Full opinion text
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge. Mary Doe challenges the State of California’s jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights over her Indian child, Jane Doe, who was domiciled on the Elem Indian Colony reservation at the time she was removed from Mary Doe’s custody by the Lake County Department of Social Services. The case arises under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which was passed in 1978 to ensure the tribes a role in adjudicating child custody proceedings involving Indian children. P.L, 95-608, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. ICWA provides that tribes will have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled or residing on the reservation “except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (emphasis added). Under one such federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), commonly known as “Public Law .280,” California is vested with broad criminal and certain civil jurisdiction over Indians. This case presents an issue of first impression for the federal courts, requiring us to reconcile Public Law 280’s grant of certain jurisdiction to the state of California over Indians with the exclusive jurisdiction granted to tribes by ICWA over child custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on Indian reservations. As a threshold matter, we conclude that the federal court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and, in conjunction with ICWA, may use that jurisdiction to review the state court judgment terminating Mary Doe’s parental rights; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction. On the merits, we conclude that ICWA does not provide the Elem Indian Colony with exclusive jurisdiction over this child dependency proceeding involving Jane Doe, an Indian child. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the State of California. I. Factual and Procedural Background Mary Doe is a member of the federally recognized Elem Indian Colony in Lake County, California. In 1999, Jane told her mother that a minor male cousin had sexually assaulted her. Mary Doe called the Department of Social Services, and the agency responded by removing Jane from her great-aunt’s home on the Elem Indian Colony’s reservation, where Jane was residing at the time. The Department of Social Services initiated child dependency proceedings in Lake County Superior Court under California’s Welfare and Institutions Code (“Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code”) §§ 300(b) and (d) based on Mary Doe’s failure to protect her daughter. Jane was placed in a licensed foster home while the state dependency proceedings were pending in state superior court. In the fall of 2000, the Elem Indian Colony intervened in the superior court proceedings. At the same time, the Tribal Council passed a resolution declaring that Jane should be placed for adoption with Mary Doe’s brother and her sister-in-law. The superior court terminated Mary Doe’s parental rights in 2001. Jane’s foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. D, petitioned to adopt her. Mrs. D is an Indian but not a member of the Elem Indian Colony. Despite the Elem Indian Colony’s resolution, the superior court approved the adoption by Mr. and Mrs. D. The petition for adoption stated that Jane was an Indian child under ICWA and was affiliated with the Elem Indian Colony. A year and a half after her parental rights were terminated, Mary Doe filed a complaint in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Among other claims, Mary Doe challenged the superior court’s jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights and to approve Jane’s adoption by Mr. and Mrs. D. Mary Doe named as defendants two Superior Court Judges and the Superior Court (collectively “Courb-Appellees”), Mr. and Mrs. D, and the Department of Social Services. The district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar it from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Mary Doe’s complaint because § 1914 provides a cause of action in federal court to invalidate certain state court child custody proceedings. Doe v. Mann, 285 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1233-34 (N.D.Cal.2003). Applying its jurisdiction, the district court held that, because the Elem Indian Colony did not have exclusive jurisdiction over child dependency proceedings under § 1911(a), the superior court had jurisdiction to terminate Mary Doe’s parental rights and approve Jane’s adoption. Id. at 1238-39. The district court entered a final judgment against Mary Doe, thus leaving intact the state court parental termination and adoption orders. II. Jurisdiction Mary Doe’s district court complaint asserted that the state judges and “the Superior Court erroneously deprived [Mary Doe] of custody of [Jane] without jurisdiction.” Invoking § 1914, which provides that a parent “may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate” a parental rights termination order, Mary Doe sought a declaration that the state court judgments terminating Mary Doe’s parental rights and approving the adoption of Jane were null and void for lack of jurisdiction under ICWA. Mary Doe contended that § 1911(a) provides the Elem Indian Colony exclusive jurisdiction over Jane’s dependency proceedings because Jane was domiciled within Indian country at the time dependency proceedings commenced. Typically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in “which a party losing in state court” seeks “what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). The nature of Mary Doe’s federal complaint falls squarely within the confines of a “de facto appeal” of a state court judgment that would be outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district court under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.2003) (federal district court must refuse to hear “a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court”). We ultimately conclude, however, that the federal district court had jurisdiction to consider Mary Doe’s complaint because the federal district court had federal question jurisdiction over Mary Doe’s claims, and § 1914 grants federal district courts the authority to invalidate state court actions that violate §§ 1911, 1912, and 1913. A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). In simple terms, “[u]nder Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 896(9th Cir.2003). The Supreme Court has applied the doctrine only three times, in the named cases and, just this year, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., where it emphasized the narrow scope of the doctrine: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court activities. — U.S.-,-, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Our earlier precedent is consistent. As we explained in Noel v. Hall, [a] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision. 