Full opinion text
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs appeal from the entry of summary judgment for the defendants, Philip Morris USA Inc. and its parent company (collectively, “Philip Morris”), on state-law claims based on the marketing of “Light” cigarettes. The district court ruled that these claims were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the “FCLAA”), which provides that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1998). Because we find that the claims are not preempted, and because Philip Morris’s alternative arguments for affirmance are also unavailing, we vacate the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings. I. The plaintiffs, who say they have smoked Marlboro Lights for at least fifteen years, claim that Philip Morris has employed unfair and deceptive practices in “designing, manufacturing, promoting, marketing and selling Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights purporting to be ‘light’ and having ‘Lowered Tar and Nicotine,’ all while [it] knew those cigarettes would not deliver less tar or nicotine to the consumer.” These brands have rings of ventilation holes in their filters, causing air to mix with the smoke as the smoker draws on the cigarette. As a result, “Lights” register lower levels of tar and nicotine than their so-called “full-flavor” counterparts under a test known as the “Cambridge Filter Method.” This test uses a machine to “smoke” a cigarette, collecting the resulting tar and nicotine in a filter for weighing. The plaintiffs allege that a person smoking “light” cigarettes, however, engages in unconscious behaviors that essentially negate the ventilation effect, such as taking more frequent, voluminous, or longer puffs, covering the air holes with the lips or the fingers, or smoking additional cigarettes. Due to such “compensation,” which the plaintiffs attribute to the addictive nature of nicotine, they assert that a smoker consumes the same quantities of tar and nicotine from light cigarettes as from full-flavored ones. The plaintiffs explain that the relative levels of these substances bear on a reasonable consumer’s decision on which cigarette to purchase because consumers understand that reducing the quantities of tar and nicotine in cigarettes reduces their adverse health effects. Thus, the plaintiffs allege that Philip Morris has misrepresented material facts by describing its “Lights” as such or as having “lower tar and nicotine,” and that Philip Morris — which was aware of the “compensation” phenomenon before it began marketing its “Lights” brands — did so with the intent to deceive. The plaintiffs claim that these misrepresentations amount to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (2002). This statute entitles any person who suffers a loss of money or property as a result of such acts or practices to sue for “actual damages, restitution and for ... other equitable relief.” Id. § 213(1). The plaintiffs have expressly disclaimed any “damages for personal injuries,” but they do seek other relief, including the return of the sums they paid to purchase Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights, in addition to punitive damages and the attorneys’ fees as authorized by the Act. The plaintiffs also seek to certify a class of all purchasers of Marlboro Lights or Cambridge Lights in Maine through November 2002. In response to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, Philip Morris promptly moved for summary judgment. Philip Morris argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were (1) expressly preempted by the FCLAA, (2) implicitly preempted by “the efforts of Congress and the [Federal Trade Commission] for 40 years to implement a national, uniform policy of informing the public about the health risks of smoking,” and (3) for similar reasons, not cognizable under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, which does not apply to “[transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under the statutory authority of the ... United States.” Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 208(1). Each of these arguments relied to some degree on what Philip Morris described as “the FTC’s comprehensive, nationwide program regulating the disclosure of tar and nicotine yields.” In 1959, the then-seven major American cigarette manufacturers had agreed to delete all tar and nicotine claims from their advertising. The FTC subsequently advised them, however, “that a factual statement of the tar and nicotine content (expressed in milligrams) of the mainstream smoke from a cigarette would not be in violation ... of any of the provisions of law administered by [the FTC],” provided the statement was “supported by adequate records of tests conducted in accordance with the Cambridge Filter Method.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Mar. 25, 1966). But this advice did not extend to “collateral representations (other than factual statements of tar and nicotine contents of cigarettes offered for sale to the public) ... expressly or by implication, as to reduction or elimination of health hazards.” Id. Then, in 1967, the FTC itself began using the Cambridge Filter Method to test, inter alia, all cigarette “brands for which any tar or nicotine statement appears on the label or in the advertising ... to determine the accuracy of such statement.” 32 Fed.Reg. 11,178 (Aug. 1, 1967). Though the FTC understood at the time that this method could not “determine the amount of tar and nicotine inhaled by any human smoker,” it was nevertheless adopted to produce results “based on a reasonable standardized method” which were “capable of being presented to the public in a manner that is readily understandable.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Begin Cigarette Testing (Aug. 1, 1967). The FTC agreed to report the test results to Congress periodically in order to ensure their dissemination to the smoking public, and made the first such report in late 1967. The FTC subsequently proposed a rule requiring cigarette manufacturers “to disclose, clearly and prominently, in all advertising[,] the tar and nicotine content of the advertised variety ... based on the most recently published [FTC] test results.” 35 Fed.Reg. 12,671 (Aug. 8, 1970). But the rulemaking process was suspended when a consortium of cigarette manufacturers, including Philip Morris, reached an agreement with the FTC on a “voluntary program” to like effect. Letter from Horace R. Kornegay, President, The Tobacco Institute, Inc., to Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 17, 1970). By agreeing to the program, however, the manufacturers did not “admit that the failure affirmatively to disclose” the test results in their advertising “constitutes a violation of law,” or even that the FTC had the authority to enact the proposed rule. Id. The FTC, for its part, took the position that it “retained the unconditional right to reschedule the ... Rule proceeding and to take any other action relating to this subject at any time....” 36 Fed.Reg. 784 (Jan. 16,1971). Since then, the FTC has neither resumed the rulemaking proceedings suspended by its agreement with the cigarette manufacturers, nor promulgated any formal rule requiring them to disclose the tar or nicotine content of their products. In 1987, the FTC stopped conducting its own tests of cigarettes. The testing continued, however, under