Full opinion text
SACK, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, Scott Huminski, is a longtime critic of the Vermont justice system who has sought to disseminate his message using a wide variety of means and media. In 1997, he became infuriated by what he thought to be his mistreatment by Vermont judges and prosecutors in the course of criminal proceedings against him. He therefore began to include angry denunciations of them in his public communications. He apparently thought himself to be a legitimate gadfly — a quintessential example of what Justice White once referred to as the “lonely pamphleteer.” But Vermont judges and court personnel, against the background of then-recent acts of terrorism and violence, interpreted his behavior as a potential threat to personal safety, to court property, and to the orderly conduct of court business. Vermont officials therefore broadly prohibited Huminski’s presence in and around certain state courthouses. Huminski complains that the restrictions are unconstitutional. In traversing these waters, we must avoid foundering on either of opposing shoals. One is abridgement of the rights that the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, confers on members of the public and press to attend and report on judicial proceedings and to speak out on public issues. The other is impairment- of the ability of courts effectively and efficiently to protect their personnel, property, and processes. We endeavor to chart a course between them. We conclude that Huminski had an individual First Amendment right of access to court proceedings even though he was not a party to and had no other official connection with them. The right created a presumption that he was entitled to access, but one that could be overcome if court officials reasonably decided that he might pose a threat to persons, property, or proceedings and if the restrictions on his access were reasonably tailored to meet the legitimate goals of the exclusion. We conclude, however, that this individual right was not well-settled at the time of the events at issue here and that the defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity with respect thereto. We also conclude that although the Rut-land courthouses and grounds are nonpublic forums, singling Huminski out for a prohibition against his ability to express himself on any subject in those locations violated his First Amendment right to express himself. In addition, we decide that defendants Sheriff Elrick, acting in his official capacity, and the Rutland County Sheriffs Department are protected by sovereign immunity from Huminski’s lawsuit insofar , as it seeks retrospective relief. We conclude, finally, that both Judge Corsones and Judge Zimmerman are entitled to judicial immunity with respect to these events. BACKGROUND Because consideration of the issues before us requires a careful review of the record, we set forth the factual background, and the competing factual assertions of parties and witnesses, in unfortunate detail. The manner in which we are required to consider such conflicting assertions of fact differs from argument to argument on appeal, as we explain below. ' At all relevant times, Huminski was a Vermont resident with an intense interest in the conduct of public officials involved in the state’s justice system, in particular, members of the state judiciary and the office of the Vermont Attorney General. Huminski, acting as what he calls a “citizen reporter,” disseminated his views by, among other things: becoming a source for national and local news organizations; posting signs at his residence and on his van parked in areas adjacent to public venues, such as the Vermont Statehouse and state courthouses; filing judicial conduct complaints; writing letters to public officials; and seeking public office: He based his views in part on his observations while attending state court sessions. As of May 24, 1999, Huminski had sought to convey his views about the Vermont justice system, at the Benningtqn District Court in Bennington, Vermont. He did, so some thirty times by posting signs on his van parked there. He encountered no opposition to his doing so or to his presence, at Bennington District Court proceedings.- Criminal Charges Huminski’s interaction with Vermont’s justice system had begun in earnest in February 1997, when he was charged in the' Bennington District Court with two counts of obstruction of justice. He was alleged to have sought to silence a possible witness against him in a civil case by threatening to have the witness jailed for shipping alcohol to minors if the witness testified. Huminski was further alleged to have manufactured evidence that the witness was in fact shipping alcohol to minors. Judge Nancy Corsones, a defendant in the instant proceedings, was assigned to preside in Huminski’s case. Huminski and the state reached a plea agreement, which Corsones initially approved. Subsequently, however, she granted the state’s motion to vacate the plea agreement, allowing the state to reinstate the charges against him. See State v. Huminski, No. 203-2-97 Bncr, at 12 (Vt.Dist.Ct. Sept. 4, 1998). Soon thereafter, Huminski filed several complaints against Corsones regarding that decision with Vermont’s Judicial Conduct Board. The complaints were ultimately dismissed as meritless. Letters of Complaint In September 1998, Huminski also sent letters of complaint to several Vermont public officials. Two of the letters are of particular interest. One, bitterly complaining about what Huminski thought to be his unfair treatment at the hands of the state, was sent to Cindy Maguire, Chief of the Criminal Division of the Vermont Attorney General’s Office. In it, Huminski railed against, among other things, what he referred to as Vermont “policies in violation of due process,” and crimes against himself and his wife. He warned that he would have to “take the law into [his] own hands and initiate activities that will get national media attention.” An excerpt from the letter is set forth in the margin. Huminski sent the other pertinent letter to Vermont Attorney General William Sor-rell, referring to similar contentions that he had previously made. In relevant part, he wrote: Your willingness to pervert the law of the State of Vermont for the purpose of attacking one person is criminal. I believe the state will prevail in its goals[;] however, I believe my future activities will prevent the state from engaging in this behavior ever again. I require a response to my previous correspondences by noon today. Continued evidence of your corrupt behavior requires that I accelerate my activities. Shortly thereafter, state law-enforcement officials investigated the correspondence. They decided that the letters were no more than Huminski’s expressions of frustration with the Vermont justice system, and that they did not exhibit an intent or desire on the part of Huminski to inflict personal harm to anyone. Corsones was neither the explicit subject nor a recipient of the letters. She nonetheless became aware of them soon after Huminski sent them. She interpreted the letters as a threat