Full opinion text
EN BANC OPINION LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The en banc court has convened to consider a series of issues concerning the relative powers of the federal Secretary of the Interior, the State of Rhode Island, and the Narragansett Tribe over a parcel of land taken into trust and designated for Indian housing. The case is in many ways a proxy for the State’s larger concerns about its sovereignty vis-a-vis federal and tribal control over lands within the state. In 1998, the Secretary of the Interior agreed to take into unreserved trust for the Tribe’s benefit a 31- or 32-acre parcel in Charlestown, Rhode Island (the Parcel). Then-Secretary Gale Norton cited her powers under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465. The Tribe had purchased the Parcel in 1991. Under the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, Congress has plenary power to legislate on the subject of Indian tribes. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192, 109 S.Ct. 1698, 104 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989). As a result, Congress may preempt the operation of state law in Indian country. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983). Under section 5 of the IRA, Congress has authorized the Secretary “in his discretion” to acquire and take into trust for Indian tribes “any interest in lands ... within or without existing reservations ... for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. The Secretary may take land into trust for these purposes, as was done here, without the consent of the State. The Secretary’s acquisition of land into trust for Indians results in the land becoming “Indian country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Generally speaking, primary jurisdiction over land that is Indian country rests with the federal government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it, not with the state. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n. 1, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988). To be more precise, “[w]hen on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.” When, however, state interests outside the reservation are implicated, States [sometimes] may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land.... Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 144, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980)). Recognizing a conflict between state jurisdiction and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-governance, the Secretary’s regulations under the IRA provide that “none of the laws ... of any State ... limiting, zoning or otherwise governing, regulating, or controlling the use or development of any real or personal property ... shall be applicable” to land held in trust for a tribe by the United States. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4(a). This provision is subject to the Secretary’s power in specific cases or areas to make applicable those local laws determined to be in the best interest of the Indian owners “in achieving the highest and best use of [the] property.” Id. § 1.4(b). Concerned over the loss of sovereignty over the Parcel and what it may portend for the future, the State, ‘its Governor, and the town of Charlestown (collectively, the State), sued the Secretary of the Interior, now Dirk Kempthorne, and the Regional Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Franklin Keel, in federal court. See Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.R.I.2003). Having exhausted administrative remedies, the State brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, seeking review of the Secretary’s decision to take the Parcel into trust. Id. at 169, 172. The State’s case asserts three major theories. First, the State argues that the IRA does not authorize the Secretary to take land into trust for any tribe, including the Narragansetts, that first received federal recognition after June 18, 1934, the effective date of the IRA. Second, the State argues that the 1978 Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (the Settlement Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716, restricts the Secretary’s authority to place the Parcel into trust pursuant to the IRA. Third, the State argues that the Constitution prohibits this exercise of authority by the Secretary. As to the IRA, the State argues that the Narragansetts do not meet the definition of “Indian” contained in 25 U.S.C. § 479. The pertinent definition recognizes, inter alia, “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” 25 U.S.C. § 479 (emphasis added). The State reads “are members ... now under Federal jurisdiction” to plainly and literally mean the 1934 effective date of the IRA. The State thus contends that the Secretary has no authority under the IRA to take land into trust for any tribe that was not federally recognized in 1934. As a result, the State argues, the Secretary is precluded entirely from placing the Parcel into trust for the Narragansetts, who were not recognized as a tribe until 1983. Next, the State argues that the terms of the Settlement Act preclude the Secretary from placing the Parcel into trust because the Settlement Act is a later specific act of Congress that must be read to have explicitly and implicitly cabined the Tribe’s and the Secretary’s power as to the Parcel. The State argues that the Settlement Act bars the imposition of any trust. The State’s fallback position is that any trust must be restricted by the terms of the Settlement Act so that it is clear that state and local law apply to the Parcel, just as they do to the settlement lands. Finally, the State asserts various constitutional theories, with the common underpinning that the placing of thé Parcel into trust violates the State’s sovereignty. The State argues that the Indian Commerce Clause does not authorize the Secretary’s exercise of power and that the exercise violates the Tenth Amendment, as well as the Enclave and Admissions Clauses of the Constitution. The State also argues that section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 465, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. We hold that the language of 25 U.S.C. § 479 does not plainly refer to the 1934 enactment date of the IRA. We find that the text is sufficiently ambiguous in its use of the term “now” that the Secretary has, under the Chevron doctrine, authority to construe the Act. We reject the State’s claim that we do not owe deference to the Secretary’s interpretation because he has inconsistently interpreted or applied section 479. The State’s evidence> of inconsistency is mixed and is not persuasive. The Secretary’s position has not been inconsistent, much less arbitrary. The Secretary’s interpretation is rational and not inconsistent with the statutory language or legislative history, and must be honored. Likewise, the Settlement Act neither explicitly bars by its terms the Secretary’s actions, norimplicitly repeals or constrains the Secretary’s authority under the IRA to place land into trust for the Tribe. While the State apparently failed to anticipate this particular problem at the time of the settlement, the Settlement Act did specifically contemplate the event of federal recognition of the Tribe and did not restrict the Secretary’s power, should the Tribe be recognized, to take into trust land outside of the settlement lands. We are