Full opinion text
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: The petitioner, William H. Kelley, is a Florida prisoner on death row, having been convicted of first degree murder. The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his conviction and sentence. We reverse. This case — from the time of the murder to the present — has spanned nearly thirty-eight years. Understandably, its history is quite complicated. For the readers’ convenience, therefore, we preface the opinion with the following table of contents: I. Factual Background A. The Maxcy Murder B. John Sweet’s Trial C. Kelley’s State Legal Proceedings 1. Kelley’s Arrest 2. Kelley’s Two Trials 3. Kelley’s Direct Appeal 4. Kelley’s Rule 3.850 Motion and Appeal 5. Kelley’s Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief from the Florida Supreme Court II. Federal Procedural History A. Kelley’s Federal Habeas Petition B. Kelley’s Federal Evidentiary Hearing C. Disposition of Kelley’s Federal Ha-beas Petition and Subsequent Developments III. Federal Evidentiary Hearing A. Legal Standard for Permitting Federal Evidentiary Hearings B. Application of the Legal Standard to Kelley’s Case 1. The District Court’s Failure to Ascertain the Appropriate Legal Standard 2. The District Court’s Failure to Apply Any Legal Standard IV. Rulings on Habeas Claims A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 1. The Exhaustion Requirement 2. Application of the Exhaustion Requirement to Kelley’s Case 3. Kelley’s Lack of Prejudice from Ineffective Assistance B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 1. The Brady rule 2. Application of the Brady Rule to Kelley’s Case a. The Massachusetts Immunity Order and the Joe Mitchell Report b. Transcript of John Sweet’s First Trial c. Roma Trulock Report d. Fingerprint Report 3. Conclusion Regarding Brady Claims V. Conclusion I. Factual Background A. The Maxcy Murder This sordid tale begins with an illicit love affair between John Sweet, a real estate broker with shadowy ties to Boston’s criminal underworld, and Irene Max-cy, who was married to Charles von Maxcy (“Maxcy”), a wealthy citrus grower. It culminates in Maxcy’s assassination at the hands of two hit men. The investigation and legal proceedings following the murder have spanned almost four decades and have involved some of the best known lawyers in the country. The district court described the circumstances leading up to and surrounding Maxcy’s murder as follows: Irene Maxcy and John Sweet were lovers, and they planned to kill Irene’s husband, Charles von Maxcy, a wealthy citrus grover [sic] and rancher from Sebring, Florida. Sweet and Irene talked for months about the murder, after which they planned to live together on Maxcy’s large estate. Sweet contacted an acquaintance, William Bennett of Boston, Massachusetts. Arrangements were made, and a price was set: $5000 up front, and $15,000 after the murder. On October 1, 1966, Sweet went to Day-tona, Florida to meet Andrew von Etter. Von Etter was to do the killing, along with a partner. The next day von Etter called Sweet to tell him the partner, “William Kelley”, had arrived. On October 3rd, Sweet drove von Etter and “Kelley” to the estate. The alleged killers showed Sweet the weapons they would use, knives and a revolver, which they kept in a satchel. Sweet drove back to Sebring. Charles von Maxcy was murdered that day. A couple weeks later, Sweet went to Boston to pay the $15,000 balance due for the murder. Unfortunately, the murder did not signal the beginning of a blissful life on the estate for Irene Maxcy and John Sweet. Sweet wanted more money, purportedly to pay off the murder balance, and he began to harass and threaten Irene and her five-year-old daughter daily. Terrified, Irene Maxcy went to the authorities. In exchange for immunity, she implicated Sweet in the murder-for-hire scheme. Kelley v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 222 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1358 (S.D.Fla.2002) (order granting habeas relief on claim (1)). Before Irene Maxcy came forward, a comprehensive investigation was underway. Special Agent Roma Trulock of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) headed that investigation and interviewed potential eye witnesses. In particular he spoke with Kaye Carter, who met Kelley and Von Etter around the time of the murder at the Daytona Inn Motel, where the prosecution says the hit men lodged before they drove to Sebring to kill Maxcy. B. John Sweet’s Trial Sweet was tried in the Circuit Court of Polk County, Florida. As the district court explained, Sweet was arrested in 1967, charged with first degree murder. It became known in the course of the investigation for Sweet’s trial that the “triggermen” in the murder were named von Etter and “Kelley”. These men were not charged at this time, however, as prosecutors felt they had insufficient evidence against them. Irene Maxcy was the star witness for the prosecution in Sweet’s first trial. Her testimony was erratic and difficult as she denied, even under the protection of immunity, that she wanted to kill her husband. She testified it was entirely Sweet’s idea. She claimed to have witnessed many of the phone calls Sweet had made in arranging the murder, and she related many of the details about which Sweet had kept her informed, including the murder itself. She further testified that she gave Sweet more than $35,000 to help pay for the murder, and that Sweet had wanted another $75,000. Sweet, testifying on his own behalf, denied any involvement in the crime. Id. at 1358-59. Sweet also launched a vitriolic character assault on Irene Maxcy, accusing her of partaking in a host of deviant sex acts. The trial ended in a hung jury. In 1970, Sweet was tried a second time. Irene Maxcy testified against him again, and, again, Sweet denied any involvement in the murder. This time, however, Sweet was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Unfortunately, the second trial proceedings were tainted by an evidentiary irregularity. Sweet’s defense team repeated their earlier attacks on the credibility of both Irene Maxcy and another important witness against Sweet: Roma Trulock, the primary investigator for Maxcy’s murder. Sweet v. State, 235 So.2d 40, 41 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.1970). Defense counsel believed that Irene Maxcy and Trulock were engaged in a romantic relationship and, therefore, that Trulock had an interest in seeing Sweet incarcerated. To determine whether Irene Maxcy and Trulock would admit to the affair, the court permitted defense counsel to examine them outside the presence of the jury. Trulock denied the allegation vehemently, but Irene Max-cy did not. Irene Maxcy testified, among other things, that she and Trulock had engaged in sexual intercourse and that Trulock had expressed a desire to get Sweet convicted so that she and Trulock could take a trip to “the Islands.” Id. at 41-42. The court excluded such testimony, sustaining the State’s objection. Following his conviction, Sweet challenged the court’s ruling on appeal. Id. at 40-41. In a two-to-one decision, the district court of appeal reversed Sweet’s conviction and awarded a new trial. Id. at 42. In the court’s view, “the proffered cross-examination in question went directly to