Full opinion text
KEARSE, Circuit Judge. Defendants Glenn B. Laken and John M. Black, Jr., charged along with more than a dozen other individuals in a 26-count indictment that was eventually redacted at trial to seven counts, appeal from judgments entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (A) convicting both Laken and Black, following a jury trial before William H. Pauley III, Judge, on one count of racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One) (“RICO conspiracy”), one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2 (Count Five), one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 2 (Count Three), two counts of illegal kickbacks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1954 and 2 (Counts Four and Seven), one count of theft of honest services, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 2 (Count Six), and one count of conspiracy to commit the above substantive offenses and to commit union pension fund fraud, securities fraud, and fraud by an investment advisor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Two) (the “pension fund fraud/kickbacks conspiracy”); and (B) convicting Laken, following his plea of guilty before Sidney H. Stein, Judge, on one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wiré fraud, and commercial bribery in connection with stock issued by FinancialWeb.com, Incorporated (“FWEB”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the “FWEB conspiracy”). Judge Pauley sentenced Black principally to serve 37 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Laken’s offenses were consolidated for sentencing before Judge Pau-ley, who entered judgment ordering Laken principally to serve a total of 63 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release, and entered an amended judgment ordering him also to pay $6,620,675.33 in restitution to victims of the FWEB conspiracy. Defendant Lionel Reifler appeals from a judgment, entered in the same court following his plea of guilty before Judge Stein, convicting him on one count of conspiracy — the FWEB conspiracy — to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and commercial bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of credit card fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a). Judge Stein entered judgment sentencing Reifler principally to 63 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and entered an amended judgment ordering him also to pay $2 million in restitution to victims of the FWEB conspiracy. On appeal, Laken and Black contend principally (1) that the district court (a) violated their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation by admitting in evidence the plea allocutions of two of their alleged coconspirators, and (b) deprived them of a fair trial by allowing the government to introduce certain evidence, including evidence that Black and others had ties to organized crime; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on (a) the RICO conspiracy count, (b) one of the wire fraud counts, and (c) both of the illegal kickbacks counts; and (3) that the insufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions on those counts requires, on a theory of retroactive misjoinder, the invalidation of their convictions on all other counts. All three appellants (a) challenge various aspects of the sentencing judges’ calculations under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) (2000), and (b) seek remands for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 259, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (invalidating mandatory application of the Guidelines), and United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir.2005) (“Crosby ”) (establishing procedures in connection with Booker error). In addition, Laken and Reifler make several challenges, including a Booker challenge, to the orders of restitution. For the reasons that follow we find no basis for reversal of any of appellants’ convictions; we remand for consideration of resentencing in accordance with Crosby; and we vacate the restitution orders imposed on Laken and Reifler and remand for further proceedings in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A and 3664. I. BACKGROUND The prosecutions at issue on these appeals arose out of a lengthy securities-fraud investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), culminating in the June 2000 arrests of approximately 120 persons, including Laken, Black, and Reifler, and the filing of more than a score of indictments and criminal complaints. Laken and Black were indicted and tried on charges that they, along with others, engaged in a scheme to bribe officials of unions to invest pension fund assets in corrupt investment vehicles. In one format, coconspirators employed in the securities industry planned to receive substantial sums from excessive commissions generated by the churning of securities in a corrupt hedge fund. In another format, they planned simply to retain some 10-20 percent of the amount that each pension fund meant to invest, and they hoped that sufficiently profitable returns on the moneys actually invested would mask that initial diversion. In either case, those coconspirators were to use part of the illegally gained moneys to fund their bribery payments to the union officials. In addition, the indictment alleged that the coconspirators schemed to manipulate the prices of various securities and to pay secret bribes to brokers in furtherance of those schemes. A separate indictment charged Laken and Reifler with, inter alia, conspiring to manipulate the price of FWEB stock. A. The Pension Fund Fraud/Kickbacks Trial Laken and Black were tried in a 15-week trial in 2001-2002, along with defendants William M. Stephens, Gene Phillips, and A. Cal Rossi, all of whom won acquittals on all counts. Defendant Angelo Cal-vello also began the trial, but prior to its conclusion he entered into a plea agreement with the government. At trial, the principal government witness was Jeffrey Pokross. Pokross, until he was arrested in 1996 and agreed to cooperate with the government, had been an associate of the Bonan-no organized crime family (see Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”) at 2504-05). Pokross was a principal in DMN Capital Investments, Inc. (“DMN Capital” or “DMN”), a small firm in Manhattan that provided investment banking and stock promotion services to small companies. His partners in that firm included James (“Jimmy”) La-bate, “a high level ... associate” of the Gambino Crime Family (id. at 2504); and the affairs of DMN Capital were overseen by Robert Lino, a “captain or capo in the Bonan[n]o crime family” (id. at 2930). With Pokross’s cooperation many conversations were recorded, as the government obtained court authorization to install microphones in DMN Capital’s offices, and Pokross wore a wire for meetings at other locations. The resulting tapes introduced as government exhibits with the prefixes “GX Conf,” “GX Desk,” or “GX” were recordings of conversations that took place in the DMN conference room, in the DMN desk area, or beyond DMN’s premises, respectively; transcripts given to the jury as aids in listening to the tapes bear the corresponding numbers and prefixes, with the further designation “-T” (and with “... ” denoting a pause and “UI” signifying that some words were unintelligible). The tape recordings and the testimony of Pokross were the principal evidence at trial. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the trial evidence showed the following. 1. The Targeted Union Pension Funds Laken, Black, Labate, and others schemed principally to engage in fraudulent activity with respect to the pension funds of three unions: Local 400 of the Production Workers Union (“Local 400”); the Detectives’ Endowment Association (“DEA”), which handled an annuity fund for Detectives in the New York City Police Department; and Local 137 of the Operating Engineers Union (“Local 137”). Pok-ross described the beginnings and progress of the scheme with respect to each of these unions, and recordings of pertinent conversations were played for the jury. Except where indicated, all of the events described below took place in 2000. a. Local k00 Prior to 1999, Pokross had worked on a number of stock deals with Frank A. Pér-sico (“Pérsico”), whom Pokross described at trial as “a corrupt stockbroker” who would “readily take bribes,” make “unrealistic predictions” to promote house stocks (i.e., thinly-traded stocks for which his firm was a market maker), arrange undisclosed compensation to brokers, and “run[ ] the crew[s] of other corrupt stockbrokers” (Trial Tr. 2536). Pérsico, a neighbor of Labate, was an associate of the Colombo Crime Family. (See id.) In 1999, Pérsico gained control of Local 400 and contacted Pokross to discuss the possibility of DMN Capital’s finding ways to invest Local 400 pension fund assets that would be profitable for Pérsico personally. Meeting with Labate in late 1999, Pérsico said he had “t[aken] over and was running Production Workers Local 400” and “had $20 million that he wanted to put into a product to earn money on.” (Id. at 2613.) On January 13, 2000, Pérsico, Pok-ross, and Labate discussed various types of investment vehicles, including bonds, preferred stock, and real-estate investment trusts (“REITs”), and hypothetical maturity dates for those investments. Pokross stated, and Pérsico agreed, that “[t]he longer the thing goes, the more fat there is, for us. The shorter it goes, the less fat.” (GX 30A Conf-T at 3.) They also discussed the means by which, and the frequency with which, an investment advis- or could pay them. (See, e.g., id. at 4 (“PERSICO: So, how, how is this guy gonna get... get... raise the money? That’s what I wanna know?”).) Labate suggested simply taking a portion of the money at the outset. (See id. at 5 (“Take first money.. .And you let the fund replenish the money that you took.”).) Pér-sico, however, preferred receiving a sum of money annually, suggesting that their approach to an investment advisor should be “ ‘we want “this”, every year. I don’t care what you get, maybe you gonna get “this”, but we want “this”, Can that be done?’ ” (Id. at 4.) Pérsico said, “[wje’ll tell them we want 200,000,” “[e]very year though!” (Id. at 5.) On January 19, 2000, Pérsico, Pok-ross, and Labate met at Labate’s home and “discussed a plan for the investment” of Local 400 assets “and getting some splits, some commission sharing.” (Trial Tr. 2752-53.) There followed several weeks of non-communication between Pérsico and Pok-ross; and in a February 25, 2000 conversation with Pokross and Labate, Lino asked whether Pérsico had lost interest. Pok-ross said he thought not, pointing out that Pérsico had asked them to “find a friendly” investment advisor who would do what they wanted. (GX 57C Conf-T at 2.) Lino suggested that perhaps the plan was simply being delayed because “[t]his kid’s got heat,” ie., because Pérsico was receiving attention from law enforcement agents (id. at 10). Thereafter, Lino inquired of the underboss of the Colombo Crime Family (see Trial Tr. 3039) — whose “boss” was Persico’s “cousin, Alley Boy Pérsico” (id. at 2536) — and reported to Labate and Pok-ross on March 2 that the Colombo Crime Family was still interested in pursuing the scheme to defraud Local 400 (see GX 61C Desk-T at 3). Pokross testified that the union pension fund scheme was also discussed with Pérsico at a meeting on April 25 (see Trial Tr. 3151-52) and that Pérsico confirmed “[t]hat the scheme was going to continue to move forward” (id. at 3152). b. The DEA In January 2000, Labate had suggested that additional unions be approached with respect to the possibility of their making pension fund investment arrangements similar to that envisioned by Pérsico for Local 400. (See GX 33E Conf-T at 3-5.) In particular, Labate targeted the DEA, whose president and treasurer, Thomas J. Scotto and Stephen (“Steve”) Gardell, respectively, were also neighbors of Labate (see id.; Trial Tr. 2749-50). Labate knew that Gardell lived beyond his means and had a gambling problem. (See, e.g., GX 318-T at 12; Trial Tr. 3670.) Pokross testified that on February 8, 2000, Labate reported that he .had informed Gardell on the previous evening that “[Gardell] would be getting 50,000 per million back as kickback.” (Id. at 2968-69.) c. Local 137 Local 137 of the Operating Engineers Union, sometimes referred to as the Operating Engineers, the Westchester Operating Engineers, or simply the Engineers, was controlled by its business manager, Nicholas Signorelli Sr. Calvello, a member of Local 137 who sometimes received remuneration from DMN Capital for bringing it clients (see GX 88C Desk-T at 2), and who was a good Mend of Nicholas Signorelli Jr., Local 137’s president (a figurehead position, according to Calvello) (see id. at 5), had discussions with Pokross and Labate in March and April about the possible fraudulent investment of Local 137’s pension fund assets (see, e.g., id. at 6-9; Trial Tr. 4163). Calvello said there was “a lot of money in the Fund” (GX 88C Desk-T at 6); Labate told Calvello that if Local 137 would “do 500,000 dollars, you got yourself 20 grand more money” (id. at 17). Labate hypothesized that Local 137 “is a billion dollar Fund” (id. at 6), and he and Pokross explained that the plan would be to seek the placement of $100 million with an investment advisor; the advisor would put $90 million of that into secure investments and put the remaining $10 million into an investment vehicle from which 10 percent, or $1 million, could be skimmed for payments to the individuals (see id. at 6-8; id. at 8 (“10 million gets a million dollars... the right way for a chop”)). Labate told Calvello that DMN would be happy with a “60/40” split of the $1 million, and the Signorellis could “walk away with 200,000 apiece.” (Id.) 2. The Participation of Laken and Black In early 2000, Black had introduced Pokross and Labate to Laken. Black, a corrupt securities broker dealer in Manhattan (see Trial Tr. 2644), was a self-described associate of the Luchese Crime Family (see id. at 2692-93). Black’s friend Laken was an experienced Chicago-based commodities trader who planned to open a hedge fund called Trade Venture Fund. On or about February 7, 2000, Black approached Labate and proposed that DMN Capital find investors for Laken’s hedge fund, in return for which Laken would pay DMN secret commissions. (See GX 44A Conf(2)-T at 2.) Pokross testified that the plan to “bribe [DMN] to find investors for Trade[ ]Venture[ ]Fund” was originated by “Mr. Black and then Mr. Laken.” (Trial Tr. 5199.) Labate responded to this proposal by telling Black that DMN had “access to 2” possible investors for Laken’s fund (GX 44B Conf-T at 3), which were “[ujnions” (id. at 4). Labate cautioned Black, however, that