to her safety, that of her family, and that of the Vermont court system. More specifically, she thought that they contained a veiled bomb threat. Corsones’s views were reinforced by fearful Bennington District Court staff members who similarly perceived the letters as threats and told Corsones so. The staff members also voiced their concern about Huminski’s repeated presence at the courthouse in Bennington, particularly their fear that his van, often parked nearby, might contain a bomb. According to Corsones, at about this time, Huminski telecopied at least four communications to her former law office, where her then-husband continued to practice law. The only such communications that we find in the record, however, are Huminski’s complaints against her to the Judicial Conduct Board, which he asserts he sent to her to put her on notice of the complaints for purposes of according her due process. Protest at Rutland District Court More than six months later, on the morning of May 24, 1999, Huminski drove his van to the Rutland District Court courthouse in Rutland, Vermont — some fifty-five miles north of Bennington — where Corsones was then presiding. He later testified that his purpose was to publicize what he thought to be Corsones’s “oppressive and unconstitutional conduct.” Tr. of Dep. of Scott Huminski, Oct. 26, 2001, at 96. At approximately 7:30 a.m., Huminski parked his van in a legal parking space in the Rutland District Court parking lot. He displayed, on one side of the van, three signs, each measuring forty-five inches by fifty-four inches. They read, respectively: JUDGE CORSONES: BUTCHER OF THE CONSTITUTION * STRIPS DEFENDANTS OF RIGHT TO DEFENSE COUNSEL * REINSTITUTES CHARGES VIOLATING ART 11, CHI, VT CONST. * PUNISHES PROTECTED EXPRESSION WITH CRIMINAL CHARGES * MALICIOUSLY DISREGARDS DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY REINSTI-TUTING CHARGES AFTER CONVICTION AND FULL PUNISHMENT * SUBVERTS DUE PROCESS BY VACATING BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT POST-PUNISHMENT * UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PUNISHES DEFENDANT FOR SEEKING REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES IN CIVIL COURT * IGNORES AND ENCOURAGES PROSECUTORIAL VIOLATIONS OP THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CORSONES’ OPINION [Displayed was a copy of Corsones’s September 4, 1998, opinion vacating Hu-minski’s plea agreement.] THE LAW [Displayed were the decision of another state’s criminal court and three motions by Huminski to vacate Corsones’s September 4, 1998, opinion and to dismiss the charges against him in his case before Corsones.] Despite the presence of the signs on the van, Huminski later testified, its interior remained visible through the windows that were not blocked by the posters. This was the first time Huminski had explicitly mentioned Corsones in a public protest. According to the deposition testimony of Deputy Sheriffs Steven Schutt and Mark Beezup of the defendant Rutland County Sheriffs Department, they were on a security detail at the Rutland District Court that morning pursuant to a contract between the Sheriffs Department and the Vermont Court Administrator’s Office. The performance of the contract was supervised by the defendant Rutland County Sheriff R.J. Elrick. They noticed the van and the signs on it, which, Schutt recalled, contained Corsones’s name. They saw that although some of the van’s windows were covered, others were visible and presumably would permit them to see into the vehicle. Neither Schutt nor Beezup could recall whether either of them said anything to Huminski that morning, although Schutt remembered that Huminski said that he was there to observe the day’s court proceedings and Beezup thought it likely that another officer on the. scene spoke with Huminski. The deputy sheriffs contacted their supervisor, Captain Bruce Sherwin. They asked him whether the presence of the signs on the van violated the law. Sherwin responded that they did not. According to Beezup and Schutt, they then returned from the parking lot to the courthouse. Huminski testified, however, that Schutt and Beezup told him before returning to the courthouse that they had a problem with the signs on the van and asked him to remove them. Huminski refused. They then asked him to move his van to the back of the parking lot. Again he refused. Finally, Beezup told Huminski that the parking lot was for official court business only. Huminski replied that he was there to attend the day’s court proceedings. Neither deputy sheriff voiced a security-related concern about either Huminski’s signs or his parked van. When Corsones arrived at the Rutland District Court that day, she entered through the employee side-entrance. According to her deposition testimony, a court staff member met her there and told her- — mistakenly—that Huminski had improperly or illegally parked his van near the building on the other side of the courthouse. The staff member told her that a court deputy had asked Huminski to move his van, which he refused to do. The apparently skittish staff member also told her — again mistakenly — that no one could see inside the rear of the van. And a staff member reported that the signs called Corsones a “butcher.” Corsones herself never saw the van or the signs. Deputy Sheriff Schutt also told Cor-sones that there was a van parked outside the courthouse with signs on it that mentioned her. According to Schutt’s and Beezup’s deposition testimony, Corsones responded that Huminski had criminal charges pending against him in Benning-ton and that he had threatened her with regard' to the charges. She later testified that, at the time, she was alarmed by what she had been told that morning because of the earlier letters Huminski had sent and because she thought that Huminski was obsessed with her as a result of her previous reinstatement of the criminal charges against him. She was particularly afraid that Huminski’s van might contain explosives, although she did not tell the deputies so. Beezup testified that Corsones asked Schutt and him “if we could do something with [Huminski] ... — basically, she didn’t want him on the property.” Tr. of Dep. of Deputy Sheriff Mark Beezup, Oct. 24, 2001, at 7. The defendant Karen Predom, Court Manager for the Rutland District Court and the Rutland Family Court, was, at about this time, informed of the Huminski situation. One of Predom’s responsibilities was maintenance of security at the courthouse. She therefore attempted to keep track of Huminski’s whereabouts. She also telephoned Ed Polk, Vermont’s statewide Director of Court Security, bringing him up to date on the incident. Corsones spoke with Predom at some length about Huminski’s presence. She told Predom about the history of her previous interactions with him in Bennington and the letters he had sent to public officials. Predom later testified that based on this information, Huminski’s activities worried her, particularly because of then relatively recent detonations of explosives in vehicles inside the garage of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 and