interfering with one another, Congress required that broadcast licensees serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a); see also id. §§ 307(a), 310(d), 312. “In setting its licensing policies, the Commission has long acted on the theory that diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic power.” FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978) (“NCCB”). The Commission’s early regulations reflected its presumption that a single entity holding more than one broadcast license in the same community contravened public interest. See Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183, 186-87 (1938). In 1941, the Commission announced that it would not license more than one station in the same area to a single network organization. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 206-08, 224-27, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (upholding the rule). At the same time, the Commission prohibited common ownership of stations within the same broadcast service (AM radio, FM radio, and television) in the same community. See Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (June 26, 1940) (FM radio); Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (May 6, 1941) (television); Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (Nov. 27, 1943) (AM radio). Regulations limiting an entity to the common ownership of seven AM radio stations, seven FM radio stations, and seven television stations survived judicial scrutiny in 1956. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 76 S.Ct. 763, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956). In the 1970s the Commission adopted its first cross-ownership bans, which prohibited, on a prospective basis, the common ownership of television and radio stations serving the same market, as well as combinations of radio or broadcast stations with a daily newspaper in the same community. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.24,0 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, ¶ 5, 1970 WL 18044 (1970); Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1975 WL 30457 (1975). The Supreme Court upheld the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban as a “reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications.” NCCB, 436 U.S. at 802, 98 S.Ct. 2096. B. Deregulation Initiatives The 1980s saw a deregulatory trend for media ownership. The Commission raised its national ownership limits to permit common ownership of 12 stations in each broadcast service (though still prohibiting station combinations that would reach more than 25% of the national audience). Amendment of Section 73.3555 (formerly 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 ¶¶38, 39, 1985 WL 260060 (1985). The Commission also determined that UHF television stations should not be deemed to have the same audience reach as VHF stations, due to “the inherent physical limitations of [the UHF] medium,” and therefore applied a 50% “discount” to UHF audiences as counted under the national audience limitation. Id. ¶¶ 42-44. In other words, UHF stations count only half of their audiences in determining compliance with the national television ownership rule. In 1989 the Commission eased its “one to a market” radio/television cross-ownership rules by allowing waiver requests for radio/television cross-ownership in the 25 largest television markets. The Commission stated that it would look favorably upon requests for waivers where there would be 30 independently owned broadcast “voices” remaining in the market after consolidation. Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission’s Rules, the Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 1741, ¶ 1, 1989 WL 510875 (1989). In 1992, the Commission relaxed local and national radio ownership restrictions and adopted a tiered approach to radio concentration that allowed a single entity to own more radio stations in the largest markets (up to three AM and three FM stations, subject to a local audience reach limitation of 25% and a national cap of 30 AM stations and 30 FM stations) and fewer in the smallest markets. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387, ¶ 27, 1992 WL 690638 (1992). C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 In 1996 Congress overhauled the Communications Act by enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 1996 Act contemplated a “pro-competitive, deregula-tory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector development of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition.” S.Rep. No. 104-230, at 1-2 (1996). The 1996 Act eliminated all limits on national radio ownership and raised the national television audience reach cap from 25% to 35%. 1996 Act §§ 202(a), (c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 110-11. Congress also eased local radio ownership limits, establishing a four-tier sliding scale limit of numerical caps that allowed for as many as eight co-owned radio stations in the largest markets. Id. § 202(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 110. The 1996 Act did not contain a new local television rule, but it directed the Commission to “conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to retain, modify, or eliminate” its existing local television ownership limitations. Id. § 202(c)(2), 110 Stat. at 111. It also expanded the applicability of the one-to-a-market radio/television cross-ownership restriction waiver to the fifty largest markets. Id. § 202(d), 110 Stat. at 111. Finally, the 1996 Act instructed the Commission to review biennially its broadcast ownership rules “to determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.” Id. § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12. Section 202(h) also required the Commission to “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” Id. D. Regulatory Review Since 1996 In 1999 the Commission responded to Congress’s directive under § 202(c) of the 1996 Act to review its local television rule and announced that it would relax its prohibition on the common ownership of television stations with overlapping signals. The Commission’s new rule would allow two commonly owned television stations (a television station “duopoly”) in the same Designated Market Area (“DMA” or “market”) as long as (1) neither station was ranked among the four largest (“top-four”) stations in the market and (2) eight independently owned stations remained in the market post-merger. Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, ¶ 8, 1999 WL 591820 (1999) (“1999 Television Rule Review”). In the same rulemaking, the Commission also relaxed the one-to-a-market radio/television cross-ownership restriction and allowed radio/television station combinations to exist within three-tiered limits that depend on the size of the market. Id. ¶ 9. Meanwhile, in 1998 the Commission began the first biennial review of its broadcast ownership regulations as required under § 202(h). In 2000 it announced that it would retain the national television ownership rule (the 35% limit provided in the 1996 Act) and its cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule after determining that both rules remained “necessary in the public interest.” 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review — Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, ¶ 4, 2000 WL 791562 (2000) (“1998 Biennial Regulatory Review”) On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Commission had not sufficiently explained its reasons for retaining either of these rules. Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1043-44, 1051-52 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Fox I”), modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“Fox II”). As for the national television ownership rule, the Court determined that the agency had taken a “wait and see” approach in evaluating its competition and diversity effects, which was impermissible in light of § 202(h)’s mandate to repeal or modify rules found no longer necessary in the public interest. Id. at 1042. It remanded the rule to the Commission for additional justification. Id. at 1049. The Court vacated the cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule, however, finding that the Commission’s decision to retain it was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to § 202(h). Id. at 1053. A few months later, the same Court reviewed the local television multiple-ownership rule. Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C.Cir.2002). The petitioner challenged the “eight independent voices” exception, contending that it lacked foundation or connection to the Commission’s goal of promoting diversity in local markets. Id. at 152. The Court determined that the Commission had adequately justified its decision to retain the local television rule under the APA and § 202(h), but that it had not provided a rational basis for the exclusion of non-broadcast media from the eight voices exception. Id. at 165. It remanded the rule for the Commission’s further justification. Id. at 169. E. The Commission’s 2003 Report and Order In September 2002 a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the “Notice”) announced that the Commission would review four of its broadcast ownership rules pursuant to § 202(h): the 35% national audience reach limit remanded in Fox; the local television rule remanded in Sinclair; the radio/television cross-ownership rule; and the dual network rule. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503, ¶ 6, 2002 WL 31108252 (2002). The Notice also advised that the Commission was incorporating into its biennial review pending proceedings on two additional rules: its rule limiting radio station ownership in local markets and its rule prohibiting newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership. Id. ¶ 7. The Commission established a Media Ownership Working Group (“MOWG”), which commissioned twelve studies ranging from consumer surveys to economic analyses of media markets. These reports were released for public comment in October 2002. Interested parties filed thousands of pages of comments, consisting of legal, social, and economic analyses, empirical and anecdotal evidence, and industry and consumer data to respond to the issues identified in the Commission’s Notice. Notably, nearly two million people weighed in by letters, postcards, e-mails, and petitions to oppose further relaxation of the rules. Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Dissenting, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,974, 13,977, 2003 WL 21251887 (July 2, 2003). The Commission also heard public comment at a February 2003 “field hearing” in Richmond, Virginia. On June 2, 2003, the Commission adopted the Order modifying its ownership rules to provide a “new, comprehensive framework for broadcast ownership regulation” by a vote of 3-2. Order ¶ 3. The Order was released on July 2, 2003. F. The Order’s Modification of Broadcast Media Ownership Rules After reaffirming the Commission’s three traditional policy objectives in promoting the public interest — competition, diversity, and localism — Order ¶ 8, the Commission considered whether each of the six rules remained in the public interest and proposed modifications where it believed necessary. With respect to each of the rules, the Commission determined as follows. 1. Local Television Ownership The existing local television ownership rule allowed television station duopolies, so long as at least one of the stations was not ranked among the market’s four largest stations and so long as at least eight independently owned and operated full-power television stations would remain in the market post-merger. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b). The Order modified this rule to permit television station triopolies in markets with 18 or more television stations and television station duopolies in markets with 17 or fewer television stations. Order ¶ 134. These limits are subject to the restriction (effectively a ban subject to a waiver provision) that a single firm may not own more than one top-four station in a market. This restriction forecloses common station ownership in markets with fewer than five television stations. Id. ¶ 186. The existing rule effectively precludes duopolies in most markets; only the largest 70 markets of the nation’s 210 DMAs could comply with the “eight voices” test. Adelstein Dissenting, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13,998. The new rule would allow triopolies in the nine largest DMAs, which represent 25.2% of the population. Duopolies could exist under the new rule in the largest 162 markets, representing 95.4% of the nation’s population. Id. at 13,997-98. 