Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. Table of Contents I. Facts and Procedural History A. The Alleged Illegal Lending Scheme B. The Separate Class Actions C. Consolidation of the Class Actions D. The Opt-Out Solicitations E. The Joint Motion to Invalidate OpL-Outs F. The October 31, 2003 Conference Call G. Appellants’ Motion to Intervene H. Appellants’ Request for Discovery I. The Fairness Hearing J. The FDIC as Receiver for GNBT II. Jurisdiction III. Analysis A. Class Certification 1. Certification Process Followed by the District Court 2. The Appropriateness of Class Certification i. The Rule 23(a) Criteria ii. The Rule 23(b)(3) Criteria iii. Summary of Rule 23 Analysis B. The District Court’s October 14th and 17th Order Invalidating Opt-Outs C. The Motions to Intervene D. Appellants’ Request for Discovery E. The Fairness of the Settlement F.The Petition for Mandamus TV. Conclusion This consolidated appeal arises from a “settlement only” class action in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania that had consolidated six separate actions alleging an illegal home equity lending scheme against two banks and a company that acquired second mortgage loans from those banks in the secondary market. Plaintiffs are persons who borrowed from the two banks and signed second mortgages. On December 4, 2003, the District Court issued a Final Order approving a proposed settlement, which awarded $33 million to a class of 44,000 borrowers and $8.1 million in attorney fees. Appellees in this case are the settling parties. Appellants are a number of law firms and plaintiff class members who challenge the District Court’s jurisdiction, nearly every aspect of the settlement process, and the fairness of the settlement itself. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. The Alleged Illegal Lending Scheme This action alleges a pervasive predatory and illegal lending scheme affecting borrowers nationwide. The alleged mastermind of the scheme was the Shumway Organization (“Shumway”), a residential mortgage loan business operating out of Chantilly, Virginia. Through its several business forms, including EquityPlus Financial, Inc. (“Equity Plus”), Equity Guaranty, LLC (“Equity Guaranty”), and various title companies, Shumway offered high-interest mortgage-backed loans to debt-laden homeowners. Shumway was subject to fee caps and interest ceilings imposed by various state mortgage lending laws because it was a non-depository lender. State and nationally chartered banks, by contrast, are arguably not subject to the same restrictions. Plaintiffs allege that in an effort to circumvent the relevant state fee and interest ceilings, Shumway formed associations with several financially distressed banks, including two banks named as defendants, the Community Bank of Northern Virginia (“CBNV”) (a state chartered bank) and the Guaranty National Bank of Tallahassee (“GNBT”) (a nationally chartered bank). CBNV and GNBT were allegedly paid for nothing more than permitting Shum-way to disguise the origin of their loans, thus creating the appearance that fees and interest were paid solely to a depository institution. In reality, the overwhelming majority of fees and other charges associated with the loans were funneled through the two banks to Shumway via Equity Plus (in the case of loans purportedly made by CBNV) and Equity Guaranty (in the case of loans purportedly made by GNBT). Plaintiffs further allege that both CBNV and GNBT uniformly misrepresented the apportionment and distribution of settlement and title fees in their HUD-1 Settlement Statement forms, issued by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, and that the stated fees in the HUD-1 Settlement Statements included illegal kickbacks to Shumway that did not reflect the value of any services actually performed. GMAC Residential Funding Corporation (“RFC”), a division of GMAC Financial Services (part of the General Motors Corporation family), was alleged to be an essential co-conspirator in the Shumway scheme. In the late 1990s, RFC derived a substantial portion of its business by purchasing “jumbo” mortgages (mortgages with loan balances above the purchasing authority of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and especially High-LTV (loan-to-value) loans (loans where the amount financed represented up to 125% of the value of the securitized collateral) in the secondary market. By 1999, Shumway, acting through CBNV and GNBT, had become the largest producer of High-LTV loans in the country. Plaintiffs allege that RFC purchased a majority and perhaps all of the CBNV and GNBT originated loans, despite knowing that CBNV and GNBT were mere “straw-parties” used to funnel origination and title services fees to Shum-way. The high origination fees on the purchased loans generated profit not only for Shumway but also for RFC; in most cases, fees were rolled into the principal balance of the loans, thereby generating substantial interest income. In 2001, the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency conducted an investigation and audit of GNBT, resulting in the Comptroller’s imposition of tight restrictions on the bank. Shortly thereafter, Shumway’s relationship with RFC began to deteriorate. In a press release dated March 28, 2002, RFC announced that it was no longer willing to purchase high interest mortgage loans like the ones sold by Shumway. Without a purchaser for its loan product and without adequate reserves to maintain the loans in its own portfolio, the Shumway scheme essentially shut down by early 2003. B. Separate Class Actions The Community Bank class action began as the following six separate actions: Kessler v. GMAC-RFC, No. 03-0425 (W.D.Pa.) was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania on February 26, 2003. Plaintiffs, a class of Pennsylvania borrowers, charged that RFC had assignee liability under Pennsylvania state law for the “bogus” loan origination and title service fees charged ostensibly by CBNV and GNBT. On March 26, 2003, RFC removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, asserting that Sections 85 and 86 of the National Banking Act (“NBA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86, and Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (“DIDA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, completely preempt any state law attempting to limit the amount of interest and fees a national or federally insured state-chartered bank could charge. Plaintiffs did not challenge removal. Before the Kessler action was filed there were five other related actions pending in the same District Court premised on the same Shumway lending scheme. In Davis v. CBNV, No. 02-1201, initially filed on May 1, 2001, different plaintiffs sought to represent both a class of Pennsylvania borrowers and a class of nationwide borrowers. They asserted claims against CBNV, RFC, and Sovereign Bank (a purchaser of CBNV loans on the secondary market). On behalf of the Pennsylvania class, plaintiffs asserted that defendants violated Pennsylvania’s mortgage lending usury statute, 41 Pa. Stat. §§ 101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. §§ 201-1, et seq. On behalf of the nationwide class, the Davis plaintiffs asserted a violation of