alongside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Her fears were exacerbated by her mistaken understanding that no one could see the inside of Huminski’s van. After their initial conversation, Predom and Corsones together placed another telephone call to Polk to discuss Huminski. They told Polk about their fears. The three discussed the possibility of having the situation investigated or of issuing a “Notice Against Trespass” to Huminski covering the Rutland District Court. Corsones was unwilling to begin proceedings in her courtroom while the perceived threats to her personal security remained unresolved. Predom therefore telephoned the defendant Rutland District Court Judge M. Patricia Zimmerman, who was presiding that day in Rutland Family Court. Predom told Zimmerman that Hu-minski had a vehicle parked at the courthouse with signs on it and that at least one sign discussed Corsones. Predom asked Zimmerman whether, given the Huminski issue, she would handle Corsones’s docket that morning. Zimmerman demurred on the ground that her own docket was full. May 2U Notice Against Trespass Corsones told the court staff that because of Huminski’s Judicial Conduct Board complaints against her, she would not participate in any decision about the court’s response to his presence. It was Predom, then, who took charge of the situation. She decided to issue a Notice Against Trespass to Huminski. Corsones, meanwhile, requested that Schutt issue a parallel Notice Against Trespass to Hu-minski covering her residence and her former law office. At about 8:30 a.m., an hour after the incident had begun, Rutland City Police Officer Robert Emerick was dispatched to the Rutland District Court to meet with Predom in response to her request that a Notice Against Trespass be issued. The Sheriffs Department “LAW Incident Table” listed Corsones as the complainant. When Emerick arrived, Predom requested that he serve a trespass notice on Humin-ski. Predom told Emerick that Huminski had already created difficulties, without detailing them. Emerick then completed the form for a Notice Against Trespass based on Predom’s instructions. The completed form (the “May 24 Notice”) stated that Huminski was “not to enter upon or remain upon the property that is lawfully possessed by” the Rutland District Court. The May 24 Notice permitted Huminski to enter upon and remain upon the Rutland court property, however, “only when [he had] a written notice from the court directing [his] appearance or if [he had] made prior arrangements or permission of the court manager” (emphasis in original). Predom signed the May 24 Notice as the “owner” or “tenant” of the Rutland District Court. At about the same time, Captain Sher-win informed Sheriff Elrick that Huminski was present on court property; that he had parked his vehicle, with signs mounted on it, in the court parking lot; and that court staff members had contacted the Sheriffs Department to convey their concern. Elrick thought Huminski to be a potential security risk based on information he had theretofore received from Cor-sones and others. At some point during the prior several weeks, Corsones had told him about her fears. Elrick had also previously learned that members of the staff of the Bennington District Court thought that the purpose of Huminski’s presence at the courthouse was to intimidate them and that they were in fact afraid of him. Elrick drove to the Rutland District Court. When he arrived, he saw Humin-ski’s van. He also saw the signs, although he did not get close enough to read them. Officer Emerick informed Sheriff Elrick that he, Emerick, was going to serve the May 24 Notice on Huminski. Emerick asked Elrick to accompany him. Elrick did not participate in the decision to issue the notice. He was unaware that court personnel feared that Huminski’s van contained explosives. Shortly before 9 a.m., Huminski entered the courthouse, where he underwent security screening without incident. He waited quietly in the hallway for the day’s proceedings to begin. Soon thereafter, Emer-ick approached Huminski and asked him to retire to a conference room with Emerick, Elrick, and Deputy Sheriff Schutt. Once inside, Emerick served Huminski with the May 24 Notice. Huminski refused to acknowledge formally his receipt of the May 24 Notice. Elrick therefore signed it as a witness instead.. Schutt also served Huminski with similar Notices Against Trespass for Corsones’s residence .and her former law office. Elrick signed these notices, too, in the face of Huminski’s refusal to execute an acknowledgment of their receipt. Hu-minski was told that he would be in violation of the May 24 Notice if he did not leave the courthouse. He therefore left, peacefully, with the three trespass notices in hand. May 27 Notice Against Trespass Soon after the incident at the Rutland courthouse, Elrick discovered that because of a then-recent statutory change, the May 24 Notice was improperly executed inasmuch as it had been signed by Predom alone. Elrick understood that under the new Vermont law, the court administrator’s office was responsible for state courthouses but the Vermont Commissioner of Buildings and General Services (the “Commissioner”) was now responsible for the grounds adjacent to the courthouses and other state property. Predom therefore could execute a trespass notice only for the courthouse, not for the adjacent parking lot and other grounds. The Commissioner told Elrick that he could act as the Commissioner’s agent to sign a renewed Notice Against Trespass applicable to the courthouse grounds and other state property on his behalf. The court administrator’s office and the administrative judge of the Rutland District Court therefore decided that a presiding judge would sign another Notice Against Trespass on behalf of the Rutland District Court. On May 27, 1999, another Notice Against Trespass (the “May 27 Notice”) was therefore issued and served on Huminski, barring him from “entering] upon or remain[ing] upon the property that is lawfully possessed by” the Rutland District Court. The May 27 Notice further identified the property as that “located in the Town of Rutland, County of Rutland, State of Vermont,” which included “[a]ll lands and property under the control of the Supreme Court and the Commissioner of Buildings and General Services, including the Rutland District Court, parking areas, and lands.” It was executed jointly by Zimmerman, on behalf of the court administrator’s office as a presiding judge in' the Rutland District Court (to cover the courthouse), and El-rick, as the agent of the Commissioner (to cover other court property). Zimmerman signed it after Elrick briefed her about Huminski’s van being parked in the courthouse parking lot on May 24 and about what he thought was an inability to see underneath the van. By this time, Zimmerman had also learned of the general tenor of the two letters by Huminski to the Vermont Attorney General’s office and had been told that Huminski had persistently tried to contact Corsones by letter and telecopy. The May 24 Notice signed by Predom was not, however, formally withdrawn. Huminski promptly moved in the Rutland