Laken must be instructed not to disclose that Black had secured the union pension fund investments through Labate and his associates: Labate: And it’s gotta stop at you. If anybody ever asks him questions, it goes to him or I got it through you. “Where did you get it from”? Black: Right. (UI) I mean, that could be it. ‘Where did I get it from”? “I got it from”... Labate: [ ]You, you, you started investi- . gating it. You started investigating with unions (UI). You seen an open market because of CIGNA taking over Unions, and you’re seeing all these other companies... Black: Give me the script. Tell me what I gotta do. (Id. at 7.) In conversations with Pokross and La-bate on February 7, 8, and 9, Black described the process by which Laken, using his own clearing firm, would churn a pension fund’s account by making matching purchases and sales of securities (see GX 46C Conf(l)-T at 12), which Black referred to as “round trips” (GX 44A Conf(2)-T at 2) and “in and outs and in and outs” (GX 45B Conf-T at 3), and which Laken called “round turns” (GX 46C Conf(l)-T at 12). On February 7, for example, Black stated that Laken would pay commissions of $150,000 to $200,000 each year for every million dollars invested by DMN-produced investors, with a portion of those commissions going to Black. Black stated: [F]or every, for every million dollars uh, about a buck fifty to 200 a year they’ll give back. Alright? And that’s after they make 40 something percent. It’s just on the clearing side... ‘cause he owns the clearing. The Fund has got... Labate: 10 million would be a $1,500,000 a year coming back. Black: Yeah. That’s what I said. Labate: And that’s guaranteed. Black: He’ll put it in writing. Labate: What would you want out of that. Black: Give me a little smidgeon. You know.... Labate: [ JYeah, ‘cause the guy’s gonna want 60%. Black: I mean, we’ll... however, however we gotta take care of it. You know? (GX 44A Conf(2)-T at 2.) On February 8, Black reiterated to Pok-ross and Labate that for every $1 million that a pension fund introduced by DMN Capital put into Laken’s hedge fund, Black and DMN, collectively, would receive approximately $150,000 a year. (See GX 45B Conf-T at 2.) Black said, what it is, you’re getting basically the majority of the commissions. What happens is, he owns... He’s gonna be managing the Fund. The Fund’s a separate entity. All of the commissions that are generated off the Fund are gonna be done through a clearing firm that he owns. Alright. That’s how he’s gonna pay us. (Id. at 3.) Labate and Black then debated how much DMN Capital would have to pay the corrupt union officials in bribes in order to get them to invest in Laken’s fund. In their conversation on February 7, Labate had speculated that an official would want 60 percent of the amounts generated through churning. (See GX 44A Conf(2)-T at 2.) On February 8, Labate questioned whether the plan would be financially worthwhile for DMN if the bribe amounts had to be as much as 80 percent of what they received from Laken. (See GX 45B Conf-T at 4.) They calculated that at the rate of $150,000 per million dollars invested, an investment of $20 million would get them $3 million from Laken; and if they were required to pay 80 percent of that $3 million, or $2.4 million, in bribes, Black and DMN would be left to share $600,000. (See id. at 5-6.) Black and Labate considered whether they could give the officials a smaller percentage, with Labate cautioning, “we gotta make it sensible for them to do it” (id. at 6): Black: I mean, I think 80’s very sensible for them to do it. For them to get 2.6 million a year... 2.4 million a year. That’s pretty sensible. Labate: Are we happy with the, with... Black: I think we should get a little bit more... Alright... Labate: [ ]How much money... Black: [ ]I mean, not so much you... Labate: [ ]Do we wanna get 30%[?] (Id.) They settled on a proposed aggregate of 30 percent for Black and DMN Capital, amounting to $900,000, to be divided $300,000 for Black and $600,000 for DMN. (See id. at 7-8.) Laken was due to come to New York to meet with Pokross and Labate the next day, February 9, and Black, Pokross, and Labate proceeded to discuss plans for that meeting. (See GX 45B Conf-T at 12.) Pokross told Black that the head of the DEA would be there. (See id. at 13.) In an ensuing conference call in which Black, Labate, Pokross, and Laken participated, Pokross told Laken that the DEA retirement fund assets totaled some $300 million: Pokross: Okay, we have a very, very near and dear friend of ours who runs the Detectives uh, Retirement Fund... that’s got about 300 million dollars in it. Laken: Yup. Pokross: A very, very close friend. Okay? Laken: Right. Pokross: So, keep it quiet. You know, I think John had mentioned that to you. Laken: Yes he did. (Id. at 16.) On February 9, Laken met with Black, Pokross, and Labate in New York at the DMN office to describe his hedge fund. (See Trial Tr. 2969.) Pokross told Laken that “there are a couple of Pension Funds who we happen to be very friendly with the Treasury, the Treasurers and Board of Trustees,” mentioning in particular the “Detective’s [sic ] Endowment Fund [with] 300 million dollars,” and “another particular Pension Fund with” “60 million dollars in it.” (GX 46C Conf(l)-T at 3.) Pokross said that “a lot of these particular Pension[]” funds were “mostly in the construction” industry. (Id. at 22.) At that meeting, Laken confirmed Black’s explanation that Laken would clear trades below the normal $9 — $11 cost through a clearing house in which Laken was a partner, stating that “[a]t the end of the day what’s in it for you is this” very substantial “kick back”: My charge will be somewhere around 8 bucks. At 8 bucks, I have the ability to probably kick back, or pay in commission flow as opposed to kick back, any way you want to slice it.[ ] Pokross: []I’m from Brooklyn. Kick back is fine by me. Laken: Okay. Kick... I have the ability to kick back around a buck and a half a round turn. Trading the way that I trade, a buck and a half a round turn can amount to a very, very substantive number very quickly. (GX 46C Conf(l)-T at 12.) Pokross asked Laken to quantify “what the yield” would be, explaining that [s]ome of these guys like to live a little nicer than their means. Laken: I’m sure of it. Pokross: Okay, and we will be responsible for some sharing of those commission arrangements... Laken: I got you. Pokross: .. .With them.[ ] Laken: I’m not at all, I’m not at all surprised. (Id. at 17-18.) Pokross indicated that Laken would not need to be involved in making those sharing arrangements, and Laken indicated that he would make payments to DMN Capital “to do whatever it is you need to do.” (Id. at 18.) Pokross said he would deal with the necessary officials [v]ery quietly. For instance... Without getting specific, there’s a specific individual who runs 300 million dollars. Laken: Yes. Pokross: All these guys, they make 80, a 100 grand a year. Laken: Yes. Pokross: They like to live a little. Laken: Yes. Pokross: Junkets... Gambling... Laken: Yes. Pokross: Whatever.... They, these degenerate (UI) guys. So, obviously, for him to get into something so speculative ... let, let’s say the, the, the grease, the wheels have to be greased a little bit. Laken: Yeah.[] Pokross: But I... They will never wanna deal with you on that. They’ll only deal with me and or Jimmy.