341 F.3d at 1158. Mary Doe first tries to sidestep Rooker-Feldman on the theory that state court jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not raised and litigated in Lake County Superior Court, thus preventing Mary Doe’s federal complaint from being characterized as a de facto appeal. Rather than ask the federal district court to reconsider the substance of the state court orders to terminate Mary Doe’s parental rights and approve the adoption of Jane, Mary Doe contends the complaint presents a new jurisdictional issue. We are not persuaded. Although the ICWA jurisdictional issue was not raised in the state court proceedings, Mary Doe’s federal claim is still a de facto appeal of a state court judgment, and the jurisdictional issue raised by Mary Doe is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. Indeed, while not explicitly addressed in the state court’s rulings terminating Mary Doe’s parental rights and approving Jane’s adoption, the state court necessarily must have concluded it had jurisdiction pursuant to ICWA and Public Law 280 to make those decisions. Thus, the fact that Mary Doe now challenges the state court’s jurisdiction under ICWA does not change our initial Rooker-Feldman calculus. Mary Doe requests that we “undo” a prior state court judgment, which is another way of presenting a federal district court with a de facto appeal that bars subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 (“Stated plainly, Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, re-gardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.”) (citations omitted). Our conclusion that Mary Doe’s case falls within the traditional boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is but one piece of the jurisdictional puzzle. We next consider whether Congress, in enacting ICWA, provided federal courts authority to invalidate state court actions in the narrow area of child custody proceedings involving Indian children. If so, Rooker-Feldman would not preclude federal jurisdiction. Before turning to ICWA, we consider other circumstances in which Congress authorized federal courts to review state court judgments. B. Congressional Grants of Authority to Review State Court Judgments The Constitution does not command the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“Rooker-Feldman is not a constitutional doctrine. Rather, the doctrine arises out of a pair of negative inferences drawn from two statutes.”). As a result, Congress may authorize federal district courts to review state court judgments. Id. at 1079(Rooker-Feldman must be considered in the context of “the entire federal jurisdictional constellation,” including congressional grants of authority to review state-court decisions in certain cases). Federal statutes that permit federal courts to review state court judgments are rare but obvious. Two examples, ha-beas corpus and bankruptcy jurisdiction, are often referred to as “exceptions” to Rooker-Feldman. As we explained in Noel, the principle that there should be no appellate review of state court judgments by federal trial courts has two particularly notable statutory exceptions: First, a federal district court has original jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus brought by state prisoners who claim that the state court has made an error of federal law. Second, a federal bankruptcy court has original jurisdiction under which it is empowered to avoid state judgments, to modify them, and to discharge them. 341 F.3d at 1155 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In both instances, the statutes reflect clear congressional grants of authority. Another useful example of an explicit grant of authority for federal courts to invalidate state court judgments is the implementing legislation of the Hague Convention. The statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), provides that state and federal courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague Convention. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a). We have interpreted this provision of ICARA to provide federal district courts the authority to vacate state custodial decrees that violate the Hague Convention: In this case, Congress has expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a). Thus, federal courts must have the power to vacate state custody determinations and other state court orders that contravene the treaty. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n. 55 (9th Cir.2001). Whether characterized as exceptions to Rooker-Feldman or as specific grants of authority, these three examples underscore that Congress may by statute grant federal courts authority to review certain state court judgments. C. ICWA § 1914 — Authority to. Invalidate State Court Actions The question we now consider is whether § 1914 is a grant of authority to the federal courts to invalidate certain state court child custody proceedings that counteracts the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Section 1914 provides: Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 101, 102, and 103 of this Act [25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1912, and 1913]. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (emphasis added). Federal cases that have interpreted § 1914 are few and far between, and no case has analyzed § 1914 in the jurisdictional context or in relation to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court held, by a process of elimination, that § 1914 granted it authority to review the state court judgment: [B]y a process of elimination, a “court of competent jurisdiction” must include inferior federal courts, or the provision is .meaningless. If the section only referred to state appellate courts, there would be no need for Congress to create this cause of action; Doe already has the right to appeal an adverse decision to California’s higher courts. It is highly unlikely that the provision grants tribal courts the power to invalidate state court judgments. This court finds that section 1914 grants federal courts the power to review state custody proceedings such as those here; therefore, the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine does not apply to the action at bar. 285 F.Supp.2d at 1233-34. We reach the same conclusion, but via a different path. On its face, the statutory language is clear and very broad: “any court of competent jurisdiction” may invalidate a state court action. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (emphasis added). Certainly the federal court easily fits within the broad “any court” language, but we must determine whether the statute confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts. At the outset, it is important to note that despite broad language, § 1914 is not a statute that itself confers jurisdiction. In an analogous situation involving the Administrative Procedure Act, the Supreme Court reasoned that 5 U.S.C. § 703’s reference to a “court of competent jurisdiction” was not a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction: Title 5 U.S.C. § 702 makes clear that a person wronged by agency action “is entitled to judicial review thereof.” But § 703 suggests that this language was not intended as an independent jurisdictional foundation, since such judicial review is to proceed “in a court specified by statute” or “in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Both of these clauses seem to look to outside sources of jurisdictional authority. Thus, at best, the text of [§§ 702 and 703] is ambiguous in providing a separate grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Applying Califano, we conclude that § 1914’s reference to “any court of competent jurisdiction” alone does not create subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal district court sufficient to review and vacate state custody decrees. Consequently, we must determine whether the federal district court had jurisdiction from an independent source, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, making it a “court of competent jurisdiction” that is authorized by § 1914 to invalidate certain state court child custody proceedings. More than a decade ago, we resolved that ICWA creates an implied cause of action and thus serves as a basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In Native Village of Venetie v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.1991) (“Native Village of Venetie I”), we concluded that Congress intended to create a federal private right of action in tribes and individuals to seek a determination of their ICWA rights and obligations in federal district court under ICWA’s full faith and credit clause in § 1911(d): [W]e see no reason that Congress would not have intended to give Indian tribes access to federal courts to determine their rights and obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Act includes an express congressional finding that state courts and agencies have often acted contrary to the interests of Indian tribes. It would thus be ironic indeed if Congress then permitted only state courts, never believed by Congress to be the historical defenders of tribal interests, to determine the scope of tribal authority under the Act. Without a cause of action under the Indian Child Welfare Act, [the individual tribal members] would be essentially left without a remedy. We cannot conceive that Congress intended such a self-defeating result. Id. at 553-54. We reaffirmed our holding when the case returned to the Ninth Circuit: In considering our jurisdiction in [Native Village of Venetie /], we held that § 1911(d) of the ICWA gave both the Native villages and their individual residents private rights of action in federal court. We reasoned that, given Congress’s understanding at the time of passage that statutes passed for the benefit of Indian tribes would “be liberally construed in favor of such tribes,” Congress would have expressly precluded a federal cause of action had it intended that none be recognized. After finding “no reason that Congress would not have intended to give Indian tribes access to federal courts to determine their rights and obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act,” the court held that “Congress’s intention to create a tribal cause of action under the Act can be inferred.” Native Village of Venetie v. Alaska, 155 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted) (“Native Village of Vene-tie II”). The Indian canons of construction were critical to our reasoning: Congress’s intention to create a tribal cause of action under the [ICWA] can be inferred from Congress’s understanding of the law at the time the Act was enacted. The intention of Congress can be gleaned, at least in part, by reference to prior law, as Congress is presumed to be knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to any new legislation. Thus, Congress can be presumed to know that statutes passed for the benefit of Indian tribes will be liberally construed in favor of such tribes. Congress can also be presumed to know that the federal courts routinely resolve questions of tribal sovereignty as they are implicated by various acts of Congress. If Congress did not seek to have such principles applied to the interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, we presume that it would have said so. Thus, we must conclude that the villages may seek determination of their rights under the Act in federal court. As to [the individual tribal members’] individual causes of action under the Indian Child Welfare Act, the same reasoning applies. Native Village of Venetie I, 944 F.2d at 554(internal citations omitted). The rationale in Native Village of Venetie I that § 1911(d) included an implied federal private right of action equally supports recognizing an implied federal private right of action in § 1911(a) for tribes and individuals to seek federal district court determination of the tribe’s jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on the reservation. Having resolved that the federal district court is a “court of competent jurisdiction” under § 1914, we turn to the remainder of the statute. Section 1914 provides that the Indian child, the parent or Indian custodian, or the tribe “may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action.” 25 U.S.C. § 1914. The action referred to is a state court action for “foster care placement or termination of parental rights.” Id. The language of the statute could not be clearer: Congress is authorizing any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate a state court judgment involving the Indian child. Having concluded that Congress created a federal cause of action over which the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it requires no leap for us to conclude further that Congress explicitly authorized federal courts to invalidate state court judgments in this limited arena. We recognize that the prudential concerns embodied by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are important to our system of limited federal court jurisdiction and federalism. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, will give way where Congress otherwise grants federal courts the authority to review state court judgments. Although Congress did not specifically identify federal courts in ICWA as the tribunals designated to review state judgments, in contrast to the habeas and bankruptcy statutes, here Congress went one step further and gave “any court of competent jurisdiction” the authority to “invalidate” certain state child custody proceedings. To the extent there is any uncertainty about the scope of federal authority to invalidate state court child custody proceedings, a proposition we do not embrace, one of the Indian canons of construction resolves the issue. It provides that federal courts will liberally construe a federal statute in favor of Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted for their benefit. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985). The purpose of ICWA was to rectify state agency and court actions that resulted in the removal of Indian children from their Indian communities and heritage. Resolving any ambiguity in favor of the Indians yields a conclusion that Indians have a forum in federal court to challenge state child custody decisions. We thus conclude that § 1914 provides the federal courts authority to invalidate a state court foster care placement or termination of parental rights if it is in violation of §§ 1911, 1912, or 1913. III. The Indian Child Welfare Act and Public Law 280 Jurisdiction A. Summary Resolution of Mary Doe’s case requires us to decide whether her tribe has exclusive jurisdiction in a child dependency proT ceeding. We begin with § 1911(a), which provides: An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (emphasis added). The “existing Federal law” proviso in § 1911(a) has been interpreted to include a federal law popularly referred to as “Public Law 280,” which gives certain states, including California, broad jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed in Indian country, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), and limited jurisdiction over civil causes of action that arise in Indian country, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42 n. 16, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). No other “existing Federal law” is applicable here. The first step is to determine whether the proceeding “involv[es] an Indian child who resides or is domiciled” on the reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). Jane, who no one disputes is an Indian child, was domiciled on her reservation when the child dependency proceedings in this case commenced. The next step is to determine whether the dependency proceeding at issue falls within the meaning of “any child custody proceeding.” Id. Again, the statutory language provides an easy answer as “child custody proceeding” is defined to include “termination of parental rights,” which means “any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship,” and “adoptive placement,” which means “the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of adoption.” 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(l)(ii), (iv). These are precisely the actions taken in the proceedings at issue here. On its face, § 1911(a) poses little difficulty in interpretation. The wrinkle comes in interpreting Public Law 280, which is embedded within § 1911. Section 1911(a) provides in unambiguous terms that the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child residing or domiciled on the reservation unless jurisdiction is vested in a state under Public Law 280. Thus, we must decide whether Public Law 280 vested California with jurisdiction to terminate Mary Doe’s parental rights and order the adoption of Jane. The answer to that question lies in the interplay between California’s child dependency law and Public Law 280. The California child dependency law, Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 300 et seq., permits the state to commence dependency proceedings in juvenile court, § 325, if a child’s status falls within various categories, including that the child suffered or is at substantial risk of physical harm, § 300(b), or the child has been or is at substantial risk of being sexually abused, § 300(d). The law permits the state, under certain circumstances, to petition for the termination of parental rights over a child previously judged to be a dependent of the juvenile court. Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 366.26. Determining whether the state had jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to enforce its child dependency law requires us to categorize the state dependency law as either criminal, civil regulatory, or civil adjudicatory. If the child dependency law embodies either a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) or a civil cause of action (civil adjudicatory) under 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), then the tribe does not have exclusive jurisdiction under § 1911(a) and the state properly exercised jurisdiction. If, however, California’s dependency law is a regulatory statute, then the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction and the parental rights determination is invalid. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976) (Public Law 280 did not give the states “general civil regulatory powers” over tribes and their members in Indian country). Mary Doe argues that California’s dependency law falls into the civil regulatory category and thus outside the state’s Public Law 280 jurisdiction. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390, 96 S.Ct. 2102. She asks us to reach this conclusion by drawing a distinction between involuntary and voluntary custody proceedings. She maintains that involuntary child dependency proceedings are regulatory because they involve intervention by the state, through its sovereign authority, in a parent-child relationship. This type of proceeding, according to Mary Doe, contrasts with voluntary proceedings such as private adoptions, which involve only private parties and are not regulatory. The Department of Social Services and Court-Appellees also stake their analysis on an interpretation of Public Law 280. In their view, the dependency statute falls under either the criminal or the civil adjudicatory category, meaning that the tribe lacks exclusive jurisdiction. They argue that the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy is a false one and should not inform our analysis. Although California’s child dependency statute may not fit neatly into any of the Public Law 280 jurisdictional boxes, construing ICWA as a whole and considering child dependency proceedings in the context of both ICWA and Public Law 280, we conclude that the California statute does not fall within Public Law 280’s criminal jurisdiction, but that it does fall within Public Law 280’s civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. Embedded in this determination is the conclusion that the child dependency statute is not regulatory in nature. Thus, under ICWA, the tribe does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the child dependency proceeding because “jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the state [of California] by existing Federal law.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). Before delving into the application of Public Law 280, we take a detour to explain the contours of ICWA and Public Law 280, which provide the foundation for our analysis. B. BackgRound of ICWA Congress passed ICWA in 1978 in response to a growing concern that Indian children were removed from their homes by state child protection officials at an alarmingly high rate and placed in foster care or adoption settings outside their Indian communities and culture. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4); Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32, 109 S.Ct. 1597. “At the heart of ICWA” lies a jurisdictional scheme aimed at ensuring that tribes have a role in adjudicating and participating in child custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled both on and off the reservation. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36, 109 S.Ct. 1597. This aim is reflected in § 1911(a)’s broad grant of exclusive jurisdiction to most tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). As we have explained, the “existing Federal law” proviso in § 1911(a), providing tribes with exclusive jurisdiction “except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law,” is the crux of this case. Although the text of the proviso does not specifically identify Public Law 280, the legislative history surrounding the adoption of § 1911(a) and subsequent court decisions confirm that Congress was referring, at least in part, to Public Law 280. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7554 (letter from Department of Interior); H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, at 40, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7563 (letter from Department of Justice); Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 42 n. 16, 109 S.Ct. 1597; Native Village of Venetie I, 944 F.2d at 555. An earlier draft of ICWA, House Resolution 12533, included a provision similar to § 1911(a) but did not refer to “existing” federal laws: “Sec. 101.(a) An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any placement of an Indian child who resides on or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.” Court-Ap-pellees’ Answer Brief at App. 22. During consideration of this earlier legislation, the Departments of Justice and Interior alerted Congress that this section could strip states of jurisdiction already existing where Public Law 280 applied. The Department of the Interior stated, “We believe that reservations located in States subject to Public Law 83-280 should be specifically excluded from section 101(a)....” The Department of Justice voiced similar concerns in two letters to Congress: As you may be aware, the courts have consistently recognized that tribal governments have exclusive jurisdiction over the domestic relationships of tribal members located on reservations, unless a State has assumed concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to Federal legislation such as Public Law 83-280.... [SJection 101(a) of the House draft, if read literally, would appear to displace any existing State court jurisdiction over these matters based on Public Law 83-280. We doubt that is the intent of the draft because, inter alia, there may not be in existence tribal courts to assume such State-court jurisdiction as would apparently be obliterated by this provision. After these letters were received, Congress amended the legislation to include the “existing Federal law” proviso that became law. C. Public Law 280 Twenty-five years prior to the passage of ICWA, Congress adopted Public Law 280, legislation that provides six “mandatory” states, including California, with jurisdiction over criminal and some civil matters arising in Indian country. The criminal jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 280 is expansive: Each of the States or Territories listed ... shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory .... 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). The civil jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 280, on the other hand, is more circumscribed: Each of the States listed ... shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State.... 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). The legislative history of Public Law 280 reveals that Congress was motivated to confer criminal jurisdiction on the states due to “lawlessness” on Indian reservations: In many States, tribes are not adequately organized to perform that function; consequently, there has been created a hiatus in law-enforcement authority that could best be remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on States indicating an ability and willingness to accept such responsibility. S.Rep. No. 699 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2411-12. In contrast, the civil component of Public Law 280 was adopted with a “virtual absence of expression of congressional policy or intent.” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381, 96 S.Ct. 2102. What little published legislative history exists provides only the following explanation for the civil jurisdiction: Similarly, the Indians of several States have reached a state of acculturation and development that makes desirable extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country within their borders. Permitting the State courts to adjudicate civil controversies arising on Indian reservations, and to extend to those reservations the substantive civil laws of the respective States insofar as those laws are of general application to private persons or private property, is deemed desirable. S.Rep. No. 699 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2412. In Bryan, one of the seminal cases construing Public Law 280, the Court concluded that Congress intended to confer civil jurisdiction in Public Law 280 states to “redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes.... ” 426 U.S. at 383, 96 S.Ct. 2102. However, the Court emphasized that the legislative history included no indication of “an intention to confer general state civil regulatory control over Indian reservations.” Id. at 384, 96 S.Ct. 2102. D. Public Law 280 and ICWA Precedent The federal courts have interpreted ICWA on rare occasions, and while some courts have danced seductively close to the issue, none has ever directly addressed either Public Law 280 jurisdiction over child custody proceedings or whether there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary child custody proceedings in the context of Public Law 280. More specifically, no court has addressed the California child dependency statute. The Supreme Court’s only case interpreting ICWA, Holyfield, included a footnote that referenced the “existing Federal law” proviso in § 1911(a): Section 1911(a) does not apply “where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” This proviso would appear to refer to Pub.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, which allows States under certain conditions to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction on the reservations. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1918 permits a tribe in that situation to reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings upon petition to the Secretary of the Interior. The State of Mississippi has never asserted jurisdiction over the Choctaw Reservation under Public Law 280. 490 U.S. at 42 n. 16, 109 S.Ct. 1597. This passing reference does not resolve whether California’s child dependency proceedings fall within the state’s Public Law 280 criminal or civil jurisdiction. Not only is Mississippi not a Public Law 280 state, but the child custody proceeding at issue in Holyfield was a voluntary adoption initiated by the Indian parents of Indian twins. Id. at 37-38, 109 S.Ct. 1597. Holyfield did not involve, as this case does, an involuntary termination of an Indian’s parental rights. Similar to the Holyfield footnote, the Ninth Circuit has made a broad, but ultimately non-dispositive, statement about the interplay between § 1911(a) and Public Law 280. See Native Village of Venetie I, 944 F.2d at 555 (noting that tribes in Public Law 280 states can invoke exclusive jurisdiction under § 1911 only after petitioning the Secretary of Interior). Like Holyfield, Native Village of Venetie I involved a voluntary, private adoption and the court limited its discussion of the expanse of Public Law 280’s civil jurisdiction to private adoption cases. Id. at 560 (“It is not disputed that private adoption cases are included within this transfer of civil jurisdiction [in Public Law 280] from the federal government to the states.”) (emphasis added). States that have considered the interplay between Public Law 280 and a state’s authority to enforce child dependency laws in Indian country have arrived at conflicting results. On one side, the Wisconsin Attorney General concluded that involuntary child custody proceedings lie outside Wisconsin’s Public Law 280 jurisdiction because they “involve some aspect of the state’s regulatory jurisdiction.” 