Full opinion text
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellants Lorenzo Muñoz-Franco, Francisco Sánchez-Arán, Ariel Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, and Wilfredo Umpierre-Her-nández appeal their convictions for bank fraud, conspiracy, and misapplication of bank funds, stemming from conduct that persisted for nearly a decade. Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán appeal their convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy for a similar but separate series of transactions also involving the improper use of bank funds. Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and raise many other substantive and procedural claims relating to their fifteen-month trial. After careful review of this immense record, we affirm. I. A. Factual Overview We provide here an overview of the relevant conduct drawn from the record, saving additional details for our sufficiency analysis. Throughout the opinion, we consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 1. The Gutiérrez Loans During the relevant time period charged in the Third Superseding Indictment, Mu-ñoz-Franco was President and Chief Executive Officer of Caguas Central Federal Savings Bank of Puerto Rico (“Caguas”), a federally chartered savings and loan association. Sánchez-Arán was Executive Vice President and Chief Lending Officer of Caguas. Gutiérrez was a land developer who owned several companies that received loans from Caguas. Umpierre-Hernández was an officer of several companies belonging to Gutiérrez. For nearly a decade, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán supervised a scheme to use proceeds from various loans for purposes not authorized by Caguas’ Board of Directors (“Board”). The loans were granted for land development projects involving companies that Gutiérrez owned and Um-pierre-Hernández helped to operate, including Transglobe, Modules, and Tran-shore. In many instances the appellants used proceeds from loans to Gutiérrez-owned companies to make payments on prior loans to Gutiérrez-owned companies without Board approval. In other instances Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán submitted loans to Gutiérrez-owned companies to the Board for approval without disclosing the Gutiérrez-owned companies’ failure to complete work on previous projects. On many occasions Gutiérrez and Um-pierre-Hernández submitted certifications for construction work that had not yet been completed, and Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán accepted the certifications and ordered disbursement of funds for the projects. The Board also was not informed of this practice. In January 1988, Muñoz-Franco drafted and obtained Board approval to send a letter to Richard Denby, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board auditor supervising Caguas, which responded to Denby’s concerns regarding Caguas’ lending practices (“Denby letter”). The letter contained many misrepresentations regarding the status of Gutiérrez-related projects and loans. As the government explained in its opening statement, this scheme contributed to the appearance that Caguas remained a financially viable institution under the leadership of Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán. If the problems with the bank became known and Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán were removed from their positions, “not only would that have deprived them of a very lucrative job, but it also would have made it very difficult for them to obtain new employment in the banking industry.” The scheme also maintained the appearance of solvency for the Gutiérrez companies, thus protecting the livelihood and professional reputation of Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández. The projects for which Gutiérrez-owned companies received loans included La Marina, Los Mameyes, Cerrovista, and Jar-dines de Villa Alba. We provide a brief overview of these projects here. a. La Marina In June 1980, Muñoz-Franco and Sán-chez-Arán caused Caguas to grant a $1,450,000 loan to Transglobe to finance the construction of seventy-five units of residential housing, with construction to begin within one month and to be completed within one year. As of September 1981, the loan limit had been increased four times, adding a total of $1.8 million, yet not a single house had been built. Funds were disbursed from the loan for the project based on certifications submitted by Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernán-dez and approved by Sánchez-Arán, and approximately $2 million was used to pay unrelated Gutiérrez debts with a different bank. In October 1984, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán caused Caguas to finance the sale of the La Marina project to DO.W Group. The agreement for this sale provided that Transglobe would remain the contractor for the project despite its failure to build a single house in the preceding four years. In approving the loan, the Board was not informed of Trans-globe’s prior poor performance. After this sale, appellants continued to apply funds from the La Marina loan to other projects and to disburse funds for work not completed. The houses were never completed on the section of the project for which the loan was issued, and, in 1989, Caguas entered into a settlement agreement with DO.W releasing DO.W’s debt on the project, which totaled over $2 million. b. Los Mameyes In late 1985, Muñoz-Franco and Sán-chez-Arán caused the Board to grant Modules a commercial line of credit to build two hundred housing units. Between December 1985 and March 1986, Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted a series of certifications stating that a total of two hundred housing units had been built. Even though Caguas’ inspector reported that only fifty-five units had been completed, Sánchez-Arán approved disbursements totaling about $800,000. In March 1986 Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted a certification requesting $69,000 for “payment of subcontractors,” but attached a list of interest payments due on the Jardines de Villa Alba, Levittown, Country Club, La Marina, and Los Ca-ciques projects totalling exactly $69,000. Sánchez-Arán approved the certification and Caguas disbursed the funds. c. Cerrovista In the spring of 1986, John Burns, a developer, applied to Caguas for a loan to build residential housing on land he owned but his application was denied. After meeting with Umpierre-Hernández and agreeing to use Modules as a contractor, Caguas approved Burns’ application for a loan to build twenty-three units of housing in what became known as the Cerrovista project. Burns’ loan was approved on the condition that he sign a $2 million note as a down payment to Modules. Burns signed the note. Shortly thereafter, however, Umpierre-Hernández told Burns that the project needed a new “sponsor” because Burns had been “gossiping.” Um-pierre-Hernández then began to negotiate the sale of Cerrovista to Iantho, a company owned by Walter Frambes. In August or September 1986, Burns read newspaper articles indicating that the Cerrovista project might be affected by the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation’s plans to build a hospital and an expressway. He inquired with the Department and received confirmation that the development of four lots would be “frozen.” When Burns brought this information to Um-pierre-Hernández, Umpierre-Hernández told him to “hide