[ ] Laken: I, and I’m only too happy for it to be that way because I don’t have an interest in dealing with it. Pokross: No, they’d be reluctant and you’d, you wouldn’t want to. Laken: Yes, precisely. (GX 46C Conf(l)-T at 18-19.) Pressing Laken to “quantify something up front” as to the payments DMN Capital could expect (id. at 19), Pokross explained that what he wanted to be able to do was “say to a guy ‘okay, for every million we’ll give you 80 a year. It’ll be here. Go there on vacation with your family and you can go look at it any time you want’ ” (id. at 20). Laken responded that he was not prepared to give a precise number but that he could say that “it w[ould] be a very generous commission throw back on the monies raised.” (Id. at 21.) Laken pre-dieted that not only would the pension funds make a lot of money, but DMN’s “Mends w[ould] make a lot of money.” (Id.) At that February 9 meeting, Pokross stated that he was friendly with trustees of “a lot of’ pension funds, principally associated with “the construction” industry and “the Detectives” (id. at 22). Pokross asked whether Laken could recommend “a very friendly Investment Advisor” whom the trustees could retain (id. at 23) and who would recommend investing pension fund assets in Laken’s hedge fund, and Black endorsed that approach: Black: That could be done, right? Laken: I believe so. Yes. Pokross: That’s the key to the kingdom. (Id. at 24; see also GX 44B Conf-T at 2-4 (February 7 discussion among Black, Pok-ross, and Labate of union pension fund trustees’ need for, in the words of Black, a “professional Investment Advisor” with “some credibility,” who would recommend “that they put their money in certain deals”).) Laken asked how quickly an investment could be expected “from [the time of] finding a friendly Investment Advisor.” (GX 46C Conf(l)-T at 26.) Pokross responded: Well, if you were making 80 grand a year and you lived a lifestyle that was like you spent 400,000 a year... Laken: Yeah. Pokross: ... How quickly do you think it’s gonna move forward? Laken: Probably very quickly. (Id.) On February 29, 2000, Black telephoned Pokross to say that Black and Laken had enlisted defendant Stephens, a San Francisco-based investment advisor, to be their friendly investment advisor. Pokross testified that Black said, “I have the investment advisor, I spoke to Glenn, Bill Stephens is going to be on board with what we are doing.” (Trial Tr. 2992.) Black had mentioned Stephens to Labate and Pokross on February 7 during the discussion of the need to find someone to serve as an investment advisor to union pension fund trustees and recommend investment vehicles that were controlled by the cocon-spirators. (See GX 44B Conf-T at 3-4.) On March 1, Pokross prepared for a telephone conference call with Stephens by asking Black to “[w]alk [Pokross] through” what Black’s “understanding [wa]s with Bill.” (GX 60D Conf-T at 2.) Black responded: My understanding is, is that, is the Detectives Endowment Fund... alright... Steve Gardella [sic] is the Treasurer. Pokross: Gardell. Black: Gardell. He needs somebody as an investment advisor, alright, that knows that he’s gonna be pushed in the direction of certain investments. Alright, and his job is to say, “yes, that’s a good investment”. Alright... for that, he’s gonna receive some remuneration, which I never disclose... (Id. at 2-3.) Pokross added: We are very friendly with certain labor unions and whatnot, who have pension funds ranging from 60 to 300 million. Black: Go ahead. Pokross: They’re friends of the family, if you understand what I’m saying. Black: Sure. Pokross: Okay? Black: Uh huh. Pokross: We can have carte blanche at these joints, ‘cause we’re all friendly with the trustees, who are hand picked by the wiseguys. Black: Right. (Id. at 5; see also Trial Tr. 2513 (explaining that “ ‘wise guy’ ” is a term for an initiated member of a crime family).) “[WJith the Detectives Union,” Pokross stated, “[a]ll these guys, Gardell, and even... you know, the other one.. .Scot-to,” “[t]hey all wanna earn.” (GX 60D Conf-T at 8.) Pokross reminded Black that, as to Laken’s hedge fund, Pokross and Black “were talking about a 150,000 per million,” and they could just “give Steve [Gardell] a fucking... 30,[ ]40, 50,000 dollars a year... in a bag.” (Id.) On March 2, Laken confirmed to Pok-ross and Labate that Stephens could be relied on to advise union officials to invest in Laken’s hedge fund. Laken said, “I spoke to Bill Stephens at some length last night, and uh, he, he understands.” (GX 61A Conf-T at 2.) Laken said he had emphasized to Stephens, “ ‘you’re getting this job through a friend of mine. And one of the prerequisites is that you’re friendly.’ ” (Id. at 4.) On March 2, Stephens faxed his résumé from California to Pokross in New York. In a telephone conversation on March 8, Pokross and Laken discussed the asset sizes of the various pension funds that were targeted because they were operated by DMN’s “friends” (GX 309-T at 3): Pokross: The biggest union we have is the Detective’s [sic] Pension Fund. Laken: Which is how much? POKROSS: Uh, four hundred and fifty to five hundred mill. Laken: That one alone is that big? Pokross: Yeah. (Id. at 2.) Pokross added: Then we go to the other side of the fence. We got Local... Production Local Number 400. That’s sixty mill. We got the Operating Engineers Union, which is probably about four hundred mill. Okay, and so on and so forth. So we have a whole dichotomy. Laken: [ ]To say the least. Pokross: We have the Detectives to, to, to the Labor Unions. Okay? Laken: Yep. Pokross: But those are all our friends. Laken: Right. (Id. at 3.) Pokross also explained how his “very, very good friend” (id. at 4), referring to (though not naming) Pérsico, had come to have control of Local 400: Pokross: Okay. In regard to the Production Local, okay... Our very, very good friend has that. And he has that on default, because the guy that ran it is, ya know, is ah no longer with us. Laken: Oh, he’s gonzo, huh? Pokross: Yeah, lead poisoning, so... Laken: Lead poisoning. Pokross: Yeah, none the less, Jimmy and I, Jimmy and I uh... Laken: [ ]How many pieces of lead poisoned him? Pokross: Well, I don’t know. Well several. Laken: []Several. Pokross: []I don’t think, I don’t think they found him... but I, you know... whatever. Laken: Who did he piss off? Pokross: I don’t wanna get into what certain cousins... Laken: []Okay. Pokross: [ ]But none the less, one of the cousins now has the Union. He’s Business Manager. So... Laken: Right. (Id. at 4-5.) In. a subsequent telephone conference call on March 8 among Laken, Pokross, and Stephens, Laken told Stephens that Pokross was lining up a number of pension funds that might subscribe to Stephens’s investment advisory services. Laken said, I know, from the discussions that I’ve had with Jeffrey, that your potential advisory services are blooming. That through Jeffrey’s network of individuals and the people that he has spoken to uh, he’s developing and fertilizing a number of potential relationships for you. Stephens: Pre-tenderizing? Laken: Pre-tenderizing. (GX 307-T at 6.) Laken predicted that investment recommendations by Stephens would encounter little resistance from the trustees of the pension funds in question {see id. at 20), “like this Detectives Endowment Fund,” “[a]nd the Operating Engineers” {id. at 21); Pokross added to that list other unions, including “Local 400” {id.). On March 22, Laken and Stephens met