the auspices of the Tobacco Institute Testing Laboratory, operated by the major American cigarette manufacturers. The manufacturers agreed to allow the FTC to monitor the lab’s procedures, which included the use of the Cambridge Filter Method. The FTC has obtained the test results from the individual manufacturers through its compulsory process authority, see 15 U.S.C. § 46(b), and reported those results to Congress for each year through 1998. Based on this regime, Philip Morris characterized the lawsuit as “a challenge to the FTC’s regulatory scheme,” because “terms like ‘light’ and ‘lowered tar’ ... convey precisely the same comparative information” as the tar and nicotine measurements derived from testing under the Cambridge Filter Method. The district court agreed, reasoning that To respond to Plaintiffs’ claims, Philip Morris would have to tell the public that the FTC Method test, though accurate in the laboratory, was inaccurate in real life, and that light cigarette smokers ... infused greater amounts of nicotine and tar than the designation ‘Lights’ and ‘Lowered Tar and Nicotine’ would imply. But, this information, if conveyed through a form of advertising, would run head first into ... the comprehensive federal scheme governing the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. 436 F.Supp.2d at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finding the plaintiffs’ claims thus “grounded on Philip Morris’s ‘advertising or promotion of ... cigarettes labeled in conformity with the provisions of federal law and regulation,” the district court concluded that they were expressly preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at 153 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). The court did not decide Philip Morris’s alternative arguments for summary judgment. Id. at 133 n. 1. This appeal followed. II. The plaintiffs challenge the ruling below as at odds with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), where a plurality of the Supreme Court held that some — but not all — actions for damages under state law are expressly preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at 523-24, 112 S.Ct. 2608. In response, Philip Morris argues that the district court correctly found the plaintiffs’ claims preempted under Cipollone. Philip Morris simultaneously urges us to.affirm the entry of summary judgment in its favor on the alternative grounds not reached below, namely, that the plaintiffs’ claims are implicitly preempted by federal law or that they complain of “actions otherwise permitted under laws” and therefore cannot serve as the basis for liability under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. We review these arguments de novo. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.1997). A. “A fundamental tenet of our federalist system is that constitutionally enacted federal law is supreme to state law. As a result, federal law sometimes preempts state law either expressly or by implication.” N.H. Motor Transport Ass’n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 74 (1st Cir.2006) (citation omitted), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 3037, 168 L.Ed.2d 725 (2007). Preemption questions ultimately turn on congressional intent, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, and the primary indicator of that intent is the text of the congressional act claimed to have preemptive effect, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S.Ct. 1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004). But “[t]he text of the preemption provision must be viewed in context, with proper attention paid to the history, structure, and purpose of the legislative scheme in which it appears.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001). 1. As noted at the outset, the FCLAA’s preemption clause states that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Those provisions mandate that the packages of all cigarettes sold in the United States — and, in general, their advertisements — bear one of a rotating series of labels warning about the adverse health effects of smoking. Id. §§ 1333(a), (c). But no additional “statement relating to smoking and health ... shall be required on any cigarette package.” Id. § 1334(a). The FCLAA also bans cigarette advertising “on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission,” id. § 1335, and preserves the authority of the FTC over “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes,” id. § 1336. These provisions were added to the FCLAA through the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub.L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87-90, enacted as the restrictions on cigarette advertising contained in the prior version of the FCLAA were set to expire. Pub.L. 89-92 § 10, 79 Stat. 282, 285 (1965). As the expiration date approached, both federal and state authorities prepared to resume their efforts to regulate cigarette advertising. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514-15, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Thus, Congress amended the FCLAA to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby— (1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes; and (2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health. 15 U.S.C. § 1331. With these purposes in mind, the Cipol-lone Court considered whether the FCLAA’s preemption clause barred a state-law suit for damages brought by a smoker who had allegedly developed lung cancer from the defendants’ cigarettes. 505 U.S. at 509-10, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The smoker asserted a number of common law causes of action, including strict liability, negligent failure to warn, breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. Id. The court of appeals held that, while § 1334(b) did not expressly preempt common law claims, the FCLAA’s labeling requirement “revealed a congressional intent to exert exclusive federal control over every aspect of the relationship between cigarettes and health.” Id. at 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiffs claims “challenging the adequacy of the warnings on labels or in advertising or the propriety of [the defendants’] advertising and promotional activities” were implicitly preempted. Id. A plurality of the Court disagreed with this analysis, holding that “the pre-emptive scope of the [FCLAA] is governed entirely by the express language in [§ 1334(b) ],” id., which did, in fact, reach some common law actions. Id. at 521-23, 112 S.Ct. 2608. But because “[f]or purposes of [§ 1334(b) ], the common law is not of a piece,” the plurality explained that it had to “look to each of [the smoker’s] common-law claims to determine whether it is in fact pre-empted.” Id. at 523, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (footnote omitted). This approach required the plurality to ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking or health ... imposed under State law with respect to advertising or promotion,” giving that clause a fair but narrow reading.... [E]ach phrase within that clause limits the universe of common-law claims preempted by the statute. Id. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). Employing this analysis, the plurality determined that the FCLAA preempted the claim, pleaded as a failure to warn, that the defendants’ “advertising and promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated warnings,” because it relied on “a state-law ‘requirement or prohibition ... with respect to ... advertising or promotion.’ ” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). The plurality proceeded to consider the smoker’s two theories of fraudulent misrepresentation. The first, that the defendants, “through their advertising, neutralized the effect of federally mandated warning labels,” was preempted by the FCLAA. Id. at 527, 112 S.Ct. 2608. As the plurality explained, this theory was “predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to minimize the health hazards of smoking,” which is itself “merely the converse of a state-law requirement that warnings be included in [such] materials.” Id. This fraudulent misrepresentation claim, then, was “inextricably related to” the failure-to-warn claim and therefore also premised on a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health” imposed by state law. Id. at 528, 112 S.Ct. 2608. But the plurality reached a different conclusion as to the smoker’s second fraudulent misrepresentation theory: “intentional fraud and false misrepresentation both by false misrepresentation of a material fact and by concealment of a material fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and bracketing omitted). First, the plurality held that the FCLAA does not preempt fraudulent concealment claims that “rely on a state-law duty to disclose such facts through channels of communication other than advertising or promotion,” e.g., in the case of a state law requiring cigarette manufacturers “to disclose material facts about smoking and health to an administrative agency.” Id. Second, the plurality held that fraudulent-misrepresentation claims that do arise with respect to advertising and promotion (most notably claims based on allegedly false statements of material fact made in advertisements) are not pre-empted by [§ 1334(b) ]. Such claims are predicated not on a duty “based on smoking and health” but rather on a more general obligation-the duty not to deceive. Id. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The plurality saw this result as consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of the FCLAA. Id. at 529, 112 S.Ct. 2608. First, the FCLAA “offered no sign that [Congress] wished to insulate manufacturers from longstanding rules governing fraud”—in fact, the Act “explicitly reserved the FTC’s authority to identify and punish deceptive advertising practices ....” Id. Second, reading § 1334(b) to exclude fraud claims would not frustrate the FCLAA’s stated goal of protecting commerce from “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health,” 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2), because “state-law proscriptions on intentional fraud rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity.” 505 U.S. at 529,112 S.Ct. 2608. This analysis of the FCLAA’s effect on the smoker’s claims held sway with only four of the Court’s nine Justices. Two others joined Justice Blackmun’s opinion that the FCLAA did not preempt any common law claims for damages, id. at 531, 112 S.Ct. 2608, while another joined Justice Scalia’s opinion that § 1334(b) preempted all of the smoker’s common law theories. Id. at 548, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Most lower courts have nevertheless treated the plurality opinion as controlling, see Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir.2007) (collecting cases), as have the parties here, both on appeal and in the district court, 436 F.Supp.2d at 142. We therefore do the same. Cf. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d at 69-77 (reconciling opinions of plurality and Justice Scalia in Cipollone insofar as possible but following the plurality opinion in case of disagreement between them). 2. The parties agree that whether the FCLAA expressly preempts the plaintiffs’ claims depends on how best to categorize them by analogy to the various causes of action considered in Cipollone. In doing so, as the district court recognized, 436 F.Supp.2d at 151, we must look beyond the plaintiffs’ own classification of them claims and to their actual substance. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir.1999); accord Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1999) (endorsing the same approach in deciding whether ERISA preempts particular state-law claims). The plaintiffs seek relief under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, which, in relevant part, outlaws “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207. Though this prohibition encompasses various kinds of behavior, including “a material representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances,” Maine v. Weinschenk, 868 A.2d 200, 206 (Me.2005), the substance of the plaintiffs’ claim is that Philip Morris has falsely represented certain of its brands as “light” or having “lower tar and nicotine” although they deliver the same quantities of these ingredients to a smoker as do “full-flavored” cigarettes. So, under the functional approach, we consider how this particular theory—as opposed to a more generalized claim under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act — resembles the various common-law causes of action considered in Cipollone. If, as the plaintiffs argue, they have indeed alleged fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the claims are not preempted because, as Cipollone explains, they are not premised on a state-law duty based on smoking and health. But if, as Philip Morris argues, the plaintiffs have in reality alleged failure-to-warn or warning neutralization claims, the claims are preempted. While the district court stopped short of assigning a specific label to the plaintiffs’ claims, its reasoning suggests that it considered them analogous to the failure-to-warn theory held preempted by Cipollone. The court opined that the plaintiffs had failed in them “valiant attempt to tailor their claims to fit within the Cipollone exception for violations of the duty not to deceive-” 436 F.Supp.2d at 151. Instead, the district court identified “the gist of the Plaintiffs’ cause of action” as dependent on “what Philip Moms actually said about Lights and what the Plaintiffs claim [it] should have said." Id. (emphasis added). And what Philip Morris “should have said,” the court understood the plaintiffs to assert, was that Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights deliver more tar and nicotine to an actual smoker than “the designation ‘Lights’ and ‘Lowered Tar and Nicotine’ would imply.” Id. at 152. Because doing so would require Philip Morris to alter its advertising or promotion of its cigarettes, the district court concluded, the plaintiffs’ claims were expressly preempted by the FCLAA as construed by Cipol-lone. We differ with the district court’s view of the fit between the plaintiffs’ theory and the Cipollone taxonomy and, more fundamentally, of Cipollone itself. To start, we do not read Cipollone to hold that the FCLAA preempts claims “grounded on [a defendant’s] ‘advertising or promotion of ... cigarettes labeled in conformity with the provisions of federal law and regulation,” as the district court ultimately explained its conclusion. 