2. Local Radio Ownership Although the Order retained the existing numerical limits on radio ownership that Congress established in § 202(b) of the 1996 Act, it modified other aspects of the rule. First, it changed the method for determining radio markets by replacing the “contour-overlap” method (described in detail in Part VLB infra) with the geography-based market delineations created by Arbitron, a company that generates market data for radio advertisers. Order ¶ 239. Additionally, the Commission would now include noncommercial stations in the station count for each market. Id. The Commission grandfathered any existing radio station combinations rendered noncompli-ant under the newly defined markets, id. ¶ 484, but generally restricted transfer of these combinations, id. ¶487. The Commission also changed the local radio ownership rule by deciding to attribute “Joint Sales Agreements” (agreements under which a licensee sells advertising time on its station to a broker station for a fee) toward the brokering entity’s numerical limit. Id. ¶ 239. 3 & 4. Newspaper/Broadcast and Radio/Television Cross-Ownership The Commission has prohibited common ownership of a full-service television broadcast station and a daily public newspaper in the same community since 1975. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1975 WL 30457 (1975). Additionally, the Commission regulates the number of television and radio stations that may be commonly owned with limits that vary with the size of the market. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c). The Order announced the Commission’s decision to repeal both cross-ownership rules (television/newspaper, radio/television) and replace them with a single set of Cross-Media Limits. The Commission determined that neither eross-ownOTship prohibition remained necessary in the public interest to ensure competition, diversity, or localism. Order ¶¶ 330, 371. The new Cross-Media Limits prohibit newspaper/broadcast combinations and radio/television combinations in the smallest DMAs, ie., those with three or fewer full-power commercial or noncommercial television stations. Id. ¶454. In contrast, in the largest markets — those with more than eight television stations — common ownership among newspapers and broadcast stations is unrestricted. Id. ¶ 473. In medium-sized markets — those with between four and eight television stations — one entity may own a newspaper and either (a) one television station and up to 50% of the radio stations that may be commonly owned in that market under the local radio rule or (b) up to 100% of the radio stations allowed under the local radio rule. Id. ¶ 466. In structuring its Cross-Media Limits, the Commission drew upon a methodological tool named the “Diversity Index,” which the Commission developed as a measure of viewpoint diversity in local markets to identify those “at-risk” markets where consolidation would have a deleterious effect. Id. ¶¶ 391, 442. The Diversity Index, explained more fully in Part IV.D.l below, is a highly modified version of the formula for measuring market concentration — the Herfindahl-Hirsehman Index— applied by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to analyze mergers. Id. ¶ 428. 5. National Television Ownership The national television ownership rule prohibits entities from owning television stations that in the aggregate reach a certain percentage of our country’s households. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1). Section 202(c) of the 1996 Act directed the Commission to delete the then-existing twelve-station cap and raise the audience reach limit from 25% to 35%. After the D.C. Circuit Court remanded the Commission’s decision in the 1998 biennial review to retain the limit at 35%, Fox I, 280 F.3d at 1049, the Commission decided to increase the audience reach limit to 45%. Order ¶499. The Commission also declined to repeal or modify its existing 50% discount for UHF stations’ audiences as counted toward the audience reach limit. Id. ¶ 500. 6. Dual Network Rule Under the dual network rule, a television station may affiliate with more than one network except that it may not affiliate with more than one of the four largest networks, ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g). The rule effectively permits common ownership of networks to the exclusion of the top four. Order ¶ 592. The Commission determined that the dual network rule remained necessary in the public interest, and thus did not repeal or modify it. Id. G. Procedural History of the Current Appeals Within days of the publication of the Order, several organizations filed petitions for review of the Commission’s revised rules in various courts of appeals, some contending that the Commission had gone too far in revising the rules, and others asserting that the Commission had not gone far enough. Some of these organizations, including the Prometheus Radio Project, filed their petitions in this Court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a), petitions to review administrative orders filed in different circuit courts within the first ten days of the appeal period trigger a lottery conducted by the Judicial Panel on Multidis-trict Litigation. On August 19, 2003, the Panel announced that our Court had been selected in the lottery and consolidated the appeals here. We entered a stay of the effective date of the proposed rules after a hearing on September 3, 2003. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). We then denied the Deregulatory Petitioners’ motion, joined by the Commission, to transfer venue to the D.C. Circuit Court on September 16, 2003. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2003) (order denying motion to transfer). After pushing back briefing and oral argument at the request of the parties, on February 11, 2004, we heard approximately eight hours of oral argument addressing the merits of Petitioners’ claims. H. Subsequent Legislation In January 2004, while the petitions to review the Order were pending in this Court, Congress amended the 1996 Act by increasing from 35% to 39% the national television ownership rule’s audience reach cap in § 202(c). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 (2004). The legislation also amended § 202(h) in two ways: (1) making the Commission’s biennial review obligation quadrennial; and (2) insulating from § 202(h) review “rules relating to the 39 percent national audience reach limitation.” 118 Stat. at 100. Prior to oral argument, Petitioners filed letter briefs addressing' the 'effect of these amendments on their challenges to the Order. II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review This is an appeal of an agency decision under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. Our jurisdiction is based on 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). Our standard of review is governed by the APA and the 1996 Act provision authorizing the Commission’s periodic regulatory review. A. Standard of Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act Our standard of review in the agency rulemaking context is governed first by the judicial review provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under it, we “hold unlawful or set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law ... [or] unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. § 706(2)(a), (e); N.J. Coalition for Fair Broad. v. FCC, 574 F.2d 1119, 1125 (3d Cir.1978). The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is “narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (“State Farm”). Nevertheless, we must ensure that, in reaching its decision, the agency examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)). Normally, we may find an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious where the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)); see also Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir.2002). Put another way, we reverse an agency’s decision when it “is not supported by substantial evidence, or the agency has made a clear error in judgment.” AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C.Cir.2000) (citing Kisser v. Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615, 619 (D.C.Cir.1994)). We will, however, “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)). But an agency that departs from its “former views” is “obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance” in order to survive judicial scrutiny for compliance with the APA. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Finally, the traditional APA standard of review is even more deferential “where the issues involve ‘elusive’ and ‘not easily defined’ areas such as programming diversity in broadcasting.” Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 159. Yet even when an administrative order involves policy determinations on such elusive goals, a “rationality” standard is appropriate. See NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796-97, 98 S.Ct. 2096 (finding that the Commission acted rationally in determining that diversification of ownership would enhance the possibility of increasing diverse viewpoints). Additionally, when an agency has engaged in line-drawing determinations and our review is necessarily deferential to agency expertise, see AT&T Corp., 220 F.3d at 627, its decisions may not be “patently unreasonable” or run counter to the evidence before the agency. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 162. B. Standard of Review Considerations Under Section 202(h) The Order was promulgated as part of the periodic review requirements of § 202(h) of the 1996 Act. Consequently, our review standard is informed by that provision, which, at the time of the Order’s release, read: (h) Further Commission Review. The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section and all of its ownership rules biennially as part of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest. 110 Stat. 111-12. Section 11 of the Communications Act, to which § 202(h) refers, was also added by the 1996 Act to ensure that the Commission review periodically its regulations governing telecommunications services to “determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest as a result of meaningful economic competition between providers of such service” and “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer necessary in the public interest.” 47 U.S.C. § 161. The text and legislative history of the 1996 Act indicate that Congress intended periodic reviews to operate as an “ongoing mechanism to ensure that the Commission’s regulatory framework would keep pace with the competitive changes in the marketplace” resulting from that Act’s relaxation of the Commission’s regulations, including the broadcast media ownership regulations. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 4726, ¶¶ 16, 17 (2003) (citing preamble to the 1996 Act; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996)). Put another way, the periodic review provisions require the Commission to “monitor the effect of ... competition ... and make appropriate adjustments” to its regulations. Id. ¶ 5. As noted, the first sentence of § 202(h) requires the Commission to “determine” whether media concentration rules are “necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.” The second sentence contains a separate instruction to the Commission: to “repeal or modify” those rules “no longer in the public interest.” 110 Stat. 111-12. We analyze each of these instructions in turn. 1. “Determine whether any such rules are necessary in the public interest.” Recognizing that competitive changes in the media marketplace could obviate the public necessity for some of the Commission’s ownership rules, the first instruction requires the Commission to take a fresh look at its regulations periodically in order to ensure that they remain “necessary in the public interest.” This raises the question of what is “necessary.” In the context of § 11 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 161-which, like § 202(h), requires the Commission periodically to review its telecommunications regulations and determine whether they "remain necessary in the public interest"the Commission has interpreted "necessary" to mean "useful," "convenient" or "appropriate" rather than "required" or "indispensable." Setting out its rationale for this interpretation in the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 4726, ¶11 14-22, 2003 WL 1192543 (2003), the Commission determined that the 1996 Act's legislative history indicated that Congress meant "no longer necessary" to mean "no longer in the public interest" and "no longer meaningful." 