Full opinion text
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: In these consolidated appeals, we are confronted with the task of interpreting several provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA” or the “Act”), Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The plaintiffs-appellees (the “plaintiffs”) sued the defendants-appellants (the “defendants”) in an Alabama circuit court, alleging various tort claims under state law. The defendants removed the case to federal district court, citing CAFA as a basis for removal. The district court, upon motion to remand, found that the defendants did not carry their burden of establishing that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and remanded the case to the Alabama court. CAFA authorizes appeals of remand orders in cases that fall within the Act’s ambit; the defendants petitioned this court for leave to take such an appeal, and we granted their petition. To decide this case, we must unravel some of the mysteries of CAFA’s cryptic text. We must also consider existing principles of law governing removal generally — who bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper, how that party can satisfy its burden, and how a district court must proceed in evaluating its jurisdiction after removal. I. On January 24, 2003, Katie Lowery and eight other residents of Jefferson County, Alabama filed suit in the Jefferson County Circuit Court against twelve corporations and 120 fictitious entities for discharging particulates and gases into the atmosphere and ground water. Their complaint, framed in six counts, alleged that this pollution caused them to suffer personal injuries, physical pain and mental anguish, and the loss of the use and enjoyment of their property; each plaintiff demanded compensatory and punitive damages of $1,250,000. Between January 24, 2003, and June 20, 2006, the plaintiffs amended their complaint three times, adding more than four hundred plaintiffs and amending their prayers for relief. The amended prayers for relief no longer claimed $1,250,000 on each claim, but instead, sought “compensatory and punitive damages in an amount ... in excess of the [court’s] minimum jurisdictional limit.” The third and final amended complaint, filed on June 20, 2006, added two defendants: Alabama Power Company (“Alabama Power”) and Filler Products Company, Inc. (“Filler Products”). On July 17, 2006, Alabama Power filed a notice of removal under the “mass action” provision of CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll), in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. In its notice of removal, Alabama Power asserted that the district court had jurisdiction over the case because the requisite diversity of citizenship existed, the complaint consisted of the claims of more than 100 persons, each claim was for an amount in excess of $75,000, the claims totaled in excess of $5,000,000, and the claims involved common questions of law or fact. Alabama Power attached to its notice of removal copies of the original complaint and the third amended complaint. The plaintiffs responded to Alabama Power’s notice of removal on August 3, 2006 by filing a motion to remand the case to the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Their motion asserted that Alabama Power had not met its burden of establishing federal jurisdiction because nothing in the notice of removal or the complaint indicated the specific amount of damages the plaintiffs were actually claiming. As an alternative ground for remanding the case, the plaintiffs asserted that the case fell within the “local controversy” exception to CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). Alabama Power filed a supplement to its notice of removal on August 4, articulating three reasons why it believed the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. First, the case involved claims of more than 100 persons. Second, to reach the required minimum total of $5,000,000 in value, each plaintiffs claims would need to yield only $12,500. Third, plaintiffs in recent mass tort actions in Alabama had received either jury verdicts or settlements for greater than $5,000,000. In addition to supplementing its notice of removal, Alabama Power moved the district court for leave to engage in discovery, attaching to its motion a proposed request for admissions, which we reproduce in the margin. Alabama Power requested leave for discovery in the event the court felt that the $5,000,000 jurisdictional amount was not established by Alabama Power’s notice of removal and supplement. On August 9, the plaintiffs responded to Alabama Power’s discovery request by moving the district court “for leave to take ... depositions of defendant corporations that [were] citizens of the state of Alabama.” The plaintiffs sought leave to take these depositions in order to obtain evidence to support their invocation of CAFA’s “local controversy” exception. Two days later, on August 11, the district court held a hearing regarding its jurisdiction. The court did not limit its consideration to its jurisdiction over the claims of Alabama Power, but rather considered its jurisdiction over the action as a whole. At the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel orally withdrew their motion to remand the ease and conceded jurisdiction. The court pressed plaintiffs’ counsel on the issue, inquiring, “Lloyd, you and Bill seriously think that one or more of your 400 plaintiffs is going to have a shot at more than $75,000?” Plaintiffs’ counsel responded, “One or more, Judge. All of them don’t.” Despite the plaintiffs’ withdrawal of the motion to remand, the court concluded that it would take under advisement the issue of its subject matter jurisdiction. To that end, on August 16, the court ordered the plaintiffs to file, under the constraints of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the names of all plaintiffs whose claims could reasonably be expected to exceed $75,000. In its order, the court reserved ruling on Alabama Power’s motion to engage in limited discovery. The plaintiffs responded to the district court’s August 16 order the same day it was issued, stating that they lacked sufficient information to admit or deny that each claim was worth $75,000. The next day, they moved the court to set aside its August 16 order or accept their response to that order as adequate. Then, at a hearing held on August 22, plaintiffs’ counsel orally moved the court to reinstate their motion to remand, contending that they never conceded federal jurisdiction and that it was Alabama Power’s burden to show that each plaintiffs claims amounted to more than $75,000 (as Alabama Power itself had asserted in its notice of removal). Although Alabama Power objected to the plaintiffs’ attempt to reinstate their motion to remand, the district court reinstated the motion. Then, before adjourning the hearing, the court queried whether it had jurisdiction to litigate the claims against the defendants who had been made parties to the case prior to CAFA’s effective date (the “pre-CAFA defendants”) and asked counsel to brief the issue. On August 29, Alabama Power filed a response to the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the August 16 order. It contended that CAFA’s $75,000 provision is an exception to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction, rather than a threshold jurisdictional requirement. In other