the fee split and disclosure provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b). The case, originally filed in a Pennsylvania state court, was later removed by defendants to the federal court based on the existence of federal question jurisdiction. In Sabo v. CBNV, No. 02-1563, filed on September 11, 2002, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, plaintiffs commenced a putative nationwide class action suit against CBNV and RFC asserting claims under RESPA. In Ulrich v. GNBT, No. 02-1616, filed on September 19, 2002, in the same federal court, plaintiffs filed a similar putative nationwide class action suit asserting claims under RESPA, but this one named as defendants GNBT and RFC. One month later, on November 16, 2002, plaintiffs filed Mathis v. GNBT, No. 02-1999, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County asserting various state law mortgage lending claims against GNBT and RFC, including violations of Pennsylvania’s mortgage lending usury statute, 41 Pa. Stat. §§ 101 et seq., and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. §§ 201-1, et seq. On November 19, 2002, Defendants removed the Mathis case to the federal court based on the doctrine of complete preemption. As in Kessler, these plaintiffs did not challenge removal. Finally, on October 23, 2002, plaintiffs filed Picard v. CBNV, 02-2000, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against CBNV, GNBT, and RFC. On November 19, 2002, Defendants removed the case to the federal court based on the doctrine of complete preemption. Plaintiffs initially filed a motion to remand, but on February 27, 2003, they filed an amended class action complaint asserting claims under RESPA and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, in addition to the various state law mortgage claims asserted in the original state complaint. R. Bruce Carlson of the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania law firm Specter, Specter, Evans, & Manogue, P.C. (now with Carlson Lynch), was the principal plaintiffs’ class attorney in each of the above actions, including Kessler. C. Consolidation of the Class Actions On July 11, 2003, and prior to any discovery, the named plaintiffs in all six actions, together with defendants CBNV, GNBT and RFC, filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed nationwide class action settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, the maximum total payout to the approximately 44,000 member plaintiff class was $33 million, and the agreed-upon attorney fees were $8.1 million. The settlement payouts ranged from $250 to $925 per borrower depending on the borrower’s residence and the date on which the loan was entered. In exchange, the borrowers were to release any and all state or federal claims that they might have relating to their second mortgage loan, including the right to use a violation of federal or state law as a defense to foreclosure or any other action. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 205/6; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16a-5-202. The proposed settlement states that if more that .5% of the class members opt out of the settlement class, the settling defendants may terminate the settlement. On July 17, 2003, less than a week after the motion was filed seeking approval of the settlement, the District Court, in an Order that in all material respects was a verbatim copy of the proposed Order offered by the settling parties in their July 11, 2003 joint motion, preliminarily approved the proposed settlement and consolidated all six actions listed above into the Kessler action. The case was thus consolidated at No. 03-cv-00425. The plaintiff class was “conditionally certified” for settlement purposes only. The Order defined the class as: all persons ... who (a) entered into a loan agreement with Community Bank of Northern Virginia ... and/or Guaranty National Bank of Tallahassee ...; (b) whose loan was secured by a second mortgage or deed of trust on property located in the United States; (c) whose loan was purchased by Residential Funding Corporation ... and, (d) who [were] not ... member[s] of the class certified in the action captioned Baxter v. Guaranty National Bank, et al., Case No 01-CVS-009168, in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division of Wake County, North Carolina. JA at 132. Significantly, before issuing the July 17, 2003 Order, the District Court did not analyze whether the proposed class satisfied the prerequisites for a class action set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(3), or (c)(2), as the Court explicitly reserved such analysis for a settlement hearing to be held on November 14, 2003. The July 17, 2003 Order also provided for the mailing and publication of the class notice. The class notice directed by the District Court was verbatim the proposed class notice offered by the settling parties; it described the action as: A group of CBNV and GNB[T] borrowers, who are referred to as the “Named Plaintiffs” in this Notice, claim in the Litigation that CBNV and GNB[T] violated certain federal and state laws in connection with the fees and interest charged on second mortgage loans. These claims are asserted against the Defendants CBNV, GNB[T] and RFC. JA 137. The notice also provided that all opt-outs must be received by the Settlement Administrator by October 1, 2003. Finally, class members were specifically instructed that they may discuss the settlement with their own attorneys. D. The Opir-Out Solicitations In September 2003, after the class notice was mailed, several law firms mailed letters to members of the plaintiff class urging them to contact the law firms regarding the above settlement, and in some cases urging them to opt out of the class. These law firms and the members of the class whom they solicited and who opted-out are the Appellants before us (“Appellants”). The Appellant law firms are as follows: Walters Bender, Strohbehn & Vaughan (“Walters”), Nos. 03-4221, 03-4504, 03-4732, 04-1002— Walters has represented two plaintiff classes in class action suits related to the Shumway scheme. In June 2001, it filed a class action suit in Jackson County, Missouri against CBNV and assignees, alleging violation of the Missouri Second Mortgage Loans Act (“MSMLA”), Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 408.231, et seq. The Circuit Court of Jackson County granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that their MSMLA claim failed as a matter of law. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. Avila v. Community Bank of N. Va., 143 S.N.3d 1 (Mo.Ct.App.2003). On April 3, 2003, Walters filed a putative class action in Clay County, Missouri against GNBT for violations of the MSMLA, asserting the same claim that it had asserted against CBNV. After GNBT removed that ease to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, that court held that plaintiffs’ MSMLA claims are preempted under Sections 85 and 86 of the National Banking Act. See Phipps v. GNBT, No. 03-420-CV-W-GAF, 2003 WL 22149646 (W.D.Mo. Sept.17, 2003). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 2005 WL 1773618 (8th Cir.2005). On September 18 and 19, 2003, the Walters firm mailed solicitation letters to borrowers in Missouri and Illinois urging them to object to the fairness of the settlement in the present action but did not urge them to opt out. In an affidavit to the District Court, Attorney J. Michael Vaughan of the Walters firm declared that prior to the September 18, 2003 letter, Walters was asked to advise and represent several Missouri borrowers (aside from those in either of the two Missouri class actions) who had obtained loans from GNBT. According to Walters, a total of nineteen Missouri borrowers filed opt-outs. Following the September 18 letter, thirty-five Missouri borrowers and eighty-nine Illinois borrowers filed objections to the settlement with the District Court. Attorney Franklin Nix and The Sharb-rough Law Firm (“Nix”), Nos. 03-4725, 03^1319, 03-4862, 04-1039— On September 17, 2003, Attorney Nix mailed a solicitation letter to hundreds of Georgia class members setting forth defendants’ potential liability under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq., and urging class members to opt-out or contact him regarding their settlement claims. Included in the solicitation was a Notice of Opt-Out form letter and a Representation & Fee Agreement contract. The Sharbrough Law Firm sent solicitations to Alabama class members. Legg Law Firm (“Legg”), Nos.03-4294, 03^1316, 03-4837, 04-4838— Maryland and Florida borrowers received solicitation letters from Legg urging class members to contact the firm to discuss the settlement. The original letter misstated the opt-out date as October 15, 2003. A subsequent letter corrected the mistake. In a Declaration to the District Court, Attorney Scott C. Borison of the Legg firm declared that prior to sending out the solicitation letters he had existing clients who had claims against CBNV. Bo-rison also declared that after he sent the solicitation letters approximately 100 people asked him to assess their cases. After he reviewed their documents, he recommended that only forty-four class members (collectively known as the Badeaux opt-outs) opt out of the settlement and retain Borison as their counsel against CBNV. Edelman, Combs & Latturner, LLC (“Edelman”), Nos. 03-4220— Edelman sent solicitation letters to borrowers in Illinois urging class members to contact them to assess their claims, and to opt-out of the settlement. Edelman claims to have received fifteen responses to its solicitations; thirteen of which it believed had merit. On October 3, 2003, Edelman filed a suit on behalf of these opt-outs in the Northern District of Illinois in a case captioned Spann v. CBNV, No. 03 C 7022. By the October 1, 2003 deadline, 435 people had opted out of the class action settlement. Stephen Tilghman, the settlement administrator, declared that 419 of those opt-outs were a result of the solicitation letters by the above law firms. Of those 419 opt-outs, 326 were submitted by Georgia class members on opt-out forms provided by Nix. The 435 total opt-outs amounted to nearly 1% of the total class; nearly double the .5% trigger that would allow defendants to terminate the settlement. E. The Joint Motion to Invalidate Opt Outs Fearing that their settlement was in jeopardy, on October 6, 2003, class counsel and defendants’ counsel (the “settling parties”) filed a Joint Motion to Invalidate Solicited Opt-Outs and for Court Approved Notice to Address False, Misleading and Deceptive Solicitations of Opt-Outs. The Joint Motion asserted that the above law firms had improperly solicited and misled class members, thus inducing them to opt out of the class settlement. The settling parties asked the Court to invalidate all prior opt-out decisions, send a curative notice to those class members who had opted out, and prevent any communication between Appellants and class members, except for written communications pre-approved by the Court. The settling parties’ brief in support of the Joint Motion, as expected, targeted the Nix’s solicitations. The District Court granted the settling parties’ joint motion on October 14, 2003. It did so without conducting a hearing, setting a briefing schedule or otherwise allowing Appellants any practical opportunity to be heard. The Order the District Court entered on October 14, 2003 followed verbatim the Order proposed by the settling parties, except that the District Court extended the second opt-out deadline from the October 24, 2003 date proposed by the settling parties, to November 3, 2003. On October 15, 2003, one day after entry of the Order invalidating the opt-outs, Appellants Walters, Nix, and Edelman filed emergency motions asking the District Court to stay its October 14 Order and to reconsider its decision. On October 16, Legg submitted a proposed communication to its opt-out clients to the District Court for approval. On October 17, 2003, two days after the motion to reconsider was filed, the District Court denied the motions. The brief Order stated in full: Before the court are several motions to reconsider our Order of October 14, 2003 [doc. Nos. 30, 31, 32, and 33]. The motions are DENIED. The letters mailed by each of the firms named in the October 14, 2003 Order of Court to plaintiff class members in this case were direct solicitations for prospective clients whom they knew to be represented by another lawyer. If there is not a rule of professional conduct that prohibits such activity in the jurisdictions where these lawyers practice, there should be. See generally, Georgine v. Amchem Products, 160 F.R.D. 478[, 495 n.26] (E.D.Pa. 1995).... JA at 145. The District Court apparently treated the Legg proposed communication as a motion to reconsider, and denied it in the same October 17, 2003 Order. The Court thereafter did not specifically address why it would not permit Legg to send out its proposed communications. Pursuant to the October 14, 2003 Order, “curative notices” were sent to all class members who had opted out during the first opt-out period. These notices, which were tailored to the communications sent by each Appellant law firm, were verbatim copies of the proposed curative notices submitted by the settling parties. Each notice stated that the Court has concluded that the “[Appellant law firms’ solicitations] contained a number of misleading and inaccurate statements” and therefore that the “exclusion requests received after the date of the letter are all void.” See, e.g., App. at 2062. The curative notices also contained a number of detailed bases for the finding that the Appellant law firms’ solicitations were misleading. Finally, the curative notices urged the recipients to reconsider their decisions to opt out. The notice made clear that failure to submit a second opt-out by November 3, 2003 would waive the class member’s rights to opt out of the settlement. The provision of the October 14, 2003 Order that precluded the Appellant law firms from communicating with any members of the class, except for written communications pre-approved by the District Court, included a bar on communication with class members who had retained the Appellant law firms either before or during the first opt-out period. Several Appellants declared in affidavits provided thereafter that when their retained clients attempted to contact them for advice or for explanation of the curative notice, they were compelled