undermine the very foundation of the State’s case, i.e., the credibility of Irene Maxcy and C.R. Trulock. Its exclusion was a substantial frustration of [Sweet’s] right to effective cross-examination.... ” Id. After this ruling, Sweet’s defense, citing Florida’s speedy trial rules, filed a motion to discharge Sweet from prosecution. The state conceded that it could not proceed against Sweet again because key witnesses had become unavailable. On November 16, 1971, the circuit judge who had presided over Sweet’s case found that he had “no course other than to grant the motion.” Commending the efforts of the prosecution, the judge — in his own words — “reluctantly” ordered that Sweet “stand[s] discharged from further prosecution.... ” In April of 1976, the state attorney petitioned the circuit court to enter an order authorizing the clerk of the court to destroy certain physical evidence held for Sweet’s prosecution. The court granted that petition, and several articles of evidence, including a bullet, a bloody bed sheet, and a shred from the victim’s shirt, were destroyed. Sweet had gotten away with murder, but his role in the prosecutor’s pursuit of the matter had not ended. As the district court observed, after his conviction was reversed, John Sweet wasted little time in matriculating back into the underworld. By 1981, Sweet was facing charges in Massachusetts of prostitution, narcotics distribution, arson, bribery, counterfeiting, loan sharking, and hijacking, among other things. With authorities closing in on him, Sweet went to them first. His plan was to win immunity in exchange for information he had on the murder of Charles von Maxcy. William Kelley was the target, as Sweet implicated him as one of the murderers. The Massachusetts authorities brought Sweet to Florida where Sweet gave authorities there his confession. The next day Sweet was awarded immunity in Massachusetts. Kelley v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., No. 92-14246 at 4 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 31, 2000) (order denying habeas claims (4)-(6)). On December 16, 1981, a Highlands County grand jury indicted the petitioner, William H. Kelley, for first degree murder. C. Kelley’s Arrest and Prosecution 1. Kelley’s Arrest William H. Kelley was arrested on June 16, 1983, roughly seventeen years after Maxcy’s murder. By that time, Walter Bennett, who was Sweet’s contact for the murder contract, and Andrew von Etter, who was Kelley’s supposed partner in the killing, were both dead. Irene Maxcy, of course, had immunity for her role in the murder. Three special agents of the FBI apprehended Kelley at a motel in Tampa, Florida. They had received a tip that a guest of the motel met Kelley’s description. One of the agents, Ross Davis, testified at Kelley’s trial that the FBI sought and arrested Kelley for “[ujnlawful flight to avoid prosecution” in North Carolina. The agents did not realize that Kelley was wanted for murder in Florida until they took him back to their Tampa office and conducted a background check. When Davis finally informed Kelley of his indictment for the Maxcy murder, Kelley made statements indicating knowledge of the crime and suggested that the State would never be able to obtain a conviction. These statements eventually became a subject of dispute at Kelley’s trial. 2. Kelley’s Two Trials Kelley enlisted the assistance of several attorneys in preparing his case for trial. He was represented initially by Robert E. Dinsmore of Boston and Ronald K. Caccia-tore of Tampa. On October 20, 1983, however, Kelley, acting pro se, filed a document entitled “Discharge of Attorneys,” which stated that Dinsmore and Cacciatore were no longer authorized to act on Kelley’s behalf and that new counsel would begin representing him immediately. Kelley explained that this decision was in his best interest and was made without coercion or pressure from Dinsmore and Cacci-atore. The same day, Nicholas G. Schom-mer, a lawyer practicing in Sebring, moved the court to permit Dinsmore and Cacciatore to withdraw as Kelley’s counsel. The court granted the motion. On December 7, Schommer filed a notice of appearance, stating that he would act as Kelley’s local counsel and that Kunstler and Mason, a New York law firm, would serve as Kelley’s primary counsel. William Kunstler and Mark Gombiner, partners of the firm, moved the court on December 8 for leave to appear pro hoc vice. The court granted their motion on December 20. Sometime between December 20, 1983 and January 12, 1984, Jack Edmund of Bartow, Florida, joined Kunstler and Gom-biner as part of Kelley’s defense team. Kunstler testified later that he first met Edmund and, in fact, first learned of Edmund’s role in the defense on January 12, 1984, when Kunstler came to Sebring to argue pretrial motions. Prior to trial, Kelley’s defense team also included a paralegal named Harvey Brow-er. Brower was formerly a Massachusetts lawyer, but as the district court explained, Brower was disbarred from the practice of law in Massachusetts in August, 1979, for defrauding one of his clients. In re: Harvey Brower, No. 79-14BD (Mass. Aug. 16, 1979). Earlier in his Massachusetts legal career, Brower was censured by its Supreme Judicial Court for fraudulent conduct in negligence cases. In re Harvey Brower, No. 29871 Law (Mass. Feb. 23, 1973). Brower also was convicted in the Western District of Louisiana for unlawfully conspiring to aid and abet the crime of bail jumping. United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir.1980). Kelley v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 238 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1328 (S.D.Fla.2002) (order denying habeas claim (3) but granting relief on claim (2)) (footnote omitted). The district court further noted that Brower’s law office had also been involved in a counterfeit bond sale conspiracy. Brow-er’s conduct in the course of Kelley’s defense eventually played a critical role in the district court’s conclusion that Kelley suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. It is not entirely clear how or when Brow-er became involved in the case. The record permits the inference that Brower arrived on the scene around the time Kelley decided to discharge Dinsmore and Caccia-tore as his counsel. It is equally plausible, however, that Brower’s services were first employed at Kelley’s request even before Dinsmore was hired. At the hearing the circuit court held in July 1988 on Kelley’s Rule 3.850 motion to vacate conviction and sentence, Kunstler testified that Brower was the one who first contacted him about participating in Kelley’s defense. In fact, Kunstler never met Kelley until he went to Sebring on January 12, 1984 for a motions hearing. Kunstler was under the impression that Brower had represented Kelley on other matters in the past and that Brower would be preparing the case and virtually all of the pretrial motions. Kunstler expected that his own role would be confined to trial counsel alone, and he was not initially concerned with the amount of responsibility that would be entrusted to Brower. Kunstler expressed a great deal of confidence in Brower’s ability despite the disbarment, and he regarded Brower as both an “excellent” lawyer and investigator. In fact, when Kunstler missed a hearing on pretrial motions, he recommended that the nonlicensed Brower argue the motions in his stead. Kelley’s trial began in January of 1984. By that time, Brower had disappeared. As the federal district court later observed, “Kunstler characterized Brower as a thief who ‘absconded’ with fees without ever performing his investigatory duties.” Kelley, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1328 (S.D.Fla.2002). Kunstler and Edmund were the dominant players in Kelley’s defense. Kunstler took primary responsibility for many of the most important trial tasks, including the cross-examination of the state’s star witness, John Sweet. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and on January 30, the court declared a mistrial. The state decided to prosecute Kelley again. With Brower gone, the defense enlisted the assistance of a investigator in Edmund’s office to do some additional work in preparation for the retrial. Kelley’s second trial commenced on March 27. Again, Kunstler and Edmund shared the major responsibilities for Kelley’s defense, but Edmund played a more significant role in the second proceeding. In particular, the task of cross-examining John Sweet now fell to Edmund. This important responsibility included impeaching Sweet’s testimony about a conversation he had with Kelley years after the murder, in which Kelley allegedly told Sweet, “I stabbed [Maxcy] three or four times and he kept coming after us, so I had to shoot him in the head.” Kelley v. State, 486 So.2d 578, 580 (Fla.1986). One of the State’s other key witnesses was Abe Narnia, a private investigator hired by Sweet’s defense team when Sweet was being prosecuted. Narnia’s testimony corroborated Sweet’s and was admitted to rebut the inference that Sweet recently fabricated his version of the story. Id. At the conclusion of the State’s case, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion. The defense then rested without introducing any evidence. This decision entitled the defense to make the first and last closing arguments to the jury. When asked at the evidentiary hearing on Kelley’s Rule 3.850 motion whether he considered the defense’s decision to rest without putting on a case “to be a matter of trial strategy,” Edmund responded, “Of course.” He characterized the decision as a no-brainer in Kelley’s case, and he suggested that any good defense lawyer would have adopted the same approach. On March 30, the jury found Kelley guilty of first degree murder. At the end of the sentencing phase of the trial, a majority of the jury recommended that he receive the death penalty. On April 2, consistent with the jury’s recommendation, the court sentenced Kelley to death. 3. Kelley’s Direct Appeal Kelley appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida Supreme Court. Kunstler and Edmund appeared on Kelley’s initial brief, which challenged several of the trial court’s rulings. Specifically, Kelley contended that: (1) The court , should have dismissed his indictment because the destruction of physical evidence after Sweet’s second trial violated Kelley’s due process rights. (2) The court should have excluded Abe Narnia’s testimony regarding a conversation between Namia and Sweet in 1967. (3) The court erred by refusing to answer a question posed the jury during its deliberations. In particular, the jury asked “if John J. Sweet received immunity in Florida for 1st Degree murder and perjury before he gave information on the Maxcy trial and if he had anything to gain by his testimony[.]” (4) The court erred in allowing the jurors to take notes. (5) The court erred in admitting statements Kelley made to the FBI agents who apprehended him indicating Kelley’s knowledge about the Maxcy murder at the time of his arrest. (6) Florida’s statute governing the proceedings for issuing death sentences is facially unconstitutional and, in any event, was improperly applied by the court. In addition to the brief Kunstler and Edmund filed, the supreme court allowed Kelley to file a supplemental brief prepared by Barry Haight, a Massachusetts lawyer, and Donald Ferguson, a Florida lawyer. Beyond the arguments advanced by Kunstler and Edmund, the supplemental brief asserted that the court gave improper, nonstandard jury instructions — in particular, an Allen charge — which might have coerced the jury to overcome an impasse. Significantly, the supplemental brief also claimed that Kunstler and Edmund were ineffective and, therefore, deprived Kelley of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In support of this claim, the supplemental brief cited (1) counsels’ failure to prepare pretrial motions properly; (2) counsels’ failure to move the court to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s destruction of evidence after Sweet’s second trial; (3) Kunstler’s failure to appear in Sebring on January 11 at the hearing the court had scheduled for Kelley’s pretrial motions and his ostensible willingness to allow Brower to argue those motions; (4) counsels’ failure to object to the court’s Allen charge; and (5) counsels’ failure to object to the court’s refusal to answer the jury question described above. The supreme court rejected all of Kelley’s arguments. Kelley, 486 So.2d at 586. It also explained that Kelley’s ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved on “the record as it stands.” Id. at 585. That claim could be raised, however, in a collateral motion for postconviction relief. Id. With the assistance of Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law School professor, Kelley petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court denied the writ on October 6, 1986. Kelley v. Florida, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986). 4. Kelley’s Rule 3.850 Motion and Appeal In 1987, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Kelley moved the trial court (the “Rule 3.850 court”) to vacate his conviction and sentence. At this stage, Kelley was represented by Barry Wilson, a Boston lawyer, and James Green, who practiced in West Palm Beach. The motion alleged that the State had denied Kelley due process of law for the following reasons: (1) the State destroyed certain tangible exhibits introduced into evidence during Sweet’s prosecution; (2) due to the destruction of these exhibits, defense counsel could not effectively cross-examine the State’s expert witness who testified about them; (3) the prosecution illegally suppressed numerous items of exculpatory evidence; (4) the prosecution improperly interfered with defense counsel’s cross-examination of Abe Namia; (5) the prosecutor’s closing argument to the jury contained intentional misstatements of fact; and (6) Kunstler and Edmund deprived Kelley of effective assistance of counsel. The Rule 3.850 court held an evidentiary hearing on two issues: “1) whether the prosecution suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant [claim (3) ], and 2) whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel [claim (6) ].” After receiving the parties’ evidence, the court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied Kelley’s motion. The Florida Supreme Court, largely adopting those findings and conclusions, affirmed. Kelley v. State, 569 So.2d 754, 762 (Fla.1990). Responding to claim (1), the court found that “[t]he state was not at fault in the