18 F.C.C.R. 4726, 1117 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 185 (1996)). Next, the Commission found that an "indispensable" construction of "necessary" as to § 11 would be unreasonably inconsistent with the Communications Act's grant of general rulemaking authority to the Commission. Id. at 1118 n. 31. Under 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) the Commission is authorized to "prescribe such rules and regTlla-tions [regarding services and charges of communications common carriers] as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this Act.” In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, the Supreme Court interpreted this provision as a grant of “general rulemaking authority.” 525 U.S. 366, 374, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). Characterizing this interpretation “not as a limitation on the Commission’s authority, but a confirmation of it,” the Commission concluded that the standard of review applicable to its rule-making authority under § 201 is a “plain public interest” standard. 18 F.C.C.R. 4276, ¶¶ 18 n. 31, 22 (citing 525 U.S. at 374, 378, 119 S.Ct. 721). The Commission reasoned that the same standard must also apply to the review process required under § 11 in order to avoid absurd results. If the rulemaking and review standards were different, the Commission could promulgate any rule that is useful, but then, at the next periodic review, would have to revoke any of those rules that do not also meet a higher standard of “indispensable.” Id. ¶ 18 & n. 33. Under such a system, periodic review would either be inefficient or irrelevant, as the Commission could effectively sidestep the more stringent review standard by subsequently reissuing any “useful” rule that it had to repeal for failing to be “indispensable.” Id. ¶ 18. Lastly, the Commission rejected arguments that there is controlling judicial precedent for an “indispensable” construction of “necessary.” It acknowledged that the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have upheld such constructions, see id. ¶ 19 (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 374, 378, 119 S.Ct. 721; GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C.Cir.2000)), but countered that these cases “simply demonstrate that terms such as ‘necessary’ ... must be read in their statutory context.” Id. Furthermore, the Commission found judicial support for its interpretation of “necessary” in the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 159, regarding the Commission’s periodic review of its local television ownership rule under § 202(h). The Commission noted that the Sinclair Court did not expressly adopt any particular definition of “necessary,” but, in affirming the Commission’s § 202(h) finding that the rule furthers diversity and is thus necessary in the public interest, id. at 160, it “did not articulate a new or higher public interest yardstick.” 18 F.C.C.R. 4726, ¶20. Nor did the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Fox foreclose its interpretation of “necessary,” the Commission determined, because on rehearing the Court deleted language in its initial decision that the Commission had applied too lax a standard in reviewing its broadcast media ownership rules under § 202(h). Id. ¶ 14 (citing Fox II, 293 F.3d at 540). For these reasons, the Commission determined that § ll’s requirement that it review its telecommunications regulations to determine whether they remain “necessary in the public interest” does not require it to employ a more stringent standard than “plain public interest” found in other parts of the Communications Act. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) as an example). Recently, the D.C. Circuit Court upheld, in the context of § 11, the Commission’s interpretation of “necessary” contained in the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review. Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88 (D.C.Cir.2004). Recognizing that “necessary” is a “chameleon-like” word whose “meaning ... may be influenced by its context,” the Célico Court determined that it would uphold any reasonable interpretation that did not contravene the express provisions of the Communications Act. Id. at 94, 96 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). It went on to determine that the Commission’s interpretation is both reasonable and consistent with the Communications Act, endorsing the Commission’s view that “necessary” must mean the same thing in the periodic review context as in the rule-making context in order to avoid absurd results. Id. at 98. Célico also acknowledged that the Commission’s interpretation of “necessary” is consistent with the many courts that have endorsed a “useful” or “appropriate” interpretation over an “essential” or “indispensable” one. Id. at 97 (citing, inter alia, NCCB, 436 U.S. at 795-96 98 S.Ct. 2096; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819); Cellular Telecomm. & Internet Ass’n v. FCC, 330 F.3d 502, 510 (D.C.Cir.2003) (specifically rejecting an “indispensable” connotation of “necessary” as used in the Communications Act’s enforcement forbearance provision, § 10(a))). Finally, the Célico Court rejected suggestions that the Commission’s interpretation was inconsistent with its prior decisions in Sinclair and Fox. As noted above, Sinclair did not expressly adopt any particular definition of “necessary” and Fox I’s suggestion of a heightened standard was expressly retracted by Fox II, 293 F.3d at 540. Cellco limited Fox I’s statement that “necessary” implied a presumption in favor of modification or elimination of existing regulations, see 280 F.3d at 1048, to the context in which it was made: discussing whether vacating or remanding the national television ownership rule was the appropriate remedy. Cellco, 357 F.3d at 98. And while Sinclair apparently endorsed this language from Fox I, see 284 F.3d at 159, the Cellco Court characterized Sinclair as merely “piggybacking]” on Fox I without “adopting] a general presumption in favor of modification or elimination of regulations when considering a substantive challenge to the adequacy of the Commission’s determinations.” Cellco, 357 F.3d at 98. In sum, the D.C. Circuit Court