not free to reform the Act. If aggrieved, the State must turn to Congress. The State’s arguments based on allocations of power under the U.S. Constitution also do not prevail. They do, however, underscore the seriousness of the State’s concern about the abrogation of state sovereignty at stake here. I. In order to understand the nature of the controversy and the consequences of this decision, a brief recounting of the history of relations between the State and the Tribe is required. Further background can be found in the district court’s opinion, Carcieri, 290 F.Supp.2d 167, as well as the opinions previously issued in the decades-long disputes between the State and the Tribe, see Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island (Narragansett III), 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co. (Narragansett II), 89 F.3d 908 (1st Cir.1996); Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe (Narragansett I), 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir.1994). In 1880, the State acquired the majority of the Tribe’s lands. In 1934, the Tribe organized as a state-chartered corporation. In 1975, the Tribe sued to recover its lands, arguing that the State had acquired the lands in violation of the Indian Nonin-tercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. The Tribe claimed that this violation rendered void the transfer of title to the lands. This cloud on title prompted the State to enter into settlement negotiations with the Tribe, which led in 1978 to an agreement embodied in a Joint Memorandum of Understanding (JMOU). Under the JMOU, the Tribe would receive 1800 acres of “settlement lands,” half of which were provided by the State and half of which were purchased with federal funds. The State agreed to create an Indian-controlled corporation to hold the settlement lands in trust for the Tribe, to exempt the settlement lands from local taxation, and to help secure the federal legislation necessary to implement the agreement. In exchange, the Tribe abandoned its claims of aboriginal title and its claims to lands in the state other than the settlement lands. In turn, Congress approved and codified the agreement in the Settlement Act. The Settlement Act provided that “the settlement lands shall be subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.” Id. § 1708(a). Five years later, in 1983, the Secretary granted the Tribe official federal recognition. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of- Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed.Reg. 6177 (Feb. 10, 1983). Following that recognition, in 1985, Rhode Island amended the pertinent state statute to permit the conveyance of the settlement lands directly to the Tribe, explicitly preserving the State’s jurisdiction over the settlement lands, consistent with the Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1708(a). See R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-18-13(b). The holding company conveyed the settlement lands to the Tribe, and three years later, the Tribe conveyed the settlement lands to the BIA as trustee. The trust deed confirmed the application of state law to the settlement lands, as provided in 25 U.S.C. § 1708(a). The BIA continues to hold the settlement lands in trust for thé Tribe, subject to this congres-sionally-enacted restriction that state law applies. See Narragansett I, 19 F.3d at 689, 695 n. 8. Significantly, in our earlier en banc decision in Narragansett III, we held that the language of section 1708(a) trumped any residual tribal sovereignty over the settlement lands, under which the Tribe had refused to comply with certain state laws. See 449 F.3d at 26. Then, in 1991, the tribal housing authority purchased the Parcel in fee simple, acquiring title through purchase from a private developer. The Parcel was part of the Tribe’s aboriginal lands claimed in the 1976 lawsuit. Under the Settlement Act, the Tribe had thus relinquished aboriginal title to the Parcel, but the Parcel is not part of the 1800 acres of settlement lands. It is adjacent to the settlement lands, across a town road. In 1992, the Housing Authority transferred the Parcel to the Tribe with a deed restriction that the Parcel be placed in trust with the BIA for the purpose of providing housing. A dispute soon arose over whether development of the Parcel had to comply with local law. The Tribe began construction on the planned housing project without obtaining a building permit from the Town or the State’s approval of the individual sewage disposal systems. The Tribe essentially took the position that once it had purchased the Parcel, the land had become tribal land, and the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty meant that the Parcel was exempt from local law. The State disagreed and filed suit in federal court to enjoin the Tribe. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 878 F.Supp. 349 (D.R.I.1995). Ultimately, the Tribe lost that litigation. See Narragansett II, 89 F.3d at 922. The Tribe had sought to solve the issue of the applicability of state law to the Parcel by applying to the Secretary in 1993 to have the Parcel taken into trust under section 5 of the IRA. The Secretary’s determination of whether to do so was stayed pending the resolution of the federal court litigation. After the litigation was resolved against the Tribe by this court in 1996, id. at 922, the Tribe submitted a second application to the Secretary. The Tribe filed this updated application with the Secretary in July 1997. In determining whether to take lands into trust, the Secretary follows a regulatory process set forth at 25 C.F.R. part 151, which requires consideration of several factors. If, as here, the land is off reservation, additional criteria apply. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.11. Generally, the farther from a reservation the land is, the greater the scrutiny the Secretary gives to the justification of anticipated benefits from the acquisition. See id. § 151.11(e); see also M.J. Sheppard, Taking Indian Land into Trust, 44 S.D. L.Rev. 681, 686 (1999). On March 6, 1998, the BIA notified the State of the Secretary’s intent to take the Parcel into trust for the Tribe. The State appealed the decision to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA). The State argued, inter alia, that the Settlement Act prohibited this action by the Secretary, and that in taking the land into trust without the State’s consent, the Secretary had acted unconstitutionally. The IBIA affirmed the BIA’s determination on June 29, 2000. Town of Charlestown v. E. Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 I.B.I.A. 93, 106 (2000). It noted it had no jurisdiction over the claims of unconstitutionality. Id. at 97. The State then instituted this action in federal court. The district court, in a comprehensive decision, rejected the State’s claims. See Carcieri, 290 F.Supp.2d 167. A divided panel of this court affirmed. Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d 45 (1st Cir.2005). The en banc court granted rehearing and withdrew the panel opinion. As described above and recounted in our en banc decision in Narragansett III, 449 F.3d at 18-21, for several decades the relationship between the Tribe and the State has been fraught with tension. The State’s short-term concerns in this case have to do with whether the particular project will conform with state and local law. The State also has concerns that once land is taken into trust, there will be very few mechanisms, other than negotiation with the Tribe or appeal to the Secretary’s authority under 25 C.F.R. § 1.4(b), by which the State may secure compliance with state and local laws. The State fears that the Tribe will convert or otherwise use the Parcel, or any future parcels that might be acquired and put into trust, for income-producing activities in which it normally would not be permitted to engage under state law. There has been federal litigation between state officials and the Tribe and its members over such activities. In 2003, the Tribe, seeking revenue, established on the settlement lands an Indian Smoke Shop that sold cigarettes without purchasing state cigarette stamps or collecting sales taxes then paid to the State, as required by state law. The State Police raided the smoke shop and initiated criminal prosecutions against tribe members. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment in federal court asserting that its control over the smoke shop was an inherent function of tribal sovereignty that survived the Settlement Act, despite the explicit language in section 1708(a). We rejected that claim en banc. Narragansett III, 449 F.3d at 30-31. II. A. Standard of Review Technically, the claims at issue here are reviewed through the lens of an APA appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 706. Our review of such an appeal is de novo as to the district court’s conclusions. See Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir.2005). The underlying issues remaining in the case are statutory and constitutional. Statutory issues are reviewed de novo by the courts, but subject to established principles of deference to the administering agency. Id. Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. See Cousins v. Sec’y of Transp., 880 F.2d 603, 610 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc). B. The 1931 Indian Reorganization Act The State argues that the Secretary lacks authority to place the Parcel into trust under 25 U.S.C. § 465 since, under the definition of “Indian” in 25 U.S.C. § 479, that authority extends only to tribes that were both federally “recognized” and “under [Qederal jurisdiction” on June 18, 1934, the effective date of the IRA. The State presents a series of cascading arguments. First, the State argues that the plain language of section 479 is clear, and that under that plain language, the Tribe’s status is measured as of 1934. The State further argues that its interpretation of the statute is the only one consistent with the purposes and legislative history of the Act. Thus, the State argues that because the statute is unambiguous, deference to the Secretary is unwarranted. In any event, the State argues that even if deference might have been warranted, the Secretary’s current interpretation is not entitled to deference because it contradicts the Secretary’s practice in the more than seventy years since the passage of the IRA. 1. Chevron Analysis The Secretary has offered an interpretation of the IRA that permits trust acquisitions for tribes recognized and under federal jurisdiction at the time the request for a trust acquisition is made. A court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers engages in a two-step analysis. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We must first consider “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If congressional intent is clear, we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” however, we must consider “whether the agency’s [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. (a) Whether Section 179 Is Ambiguous We begin our analysis with the statutory text. Rucker v. Lee Holding Co., 471 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir.2006). The language at issue is that contained in 25 U.S.C. § 479, which provides: The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. One might have an initial instinct to read the word “now” in the statute as the State does, to mean the date of enactment of the statute, June 18, 1934. Congress certainly has used the word “now” in this way. See, e.g., Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 312, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (interpreting the word “now” in a reenactment of an earlier act to refer to the initial date of enactment). Any such instinct quickly disappears upon further examination, however. This is not a case that can be resolved by looking to the plain meaning of the term “now” standing by itself. “Now” means “at the present time,” but there is ambiguity as to whether to view the term “now” as operating at the moment Congress enacted it or at the moment the Secretary invokes it. Indeed, Congress sometimes uses the word “now” to refer to a time other than the moment of enactment. See Difford v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 910 F.2d 1316, 1320 (6th Cir.1990) (interpreting the word “now” in a disability-benefits termination provision to refer to the time of the hearing); see also Pierce v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Iowa 1980) (noting that the phrase “now havfing] jurisdiction” in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act “refers to the time of the filing of the petition”); cf. Williams v. Ragland, 567 So.2d 63, 65-66 (La.1990) (declining to interpret “now serving” in a mandatory judicial retirement provision to refer to the date of enactment). There also are other layers of ambiguity. Given that the word “now” does not itself have a clear meaning, we must look to context. Here, the context is equivocal. On the one hand, the State points' to 25 U.S.C. § 472, another provision of the IRA, which refers to “positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office.” The State argues that this use of “now” unambiguously refers to the date of enactment and that had Congress wanted to include later-recognized tribes in section 479, it would have similarly added the words “or hereafter.” On the other hand, the Secretary points out that section 479 itself specifies the date of “June 1, 1934” as the relevant date for determining eligibility based on “residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” The Secretary thus counters that had Congress wanted to require recognition of a tribe on the date of enactment, it would have specified that date, rather than using the term “now.” See also 25 U.S.C. § 478 (requiring elections to be held “within one year after June 18, 1934”). Hence, “now” might mean “now or hereafter” or it might mean “June 18, 1934”; either would be consistent with some other part of the statute. Policy does not provide an obvious answer either: each side has a plausible explanation that policy considerations favor its interpretation. ' The State argues that the principal, perhaps exclusive, concern of the 1934 statute was with remedying the perceived ills of the prior practice of allotment. See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 222 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1220 n. 10 (D.Haw.2002). Because the IRA ended allotments in 1934, see 25 U.S.C. § 461, they would not have affected later-recognized tribes, and hence there would have been no reason to include such tribes within the ambit of the statute. The Secretary takes the view that the Act was intended not only to remedy