destruction of the evidence” and therefore did not deny Kelley of due process of law. Id. at 756. The court found that claims (4) and (5) were barred because they were not cognizable in a Rule 3.850 proceeding. Id. Although the supreme court did not say so in its opinion, the Rule 3.850 court correctly found claim (2) barred for a similar reason: “The admission of evidence and testimony at trial is clearly a matter which could have been raised on appeal.” In rejecting claims (3) and (6), the supreme court quoted the lower court’s reasoning. Turning to claim (3), the court addressed all of the items the State had withheld from the defense and concluded that each was either legally immaterial or sufficiently available to defense counsel. The court distilled Kelley’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, claim (6), into seven discreet instances. The court responded to each, finding that every alleged instance of ineffective assistance was the result of trial strategy, was legally immaterial, or otherwise was not supported by the evidence presented at the Rule 3.850 hearing. The court concluded that both Kunstler and Edmund were “capable and effective” in their defense of Kelley. Id. at 761. 5. Kelleys’ Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief from the Florida Supreme Court Kelley’s final attempt to seek relief in the state court system was a petition to the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, Kelley raised three claims: “(1) his appellate counsel [were] ineffective; (2) the application of the death penalty statute to this crime is ex post facto; and (3) the aggravating factors [supporting his death sentence] of pecuniary gain and cold calculated, and premeditated are overbroad.” Kelley v. Dugger, 597 So.2d 262, 263 (Fla.1992) (emphasis added). On March 12, 1992, the court rejected each of these claims and denied Kelley’s petition. Id. at 265. II. Federal Procedural History A. Kelley’s Federal Habeas Petition On October 9, 1992, Kelley, represented by Laurence Tribe, a Harvard Law School professor, and Barry Wilson, petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition, nearly 300 pages in length (not counting attached exhibits), asserted six bases for relief: (1) prosecutorial misconduct, including deliberate misstatements to the jury and the suppression of exculpatory evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including “failure to investigate, to depose witnesses, to present a case in defense, and to perform other basic defense functions”; (3) deprivation of Kelley’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights through the destruction of evidence following John Sweet’s second trial; (4) improper admission at trial of Abe Narnia’s testimony; (5) improper admission at trial of statements Kelley made to FBI Special Agent Ross Davis at the time of his arrest; and (6) unconstitutional imposition of the death sentence. Kelley’s petition contained a demand for an evidentiary hearing. On August 31, 2000, the court issued an order denying claims (4), (5), and (6). The court concluded that those claims could be decided on the basis of the record of the proceedings in the trial stage of Kelley’s prosecution. In the same order, the court deferred its decision on claims (1), (2), and (3) until it decided whether an evidentiary hearing on those claims was necessary. Kelley, No. 92-14246 at 29 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 31, 2000). On November 22, 2000, over eight years after Kelley filed his petition, the district court granted him an evidentia-ry hearing on the remaining claims over the State’s repeated objections. B. Kelley’s Federal Evidentiary Hearing The district court decided to hold an evidentiary hearing before it resolved three claims: (1) that the prosecution deprived Kelley of due process by suppressing exculpatory evidence; (2) that Kelley was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) that the destruction of evidence following Sweet’s second trial deprived Kelley of due process of law. The hearing commenced on April 24, 2001. Attorneys James C. Lohman of Tallahassee, Florida and Joseph Oteri of Boston, Massachusetts appeared on Kelley’s behalf. Carol Dittmar appeared for the State. In total, Kelley’s attorneys called eleven witnesses; the State called two. The first two days of the hearing were held in Boston. Kelley presented the testimony of eight witnesses, one of whom was co-counsel Joseph Oteri. The third day of the hearing was held on July 9 in Ft. Pierce, Florida. At that time, Kelley called three additional witnesses. The same day, the State called both of its witnesses, one being Edmund. Twelve of the thirteen individuals who testified at the evidentiary hearing had not testified at the Rule 3.850 hearing in state court. Only Edmund testified at both hearings. C. Disposition of Kelley’s Federal Habe-as Petition and Subsequent Developments On September 19, 2002, the court issued an order granting Kelley relief on claim (1). Based in part on testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that Kelley was entitled to a new trial because the State had withheld material exculpatory evidence in derogation of the rule laid down in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Kelley, 222 F.Supp.2d at 1363 (S.D.Fla.2002). Having granted Kelley relief on this claim, the court apparently thought it unnecessary to rule on Kelley’s two remaining claims, (2) and (3). Acting pursuant to the September 19 order, the clerk entered a final judgment and closed the case the same day. On September 30, 2002, the State filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The State supported its motion with two arguments. First, citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir.1992), the State argued that the district court should have ruled on claims (2) and (3) as well as claim (1). Second, the State argued that the court should revise its disposition of claim (1) to correct clear error and prevent manifest injustice. In the State’s view, the court reached its decision only by disregarding important testimony and failing to give due deference to the findings of the state courts. The district court disposed of the State’s motion in an order issued on December 30, 2002. Kelley, 238 F.Supp.2d 1325 (S.D.Fla.2002). Answering the State’s second argument first, the court declined to alter or amend its judgment on claim (1). The court agreed with the State, however, that it should have ruled on the two undecided claims. (a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues ... in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.... (e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later tiran 10 days after entry of the judgment. Turning to claim (2), the court found that Kelley was entitled to habeas relief because his trial counsel was ineffective. The court reasoned that Kelley’s defense counsel had “a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigation unnecessary[,]” but had met neither obligation. Id. at 1329 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In the court’s view, Harvey Brower, who was responsible for pretrial investigation, was incompetent, and Kelley’s primary defense counsel, Kunstler and Edmund, did not know that Brower had failed them. As the court stated in its