determined that the definition of “necessary” was not constrained by either its Fox or Sinclair decision. It remained an open issue for the Commission to decide in the first instance, as it did when it released the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review. Id. For the same reasons proffered by the Commission and endorsed by the D.C. Circuit Court to reject the “indispensable” definition of “necessary” under § 11, we do so under § 202(h). Though § 11 and § 202(h) are separate statutory provisions, they are both periodic review provisions from the same statute. As evidence of their relatedness, § 202(h) imposes periodic review obligations “as part of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of this Communications Act of 1934,” 110 Stat. at 111. We see no reason to adopt a different definition of “necessary” under § 202(h) than under § 11. Moreover, interpreting § 202(h)’s first sentence to require the Commission to review its rules to determine whether they are indispensable in the public interest would lead to incongruous results when compared to the instruction in § 202(h)’s second sentence, which requires the Commission to “repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” For the “determine” instruction to be meaningful, “necessary” must embody the same “plain public interest” standard that Congress set out in the “repeal or modify” instruction. Lastly, as explained by the Célico Court, the “convenient,” “useful,” or “helpful” definition of “necessary” is not foreclosed to the Commission by any judicial precedent, including Fox and Sinclair. So in interpreting the Commission’s obligation under § 202(h) to review its broadcast media ownership rules to determine whether they are “necessary in the public interest,” we adopt what the Commission termed “the plain public interest” standard under which “necessary” means “convenient,” “useful,” or “helpful,” not “essential” or “indispensable.” 2. “Repeal or modify any regulations it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” Turning to the second instruction of § 202(h), the Commission is required to “repeal or modify” rules that are “no longer in the public interest.” Having concluded that the first instruction requires the Commission to determine whether any existing rule fails to satisfy the “plain public interest” standard, the relationship between the first and second instruction is evident. Under the second instruction, the Commission must repeal or modify the regulations that it has determined under the first instruction do not satisfy that same standard. While we acknowledge that § 202(h) was enacted in the context of deregulatory amendments (the 1996 Act) to the Communications Act, see Fox I, 280 F.3d at 1033; Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 159, we do not accept that the “repeal or modify in the public interest” instruction must therefore operate only as a one-way ratchet, ie., the Commission can use the review process only to eliminate then-extant regulations. For starters, this ignores both “modify” and the requirement that the Commission act “in the public interest.” What if the Commission reasonably determines that the public interest calls for a more stringent regulation? Did Congress strip it of the power to implement that determination? The obvious answer is no, and it will continue to be so absent clear congressional direction otherwise. What, then, makes § 202(h) “deregula-tory”? It is this: Section 202(h) requires the Commission periodically to justify its existing regulations, an obligation it would not otherwise have. A regulation deemed useful when promulgated must remain so. If not, it must be vacated or modified. Misguided by the Fox and Sinclair Courts’ “deregulatory presumption” characterization and lacking the benefit of Cell-co’s subsequent clarification, the Commission concluded that § 202(h) “appears to upend traditional administrative law principles” by not requiring it to justify affirmatively a rule’s repeal or modification. Order ¶ 11. This overstates the case. Rather than “upending” the reasoned analysis requirement that under the APA ordinarily applies to an agency’s decision to promulgate new regulations (or modify or repeal existing regulations), see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, § 202(h) extends this requirement to the Commission’s decision to retain its existing regulations. This interpretation avoids a crabbed reading of the statute under which we would have to infer, without express language, that Congress intended to curtail the Commission’s rulemaking authority and to contravene “traditional administrative law principles.” C. Conclusion Though our standard of review analysis is lengthy, it is in the end amenable to a straightforward summing-up: In a periodic review under § 202(h), the Commission is required to determine whether its then-extant rules remain useful in the public interest; if no longer useful, they must be repealed or modified. Yet no matter what the Commission decides to do to any particular rule-retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make more or less stringent)-it must do so in the public interest and support its decision with a reasoned analysis. We shall evaluate each aspect of the Commission's Order accordingly. III. Mootness and the National Television Ownership Rule The national television ownership rule caps the number of television stations that a single entity may own on a national basis. In the 1996 Act, Congress limited the number of commonly owned stations to those reaching no more than 35% of the national audience.1996 Act § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 111. In its first biennial review, the Commission retained the 35% cap as “necessary in the public interest,” but the D.C. Circuit Court held that the Commission had not adequately justified this decision. Fox I, 280 F.3d at 1048. On remand and in connection with its 2002 biennial review proceeding, the Commission increased the cap from 35% to 45%. Order ¶ 583. The Commission also decided to retain its method of discounting by 50% the audiences of UHF stations toward the cap. Id. ¶ 586. Subsequently, however, Congress enacted a new national television ownership cap. In its 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act, it modified § 202(c)(1)(B) of the 1996 Act to provide that “[t]he Commission shall modify its rules for multiple ownership ... by increasing the national audience reach limitation for television stations to 39%.” See Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 (2004). Because the Commission is under a statutory directive to modify the national television ownership cap to 39%, challenges to the Commission’s decision to raise the cap to 45% cap are moot. Cf. PLMRS Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 995, 1002 (D.C.Cir.1999) (challenges to Commission’s later-modified order are moot). Although the 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act did not expressly mention the UHF discount, challenges to the Commission’s decision to retain it are likewise moot. Congress instructed the Commission to “increase the national audience reach limitation for television stations to 39%.” 