to reject their clients’ attempts at communication. See, e.g. JA 2056-57 (declaration of Borison). In the particular cases of Walters and Edelman, the October 14, 2003 Order prevented them from communicating with class members whom they represented in pending litigation. See Phipps v. GNBT, No. 03-420-CV-W-GAF (W.D.Mo.); Spann, et al. v. CNBV, No. 03 C 7022 (N.D.Ill). On October 21, 2003, Walters sought permission to submit a proposed communication in camera to avoid waiver of the attorney-client privilege. On October 22, 2003, the District Court entered an Order granting Walters’ request to submit the proposed communication to the Court but directed that it also must be served on all counsel. Thereafter, Walters did not submit the proposed communication for the Court’s approval. All Appellant law firms except Walters complied with the bar on communications. Walters sent letters by overnight delivery to the nineteen Missouri opt-outs on October 30, 2003, and informed the District Court of this action on October 31, 2003. There was no sanction by the Court. The record does not show whether the letters Walters sent were the same as the proposed communication referred to above. By November 3, 2003, the end of the second opt-out period, only 110 class members had opted-out a second time. F. The October 31, 2003 Conference Call On October 31, 2003, the District Court sua sponte convened a conference call among plaintiffs’ class counsel, counsel for RFC, CBNV, GNBT, and the Court (but not including Appellants’ counsel) to address the issue of whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the settlement proceedings. The Kessler action had been removed to federal court on the ground that Sections 85 and 86 of the NBA and Section 521 of the DIDA completely preempted Pennsylvania state law usury claims. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). Under settled precedent, where there is complete preemption of a state law claim the result is “to convert complaints purportedly based on the preempted state law into complaints stating federal claims from their inception.” Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir.2000). The District Court informed the parties to the phone conversation that he had examined the original complaint in the Kessler action and concluded that plaintiffs had not asserted any state law usury claims. Rather, the only claims asserted were state law charges of “bogus” loan origination and title services fees, which under the Court’s reasoning do not constitute interest and therefore are not preempted by federal statute. See, e.g., Hancock v. Bank of Am., 272 F.Supp.2d 608, 610 (W.D.Ky.2003) (noting that preemptive force of NBA §§ 85 and 86 does not exist with respect to claims based on unlawful assessment of non-interest service fee). In the phone conference the District Court stated: I have serious reservations as to whether or not I have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim, for the simple reason is this: My understanding of that bank act is that it regulates the amount of interest that a bank can charge for a mortgage loan. However, the claims here have nothing to do with interest. They are with these bogus filing fees. Those claims are not interest. And the cases I have reviewed said that the National Banking Act does not preempt those types of claims. App. at 127. Counsel for RFC responded that the “underlying claims in the State court were attacking the fees and interests and, therefore, [they] would give rise to subject matter jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine.” App 127. When the Court rejected this argument, counsel then suggested that perhaps the Court had jurisdiction because the Kessler action had been consolidated with several other actions which explicitly asserted federal claims. The Court responded that “the Court of Appeals from [sic] the Third Circuit has said pretty clearly that simply consolidating claims where there’s proper federal jurisdiction with one that there is not does not get us there.” App. 128; see, e.g., Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 866 (3d Cir.1996). Faced with this perceived jurisdictional hurdle, the District Court then suggested to the parties that, as he saw it, the jurisdictional problem in the Kessler action could be remedied if plaintiffs’ counsel filed an amended complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2), which “[could] be deemed related back to [the] original filing.” App. at 128. In other words, the District Court suggested to the settling parties that plaintiffs file an amended complaint explicitly asserting a federal claim. On November 10, 2003, just four days prior to the date scheduled for the fairness hearing, plaintiffs’ class counsel heeded the District Court’s advice and filed a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint asserting violations of RESPA at Counts I and II, and violations of RICO at Count III. G. Appellants’ Motion to Intervene Meanwhile, on October 1, 2003, certain Missouri and Illinois objectors represented by Appellant Walters had moved to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) and permissively under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b) for the purpose of seeking a six-month stay of the fairness hearing in order to conduct discovery into the adequacy and fairness of the underlying settlement. Appellant Walters also filed a Complaint in Intervention against CBNV, GNBT, and RFC asserting claims under HOEPA and TILA on behalf of the nationwide class, claims under MSMLA for the subclass of Missouri borrowers, and claims under the Illinois Interest Act for the subclass of Illinois borrowers. The settling parties filed an opposition to the intervention on October 17, 2003. On October 21, 2003, the District Court denied the motion to intervene under Fed. R.Civ.P. 24(a) and 24(b) “without prejudice to its renewal following the submission of evidence from objectors at the Fairness Hearing.” JA at 146-47. At the November 14, 2003 fairness hearing, the proposed intervenors orally renewed their motion to intervene and on December 3, 2003 they renewed that motion by filing a written motion to intervene. The District Court denied the renewed motion on the same day without explanation. H. Appellants ’ Request for Discovery In early November 2003, Appellant Walters served several deposition requests directed to some of the named plaintiffs and class counsel and subpoenaed the same parties to appear at the November 14, 2003 fairness hearing in an effort to establish the inadequacy of the settlement. On November 5 and then on November 10, 2003, the settling parties moved to quash the deposition requests and witness subpoenas, and requested that the District Court order that no other subpoenas be allowed nor discovery taken. On November 10, 2003 (the day the second motion was filed), the District Court granted these motions in an Order which, with the exception of a redacted portion regarding attorney sanctions, was verbatim the Order proposed by the settling parties. Specifically, the November 10 Order provided that “[t]he Missouri and Illinois Objectors, their attorneys, and any person acting on their behalf [could] not issue any further discovery