Full opinion text
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: On August 14, 1987, the petitioner, Robert Newland, was convicted in the Superior Court of Glynn County, Georgia of malice murder and aggravated assault with intent to commit rape. The following day, at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death for the murder. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced petitioner accordingly. After exhausting his direct appeal and collateral attack remedies in state court, petitioner applied to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his convictions and death sentence on several federal constitutional grounds. The court denied the writ. We granted petitioner a certificate of appealability, authorizing an appeal raising five issues. In his opening brief, petitioner presents only two of the issues; both question whether his attorneys provided him the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The first issue concerns the admissibility of the confession petitioner gave the police. Petitioner claims that the confession was involuntary, the product of police coercion, and that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to convince the court that it was inadmissible on that ground. He claims that his appellate attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to appeal the trial court’s admission of the confession into evidence. The second issue concerns the adequacy of counsel’s preparation for and prosecution of petitioner’s case at the penalty phase of the trial and asks whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing adequately to search for and present to the jury certain mitigating evidence. The Georgia courts, applying Supreme Court precedent, found no constitutional deficiency in counsel’s performance. The district court, in denying habeas relief, concluded that the Georgia courts properly applied that precedent in disposing of petitioner’s challenges. We agree with the district court and therefore affirm its judgment. This opinion is organized as follows. Part I describes the commission of the crimes in this case as presented to the jury. Part II discusses the procedural history of the case as it wound its way through the state courts and the district court on collateral review. We recount in considerable detail defense counsel’s challenge to the validity of petitioner’s confession and counsel’s preparation for and prosecution of petitioner’s case at the penalty phase of the trial. Part III states the legal standards governing our disposition of petitioner’s claims, and parts IV-VI dispose of those claims. Part VII concludes our discussion. I. A. Petitioner and Margaret Beggs, his girlfriend of four years, moved to Glynn County, Georgia in February 1984. Petitioner was self-employed as a drywall construction contractor and Beggs was employed as a social worker in a local mental health clinic. They lived in a house at 230 Broadway Street on St. Simon’s Island, across the street from Carol Sanders Beatty, who lived in a duplex at 231 Broadway Street. Over the two years that they were neighbors, Beggs and Beatty increasingly socialized with each other. Petitioner had infrequent social contact with Beatty, although they were on friendly terms. On May 30, 1986, at approximately 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Beggs went to a local bar, the Sandpiper, where petitioner had several glasses of beer. They left the bar at around 5:15 p.m., and after purchasing Chinese take-out at Ping’s Restaurant and a bottle of vodka at a local store, they went home for dinner. After dining and consuming several Bloody Marys, they went across the street to visit Beatty. They arrived at around 8:30 p.m., carrying the bottle of vodka and some Bloody Mary mix with them. While Beatty and Beggs talked — mostly about the problems Beatty was having with her husband locked up in a Florida prison for dealing drugs — petitioner and Beggs had several rounds of Bloody Marys, consuming most of the vodka in the process. Petitioner left Beatty’s residence around 9:30-10:00 p.m, announcing that he was going home to bed because he had to get up early the next morning to bid a construction job. Beggs stayed and continued the conversation with Beatty. Petitioner went home, but did not retire for the night. Instead, he packed some clothes and other household items in his pick-up truck and drove to a pier on St. Simon’s Island, where he struck a parked vehicle and immediately fled the scene. He abandoned his pick-up truck on Forest Park Drive, several blocks from his Broadway Street residence, and headed on foot to Beatty’s residence. The owner of the vehicle petitioner had struck, Donald Sanders, had witnessed the collision and called the police. While these events were unfolding, Beggs remained at Beatty’s. She left at around 11:00 p.m. After she got home, she discovered that petitioner was not there. Neither was his truck. Beatty was in her front yard when she and Beggs parted company. Bonnie Smith, who lived in the other half of the duplex at 231 Broadway Street, was there too. Beatty and Smith visited for a few minutes; both then retired for the night. It was approximately 11:15 p.m. Shortly after the two women returned to their residences, petitioner entered Beatty’s backyard. Petitioner described what happened next in his confession to the police on May 31, after he had been taken into custody. He called to Beatty, asking her to come outside. Beatty came out and petitioner attempted to kiss her. She refused, and told him to go home or she would tell Beggs. Petitioner again attempted to kiss her, and she scratched and slapped him. According to his post-arrest confession to the police, he then “grabbed her and I threw her down and somehow the knife came in my hand and started stabbing her, I don’t know, I just lost [sic] out of control ... I was drunk, I don’t know why I did it. I had no reason for it.” Petitioner stabbed Beatty in the throat and the abdomen, using a pocket knife that he regularly carried. During the assault, Beatty screamed and called for help. When she collapsed, he ran home, discarding the knife as he ran, washed himself off with a hose in his backyard, put on a new pair of jeans, and entered his house. At 11:22 p.m., Glynn County Police Department Detectives Barry Moore and James Brundage received a report of a woman screaming in the Broadway Street neighborhood. While they were responding to the call, they received a call from Bonnie Smith, who told them that a woman was screaming in her backyard, behind her residence at 231 Broadway Street. They drove to that address, heard someone run through the backyard, and gave chase. In the course of their pursuit, Brundage discovered petitioner’s pick-up truck parked nearby on Forest Drive. The truck matched the description of the vehicle involved in the hit and run Sanders had reported. Unable to find the person they were chasing, the detectives returned to Beatty’s residence. Brundage found Beatty in the