it, boy.” On September 10, 1986, Sánchez-Arán received Board approval to offer Iantho an $8.9 million loan, specifying that $1,412,177 would be used to purchase land for the Cerrovista project. The sale was then finalized on September 28. However, the actual land cost was only $480,000, and the remaining $932,000 was used to make principal and interest payments on other loans to Gutiérrez-owned companies. Over the next few months Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted certifications showing approximately $908,000 for “premanu-facture” of housing units, and Sánchez-Arán authorized disbursement of these funds. As of May 1988, however, not a single unit had been built on the project. d. Jardines de Villa Alba In 1985, a developer named Emilio Mon-tilla sought financing to build housing units on land he owned, and Caguas repeatedly denied his requests. Montilla then met with Umpierre-Hernández, who told him that if he used Modules as a contractor his request would be approved. In July 1985, the Board considered a proposed loan to Montilla with Modules as contractor. Although by this time Modules had failed to perform on the La Marina project for several years, the Board was not informed of this information when it considered the Jardines de Villa Alba project. Moreover, over $281,000 was disbursed before the Jardines de Villa Alba loan agreement was signed. Although the Board eventually approved the loan, this prior disbursement took place without Board knowledge or approval. Only one unit was ever completed on the Jardines de Villa Alba project. However, the Board was not informed of this fact. The Denby letter, which was drafted by Muñoz-Franco in January 1988 and signed by the Board members, refers to the “units” completed on this project. 2. The Mirandes Loans As will be described in more detail in our sufficiency discussion, Muñoz-Franco and Sánehez-Arán supervised a similar scheme to use loan proceeds for purposes not authorized by the Board with respect to companies owned by Francisco Mi-randes. Mirandes received construction loans from Caguas for at least fourteen different projects. In December 1989, the Mirandes corporations collapsed due to insolvency, owing Caguas a total of $23 million. In 1997, Mirandes pled guilty to charges of participating in a conspiracy to defraud Caguas, the Board, and the regulatory institution, and to misapplication of bank funds. As part of his plea agreement, he testified for the government at appellants’ trial. B. Procedural History On November 22, 1995, the government filed an indictment charging appellants with conspiracy, bank fraud, misapplication of bank funds, and making false entries. Three superseding indictments subsequently were filed on March 5, 1997; May 18, 1997; and March 6, 1998. The third superseding indictment charged Mu-ñoz-Franco, Sánchez-Arán, Gutiérrez, Umpierre-Hernández, Enrique Gutiérrez (Ariel Gutiérrez’s brother, who was also involved in running the Gutiérrez corporations), and Rafael Dominguez Wolff (who purchased several projects from the Gu-tiérrez brothers) with bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; conspiracy to commit bank fraud, misapply bank funds, and make false entries, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and misapplication of bank funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 657. The indictment also charged Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán with bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 with respect to the Mirandes loans. The trial began in federal district court in Puerto Rico in January 2001 and the presentation of evidence concluded in April 2002. On May 16, 2002, the jury convicted Muñoz-Franco, Sánchez-Arán, Ariel Gu-tiérrez, and Umpierre-Hernández on all charged counts, but acquitted Enrique Gu-tiérrez. Following the verdict, appellants filed motions for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, raising numerous grounds, including the sufficiency of the evidence. In a thoughtful seventy-seven page opinion, the district court denied all of the motions. Sentencing proceedings began on December 15, 2003. On February 12, 2004, the district court sentenced Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán to a term of forty-six months on the conspiracy and bank fraud counts and a concurrent term of sixty months on the misapplication count. It also imposed a fine of $50,000 on each defendant. The court sentenced Gutiérrez to a term of thirty-seven months on the conspiracy and bank fraud counts, and imposed a concurrent term of sixty months on the misapplication count. It also imposed a $60,000 fine. Finally, it sentenced Umpierre-Hernández to a term of twenty-four months on all counts. C. Issues on Appeal Appellants raise thirteen major issues for our consideration on appeal. Three of these claims — concerning the statute of limitations, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the pre-indictment and pre-trial delay— implicate what might be termed the validity of the entire proceedings. Although courts often begin by addressing such issues, we find, in light of the exceptionally large record, that we must review the sufficiency of the evidence in order to assess the viability of any of appellants’ other claims. Thus, we will first resolve two evidentiary issues to determine the content of the record properly before us. We will then employ that record in conducting our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence. Informed by a full understanding of the record, we will then turn to the host of other issues raised by appellants. II. We begin with two evidentiary issues: whether the district court allowed witnesses to testify beyond their personal knowledge, and whether the minutes from the Board meetings were improperly admitted. A. Personal Knowledge Appellants argue that the district court improperly permitted prosecution witnesses to testify beyond their personal knowledge, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 602. Rule 602 states, in pertinent part: “A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed.R.Evid. 602. Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is a question of law subject to de novo review, but the application of a rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046 (1st Cir.1997). 1. Arturo Somohano Appellants argue that Arturo So-mohano (the vice president of Caguas’ commercial loan department until 1988, at which time he became Caguas’ chief lending officer) testified beyond his personal knowledge on three occasions: (1) in claiming that the bank’s outside auditors were replaced for improper reasons; (2) in stating that Caguas’ loan classifications for the loans to Modules were improper; and (8) in questioning the propriety of certain construction loans. The district court excluded the first of these statements after appellants objected, and we therefore do not consider it further. With respect to Somohano’s testimony that Caguas’ loan classifications for Modules were improper, appellants objected on the ground that Somohano had previously stated that he was unaware of the bank’s classifications for those loans. So-mohano acknowledged that he did not remember seeing the loan classifications for Modules while at Caguas, but his testimony did not rely on such knowledge of Modules’ status. Instead, Somohano explained that loans at Caguas were classified from one (best) to ten (worst) based on the amount of risk involved in the loan, and that the bank would attach greater reserves to riskier loans. While still on the witness stand, Somohano then reviewed financial statements indicating that Modules had a negativo net worth of $7.6 million at the end of 1986, and that Caguas’ reserves would not cover the loans to Modules because the reserves equalled only ten or fifteen percent of the loans Modules was sustaining. Based strictly on the amount of reserves, Somo-hano would expect the Modules loan to have received a favorable classification of either two or three; however, he testified that, based on Modules’ “insolvent” financial status, such classification would have been improper. According to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness may offer opinions that are “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed.R.Evid. 701. Under Rule 701, courts have allowed lay witnesses to express opinions about a business “based on the witness’s own perceptions and ‘knowledge and participation in the day-today affairs of [the] business.’ ” United States v. Polishan, 336 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir.2003)(alternation in original)(quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175 (3d Cir.1993)); see also Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 110-11 (2d Cir.2002)(allowing a computer programmer to testify about the meaning of terms used in the copyright registrations for programs he had helped design); Williams Enters., Inc. v. Sherman R. Smoot Co., 938 F.2d 230, 233-34 (D.C.Cir.1991)(allowing an insurance broker who had personal knowledge of an insured’s business to offer lay opinion testimony on the cause of an increase in the insured’s premiums). Here, Somohano’s testimony was based on knowledge of Caguas’ banking practices that he acquired during his employment there, and thus the opinions he expressed were properly within the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Finally, appellants protest, without providing specific examples, that Somohano “was permitted to testify about the propriety of certain construction loans even though he was not part of the construction loan department and has no firsthand knowledge of those loans.” We find this generalized objection unfounded. Somo-hano’s opinions about the loans were based on his firsthand observations of Caguas’ practices with respect to these loans. He testified that, when the Modules loan was restructured, he did not think Caguas ever would be repaid, and he provided other examples of Gutiérrez loans receiving spe- - cial treatment. Given Somohano’s banking experience and his particular knowledge about the Gutiérrez loans, his testimony about these loans also was properly admissible as a lay opinion within the scope of Rule 701. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of Somohano’s testimony. 2. Anabel Enriquez Appellants also argue that Anabel Enri-quez (the senior vice president of Caguas’ mortgage department from 1980-87, who reported directly to Sánchez-Arán) testified beyond her personal knowledge when she stated, based on her review of the minutes of Board and Executive Committee meetings, that certain information was not discussed at the meetings that should have been discussed. This objection is unfounded. At trial, Enriquez read the Board meeting minutes into evidence, including minutes for meetings at which she was not present. Appellants objected, and, after considerable debate, the district court ruled “that [Enriquez] may literally read what each paragraph [of the minutes] says. If the United States then wants an explanation as to the paragraph she must then have an independent source of knowledge.” Thus, Enriquez did not testify whether certain events actually happened at a Board meeting unless she was present; for meetings she did not attend, she testified only “whether the minutes reflect” that certain information was discussed. The district court enforced this limitation, and required the prosecutor to rephrase questions on more than one occasion. Similarly, Enriquez’s testimony that the Board “should have been told” certain information was a lay opinion properly admitted under Rule 701. Her position as a senior vice president of Caguas’ mortgage department and her regular attendance at Board meetings established her familiarity with Caguas’ business operations and made it appropriate for her testify about information the Board needed to make its decisions. Again, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such testimony. 3. Victor Lugo As part of its case, the government sought to prove that Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán concealed material information relating to the Gutiérrez loans from the Board. Victor Lugo, the Board president, offered testimony that he was not told or was not aware of significant information. Appellants claim that Lugo’s testimony showed that he had no independent recollection of the events in question, some of which occurred nearly twenty years before trial. However, appellants misconstrue Lugo’s testimony about his own memory. For example, when asked whether he was informed of Modules’ performance history when the Board was making decisions on the company’s loans in July 1985, he stated: “I don’t recall that it was discussed. I believe that if it was discussed I would remember and it is not reflected in the minutes.” Similarly, when asked whether the number of houses built on Modules projects was discussed when the Board was again making decisions on the loans in September 1986, he stated definitively: “No ... that was not discussed.” These statements show that Lugo had sufficient recall to testify from his personal knowledge about the information given to the Board. Appellants also complain that the government improperly suggested the truth of hypothetical scenarios presented in certain questions to Lugo. The purpose of these questions was to probe whether the Board would have considered Gutiérrez companies’ past performance in deciding to approve later loans. For example, the prosecutor asked Lugo: “[I]f the Gutiér-rez company, out of these 96 [housing] units only built 22, would that have been information ... which you would have been interested in knowing for purposes of voting on the approval of this loan?” The court explained at sidebar that it would only allow such hypothetieals when the government had already introduced evidence that was the basis for the hypothetical — specifically, when “there is a document from the bank that clearly establishes a certain fact.” It also instructed the jurors that they should not take the facts that were the basis for the hypo-thetieals as true: Okay. The fact that the Court has authorized that question, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, does not mean ... that the Court is concluding it is a foregoing fact that you should take those facts as true. Those facts are subject to your analysis and your credibility. In other words, you have to decide in your deliberations whether or not this project called for 96 houses and you have to decide whether or not actually 22 were built or whatever number was built, that is subject to your credibility. The fact that the Court is authorizing that this question be expressed in these terms does not at all mean that the Court has already determined that it is a fact at all. You have to decide. That’s one of the issues that you’re going to have to decide in this case. The court reiterated this instruction several times. This detailed instruction was sufficient to advise the jury that it should not accept the facts set forth in the hypo-thetieals as true. Thus, Lugo’s response to these questions did not have the effect of allowing him to testify beyond his personal knowledge to the factual correctness of the hypothetical. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such testimony. 4. Victor Kareh Finally, appellants assert that Victor Kareh (the assistant vice president of the construction loan department from 1980 to 1990) “was permitted ... to opine about what the project documents and ledger cards indicated, without any clear memory of the events and mixing summary testimony with what was improper expert testimony.” To support this proposition, appellants cite to three thirty-page sections of the trial transcript, without specifying the testimony to which they object or the grounds for their objections. Although Kareh did not author all of the documents about which he testified, this in itself is not a basis for excluding his testimony about the documents. Without developed argumentation on this issue, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Kareh’s testimony. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990)(“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”). B. Admission of Minutes from Board Meetings At trial, the prosecution introduced the Board and Executive Committee meeting minutes under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), which states that business records are not excluded by the rule against hearsay “if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the ... record ... unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Appellants do not claim that the minutes themselves were improperly admitted, but rather protest the prosecution’s reliance on the absence of certain information from the minutes to prove that the Board was not informed about such matters. Appellants argue that this use violated their rights under the Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay. We examine these claims in turn. We review alleged violations of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause de novo. United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir.2005). As discussed above, interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is subject to de novo review, but application of a rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sposito, 106 F.3d at 1046. 1. Confrontation Clause The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to confront adverse witnesses. The Supreme Court has explained that only “testimonial” statements “cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” Davis v. Washington, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). Thus, “[i]t is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” Id. Although the Court has yet to articulate a precise definition of “testimonial,” it is beyond debate that the Board minutes are nontestimonial in character and, consequently, outside the class of statements prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. The Court in Crawford plainly characterized business records as “statements that by their nature [are] not testimonial.” 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354. If business records are nontestimo-nial, it follows that the absence of information from those records also must be non-testimonial. Thus, the Confrontation Clause presents no bar to reliance on the absence of certain information from the Board meeting minutes to prove that the Board was not given that information. 2. Hearsay Appellants also complain that, once the minutes were admitted, the prosecution used the absence of certain information from the minutes to demonstrate that Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán failed to inform the Board of these matters in violation of the rule against hearsay. Appellants argue that the minutes were intended to be a summary, rather than an exhaustive record, of the events that took place at Board meetings, and that, consequently, the minutes do not indicate whether such information was disclosed to the Board. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(7) states that the rule against hearsay does not exclude [ejvidence that a matter is not included in the ... records ... kept in accordance with the provisions of [Fed. R.Evid. 803(6) ], to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a ... record ... was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Fed.R.Evid. 803(7). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(7) also states that the “[fjailure of a record to mention a matter which would ordinarily be mentioned is satisfactory evidence of its nonexistence.” Thus, the absence of certain information in minutes admissible under Rule 803(6) would be admissible to show that the Board was not given that information unless the circumstances indicated some reason that these omissions from the record were untrustworthy. We note that Rule 803(6) excludes business records if “the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness,” Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), while Rule 803(7) excludes records otherwise admissible under Rule 803(6) if “the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness,” Id. 803(7). We think this repetition indicates that even if a business record is deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible for its contents under Rule 803(6), other circumstances might render omissions in that record untrustworthy to show that the events omitted did not occur. Thus, appellants’ concession that the records are admissible under Rule 803(6) does not necessarily preclude them from arguing that omissions from the records are not admissible under Rule 803(7). The government introduced testimony from Enriquez, the vice-president who reported directly to Sánchez-Arán, explaining that the minutes were prepared by one of the executive vice presidents before 1982, by Luis Pastor (an administrative assistant to MuñozAFranco) from 1982 to 1986, and by Enriquez after that time. Enriquez stated that the records prior to 1982 “were prepared and reviewed by the board, they were set forth in a record book and the secretary of the board and the president would sign them.” The government submitted an affidavit from Pastor, dated March 21, 2001, verifying that the documents it introduced were, in fact, the minutes from 1982 to 1986 and explaining that the minutes “consist of transcriptions made from notes taken by someone who was present at each meeting” and that the minutes “were kept in the regular course of business of Caguas.... [I]t was the regular business practice of Caguas to compile and prepare [the minutes] and to maintain them in its files.” Finally, Enriquez explained that, after 1986, “[w]hen I was present I would take notes, subject to the agenda and what was approved.” When Enriquez was not present, Eliza Balina, the executive secretary for Muñoz-Franco, would take notes at the meetings, and Enriquez would then “review the files that were prepared for use by the directors. And upon that review, if there was something I did not understand then I could ask the president.” Enriquez noted that the minutes “were always ratified at the following board meeting,” and that, after ratification, the minutes would be stored either in the president’s office or in the bank