requests or subpoenas” without prior approval of the Court; that Appellants could not present testimony of any witness at the final fairness hearing without prior approval of the Court; and that all prior subpoenas purporting to require a witness or party to attend and testify at the final fairness hearing were thereby void. JA 150-51. I. The Fairness Hearing On October 1, 2003, the original deadline for opt-outs, several Appellants filed Notices of Objections to the Settlement Agreement claiming that the conditionally certified class failed to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 and that the settlement was neither fair nor reasonable. On November 14, Appellant Walters filed a supplement to and amendment of its objections to the settlement agreement, arguing, inter alia, that the average RESPA claim being released was worth $14,042.95 and that the average HOEPA claim being released was worth $20,108.76. On the same day, it submitted an “Offer of Proof,” detailing the Missouri and Illinois objections to the proposed settlement. In a declaration dated November 12, Attorney Nix claimed that the settlement was releasing “over a BILLION DOLLARS of strict liability Truth-in-Lending damages owed to 44,000 Class members, who are all victims of predatory lending subject to the federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (‘HOEPA’) (15 U.S.C. § 1639, et seq.).” JA at 1909. Attached to the Nix declaration was a spreadsheet detailing his estimated TILA damages calculations for the class. The District Court held a fairness hearing on November 14, 2003, and heard oral arguments from both class counsel and objectors. Immediately prior to the fairness hearing, there was a discussion in the District Court’s chambers between class counsel and the Court. Appellants’ counsel were not invited. The following colloquy at that chambers meeting is in the record: Carlson [counsel for settling class]: We are in the process of preparing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which we would submit to Your Honor with the Court’s approval. Court: Yes. Carlson: That’s the primary— Court: I have to write an opinion anyway— Carlson: Right. Court: — on this. But you want to submit some findings of fact that I would adopt basically? Carlson: That would be our preference, Your Honor. Court: Have you prepared a final order? Carlson: We included a final order in our motion for preliminary approval. Court: Okay. Are you satisfied it will meet everything we need even after today? Carlson: With the addition of the findings and conclusions that we contemplate, we believe that it’s perfectly adequate. Court: How long do you need to have these conclusions and findings submitted? * * * Court: We will go through the hearing, and you have a week to ten days to get the rest of this stuff in. Carlson: I think we can have it in by next Friday, Your Honor. Court: Okay. Then I will, assuming they are fíne, I will go ahead and adopt them and put my reasons for approving the settlement in a written memorandum. JA 1973-74, 1976. The District Court did indeed approve the proposed settlement in a Final Order dated December 4, 2003. Filed with the Order was a Memorandum prepared by the District Court and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the settling parties. Although the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not signed by the District Court, the Court’s memorandum stated in a footnote that “[u]pon independent review of the record in this case, the court finds that the proposed findings and conclusions are fully supported by the record adopted by the court and incorporated into this memorandum by reference as if fully set forth.” JA at 176. J. The FDIC as Receiver for GNBT On March 12, 2004, after the events set forth above, the Comptroller of the Currency declared GNBT to be unsafe and unsound, and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) as receiver. The FDIC, on March 29, 2004, asked to be substituted for GNBT as the true party in interest. This court gave the FDIC leave to intervene in this appeal and granted the FDIC’s request for a ninety day stay from the date of its appointment as receiver. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) (12) (A) (ii) . II. JURISDICTION We must consider at the outset Appellants’ argument that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the original Kessler action, and that as a result we must vacate the settlement and direct remand to the Pennsylvania state court. As the District Court recognized, there was no diversity in the original Kes-sler action and no federal question was pled on the face of the complaint. It is well settled that “[o]nly state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, there can be no removal on the basis of a federal question unless the federal law under which the claim arises is a direct and essential element of the plaintiffs case. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). However, the complete preemption doctrine is an “independent corollary” to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. In Caterpillar, the Supreme Court stated: On occasion, the Court has concluded that the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.... Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir.1999); Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that complete preemption is “not as a crude measure of the breadth of the preemption (in the ordinary sense) of a state law by a federal law, but rather as a description of the specific situation in which a federal law not only preempts a state law to some degree but also substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action, thereby manifesting Congress’s intent to permit removal”). RFC removed the Kessler action on the ground that plaintiffs’ charges of “blatantly fraudulent” origination and title services fees, are completely preempted by §§ 85 and 86 of the NBA and by § 521 of the DIDA. In Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003), the Supreme Court definitively held that §§ 85 and 86 of the NBA completely preempt state law usury claims against national banks. The Court stated: Because §§ 85 and 86 provide the exclusive cause of action for [usury] ... claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank. Even though the complaint makes no mention of federal law, it unquestionably and unambiguously claims that petitioners violate usury laws. This cause of action against national banks only arises under federal law and could, therefore, be removed under § 1441. 539 U.S. at 11, 123 S.Ct. 2058. In other words, a claim of usury against a national bank such as GNBT purporting to be grounded in state law is in reality a federal claim. Likewise, § 521 of DIDA completely preempts any state law attempting to limit the amount of interest and fees a federally insured-state chartered bank can charge. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Mass., 971 F.2d 818, 826-28 (1st Cir.1992). Not only does § 521 contains an express preemption clause, “notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section,” 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a), but the statute also incorporates verbatim the language of § 85 of the NBA. When Congress borrows language from one statute and incorporates it into a second statute, the language of the two acts ordinarily should be interpreted the same way. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144-45, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979). In light of this precedent, we must examine the Kessler complaint to determine if it alleged state law claims of unlawful interest by a nationally or state chartered bank. We can set aside the issue raised by the District Court during the October 31, 2003 conference call (whether the fraudulent origination and title service fees alleged by plaintiffs constitute “interest” under the NBA or the DIDA) and focus instead on two more substantial, and ultimately determinative, issues. First, the Kessler complaint asserted no claims against a national or state chartered federally insured bank. Rather, only RFC (and not CBNV or GNBT) was named as a defendant in the original action. See, e.g., Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1285 (D.Colo.2002) (“The Complaint strictly is about a non-bank’s violation of state law. It alleges no claims against a national bank under the NBA.”). Second, the complaint asserted no usury claims against any party under Pennsylvania state law. Sections 85 and 86 of the NBA and Section 521 of the DIDA apply only to national and state chartered banks, not to non-bank purchasers of second mortgage loans such as RFC. See, e.g., Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F.Supp. 684, 687 (E.D.Pa.1973) (stating that NBA “regulates national banks and only national banks, which can be identified by the word ‘national’ in their name”). Several courts have explored the issue of removal in cases involving complaints very similar to that found in the present case and found removal improper. In Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 1191 (N.D.Okla.2004), plaintiffs brought Oklahoma state-law claims of usury and fraud against two defendants, alleging that those defendants had “[entered] into a ‘sham’ relationship with County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware ... for the purpose of claiming federal preemption and evading state usury, fraud and consumer protection laws.” Id. at 1196. County Bank itself was not named as a defendant in the state court action. The district court denied removal, stating that “[n]o claims have been brought against County Bank in this lawsuit. The state action claims are asserted against EZPawn and EZCorp, neither of which is a state-chartered, federally insured (or national) bank.” Id. at 1204. Likewise, in Colorado v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 188 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D.Colo. 2002), plaintiffs asserted state law claims against a non-bank check cashing business, which offered ancillary loans made by a national bank. The national bank was not named as a defendant in the complaint. The district court denied defendants’ attempt at removal, stating that “in this case Defendant and the national bank are separate entities and their relationship does not give rise to complete preemption under the NBA.... The Complaint strictly is about a non-bank’s violations of state law. It alleges no claims against a national bank under the NBA. ” Id. at 1285. The facts in the Kessler action are distinguishable from Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919 (8th Cir.2000), where the holders of a department store’s credit cards brought a class action alleging violation of Missouri state usury laws. Although there were no claims against a national or state-chartered bank, the loans were issued by a national bank, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of the department store. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that removal was proper, noting that although the credit agreement existed between customers and the department store, it was the national bank that “process[ed] and servic[ed] customer accounts, and set[ ] terms [such] as interest and late fees.” Id. at 924. Krispin is inapplicable to Kessler where, despite the provision in the loan agreement that loans were made through a national or state-chartered bank (CBNV or GNBT), the loans were, in fact, made and serviced by Shumway, a non-depository institution. These loans were then bought by RFC (the named defendant), also a non-bank, in the secondary market. Because RFC, CBNV, and GNBT are entirely separate entities, plaintiffs’ state law claims against RFC could not be preempted by the NBA or by the DIDA. Moreover, the original Kessler complaint failed to plead any state law usury claims, alleging only a series of other state law claims that are not preempted by the NBA, DIDA, or any other federal law. See Appendix of Exhibits, Ex. 1 at 33 (Kessler complaint) (“The claim that Plaintiff and the Class are asserting in this Count [Count III] is predicated upon state common law and this claim is expressly not seeking to assert a private right of action under the Pennsylvania Secondary Mortgage Loan Act or any other statutory law.”). It follows that removal was improper. This does not end our inquiry. The Supreme Court has held that where after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court. Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); see also Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 1138 (3d Cir.1989). The same result may obtain where a case has been improperly removed but the original complaint is subsequently amended to state a well-pleaded federal question. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 215 n. 2, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000) (stating that plaintiffs amended complaint “alleged ERISA violations, over which the federal courts have jurisdiction, and we therefore have jurisdiction regardless of the correctness of the removal”); Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1280 (11th Cir.2005) (same); Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1996) (“[I]f a district court erroneously exercises removal jurisdiction ..., and the plaintiff voluntarily amends the complaint to allege federal claims, we will not remand for want of jurisdiction.”); Kidd v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 891 F.2d 540, 547 (5th Cir.1990) (same); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 185 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that although plaintiffs original complaint was not removable, his decision to “throw in the towel” and amend his complaint to state “an unmistakable federal cause of action” conferred original jurisdiction on the federal court). The amended complaint submitted by the settling parties on November 10, 2004, not only added CBNV and GNBT as defendants, but also explicitly asserted federal claims, specifically, violations of RESPA at Counts I and II, and RICO at Count III. We are persuaded that under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Grubbs and Pegram, the District Court properly acquired subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the amended complaint. II. ANALYSIS Appellants challenge nearly every aspect of the proceedings in the District Court. We examine each challenge in turn. A. Class Certification An appellate court reviews the initial certification of the class and the decision whether to approve the proposed settlement for abuse of discretion. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir.1998); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d Cir.1995) (“G.M.Trucks’’); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir.1975). We must decide whether a district court’s failure to follow the procedures required before approving a settlement-only class action was an abuse of discretion. As we stated above, on July 17, 2003, the District Court, acting on the settling parties’ motion, consolidated five separate class actions into the Kessler action, conditionally certified the class for “settlement purposes” only, and preliminarily approved the settling parties’ proposed settlement. JA at 132. The Order explicitly left the issue of whether “the Class meets the requirements for final certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(3), (c)(2) and the United States Constitution” until the final fairness hearing. JA at 133. The settlement class action device offers defendants the opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations without conceding any of the arguments they may have against class certification. See G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 786. Often, as in this case, the parties never intend to litigate the claims; rather, from the time the plaintiffs file the complaint, the goal on both sides is to reach a nationwide settlement. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601-02, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (discussing case where complaint, answer, proposed settlement agreement, and joint motion for conditional certification of settlement class were all filed on same day). “By specifying certification for settlement purposes only ... the court preserves the defendant’s ability to contest certification should the settlement fall apart.” G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 786. As stated in Amchem, “all Federal Circuits recognize the utility of Rule 23(b)(3) settlement classes” as a means to facilitate the settlement of complex nationwide class actions. 521 U.S. at 618, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (stating also that “[a]mong current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘settlement only’ class has become a stock device”). However, drawing, inter alia, on Judge Becker’s comprehensive opinions in G.M. Trucks and Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.1996), the Supreme Court noted the special problems encountered with settlement classes. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621-23, 117 S.Ct. 2231; see also, G.M.Trucks, 55 F.3d at 795 (stating that “collusion, inadequate prosecution, and attorney inexperience are the paramount concerns in precertification settlements”). Nonetheless, the Amchem Court held that certification of classes for settlement purposes only was consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, provided that the district court engages in a Rule 23(a) and (b) inquiry: Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the—-proposal is that there be no trial. But other specifications of the Rule those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions— demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold. 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231. The Court made clear that the ultimate inquiry into the fairness of the settlement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) does not relieve the court of its responsibility to evaluate Rule 23(a) and (b) considerations. “Federal courts ... lack authority to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard never adopted—that if a settlement is ‘fair,’ then certification is proper.” 521 U.S. at 622, 117 S.Ct. 2231. Indeed, [t]he safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) class-qualifying criteria, we emphasize, are not impractical impediments—checks shorn of utility—in the settlement-class context. First, the standards set for the protection of absent class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the chancellor’s foot kind— class certifications dependent upon the court’s gestalt judgment or overarching impression of the settlement’s fairness. Second, if a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer ... Id. at 621, 117 S.Ct. 2231. Thus, regardless of whether a district court certifies a class for trial or for settlement, it must first find that the class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23. Id.; G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 799-800 (“In sum, ‘a class is a class is a class,’ and a settlement class, if it is to qualify under Rule 23, must meet all of its requirements.”). In making this analysis, the district court may take the terms of the proposed settlement into consideration. The central inquiry, however, is the adequacy of representation. In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 308. Thus, “[sjubdivisions (a) and (b) [of Rule 23] focus court attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621, 117 S.Ct. 2231. 1. Certification Process Followed by the District Court Our review of the record makes plain that the District Court did not engage in the Rule 23(a) and (b) inquiry required by Amchem. The July 17, 2003 Order, which conditionally certified the class for settlement purposes, explicitly left the Rule 23 analysis for the November 14, 2003 fairness hearing. Review of the transcript of the fairness hearing reveals no instance where the District Court discussed the issue of certification. Finally, the District Court’s December 4, 2003 Final Order Approving Class Action Settlement states only that “[t]he Class this court preliminarily certified is finally certified for settlement purposes under Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(3), and (c)(2) because the court finds that the Class fully satisfies all the applicable requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 23 and due process.” JA 159. The Court’s ipse dixit statement was not accompanied by any discernable analysis. Appellees direct us to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the settling parties, which do provide a detailed Rule 23 analysis. Although the District Court did not sign them, it adopted them wholesale by way of a footnote in its December 4, 2003 Memorandum accompanying the Final Order approving settlement. In this footnote, the Court stated that Subsequent to the hearing, class counsel submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions [of law].... Upon independent review of the record in this case, the court finds that the proposed findings and conclusions are fully supported by the record adopted by the court and incorporated into this memorandum by reference as if fully set forth. JA at 176. We are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), holding that a district court’s verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, although highly disapproved of, is not per se grounds for reversal. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1215-16 (3d Cir.1993). However, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating that the district court exercised “independent judgment” in adopting a party’s proposed findings. Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729, 731-32 (3d Cir.2004); see also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir.1998) (“The central issue is whether the district court has made an independent judgment.”). In the present case, the only evidence we find in the record that the District Court exercised independent judgment is the fact that it said it did. JA at 176 (“Upon independent review of the record in this case_”). Indeed, when questioned at oral argument, Appellees were unable to point to any additional record evidence to support a finding of independent judgment. By contrast, there is substantial basis in the record to question whether “independent judgment” was exercised. As detailed above, see JA at 1973-74, during a closed door session held before the November 14, 2003 fairness hearing, the District Court asked the settling parties to submit the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which it “would adopt basically.” Cf. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572-73, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (holding that district court’s findings should receive no less deferential review when district court announced its decision to parties first and then asked prevailing party to prepare findings of fact, many of which it ultimately adopted verbatim). At the actual fairness hearing, class certification itself was never discussed. We also note that nearly every order issued by the District Court in this case was a verbatim copy of a proposed order offered by the settling parties. See, e.g., July 17, 2003 Order conditionally certifying class for settlement purposes; October 14, 2003 Order invalidating class opt-outs and restricting communications between Appellants and class; November 10, 2003 Order quashing Appellants request for discovery; December 4, 2003 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. We are therefore concerned that the District Court may have abdicated its role as a neutral and independent adjudicator or, at the very least, sacrificed independent judgment for administrative efficiency. We are confident that the district judge sincerely concluded that he had exercised the required “independent judgment.” Statements of subjective conclusions, however, are insufficient when adopting verbatim suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law to meet the strict requirements of Rule 23. What is required at a minimum is a statement of reasons, expressed in objective form, how the court exercised independent judgment in evaluating the submissions of counsel. In the context of meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), we are not satisfied that the bare statement that the “proposed findings and conclusions are fully supported in the record” meets the minimum standard of accepting verbatim adoption as contemplated in the teachings of Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572, 105 S.Ct. 1504. We believe that a court must set forth persuasive reasons, stated with objectivity, why the submissions of counsel totally reflect the independent judgment of the court. The act of accepting as its own these critical suggestions is an important judicial conclusion whose acceptability is merited only to the extent that sound reason stated publicly supports the acceptance. Because we are not convinced that the District Court exercised “independent judgment” in adopting the proposed findings of the settling parties, we conclude that the settlement-only class was never properly certified in accordance with Am- chem. “[W]ithout certification there is no class action, and in a settlement entered without class certification the judgment will not have res judicata effect on the claims of absent class members.” G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 800 (internal citation, quotations, and alterations omitted). We will therefore vacate the settlement Order and remand to the District Court. 2. The Appropriateness of Class Certification Our conclusion that the settlement class was not properly certified does not mean that the class could not be certified on remand. Because we believe certification may indeed be appropriate, we examine some of the relevant factors to be considered on remand. We have stated that “Rule 23 is designed to assure that courts will identify the common interests of class members and evaluate the named plaintiffs’ and counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately protect class interests.” G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 799. To be certified, a class must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). If the Rule 23(a) requirements are met, the court must then find that the class fits within one of the three categories of class actions set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). In the present case, the parties chose to pursue a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), the customary vehicle for damage actions. Thus, the District Court must determine that common questions of law or fact predominate and that the class action mechanism is the superior method for adjudicating the case. “The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) are designed to insure that a proposed class has ‘sufficient unity so that absent class members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives.’ ” In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 309 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621, 117 S.Ct. 2231); see also Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 176 n. 4 (3d Cir.1988) (“ ‘[C]ommonality, like ‘numerosity’ evaluates the sufficiency of the class itself, and ‘typicality’ like ‘adequacy of representation’ evaluates the sufficiency of the named plaintiff ....”) (citation omitted). A court must determine class certification independently from its Rule 23(e) inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621, 117 S.Ct. 2231. i. The Rule 28(a) Criteria There is no dispute that the conditionally certified class meets the numerosity and commonality prongs of Rule 23(a). See generally In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 309. The class consists of approximately 44,000 members and “the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” Baby Neal by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994). We likewise find that the requirements of typicality are met. “The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly defined and tend to merge.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56. Both concepts seek to ensure that the interests of the absentees will be adequately represented by the named plaintiffs. Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). However, “neither of these requirements mandates that all putative class members share identical claims.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56; see also Hassine, 846 F.2d at 176-77; Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 809 (3d Cir.1984). “[C]ases challenging the same unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58. The mere fact that some members of the class may have additional state or federal law