backyard, laying in the garden, and still alive. Paramedics were summoned and transported Beatty to Glynn-Bruns-wick Memorial Hospital. According to Dr. Irwin Berman, one of her treating surgeons, Beatty had a slash wound [in] her neck, which had exposed the entire cross section of her windpipe ... In addition to that, she had multiple wounds of her great vessels of neck ... There were smaller wounds of the flank ... and a stab wound of the abdomen through which ... some of the organs of the, of the abdomen were protruding. After Beatty had been taken to the hospital, petitioner, dressed in jeans but without a shirt or shoes, entered his house through the backyard. Beggs was awake. She noticed scratches on his face and chest. When she asked about them, petitioner told her that he fell in some bushes on the way back from Beatty’s. Beggs then observed the flashing lights of police cars across the street, at Beatty’s, and went over to find out what had happened. She learned that Beatty had been attacked and taken to the hospital. Beggs returned home and told petitioner that “something terrible had happened to Carol.” Petitioner told her “he didn’t do it.” He asked Beggs to find his truck, because he could not remember where he had left it, and attempted to crawl into a small attic space, telling Beggs he was going to hide. Beggs, increasingly distraught at petitioner’s bizarre behavior, left the house in an attempt to find the truck. She also wanted to get away from petitioner, to collect her thoughts. Beggs drove by Beatty’s duplex for a minute or two, searched the neighborhood for petitioner’s vehicle and, failing to find it, drove to a local convenience store to purchase cigarettes. After that, she drove to the same pier petitioner had headed for earlier, to have a smoke and collect her thoughts before returning home. At around 12:15 a.m., Dr. Berman noticed that Beatty was mouthing words, apparently in an attempt to communicate. He notified Detective Greg McMichael, who was standing by, and McMichael came to her bedside. The Georgia Supreme Court, in Newland v. State, related what followed: McMichael ... asked the victim who had attacked her and read her lips to say the name, “Bob.” He then sounded out the name, “Bob” and asked the victim if this was correct. She nodded her head affirmatively. When asked the last name of her assailant, the victim mouthed a word McMichael could not understand. He then asked the victim if the name began with an “A.” She shook her head negatively. McMichael proceeded in this manner through the alphabet until he asked about the letter “N.” The victim “nodded her head vigorously” and squeezed his hand. By this procedure McMichael was able to elicit affirmative shakes of the head from the victim to the letters, “NEWL A.” McMichael then asked the victim if the last name was “Newland.” The victim “nodded her head again very vigorously,” and squeezed McMichael’s hand. 258 Ga. 172, 366 S.E.2d 689, 692-93 (1988). In like manner, Beatty was able to give McMichael petitioner’s phone number and the name of the street where he lived. Relying on this information, the Glynn County Police Department dispatched several officers, including Detectives Bill Williams and Dennis Krauss, to petitioner’s residence. They arrived at 1:10 a.m. and found petitioner sitting up in his bed and pulling on a pair of jeans, as if he had just awakened. They placed petitioner under arrest for aggravated assault and transported him to the police department headquarters in nearby Brunswick. Beggs came home shortly after the police left with petitioner. Several officers were still there, and they asked her, and she agreed, to accompany them to the headquarters. She was not under arrest. B. At some point early that morning, on May 31, the police obtained a search warrant for petitioner’s residence. They found a blood-stained shirt and a pair of socks on the back porch, and a pair of blood-stained blue jeans in a shed in the backyard. At 1:30 a.m., Detective Williams questioned petitioner in an interview room at the police department headquarters. Williams was the only officer present. Petitioner smelled of alcohol but his speech was not impaired. Williams began by informing petitioner of his Miranda rights. He then asked petitioner what he had done the previous evening. Petitioner said that his truck had broken down early in the afternoon and that he had left it on Forest Park Drive. Later that afternoon, he had gone to the Sandpiper bar with Beggs, had three glasses of beer, picked up Chinese food at Ping’s Restaurant, and gone home for dinner. After dinner, they went over to Beatty’s place, where he and Beggs had several Bloody Marys. At around 8:30 p.m., they left Beatty’s to go home. On the way, he stumbled, because he had been drinking “quite a bit,” and fell in some bushes, which accounted for the scratches on his face. Once home, he went to bed and fell asleep. Beggs awakened him to say that the police were at Beatty’s. He told her that this was the neighbor’s problem and went back to sleep. He was sleeping when the police arrived to arrest him. Williams asked petitioner if he had gotten drunk that evening; he replied that he had been drinking, but was not drunk. Petitioner asked Williams why he was being questioned — whether he had been charged with anything. Williams gave no answer. The interrogation lasted about half an hour. Around 2:00 a.m., the police had his blood alcohol content (“BAC”) tested. Officer Richard Strickland performed the test, which revealed a .12 percent BAC. Petitioner was placed in a holding cell following the test. While petitioner was submitting to the BAC test, Williams began questioning Beggs, who had arrived at the headquarters (as Williams was questioning petitioner). This interrogation began approximately at 2:00 a.m. and was broken into two sessions, which combined lasted no more than two hours. Williams began the first session by informing Beggs that she was not under arrest. He then asked her to tell him what had transpired the previous evening up to the moment she arrived at the department headquarters. Beggs’s account of the first part of the evening was consistent with the account petitioner had provided Williams. She stated that they had gone to a local bar, picked up Chinese food, gone home to eat, and then gone over to Beatty’s. At this point, her account began to diverge from petitioner’s. She stated that petitioner left Beatty’s before she did and that when she returned home, she saw petitioner lying in bed. Moments later, she saw police lights flashing at Beatty’s and went there to find out what had happened. She learned that Beatty had been stabbed and hastened home to tell petitioner. He was asleep and did not respond. She went back to Beatty’s because she was concerned about her friend and wanted to learn more. After a brief conversation with a police officer, she drove to a local convenience store to purchase cigarettes and from there to the St. Simon’s Island pier. Distraught about Beatty’s