past wrongs, but also to set a template for the future that would encourage the strength and stability of tribal communities. Based on this view, it would make no sense to distinguish among tribes based on the happenstance of their federal recognition status in 1934. The Secretary’s view is buttressed by the fact that the Act contains a number of provisions that have,nothing to do with land consolidation. See id. § 472 (Indian employment preference); id. § 476 (tribal organization). The State reads United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 57 L.Ed.2d 489 (1978), to indicate that the Supreme Court had an initial interpretation of the Act that coincides with the State’s interpretation. It is unclear if the Court had any such interpretation, and in any event, we find that John is not controlling here. In John, the Fifth Circuit had found that the Mississippi Choctaws were not eligible for benefits under the IRA because the tribe had not been recognized in 1934. United States v. John, 560 F.2d 1202, 1212 (5th Cir.1977); see also United States v. Miss. Tax Comm’n, 505 F.2d 633, 642 (5th Cir.1974). The Supreme Court reversed, relying on a different clause in the statute and finding the tribe eligible for benefits under the IRA, but on the basis that its members were “persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” 437 U.S. at 650, 98 S.Ct. 2541. Along the way, the Supreme Court stated: The 1934 Act defined “Indians” not only as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized [in 1934] tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” and their descendants who then were residing on any Indian reservation, but also as “all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1976)). The bracketed addition may be read to support the State’s position, but the opinion contains no analysis on this point, and the Court rested its holding on an entirely separate provision of the Act, one not at issue here. We are mindful that the Supreme Court’s musings may warrant our attention. See Rossiter v. Potter, 357 F.3d 26, 31 n. 3 (1st Cir.2004); but see P. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1249 (2006). In this case, however, given John’s complete lack of analysis of the provision that concerns us, the relevant language seems to us to fall short even of being dicta. Having found both text and context to be ambiguous, we turn to legislative history. Despite the State’s arguments to the contrary, that history also does not clearly resolve the issue. Indeed, it suggests a reading of the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” different from that offered by any of the parties, and is thus another source of ambiguity. The congressional record establishes that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” was specifically added to the statutory definition of “Indian,” a term defined separately from “tribe.” See 25 U.S.C. § 479. The phrase was suggested by then-Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier in response to the concern that not all self-identified Indians deserved to benefit from the Act: The Chairman. But the thing about it is this, Senator; I think you have to sooner or later eliminate those Indians who are at the present time — as I said the other day, you have a tribe of Indians here, for instance in northern California, several so-called “tribes” there. They are no more Indians than you or I, perhaps. I mean they are white people essentially. And yet they are under the supervision of the Government of the United States, and there is no reason for it at all, in my judgment. Their lands ought to be turned over to them in severalty and divided up and let them go ahead and operate their own property in their own way. Senator O’Mahoney. If I may suggest, that could be handled by some separate provision excluding from the benefits of the act certain types, but must have a general definition. Commissioner Collier. Would this not meet your thought, Senator: After the words “recognized Indian tribe” in line 1 insert “now under Federal jurisdiction”? That would limit the act to the Indians now under Federal jurisdiction, except that other Indians of more than one-half Indian blood would get help. To Grant to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom To Organize for Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise: Hearing on S.2755 and S.3645 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 266 (1934). Commissioner Collier offered the phrase as a limitation, but it is not clear whether it was intended as a temporal limitation. If the committee was concerned about the bona fides of an individual’s status as an Indian and wanted to use the fact of federal jurisdiction to measure those bona fides, then there would have been no reason to distinguish between those under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and those who later came under federal jurisdiction. In fact, the colloquy quoted above suggests that the committee sought to exclude some Indians already “under the supervision of the Government of the United States.” If the purpose was to exclude those who might later be dropped from federal jurisdiction, it would make more sense to measure status as of the date benefits were sought, not as of the date of enactment of the statute. Indeed, the colloquy and the remainder of the hearing suggest that the committee was focused on the issue of individual Indians who received benefits from the federal government on the basis of a limited heritage and without acting as a part of a tribal community. Earlier in the session, the chairman had raised the case of a “former Vice President of the United States,” who was apparently receiving Indian benefits, asking, “Why should the Government of the United States be managing the property of a lot of Indians who are practically white and hold office and do everything else, but in order to evade taxes or in order to do something else they come in under the Government supervision and control?” Id. at 264. Thus, although none of the parties have raised this, it may well be that the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” was intended to modify not “recognized Indian tribe,” but rather “all persons of Indian descent.” So interpreted, the purpose of the phrase might well have been to grandfather in those individuals already receiving federal benefits, but' to otherwise insist that in the future, only individuals with at least one-half Indian blood would qualify. In that case, the limitation may well have been a temporal one, but the limitation, temporal or not, may have been intended to affect only the Secretary’s authority to act for the benefit of an “individual Indian,” not an “Indian tribe.” See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (“Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act ... shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired .... ” (emphasis added)). After all, while Congress may have been concerned about misdirecting resources to individuals who were only Indians in name, the same concern would not apply to federally recognized tribes, regardless of the date of federal recognition. In any event, this piece of legislative history amply supports the view that the statute is at least ambiguous and leaves room for administrative interpretation. The other relevant piece of legislative history, heavily relied upon by the