vault. Appellants emphasize that Lugo (the president of the Board) acknowledged on cross-examination that the minutes were only a summary of the meetings and did not “word for word report discussions.” However, a review of the Board and Executive Committee minutes reveals that, while not word for word renditions of the meetings, the minutes capture more than a skeletal outline of each meeting and include descriptions of the considerations relevant to each loan rather than simply the fact that the loan was discussed and approved. After considering this evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the use of the minutes to demonstrate that the Board did not receive material information about many of the transactions it considered. Enriquez’s testimony and Pastor’s affidavit demonstrate that the business records were prepared regularly after every meeting, reviewed and ratified by the Board, and stored securely following ratification. These circumstances do not indicate lack of trustworthiness. Indeed, they permit a finding of trustworthiness. Moreover, given the minutes’ thorough description of information discussed at the meetings, we conclude that the missing information relating to the loan transactions was a “matter ... of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved.” Fed. R.Evid. 803(7). III. We proceed to the sufficiency of the evidence, including in our analysis the previously-discussed witness testimony and the absence of certain information from the Board minutes. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir.1998)(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In performing this inquiry, we “neither weight ] the credibility of the witnesses nor attempt! 1 to assess whether the prosecution succeeded in eliminating every possible theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence.” United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 494 (1st Cir.1997). Similarly, we “review[] a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal ‘using the identical standard employed to measure the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.’ ” United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 590 (1st Cir.1994)(quoting United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir.1991)). A. Bank Fraud with Respect to the Gutiérrez Loans The jury found all four appellants guilty of bank fraud with respect to the Gutiérrez loans. To prove bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the government must show that the appellants knowingly engaged in a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain money from a federally insured financial institution by means of materially false statements or misrepresentations. See United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir.2000). We first consider the evidence against bank officers Muñoz-Franco and Sánchezr-Arán, and then the evidence against Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández. 1. Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán In their positions as President and Executive Vice President, respectively, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán were responsible for keeping the Board informed of information relevant to current and prospective loans. Moreover, Sán-chez-Arán was the primary supervisor of the construction and commercial loans to Modules, a Gutiérrez-owned company involved in many of the fraudulent transactions. Muñoz-Franco supported Sánchez-Arán’s recommendations on these projects. At trial, Lugo, the president of the Board of Directors, explained that he and the other Board members relied on the reports prepared by Muñoz-Franco and Sán-chez-Arán in making decisions regarding loans. Lugo explained that it was not his job to “verify the accuracy of information that was being given” to him by the management of the bank, and added that he “trusted fully that the information that was being provided me was whole and true.” Despite their responsibility to keep the Board fully apprised, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán concealed important information on many occasions. For example, in July 1985 Caguas considered the Jar-dines de Villa Alba project, for which Modules would be the contractor. As of October 29, 1984, Modules had completed none of the 212 units planned for the La Marina project, even though the original loan agreement from June 25, 1980 called for construction to begin in thirty days and for seventy-five units to be completed within twelve months. Despite the lack of progress, the loan amount had been increased four times between August 7, 1980 and September 17, 1981. Lugo testified that this poor performance history was not discussed during the loan presentation for the Jardines de Villa Alba project. Lugo stated unequivocally that he would have wanted to know Modules’ performance history in evaluating the Jardines de Villa Alba loan, demonstrating the materiality of such information. Lugo further testified that, after the original loan presentation, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán continued to withhold information from the Board regarding the Jardines de Villa Alba loan. Although the record shows $231,000 was paid to Modules before the Jardines de Villa Alba loan agreement was signed, even at trial Lugo expressed surprise that this had happened and stated that “it would have been difficult for me to believe that” this occurred. More than a year after the Jar-dines de Villa Alba loan was approved, in September 1986, Lugo did not know that only one house had been built on the project. Lugo also testified that as of September 1986 the performance history of Modules “as to construction of homes that were to be constructed versus the ones that were constructed ... was not discussed.” Finally, on January 10, 1988, Lugo signed the Denby letter, which was prepared by Muñoz-Franco and which referred to the “units” built on Jardines de Villa Alba, without realizing that only one house had been built on the project. Lugo also testified that Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán did not inform him and the Board of other material information relating to Modules. For example, he did not know that Modules remained the contractor after the La Marina, Country Club, and Levittown projects were sold from Transglobe to DO.W in October 1984. He also did not know that, between 1984 and 1986, Modules did not make any principal or interest payment on any loan to Caguas with funds generated from its own business as opposed to proceeds from other loans. Likewise, he was not informed, when the Board approved the sale of Modules to Camero on September 10, 1986, in conjunction with a restructuring of its loans, that approximately seventy percent of Modules’ debt was with Caguas and that over seventy-one percent of Modules’ assets were intangibles. Finally, Lugo testified that when the board approved a loan of $1,412,077 for land acquisition for the Cerrovista project, for which Modules also was the contractor, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán did not advise him or the Board that the cost of the land was actually only $480,000' — -in other words, that $932,177 would be used to make principal and interest payments on other Modules loans. Lugo’s testimony is corroborated by the absence of this and other material information from the Board minutes. Although the government did not rely heavily on the absence of such