order, Kelley’s trial counsel was deficient in having a disbarred attorney, lazy to a fault, resolve whether or not to conduct a pretrial investigation.... [T]rial counsel in the present case acted under the mistaken belief that Brower would perform a dutiful investigation or decide not to investigate after thoughtful consideration. Id. at 1329. After finding that counsel’s performance fell short of the Sixth Amendment’s standard for effective assistance of counsel, the court neglected to say how, if at all, counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced Kelley. The court also failed to mention the other instances of ineffective assistance of counsel that Kelley asserted in his petition. The court found no merit in claim (3) because Kelley failed to show that the State had acted in bad faith when it destroyed the exhibits introduced into evidence during Sweet’s prosecution. On January 28, 2003, the State initiated the appeal now before us. The appeal calls into question the correctness of the orders the district court entered on September 19, 2002 (granting habeas relief on claim (1)) and December 30, 2002 (granting relief on claim (2)). Kelley does not cross-appeal the district court’s denial of claims (3), (4), (5), and (6) or its partial denial of claim (2). We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. III. Federal Evidentiary Hearing Before proceeding to the merits of the district court’s rulings, we first address the question of whether the court abused its discretion in granting Kelley an evidentiary hearing so that he could present evidence to it that was not presented to the state courts. We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. See Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 690 (11th Cir.2002); cf. Mathis v. Zant, 975 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir.1992) (vacating grant of habeas relief and remanding for cause-and-prejudice hearing where the district court, without identifying its authority to do so and despite respondent’s objections, permitted petitioner to develop evidence never presented to the state court). A district court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1332 (11th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). A. Legal Standard for Permitting a Federal Evidentiary Hearings The legal standard for determining the scope of a district court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus case depends on whether the case is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Where AEDPA applies, the standard is articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). In pre-AED-PA cases, the standard was first set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and clarified in subsequent decisions, including most prominently Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). Beginning with pre-AEDPA cases, the Supreme Court held in Townsend that district courts are required to grant eviden-tiary hearings to state prisoners when any of the following six circumstances applies: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. at 757. The Court emphasized that these six circumstances merely enumerated the cases in which an evidentiary hearings is mandatory. The circumstances in which an eviden-tiary hearing is authorized were considerably broader. Indeed, the Court indicated that district judges have “discretion” to hold evidentiary hearings in “all” cases, even where the petitioner “was afforded a full and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable findings.... ” Id. at 318, 83 S.Ct. at 760. The Court elaborated, In every case [the district judge] has the power, constrained only by his sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing up the applicant’s constitutional claim. There is every reason to be confident that federal district judges, mindful of their delicate role in the maintenance of proper federal-state relations, will not abuse that discretion. Id. Three years after the Townsend decision came down, Congress amended the habeas statute. Among these amendments, Congress established a statutory presumption according deference to state-court factfindings except under eight enumerated exceptions, which roughly paralleled Townsend’s tests for determining when district courts must grant an eviden-tiary hearing. Where none of these exceptions applied, the amended statute increased the burden petitioners had to meet to override state factfindings. Where state factfindings were presumed correct, the petitioner had to establish the state court’s error by “convincing evidence”; where state factfindings were not presumed correct (because one of the statute’s exceptions applied), the petitioner had to establish the facts necessary to support his claim by only a preponderance of the evidence. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 20, 112 S.Ct. at 1726 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551, 101 S.Ct. 764, 771, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)). Thus, although district courts still could, within the limits of their “sound discretion,” Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318, 83 S.Ct. at 760, grant evidentiary hearings when Townsend’s tests were not met, they could not overlook the elevated deference accorded state factfindings unless an exception to the revised statute applied. In 1992, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of federal evidentiary hearings and overruled Townsend in part. In Kee-ney, the Court reconsidered the fifth circumstance in which Townsend entitled a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing, namely, when material facts were not adequately developed in the state courts. The Court held that a habeas petitioner is “entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he can show cause for his failure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure.” Keeney, 504 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. at 1721 (emphasis added). Alternatively, the petitioner is permitted to develop additional fáets at the federal level if he could “show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. at 1721. The Supreme Court explained that this rule limiting the availability of federal evidentiary hearings was motivated not only by considerations of judicial economy, but also by those of comity to state courts, accuracy and finality of state court judgments, and consistency in habeas corpus jurisprudence. Id. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at 1719-20. A majority of the Court did not specify whether Keeney’s revision of the law defined the conditions in which federal evi-dentiary hearings were mandatory or, rather, the outer boundaries of when they were permissible. But see id. at 23, 112 S.Ct. at 1727 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he district courts ... still possess the discretion, which has not been removed by today’s opinion, to hold [evidentiary] hearings even where they are not mandatory.”). We confronted that issue, however, in Mathis v. Zant, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.1992). There, “the district court, on its own initiative, permitted [the] petitioner to introduce additional evidence to bolster his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing by developing and submitting evidence never presented to the state court that first addressed this claim.” Id. at 1497. After considering the newly developed evidence, the court granted relief on the ineffective assistance ground. Id. We observed that, despite the respondent’s numerous objections, the district court never identified its authority for holding an evidentiary hearing on its own initiative. Id. Consequently, we vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded, instructing the court (1) to articulate its ground or grounds for circumventing the presumption of correctness accorded a state court’s factual findings under [pre-AEDPA] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) by sua sponte permitting petitioner to submit additional evidence on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, [and] (2) to determine whether petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to present to the state courts the supplemental evidence submitted to the district court.... Id. (citing Keeney, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318). Arguably, this holding could be narrowly read to require satisfaction of Keeney’s cause-and-prejudice test only where á district court elects to hold an evidentiary hearing absent motion of the petitioner. But we later resolved any doubt as to the necessity of applying Keeney’s test to all cases in Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1043 (11th Cir.1994). There we held unequivocally, “Without a cause and prejudice showing for evidence not submitted to the state court, a habeas petitioner' is procedurally barred on federal habeas review just as he is from presenting new claims not previously before the state court.” Id. at 1043; see also Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that under pre-AEDPA law “a district court abuses its discretion by ordering [an evi-dentiary] hearing without first requiring the petitioner 'to make the requisite showing [of -cause and prejudice]”). But see Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 754-55 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that Keeney did not limit the discretion of a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing that is not required by Townsend); Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir.1997) (“Keeney ... addresses only the circumstances under which an evidentiary hearing is required.”); Pagan v. Keane, 984 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that, after Keeney, district courts retain the power to hold evidentiary hearings even though one is not required). Thus, it was settled in this circuit that, after Keeney and before AED-PA, district courts lacked discretion to grant evidentiary hearings to develop facts that a habeas petitionér had failed to develop in state court, unless the petitioner established cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. The test AEDPA established in 1996 is even more deferential to state courts than the earlier standard: If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that— (A) the claim relies on— (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no, reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). Note that, like the Keeney test, the current § 2254(e)(2) is specific to those situations in which an evidentiary hearing is requested to develop facts that the petitioner failed to develop in state court. Note further that AEDPA expressly limits the extent to which hearings aré permissible, not merely the extent to which they are required. B. Application of the- Legal Standard to Kelley’s Case Kelley requested an evidentiary hearing in his petition for habeas corpus relief and renewed his request several times thereafter. For example, after AEDPA’s enactment in 1996, the court asked the parties to file memoranda briefing AEDPA’s effects on the ongoing proceeding. Kelley’s memorandum argued that AEDPA’s amendments to § 2254, and § 2254(e) in particular, do not apply to this case, and it urged the court to honor Kelley’s previous demand for a hearing. The State took the opposite position and specifically noted that the amended § 2254(e) limits the availability federal evidentiary hearings. On April 23, 1997, Kelley, acting under the impression that the court had ordered an evidentiary hearing “for some time during the period of May 12 to May 23, 1997,” moved the court for leave to issue subpoenas requiring several witnesses to appear at the federal government’s expense to testify in support of his claims. The State filed a response on April 30, contending that a hearing should not be held. The State protested that Kelley had not shown “(1) cause for, and prejudice from, the failure to develop such facts, or (2) that a federal evidentiary hearing is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” On May 27, 1997, Kelley filed a pretrial memorandum outlining several avenues along which he hoped to develop additional facts to support his claims. Ultimately, the memorandum asked the court to convene a hearing to receive Kelley’s new evidence. In the alternative, Kelley asked for a hearing to argue that the court could receive that evidence because he had cause for his failure to present it to the state courts and resulting prejudice. On August 26, 1997, the court heard argument of counsel on the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. At a status conference held on December 15, 1998, the court indicated its inclination to hold an evidentiary hearing in both Ft. Pierce and Boston, where it could receive the testimony of witnesses located in that vicinity and alleviate concerns about the cost of transporting many of Kelley’s witnesses. The State protested again: MS. DITTMAR: [Y]our Honor, I feel like I need to reiterate the respondent’s position that there just is no reason— THE COURT: I know what your position is; that you don’t think it necessary. MS. DITTMAR: That is correct, your Honor. THE COURT: I feel under all of the circumstances that the better course is to have the hearing. MS. DITTMAR: Your Honor, I am not sure what circumstances those are. I am not aware of any capital case in Florida where there has been a federal evidentiary hearing after there has been a full and fair hearing in State Court. And I just don’t understand the legal basis for having any of these witnesses give testimony at this point. THE COURT: Well, that is not the kind of new ground I would like to break. And I promise you I will review it one more time before I take any, set the wheels in motion with the Administrative Office. The court deferred its final ruling on the evidentiary hearing issue until November 22, 2000, when in a telephone conference with counsel, it resolved to hold a hearing on Kelley’s remaining habeas claims. The State emphasized that it had “a continuing objection to holding the hearing at all.” Over that objection, the court decided that the hearing would begin the next spring in Boston. The State persisted in its opposition to the hearing. On December 11, 2000, for instance, the State once again objected to having a hearing; alternatively, it moved the court to limit the scope of the hearing, contending that it should be limited only to Kelley’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of Kelley’s trial. On December 29, 2000, the court entered an order