State, is the statement of Representative Edgar Howard, a cosponsor of the IRA: For purposes of this act, [the definitional section] defines the persons who shall be classed as Indian. In essence, it recognizes the status quo of the present reservation Indians and further includes all other persons of one-fourth Indian blood. The latter provision is intended to prevent persons of less than one-fourth Indian blood who are already enrolled members of a tribe or descendants of such members living on a reservation from claiming financial and other benefits of the act. Obviously the line must be drawn somewhere ... Kahawaiolaa, 222 F.Supp.2d at 1220 n. 10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Congressional Debate on Wheeler-Howard Bill (1934) in III The American Indian and the United States (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State interprets the reference to “status quo” as supporting its view that federal recognition of tribes was essentially frozen for purposes of the IRA in 1934. This seems to be a misinterpretation of the quote, however. Representative Howard did not say that the Act would “maintain” or “preserve” the status quo; rather he stated that the Act would “recognize” it. Moreover, the quote refers not to Indian tribes, but to “reservation Indians.” Thus, in context, this sentence is more likely a reference to that portion of the definition of an Indian, not at issue here, that covers “all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. This provision, with its explicit reference to 1934, covered those people of Indian descent then living on a reservation, without regard to whether they might independently qualify as Indians under the Act. In that sense, the definition accepted and “recognized” the status quo of the reservations. Thus, we find from the text, context, and legislative history that section 479 is at least ambiguous as to whether the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” disqualifies tribes that were federally recognized after 1934, such as the Narragansett Tribe, from the benefits of the IRA. (b) Whether the Secretary’s Interpretation Is Permissible As we have found the meaning of section 479 to be ambiguous, we must consider whether the Secretary’s interpretation is “permissible.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. An interpretation is permissible if it is “rational and consistent with the statute.” NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 413, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1987). The Secretary’s construction meets this test. As discussed above, it is reasonable and is consistent with the language and legislative history of the IRA. It also is consistent with the policy of the IRA, which, as we have indicated, may permissibly be viewed not only as intending to reverse the government’s allotment policy, but also as affirmatively conferring benefits on Indians, including Indian employment preferences and a statutory right to organize and adopt governing documents. We therefore reject the State’s argument that the text and purposes of the IRA prohibit the Secretary’s interpretation of section 479. Rather, we find that the Secretary’s construction of section 479 as allowing trust acquisitions for tribes that are recognized and under federal jurisdiction at the time of the trust application is entitled to deference. 2. Alleged Inconsistency of the Secretary’s Interpretation The State makes a separate argument on which it heavily relies. It argues that the Secretary’s interpretation of section 479 to allow trust acquisitions for tribes not federally recognized in 1934 represents a change in position as to the eligibility of tribes for IRA benefits, and that this interpretation therefore is not entitled to deference. The State relies particularly on historical practice, and says that the Secretary has never, or at least has hardly ever, identified as IRA-eligible a tribal entity that was not federally recognized in 1934 and does not meet the half-blood test. The evidence is limited with respect to whether the Secretary’s interpretation of section 479 of the IRA has been consistent over the past seventy-three years. The consistency of the Secretary’s construction is supported, though not directly, by a regulation promulgated by the Secretary in 1980. The regulation, found at 25 C.F.R. § 151.2, sets forth definitions that pertain to the regulations governing trust acquisitions. 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(b) defines a tribe that may be eligible for a trust acquisition as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo, community, ranchería, colony, or other group of Indians ... which is recognized by the Secretary as eligible for the special programs and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” The regulation does not distinguish between tribes recognized before June 18, 1934 and those recognized thereafter. Rather, it suggests that whether or not a group of Indians is considered a tribe, and therefore may be eligible to have land taken into trust, turns on a tribe’s federal recognition status at the time a trust acquisition is requested. Moreover, the Secretary’s proffered interpretation of “now” as meaning “today” is consistent with regulations implementing other provisions of the IRA. For example, the regulation implementing 25 U.S.C. § 466, which directs the Secretary to regulate the operation and management of Indian forestry units, states that it applies to “any Indian tribe ... which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their- status as Indians.” 25 C.F.R. § 163.1. Similarly, the regulation implementing 25 U.S.C. § 476, which allows eligible Indian tribes to organize and adopt constitutions and bylaws, defines eligibility-in current terms: all Indian entities that have not voted to exclude themselves from the IRA and that are “included, or [are] eligible to be included, among those tribes ... recognized and receiving services from the [BIA]” are eligible to organize under section 476. 25 C.F.R. § 81.1. As to the Secretary’s trust acquisition practice, it is not seriously disputed that the Secretary has never rejected an application to take land into trust for a federally recognized tribe on the ground that the tribe was not recognized and under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Responding to the State’s allegations about whose trust acquisition applications have been granted, the Secretary and Indian amici have submitted to us lists of tribes that they assert were not federally recognized in 1934 for whom land has since been taken into trust. The State disputes this evidence, arguing that nearly all of the identified tribes either have no trust lands, are not “newly recognized” because they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, or have obtained legislation from Congress specifically permitting trust acquisitions on their behalf. The State’s evidence of inconsistent practice is not persuasive. For example, although the State seems to concede that the Miccosukee Tribe was not recognized in 1934, it argues that the later trust acquisition for that tribe identified by Indian amici was made pursuant to specific statutory authorization, not section 465. But the statute to which the State points us, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1741-1750e, does not, itself authorize acquisition of the