situation, she stayed at the pier for a few minutes, smoking and trying to calm down. She returned home only to find the police waiting. Williams asked her if she had observed any scratches on petitioner, and she said that she had not. Williams confronted Beggs with the inconsistencies between her account and petitioner’s. He pointed out the contradictions concerning whether they returned from Beatty’s together or separately and whether petitioner had scratches on his face. Williams asked her if she was lying; she denied it. The first session ended with Williams telling Beggs to sit down on a couch outside the interview room and “think about everything again,” warning her that she would “go down with [petitioner]” if she was trying to cover up for him. A short time later, Williams resumed the questioning. Beggs admitted that she had not actually seen petitioner at home when she returned from Beatty’s but had assumed he was there, telling Williams, “that’s the part I covered up.” She explained that after she returned to her house, she saw the flashing police car lights at Beatty’s, walked over there and then back home, at which point she saw petitioner in the bedroom and they talked. She admitted that during this conversation, she saw scratches on his face and asked him what had happened. He said he had fallen. Williams challenged Beggs’s account and told her that Beatty had identified petitioner as her attacker. He asked Beggs if she was sure about her story and reminded her that “this is your friend laying out there in the garden.” Beggs, reconsidering, told Williams that she had not seen petitioner at home — after she crossed the street to inquire about the police car lights. He did not arrive until later, when he entered the house from the backyard. It was then that they talked about the scratches on his face. Williams asked her about the knife used in the attack on Beatty. He accused her of disposing of the knife to protect petitioner. Beggs denied doing anything with the knife. The interrogation ended around approximately 3:30 a.m. Beggs was taken to a waiting area at the police headquarters where she sat for the next two hours. At 3:50 a.m., Williams resumed questioning petitioner after advising him of his Miranda rights. Williams began by asking petitioner to recount again the events of the previous evening. Petitioner repeated what he had told Williams earlier, but stated that after he left Beatty’s, he drove off in his pick-up truck to go to the store, but the truck had “died” on Forest Park Drive. He left the truck there, returned home, and went to sleep. Beggs awakened him later. Williams asked petitioner whether his truck died during the evening hours or in the afternoon, and petitioner stated that it died that evening. Once again petitioner asked Williams why he was being questioned. Williams said he was being questioned because he had attacked Beatty, and confronted him with the inconsistencies between his story and Beggs’s. He told petitioner that a bloody shirt and pair of pants had been found at his residence. Petitioner responded to Williams’s accusation that he had attacked Beatty by stating, “I have no idea, no remembrance, if I did anything like that.” Petitioner reinforced this statement by repeatedly saying that he had no memory of attacking Beatty. He attributed this to the quantity of vodka he had consumed; he was not used to consuming that amount of alcohol. Williams challenged petitioner’s no-memory claim as inconsistent with the rest of petitioner’s account of the evening. He asked petitioner how he could remember falling in the bushes and conversing with Beggs after they got home, but not remember the attack. Although he had previously told Williams about his conversation with Beggs, he said he could not recall it. He could not explain why he remembered falling in the bushes. Williams attempted to prod petitioner’s memory by confronting petitioner with the possibility that “if that girl dies, you [will be] charged with murder” and Beggs will be charged as an accessory to murder. Their first exchange involving Beggs went as follows: WILLIAMS: You remember enough to lie about it. You remember enough to lie about it and you don’t even care enough about Peggy, her ass is going to jail. PETITIONER: I do care about Peggy. WILLIAMS: ... her ass is going to jail, too. PETITIONER: For what? WILLIAMS: For accessory. PETITIONER: Accessory to what? WILLIAMS: To murder. In their second exchange about Beggs, Williams was more specific about the basis for potential charges against Beggs: PETITIONER: I was in my bed when y’all came. WILLIAMS: Yea, but you hadn’t been asleep. You hadn’t been in bed very long at all, I know that for a cact [sic]. Well, I think Peggy carried that knife off and hid it for you. Because the knife has disappeared. PETITIONER: Are you thinking that or do you know that? WILLIAMS: No, I think that she, you know, and my boss wants to charge her as an accessory, so you know, if you know where the knife is, if you don’t want her to go to jail ... PETITIONER: ... I have no idea, I have no idea, I’m just being straight with you, I just don’t know. The prospect of Beggs being charged as an accessory to murder did not cause petitioner to alter his account of the evening; he continued to claim that he did not remember attacking Beatty. The interrogation ended at approximately 5:00 a.m. A short time after petitioner’s second interrogation ended, Williams escorted petitioner to a rest area within the headquarters building, where petitioner was allowed to speak with Beggs in Williams’s presence. Their conversation lasted less than ten minutes. Petitioner told Beggs that he could not remember what had happened that evening. After this, Beggs returned to a waiting area. At around 6:00 a.m., the police informed her that she could leave, and a sister picked her up at around 6:20 a.m. During the interim, petitioner was taken to the Glynn-Brunswick Hospital, where his blood was drawn at 6:55 a.m. for its BAC and blood type. The police then transported petitioner to the Glynn County Detention Center. Later in the morning, the Detention Center contacted a local mental health hospital that provided emergency psychiatric services for the Center and requested that someone evaluate petitioner. Frederick Dodd, Jr., Ph.D., a psychiatric social worker, who was on-call, met with petitioner for roughly an hour. Petitioner appeared to Dodd to be “extremely tearful,” “pretty agitated,” and “very confused.” At Dodd’s request, the Detention Center placed petitioner on suicide watch. Police officers brought Beggs back to the police headquarters around 9:00 a.m., where she was questioned for the next several hours. At noon, she was arrested for aggravated assault and taken to the Detention Center. At 9:35 p.m., on May 31, Beatty died from excessive blood loss caused by the injuries she had suffered. The following morning, June 1, at around 10:00 a.m., Detectives Krauss and Putnam went to the Detention Center in order to inform petitioner