118 Stat. at 99. Since 1985 the Commission has defined “national audience reach” to mean “the total number of television households” reached by an entity’s stations, except that “UHF stations shall be attributed with 50 percent of the television households” reached. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(2)(i); Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 Fed. Reg. 4666, 4676, 1985 WL 260060 (Feb. 1, 1985). We assume that when Congress uses an administratively defined term, it intended its words to have the defined meaning. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). Furthermore, because reducing or eliminating the discount for UHF station audiences would effectively raise the audience reach limit, we cannot entertain challenges to the Commission’s decision to retain the 50% UHF discount. Any relief we granted on these claims would undermine Congress’s specification of a precise 39% cap. As additional evidence of the mootness of challenges to the UHF discount, we note that the 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act also added a sentence to § 202(h): “This subsection does not apply to any rules relating to the 39% national audience limitation.” 118 Stat. at 100. The UHF discount is a rule “relating to” the national audience limitation. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(2) (providing for the UHF discount in a section qualified “for the purposes of this paragraph (e),” the national television ownership rule paragraph). Congress apparently intended to insulate the UHF discount from periodic review, a position that is consistent with our reading of the legislation as endorsing the almost 20-year-old regulatory definition of “national audience reach” that provides for the UHF discount. Although we find that the UHF discount is insulated from this and future periodic review requirements, we do not intend our decision to foreclose the Commission’s consideration of its regulation defining the UHF discount in a rulemaking outside the context of Section 202(h). The Commission is now considering its authority going forward to modify or eliminate the UHF discount and recently accepted public comment on this issue. 69 Fed. Reg. 9216-17 (Feb. 27, 2004). Barring congressional intervention, see, e.g., S. 1264, 108th Cong. § 12 (2003) (proposing phase-out and 2008 sunset of the UHF), the Commission may decide, in the first instance, the scope of its authority to modify or eliminate the UHF discount outside the context of § 202(h). IV. Cross-Ownership Rules The Commission’s decision to repeal its newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rules in favor of new Cross-Media Limits has been attacked on all fronts. Some petitioners support the repeal but argue that the Cross-Media Limits are too restrictive. Others challenge the repeal decision and argue that the new limits are too lenient. We conclude that the Commission’s decision to replace its cross-ownership rules with the Cross-Media Limits is not of itself constitutionally flawed and does not violate § 202(h). But we cannot uphold the Cross-Media Limits themselves because the Commission does not provide a reasoned analysis to support the limits that it chose. A. Regulatory Background and the 2002 Biennial Review Since the 1970s, the Commission has enforced two separate limits on the common ownership of different-type media outlets in local markets. One cross-ownership'rule prohibits the common ownership of a full-service television-broadcast station and a daily public newspaper in the same community. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d). The other limits the number of television and radio stations to the following combinations: (1) in.markets where at least 20 independently owned media, voices would remain post-merger, two television stations and six radio stations or one television station and seven radio stations; (2) in markets where at least 10 independent voices would remain, two television stations and four radio stations; and (3) in other markets, two television stations (subject to the local television ownership rule) and one radio station. Id. § 73.3555(c). The Commission’ considered both cross-ownership rules during its 2002 biennial review under § 202(h). In the Order, the Commission announced that because neither rule remained necessary in the public interest, it was repealing them and replacing them with a single set of Cross-Media Limits. The three-tiered Cross-Media Limits regulate common ownership depending on the size of the market: small (those with three or fewer full-power commercial or noncommercial television stations), mid-sized (between four and eight television stations), and large (more than eight television stations). In small markets, newspaper/broadcast combinations and radio/television combinations are prohibited. Order ¶ 454. In medium-sized markets, an entity may own a newspaper and either (a) one television station and up to 50% of the radio stations that may be commonly owned in that market under the local radio rule or (b) up to 100% of the radio stations allowed under the local rule. Id. ¶ 466. In large markets, cross-ownership is unrestricted. Id. ¶ 473. B. The Commission’s decision not to retain a ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership is justified under § 202(h) and is supported by record evidence. The Commission determined that the rule prohibiting newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership was no longer necessary in the public interest for three primary reasons: (1) the ban is not necessary to promote competition in local markets because most advertisers do not view newspapers and television stations as close substitutes, Order ¶ 332; (2) the ban undermines localism by preventing efficient combinations that would allow for the production of high-quality local news, id. ¶ 343; and (3) there is not enough evidence to conclude that ownership influences viewpoint to warrant a blanket cross-ownership ban, thus making it unjustifiable on diversity grounds, id. at Ii 364, (and moreover, the presence of other media sources-such as the Internet and cable-compensate for the viewpoint diversity lost to consolidation, id. ¶ 365). The Citizen Petitioners object to the local-ism and diversity components of the Commission's rationale. We conclude differently, as reasoned analysis supports the Commission's determination that the blanket ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership was no longer in the public interest. Part II.C supra. 1. Newspaper/broadcast combinations can promote localism. The Commission measured the promotion of localism by considering “the selection of programming responsive to local needs and interests, and local news quantity and quality.” Order ¶ 78. Evidence that existing (grandfathered) newspaper-owned broadcast stations produced local news in higher quantity with better quality than other stations convinced the Commission that the ban on newspaper/broadcast combinations undermined its localism interest. The Commission principally relied on the findings of its MOWG study that newspaper-owned television stations provide almost 50% more local news and public affairs programming than other stations, an average of 21.9 hours per week. Id. ¶ 344 (citing Thomas C. Spavins et al., The Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs Programs (MOWG Study No. 7) at 3 (Sept.2002)). The Commission also found corresponding advantages in quality of local coverage provided by newspaper-owned stations, as shown by ratings (measuring consumer approval) and industry awards (measuring critical approval). Id. ¶ 344-45 (citing, among other things, findings by the Project for Excellence in Journalism that newspaper-owned stations “were more likely to do stories focusing on important community issues and to provide a wide mix of opinions, and they were less likely to do celebrity and human interest features”). The Citizen Petitioners argue that the MOWG study was flawed because it examined all newspaper/broadcast station combinations, including “intermarket” combinations (entities that own a newspaper and broadcast stations in different cities), as well as “intramarket” combinations (entities that own a newspaper and a broadcast, station in the same city). But the Citizens Petitioners do not suggest that a study entirely focused on intramarket combinations would have different results. The six intramarket combinations that were included in the study (grandfathered exceptions to the cross-ownership ban) averaged more local news and public affairs programming as compared to the overall average (26 weekly hours compared to 21.9) and higher ratings for their 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. news programs (9.8 and 11 compared to 7.8 and 8.2). MOWG Study No. 7 app. A; Comments of Newspaper Association of America, MB Docket No. 02-277 at 15 (Jan. 2, 2003). The Citizen Petitioners also protest the Commission’s reliance on anecdotal evidence of pro-localism combinations and its disregard of anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Significantly, however, the Commission used anecdotal evidence merely to illustrate its statistical findings — it did not rely on anecdote as the sole basis for its conclusions about localism. Moreover, the Commission properly discounted anecdotal evidence of a Canadian newspaper conglomerate’s detrimental effect on local-ism. Can West, which controls 30% of Canada’s daily newspaper circulation, requires its newspaper editors to publish editorials from headquarters, which it forbids local editorials to contradict. But the Commission explained that the Can West example shows the peril of national ownership and corporate centralization of media services, which is not relevant to the Commission’s regulations on local combinations. Order ¶ 352. In summary, the Citizen Petitioners’ arguments do not unsettle the Commission’s conclusion that the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban undermined localism. 2. A blanket prohibition on newspaper/broadcast combinations is not necessary to protect diversity. The Commission offered two rationales for its conclusion that a blanket prohibition on newspaper/broadcast combinations is no longer necessary to ensure diversity in local markets. First, it found that “[Commonly-owned newspapers and broadcast stations do not necessarily speak with a single, monolithic voice.” Id. ¶ 361. Given conflicting evidence in the record on whether ownership influences viewpoint, the Commission reasonably concluded that it did not have enough confidence in the proposition that commonly owned outlets have a uniform bias to warrant sustaining the cross-ownership ban. Id. ¶ 864. Second, the Commission found that diverse viewpoints from other media sources in local markets (such as cable and the Internet) compensate for viewpoints lost to newspaper/broadcast consolidations. Id. ¶ 366. We agree record evidence suggests that cable and the Internet supplement the viewpoint diversity provided by broadcast and newspaper outlets in local markets. As discussed more fully below, we believe that the Commission gave too much weight to the Internet in deriving the Cross-Media Limits. But separate from the question of degree, we conclude that it was acceptable for the Commission to find that cable and the Internet contribute to viewpoint diversity. C. The Commission’s decision to retain some limits on common ownership of different-type media outlets was constitutional and did not violate § 202(h). The Deregulatory Petitioners support the Commission’s repeal of the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban but object to its decision to retain any restriction on the common ownership of newspaper and broadcast media outlets.