words, Alabama Power argued that jurisdiction attaches upon a showing of at least 100 plaintiffs and a total amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 (after which the court must dismiss individual plaintiffs whose claims do not meet the $75,000 exception). The plaintiffs replied to Alabama Power’s response on September 11, contending that Alabama Power bore the burden of establishing that the claims of each individual plaintiff exceeded $75,000. The plaintiffs further asserted that Alabama Power had not demonstrated that the claims of even one plaintiff exceeded $75,000, or that the total amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Finally, the plaintiffs — expanding upon the court’s concerns about its power to entertain the claims against the pre-CAFA defendants— argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the entire case because the action was originally filed prior to CAFA’s effective date. On October 12, 2006, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of its August 16 order and entered an order remanding the case to the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Alabama Power moved the court to reconsider its decision, pointing out that some of the factual assertions in the memorandum opinion accompanying the October 12 order were incorrect. The court granted the motion and issued a substitute order and accompanying memorandum opinion on October 24, 2006. Lowery v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 460 F.Supp.2d 1288 (N.D.Ala.2006). In its October 24 memorandum opinion, the district court held that, as a threshold matter, it lacked jurisdiction over the claims against the defendants who had been made parties prior to CAFA’s effective date. Hence, only Alabama Power and Filler Products were properly before the court. Addressing these defendants, the court observed that CAFA had not changed the rule that “when a state court complaint is uncertain or silent on the amount being sought, the removing defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1832 has the burden of proving the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence,” id. at 1296, and held that Alabama Power had failed to prove that CAFA’s jurisdictional amounts were satisfied. That is, these defendants had shown neither that one plaintiff had claims in excess of $75,000, nor that all of the plaintiffs’ claims exceeded $5,000,000 in the aggregate. Following the district court’s remand order of October 12, 2006, Alabama Power, pursuant to CAFA’s removal provision § 1453(c)(1), moved this court on October 19. for leave to appeal. On October 20, a group consisting of all but two of the pre-CAFA defendants did the same. We granted both motions on December 8, 2006, and subsequently consolidated the appeals. The defendants’ appeals require us to address four distinct issues, and we address each in turn in the parts of this opinion that follow. In part II, we consider whether the removal of an action under CAFA by a defendant added as a party after CAFA’s effective date removes the claims against all of the defendants in the action — including those claims brought before the effective date. Part III dissects CAFA’s “mass action” provisions to identify the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction created by those provisions. In part IV, we set forth the applicable burden of proof in establishing subject matter jurisdiction in a removed case in which damages are unspecified, and we identify the party that bears this burden under CAFA. In part V, we determine what a district court may consider in reviewing the propriety of removal that is timely challenged by a motion to remand. This inquiry requires us to examine the significance of the existing removal procedures under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 — which are incorporated, in part, by CAFA — as well as the propriety of post-removal discovery on the issue of jurisdiction. Part VI applies the relevant legal principles to the instant case. Finally, part VII briefly concludes. II. We review de novo the district court’s decision to remand a case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir.2006); see 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), court of appeals may review remand order where case was removed under CAFA). A. Congress enacted CAFA to address inequitable state court treatment of class actions and to put an end to certain abusive practices by plaintiffs’ class counsel. CAFA § 2, 119 Stat. at 5. CAFA seeks to address these inequities and abusive practices by, among other things, broadening federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with interstate implications. CAFA § 2, 119 Stat. at 5; see also Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1329 (“[T]he text of CAFA plainly expands federal jurisdiction over class actions and facilitates their removal[.]”). CAFA amends the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, by inserting a new subsection, § 1332(d). This new subsection works a sea change in diversity jurisdiction for certain class actions. It broadens diversity jurisdiction by establishing lower threshold requirements for jurisdiction and abrogating long-established precedent. Subject to certain exceptions designed to keep purely local matters and issues of particular state concern in the state courts, § 1332(d)(3) to (5), CAFA provides federal courts with jurisdiction over class actions provided that: the number of plaintiffs in all proposed plaintiff classes exceeds one hundred, § 1332(d)(5)(b); any member of the plaintiff class is diverse from any defendant, § 1332(d)(2); and the aggregate of the claims of individual class members exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs. § 1332(d)(2), (6); see also Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1327; Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir.2006). In this part, we discuss the issues related to the proper interpretation of CAFA’s removal provisions raised by the present dispute. In part III, infra, we address in greater detail the requirements that must be met for the district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a mass action under CAFA. B. We must first address whether the pre-CAFA defendants could, as a procedural matter, properly join in the removal to federal court initiated by Alabama Power. Alabama Power alone among the defendants removed this action while the other defendants — at first passively and then explicitly — rode Alabama Power’s coattails into the district court. What the district court had before it in considering the propriety of removal was limited to those documents provided by Alabama Power in seeking removal. The issue here arises because the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Alabama Power and Filler Products as defendants on June 20, 2006 — after CAFA became law. See CAFA § 9, 119 Stat. at 14 (“The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after ... February 18, 2005.”). Alabama Power filed a notice of removal, in which nearly all the other defendants later joined, citing as a basis for federal jurisdiction CAFA’s provisions pertaining to “mass actions” under § 1332(d)(ll). The plaintiffs argue, and the district court held, that because the action against the pre-CAFA defendants “commenced” before the Act’s effective date, those defendants could not join in the removal, regardless of whether Alabama Power was itself entitled to remove the action. 