that Beatty had expired and that he was now being charged with murder. Petitioner was escorted from his cell out to a holding cell to meet with the detectives. Before Detective Krauss began speaking to petitioner, petitioner stated: “I just want to plead guilty and get out of town.” Krauss instructed petitioner not to say anything else and advised him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner signed a form waiving those rights. Krauss then asked petitioner to tell him what happened the night of May 30. Petitioner, despite his expressed desire to plead guilty, said nothing inculpatory. Instead, he told Krauss that he did not remember assaulting Beatty and did not want to continue talking. Krauss informed petitioner that Beatty had died and that he was being charged with murder. Petitioner became upset and started to cry, but did not make any inculpatory statements. Since petitioner had stated he did not wish to continue talking, Krauss asked that he be taken back to his cell. As petitioner was being escorted out of the holding cell, he asked Krauss about Beggs’s status. Krauss told him that Beggs was in the Detention Center and that he was about to inform her that she also was being charged with murder. Petitioner then confessed to killing Beatty. Petitioner stated that Beggs was not with him when he went to Beatty’s backyard the night of May 30. According to Krauss, petitioner said that he “tried to kiss her that, that she pushed him away, and they got into a struggle, and he got very angry about it. He ... hit her and then threw her to the ground. He ... pulled out his knife and just started cutting her.” Krauss asked him where the knife was, and he said he could not remember. Petitioner cried as he recounted the assault and expressed his remorse. The confession, including Krauss’s questions, lasted for ten to fifteen minutes. Krauss informed Williams of petitioner’s confession. Because the confession had not been recorded, Williams decided to visit petitioner to have him repeat his confession. Accompanied by Detective McMi-chael and armed with a recorder, he went to the Detention Center to speak with petitioner. At 1:05 p.m., Williams and McMichael spoke with petitioner in an interview room. Williams informed petitioner of his Miranda rights, and petitioner signed a waiver-of-rights form. Petitioner again confessed to the murder. But it was not recorded; the recorder’s batteries had expired. Realizing that the confession had not been recorded, Williams went to see petitioner again, at 11:10 a.m. the following day, June 2. He came alone, but this time he brought a functioning tape recorder. As he had done on the previous occasions, he informed petitioner of his Miranda rights. He did not ask him to sign a waiver-of-rights form, opting instead to have petitioner verbalize a waiver through the tape recorder. The interrogation lasted for fifteen minutes. Williams asked petitioner to repeat what he had told him the previous day, and petitioner did so, giving a detailed statement of his involvement in the killing. The statement was recorded and transcribed and published to the jury. In his statement, petitioner essentially repeated what he had told Detective Krauss on June 1. He also stated several times that he lost control and attacked Beatty because he was intoxicated. He explained that after stabbing Beatty, he ran home, washed himself off in his backyard, changed clothes, and then entered the house, where he spoke with Beggs. She asked him what had happened and how his face had gotten scratched. He told her nothing had happened. “[S]he went over next door, the next thing I remember I was being arrested.” He claimed that he did not remember getting into an accident with his pick-up truck and what he had done with the knife. Petitioner expressed remorse throughout the interrogation. On June 3, Beggs, now represented by counsel, gave an affidavit to the police describing petitioner’s behavior on May 30-31. In exchange for the affidavit, the State reduced her charge from murder to giving a false statement to law enforcement officials. And that charge was eventually dropped. II. A. On June 4, Donald Manning, the Glynn County Public Defender, met with petitioner at the Detention Center. Petitioner was indigent, and Manning informed him that he was appointed to represent him. Under Georgia law, petitioner, having been detained without bail, was entitled to a commitment hearing. Because a commitment hearing gives the accused an opportunity to discover the essence of the State’s case, Manning, on June 10, informed the assistant district attorney handling the case, Robert Crowe, that he would be requesting a commitment hearing. Crowe replied that a grand jury would be convened the next day and would consider the Beatty ease, and that if petitioner were indicted, a preliminary hearing would be unnecessary. Crowe nonetheless agreed not to oppose Manning’s request for a preliminary hearing. On June 11, the grand jury returned a five-count indictment against petitioner, charging him with malice murder, aggravated assault with intent to rape, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault charges. On July 1, the Glynn County Magistrate Court held a commitment hearing. To show that the State had probable cause to detain petitioner for the Beatty assault, Crowe presented the testimony of three witnesses: Bonnie Smith, Beatty’s next-door neighbor, and Detectives McMi-chael and Williams. Smith testified about calling the police after hearing a woman screaming in Beatty’s backyard and seeing what appeared to be a man, whom she could not identify, running away. Manning cross-examined her about the relationship between Beatty and petitioner. Smith described the relationship as one of friendly neighbors. McMichael told of being summoned to Beatty’s hospital bed and Beatty’s identification of petitioner as her assailant, and Williams described his interrogation of petitioner and the incriminating content of petitioner’s statements. Manning cross-examined both detectives; in doing so, he learned of other incriminating evidence the police had obtained. The commitment hearing ended after Williams finished testifying. On October 21, the Glynn County Superior Court judge convened an “initial pretrial proceeding,” as required by the Georgia Unified Appeal Procedure (“UAP”). Judge Blenn Taylor, Jr., presided and handled the case to its conclusion. Crowe, appearing for the State, announced that the State would seek the death penalty and provided Manning with written notice in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(7). Following the UAP format, the court instructed Manning that he must “locate and interview all persons whose testimony might be helpful in ... mitigation of the punishment” and he acknowledged that such was his responsibility as defense counsel. When the initial pretrial proceeding concluded, the court arraigned petitioner. On November 10, Manning filed twenty motions. Among them were a motion to suppress the