436 F.Supp.2d at 153 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). Cipol-lone reasoned that “each phrase” in § 1334(b) — -not just the phrase “with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes” — “limits the universe of common-law claims pre-empted by the statute.” 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608. So “[t]he appropriate inquiry is not whether a claim challenges the ‘propriety’ of advertising and promotion, but whether the claim would require the imposition under state law of a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to advertising and promotion.” Id. at 525, 112 S.Ct. 2608. A claim is not preempted, then, merely because it is “grounded on” the advertising or promotion of cigarettes with FCLAA-compli-ant labels. Nor is a claim preempted merely because it arises out of the adverse health consequences of such cigarettes, as both the reasoning and the result in Cipollone make clear. There, in fact, all of the plaintiffs claims were “based on smoking and health” in the sense that they “alleged that [she] developed lung cancer because she smoked cigarettes,” 505 U.S. at 509, 112 S.Ct. 2608, yet the Court held that the FCLAA preempted only some of them. And the fate of each claim depended on “whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action”— not the claim itself — met the criteria of § 1334(b). Id. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Thus, for example, while the theory that the defendants in Cipollone “had expressly warranted that smoking the cigarettes which they manufactured and sold did not present any significant health consequences,” id. at 509, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (internal quotation marks omitted), was clearly based on smoking and health, it was not preempted because “it [did] not rest on a duty imposed under state law,” but on the defendants’ own “contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken,” i.e., the warranty. Id. at 526, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Accordingly, the FCLAA preempts only those claims based on a “requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in accordance with” the FCLAA. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (emphasis added). It does not preempt claims because they are “based on smoking and health.” Furthermore, unlike Philip Morris, we do not read the Court’s subsequent decision in Reilly to suggest that the statute’s preemptive effect on a claim depends on the claim’s connection with “smoking and health.” In Reilly, the Court held that § 1334(b) preempted regulations on tobacco advertising promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney General pursuant to his authority under that state’s counterpart to the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. 533 U.S. at 533, 121 S.Ct. 2404. Though their stated purpose was “to address the incidence of cigarette smoking ... by children under legal age,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court rejected the notion that the regulations were “not ‘based on smoking and health’ because they do not involve health-related content in cigarette advertising but instead target youth exposure to cigarette advertising.” Id. at 547, 121 S.Ct. 2404. Noting that the FCLAA “prohibited state cigarette advertising regulations motivated by concerns about smoking and health,” the Court reasoned that “[a]t bottom, the concern about youth cigarette advertising is intertwined with” such concerns, bringing the regulations within the preemptive sweep of the FCLAA. Id. at 548,121 S.Ct. 2404. Philip Morris urges us to draw an analogy between the regulations found preempted in Reilly and the claims of the plaintiffs here, arguing that, in either case, a state consumer protection act is used “to create requirements or prohibitions regarding advertisements and promotions that are intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and health” (internal quotation marks omitted). But this argument again confuses the claim at hand with its predicate state-law duty as the relevant “requirement or prohibition” under § 1334(b). The plaintiffs’ claims are indeed “intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and health,” just as surely as the regulations in Reilly were; the difference, however, is that those regulations were themselves the “prohibitions,” while the prohibition here is the ban on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. And Cipollone, as we have noted, treats a state-law “duty not to deceive” as broader than a “duty ‘based on smoking and health’” and therefore beyond the reach of FCLAA preemption. 505 U.S. at 529-30, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). We see nothing in Reilly suggesting any intent to disturb this aspect of the Cipol-lone plurality holding. Nor do we see any internal inconsistency in the view that the phrase “based on smoking and health” includes state-law prohibitions on cigarette ads targeting youths, Reilly, 533 U.S. at 548, 121 S.Ct. 2404, but 'excludes state prohibitions on cigarette ads making false statements of material fact, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Accordingly, we agree with those courts that have rejected the notion that the FCLAA preempts claims “intertwined with the concern about smoking and health” but nevertheless premised on a state-law duty that is broader in scope. See Mulford v. Altria Group, Inc., No. 05-659, 506 F.Supp.2d 733, 752-54, 2007 WL 1969734, at *18 (D.N.M. Mar.16, 2007); Gerrity v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 399 F.Supp.2d 87, 95 (D.Conn.2005). Because the state-law “duty not to deceive” is one such “more general obligation,” it falls within Cipollone’s express holding that “claims based on allegedly false statements of material fact made in advertisements” survive FCLAA preemption. 505 U.S. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. In line with this holding, courts have routinely (though not uniformly) concluded that the FCLAA does not preempt fraudulent misrepresentation claims arising out of false statements made in advertising or promoting cigarettes. See, e.g., Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 363 F.3d 1183, 1202 (11th Cir.2004); Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 750-51, 2007 WL 1969734, at *16; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 198, 216 & 264-65 (E.D.N.Y.2001), aff'd in relevant part, 344 F.3d 211, 222 (2d Cir.2003); Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F.Supp.2d 194, 203 (D.Mass.2000); Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 F.Supp.2d 167, 175. (D.Conn.2000); Hyde v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97-0359, 1998 WL 656074, at *6 (D.R.I. May 1, 1998); Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 807, 842 (2004); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d 1, 33 (2005); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 252 A.D.2d 1, 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 603-604 (N.Y.App.Div.1998); Est. of Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., 206 Or.App. 20, 135 P.3d 409, 421 (2006) (en banc); but see In re Tobacco Cases II, No. JCCP 4042, 2004 WL 2445337, at *19-*22 (Cal.Super.Ct. Aug. 4, 2004), aff'd sub nom. In re Tobacco II Cases, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 (Cal.Ct.App.), rev. granted, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 707, 146 P.3d 1250 (Cal.2006) ; Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 03-5582, 2005 WL 1172019, at *10-*12 (Minn.Dist.Ct. May 11, 2005); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 440 (Tex.1997). A number of these decisions, in fact, hold that the FCLAA does not preempt the very theory the plaintiffs advance here-that a cigarette manufacturer has perpetrated fraud by stating that its light brand offers lower tar and nicotine than its full-flavored one. See Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 754-55, 2007 WL 1969734, at *19; Price, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d at 33; Est. of Schwarz, 135 P.3d at 421; but see Brown, 479 F.3d at 391-93; Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 498 F.Supp.2d 639, 651-52 (S.D.N.Y.2007); In re Tobacco Cases II, 2004 WL 2445337, at *19-*21; Dahl, 2005 WL 1172019, at *11. The district court saw the plaintiffs’ case differently, observing that “[o]ther than these descriptors” (ie., the “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” claims) “the record here is devoid of any affimative misstatement.” 