70 Op. Att’y Gen. Wis. 237 (1981), 1981 Wisc. AG LEXIS 7, *7,18-20. The Attorney General contrasted voluntary proceedings, which are “not between the state and an individual, but rather primarily involve[ ] only private persons.” Id. at *7. No other source has adopted this voluntary versus involuntary custody analysis. In contrast, Washington and Idaho, two non-mandatory Public Law 280 states, have long identified child dependency proceedings as a subject matter within their Public Law 280 jurisdiction. See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 465 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) (quoting Washington’s 1963 law asserting Public Law 280 jurisdiction); State v. George, 127 Idaho 693, 905 P.2d 626, 629 (1995) (quoting Idaho’s 1963 law asserting Public Law 280 jurisdiction)., In sum, we navigate the question whether California properly exercised jurisdiction over Jane’s dependency proceedings without much of a compass. IV. ICWA, Public Law 280, and the California Dependenoy Regime Given that no federal court has squarely addressed the question, we must break new ground in deciding whether California’s child dependency proceedings are within California’s Public Law 280 jurisdiction. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, is California’s child dependency law criminal in nature? Second, if the child dependency law cannot be considered criminal, does enforcement of this law fall within the state’s Public Law 280 civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, or is the state enforcing a “regulatory” law that is outside the state’s jurisdiction under Bryan? Resolution of these questions must also be squared with an overall statutory analysis of ICWA, as Public Law 280 does not stand alone here but is integrated into the ICWA scheme. A. Public Law 280 Criminal Jurisdiction 1. Identifying Criminal/Prohibitory Laws Under Public Law 280 In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme Court succinctly outlined the path to deconstructing Public Law 280: In Bryan v. Itasca County, we interpreted [28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)] to grant States jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court, but not to grant general civil regulatory authority.... [Public Law 280] plainly was not intended to effect total assimilation of Indian tribes into mainstream American society. We recognized that a grant to States of general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations would result in the destruction of tribal institutions and values. Accordingly, when a State seeks to enforce a law within an Indian reservation under the authority of Pub.L. 280, it must be determined whether the law is criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation under [18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)], or civil in nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state court. 480 U.S. 202, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987) (internal citations omitted). The decision establishes three categories into which a state law may fall: criminal, regulatory, and civil law relevant to private litigation. Id. In Cabazon, the Court applied this analytical framework by grappling with whether the State of California could enforce its penal code in Indian country for violation of the state’s bingo laws. Id. at 205, 107 S.Ct. 1083. The Court observed that state regulatory laws are often enforced with penal sanctions, making them appear “criminal” for Public Law 280 purposes, and thereby avoiding the regulatory classification that would prevent their enforcement under Bryan. Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (“But that an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means does not necessarily convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub.L. 280. Otherwise, the distinction between [Public Law 280’s criminal jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction] could easily be avoided.... ”). Under Cabazon, the label attached to the law in the state’s statutory code is not the determinative factor for the purposes of classifying a law as either criminal or regulatory in nature. Id. Rather, the critical factor is whether the conduct at issue in the statute is generally prohibited by the state, or whether the conduct is generally permitted by the state but subject to regulation: [I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L. 280’s grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. Id. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083. The Court ultimately determined that the bingo laws were regulatory in nature, even though enforced with penal sanctions, because “California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery,” demonstrating that “California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.” Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1083. Federal and state courts have applied the Cabazon criminal/prohibitory versus regulatory test with widely varying results, provoking some commentators to question whether the test is manageable in its current form. The variation tends to result from how courts characterize the scope of the conduct at issue. Some courts take a broad perspective by considering the conduct in the context of a larger permitted but regulated activity, while other courts have focused on the narrow conduct specifically at issue in the case. Our decision in Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.1991), provides a concrete example of the difficulty of classifying a state law based on the specific conduct that is prohibited. In Confederated Tribes of Colville, we considered whether Washington state’s traffic offense statutes, including its speeding laws, were prohibitory or regulatory in nature. Id. at 147. We concluded, relying on the broad line drawing in Cabazon, that driving was the conduct at issue, not speeding — even though speeding was certainly a prohibited activity in Washington state. Id. at 148. Thus, because driving is a generally permitted but regulated activity, the state law was regulatory in nature and could not be enforced by state officers against Indians in Indian country: Laws which prohibit absolutely certain acts fall into the [criminal/prohibitory] category, while those generally permitting certain conduct but subject to regulation are within [the regulatory category].... Cabazon focuses on whether the prohibited activity is a small subset or facet of a larger, permitted activity— high-stakes unregulated bingo compared to all bingo games — or whether all but a small subset of a basic activity is prohibited. Id. at 147, 149. The Supreme Court injected another wrinkle in the analysis when it held that the “shorthand test” for whether a law is prohibitory or regulatory is “whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083. If the conduct at issue violates public policy, then the law is more likely criminal/prohibitory. Id. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that permitting tribes rather than states to enforce a policy does not undermine state public policy. For instance, in Confederated Tribes of Colville, we acknowledged that tribal enforcement of its own traffic code in lieu of the state’s speeding laws would not undermine the state’s public policy: Thus, although the government is correct that speeding remains against the state’s public policy, Cabazon teaches that this is the wrong inquiry. Cabazon focuses on whether the prohibited activity is a small subset or facet of a larger, permitted activity — high-stakes unregulated bingo compared to all bingo games — or whether all but a small subset of a basic activity is prohibited. Thus, in United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir.1977) we found ... [t]o allow tribal members to operate fireworks stands on reservations would “entirely circumvent Washington’s determination that the possession of fireworks is dangerous.” Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364. But to look to the Tribes rather than the state for traffic enforcement on the reservation will not detract from Washington’s determination to discourage speeding. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 938 F.2d at 148-49 (emphasis added). 2. Analysis of the California Child Dependency Statute as a Criminal Statute Although the Ninth Circuit and numerous other courts have applied the Cabazon test to state gaming, driving, fireworks, and boxing laws, to name just a few, reconciling the many distinctions and finding a common, consistent thread of analysis is neither an easy task nor a productive one. In particular, applying the criminal versus regulatory test to Mary Doe’s case is unwieldy because it is problematic to compare a state’s child dependency statutory scheme to a criminal prosecution or to state gaming laws. Overall, California’s child dependency law and proceedings are aimed at promoting the best interests of the child, not at prohibiting conduct. As a result, the dependency proceedings do not fall within California’s broad Public Law 280 criminal jurisdiction over Indians. First and foremost, the statute does not prohibit specific conduct. Rather, the child dependency statute gives the state broad authority to remove children and terminate parental rights under specific circumstances. Granted, the state’s authority under the statute is often triggered if a child is a victim or at substantial risk of harm, abuse, or neglect. Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code §§ 300(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (j). Indeed, Jane was made a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to §§ 300(b) and (d) because her mother had failed to adequately supervise and protect her from physical harm and because Jane was the alleged victim of sexual abuse from which her mother failed to protect her. But the statute is also triggered where abuse is not an issue, such as where the child is suffering from mental illness and the parents cannot address this special need. Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 300(c). Likewise, subsection (h) makes a child a dependent of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has been freed for adoption by one or both parents for 12 months by either relinquishment or termination of parental rights or an adoption petition has not been granted.” Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code 8450 § 300(h). Both of these provisions demonstrate that abusive conduct or neglect is not necessarily a predicate to trigger California’s child dependency statute. While some of the circumstances that trigger the statute, such as child abuse, may constitute criminal violations under different parts of the California code, the statute itself does not require proof of a criminal violation nor does it prohibit such conduct. Moreover, the statute provides that it is not designed to infringe on the permitted activity of parenting, suggesting that the state law regulates but a small facet of the generally permitted activity of parenting. It is also important to underscore that the statute is geared toward protecting the best interests of the child rather than controlling behavior. For that reason, our precedent that looks to categorization of the conduct at issue does not easily fit this statute. Of course, one could say that the statute regulates parenting, which is a permitted activity. Or one could argue that the statute prohibits abuse. But this framework is not particularly transferable because the well-being of the child, not conduct of the parent, is the focus of the statute and no specific conduct is prohibited. Although the criminal versus civil inquiry is “one of the statute’s intent and not simply its label,” Quechan Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d at 307, the fact that California’s child dependency statute is codified in the civil code is telling. More importantly, the California Supreme Court has affirmed that child dependency proceedings are civil in nature. See In re Malinda S., 51 Cal.3d 368, 384, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244 (Cal.1990) (quoting In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d 414, 418, 230 Cal.Rptr. 726 (Cal.Ct.App.1986)). Just as significant, the proceedings are not punitive. “Dependency proceedings are civil in nature, designed not to prosecute the parent, but to protect the child.” In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d at 418, 230 Cal.Rptr. 726; see also In re Malinda S., 51 Cal.3d at 384, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244 (same); Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.3d 47, 52, 141 Cal.Rptr. 273 (Cal.Ct.App.1977) (“The purpose of these dependency proceedings is to protect and promote the welfare of the child, not to punish the parent.”). Consistent with the notion that the proceedings are neither criminal nor punitive, the procedural protections available in California’s child dependency proceedings lie somewhere between criminal and civil in nature. See Confederated Tribes of Colville, 938 F.2d at 148 (considering procedural elements in assessing whether the state scheme was criminal or civil). Although indigent parents have a statutory right to counsel similar to that afforded criminal defendants, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317, the standard of proof required to remove a child from the parents’ custody is “clear and convincing evidence,” § 361(c), something more akin to the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence than to the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Many other procedural protections associated with criminal proceedings are likewise unavailable: A parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since ‘the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any. deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence’ unlawfully seized. Nor can the parent seek reversal on the grounds of incompetency of counsel. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal.3d at 384-85, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244 (quoting In re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d at 418-19, 230 Cal.Rptr. 726); see also Lois R. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.App.3d 895, 900, 97 Cal.Rptr. 158 (Cal.Ct.App.1971) (“[DJependen-cy proceedings are civil and have been conducted without strict adherence to all the formalities of a criminal trial.”). Finally, we address Cabazon’s “shorthand test” for whether a law is prohibitory or regulatory, that is “whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.” 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083. California’s public policy “to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm,” Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 300.2, is not undermined simply because the law is not classified as criminal in nature. As in Confederated Tribes of Col-ville, “lookpng] to the Tribes rather than the state” for protection of children against abuse and neglect does not violate the state’s public policy. See 938 F.2d at 149. Taken as a whole and considering the multiple factors used for analyzing whether a law is criminal/prohibitory, we conclude that the California child dependency statute is not prohibitory. Therefore, California may not enforce its involuntary child dependency statute in Indian country through its criminal Public Law 280 jurisdiction. B. Public Law 280 Civil Jurisdiction We next consider whether the child dependency law falls within Public Law 280’s civil adjudicatory jurisdiction or whether it is analogous to a regulatory statute. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390, 96 S.Ct. 2102. This distinction may be easy to state but, as noted in the American Indian Law Deskbook, the application is quite onerous. California may assert its Public Law 280 civil jurisdiction over cases that are “civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties” and that involve “those civil laws ... that are of general application to private persons or private property.” 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). The plain language of Public Law 280’s civil jurisdictional provision suggests that California’s enforcement of its child dependency law falls within the state’s Public Law 280 civil jurisdiction. The state proceedings involved a civil cause of action to which Mary Doe and her child, both Indians, were parties. In addition, California’s child dependency law is of “general application to private persons” in the state of California. While it is tempting to rest on this plain reading of the statute, the Supreme Court’s language in Bryan and Cabazon gives us pause: those two cases intimate that Public Law 280’s civil jurisdiction is limited to disputes between private parties, which begs the question whether when, as here, the state is one of the parties, a proceeding falls within Public Law 280’s civil jurisdiction. In Bryan, the Supreme Court described the civil component of Public Law 280 as “primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens. ...” Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (emphasis added). In Cabazon, the Court reiterated its holding that Public Law 280 granted to states civil jurisdiction only over private disputes. 480 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1083. We later characterized a Public Law 280 state’s “very limited” civil jurisdiction provision as “essentially [affording] Indians a forum to settle private disputes among themselves.” Confederated Tribes of Colville, 938 F.2d at 147 (emphasis added). Throughout these cases, the theme is that the private nature of disputes is what places them within Public Law 280’s civil jurisdiction. We are confident, however, that resting our analysis simply on the Supreme Court’s references to private disputes would create a tortured result that is at odds with the overall structure of ICWA, as well as with the history of Public Law 280 and California child dependency proceedings. To begin, the genesis of the Court’s analysis in Bryan and Cabazon was very different from a child dependency proceeding. In both those cases, the broad language about “private legal disputes” and “private civil litigation” was made in the context of an attempt to categorize a state’s authority to regulate taxation and gambling. The taxation and gambling statutes both regulate the conduct of the public at large. They do not address the rights or status of private individuals. And, in the case of taxation, the Court was particularly sensitive to precedent barring states from taxing reservation Indians without express congressional approval. In contrast, California’s child dependency proceedings focus, not on public activities, but on the status of individual Indian parents and children. At the heart of the dependency proceedings is a dispute about the status of the child, a private individual; the simple fact that the state steps in as a party does not transform what is an adjudicatory proceeding involving private parties into a regulatory proceeding. In short, child dependency proceedings are more analogous to the “private legal disputes” that fall under a state’s Public Law 280 jurisdiction than to the regulatory regimes at issue in Bryan and Cabazon. A footnote in Bryan underscores that California’s child dependency law is different from the taxation laws considered in that case and that it should not be considered “regulatory” in nature. In Bryan, the Supreme Court recognized commentary stating that laws having to do with status were the types of laws .that Congress envisioned would fall within a state’s civil Public Law 280 jurisdiction: A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that Congress never intended ‘civil laws’ to mean the entire array of state noncriminal laws, but rather that Congress intended ‘civil laws’ to mean those laws which have to do with private rights and status. Therefore, ‘civil laws ... of general application to private persons or private property’ would include the laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., but would not include laws declaring or implementing the states’ sovereign powers, such as the power to tax, grant franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning of ‘private’ laws. 426 U.S. at 384 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (emphasis added) (quoting Daniel H. Israel & Thomas L. Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N.D. L.Rev. 267, 296 (1973)). While we do not view the Supreme Court’s footnote as dispositive, we observe that the Court recognized “status” laws generally, and “insanity” laws particularly, as different from regulatory laws. In a similar vein, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has categorized statutes involving status determinations as falling within Public Law 280’s civil jurisdiction. That court held that a state civil statute permitting the state to involuntarily commit sexually violent persons applie