1. Removal of state court actions to federal court involves both jurisdictional and procedural considerations. See Ariail Drug Co., Inc. v. Recomm Int’l Display, Inc., 122 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir.1997); Monroe v. United Carbon Co., 196 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir.1952). For the purpose of our present discussion of removal procedure, however, we observe that CAFA’s jurisdictional and procedural provisions operate in tandem with regard to removal. The availability of federal jurisdiction created by CAFA in § 1332(d), and the Act’s procedural removal provisions under § 1453, both depend on whether a given suit constitutes a “class action” as defined by the statute. The terminology of the statute can be somewhat convoluted, so we track it methodically. Alabama Power removed this action as a mass action under CAFA. § 1332(d)(ll). Under that subsection, “a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action” subject to certain other CAFA provisions. § 1332(d)(ll)(A). We discuss the substantive jurisdictional import of § 1332(d)(ll)(A) in much greater detail in part III.B, infra, but for our present purposes it is important to note that the plain language of the provision makes it clear that any “mass action” is also considered a “class action” for the purposes of CAFA’s removal provisions. CAFA generally creates federal jurisdiction over “any civil action” that meets the various jurisdictional requirements and “is a class action.” § 1332(d)(2). CAFA’s procedural removal section, § 1453, adopts the “class action” definition of CAFA’s substantive section, § 1332(d), and provides for removal of “[a] class action ... without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought, except that such action may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants.” § 1453(a), (b). Importantly, § 1453 otherwise adopts the procedural requirements of the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446. § 1453(b). While adopting § 1446 generally, § 1453 expands the availability of removal by eliminating the one-year limited removal period for diversity suits. § 1453(b). The import of the shared “class action” definition in CAFA’s various provisions is that any lawsuit that meets the jurisdictional requirements of a “mass action” is also a removable “class action.” 2. With that background, we now must determine whether the claims against the pre-CAFA defendants were properly included in the removal to the district court. Although the plaintiffs dispute whether CAFA’s provisions apply to the claims against the pre-CAFA defendants, they have not argued that CAFA is wholly inapplicable to the entire case. In other words, plaintiffs do not dispute that CAFA applies to Alabama Power, which was added as a defendant after CAFA’s effective date. Thus, we consider only whether the pre-CAFA defendants can, under CAFA’s procedural removal provisions, “tag along” with Alabama Power’s removal to federal court. We conclude that, in light of the plain language of CAFA, removal under the statute encompasses all the claims in the “action” as a whole, not simply the claims against a removing defendant. Both the substantive and procedural sections of CAFA dealing with removal of mass actions refer to removal of the “class action.” See § 1332(d)(11)(A) (“[A] mass action shall be deemed to be a class action[.]”); § 1453(b) (“A class action may be removed to a district court[.]”). The statute’s reference to “actions,” as opposed to “claims,” suggests that removal under CAFA is broadly inclusive. See Braud v. Transport Serv. Co., 445 F.3d 801, 808 (5th Cir.2006) (“[I]t is the ‘action,’ not claims against particular defendants, that is removable.”) (citing Dinkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 400 F.Supp.2d 289, 294 (D.Me.2005)). Furthermore, a class action removable under CAFA “may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants.” § 1453(b). Read together, these provisions establish that one defendant may remove the entire action, including claims against all defendants, using the procedures established by § 1453 and the incorporated provisions of § 1446. See id. (“The language of CAFA is plain that any single defendant can remove (without the consent of the other defendants) the entire class action (not merely the claims against that defendant).”); Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville, No. 06-528, 2006 WL 3392752, at *3 (S.D.Ill. Nov.22, 2006) (slip op.) (“The clear language of the statute permits the removal of a ‘class action,’ regardless of whether specific claims asserted in the action are removable or not.”); Robinson v. Holiday Universal, Inc., No. 05-5726, 2006 WL 470592, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.23, 2006) (unpublished) (post-CAFA defendant “removed the entire class action and not just the claims against it” where, at the time of the filing of the notice of removal, “all of the jurisdictional requirements of CAFA were then met”); cf. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1161 (noting that four out of eighteen defendants removed the case). Contra Brown v. Kerkhoff No. 05-00274, 2005 WL 2671529, at *16 (S.D.Iowa Oct. 19, 2005) (unpublished). The principle that one defendant may remove the action as a whole holds true even where, as here, the removing defendant was added after CAFA’s effective date to an action that was filed against other defendants before CAFA was enacted. See Braud, 445 F.3d at 808 (holding that, where the removing defendant was added after CAFA’s effective date and then was later dismissed from the action, the district court could properly maintain jurisdiction over the “action” with regard to the remaining pre-CAFA defendants). 3. Our interpretation of the removal language in CAFA is consistent with the Act’s overall statutory purpose, as well as removal practice outside the CAFA context. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2056, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (instructing that, in matters of statutory interpretation, ■ we must construe statutory provisions not in isolation, but in light of the statute as a whole); Dinkel, 400 F.Supp.2d at 293. (noting that, under removal practice generally, “the entire lawsuit is removable or not removable, not merely the claims against particular defendants”). First, as to the statutory purpose, Congress expressly intended CAFA to expand federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions. CAFA § 2,119 Stat. at 5. To read the plain language of the removal provisions narrowly, such that removal would only be available as to claims against the particular removing defendants, would frustrate congressional intent that CAFA be used to provide for more uniform federal disposition of class actions affecting interstate commerce. CAFA § 2, 119 Stat. at 5. As a result of such a reading, certain defendants in a lawsuit could unilaterally elect to have the claims against them heard in a federal court while other defendants would be excluded from that forum, notwithstanding that all the claims against both sets of defendants arose from the same group of plaintiffs on common issues of law and fact. Such a result would run counter to the express purposes of CAFA. Second, as to non-CAFA removal practice generally, we have previously read a similar removal provision as extending the