information, we have found these omissions properly admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(7) and note that they lend support to the prosecution’s case. There was substantial evidence that Mu-ñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán withheld all of this information from the Board with full knowledge of the problems with Modules and other Gutiérrez companies. Am-abel Enriquez, who reported directly to Sánchez-Arán, explained that the handling of Gutiérrez certifications at Caguas concerned her “[b]ecause practically monthly, each time they invoiced!,] the certifications would be ahead of the construction.” She discussed her concerns with Muñoz-Fran-eo at least by the time La Marina was going to be sold to DO.W in 1984, and with Sánchez-Arán around the same time. She also discussed her concern with Muñoz-Franco that, following the sale, Modules would remain a contractor for La Marina, Levittown, and Country Club. However, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán took no action in response to Enriquez’s concerns. Finally, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán took steps to conceal their misrepresentations from both internal and external auditors. Juan Hernández, Caguas’ internal auditor, testified that, in 1981, Kareh (the assistant vice president of the construction loan department) initially provided information in connection with an audit of the construction loan department, but, after a short meeting with Sánchez-Arán, Kareh stopped providing the information Hernández requested. Hernández further testified that, although he requested the auditing committee “several times” between 1980 and 1990 to allow him to audit the construction loan department, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán did not allow the audit to take place. In a letter dated January 22, 1985, an external auditing firm, Stephen P. Bradics and Company, recommended “that the scope of internal auditing be expanded to include ... construction loans.” After Caguas received this letter, Hernández again recommended to the audit committee on several occasions that he should be allowed to audit the construction department, but he still was not allowed to do so. The audit committee minutes reflect his recommendation at several meetings at which Muñoz-Fran-co and Sánchez-Arán were present. At one meeting, on January 28, 1988, Muñoz-Franco responded by telling Hernández that “construction loans was the area most audited by senior management.” Sán-chez-Arán heard and agreed with Muñoz-Franco’s response, and Sánchez-Arán had also made similar statements to Hernán-dez in the past. However, Hernández was never provided with any internal audit conducted by either Muñoz-Franco or Sán-chez-Arán. Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán also concealed information regarding Caguas’ lending practices from external authorities. Critically, Muñoz-Franco drafted and obtained Board approval to send the Denby letter, which states: “This Board of Directors wishes to state in no unclear and uncertain terms that it has never considered and much less approved any policy or practice of permitting borrowers to use construction loan proceeds to satisfy or make interest payments] on other unrelated loans.” At the time of the letter, however, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán had, as discussed above, approved loans for such purposes on many occasions. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence demonstrates that Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán repeatedly concealed material information regarding the status of the Gutiérrez loans from the Board, approved disbursements for work that was not completed, and prevented audits. Such conduct caused Caguas to continue lending money to Gutiérrez-owned companies despite the companies’ financial instability, which demonstrates appellants’ knowing scheme to defraud Caguas by means of material misrepresentations within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s finding that a rational jury could have found Muñoz-Fran-co and Sánchez-Arán guilty of bank fraud. 2. Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández The record also contained considerable evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Her-nández knowingly engaged in a scheme to defraud Caguas by misrepresenting material information. The certifications they submitted and signed contained many misrepresentations. For example, on the Los Mameyes project, between December 9, 1985 and January 10, 1986, Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted nine certifications attesting to the manufacture of 74 housing units and requesting payments totaling $380,000, even though the inspector’s report stated that only 19 houses had been built. Between January 16 and February 21, 1986, Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted 10 more certifications attesting to the manufacture of 90 additional housing units and requesting payment of approximately $500,000, at which point payment had been disbursed for at least 164 housing units even though only 40 units had been manufactured. As of February 25, 1986, Gutiérrez and Um-pierre-Hernández had certified the completion of 200 units, but an inspection report dated March 23, 1986, indicated that only 55 units had been built. On March 31, 1986, Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernán-dez submitted a certification requesting $69,000 for “payment of subcontractors” along with a list of interest payments they had made on other projects, including Jar-dines de Villa Alba, Levittown, Country Club, La Marina, and Los Caciques, which equalled exactly $69,000. Finally, on June 26, 1986, Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernán-dez submitted a “special certification” of $85,000 with no justification for work allegedly completed; Kareh testified that such a certification was not a usual practice. Sánchez-Arán authorized the disbursements based on these certifications. Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted similar certifications for work not completed on other projects. For example, on the Jardines de Villa Alba project, Modules had installed only one unit as of the time of the Denby letter on January 10, 1988; however, on October 22, 1985 Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández certified that twenty-two units had been completed, causing $626,000 to be disbursed to Modules. Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández perpetuated their scheme by recruiting other developers to obtain loans from Cag-uas on the condition that they use Modules as the contractor. This conduct allowed Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández to obtain new funding for Modules, which they would then use to pay down prior loans and keep Modules from collapsing. Developer Burns, the original owner of the Cer-rovista project, was a typical example. After unsuccessfully applying to Caguas for a loan to build residential housing on land he owned, Burns met with Umpierre-Hernán-dez, who told him that if he used Modules as his contractor and signed a $2 million note he would be approved for a loan. A week later Burns received financing for the Cerrovista project. He testified that the approval was “[d]efinitely[ ] because of the use of Modules.” Burns met with Umpierre-Hernández on “many other occasions,” and, after problems arose with the Cerrovista project, with Umpierre-Hernández and Sánehez-Arán in Sánchez-Arán’s office. Subsequently, Umpierre-Hernández told Burns that the project would be sold to Iantho, and explained that “this project was going to contribute to paying off some interest for some of the projects that were in default,” which caused Burns to understand “that was the reason ... I was rejected as sponsor.” On September 10, 1986, Sánchez-Arán presented, and the Board approved, a loan of $8.9 million to Iantho Corporation to take over the Cerrovista project; the loan agreement specified that Modules would be the contractor for the project’s two hundred units. Burns testified that, around the time the project was being sold, he received confirmation that the Department of Transportation’s plans to build a hospital and expressway would cause the development of four lots of the project to be “frozen.” When told the news, Um-pierre-Hernández responded, “hide it, boy.” On September 28, 1986, Cerrovista was sold to Iantho with no mention of the impending development. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence shows that Gu-tiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández knowingly concealed information relevant to the viability of the Cerrovista project and submitted many certifications for work that was not completed. To sustain their schemes, they recruited other developers and helped them receive funding from Caguas on the condition that these developers use Modules as a contractor. These activities caused Caguas to continue lending money to Gutiérrez-owned companies despite the companies’ financial instability, providing an ample basis for a jury to find that appellants knowingly schemed to defraud Caguas by means of material misrepresentations within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Consequently, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that both Gu-tiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández were guilty of bank fraud. B. Conspiracy with Respect to the Gu-tiérrez Loans The four appellants were charged with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), misapply bank funds (18 U.S.C. § 657), and make false entries in the books and records of the bank (18 U.S.C. § 1006). To establish a conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant knew of and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy; and (3) there was an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Blasini-Lluberas, 169 F.3d 57, 67 (1st Cir.1999). The government must prove both intent to agree and intent to commit the substantive offense. United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st Cir.1989). A formal agreement is not required, Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946); rather, “[t]he agreement may be shown by a concert of action, all the parties working together understandingly, with a single design for the accomplishment of a common purpose.” Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 107 (6th Cir.1944); see also Adver. Special Nat’l Ass’n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir.1956). Where, as here, the indictment alleges a conspiracy to commit multiple offenses, the charge may be sustained by sufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit any one of the offenses. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991); see also United States v. Wedelstedt, 589 F.2d 339, 341-42 (8th Cir.1978)(“[P]roof that [defendant] agreed to commit one of the multiple illegal objectives of the conspiracy sufficed to sustain the conviction on that count.”). On the verdict form, the jury found Mu-ñoz-Franco, Sánchezr-Arán, Gutiérrez, and Umpierre-Hernández guilty of conspiracy “as charged in the indictment.” Docket Nos. 1291, 1292, 1294, 1295. In considering appellants’ motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court found that there was more than enough evidence with respect to bank fraud to sustain the conspiracy conviction, and thus did not review the evidence concerning the misapplication and false entry crimes. We agree with the district court’s assessment. First, there was substantial evidence of an agreement among the four men to defraud the bank. Sánchez-Arán directly supervised the Gutiérrez loans and worked closely with Muñoz-Franco on the loans. Enriquez testified that Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán always reached an agreement regarding the treatment of these loans. Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández submitted many certifications for work not yet completed, and Sánchez-Arán then repeatedly approved disbursements for this work. Sánchez-Arán also facilitated Gutiérrez’s efforts to secure new borrowers by ensuring that a loan would be approved if Modules was used as a contractor. Sánchez-Arán and Umpierre-Hernández met frequently regarding the status of the Gutiérrez companies. Burns testified, for example, that he met with Umpierre-Hernández many times in Sán-chez-Arán’s office regarding the Cerrovis-ta project. Finally, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán failed to disclose material information to the Board on many occasions, and this joint failure further demonstrates their collaboration in defrauding the bank. Given the many instances of concealing the Gutiérrez companies’ performance from the Board of Directors, submitting certifications for work not completed, authorizing disbursements for such work and preventing audits, a reasonable jury could easily find the other two elements of conspiracy: that appellants knew of and participated voluntarily in the conspiracy, and that each committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Viewed as a whole, this synchronized pattern of conduct demonstrates appellants’ agreement to maintain the appearance of financial viability of the Gutiérrez corporations by securing new loans to make payments on outstanding loans. Thus, we find that a reasonablé jury could have found each element of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to each of the four appellants. C. Misapplication of Bank Funds The jury found all four appellants guilty of misapplication of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 657 for a single transaction related to the Cerrovista project. The crime of misapplication eludes easy definition. As we have previously noted, “[t]he problem that has confronted and perplexed the courts is that there is no statutory definition or common law heritage that gives content to the phrase ‘willfully misapplies.’ ” United States v. Wester, 90 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir.1996). However, we have held that misapplication has two key elements: (1) wrongful use of bank funds; and (2) intent to injure or defraud a bank. Blasini-Lluberas, 169 F.3d at 63. We have also explained that “the same facts can easily be the basis for deeming the conduct to be wrongful and the intent fraudulent; both misapplication and scien-ter are required.” Wester, 90 F.3d at 595. Finally, the misapplication statute applies only to officers, agents, and employees of a bank. Thus, appellants who do not hold one of these positions — here Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández — may not be convicted as principals for misapplication, but may be convicted as aiders and abettors. See Giragosian v. United States, 349 F.2d 166, 167 (1st Cir.1965)(“Since [defendant] was not an officer, director, agent or employee of the bank, he could not be guilty as a principal ... for misapplication of the bank’s funds, but only as an aider and abettor.”). A reasonable jury could have concluded that appellants’ handling of the Cerrovista loan constituted misapplication. The original loan offering, which was prepared according to Sánchez-Arán’s instructions, designated $1,412,177 for land costs and $855,323 for “partial assumption of other loans.” This document did not disclose the purpose for which the funds were actually used. Of the $1,412,177 designated for land, only $480,000 was used to purchase land for the project. The remaining $932,177 was disbursed to the Gutiérrez-owned Quintas de Humacao company and immediately applied to other Gutiérrez projects: principal and interest on the Quintas de Fajardo loan, interest on the Las Gaviotas loan, and interest on a Modules commercial loan. The documents associated with the Cer-rovista loan demonstrate appellants’ intent to defraud Caguas by redirecting these funds. Although the settlement statement for the Cerrovista loan, dated September 29, 1986, lists a disbursement of $932,177 for “repayment of other loan” and lists the payee as “Quintas de Humacao Inc. & Caguas Federal Savings,” these disclosures appear in a markedly different type, as does the total loan amount. Ka-reh testified that this different type indicates that “the entry was made later or at another place,” allowing an inference that the document was amended to make it appear that the Board had approved the use of loan proceeds to make payments on other loans. This inference is bolstered by the fact that the loan settlement statement was not prepared until after the Board had approved a loan. Kareh also testified that, although the $855,323 amount designated for “partial assumption of other loans” was listed on the loan offering and disbursed on the date of closing, the $855,323 amount was omitted from the settlement statement at Sánchez-Arán’s instruction. This omission concealed the fact that two separate disbursements, in the amounts of $932,177 and $855,323, were used to pay down other loans. Each appellant was sufficiently involved in concealing the use of funds to allow an inference of intent to defraud. Sánchez-Arán drafted the original loan offering, which did not disclose that the $932,177 difference between the amount allocated for land purchase and the amount spent on land would be used to pay principal and interest on other loans. Moreover, according to Kareh, Sánchez-Arán explicitly instructed him to omit the $855,323 amount from the loan settlement document. A jury could infer that Muñoz-Franco helped to conceal this wrongful use of funds, thereby intentionally defrauding Caguas, based on his supervisory role on the Gu-tiérrez loans and his regular responsibility of conveying information to the Board. A jury also could infer that Gutiérrez and Umpierre-Hernández aided and abetted Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán in the transaction: Umpierre negotiated the transaction involving the sale of Cerrovis-ta, and the funds were used to pay down loans held by companies that Gutiérrez owned and supervised. Although appellants assert that the loan settlement documents demonstrate that the transaction was disclosed to the Board, the record indicates that the loan settlement statement was prepared after the loan had already been approved. Appellants attempt to counter the charge by segregating the activities relating to the Cerrovista loan into two separate transactions: the disbursement of the $932,177 land purchase differential to Quintas de Humacao, and the use of those funds to pay down other Gutiérrez loans. They argue that, at the time the funds were disbursed to the Gutiérrez-owned Quintas de Humacao, they ceased to be “bank funds” under 18 U.S.C. § 657 and thus cannot support a misapplication violation. We do not find this technicality pertinent. The disbursement of funds from the Cerrovista loan to Gutiérrez-owned companies, and the subsequent use of these loans to pay down other Gutiérrez loans, was a single unified transaction. The district court explained: The funds did not cease to be controlled by the express purpose for which they were disbursed. The fact the $932,177 check was endorsed does not change the express purpose for which said funds were to be used. The second transfer, the Gutiérrez’s endorsement back to Caguas Central for the repayment of four separate loans, is still the use of bank funds and subject to misapplication. By expressly designating these funds for “repayment of other loan[s],” Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán retained control over the funds even if the funds nominally changed hands. Moreover, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán supervised the entire transaction, as demonstrated by four entries in Caguas’ ledgers showing the transfer of funds to the Gutiérrez accounts. Critically, appellants also ignore the separate concealment of the $855,323, which, although it was listed on the original loan application, was left off of the loan settlement statement of September 29, 1986 at Sánchez-Ai'án’s explicit instruction. Although the disbursement of the $855,323 was disclosed to the Board, the fact that this disbursement was left off the loan settlement statement indicates the bank officials’ efforts to conceal the fact that two separate disbursements, in the amounts of $855,323 and $932,177, were used to pay down other loans. In short, there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that appellants engaged in wrongful use of bank funds with the intent to defraud the bank. D. Bank Fraud with Respect to Mi-randes Loans The jury also found appellants Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán guilty of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 with respect to the Mirandes loans. The Mi-randes scheme involved many of the same elements as the Gutiérrez loans. In September 1981, Muñoz-Franco asked Mi-randes to take over ownership of a project called Repai'to Valenciano, and Mirandes, then the contractor for the project, agreed. At the time the project was in debt to Caguas for $2.2 million, and delays and other problems continued after Mirandes assumed ownership. On an ongoing basis, Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán supervised the transfer of funds from other projects to pay down the debt on the Re-parto Valenciano project. For example, on September 30, 1986, approximately $2.2 million was applied to the Reparto Valenci-ano project from other Mirandes projects. Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán did not disclose these transfers of money among various Mirandes projects to the Board. After the Reparto Valenciano debt increased to $3.2 million, Mirandes received five contracts from the Puerto Rico Housing Department to build basic housing. Although Caguas initially denied Mi-randes’ application for funding for these projects, it subsequently agreed to finance the Villas de Gurabo project if Mirandes would agree to apply the profits of that project to the debt and interest of the Reparto Valenciano project. These transfers temporarily sustained the Mirandes projects, but the decreased funds available to successive projects ultimately made it impossible for those projects to be completed or to yield profits. Both Muñoz-Franco and Sánchez-Arán were intimately involved with the administration of the Mirandes loans. Sánchez-Arán met w