District Court to vacate the May 24 and May 27 Notices and to disqualify Corsones from adjudicating the motions. A presiding judge — neither Corsones nor Zimmerman — decided that the motion to disqualify Corsones was moot. While doing so, the court noted its understanding that the May 24 Notice had been withdrawn, presumably by operation of the issuance of the May 27 Notice. The court concluded, however, that “the district court is a court of limited jurisdiction and cannot convene a ‘special proceeding’ to determine those issues.” June 29, 1999, Entry Regarding Motion in Huminski v. Rutland Dist. Court (Vt.Dist.Ct.1999). It also determined that because the court was itself a respondent in the proceedings, Hu-minski would be required to pursue his claims elsewhere. Huminski later testified that the trespass notices have limited his ability to attend court sessions to observe judicial proceedings, which in turn has interfered with his ability to gather information and disseminate his views about the Vermont judicial system. He also testified that the notices have stopped him from fully continuing his protest activities at the Rutland District Court and other Vermont state courts because of his fear of arrest and criminal prosecution. District Court Proceedings On June 1, 1999, Huminski filed suit against Corsones, Zimmerman, Predom, Elrick, and the Rutland County Sheriffs Department, in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. He claimed, among other things, that the defendants had deprived him of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to criticize public officials and to gain access to courthouses. He invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requesting declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On February 2, 2001, Huminski moved in the district court for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the May 24 and May 27 Notices, as well as any future trespass notices, until the court rendered a decision on the merits of the case. On February 27, 2001, the court (J. Garvan Murtha, Judge) preliminarily enjoined the defendants “from issuing or enforcing any notices of trespass against Huminski that prevent him from accessing court property where such notices are based solely upon Huminski’s public expression of his political opinions so long as the expression does not disrupt or threaten the orderly performance of court business.” Huminski v. Rutland County, 134 F.Supp.2d 362, 366 (D.Vt. 2001) (“Huminski /”). The court reasoned that Huminski’s allegations of First Amendment violations were sufficient to demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue and that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. See id. at 363-66. On March 9, 2001, Corsones and Zimmerman moved to dismiss Huminski’s complaint on the grounds, among others, that they were absolutely immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity and that they were immune from suit in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. See Huminski v. Rutland County, 148 F.Supp.2d 373, 376 (D.Vt.2001) (“Humin-ski II”). The court reasoned that there could be no finding of judicial immunity as a matter of law because the' defendant judges had not addressed whether they had the authority to issue the May 24 or May 27 Notices based on the information they had at the time. Id. at 378. The court concluded, though, that as state officers, Corsones and Zimmerman were not persons subject to suit insofar as they were sued in their official capacities for retrospective relief. They were therefore immune from suit in that regard. Id. at 379. In the district court’s view, however, they were subject in that capacity to claims for prospective relief and therefore remained subject to the previously entered preliminary injunction. Id. On January 31, 2002, and February 1, 2002, the various defendants moved for summary judgment. Elrick and the Rut-land County Sheriffs Department argued, among other things, that they were entitled to sovereign immunity and qualified immunity, that there was no basis on which to grant a permanent injunction against them, and that the Department could not be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Corsones and Zimmerman asserted in relevant part that they were entitled to absolute judicial immunity and to qualified immunity. And Predom contended, among other things, that she was entitled to qualified immunity, that Huminski had not suffered any injury, and that injunctive relief was unwarranted because there was no continuing violation of federal law. On January 31, 2002, Huminski cross-moved for partial summary judgment and asked that the injunction be made permanent on the grounds that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, their actions violated his constitutional rights to attend court hearings and to criticize public officials. He also contended that neither judicial nor qualified immunity protected the defendants’ actions. On July 11, 2002, the district court, in a thoughtful and thorough opinion, ruled that Predom, Corsones, and Zimmerman were immune from suit in federal court insofar as Huminski sought damages against them in their official capacities. Huminski v. Rutland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 211 F.Supp.2d 520, 531 (D.Vt.2002) (“Huminski III ”). The court also decided that Elrick was immune from liability under- section 1983 in his official capacity because he acted for the State of Vermont with respect to state courthouse security. Id. at 531-32. For that reason, the Department was similarly immune. Id. at 532 n. 20. What then remained of Huminski’s section 1983 claims were his requests (1) for monetary relief against Predom, Elrick, Corsones, and Zimmerman in their personal capacities for alleged past constitutional violations, and (2) for permanent injunctive and declaratory relief against - Predom, Corsones, and Zimmerman in their official capacities for alleged ongoing constitutional violations. Id. at 532. The district court concluded that Cor-sones and Zimmerman did not qualify for judicial immunity. Id. at 535. It ruled that “the issuance of a criminal trespass notice in’Vermont is not a judicial act.” Id. at 533.’ It held that Corsones’s involvement in'the decisionmaking process that led to the issuance of the trespass notices was sufficient to trigger possible personal liability for her. Id. at 533-34. According to the court, the judges were “act[ing] in a ... non-judicial capacity- — as the representative of the true.landowner (the State of Vermont) — in facilitating the-issuance of the initial trespass notice.” Id. at 534 (Corsones); see also id. at 535 (Zimmerman). Moreover, the court reasoned, “the general rule that judges act in a judicial capacity whenever they order the removal of persons from their courtroom who disrupt or otherwise negatively impact the judicial process” did not apply because providing security at a courthouse building is not an adjudicative function. Id. at 534. The court also observed that the Vermont statute that entrusts the state judiciary with the duty to maintain security at Vermont courthouses does not transform trespass notices issued by state judicial officers into judicial acts. Id. Finally, the court concluded that the judges’ actions were not judicial in nature “because Hu-minski had no official business” at the Rutland District Court on the morning in question. Id. at 534-35. Turning to the First Amendment questions raised by the parties’ motions, the district court construed the May 27 Notice as barring Huminski from all lands and property under control of the Vermont Supreme Court, even those outside of Rut-land. See id. at 528-29 & 529 n. 11. The court determined that these lands and property (including state court buildings and their adjacent parking lots) were neither “traditional public fora” nor “designated public fora,” but were instead “nonpublic fora.” See id. at 537-39. The court therefore addressed the question whether the trespass notices were a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restriction of expressive activity, the test for evaluation of restrictions of expressive activity in nonpublic forums. See id. at 539-42. The court did not separately address Huminski’s claim that the defendants violated his First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. The district court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment on the issue whether the trespass notices were viewpoint neutral. It therefore denied Predom’s, Corsones’s, and Zimmerman’s motions for summary judgment with respect to Huminski’s claims for monetary relief on the ground of qualified immunity. See id. at 539-40. The court reasoned that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the defendants’ actions were motivated by security concerns or by disagreement with the views reflected on the signs on Humin-ski’s van. Id. at 529. The court decided that some of the circumstances, such as the expression of concern about Huminski to Corsones by court staff at the Benning-ton District Court, supported the defendants’ position. Id. at 529-30. But it also was of the view that countervailing considerations — such as the fact that Huminski had never before caused a disturbance relating to his criticism of Corsones and the fact that although Huminski had participated in many previous protests, he was cited for trespass the first time that he criticized Corsones — supported Huminski’s position that these defendants violated his right to be free from governmental discrimination against him as a speaker based on disagreement with his viewpoint. Id. at 530-31. The court concluded that there was therefore a genuine dispute as to a material fact — viewpoint neutrality — that precluded summary judgment. Id. at 540. But the court granted Elrick’s motion for summary judgment as to Huminski’s claims for monetary relief against Elrick in his personal capacity, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 542. The court reasoned that inasmuch as Elrick never saw Huminski’s protest signs, he could not have engaged in viewpoint discrimination. Id. Even had Elrick seen the signs, moreover, Huminski “fail[ed] to demonstrate that a reasonable official in [Elrick’s] position ... would have known that the notices against trespass were ‘clearly’ unreasonable.” Id. The court then denied Huminski’s motion for partial summary judgment on his demands for monetary relief. See id. at 542. The court, now viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendants, decided that the trespass notices were reasonable in light of the purpose of the state court facilities and the availability of alternative means by which Huminski could have communicated his grievances. The court also said that Huminski had failed to demonstrate that “a reasonable official in Defendants’ position — and thérefore concerned about security in light of Huminski’s presence — would have known that the notices against trespass were ‘clearly’ unreasonable as a matter of law.” Id. Because the court concluded that there was “no reasonable likelihood” that Huminski would succeed on the merits, it also dissolved its preliminary injunction. Id. at 542-43. Subsequently, on August 22, 2002, the district court granted Huminski’s motion to stay its dissolution of the preliminary injunction pending further' proceedings. Huminski v. Rutland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:99-CV-160, at 16-19 (D.Vt. Aug.22, 2002). It also granted Huminski’s motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of its summary judgment rulings. Id.; Huminski v. Rutland County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:99-CV-160 (D.Vt. Jan.16, 2003). We agreed to hear the appeal. Huminski v. Corsones, No. 03-6059 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2003). Pursuant to the certification, Huminski appeals the district court’s conclusion as to the reasonableness of the trespass notices under the First Amendment, the court’s dissolution of the preliminary injunction, and the court’s grant of summary judgment to Elrick. Corsones and Zimmerman appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on the grounds of judicial immunity and qualified immunity. Predom appeals the court’s denial of her motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review “We may overturn a district court’s decision to dissolve a preliminary injunction only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion, which usually involves either the application of an incorrect legal standard or reliance on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 24 (2d Cir.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872, 121 S.Ct. 173, 148 L.Ed.2d 118 (2000). We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir.2003). The moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment. Castro v. United States, 34 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.1994). The motion should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, Show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ... draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” World Trade Ctr., 345 F.3d at 166. Only when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[ is there] no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). II. Sovereign Immunity In granting Sheriff Elrick’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Elrick is immune from liability under section 1983 in his official capacity because he acted for the State of Vermont with respect to state courthouse security. Huminski III, 211 F.Supp.2d at 531-32. By extension, it also concluded that the Rutland County Sheriffs Department is similarly immune. Id. at 532 n. 20. Hu-minski contends that the district court erred in according Elrick the benefit of sovereign immunity as a state official with responsibility for state courthouse security because he is a county official for whom sovereign immunity is not warranted with regard to either his involvement in issuing the Notices Against Trespass or any future involvement in enforcing the trespass notices. Huminski also contends that to the extent Elrick was a state official, he is in any event subject in his official capacity to injunctive and other prospective relief. Elrick responds that he is immune from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks retrospective relief because all of his actions relevant to this appeal were taken while Elrick was acting as a state official with respect to state courthouse security. A. General Principles “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under [42 U.S.C.]