parcel identified by Indian amici. Rather, it authorizes acquisition of a different parcel. Indeed, in taking the parcel identified by Indian amici into trust, the Secretary explicitly relied on his authority under section 465. Turning to a different distinction, the State argues that eight of the tribes identified by Indian amici were recognized and under federal jurisdiction in 1934 because they previously had signed treaties with the United States. It is not self-evident that simply because a tribe had signed a treaty with the U.S. government it necessarily was recognized and under federal jurisdiction in 1934; recognition as intended in section 479 requires an ongoing government-to-government relationship between a tribe and the United States. See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.02(3), at 138-40 (N.J. Newton et al., eds. 2005). Whether or not a treaty executed before 1934 has significance, however, the evidence is still that the Secretary has taken land into trust for tribes that did not appear to be federally recognized in 1934. We note two examples. The Secretary has taken land into trust for the Sault Ste. Marie Band of Chippewa Indians despite the Secretary’s position that, regardless of prior treaties, the Band was not federally recognized in 1934. The Sault Ste. Marie Band is a successor to some of the Chippewa tribes that had signed treaties with the United States between 1785 and 1855. In addition, in 1855 the Band had signed two treaties with the United States. Despite those treaties, however, by 1917 the Department of the Interior did not recognize the Band as an entity with which it had government-to-government relations. Opinion of Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, The St. Ignace Parcel at 7 (July 31, 2006); see also City of Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 532 F.Supp. 157, 161 (D.D.C.1980) (indicating that a period of non-recognition existed by stating that “although the question of whether some groups qualified as Indian tribes for purposes of IRA benefits might have been unclear in 1934, that fact does not preclude the Secretary from subsequently determining that a given tribe deserved recognition in 1934”). The State rejoins that the Department of the Interior cannot abrogate an Indian treaty. But the validity of the Department’s treatment of the Sault Ste. Marie Band’s status under the treaties is not ■ the issue before us. What is important is the Department’s position that the Band was not recognized and under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Id. at 16. Nevertheless, after 1934, the Secretary has invoked his section 465 authority to take land into trust for the Band. The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians provides a similar example. The Secretary has taken land into trust for the Grand Traverse Band, which the Department of the Interior ceased to recognize in 1872. The Grand Traverse Band signed the 1855 Treaty of Detroit with the United States. In 1872, however, the then-Secretary of the Interi- or severed the United States’ relationship with the Band and ceased to treat the Band as a federally recognized tribe. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 961 (6th Cir.2004); see also Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F.Supp.2d 920, 924 (W.D.Mich.2002) (“Between 1872 and 1980, the Band continually sought to regain its status as a federally recognized tribe.”). Yet; the Secretary has invoked his authority under section 465 to take twenty-one parcels of land into trust for the Band. The State also concedes that the Secretary appears to have taken land into trust for two tribes, the Tunica-Biloxi Indian Tribe and the Narragansetts themselves, that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and for whom Congress has passed no specific act authorizing trust acquisitions. Even if we had no reason to doubt the State’s argument that the Secretary has not historically taken land into trust for tribes not recognized in 1934, however, in at least some cases the Secretary has not looked to the status of the tribe in 1934 or to the specific statutory authority identified by the State in making the determination to take land into trust. In Baker v. Muskogee Area Dir., 19 I.B.I.A. 164 (1991), for example, the IBIA, in concluding that particular members of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma were eligible to have land taken into trust, did not rely on the 1936 Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-570, which authorized the Secretary to take land into trust for Indians in Oklahoma. Rather, the IBIA stated that the Indians “c[a]me within the IRA definition because they are members of a recognized Indian tribe under Federal jurisdiction.” 19 I.B.I.A. at 179. The Secretary thus seems to have intended to exercise his section 465 authority to take land into trust on the basis of current federal recognition. The State has not met its burden of showing inconsistent interpretation by the Secretary. Moreover, even if the State had shown that the Secretary has changed his interpretation of section 479 over time, that would not necessarily resolve the matter in the State’s favor. The Chevron doctrine permits the Secretary some ability to alter his interpretation over time. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-82, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005) (under Chevron, an agency should have flexibility to vary its interpretation of a statute over time). The Secretary has given a reasoned explanation for his interpretation. We reject the State’s argument that the Secretary has been inconsistent in his interpretation of section 479 and is therefore not entitled to deference. C. The Settlement Act The State’s next attack is to argue that the Settlement Act repealed the Secretary’s trust authority as to all lands in Rhode Island. Alternatively, the State argues that the Settlement Act at least curtailed that authority so that any trust must preserve the State’s civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Parcel. There is simply nothing in the text of the Settlement Act, however, that accomplishes such a repeal or curtailment of the Secretary’s trust authority. 25 U.S.C. § 1708(a) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], the settlement lands shall be subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island, (emphasis added). The State would have us read the Act as if section 1708(a) applied to all lands the Tribe might ever acquire, either directly or as the beneficiary of a trust, but that is not what the section says. By its terms, section 1708(a) applies state law only to the 1800 acres of “settlement lands.” The Parcel is not part of the settlement lands. No other provision of the Settlement Act directly provides for state jurisdiction outside of the settlement lands. No language in the Act applies state law to lands the Tribe might later acquire. More importantly, no language explicitly curtails, or even references, the Secretary’s power under the IRA to take lands into trust and thereby to create Indian country. The State’s argument thus depends on finding that the Settlement Act implicitly repealed the IRA, at least in part. The framework for evaluating such a claim of implicit repeal was set out by the Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). First, we must look to affirmative