with Pokross and others in New York. Pokross emphasized the need to bribe— and the ease of bribing — DEA Treasurer Steve Gardell: You gotta remember something. These guys make about 80, 90,000 dollars a year. Tommy [Scotto] lives in a million dollar house across the street from Jimmy [Labate]. Garden’s got a gambling problem. Okay. He makes about 80-90 grand a year. We take care of Steve. We do what ever we have to do. So Steve lives a lifestyle... he needs 500,-000 a year. Okay? (GX 318-T at 12.) Laken said, “if the money is gonna come to me to do this... you know what I mean, to do this venture ... I’m more than willing to do what I need to do so that everybody gets fed appropriately.” {Id. at 14 (emphasis added).) Pokross continued: [W]ith Steve Gardell... okay... with Jimmy and I giving him 50,000 a year for every million... in a fucking Speed Racer lunch box. That’s what’s important for Steve Gardell. ‘Cause we send him to Atlantic City. We make him reservations. We got him hotel suites... and his play doesn’t deserve that. That’s what’s important to Steve. {Id. at 15.) Pokross reiterated that “Steve wants his 50,000 dollars per million or his 25,000 per million. Whatever we’re gonna pay him,” to which Laken responded, “Right.” {Id.) Pokross compared Gardell’s demands with those that could be expected from others such as Labate’s cousin Ralph Gargiulo (who “was an executive at the Operating Engineers Local in Staten Island” (Trial Tr. 3014; see also GX 74B Conf-T at 18-19)). Pokross told Laken, “a guy like Steve, we gotta kick him back 25, 35 grand. His [Labate’s] cousin Ralphie, with the Operating Engineers [of Staten Island], he gives us 5 million dollars, I gotta give him a fucking bag... a 150,000 in cash.” (GX 318-T at 24.) Laken responded, “Right.” {Id. at 25.) When Stephens asked on March 22 what was needed of him while he was in New York, Labate indicáted that they would try to set up a conference call with “Sig[n]ore[lli]” of “the Wes[t]chester Operating Engineers.” (GX 74B Conf-T at 11-12.) Although it is unclear whether such a call was arranged at that time, Labate sent Calvello materials containing information on Stephens’s firm on March 28 {see GX 849; Trial Tr. 4163), and in an April 11 meeting with Labate, Pokross, Black, and others, Calvello stated that he had spoken by telephone to Stephens and had passed the Stephens materials on to the Signorel-lis {see, e.g., GX 88C Desk-T at 18). On April 18, Calvello reported that Signorelli Jr. had read the Stephens materials {see GX 93A Conf-T at 3) and would try to get Calvello an appointment with Signorelli Sr. {see id. at 5). On April 26, Calvello reported to Pok-ross that he had spoken that day to both Signorellis (see GX 98E Conf-T at 2) about the possibility of investing “ ‘through very dear friends’ ” (id.) at a return rate of “18 or 20 or 30%” (id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted)); that “they like[d] what they heard” (id. at 4); and that Signorelli Sr. “was very impressed” (id. at 2). Sig-norelli Sr., who in Calvello’s view was not generally cordial, invited Calvello to come to see him (see id. at 4), which Calvello planned to do in the near future (see id. at 5). Calvello stated that he had not provided details of the investment plan to Signo-relli Sr. that day because Signorelli Jr. was present, and Calvello “would never mention anything with 2 people around” (id.). On May 4, Calvello informed Pokross that Signorelli Jr. thought the plan “look[ed] so good” (GX 104B Conf-T at 6), but that Calvello had not yet been able to meet with Signorelli Sr. alone (see id.). He stated that he was hoping to meet with Signorelli Sr. the following week because Labate had told him Stephens would be in town. (See id.; see also GX 103D Conf-T at 10 (Labate stating to Pokross, Laken, and others on May 3, 2000, that “when Stephens comes in on the 15th, we’re gonna make him meet with the Engineers in Westchester”).) In the meantime, on March 23, Stephens had made a presentation to Gardell to persuade him to retain Stephens as investment advisor for the DEA. At the end of that presentation, Gardell stated, “I can tell you 90% it looks pretty good,” and that he would be able to commence the retention of Stephens around July 1. (GX 75B Conf-T at 20.) Gardell said he would like to meet with Stephens in San Francisco. Stephens agreed, and he arranged and paid for round-trip flights for Gardell and his secretary, as well as hotel accommodations for five days. (See, e.g., GX 925; GX 90C Conf-T at 2; Trial Tr. 3108-11.) On April 13, 2000, Stephens sent Pokross, by fax, a travel itinerary and a receipt for E-tickets for Garden’s trip. (See GX 925; Trial Tr. 3110.) On April 26, Pokross reported to Black that Gardell was then in San Francisco, meeting with Stephens. Black: Have we gotten any word back? Pokross: I’m gonna get it later, or certainly tomorrow. They were out for dinner last night. I don’t need word how their uh... Dungeness crab was. Black: Well, you figure, you know... Pokross: I know how it’s gonna go. Meaning, I know the outcome of it in advance. Black: Alright. So you’re saying it’s a done deal? Pokross: It’s impossible to fuck it up. (GX 98B Conf-T at 2.) Black responded approvingly, stating that he wanted Laken’s hedge fund launched by June. (See id. at 3.) The discussion then turned to other pension funds whose trustees might be persuaded to invest their pension fund assets in Laken’s hedge fund if Gardell so invested DEA funds: Black: And how about the other ones from... Baker and, and Operating. ..? Pokross: We’re working. Black: Alright. Pokross: We got em all lit up. Let him come back, so I can point to him. Black: Alright. Okay. Pokross: And then we have Local 137 in play... up in Westchester. (Id. at 4.) Laken expressed the same views, both as to the likely success of the meeting between Gardell and Stephens and as to the persuasive effect that an agreement with Gardell would have on the other targeted unions. Although on April 26 Laken said he had not yet received a report from Stephens as to how the meeting with Gar-dell had gone, Laken said he had had an extended chat with Bill on Sunday night at home. Pokross: Yeah, go ahead. Laken: .. .And, and I told him pretty much that. I said, you know... I, I said... you know, “this is pretty much idiot proof. This guy is the Number One domino in a number of dominos.” (GX 98B Conf-T at 13.) Pokross said that before Gardell left for San Francisco to meet with Stephens, Pokross “took a visit to his house early one morning” to ensure that Gardell was “well equipped to do shopping and uh, have spending money.” (Id. at 14.) Laken responded, “Well, I figured he was pre-tenderized.” (Id.) Later on April 26, Gardell telephoned Pokross to say that the meeting with Stephens had gone well and that the investment of DEA assets with Stephens was “99.9 a go.” (GX 98D Conf-T at 3.) On May 3, Laken reported that Gardell had told Stephens that “it was a done deal.” (GX 103D Conf-T at 2.) 