scope of removal to encompass entire actions, not just individual claims. See In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255, 1258-60 (11th Cir.1992). In our Surinam Airways decision, a panel of this court interpreted the language of the jurisdictional provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) — which creates removal jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil action ... against a foreign state” — in light of plain language and legislative intent. Id. at 1258. We noted that “such open-ended language as ‘any civil action’ does not always serve to affirmatively grant jurisdiction over an entire case.” Id. at 1259. Nevertheless, our examination of the legislative intent, coupled with the lack of any express limitation on the plain language, led us to conclude that the statute’s grant of removal jurisdiction over “any civil action” encompassed claims by or against other parties in the same lawsuit. Id. at 1259-60. In Surinam Airways, the removal provision at issue, which had been enacted as part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, was intended “to give foreign states the discretion to use a federal forum to litigate civil actions into which they have been brought” for the purpose of encouraging uniformity in that area of law. ■ Id. Although the context of CAFA is, of course, quite different from the - Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the reasoning behind our interpretation of the latter statute’s removal scheme is analogous. Congress intended CAFA to encourage the litigation of certain class actions — “cases of national importance” — in federal courts, so as to minimize bias against out-of-state defendants and promote the fair application of state law to the multifarious parties in class actions. CAFA § 2, 119 Stat. at 5. As in the case of § 1441(d), CAFA’s purposes encourage a reading that makes more inclusive the scope of its removal provisions, not less inclusive. In light of that expansive construction of the removal provisions, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that the pre-CAFA defendants were not properly included in Alabama Power’s removal. Because we read CAFA’s jurisdictional and procedural removal provisions to relate to the “class action” and not particular claims, the removal of the claims against all the defendants either stands or falls as a whole. We now turn our attention to the requirements set forth by CAFA for a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a mass action. III. The defendants contend that the district court’s remand order was improper because this action meets the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction under CAFA. As discussed above, CAFA does not apply exclusively to class actions certified under Rule 23 or state analogues. CAFA’s mass action provisions extend federal diversity jurisdiction to certain actions brought individually by large groups of plaintiffs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll). In the present suit, the plaintiffs did not seek class certification. The plaintiffs assert that this action does not qualify for treatment as a mass action. The defendants contend that the action, while not certified as a class action under either federal or state law, is nonetheless a class action for purposes of CAFA because it satisfies CAFA’s mass action requirements. In large part, this dispute can be attributed to the parties’ divergent interpretations of what requirements an action must meet under CAFA to qualify as a mass action. CAFA’s mass action provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation, even though they are contained in a single paragraph of the amended diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll), and are comprised of but four sub-paragraphs, only two of which are relevant for our purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(A),(B). The proper interpretation of CAFA’s mass action provisions is a matter of first impression in this circuit. Thus, to resolve the current dispute, we are tasked with plotting the proper route through this statutory labyrinth. We turn to that now. A. In interpreting a statute, we look first to the statute’s plain meaning and, if the statutory language is facially unambiguous, our inquiry comes to an end. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (“We begin our construction ... where courts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision.”). We begin, therefore, by setting forth the relevant statutory provisions and looking to the plain meaning of the language. 1. The relevant substantive mass action provisions are found in § 1332(d)(ll). As we noted in discussing its implications for removal in part II.B, supra, sub-paragraph (d)(ll)(A) states that: “For purposes of [28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)] and [CAFA’s removal provisions], a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the provisions of those paragraphs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(A). On its face, sub-paragraph (d)(ll)(A) serves two functions. First, the provision states that for the purposes of the CAFA amendments to the diversity jurisdiction statute, a mass action “shall be deemed a class action.” § 1332(d)(ll)(A). This language makes it clear that a mass action is to be treated as a class action, despite not meeting CAFA’s definition of a class action under § 1332(d)(1)(B). Second, § 1332(d)(ll)(A) comes with a proviso: a mass action is only deemed a class action “if it otherwise meets the provisions of [§ 1332(d)(2) through (10).]” This language conditions a mass action’s treatment as a class action on the mass action conforming with eight additional statutory provisions, § 1332(d)(2) through (10). These incorporated provisions cover a variety of terrain. Some act to limit CAFA’s expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction by authorizing a district court to decline jurisdiction over certain cases that may lack significant interstate impact, or by creating an exception to jurisdiction for matters likely to be purely local controversies. Other provisions create additional exceptions to jurisdiction in suits against states and state officials and in certain securities litigation. Some provide guidance on the treatment of citizenship under CAFA. Finally, some provisions, despite being incorporated into the mass action context by § 1332(d)(ll)(A), seem to have no application to mass actions. Most importantly for our purposes, § 1332(d)(ll)(A) incorporates into the mass action context a number of the requirements for a class action to qualify for CAFA diversity jurisdiction. Thus, for a mass action to be deemed a class action, the plaintiffs’ claims must exceed an aggregate of $5,000,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),(6), and the parties must be minimally diverse, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 2. The second mass action provision, sub-paragraph (d)(ll)(B)(i), defines a mass action: As used in [§ 1332(d)(11)(A)], the term “mass action” means any civil action (except a civil action within the scope of section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). This sub-paragraph begins by excluding from the definition of mass actions those civil actions that fall within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2). Section 1711(2) provides: The term “class action” means any civil action filed in a district court of the United States under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any civil action that is removed to a district court of the United States that was originally filed under a State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representatives as a class action. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2). Thus, § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) makes clear that a class action certified under Rule 23, or a state equivalent to Rule 23, is not a mass action. Actions meeting the definition of § 1711(2) meet the requirements of CAFA’s class action provisions, § 1332(d)(1), and can qualify for CAFA’s expanded jurisdictional thresholds without resorting to the mass action provisions in § 1332(d)(ll). This exception in § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) is followed by two affirmative requirements for a civil action to qualify as a mass action. First, there is a numerosity requirement: a mass action must involve the proposed “monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). Second, there is a commonality requirement: “the plaintiffs’ claims [must] involve common questions of law or faet[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). Combining the requirements drawn from § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i)’s definition of a mass action and those drawn from § 1332(d)(ll)(A)’s incorporation of CAFA’s class action requirements into the mass action context, we now have identified at least four requirements for an action to be deemed a mass action. These requirements are: (1) an amount in controversy requirement of an aggregate of $5,000,000 in claims; (2) a diversity requirement of minimal diversity; (3) a numerosity requirement that the action involve the monetary claims of 100 or more plaintiffs; and (4) a commonality requirement that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact. Despite some minor tensions in the provisions discussed, it is clear from the plain language of the text that for an action to qualify as a mass action, at least these four requirements must be met. While the parties here dispute whether these four requirements have been satisfied — and who bears the burden of showing that the requirements have been met — they do not dispute that each is a threshold requirement to federal court jurisdiction over a mass action. B. This brings us to the interpretational heavy-lifting. Unlike the four requirements we have identified, the proper interpretation of the final clause of § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i)’s definition of a mass action is disputed. This clause states certain conditions under which jurisdiction will exist over a mass action “exce-pt that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Under § 1332(a), the current amount in controversy threshold is $75,000. 1. The parties dispute the meaning of the $75,000 provision. The defendants argue that in choosing the word “except,” Congress intended to create an exception to mass action diversity jurisdiction — that Congress intended to use “except” to mean “to the exclusion of.” The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that Congress intended “except” to be read as “only.” Under the former approach, the $75,000 would seem to serve as an exception to jurisdiction, while under the latter, it would appear to be a threshold requirement. The glosses each party seeks to put on congressional use of the word “except” comport with well known definitions of the word. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 791 (1976) provides numerous definitions for the word “except,” including definitions consistent with the defendants’ interpretation — “with the exclusion or exception of’ — and the plaintiffs’ — “only.” Congressional intent in using the term, therefore, cannot be divined from looking to that passage alone. The defendants address this apparent ambiguity by arguing that the provision serves as an exception. Thus, a district court has diversity jurisdiction over a civil action as a whole if the aggregate jurisdictional amount, minimal diversity, numerosity and commonality requirements are met. Under these circumstances, the district court has jurisdiction over the action, but it lacks jurisdiction over an individual plaintiff whose claims do not exceed $75,000. The claims of these individual plaintiffs must be returned to state court. Under this reading, the numerosity and aggregate amount in controversy requirements are threshold requirements measured at the time of removal, while the $75,000 provision is treated as an exception addressed on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis after the action is removed. The difficulty with the defendants’ approach is that under this view the district court could retain jurisdiction over an action even if, in eliminating individual claims, the total number of plaintiffs in the action fell below 100 or the aggregate total of the remaining plaintiffs’ claims fell below $5,000,000. Indeed, in the most extreme example under the defendants’ interpretation, the district court would retain jurisdiction over the action even if only a single plaintiff remained with claims in excess of $75,000. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that Congress intended “except” to mean, in effect, “only.” Under this reading, the $75,000 provision does not function as an exception, but as an additional primary requirement. Jurisdiction over a mass action would, therefore, only be proper if the four previously identified requirements were met and each of the individual plaintiffs had claims that exceeded $75,000. The difficulty with the plaintiffs’ argument is that, if the $75,000 provision creates an initial jurisdictional requirement— if, in other words, in the current context, the district court must consider the $75,000 provision in assessing the remova-bility of the action as a whole — then the aggregate amount in controversy requirement is surplusage. If there are 100 individual plaintiffs, as there must be under the numerosity requirement of § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i), and if their individual claims cannot be removed unless the claims of each plaintiff exceed $75,000, then one need not even resort to a calculator to deduce that the aggregate value of the claims of each of the 100 plaintiffs would be, at a minimum, $7,500,000. This approach negates the need for the $5,000,000 aggregate amount in controversy requirement of § 1332(d)(2), which is applied to mass actions through § 1332(d)(ll)(A). Every civil action satisfying the numerosity requirement and the $75,000 provision would exceed $5,000,000 in the aggregate. The district court, accepting the plaintiffs’ argument, viewed the $75,000 inquiry as a threshold jurisdictional requirement. The court noted the tension between the $75,000 provision and the other mass action provisions and reasoned that “[i]f there is internal inconsistency in CAFA, that inconsistency must be resolved by giving predominance to the language that limits jurisdiction, and not to language that would expand it.” Lowery v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 460 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1294 (N.D.Ala.2006). The district court thus viewed the $75,000 inquiry as part of the inquiry into the removability of the action as a whole. Id. at 1293-94. The court did not discuss the effect this interpretation would have on the salience of the $5,000,000 aggregate requirement. 