436 F.Supp.2d at 152 (footnote omitted). Based on this reasoning, Philip Morris argues that the district court properly treated the plaintiffs’ claims as “based on implied misrepresentations about health,” which qualify as preempted failure-to-warn or warning neutralization claims, rather than non-preempted fraudulent misrepresentation claims, which arise out of only “express” misrepresentations. We disagree. First, we question the conclusion that, although the descriptors are themselves characterized as affirmative misstatements, they cannot ground a fraudulent misrepresentation claim left unscathed by Cipollone’s reading of the FCLAA. The district court appears to have based its conclusion on its understanding that, despite the popularity of the terms “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” in cigarette advertising, “Congress and the FTC never acted to restrict the tobacco companies from using these general descriptors.” 436 F.Supp.2d at 152; see also Clinton, 498 F.Supp.2d at 652 (finding fraudulent misrepresentation claim arising out of descriptors expressly preempted because “the FTC has declined to disallow those terms despite several invitations to do so”). But whatever support this might lend to an argument for implied preemption of state law — and we consider that question in detail infra — it provides little guidance in applying the express preemption provision of the FCLAA, the scope of which “is governed entirely by the express language in” § 1334(b). Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Cipollone read this language to preserve state-law claims based on allegedly fraudulent statements in advertising and promotion, without regard to whether Congress or the FTC had separately acted to prohibit particular examples of them. Cipollone arrived at this interpretation in part because, in the FCLAA, “Congress offered no sign that it wished to insulate cigarette manufacturers from longstanding rules governing fraud.” Id. at 529, 112 S.Ct. 2608. So if its inaction since has any significance — and we usually hesitate to make much ado about congressional nothing, see, e.g., Estey v. Comm’r, Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1198, 1206 (1st Cir.1994) — it could just as likely be that Congress chose not to regulate the descriptors because it believed the generalized state-law prohibitions on fraud left in place under the FCLAA adequately protected smokers against false claims to lower tar and nicotine, and not because it viewed such claims as permissible. But, in either case, what Congress thinks of “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” advertisements in general simply does not speak to whether, in enacting the FCLAA, Congress intended to preempt state lawsuits challenging them. The answer to that question, as Cipollone makes clear, lies in § 1334(b). Second, Cipollone does not appear to treat claims based on “implied” as opposed to “express” misrepresentations differently for purposes of FCLAA preemption. Under general principles of tort law, either an express or an implied statement can give rise to a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526(c) (1977); accord Est. of Whit-lock, 615 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me.1992). And Cipollone flatly holds that “fraudulent-misrepresentation claims that do arise with respect to advertising and promotion (most notably claims based on allegedly false statements of material fact made in advertisements)” are not preempted, without drawing any distinction between the express and the implied. 505 U.S. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Indeed, in either case, the claim is “predicated not on a duty ‘based on smoking and health’ but on a more general obligation — the duty not to deceive.” Id. The “express” or “implied” nature of an allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation, then, does not determine whether it is preempted by the FCLAA under the Cipollone approach. See Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 751-52, 2007 WL 1969734, at *17 (rejecting distinction, for purposes of FCLAA preemption, between fraud claim arising out of statements “light” and “Lowered Tar and Nicotine,” and statement “Smoking cures cancer,” which Philip Morris had proffered as a counterexample of “express,” as opposed to “implied,” misrepresentation). Cipollone does set up a dichotomy between fraud “by false representation of a material fact,”- on one hand, and “by concealment of a material fact,” on the other. 505 U.S. at 528, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (internal quotation marks and bracketing.omitted). As-just discussed, the FCLAA does not preempt claims of the former; Cipollone holds that claims for the latter also survive preemption “insofar as those claims rely on a state-law duty to disclose such facts through channels of communication other than advertising or promotion,” such as, for example, a state-law duty “to disclose such facts to an administrative agency.” Id. We need not concern ourselves with Cipollone’s holding on the reach of § 1334(b) over fraudulent concealment claims, however, because, the plaintiffs have not brought any. Instead, they allege that Philip Morris made material statements of fact that it knew to be false — “that Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes are ‘light’ or have ‘lower tar and nicotine’ ” — to encourage smokers to purchase its products, and that smokers did so in reliance on those statements. These allegations state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977); accord, e.g., St. Francis De Sales Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y., 818 A.2d 995, 1003-04 (Me.2003). Unlike the district court, then, we do not see the plaintiffs’ claims as arising out of what Philip Morris “should have said,” but rather, what it did in fact say: that Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights have “lower tar and nicotine” than their full-flavored counterparts. Philip Morris nevertheless insists that this theory amounts to a preempted failure-to-warn claim, “[bjecause any false impression that the descriptors allegedly created would have been eliminated if [Philip Morris] had provided additional health information regarding compensation,” that is, a smoker’s tendency to take in the same harmful quantities of tar and nicotine from light cigarettes as from regular ones. We accept, for present purposes, that the plaintiffs could not claim to have been defrauded by the statements “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” in Philip Morris’s advertising and promotion if they were accompanied by a specific warning about compensation. And we agree that, if the plaintiffs were claiming that the failure to give such a warning through those media was a breach of Philip Morris’s duty under Maine law, the FCLAA would preempt that claim as “rely[ing] on a state-law requirement or prohibition with respect to advertising or promotion.