3. The Allegations Against Phillips and Rossi The indictment alleged that the scheme to defraud union pension plans and to pay illegal kickbacks to union officials also envisioned use of a second corrupt investment vehicle, to wit, American Realty Trust (“ARB”), a REIT controlled by Basic Capital Management Inc. (“Basic”). Basic was an advisory firm controlled and managed by defendants Phillips and Rossi, respectively. The indictment alleged that the defendants agreed that Phillips would have ARB issue a series of preferred stock that would appear to be suitable for investment by a pension fund; that Stephens would recommend investments in that ARB preferred stock (as well as in Laken’s hedge fund); and that Rossi would structure the offering of the preferred stock to allow a portion of the proceeds to be paid to the coconspirators. The alleged agreement was that out of every $10 million of union pension funds invested in the fraudulently issued ARB preferred stock, the enterprise would secretly be paid some $2 million. A portion of that $2 million was to be used to pay off the corrupt union officials. 4. The End of the Scheme; the Redacted Indictment The scheme came to a halt in June 2000, when the FBI concluded its investigation and arrested Laken and Black (and many others) before any pension fund moneys had actually been invested in the corrupt investment vehicles or diverted. As eventually redacted and submitted to the jury, the pension fund fraud/kickbacks indictment at issue here charged Laken and Black, along with Stephens, Phillips, and Rossi, in seven counts: Count One: RICO conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise (described as the association of DMN Capital, the defendant individuals, and others) through a pattern of racketeering activity, to wit, wire fraud and illegal kickbacks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Count Two: conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and fraud by an investment advisor, and to pay illegal kickbacks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; Count Three: wire fraud in connection with the scheme to defraud Local 400, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 2; Count Four: offering or promising illegal kickbacks to officials of Local 400, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1954 and 2; Count Five: wire fraud in connection with the scheme to defraud the DEA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; Count Six: theft of the honest services of a DEA official, specifically Gar-dell, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 2; and Count Seven: offering or promising illegal kickbacks to officials of Local 137, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1954 and 2. 5. The Plea Allocutions of Lino and Labate The defendants named in the original indictment also included Pérsico, Gardell, Lino, and Labate. Those four defendants entered pleas of guilty prior to trial. Over objection, portions of the plea allocutions of Lino and Labate were introduced at the trial of Laken, Black, Stephens, Phillips, and Rossi. As discussed in greater detail in Part II.A. below, those allocutions stated, to the extent pertinent to the pension fund fraud/kickbacks charges, that there had existed a conspiracy to bribe union pension fund officials and that the DEA and Locals 400 and 137 were targets of that conspiracy. 6. The Verdicts The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts as to Laken and Black. Stephens, who presented a defense of entrapment, was acquitted on all counts. Phillips and Rossi were also acquitted on all counts. B. The FWEB Conspiracy and Other Charges Against Reifler FWEB, a small company whose stock was traded over-the-counter, was purportedly engaged in the business of providing investment-related services on the Internet, including information on stocks. One of its featured services, “The Stock Detective,” offered to advise subscribing investors of suspicious circumstances involving the stocks of other companies. The FWEB conspiracy indictment, which was assigned to Judge Stein, alleged that Laken, personally or through nominees, controlled large blocks of FWEB stock. It alleged that Reifler was in the business of promoting stocks through, inter alia, Internet promotions and mass mailings of newsletters to investors and that he had described to Laken a fraudulent newsletter program and his past track record in generating high trading volume in over-the-counter stocks at inflated prices. This indictment alleged that beginning in or about February 2000, Laken sought to sell blocks of FWEB stock under his control, that he and others conspired to inflate the price of FWEB stock artificially in order to permit Laken to sell his shares at a profit, and that Reifler joined the conspiracy in or about April 2000. Count 1 alleged that Laken paid his coconspira-tors by secretly giving them blocks of free-trading FWEB stock, that retail brokers were so paid to induce them to create trading volume in the stock, and that neither the fact of those payments nor the fact that Laken would be the true party to the sales transactions was disclosed to the public. That count charged Laken, Reifler, and others with conspiring to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, commercial bribery, and fraudulent failure to disclose compensation for stock promotion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count 2 of the indictment charged Laken, Reifler, and others with securities fraud; count 5 charged those defendants with wire fraud. Counts 3 and 4 charged Laken and others, not including Reifler, with fraudulent concealment of compensation for stock promotion. After this indictment was made public, the price of FWEB shares plunged. FWEB shareholders lost millions of dollars. In February 2002, following the conclusion of his trial on the pension fund fraud/Mckbacks charges, Laken entered a plea of guilty to Count 1 of the FWEB conspiracy indictment in satisfaction of all of the charges against him in that indictment. In his plea allocution, he stated, “I agreed with others [to] inflate the price of FWEB stock above its market value.” (Laken Plea Transcript, February 25, 2002 (“Laken Plea Tr.”), at 34-35.) Laken also asserted that at the time of that conduct, he “didn’t know it was illegal.” (Id. at 41.) Reifler agreed to the filing of a three-count information against him superseding the FWEB conspiracy indictment. The information charged him with the FWEB conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two apparently unrelated counts of credit card fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a). In March 2002, Reifler pleaded guilty to those three charges. In his plea allocution with respect to the FWEB conspiracy charge, Reifler said: I agreed with others to attempt to artificially raise the price of the F Web stock through internet and other promotions. These individuals were doing this in a manner which failed to disclose that Glen [sic ] Lakin [sic ], a shareholder in F Web, was the driving force behind the promotion and that he planned to sell all his stock at these inflated profits if the profits could be achieved. (Reifler Plea Transcript, March 12, 2002 (“Reifler Plea Tr.”), at 24.) C. The Sentences and the Issues on Appeal All three appellants received Guidelines sentences based on calculations discussed in greater detail in Part III below. Judge Pauley sentenced Black principally to 37 months’ imprisonment. Laken’s convictions of the pension-fund-related offenses following his trial before Judge Pauley and his conviction of the FWEB conspiracy following his plea of guilty before Judge Stein were consolidated for sentencing before Judge Pauley, who sentenced Laken principally to a total of 63 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $6,620,675.33 in restitution