statements petitioner gave the police and requests for discovery, including a list of the witnesses the State intended to call in its case in chief. On January 15, Manning moved the court for the appointment of a psychiatrist and a neurologist to examine petitioner to determine both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. The court heard Manning’s motions on January 21, 1987. Arguing his January 15 motion, Manning told the court that he wanted a neurological (as well as a psychiatric) examination because he had reason to believe that petitioner had a “neurological disorder.” If Georgia Forensic Services (“GFS”) could not provide a neurological examination, he said, he would request that petitioner be seen by William Clary, M.D., a neurologist in private practice in Savannah, Georgia. The court granted Manning’s motion in full. After Crowe agreed to provide Manning with the discovery he requested, the court turned to Manning’s motion to suppress petitioner’s statements to the police and asked counsel if they were ready to proceed with an evidentiary hearing. They responded that they were ready to go forward. Crowe called Detectives Williams and Krauss to the stand. They testified that petitioner had been informed of his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest and at each interrogation, that he waived his rights before questioning commenced, that he had not been threatened or promised anything in exchange for his statements, and that he gave no sign of mental impairment. In examining Williams about the two interrogations he conducted on May 31, Crowe focused on the degree of petitioner’s intoxication. Williams stated that while petitioner did appear to have been drinking, his answers were responsive and he was steady on his feet. Krauss told Crowe that petitioner did not confess until after he asked about Beggs and had been informed of his rights. Manning cross-examined both witnesses. In questioning Williams, he concentrated on what Williams said to petitioner while interrogating him — twice on May 31 and once on June 1. Referring first to the May 31 interrogations, Manning asked Williams about the extent of petitioner’s intoxication, and Williams repeated what he told Crowe on direct-examination. Manning asked him whether petitioner expressed “concern” about Beggs’s status in the investigation, and he said that petitioner seemed concerned. Turning to June 1, when, following Beggs’s arrest for murder, Williams took petitioner’s statement, Manning asked him if he told petitioner that Beggs would get the death penalty if petitioner did not confess. Williams said no. Manning questioned Krauss regarding his interrogation of petitioner on June 1 and petitioner’s emotional status at that time. He also put to Krauss the same question he had asked Williams: whether he told petitioner that Beggs would get the death penalty if he refused to confess. Krauss said he did not. After hearing from these witnesses and considering argument of counsel, the court overruled Manning’s motion to suppress, finding that petitioner’s statements had been freely and voluntarily made after a waiver of rights. The court then announced that petitioner’s trial would commence on April 27,1987. B. On January 28, 1988, Dominic D’Alesan-dro, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist in the employ of GFS, interviewed petitioner at the Detention Center pursuant to the court’s order granting Manning’s motion for a psychiatric examination. D’Alesan-dro submitted a report to the court and counsel on January 27, in which he concluded that petitioner was competent to assist counsel in his defense, but deferred any opinion as to petitioner’s criminal responsibility for the charged offenses until petitioner was evaluated by a neurologist. On February 16, petitioner was examined by Dr. Clary, who subsequently issued a report. In it, he stated that he had “been asked to see [petitioner] for evaluation of headaches.” He discussed petitioner’s background and the head injuries petitioner had suffered in the past. Regarding the latter, he indicated that petitioner had been struck in the head with a sledge-hammer and had injured his head in a car accident that resulted in a loss of consciousness for several hours. Dr. Clary also stated that petitioner said he had not “had beer for several years, although he used to drink apparently fairly heavily, [and] that prior to six years ago he was using drugs fairly consistently, but eventually stopped.” Dr. Clary concluded that petitioner was suffering from “chronic muscle tension headaches ... [but] doubt[ed] that there is any more significant underlying neurological problems.” Nonetheless, he ordered an electroencephalogram (“EEG”) and computed tomography (“CT”) scan if petitioner’s headaches did not diminish. On March 24, the EEG and CT scan were conducted. Neither revealed any sign of neurological injury. On April 2, petitioner was examined by Richard Doss, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist in the employ of GFS, at Georgia Regional Hospital. On April 10, Drs. Doss and D’Alesandro issued a joint report, which was sent to the court with copies to counsel. The report concluded that “there were no indications to suggest the existence of a psychiatric, psychological, or neurological disorder which could conceivably have been a factor in his behavior during the night of the alleged murder with which he is charged.” The report also noted that petitioner “maintain[ed] that he was unable to remember the specific episode which resulted in the charges,” but, nonetheless, “demonstrated a significant remorse for the situation.” C. On July 31, the prosecutor provided Manning with notice that he would be seeking the death penalty under O.C.G.A. 17-10-30(2) as well as subsection (7). On August 7, three days before petitioner’s trial was to commence, the prosecutor filed notice that he intended to present a prior indictment of petitioner as a non-statutory aggravating factor at the sentencing hearing, should petitioner be convicted. Petitioner had been indicted in December 1978 in Tennessee for aggravated assault, burglary, and criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. The victim of these alleged offenses was a woman. Manning objected to the prosecutor’s use of the indictment, and the court sustained his objection. Manning, however, successfully persuaded the court not to allow this indictment to be used at the sentencing hearing. D. 1. Petitioner’s trial, which had been set for April 27, 1987, began on Monday, August 10, 1987. It lasted five days. The State called twenty-two witnesses in its case in chief during the guilt phase of the trial. The testimony of these witnesses established the facts set out in subpart I.A, supra. In addition to these facts, their testimony established that the victim’s blood was present on petitioner’s jeans and shirt. Anticipating Manning’s defense— that petitioner’s level of intoxication diminished the mens rea necessary for a malice murder conviction — the State introduced evidence of what it contended was a minimal level of intoxication through the testimony of Sally Watford, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation forensic scientist. She testified that petitioner’s BAC was .04 percent when his blood was drawn at Glynn-Brunswick Hospital at 6:55 a.m. on May 31. Extrapolating back seven hours, using an average alcohol dissipation rate, she testified that petitioner may have had a BAC of .14 percent around midnight on May 30. Manning’s defense strategy was to portray petitioner as a normal guy, a hard worker who had an excellent reputation as a dependable drywall contractor, a good and friendly neighbor, and a person who used alcohol in moderation. On the evening of the crime, petitioner drank, for him, an excess amount of alcohol, and the alcohol caused him to act completely out of character. He had no reason to attack Beatty; he was not a violent person. Alcohol was the sole explanation for his conduct. The alcohol had such an effect on him that he could not form the mens rea required for malice murder. Manning executed this defense strategy principally through his cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. Beggs related how much petitioner had to drink that evening. Petitioner had three to four beers at Ping’s, the Chinese take-out restaurant, two Bloody Marys at their house before and during dinner, and three more over at Beatty’s. By the time he left Beatty’s, there was very little vodka left in the bottle. Beggs testified that she had not seen petitioner drink to the point of intoxication since February 1984, and that he was not normally a vodka drinker. When he left Beatty’s, she said, “it was time” for him to go home. Manning asked Detective Williams about petitioner’s state of intoxication prior to the 1:80 a.m. interrogation on May 31. Williams said that petitioner had an odor of alcohol and that his eyes were bloodshot. Manning asked Watford to extrapolate back nine hours from the time petitioner’s blood was drawn at the hospital, at 6:55 a.m. on May 31, and she said that petitioner’s BAC was possibly .17 percent at approximately 10:00 p.m. the night before. Manning questioned Bonnie Smith and Beggs about petitioner’s lifestyle. Beggs said that she and petitioner had a normal relationship and that he had been regularly employed since they moved to St. Simon’s Island in 1984. Petitioner owned his own drywall contracting business, and left Beatty’s around 10:00 p.m. because he had to get up early the following morning to bid on a construction job. Smith testified that she saw no signs of animosity or of a sexual relationship between petitioner and Beatty. She went on to say that she, Beggs, petitioner, and Beatty had worked together on a garden in the backyard of Beatty’s and her duplex. In a leading question, Manning characterized petitioner and Beggs thusly: “Just normal people concerned with a garden, that’s basically how you knew them is that, that it?” She replied, “Right.” In addition to portraying petitioner as a friendly, caring person who had no reason to attack Beatty, Manning had to deal with the highly incriminating post-arrest statements petitioner had given to the police. His tack was to plant the idea with the jury that petitioner gave a false confession to protect Beggs and that his description of the crime was provided by the police as they interrogated him. He had Detective Williams admit that when he questioned petitioner at 1:30 a.m. and 3:10 a.m. on May 31, petitioner consistently claimed not to be able to recall any involvement in the murder, that he told petitioner that “[Beggs’s] ass is going to jail, too ... for accessory,” that he was deeply concerned about Beggs’s welfare, and that during the 3:10 a.m. interrogation, he provided petitioner with several details about the crime. In cross-examining Detective Krauss, Manning focused on the events surrounding petitioner’s statements to him on June 1. Krauss testified that petitioner first claimed that he could not remember what happened and that he only confessed after being informed that Beggs had been charged with aggravated assault. Asked whether petitioner “was trying to do his best to protect Peggy Beggs,” Krauss said that he was. After the State rested its case, Manning presented the petitioner’s case; he called two witnesses, Frederick Dodd, the psychiatric social worker who saw petitioner at the Detention Center the morning of May 31, and Officer Richard Strickland, who performed a BAC test around 2:00 a.m. that day. Dodd supported Manning’s attack on the reliability of petitioner’s incriminating statements. He testified that he visited petitioner after he had twice been interrogated by Williams, and that petitioner told him that he “could not believe that he had done what they said he had done.” Dodd felt that petitioner’s lack of memory could have been due to an alcoholic blackout. Strickland added to the blackout theory, albeit indirectly, by testifying that petitioner’s BAC was .12 percent at 2:09 a.m. and was likely at a higher level earlier. The defense rested; it was Friday, August 14. The State had no rebuttal, so the jury was excused while the court held a charge conference. Manning proposed a jury instruction that would allow the jury to consider petitioner’s intoxication in its determination of criminal intent. Manning reminded the judge that he had given the same instruction in a case he had tried before the judge in December 1986. The judge acknowledged that he had given the instruction in that case, but stated that his view of the law regarding the relevance of voluntary intoxication in determining criminal intent had changed since that time. Accordingly, he would not give the requested instruction; instead, he would submit an instruction to the jury that read, in part, “voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act.” After the charge conference ended, the guilt phase of the trial resumed for counsel’s closing arguments to the jury, beginning with the defendant’s. Manning first reminded the jurors that they would be required to find that petitioner murdered Beatty “with malice aforethought.” He defined malice for them as the “deliberate intention unlawfully ... to take away the life of another human being.” He argued that Smith and Beggs had described petitioner as a hard worker, “a good neighbor,” and “a good husband,” and recalled Beggs’s testimony that he had not drunk to the point of intoxication in several years. Petitioner got so intoxicated on the night of May 30, though, that, in Manning’s words, “[he] did not even know what he was doing.” For this reason, the jury was urged to find “ample doubt, more than a reasonable doubt, about malice aforethought, about intent to kill.” Manning referred briefly to the aggravated assault with attempt to rape charge, saying that petitioner’s attempt to kiss Beatty did not rise to the level of attempted rape. The prosecutor’s closing argument, delivered by Crowe, summarized the extensive evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Crowe downplayed the impact of petitioner’s intoxication by arguing that petitioner was not too intoxicated to run from Beatty’s backyard, clean himself off, lie to Beggs when she spoke to him after he returned from attacking Beatty, and lie to Detective Williams in the initial interrogations. He relied heavily on petitioner’s confession (to Detectives Krauss, Putnam, and Williams) to show that petitioner intended to assault Beatty with intent to rape, pointing to his statement that he tried to kiss her twice as evidence of intent to rape. The case went to the jury on August 14 at 11:44 a.m. At 2:39 p.m., the jury returned its verdict. It found petitioner guilty of murder, aggravated assault with intent to rape, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a short recess, the trial entered the penalty phase. 