manifestations of congressional intent to repeal the prior act, mindful of the “cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored.” Id. at 549, 94 S.Ct. 2474 (omission in original) (quoting Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503, 56 S.Ct. 349, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for [finding] a repeal by implication is [that] the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.” Id. at 550, 94 S.Ct. 2474. Such a conflict is not lightly to be found: “[A]bsent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,” we must “give effect to both [acts] if possible.” Id. at 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474 (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A determination of congressional intent must be rooted in the text of the Act. Nothing in the Act explicitly curtails the Secretary’s trust authority. The State offers two different lines of argument as to why provisions of the Act must be read to restrict that authority. One concerns how the Act affects the Tribe’s rights; the other concerns how the Act affects the Secretary’s authority. The provisions of the Settlement Act cited by the State, however, are most naturally read as merely resolving the claims that had clouded the titles of so much land in Rhode Island and that had led to the settlement embodied in the Act. As to the provisions affecting the Tribe, the State relies independently on the ex-tinguishment of aboriginal title in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1705(a)(2) and 1712(a)(2) and the further extinguishment in sections 1705(a)(3) and 1712(a)(3) of “all claims ... based upon any interest in or right involving” certain land or natural resources. These provisions, however, follow sections 1705(a)(1) and 1712(a)(1), respectively, which validate “any transfer of land or natural resources” in the United States by the Narragansett Tribe or in Rhode Island by any Indian tribe “as of the date of said transfer.” The provisions then go on to state: (2) [T]o the extent that any transfer of land or natural resources described in subsection (a) of this section may involve land or natural resources to which [an Indian tribe] had aboriginal title, subsection (a) of this section shall be regarded as an extinguishment of such aboriginal title as of the date of said transfer; and (3) by virtue of the approval of a transfer of land or natural resources effected by this section, or an extinguishment of aboriginal title effected thereby, all claims ... by the [Narragansett Tribe], or any predecessor or successor in interest, member or stockholder thereof, or any other Indian, Indian nation, or tribe of Indians, arising subsequent to the transfer and based upon any interest in or right involving such land or natural resources (including but not limited to claims for trespass damages or claims for use'and occupancy) shall be regarded as extinguished as of the date of the transfer. 25 U.S.C. § 1705(a). Given the references back to the -transfers validated in paragraph (1), the evident purpose of these provisions is to extinguish claims based on the purported invalidity of those transfers. The State’s arguments that the provisions should be read more broadly are unavailing. First, the State argues that the extinguishment of aboriginal title over land in Rhode Island precludes the later exercise of tribal sovereignty over Rhode Island land acquired by the Secretary in unrestricted trust. The Secretary disputes whether aboriginal title is ever the basis for tribal sovereignty, but in any event, it is clear that such title is not the only basis for tribal sovereignty. This is evident from the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 125 S.Ct. 1478, 161 L.Ed.2d 386 (2005). In Sherrill, the Supreme Court both held that “the Tribe [could not] unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue,” id. at 202-03, 125 S.Ct. 1478, and directed the Oneidas to 25 U.S.C. § 465 as “the proper avenue for [the tribe] to reestablish sovereign authority over [the relevant] territory,” id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478. The State’s protestation that Sherrill did not involve a statutory extinguishment of aboriginal title is beside the point. However aboriginal title or ancient sovereignty was lost, the IRA provides an alternative means of establishing tribal sovereignty over land. Trust acquisition is not incompatible with the extinguishment of aboriginal title. The Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, for example, contains virtually identical language extinguishing aboriginal title “to any land or natural resources the transfer of which was approved and ratified” by the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1753(b). At the same time, the Act provides that certain land and natural resources “located within the settlement lands shall be held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe,” id. § 1754(b)(7), and that such lands are “declared to be Indian country,” id. §§ 1752(7), 1755. It is implausible to think that Congress intended the extin-guishment of aboriginal title in the Rhode Island Settlement Act to preclude the taking of land into unrestricted trust, but did not intend for identical language in the Mashantucket Settlement Act to do so. Alternatively, the State argues that the “all claims” language in paragraph (3) even more broadly forecloses the assertion of tribal sovereignty over non-settlement lands. To hold otherwise, says the State, would render that language surplusage. Paragraphs (2) and (3) are complementary, however, not duplicative. While paragraph (2) extinguishes a form of title, paragraph (3) extinguishes claims. Moreover, paragraph (3) covers claims based on other forms of title, besides aboriginal title, that the Tribe might have held to land in Rhode Island prior to the Settlement Act. The State’s broad interpretation of paragraph (3) proves too much. The State argues that the paragraph precludes an assertion of tribal sovereignty over any land in Rhode Island. Nothing in the language of the provision, which refers to “any interest in or right involving” such land, distinguishes between claims of sovereignty and traditional property claims. Indeed, the latter are explicitly included. See id. § 1705(a)(3) (“including but not limited to claims for trespass damages or claims for use and occupancy”). It would be highly improbable that Congress intended to prevent the Tribe from asserting any ownership interest over land it purchased outside the settlement lands, and it would be contradictory as to the settlement lands themselves. Thus, there is no support for reading this provision as precluding all future assertions of tribal sovereignty over land in Rhode Island. Ultimately, this entire line of argument by the State misses the point that what is at issue is not what the Tribe may do in the exercise of its rights, but what the Secretary may do. The displacement of state law arises from the Secretary’s authority and not from the Tribe’s mere purchase of the land. See Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 113-15, 118 S.Ct. 1904, 141 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998). In order to prevail on its claim of implied repeal, the State- must show that the Settlement Act repeals the. Secretary’s authority under the IRA. As to the implied repeal of the Secretary’s power, the State first argues that the Secretary is bound by the extinguishment of the Tribe’s claims because that extinguishment binds the Tribe’s “successor in interest.” 