to victims of the FWEB conspiracy. Judge Stein sentenced Reifler principally to 63 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $2 million in restitution to victims of the FWEB conspiracy. As discussed in Part II below, Laken and Black challenge their pension-fund-related convictions, alleging constitutional and evidentiary errors at trial and contesting the sufficiency of the evidence on several counts. As set forth in Part III below, all three appellants make a variety of challenges to their sentences, complaining of interpretations of specific guidelines and, in any event, seeking resentencing pursuant to Booker and Crosby on the ground that the district court considered application of the Guidelines to be mandatory. As set forth in Part IV below, Laken and Reifler also make several challenges, including statutory-interpretation and Booker challenges, to the orders for restitution. II. CHALLENGES BY LAKEN AND BLACK TO THEIR CONVICTIONS In challenging their convictions, Laken and Black contend principally (A) that the trial court’s admission of codefendants’ plea allocutions violated their Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation as enunciated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); (B) that the admission of references to organized crime and to additional other-act evidence denied them a fair trial; (C) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on Count Three (wire fraud in connection with Local 400), Count Four (offering or promising illegal kickbacks in connection with Local 400), Count Seven (offering or promising illegal kickbacks in connection with Local 137), and two of the three predicate racketeering acts wire fraud and/or illegal kickbacks with respect to Locals 400 and 137) alleged in the Count One RICO conspiracy-charge; and (D), assuming the merit of their insufficiency challenges, that the convictions on the remaining counts should be vacated on the ground of retroactive mis-joinder. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that these contentions provide no basis for reversal. A. The Crawford Error At the pension fund fraud/kickbacks trial, the government was allowed, over objection, to introduce portions of the allocu-tions given by Lino and Labate in entering pleas of guilty to RICO conspiracy and a substantive RICO violation. Each allocution dealt with the fraudulent operations of DMN Capital from 1995 to 2000 and with the expansion of its operations in late 1999 to include the union pension fund fraud/kickbacks scheme. Lino’s admissions were as follows: “From 1995 up until June 2000, I and others were involved with financial advisory company called DMN Capital Incorporated located in Manhattan. DMN Capital was in the business of promoting stocks of various companies and raising money for those companies. I knew that it was a part of business of DMN Capital to line up brokers to work on these deals and these brokers would receive secret payments, cash under the table, to sell these stocks to their customers. Brokers were supposed to discourage customers from selling in return for these payments. “I was informed of and approved deals with certain groups of brokers at various stock brokerage firms in Manhattan and New Jersey. I also knew that DMN Capital and another secretly controlled firm in Manhattan called Monitor Investment Group in 1995 and 1996. I helped to settle disputes between DMN Capital and various brokers at these firms and others about how much monies they were owed. I also helped settle disputes about failures of brokers to pay money that was owed to DMN. I also occasionally brought deals to DMN Capital and asked the partners to work on them. “Later, in approximately 1997, I helped to arrange DMN Capital control over two branches of First Liberty Investment Group in Manhattan. I knew that the secret payments to brokers were wrong and against the law and the investors were defrauded because they wound up paying too much for these stocks. I didn’t know the names of all these stocks that DMN Capital worked on. I do not dispute that the stocks identified in racketeering acts one through four of Count One of the indictment were DMN Capital deals. “In return for my assistance the manipulation of stocks with DMN Capital and others tha[n] DMN Capital partners paid me a weekly salary in cash. I understood this ... money came from the proceeds of illegal stock sales and that DMN Capital had engaged in financial transactions to generate this cash. I knew that these financial transactions were wrong and against the law. “In late 1999 the business arrangement that I had with DMN Capital and others expanded to include a plan to defraud several unions’ pension funds. We agreed that DMN Capital and others would market fraudulent investments to these pension funds. I understood that DMN Capital and others entered into agreements that would result in large kickbacks, and part of that money woidd be used to pay off union officials to get the pension officials to invest in these deals. “Two of these unions were the Detectives’ Endowment Association and the Local 400. I also knew there were several others. I knew that this plan to defraud the pension funds was wrong and against the law.” (Trial Tr. 2475-77 (quoting GX 855, at 18-21 (emphases ours)).) The admitted portion of the Labate plea allocution was similar: “I was a principal at DMN Capital from ’95 through June of 2000. I, with others, participated in the promotion of the sale of stock of various companies and raised money for those companies. I participated with others in getting stockbrokers to work on these deals, and we paid these brokers secret commissions to sell stock to their customer. We also agreed that these brokers would prevent their customers from selling stock they had purchased. Reclaim, in racketeering act two, was a stock on which we paid secret money to stockbrokers. “DMN, of which I was a principal, controlled the brokerage firm, Monitor Investment Group. In 1995 through 1996 we used Monitor to further our ability to fraudulently sell stock to the public by paying secret commissions to brokers to prevent customers from selling their stock they had purchased. “Monitor and various brokers working with us sold stock in Beachport International Stock named in the racketeering act three and four. Brokers were paid cash for excessive commission. “I knew it was wrong to pay secret payments to brokers and against the law to defraud investors. As to racketeering act nine, we engaged in financial transactions and to hide the illegal activity and unlawful payment for brokers and others. I knew this was wrong and I did it in violation of law. “In 1996 Monitor was shut down and DMN had to look for another retail outlet for the stock deals. In 1996 and early ’97 we negotiated to obtain First Liberty Investment Group in Manhattan. We did this secretly with two stockbrokers acting as a front for DMN. With their help we sold Globus International by manipulating the market for Globus so that customer paid more than the stock was worth. I also knew there was a large commission on Globus at First Liberty. “In early 2000 I, with others at DMN, attempted to defraud various union pension funds. We agreed that DMN and others would market fraudulent investments to these pension funds. We agreed with others who are behind the deal that DMN would get large kickbacks from delivering pension funds as clients