§ 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Therefore, state officials cannot be sued in their official capacities for retrospective relief under section 1983. See id. Nonetheless, state officials can be subject to suit in their official capacities for injunctive or other prospective relief. Id. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Suit can also be brought against them under section 1983 in their individual capacities for both prospective and retrospective relief. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Posr v. Court Officer Shield #207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir.1999). On the other hand, “local government officials sued in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 in those cases in which ... a local government would be suable in its own name.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Whether a defendant is a state or local official depends on whether the defendant represented a state or a local government entity when engaged in the events at issue. See McMiUian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785-86, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). To answer that question here, we must determine, inter alia, whether it was the State of Vermont or Rutland County that controlled Elrick in his involvement in the events leading up to and culminating in his serving Huminski with the trespass notices. [O]ur inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law. This is not to say that state law can answer the question for us by, for example, simply labeling as a state official an official who clearly makes county policy. But our understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s function under relevant state law. Id. at 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734 (citations omitted). Relevant factors in determining the status of an official include how the state’s laws and courts categorize the official; whether the official is elected and by whom; the scope of the official’s duties; to whom the official is fiscally responsible, if anyone; which governmental entity sets or pays the official’s salary; which governmental entity provides the official’s equipment, if any; and the scope of the official’s jurisdiction. See id. at 787-91, 117 S.Ct. 1734. For a law-enforcement official, the most important factor in making this determination is whether he or she has the authority to investigate and enforce the state’s criminal law. See id. at 790, 117 S.Ct. 1734. Whether a sheriff is elected statewide or countywide and where a sheriffs jurisdictional boundaries lie are, by contrast, relatively unimportant factors. See id. at 794, 117 S.Ct. 1734 (“As the basic forms of English government were transplanted in our country, it also became the common understanding here that the sheriff, though limited in jurisdiction to his county and generally elected by county voters, was in reality an officer of the State, and ultimately represented the State in fulfilling his duty to keep the peace.” (footnote omitted)). The impact of a governmental entity’s payment of an official’s salary, moreover, although important, is softened if that entity does not control the amount of the salary or cannot refuse to pay the salary entirely. See id. at 791, 117 S.Ct. 1734. With these factors in mind, we review Vermont’s statutory scheme to assess the function and control of sheriffs and sheriffs departments. B. The Status of Sheriffs under Vermont Law Vermont Statutes Title Twenty-Four, Chapter Five, contains provisions regarding the powers and duties of sheriffs and sheriffs departments. It establishes a sheriffs department in each Vermont county. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 290(a). Each department consists of a sheriff elected by the people of the county and, as appointed by the sheriff, deputy sheriffs and supporting staff. Id.; see also Vt. Const, ch. II, § 50 (providing for the election of sheriffs by the voters of their respective districts). According to the statute, “[f|ull-time employees of the sheriffs department, paid by the county, [are] county employee's for all purposes but [are] eligible to join the state employees retirement system, provided the county [pays] the employer’s share.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 290(a). A sheriffs duties include preserving the peace. Id. § 299. The powers of sheriffs and their deputies with respect to criminal matters and law enforcement extend statewide. Id. §§ 307(c), 312. “The sheriffs department [is also] entitled to utilize all state services available to a town within the county.” Id. § 290(a). Sheriffs and full-time deputy sheriffs must provide Vermont’s Commissioner of the Department of Finance and Management and their county clerk quarterly reports as to their compensation received as sheriffs. Id. § 290b(a); see also id. tit. 3, app., Exec. Order No. 3-11 (establishing the commissioner’s position). Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts has the power to audit each department’s accounts at any time, receives information from the state’s sheriffs departments and sheriffs about these accounts, establishes a uniform accounting system for these departments, and annually reviews the accounting records thereof. Id. tit. 24, §§ 290b(b)-(e); see also Vt. Const, ch. II, § 48 (requiring the Auditor of Accounts to be elected by the state’s voters on the same ticket as the Governor). A sheriff may'enter into a written contract with the State of Vermont or a town within the relevant county “to provide law enforcement or other related services including, but not limited to, security services.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 291a(a). C. Sheriff Elrick’s Assertion of Sovereign Immunity Sovereign immunity, in these circumstances, operates only retrospectively. EI-rick cannot benefit from such immunity with respect to his possible future behavior, with regard to enforcement of the trespass notices or otherwise. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304. The retrospective relief that Huminski seeks from Elriek concerns only his actions that led up to and culminated in the issuance of the Notices Against Trespass. We must therefore determine whether Elriek was a Rutland County official or a Vermont official only with regard to those' actions. We agree with the district court that an analysis of the relevant factors indicates that Sheriff Elriek was a state official with regard to his involvement in the events related to the issuance of the trespass notices. The Rutland County Sheriffs Department, for whom Elriek was employed, had a contract with the State of Vermont through the Vermont Court Administrator’s Office to manage security at the Rut-land District Court. We think that Elrick was acting as a state official while doing so and when he played a role in the issuance and service of the trespass notices. First, when Elrick was performing the contract, he was acting as a supervisory policymaker for the State of Vermont, irrespective of what his status was when he performed his other duties as a sheriff. Second, it is undisputed that Elrick acted as a state official when he signed the May 27 Notice as the agent of the Commissioner, himself a state official. Third, although it is not necessary to decide the broader issue, we think that in light of the statutory structure under which Elrick acted, he was likely a state official when he was performing his general duties for the sheriffs department, particularly when he was acting pursuant to state law, as he was with respect to the Huminski incident. State statute establishes the most important factor in this inquiry, see McMillian, 520 U.S. at 790, 117 S.Ct. 1734: Elrick had the authority to investigate and enforce the State of Vermont’s criminal law in Rutland County. He was therefore acting for the state when he engaged in the behavior that is at issue here. It follows that Elrick is immune in his official capacity from suit for retrospective relief. Because Elrick is entitled to sovereign immunity, we also affirm the district court’s holding that the Rutland County Sheriffs Department is similarly immune. Neither of these defendants is immune, however, from injunctive or other prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). To the extent that the district court held otherwise, we reverse. III. Judicial Immunity The district court denied the motion by Judges Corsones and Zimmerman for summary judgment in part because of its conclusion that they were not entitled to judicial immunity. Corsones and Zimmerman maintain that the district court erred in so ruling because, in performing the acts that underlie Huminski’s claims, they were acting within their judicial capacities to protect court security and court operations. They also assert that Huminski’s dealings with the judges were in their judicial capacities with respect to the issuance of the trespass notices. Huminski replies that neither Corsones nor Zimmerman acted in her judicial capacity but instead each acted in her administrative capacity, and, similarly, that Huminski’s dealings with the judges were not in their judicial capacities. He asks us to conclude that they are therefore not protected by judicial immunity. We ultimately conclude that Corsones and Zimmerman are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their behavior relating to the issuance of the Notices Against Trespass in connection with Hu-minski’s claim that they violated his First Amendment right of access to the courthouse, but that they would not, as a matter of law, be qualifiedly immune with respect to his claim that they violated his First Amendment right to criticize public officials. See infra sections IV.A.4, IV.B.2. Inasmuch as they are not shielded by qualified immunity from prospective relief and are not protected by such immunity from monetary relief with respect to Huminski’s free-expression claims, we must consider their assertion that judicial immunity protects them. A. General Principles Judicial immunity has been created both by statute and by judicial decision “for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (“As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court recognized that it was a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, should be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)). “Imposing ... a burden [of exposure to liability] on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213. Judges, acting as judges, who are threatened with personal liability for those actions, may well be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct. In this way, exposing [judges] to the same legal hazards faced by other citizens may detract from the rule of law instead of contributing to it. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). In furtherance of these ends, “in any action brought against a judicial officer [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983] for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam) (discussing this statutory form of judicial immunity in the context of section 1983 actions). Judges are, of course, immune from liability for damages under many circumstances. See, e.g., Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213; Heimbach v. Vill. of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam). [T]he necessary inquiry in determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit [for damages] is whether at the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.... [T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability ... when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As intimated by the Stump excerpt, our determination that a judicial official is entitled to judicial immunity “is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam); see also Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 932 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997, 118 S.Ct. 562, 139 L.Ed.2d 402 (1997). Thus, if the relevant action is judicial in nature, the judge is immune so long as it was not taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286; Tucker, 118 F.3d at 933. A judge is not protected under the doctrine of judicial immunity, however, if the action in question is not judicial in nature, as when the judge performs an administrative, legislative, or executive act. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099; Tucker, 118 F.3d at 933. “To conclude that, because a judge acts within the scope of his authority, such ... decisions are brought within the court’s ‘jurisdiction,’ or converted into ‘judicial acts,’ would lift form above substance.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230, 108 S.Ct. 538. Instead, “the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act itself, ie., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, ie., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099; accord Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir.1997) (“The Supreme Court has established a two-prong test to determine whether an act is ‘judicial.’ First, the [c]ourt must consider whether the function is normally performed by a judge.... Second, the court must assess whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 1517, 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (observing that “immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). An act by a judicial official need not be formal for it to constitute a judicial act. Stump, 435 U.S. at 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citing In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 89 L.Ed. 1795 (1945)). We do not examine the particular act at issue but the nature and function of the act; “if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a ‘non-judicial’ act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge.” Míreles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 286. At the margins, it can be difficult to distinguish between those actions that are judicial, and which therefore receive immunity, and those that happen to have been performed by judges, but are administrative, legislative, or executive in nature. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. 538; cf. Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir.1994) (“Clearly, the paradigmatic judicial act is the resolution of a dispute between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court. We have indicated that any time an action taken by a judge is not an adjudication between parties, it is less likely that the act is a judicial one. We have been reluctant to extend the doctrine of judicial immunity to contexts in which judicial decisionmaking is not directly involved.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)). “Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not ... been regarded as judicial acts.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228, 108 S.Ct. 538. For example, there is no judicial immunity for a judge’s demotion and discharge of a subordinate court employee, id. at 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, or for judges’ promulgation as rulemakers of a code of conduct for lawyers, even though the issuance of the code was a proper function of the judges, id. at 228, 108 S.Ct. 538 (citing Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980)). By contrast, “[a] judge’s direction to court officers to bring a person who is in the courthouse before him is a function normally performed by a judge. [Such a person], who was called into the courtroom for purposes of a pending case, was dealing with [the judge] in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 286 (citing state law on the powers of state judges). A court’s control of its docket is also a judicial act because it “is part of [a court’s] function of resolving disputes between parties.” Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir.1997). And the Sixth Circuit has held that a judge performed a judicial act when he issued a report critical of a party who appeared before him, even though it “[bore] some resemblance to an administrative act,” Cameron, 38 F.3d at 272 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), because “[t]he report specifically addresse[d] problems directly associated with the disposition of the types of cases before [the judge’s] court,” id. In the Sixth Circuit’s view, “the report was closely related to the performance of [the judge’s] functions as a judge.” Id. The court also reasoned that “[a] judge’s judicial independence would be severely compromised if he could not comment on or criticize the offices supporting his own court, without fear of liability.” Id. B. Judge Corsones’s and Judge Zimmerman’s Assertion of Judicial Immunity We look to state law to determine whether Corsones and Zimmerman acted within their jurisdiction and to inform our inquiry as to whether they acted, and Hu-minski dealt with them, in their judicial capacities. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 357, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Under Vermont law, the Vermont state courts have jurisdiction over the security of courthouse buildings or spaces where a court is housed, while the Vermont Commissioner of Buildings and General Services has responsibility for the security of the lands of such courts. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 171. Vermont law also allows state courts to take certain actions to “secure both the proper transaction and dispatch of business and the respect and obedience due to the court and necessary for the administration of justice.” State v. Allen, 145 Vt. 593, 600, 496 A.2d 168, 172 (1985) (citation, internal quotation marks, alterations, and emphasis omitted). One such approved action is summary punishment of a person for criminal contempt. Id.; see also State v. Robinson, 165 Vt. 351, 353, 683 A.2d 1005, 1007 (1996). Another is the exclusion of spectators from courtroom proceedings under certain circumstances. See State v. Rusin, 153 Vt. 36, 38-41, 568 A.2d 403, 405-06 (1989); accord Cosentino v. Kelly, 102 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“[I]t is essential to the proper administration of ... justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970))), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1821, 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997); Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 149-52 (2d Cir.1994) (approving of, inter alia, a judge’s orders to a former law clerk (1) to leave the courtroom if he wished to examine documents, (2) not to go in and out of the courtroom repeatedly, and (3) to be quiet when he tried to respond to the second order), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816, 115 S.Ct. 73, 130 L.Ed.2d 28 (1994); see also Cameron, 38 F.3d at 271 (holding that a judge is entitled to judicial immunity for acts that exercise control over his or her courtroom (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966))); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir.1974); Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278, 280 (10th Cir.1973) (per curiam). We conclude in light of the foregoing that Corsones is immune 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks injunctive relief, provided declaratory relief remains available, and she has not violated a previous declaratory judgment, and 2) under the judicially established judicial-immunity doctrine, from Huminski’s suit insofar as it seeks monetary relief with respect to her role in the issuance of the May 24 and May 27 Notices. First, Corsones did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Vermont law grants its state courts the authority to ensure the security of their facilities. Judges also have substantial power to maintain the decorum and security of their courtrooms and the courthouses in which those courtrooms are located. Irrespective of her motives, which are irrelevant to this inquiry, Corsones therefore did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction when she participated in a decision to issue to Huminski trespass notices barring him from certain state court buildings and lands, as set out in the notices. Second, to the extent that she' participated in a decision to issue the trespass notices, Corsones engaged in a judicial act because the general nature and function of her actions were substantially judicial. See Barrett, 130 F.3d at 257-58 (concluding that a judge was entitled to judicial immunity for actions that included letters she wrote on judicial letterhead to state and federal prosecutors requesting an investigation, of the plaintiff, against whom she had previously rendered judgment, after concerns arose for her safety based on the plaintiffs actions). There was a nexus between her actions — whether or not her actions were motivated by security and safety concerns — and Huminski’s criminal case before her. Huminski’s letters, complaints, and protests regarding Corsones stemmed directly and proximately from her deci