25 U.S.C. § 1705(a)(2), (3). Even if the Secretary is such a “successor in interest,” however, those provisions cannot plausibly be read to repeal the Secretary’s power under the IRA to take land into trust. The Secretary’s power does not turn on the Tribe’s original aboriginal interest in the Parcel, before it purchased the land, nor does it turn on whether the Secretary is a successor in interest to the Tribe. The State also relies on 25 U.S.C. § 1707(c), which provides: Upon the discharge of the Secretary’s duties under sections 1704, 1705, 1706, and 1707 of this title, the United States shall have no further duties or liabilities under this subchapter with respect to the Indian Corporation or its successor, the State Corporation, or the settlement lands.... The language of this provision, however, cannot be read to have a preclusive effect or to limit the Secretary’s powers in any way. . The statement that the United States has “no further duties or liabilities under this subchapter” merely delimits the federal government’s obligations in implementing the Settlement Act. We reject the State’s suggestion that this language parallels the language in the Mashantucket Settlement Act that the Second Circuit found to prohibit certain trust acquisitions. See Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.2000). The Mashan-tucket Settlement Act uses very different language that provides that “the United States shall have no further trust responsibility with respect to [certain] land and natural resources” outside of the settlement lands. 25 U.S.C. § 1754(b)(8). Disclaiming “trust responsibility” over land is nothing like disclaiming “duties or liabilities under this subchapter.” There is nothing in the text of the Settlement Act that clearly indicates an intent to repeal the Secretary’s trust acquisition powers under the IRA, or that is fundamentally inconsistent with those powers. This lack of language is not because either _ Congress or the parties failed to anticipate that the Tribe might later become federally recognized and eligible for the benefits of the IRA. The Settlement Act specifically provides for a restraint on alienation of the settlement lands “if the Secretary subsequently acknowledges the existence of the Narragansett Tribe of Indians.” Id. § 1707(c). The underlying JMOU also explicitly recognized that the Tribe would “not receive Federal recognition” in the implementation of the settlement, but would “have the same right to petition for such recognition ... as other groups.” JMOU para. 15. Had the Act intended to limit the Secretary’s trust authority in case of federal recognition, it could have done so explicitly. It would have been easy to extend the provisions of section 1708(a) preserving state sovereignty to cover all lands in Rhode Island owned by or held in trust for the Tribe. No such language appears in the Act. Similarly, as the IBIA also noted, paragraph 15 of the JMOU would have been “a logical place for the parties to set out any restrictions” on the Secretary’s trust authority following federal recognition of the Tribe. Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 101. No such restrictions appear. Nor does the Settlement Act contemplate any role for the State to play in the Secretary’s decision whether to take the land into trust. This is in contrast to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In other settlement acts, Congress has specifically described limits on the Secretary’s trust authority. In the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Congress expressly precluded application of section 465. 25 U.S.C. § 1724(e) (“Except for the provisions of this [Act], the United States shall have no other authority to acquire lands or natural resources in trust for the benefit of Indians or Indian nations, or tribes, or bands of Indians in the State of Maine.”). In the Mashantucket Settlement Act, Congress precluded the trust acquisition of non-settlement lands purchased with settlement funds. See Blumenthal, 228 F.3d at 88. The absence of any restrictions in the Settlement Act supports our finding that no restrictions were intended. See id. at 90. The State’s fallback position is that the Settlement Act requires that this court order the Secretary to honor the intent of the bargain it believes is embodied in the Act by putting the Parcel into a restricted trust, subject to state laws and jurisdiction. Acknowledging the genuineness of the State’s sense that its bargain has been upset, we find that the relief it seeks is not an appropriate exercise of judicial power. In the Settlement Act, the State procured at least two clear benefits: (1) the settling of disputed land claims and (2) the application of its civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction to the settlement lands. Beyond that, the State argues that it would never have agreed to displacement of state law as to later acquired parcels if the issue had surfaced during the negotiations. The State argues that the practical consequences of the unrestricted trust leave it in an entirely unsatisfactory position and undermine the central bargain. Rhode Island points out that it is a small, very populous state and that the practical consequences of establishing Indian country for its nearby towns may be far greater than they would be in less densely populated areas. Even so, we are still bound by the language of the Settlement Act. Even viewing the State’s argument in contract terms, it is rare that a court will step in and reform a contract. See Broadley v. Mashpee Neck Marina, Inc., 471 F.3d 272, 275 (1st Cir.2006) (reversing the district court’s reformation of a contract). Our ability to edit, as opposed to interpret, an act of Congress is no less constrained: only a finding of absurdity, not present here, provides the necessary precondition. Compare Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510-11, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (editing a federal rule of evidence where the apparent distinction between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants would be “unfathomable”), with W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) (refusing to read in an additional component to a fee-shifting provision on the basis that Congress “simply forgot” to include it). See also Blumenthal, 228 F.3d at 91 (“While we might question the wisdom of different jurisdictional provisions governing different trust lands, we will not provide a strained interpretation of the Settlement Act simply to avoid such a result.”). The judiciary may not usurp the role of Congress. D. Constitutional Claims In support of recognition of its state sovereignty interests under the Constitution, the State presents four arguments. It argues first that the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, does not provide the Secretary the authority to displace state law within a state’s boundaries, and that section 465 of the IRA therefore violates the Tenth Amendment. Next, it argues that the Secretary may not, in any event, displace state law without the State’s consent, by operation of the Enclave Clause of the Constitution. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The State further argues that the Secretary’s actio