would invest in these deals. “We also agreed with the people behind these deals that ive would use part of the kickbacks to pay off union officials to influence pension funds in their investment decision. The unions ivere Production Workers Local 400, Detectives’ Endowment, and Operating Engineers of Local 137. I knew this plan was wrong and in violation of the law.” And in response to a question posed by the Court: “Did you understand that commissions being paid with respect to the Globus International Securities transaction were secret and excessive?” The defendant answered: ‘Tes.” (Trial Tr. 2477-79 (quoting GX 856, at 19-22 (emphases ours)).) The racketeering acts cited by Lino and Labate in the above allocutions referred to an indictment that preceded the redacted indictment; although those acts paralleled certain of the redacted indictment’s allegations as to the means and methods of operation of the RICO enterprise, they were not among the racketeering acts alleged in the redacted indictment. In accordance with this Court’s then-prevailing holdings, see, e.g., United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 104-05 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 268-70 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 166-68 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1216, 120 S.Ct. 2220, 147 L.Ed.2d 252 (2000), the district court allowed these allo-cution statements to be introduced on the limited issues of whether either conspiracy alleged in the indictment existed and what acts Lino or Labate had performed in furtherance of such a conspiracy if it existed. Upon admitting the allocutions, the court instructed the jury that the statements could be considered for those purposes only: Members of the jury, please understand that you may consider these guilty plea proceedings of Robert Lino and James S. Labate only on the following two issues: First, whether there was a racketeering conspiracy or a conspiracy to defraud union pension funds; and second, what, if anything, a defendant who pled guilty did, in order to further the objects of any of those conspiracies if you find that one or both existed. However, the question of whether any one of the defendants on trial before you was also a member of either one or both of the charged conspiracies is an issue for which you ioill have to rely on other evidence. There is no evidence in these statements naming any other defendant or co-conspirator. (Trial Tr. 2479-80 (emphasis added).) The court emphasized that the matter of “whether any defendant on trial was a part of the alleged conspiracy” was “a separate question” that the jury must decide “based entirely on the other evidence in the case,” and that “[t]here is nothing in these statements from Mr. Lino and Mr. Labate that answers that question one way or the other.” (Id. at 2480.) These limitations were reiterated in the court’s general charge to the jury prior to deliberations (see id. at 8252-53) and again in supplemental instructions when the plea allocutions were among the exhibits requested by the jury during deliberations (see id. at 8514, 8519-20). In 2004, Crawford v. Washington established that, in the trial of a criminal case, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement against the defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. See 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. While “leav[ing] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’ ” the Crawford Court stated that “[wjhatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. In the wake of Crawford, we have held that a plea allocution is a testimonial statement, “as it is formally given in court, under oath, and in response to questions by the court or the prosecutor.” United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir.2004). “Therefore, a plea allocution by a co-conspirator who does not testify at trial may not be introduced as substantive evidence against a defendant unless the co-conspirator is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 222. In the present case, there is no suggestion that Laken or Black had any opportunity to cross-examine Lino or La-bate with respect to their plea allocutions, and the government concedes that, in light of Crawford, the admission of those allocu-tions violated the rights of Laken and Black to confrontation. The government contends, however, that the error provides no basis for relief because it was harmless, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) (“Any error ... that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). For the reasons that follow, we agree. Prior to Crawford, it was established that violations of the Confrontation Clause, when preserved for appellate review, are subject to harmless-error review, see, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), and we have interpreted Crawford as not altering that principle, see, e.g., Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 302-03 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d at 222. In order to disregard an error of constitutional dimension, we must be convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In assessing the error’s likely impact, we consider the nature of the violation and the context in which it occurred, see, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1179 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990), taking into account, in this case, the strength of the government’s case, the degree to which the statement was material to a critical issue, the extent to which the statement was cumulative, and the degree to which the government emphasized the erroneously admitted evidence in its presentation of the case. See generally Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431; Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d at 308-09. No one factor is dispositive. See generally id. at 309 (hypothetically erroneous admission was harmless “[gjiven the overall strength of the prosecution’s case” and the fact that “the prosecutor highlighted [the challenged evidence] as only one of several important pieces of evidence ... during his lengthy summation”) (emphasis in original); United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d at 222-23 (erroneous admission of plea al-locutions held to be harmless where “[t]he evidence of ... guilt was overwhelming” and “the plea allocutions were cumulative”). However, “[t]he strength of the prosecution’s case is probably the single most critical factor.” Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1006, 115 S.Ct. 1319, 131 L.Ed.2d 200 (1995). Assessing these factors in the present case, we find no basis for reversal. First, there was little emphasis on the plea allo-cutions of Lino and Labate by the government at trial. The government referred to the allocutions in only one paragraph of its lengthy summation, citing them as evidence consistent with the testimony of Pokross as to the existence of an enterprise and the targeting of the DEA and Locals 400 and 137: The enterprise, as we’ve said, is DMN Capital and the stock fraud business that it was in all the way up from ’95 into 2000. You have heard Jeffrey Pok-ross testify about the business that he was in, and you heard a lot about that on cross-examination, and I think you have a pretty clear idea about the kind of activity that he was involved in with his partners back in ’95 and ’96