2. The State sought the death penalty based on the existence of the two statutory aggravating factors indicated in the notices the prosecution had provided the petitioner. The State’s case in chief was brief. Crowe waived his opening statement, and called no witnesses. To establish a non-statutory aggravating factor, he introduced and relied on documentary proof of petitioner’s September 14, 1967 conviction in Florida for breaking and entering. He then rested the State’s case. Manning’s strategy in presenting the petitioner’s case was to focus on petitioner’s lack of intent to kill Beatty. Part of this strategy was to show that petitioner had a new-found religious faith and that he would dedicate his life in prison to ministering to fellow inmates. Manning called five witnesses to the stand, then petitioner. Four of the five witnesses were either lay or ordained ministers who had visited petitioner during his incarceration. All testified that petitioner had experienced a genuine conversion to Christianity and could be an effective lay minister to inmates. Patty Parkinson, Beggs’s sister, testified to petitioner’s good. character and that she had known him to be “very supportive, a generous kind man.” .He was “a passive type person. I never saw him angry.” Petitioner testified that he was committed to his faith and asked the jury to spare his life so he could minister to other prisoners. He pled for forgiveness, expressing sorrow for what he had done. He said that he had no intent to kill Beatty — in fact, he still had no memory of the attack. After he concluded his testimony, the defense rested, and counsel began their closing arguments. The prosecutor’s closing argument was largely an explanation of why the jury should find the requisite statutory aggravating factors. Crowe argued that Beatty’s injuries were so extensive and severe that they constituted torture, such that the jury could find the existence of both of the statutory aggravating factors. Reminding the jurors that Beatty had screamed and begged for her life while petitioner was assaulting her, Crowe asked them to show petitioner the same mercy he had shown Beatty. Manning, in closing, argued that petitioner deserved life imprisonment. Petitioner did not intend to kill Beatty: “he doesn’t even remember how he did it, eer-tainly not why.” He suggested that the attack on Beatty “appears from all the evidence ... to be an isolated incident,” for which petitioner had expressed great remorse. He urged the jury to spare petitioner’s life so he could minister to other prisoners through sharing his religious faith. The jury began deliberating over the penalty to be imposed at 5:26 p.m. on August 14. At 8:51 p.m., after the jury informed the court that it had not reached a verdict, the court recessed for the day. The jury resumed its deliberations on Saturday, the 15th, at 9:00 a.m. At 10:22 a.m., it returned its verdict. It found the existence of both statutory aggravating factors and recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death. The court, as required by Georgia law, adopted the recommendation and imposed a death sentence. E. 1. Petitioner appealed his convictions and death sentence to the Supreme Court of Georgia, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder and aggravated assault with intent to rape convictions and the admission of Detective McMichael’s testimony as to Beatty’s identification of petitioner as her attacker. He did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the statements petitioner had made to the police. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his conviction. Newland v. State, 258 Ga. 172, 366 S.E.2d 689 (1988). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Newland v. Georgia, 488 U.S. 975, 109 S.Ct. 514, 102 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988). 2. On January 2, 1991, petitioner applied to the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, for a writ of habeas corpus. The case lay dormant until September 4, 1996. Petitioner amended his petition on November 12, 1997; as amended, it contained twenty-five claims based on the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Georgia Constitution. The petition included the ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented to us in this appeal. On March 3-4,1998 and January 13,1999, the superi- or court held evidentiary hearings, at which the petitioner submitted affidavits from various individuals in support of his claims but did not testify. The State called Manning to testify at the March 3-4 hearing. He was the sole State’s witness. Petitioner’s case consisted of several affidavits, none coming from petitioner himself. The superior court denied petitioner ha-beas corpus relief in a one-sentence order on February 22, 1999. On June 5, 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. On December 17, 2001, the court issued an order that adopted the State’s proposed findings and conclusions and again denied relief. The Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner’s application for probable cause to appeal on October 1, 2002. The Supreme Court denied certiorari review on May 5, 2003. Newland v. Turpin, 538 U.S. 1015, 123 S.Ct. 1933, 155 L.Ed.2d 853 (2003). 