2. When the meaning of statutory language cannot be divined from the face of the statute, we turn first to intrinsic aids to interpretation. Here, we rely on two well-established rules of statutory construction. First, we must construe the statute to give effect, if possible, to every word and clause. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166-68, 125 S.Ct. 577, 583-84, 160 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004); Jaggernauth v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir.2005). Second, in determining the proper interpretation of a statutory provision, we must view the provision in the context of the statute as a whole. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 1257, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). The interpretation given CAFA by the district court, and urged by the plaintiffs, would fail to give effect to every word and clause in CAFA. The $5,000,000 aggregate amount in controversy threshold would be rendered mere surplusage. By rejecting the interpretation proposed by the plaintiffs, we avoid this result. Moreover, the context of CAFA as a whole counsels against the interpretation urged by the plaintiffs. As we observed, § 1332(d)(ll)(A) incorporated for mass actions the jurisdictional grant of § 1332(d)(2). That section states that “[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 ... and is a class action in which [there is minimal diversity.]” § 1332(d)(2) (emphasis added). This provision grants the district courts jurisdiction over the actual case and, moreover, § 1332(d)(6) directs the courts to aggregate individual plaintiffs claims in determining if the $5,000,000 threshold is satisfied. By the terms of § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i), a mass action is, again, defined as “any civil action ” for which the numerosity and commonality requirements are met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) (emphasis added). As such, in setting forth four of the five potential requirements for a mass action, the statute explicitly treats the civil action as a whole. By contrast, the $75,000 provision states “that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action [exceed $75,000].” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) (emphasis added). This language seems to refer to individual plaintiffs and their claims, not to the civil action as a whole. Thus, read in the context of these other provisions, it seems clear that the $75,000 provision was not intended to bar district courts from asserting jurisdiction over the entire case if each individual plaintiffs claims do not exceed $75,000. c. Though we conclude that, with use of the familiar canons of statutory construction, the meaning of the disputed provision becomes clear, we recognize that reasonable jurists often disagree on the clarity such canons can bring to statutory language. See Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 362 F.3d 739, 746-47 (11th Cir.2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc) (noting that courts had found multiple “plain meanings” in the same language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, while still other courts had found ambiguity). When ambiguity in a statute renders congressional intent unclear, and that lack of clarity can not be resolved through the sort of intrinsic aids we have employed here, it is appropriate to resort to extrinsic aids such as legislative history. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Svcs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2625-27, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) (recognizing the occasional need for, and limitations of, legislative history as an extrinsic aid when confronted with statutory ambiguity). Though we are mindful that it is error to cloud the plain meaning of a statutory provision with contrary legislative history, where, as here, the legislative history comports with the interpretation that has been adopted, and where there is a potential that others may find ambiguity where we have found plain meaning, caution and completeness counsel that we discuss the statute’s legislative history. Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represent] the considered and collective understanding of those [Members of Congress] involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’ ” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 483, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186, 90 S.Ct. 314, 324, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969)). As such, we look to Senate Report 109-14 from the Senate Judiciary Committee. S.Rep. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report squarely confronts how the tension between the mass action provisions is to be resolved. In discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll), the report states: If a mass action satisfies the criteria set forth in the section (that is, it involves the monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons that are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the claims involve common questions of law or fact and it meets the tests for federal diversity jurisdiction otherwise established by the legislation), it may be removed to a federal court, which is authorized to exercise jurisdiction over the action. Under the proviso, however, it is the Committee’s intent that any claims that are included in the mass action that standing alone do not satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements of Section 1332(a) (currently $75,000), would be remanded to state court. Subsequent remands of individual claims not meeting the section 1332 jurisdictional amount requirement may take the action below the 100-plaintiff jurisdictional threshold or the $5 million aggregated jurisdictional amount requirement. However, so long as the mass action met the various jurisdictional requirements at the time of removal, it is the Committee’s view that those subsequent remands should not extinguish federal diversity jurisdictional over the action. S.Rep. No. 109-14, at 47 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44. This view of § 1332(d)(ll) is directly in line with the conclusions we reached in employing intrinsic interpretational aids: at least four primary requirements— $5,000,000 aggregate amount in controversy, minimal diversity, numerosity, and commonality — serve as threshold requirements for a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the action as a whole.’ Because we hold in part VI, infra, that the defendants have not established the $5,000,000 aggregate amount in controversy, we need not decide today whether the $75,000 provision might yet create an additional threshold requirement that the party bearing the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction must establish at the outset, i.e., that the claims of at least one of the plaintiffs exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). We need only decide what the $75,000 provision does not do — namely, supplant the Act’s plainly expressed $5,000,000 aggregate requirement by requiring a per-plaintiff minimum threshold requirement that ultimately requires a showing of claims worth $7,500,000 in the aggregate. We conclude, therefore, that even were we to find the statutory language at issue ambiguous — and intrinsic canons of statutory construction failed to solve that ambiguity — by looking to the legislative history of the Act, our conclusion would remain unchanged. rv. Identifying CAFA’s threshold requirements for subject matter jurisdiction over a mass action does not bring our task to an end. Several questions remain unanswered: which party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, what is that party’s burden of proof, and what may a district court look to in deciding whether that burden has been met. Now, we turn to the first two of these inquiries. A. Consistent with the limited nature of federal jurisdiction, the party seeking a federal venue must establish the venue’s jurisdictional requirements. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Under this traditional rule, the defendants, having removed the case to the district court, would bear the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction. The defendants contend, however, that this traditional rule frustrates CAFA’s motivating congressional purpose of expanded access to the federal courts. The defendants are not alone in this contention. Since its passage, courts have struggled with the question of whether CAFA shifts the burden of establishing jurisdiction in the removal context to the removed plaintiffs. The uncertainty surrounding the burden of proof in CAFA cases arises not from the text of CAFA itself — which is silent on the matter — but from a few discrete excerpts of the statute’s legislative history. The most cited passage, taken from the Senate Committee Report, states: “If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident.” S.Rep. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40. Although several district courts have followed this apparent congressional intent in shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiff, the courts of appeals have been reluctant to make the shift from such a “longstanding, near-canonical rule.” Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006); see Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing the “long-standing judicial rules placing the burden on the defendant” to establish jurisdiction in removal cases); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir.2006) (“Under CAFA, the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden to establish that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.”); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.2005) (“The rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the risk of non-persuasion has been around for a long time. To change such a rule, Congress must enact a statute with the President’s signature (or by a two-thirds majority to override a veto).”). We have recently joined the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in following the settled practice of placing the burden of proof on the removing defendant. See Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir.2006) (citing decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in maintaining that the removing party bears the jurisdictional burden of proof); Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir.2006) (“CAFA does not change the traditional rule that the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.”). B. Having established that CAFA does not shift the burden of proof in removal actions, we must still clarify what that burden is. For our purposes, therefore, we must identify the standard by which we measure the sufficiency of the defendants’ showing that the plaintiffs’ claims exceed $5,000,000 in aggregate. We have held that, in the removal context where damages are unspecified, the removing party bears the burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir.1996) (adopting the “preponderance of the evidence” standard after examining the various burdens of proof in different factual contexts), overruled on other grounds, Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir.2000); see also Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683 (“Where the complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.”). Specifically, the removing defendant must establish the amount in controversy by “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, ... [a] superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1220 (8th ed.2004). We must acknowledge the peculiar implications of applying the preponderance of the evidence standard — a standard usually used to weigh competing pieces of evidence — to a situation, as here, where the court has only naked pleadings to consider. See, e.g., Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir.2004) (dictum) (noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate for resolving disputes over factual matters). There is a unique tension in applying a fact-weighing standard to a fact-free context. This tension compels us to take a closer look at how this precedent emerged in our circuit. We first specifically adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard as the burden of proof in removed cases with unspecified damages in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp. 77 F.3d at 1357. In adopting this standard, Tapscott relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150 (6th Cir.1993), which, in turn, cited Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.Mich.1990), which relied on the Supreme Court’s opinion in McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. Of Ind., Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). Other circuits’ use of the preponderance standard in this context can similarly be traced to McNutt. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir.1993); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir.1992). The reliance on McNutt for this standard is premised on language in that opinion suggesting that the party bearing the burden of proving jurisdiction may be required to do so by the preponderance of the evidence. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189, 56 S.Ct. at 785 (“[T]he court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.”). The application of the McNutt-Garza-Tapscott line to the present case is problematic. There is reason to question these courts’ reliance on language in McNutt suggesting the preponderance standard, as McNutt is distinguishable both from the cases leading up to and including Tapscott and from the present action. The action in McNutt did not arise from the removal context, but was brought originally in federal court. Id. at 179, 56 S.Ct. at 780-81. The relevant language in McNutt regarding the preponderance standard, moreover, is dicta. The McNutt Court did not apply a preponderance standard. Additionally, the McNutt Court’s discussion of the burden of proof noted that a more limited inquiry is appropriate in a case in which a court has only the bare pleadings to consider. The Court stated that “[t]he prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction ... must be met by the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor. He must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction. If he fails to make the necessary allegations he has no standing.” Id. at 189, 56 S.Ct. at 785. Lastly, we cannot account for the sixty-year gap between the McNutt decision and the initial adoption of its preponderance language in the present context in 1990 by the Eastern District of Michigan in Garza, 752 F.Supp. at 763. Even assuming that Tapscott and similar decisions were correct in relying on McNutt, one might question the application of a preponderance of the evidence standard in a removal case — like this one — where there is no evidence to review. In each decision adopting the preponderance standard in the removal context, the court had before it evidence beyond the pleadings on which to base a decision about the amount in controversy. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1357 n. 10 (“At oral argument, attorney for Appellants conceded that if considered in the aggregate, punitive damages would exceed [the jurisdictional amount].”); Gafford, 997 F.2d at 160-61 (noting that the defendant’s employee testified during a pretrial hearing on jurisdiction that the plaintiffs claims for back pay would satisfy the amount in controversy requirement); Garza, 752 F.Supp. at 763-64 (determining that additional evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion for reconsideration indicated that it was “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy was satisfied). We have no such evidence before us here. Despite these distinctions, the preponderance standard has been adopted by this circuit in the naked pleading context. See Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1352-53 (11th Cir.2005); Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1281 n. 5 (11th Cir.2001). We are bound to adhere to circuit precedent. Defendants must establish the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence. We note, however, that in situations like the present one — where damages are unspecified and only the bare pleadings are available — we are at a loss as to how to apply the preponderance burden meaningfully. We have no evidence before us by which to make any informed assessment of the amount in controversy. All we have are the representations relating to jurisdiction in the notice of removal and the allegations of the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint. As such, any attempt to engage in a preponderance of the evidence assessment at this juncture would necessarily amount to unabashed guesswork, and such speculation is frowned upon. See Lindsey v. Ala. Tel. Co., 576 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1978) (noting, in a removed class action, that “it was not open for defendants to attempt to show” the requisite amount in controversy per capita where the complaint made insufficient allegations, “[n]or was it open to the district court to speculate” on whether the jurisdictional facts existed). In part V, infra, we conclude that the removal-remand scheme set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) and 1447(c) requires that a court review the propriety of removal on the basis of the removing documents. If the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face of the documents before the court, or readily deducible from them, then the court has jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand. Under this approach, jurisdiction is either evident from the removing documents or remand is appropriate. Significantly, if a defendant can only carry the burden of establishing jurisdiction under these circumstances, then the defendant could have satisfied a far higher burden than preponderance of the evidence. Regardless, our precedent compels us to continue forcing this square peg into a round hole. Y. We pause to take stock of what we have determined thus far. With its notice of removal, Alabama Power removed this action as a whole, including the plaintiffs’ claims against both the pre-CAFA defendants and Filler Products. Because CAFA does not disturb the long-established rule that a removing defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction, upon the plaintiffs’ motion to remand in this case, the defendants bear the burden of establishing the jurisdictional requirements for a CAFA mass action. Furthermore, because this case involves a complaint for unspecified damages, the defendants must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. We turn now to two related questions: (1) on what evidence may a removing defendant rely in asserting jurisdiction?; and (2) if that evidence is found wanting, may discovery be invoked to supplement that evidence? A. Our first question involves the scope of evidence on which a removing defendant may rely to establish jurisdiction. Because this inquiry depends upon how and when a defendant may remove a case to federal court, we discuss, at the outset, the relevant removal statutes. CAFA’s removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), expressly adopts the procedures of the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, to govern the removal of mass actions. As a threshold matter, § 1446(a) answers the question of how removal is accomplished, stating that a defendant may remove any “civil action” by filing a notice of removal, signed pursuant to the good faith requirements of Rule 11, which contains “a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Section 1446(b) then answers the question of when an action is removable, setting forth the preconditions for removal in two types of cases: (1) those removable on the basis of an initial pleading; and (2) those that later become removable on the basis of “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper.” § 1446(b). Regardless of the type of ease, a defendant must remove within thirty days of receiving the document that provides the basis for removal. § 1446(b). Thus, under § 1446(b), in assessing the propriety of removal, the court considers the document received by the defendant from the plaintiff — be it the initial complaint or a later received paper— and determines whether that document and the notice of removal unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction. This inquiry is at the heart of a case, such as the one before us, in which the plaintiffs challenge removal by filing a timely motion to remand under § 1447(c). In assessing whether removal was proper in such a case, the district court has before it only the limited universe of evidence available when the motion to remand is filed — i.e., the notice of removal and accompanying documents. If that evidence is insufficient to establish that removal was proper or that jurisdiction was present, neither the defendants nor the court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the notice’s failings. See Lindsey v. Ala. Tel. Co., 576 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that, where a complaint did not specify the number of plaintiffs in a class action, it was not open to the defendants or the court to speculate that the class was small enough to establish the minimum amount in controversy). The absence of factual allegations pertinent to the existence of jurisdiction is dispositive and, in such absence, the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking to the stars. B. We next consider whether a district court faced with insufficient evidence to establish jurisdiction, may, in assessing the propriety of removal, invoke discovery to supplement that evidence. The defendants argue that, if we hold that they have failed to carry the burden of establishing jurisdiction, we should remand the ease to the district court with instructions to grant Alabama Power’s motion for leave to serve limited discovery. When Alabama Power filed its motion for discovery, the