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). But that is not the plaintiffs’ claim. Again, they allege that Philip Morris made fraudulent misrepresentations in derogation of “a more general obligation-the duty not to deceive.” Id. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The fact that these alleged misrepresentations were unaccompanied by additional statements in the nature of a warning does not transform the claimed fraud into failure to warn. Indeed, we have trouble imagining any misrepresentation claim wholly independent of what else the defendant said or did not say, given the “well-established principle that a statement or omission must be considered in context, so that accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law.” In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir.1993) (adopting “bespeaks caution” doctrine in federal securities fraud context); accord, e.g., Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 16-17 (1st Cir.2004) (considering effect of disclaimer on plaintiffs ability to show reasonable reliance on false statement). Accepting Philip Morris’s argument, then, would extend the preemptive reach of the FCLAA to virtually all fraudulent misrepresentation claims, doing violence to Cipol-lone’s explicit holding that those claims survive preemption. Moreover, Cipollone itself conceived of failure-to-warn claims much more narrowly than Philip Morris does, describing them to “require a showing that ... advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated warnings.” Id. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (emphasis added). Because the plaintiffs’ chosen theory of recovery requires no such showing, theirs is not a preempted failure-to-warn claim, as a number of courts have concluded in rejecting similar arguments. See Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 751-52, 2007 WL 1969734, at *17; Schwab v. Philip Mortis USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992, 1294-95 (E.D.N.Y.2006), pet for rev. of class certification granted sub nom. McLaughlin v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No, 06-4666 (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2006); Izza-relli, 117 F.Supp.2d at 175; Price, 302 Ill.Dee. 1, 848 N.E.2d at 33; Est. of Schwarz, 135 P.3d at 421. For the same reason, we do not see the plaintiffs’ claims as embracing a preempted warning neutralization theory. Warning neutralization is a species of products liability claim based on conduct by the manufacturer tending to dilute what might otherwise serve as an effective warning of the dangers of its product. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 368 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006); Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 514-15 (3d Cir.1987); 2 Louis R. Frumer & Melvin I. Friedman, Products Liability § 12.03[2][e], at 12-61-12-62 (1960 & 2003 supp.). As an example, Cipollone cited “advertising that ‘associated cigarette smoking with such positive attributes as contentment, glamour, romance, youth, happiness,’ ” noting the FTC’s 1964 conclusion that “ ‘[t]o avoid giving the false impression that cigarette smoking is innocuous,’ ” such advertising “ ‘must also disclose the serious risks to life that smoking involves.’ ” 505 U.S. at 527, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (quoting 29 Fed.Reg. 8356 (1964)). In light of this “relationship between prohibitions on advertising that downplays the dangers of smoking and requirements for warnings in advertisements,” id., Cipollone considered the plaintiffs warning neutralization claim “inextricably related to [her] failure-to-warn claim” and likewise preempted. Id. at 528, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The plaintiffs here, however, do not allege that the statements “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” diluted the warnings on Philip Morris’s packaging or advertising so as to make its cigarettes unreasonably dangerous or otherwise defective. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the statements deceived them into purchasing Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights. The presence of the warnings may have some bearing on the materiality of these statements, as just discussed, but that possibility does not change the plaintiffs’ case from one about the statements into one about the warnings. As one court has put it, because “[a]ny statement, even affirmatively false misrepresentations about the health effects of smoking, may have some neutralizing effect on the package warning ..., the concept of neutralization could preempt virtually all affirmative .fraud claims” if viewed as expansively as Philip Morris urges. Whiteley, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d at 837. We, too, reject that expansive view as irreconcilable with the different treatment Cipollone accords warning neutralization claims, on one hand, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, on the other. See also Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 751-52, 2007 WL 1969734, at *17; Izzarelli, 117 F.Supp.2d at 175; Price, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d at 33; DaSilva v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 Misc.2d 424, 667 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1997); Est. of Schwarz, 135 P.3d at 421. We acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Brown, ruling that fraudulent misrepresentation claims arising out of the statements “light” and “Lowered Tar and Nicotine” are in effect warning neutralization claims preempted by § 1334(b). 479 F.3d at 392-93; accord In re Tobacco Cases II, 2004 WL 2445337, at *21; Dahl, 2005 WL 1172019, at *7-*8. Taking the plaintiffs there to allege that “the descriptors, though accurate under the FTC method, are misleading because they suggest that Lights are less harmful than full-flavored cigarettes,” the Brown court reasoned that the FCLAA “pre-empts these ‘implied misrepresentation’ claims, which arise from statements or imagery in marketing that misleadingly downplay the dangers of smoking, and thus minimize or otherwise neutralize the effect of the federal mandated safety warnings.” 479 F.3d at 392 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527, 112 S.Ct. 2608). In line with our earlier discussion, however, we do not see anything in Cipollone’s discussion of warning neutralization claims that equates them with “implied misrepresentation” claims as Brown does. We appreciate that the statements “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” could support a warning neutralization claim, ie., by suggesting that those brands of cigarettes do not pose the same grave threats to health announced in the accompanying warning label. See, e.g., Maize v. Atl. Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850, 852 (1945) (upholding plaintiffs verdict in products liability suit on the theory that calling cleanser “Safety-Kleen” could cause accompanying warnings to “seem of comparatively minor import”). But, as just discussed, it does not follow that those statements cannot also support a different theory of recovery, including one that falls outside the preemptive reach of FCLAA. Indeed, that is the central teaching of Cipollone: the same alleged conduct by a cigarette manufacturer can give rise to a number of claims, some of them preempted and some of them not. 505 U.S. at 523-24, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Though, again, plaintiffs cannot dodge § 1334(b) by slapping a non-preempted label on a preempted theory, they otherwise remain free to choose from among these potential claims in framing their complaints. See 5 Frumer & Friedman, supra, § 56.05[3], at 56-75 (“Plaintiffs suing the tobacco companies must, of necessity, assert a broad range of causes of action in order to avoid the pitfalls of preemption”); accord Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 751-52, 2007 WL 1969734, at *17 (refusing “to convert [a] claim into something that it is not” in deciding whether the FCLAA preempts it). Of course, plaintiffs who elect to proceed on a non-preempted fraudulent misrepresentation theory must eventually prove each of the elements of that cause of action if they are to prevail, including that the challenged representations are indeed false. But, unlike the court in Brown, we do not believe that a plaintiffs chance of proving his claim plays any role in determining whether it is preempted by the FCLAA. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ characterization of their claim as sounding in fraud, Brown concluded that “[t]he terms ‘light’ and ‘Lowered Tar and Nicotine’ cannot ... be inherently deceptive or untrue,” because the cigarettes in question “do deliver less tar and nicotine as measured by the only government-sanctioned methodology for them measurement,” ie., the Cambridge Filter Method. 479 F.3d at 392; see also Clinton, 498 F.Supp.2d at 651-52. This reality, in Brown’s eyes, foreclosed any fraudulent misrepresentation claim, leaving the plaintiffs to argue that the challenged statements served to neutralize the warnings — a theory preempted by Ci-pollone’s construction of the FCLAA. 479 F.3d at 392. We think this approach puts the cart before the horse. The assertion that Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights rate lower in tar and nicotine than their full-flavored cousins according to the Cambridge Filter Method may ultimately affect whether the plaintiffs can show that the challenged statements are false. Cf. Schwab, 449 F.Supp.2d at 1090-91 (“evidence that the FTC approved defendants’ representations [as to tar and nicotine content] might tend to disprove the existence of a scheme to defraud”). We do not resolve the issue, however, because Philip Morris did not seek summary judgment on that ground. Instead, Philip Morris argued that the plaintiffs’ claims — as set forth in their amended complaint — were (1) expressly preempted, (2) implicitly preempted, or (3) exempt from the reach of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. We consider the effect of the descriptors’ claimed accuracy on the second and third points infra, but we do not believe that the issue has any relevance in deciding the express preemption question. Under Cipollone, whether § 1334(b) expressly preempts a particular claim depends on “whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a requirement or prohibition based on smoking or health ... imposed under State law with respect to advertising or promotion,” 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608, not on whether the action itself can ultimately succeed as a matter of substantive law. So we do not see how the statements’ falsity — or, for that matter, their materiality, or whether Philip Morris made them with the requisite scienter— bears on the preemption analysis. Such issues “go[ ] to the merits of the fraud claim, not to the threshold question of preemption.” Price, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d at 36-37; see also Mulford, 506 F.Supp.2d at 751-52, 2007 WL 1969734, at *17 (“Courts do not determine whether a plaintiff can succeed on the merits of the fraud claim before determining whether the fraud claim itself is preempted.”); cf. Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 349-54 (6th Cir.2000) (considering whether FCLAA preempted fraud claim before considering whether plaintiff had stated elements of fraud cause of action). We disagree, then, with Brown’s view that the FCLAA preempts fraud theories arising out of “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” because those statements are not “inherently deceptive or untrue.” 479 F.3d at 392. Finally, Philip Morris argues that, because “the standards for finding liability under consumer protection acts around the country vary widely,” allowing the plaintiffs’ claims to survive preemption will undermine the FCLAA’s goal of protecting manufacturers from “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.” 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2). This is not an imaginary concern. As we have explained, however, fraudulent misrepresentation claims, even if brought under the aegis of a state consumer protection act, are not premised on “regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.” They are premised on “longstanding rules governing fraud,” which themselves arise not from any duty based on smoking and health, but on a duty not to deceive. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. So, as Cipollone holds, neither the text of the FCLAA’s statement of purpose nor the preemption provision itself fairly evinces the intent to displace all potentially inconsistent state cigarette advertising regulations, only such regulations that are “based on smoking and health.” Id. Of course, Cipollone further reasoned that § 1334(b) does not encompass fraudulent misrepresentation claims because they “rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity” and therefore “do not create diverse, nonuniform and confusing standards.” Id. at 529, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (internal quotation marks omitted). Seizing on this language, Philip Morris notes that some of the elements of consumer protection violations, such as reliance and actual damages, vary from state to state. Yet the same can be said of the elements of common-law fraud, see generally Peter A. Aces, The Law of Fraudulent Transactions § 2:3 (1989 & 2006 supp.) (discussing how states differ in articulating the elements of the tort), and Cipollone nevertheless concluded that reading the FCLAA not to preempt such claims was consistent with its text, context, and purpose. 505 U.S. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Bound by Cipol-lone, as the parties agree we are, we reject the argument that the potential for varying standards of liability under different states’ consumer protection acts means that the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the FCLAA. They are not. The district court’s ruling was in error. B. Philip Morris also challenges the plaintiffs’ claims as impliedly preempted by federal law. Even in the absence of express preemptive language' — -which the FCLAA contains, but which we have concluded does not reach the claims in this case — federal law can preempt state law by implication in two other ways. See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989). First, “Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field to the exclusion of state law.” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988). “Second, even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is nevertheless preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100-01, 109 S.Ct. 1661; see also, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109-11, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000). And, whether through field or conflict preemption, “state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.” Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). Philip Morris does not argue that either Congress or the FTC has evinced an intent to occupy the entire field of cigarette advertising, or even the narrower field of low-tar cigarette advertising. Nor does Philip Morris protest that complying with both the state law the plaintiffs say has been violated and some contrary federal law would be impossible. Instead, Philip Morris maintains that the “[plaintiffs’ claims conflict with the FTC’s 40-year history of regulation and control over the development, testing and marketing of low tar cigarettes, as well as the reporting of tar and nicotine measurements pursuant to the FTC Method and the use of descriptors substantiated by those measurements.” Because Philip Morris has limited its implied preemption argument to the so-called “frustration-of-purpose” theory, see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873-74, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (collecting eases), it cannot prevail unless “the rule of law for which [the plaintiffs] contend [stands] ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the important means-related federal objectives” at stake. Id. at 881, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). In identifying those objectives, Philip Morris argues that “Congress and the FTC have both sought uniform, national standards for cigarette advertising with respect to smoking and health. And State-law actions like this one would create a different standard of deceptiveness that would plainly conflict with these goals.” At the outset, we reject the notion that the plaintiffs’ claims would interfere with any congressional designs on cigarette advertising. It is true that, in the FCLAA, “Congress prohibited state cigarette advertising regulations motivated by concerns about smoking and health.” Reilly, 533 U.S. at 548, 121 S.Ct. 2404. By the same token, however, “Congress offered no sign that it wished to insulate cigarette manufacturers from longstanding rules governing fraud,” which are not so motivated. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529, 112 S.Ct. 2608. As we have taken pains to elucidate, the plaintiffs’ claims seek to enforce state-law prohibitions on fraud, not state-law prohibitions on cigarette advertising based on smoking and health. So their asserted rule of law — that the statements “light” and “lower tar and nicotine” constitute fraud — does not interfere with the goals of the FCLAA, which do not include establishing any national “standard of deceptiveness” for cigarette advertising. In any event, both the Supreme Court and this one have squarely held that the FCLAA has no preemptive force beyond the language of § 1334(b) itself. Cipol-lone, as we have noted, overturned the ruling of the court of appeals “that Congress had impliedly pre-empted [the plaintiffs] claims challenging the adequacy of warnings on labels or in advertising or the propriety of [the defendants’] advertising and promotional activities,” holding instead that “the pre-emptive scope of the [FCLAA] is governed entirely by the express language in [§ 1334(b) ].” 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Relying on Cipollone, we decided in Harshbarger that the FCLAA could not sustain an implied preemption challenge to a Massachusetts law requiring, inter alia, cigarette manufacturers to provide the state health department with nicotine yield ratings for each of their brands “ ‘which shall accurately predict nicotine intake for average consumers.’ ” 122 F.3d at 62 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 307B (1996)). In declining to imply a preemptive effect from the FCLAA, Cipollone reasoned that “[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.” 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Philip Morris argues that this reasoning has lost its force in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions teaching that an express “pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) ‘any possibility of implied conflict preemption.’ ” Geier, 529 U.S. at 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (bracketing by the Court and further citation omitted)); see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). Philip Morris maintains that Ci-pollone and Harshbarger thus pose no obstacle to its implied preemption claim. By the time we decided Harshbarger, however, the Supreme Court had already made clear in Freightliner that “[a]t best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule.” 514 U.S. at 289, 115 S.Ct. 1483. Yet we did not read Freightliner — which considered the preemptive effect of a safety standard for trucks promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966 (“NTMVSA”), 514 U.S. at 283-86, 115 S.Ct. 1483 — to cast doubt on Cipol-lone’s view that the presence of an express preemption clause in the FCLAA rules out expanding its preemptive reach through implied preemption principles. Harsh-barger, 122 F.3d at 78. Moreover, Freightliner explained that the Cipollone Court had, notwithstanding that view, nevertheless “engaged in a conflict preemption analysis of the [FCLAA], and found ‘no general, inherent conflict between'federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state common-law damages actions.’ ” 514 U.S. at 288-89, 115 S.Ct. 1483 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 112 S.Ct. 2608). Given this alternative basis for Cipol-lone’s holding that the FCLAA does not implicitly preempt state-law claims arising out of cigarette advertisements or promotions, it remains good law regardless of what the Court has since said, in other contexts, about the effect of express preemption clauses on implied preemption. Furthermore, we see nothing in either Geier or Sprietsma — which, like Freight-liner, did not consider the preemptive effect of the FCLAA, but other federal statutes with express preemption provisions— suggesting that the Cipollone Court was wrong to draw an inference against implied preemption of state-law challenges to cigarette advertising from the presence of an express preemption provision in the FCLAA, as opposed to those other statutes. Just as in Harshbarger, then, “[w]e are bound by the Cipollone majority’s holding that § 1334(b) governs the preemptive scope of the FCLAA” and, therefore, “we are not at liberty to address any implied preemption theories” premised on the statute. 122 F.3d at 78. Philip Morris also founds its implied preemption claim on the FTC’s oversight of cigarette advertising under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1