scheduling the evidentiary hearing to commence in Boston on April 24, 2001. On March 21, 2001, the state filed written objections to Kelley’s list of proposed witnesses. Once again, it reiterated its opposition to the course the court was taking: Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any cause or prejudice for his failure to present these witnesses at his state court postconviction evidentiary hearing. Absent such cause and prejudice, this additional evidence should not be presented.... Since the Petitioner has not offered any justification for his failure to present this evidence when he was granted the opportunity to do so in state court, he is precluded from offering it at Ms federal eviden-tiary hearing. The court did not address the State’s December 11, 2000, motion to limit the scope of the evidentiary hearing until March 18, 2002. Because the hearing had already been held at that point and, indeed, had concluded almost a year earlier, the court denied the State’s motion as moot. In our view, the district court abused its discretion in granting the evidentiary hearing. First, the court failed to determine the appropriate legal standard for measuring its discretion to grant the hearing. Second, despite the State’s continuous objections to the hearing, the court failed to acknowledge and apply any legal constraint on its discretion at all. We elaborate on these points below. 1. The District Court’s Failure to Ascertain the Appropriate Legal Standard Determining the test to be applied in this ease — AEDPA’s or the pre-AEDPA standard — is a difficult question that cannot be resolved on this record. The district court and the litigants uncritically agreed that the pre-AEDPA cause-and-prejudice test applied. Although it is true that Kelley filed his habeas petition prior to AEDPA’s enactment, the possibility of retroactive application complicates our analysis. The Supreme Court addressed the extent of AEDPA’s retroactive application in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). The Court noted that AEDPA amended portions of Title 28, Chapter 153 of the United States Code, which involves habeas corpus proceedings generally. Section 2254(e)(2), which contains- the updated limitations- on federal evidentiary hearings, was among the amended provisions in that chapter. AEDPA also “creates an entirely new chapter 154, with special rules favorable to the state party, but applicable only if the State meets certain conditions, including provision for appointment of postconviction counsel in state proceedings.” Id. at 327, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. AEDPA specifically provided that chapter 154, .which pertains only to capital cases, “shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” AEDPA § 107(c), 110 Stat. at 1221 (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 2261). Because the statute contained no similar indication about the reach of the amendments to chapter 153, the Supreme Court concluded that AEDPA’s text fairly implies “that the new provisions of chapter 153 generally apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective.” Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336, 117 S.Ct. at 2068. Although AEDPA’s pertinent provision, § 2254(e)(2), is contained in nonretroactive chapter 153, its restrictions might still apply to Kelley through chapter 154, which is retroactive and at least potentially applicable. Importantly, chapter 154 incorporates parts of -chapter 153 by reference; it expressly provides, for instance, that district courts must rule on the claims before them “subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of section 225k [.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2264(b) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court noted that where retroactive chapter 154 applies and incorporates parts of chapter 153 by reference, it renders those portions of AEDPA retroactive for its limited purposes. As the Court explained, “[W]hen a pending case is also an expedited capital case subject to chapter 154, the new provisions of §§ 2254(d) and (e) will apply to that case[,]” even though those sections are nonretroactive without the help of chapter 154. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 335, 117 S.Ct. at 2067; see also id. at 326, 117 S.Ct. at 2063 (“The statute reveals Congress’s intent to apply the amendments to chapter 153 only to such cases as were filed after the statute’s enactment (except where chapter 15U otherwise makes select provisions of chapter 153 applicable to pending cases)” (emphasis added)). Kelley’s habeas petition was pending when AEDPA became effective; thus, AEDPA’s restrictions on federal evidentiary hearings probably extend to his case if chapter 154 applies and makes them retroactive. This conclusion, of course, begs another challenging question: Is chapter 154 applicable? At the broadest level, the chapter, entitled “Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases,” applies only to “cases arising under section 2254, brought by prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2261(a). Without question, Kelley, unlike the petitioner in the Lindh case, is subject to a capital sentence. More particularly, chapter 154 only applies if the state that sentenced the petitioner meets the criteria of §§ 2261(b) and (c), which involve the appointment and compensation of competent postconviction counsel for the petitioner. At this time, it is not clear whether the state of Florida had satisfied those criteria. Here, the district court naively assumed that pre-AEDPA law applied. The court reasoned, “[Ejxcept for select provisions that Congress explicitly made retroactive, [AEDPA’s] amendments apply only to cases filed after the effective date of the amended statute.” Kelley, 222 F.Supp.2d at 1361 (S.D.Fla.2002). It concluded, “As Kelley’s petition was filed in 1992, and does concern the select retroactive provisions, this court must apply the law as it was prior to the 1996 amendments.” Id. The court did not explain why the retroactive provisions of chapter 154 did not concern Kelley’s petition. Indeed, it is apparent that the court never considered the possibility that chapter 154 made AED-PA’s other provisions retroactive such that they might control the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing in this case. This issue was not briefed to us, however, and the record lends no insight sufficient to permit us to decide whether chapter 154 extends to Florida such that AEDPA’s restrictions on evidentiary hearings should have applied in this case. 2. The District Court’s Failure to Apply Any Legal Standard In any event, the district court clearly abused its discretion by authorizing the hearing. The court compounded its failure to determine the applicable legal standard by neglecting to apply any standard at all. If AEDPA applied, the court could not have afforded Kelley an evidentiary hearing. The record was, and is, devoid of any indication that Kelley’s claims rely either on “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review” or on “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.... ” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Although it is the nature of Brady claims that the prosecution precludes the defense from obtaining important evidence before trial, we observe no indication that Rule 3.850 counsel were precluded from developing the factual basis for any of Kelley’s collateral claims through the exercise of due diligence during the Rule 3.850 proceedings. Nor do we perceive the remotest possibility that the facts supporting the three claims for which the evidentiary hearing was granted “would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [Kelley] guilty of [murder].” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Even if the district court were correct in its hasty assumption that pre-AEDPA law governed its decision, the court abused its discretion by neglecting to apply the pre-AEDPA test properly. Kelley, who also assumed that pre-AED-PA law applied, advanced, as he does here, several explanations for why he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Townsend. None have merit. He argues that the Rule 3.850 court’s factual determinations cannot be presumed correct because the court failed to address “crucial allegations and matter in dispute” and because it made “findings that were clearly unsupported by the record.” We cannot agree. In the Rule 3.850 court, Kelley’s attorneys placed twenty-six exhibits in evidence , and presented the testimony of ten witnesses in support of the Kelley’s claims for relief. The court systematically analyzed each of Kelley’s claims in a thorough opinion that was ultimately given great deference by the Florida Supreme Court. After reviewing the record of the Rule 3.850 proceedings, we conclude that the court’s findings are fairly supported. Thus, Kelley’s only basis for obtaining a federal evidentiary hearing must be that he failed to develop material facts adequately in the Rule 3.850 court. As explained above, the district court had discretion to allow a hearing before AEDPA took effect only if Kelley could satisfy Kee-ney ’s test of cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice. The court erroneously neglected to apply this standard. Indeed, although the court voiced its view that the hearing was necessary, the record is barren of any indication as to why it concluded that a hearing was permissible. Because it failed properly to apply Kee-ney and our subsequent precedent, the district court has deprived us of a record basis for deciding whether Kelley established cause and resulting prejudice for his failure to develop the factual bases for his claims in the Rule 3.850 court. In oral argument in this appeal, Kelley’s attorney agreed that the district court failed to make findings of cause and prejudice. In fact, he contended that this court could not make a cause-and-prejudice determination on the record as its stands, and that if we conclude that the district court erred in granting Kelley an evidentiary hearing, we should remand the case to the district court to permit Kelley to show the cause and prejudice that warranted the district court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing. Even so, we observe from what is before us that Kelley would have faced great difficulties in satisfying Keeney’s test. To show cause, Kelley had to prove that some impediment external to the decisions of his Rule 3.850 counsel prevented him from first presenting to the state court the evidence he introduced in the hearing in the district court. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Three of the eleven witnesses Kelley called to the stand before the district court testified to events that occurred in Kelley’s presence. If Kelley now hangs his “cause” hat on Brower’s insufficient pretrial investigation, we are baffled as to why Kelley required an investigator at all to discover these witnesses. Furthermore, the record reveals no hint that Kelley was incapable of fully developing his collateral claims in the Rule 3.850 court. Kelley’s failure to present evidence to that court must not be confused with his inability to develop certain evidence at the second trial. For example, although prosecutorial misconduct might have created cause for defense counsel’s failure to present certain evidence at trial, the record before us yields no indication that similar misconduct impeded counsel from presenting to the Rule 3.850 court the evidence they introduced (for the first time) at the federal hearing. By the same token, although trial records rarely reflect a complete account of an attorney’s ineffectiveness, there is no apparent reason why Kelley should not have known the extent of trial counsel’s shortcomings by the time he filed his Rule 3.850 motion for collateral relief. Kelley would also be hard-pressed to demonstrate any prejudice for failing to develop the new evidence that was not properly presented to the state court. If Kelley was prejudiced by such failure, it must be because he either (1) would have prevailed on a claim he asserted had he introduced the new evidence with it, or (2) would have prevailed on a claim he never asserted at all. Kelley cannot establish the latter circumstance. To raise an unexhausted claim for the first time in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner must first establish cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice for failing to exhaust the claim in state court. See, e.g., Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted). This is a onetime requirement. If the petitioner meets it successfully, he can go forward and develop the claim’s factual basis; if he does not, the claim is barred and the issue of factual development is moot. As we explain below, the district court improperly granted Kelley relief on an unexhausted instance of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See swpra Part IV.A. Because that instance of Kelley’s claim was not presented to the state courts, it was procedurally defaulted. Kelley obviously could not have been prejudiced in the district court by his failure to develop evidence in the Rule 3.850 court for a claim he can no longer raise. Kelley would also have difficulty establishing prejudice from Rule 3.850 counsel’s failure to present the new evidence supporting the claims he did exhaust. The district court correctly denied claims (4), (5), and (6) as a legal matter. Kelley, No. 92-14246 at 29 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 31, 2000). Additional evidence could not have enhanced these claims. The court rejected claim (3) on the ground that the State did not deny Kelley due process by destroying certain evidence after Sweet’s second trial because the State had not done so in bad faith. Kelley, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1329 (S.D.Fla.2002). Kelley’s new evidence had nothing whatsoever to do with the State’s intentions surrounding the destruction of the evidence. Thus, that evidence could not have enhanced that claim. Furthermore, for reasons we discuss below, see infra Part IV.B, Kelley’s Brady claims fail for lack of legal materiality. No amount of additional evidence can revive a claim that is legally insufficient. That leaves us with Kelley’s ineffective assistance claims. The evidence Kelley presented to the district court shed little light on the instances of his ineffective assistance claim that had been exhausted and, therefore, were preserved for federal review. Most of the new evidence appears relevant primarily to the