3. On September 22, 2003, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. His petition raised twelve claims, including the ineffective assistance of counsel claims now before this court. The petition was referred to a magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation on January 27, 2005, based on the records compiled in connection with the criminal prosecution and the state court habeas proceeding. The magistrate judge concluded that petitioner had failed to establish that the state courts had handed down a decision regarding any of his claims that entitled him to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation as its decisión on June 16, 2005, and denied relief. Petitioner moved the court to alter or amend its judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), on June 30, 2005. The court denied the motion on August 31, 2005. On December 1, 2005, we granted a certificate of appealability to determine whether, as petitioner contends, (1) the performance of his trial and appellate attorneys, Donald Manning and John Davis, was constitutionally ineffective concerning the admissibility of his confession, and (2) Manning was ineffective in failing adequately to search for and present to the jury certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. III. A. We review petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standards established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254 was amended by the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 214, to ensure “greater federal court deference to state court decisions and to promote more federal-state judicial comity.” Wright v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir.2002). As amended, § 2254 reads: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court instructs that a state court decision is “contrary to” established federal law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases,” or if the state court “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O’Connor, J., for the majority). A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application of’ established federal law if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. “Clearly established Federal law” consists of the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. Our review of a state court’s findings of fact — to ascertain whether the court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of facts — is circumscribed by both section 2254(d)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that: “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and that the habeas petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” B. The Supreme Court established the test for establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The test is two-pronged. First, the petitioner must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient. Second, the petitioner must show this deficiency prejudiced his defense, in that it “deprive[d] [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The petitioner satisfies the test’s performance prong by proving that counsel’s performance failed to meet the standard of “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). Our evaluation of counsel’s performance is highly deferential; we must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable and that counsel “made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66. We review counsel’s performance “from counsel’s perspective at the time,” to avoid “the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Our review is objective, in that we consider whether there was any reasonable justification for the attorney’s conduct. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315. Thus, the “petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Id. The petitioner satisfies the Strickland test’s prejudice prong by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Where, as here, the petitioner contends that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have received a sentence of death, we consider “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. With the foregoing principles in mind, we consider petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. rv. In his state habeas petition, petitioner claimed that the performance of his trial and appellate attorneys, Donald Manning and John Davis, failed to pass Strickland muster in connection with the handling of his confession. Manning failed to present the trial judge with the evidence necessary to convince the court that petitioner’s confession was involuntary and thus inadmissible; Davis failed to appeal the court’s ruling admitting the confession into evidence. We consider first the adequacy of Manning’s performance, then turn to Davis’s performance. A. On November 10, 1986, Manning moved to suppress the confession petitioner gave the police on June 1 and 2, 1986, following his arrest. The court considered the motion at an evidentiary hearing held on January 21, 1987. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim is rooted in Manning’s performance at that hearing, specifically, in Manning’s failure to introduce into evidence two statements Detective Williams made while interrogating petitioner at 3:50 a.m. on May 31. Petitioner claims that these statements constituted threats, impermissible police coercion. Had Manning introduced the two statements and explained their significance to the court, petitioner submits, the court would have found his confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. To assess the validity of petitioner’s position, it is necessary to review the events that led to petitioner’s confession. As indicated in subpart I.B, supra, petitioner was interrogated by the police on five occasions between 1:30 a.m. on May 31 and 11:10 a.m. on June 2, 1986. When questioned the first time, by Detective Williams at 1:30 a.m. on the 31st, petitioner said nothing to implicate himself. Williams questioned him again at 3:50 that morning. It was during that interrogation that Williams uttered the two statements at issue. Petitioner was worried about Beggs, whether she might be held criminally liable. Acting on this concern for Beggs and hoping that petitioner would confess for her sake, Williams told him that if Beatty died, he would be charged with murder and that Beggs’s “ass [would be] going to jail, too ... [f]or accessory ... [t]o murder.” Williams emphasized what lay in store for Beggs by adding: “[M]y boss wants to charge her as an accessory.” The prospect of Beggs being charged as an accessory did not prompt petitioner to confess, however. He stuck to the story he had given Williams at 1:30 that morning: he had no memory of attacking Beatty. Petitioner’s next encounter with the police occurred the following day, June 1. Beatty had died the previous evening, and at 10:00 a.m., Detectives Krauss and Putnam went to the Detention Center, with the intention of informing petitioner that he was being charged with murder. Before either Krauss or Putnam had a chance to speak to petitioner, he blurted out: “I just want to plead guilty and get out of town.” Krauss told him to say nothing more and advised him of his Miranda rights. After petitioner waived his rights, Krauss asked him what happened on the night of May 30. He told Krauss that he did not recall assaulting Beatty, then refused to talk further. As petitioner was being escorted out of the holding cell, however, he broke his silence and asked them about Beggs’s status. Krauss told him that Beggs was being charged with murder, too. On hearing that, petitioner confessed to having assaulted Beatty. Krauss immediately informed Detective Williams of the confession. Because the confession had not been recorded, Williams decided to get it on tape. At 1:05 p.m. the same day, he and Detective MeMichael saw petitioner, and he reiterated what he had told Krauss and Putnam. When Williams subsequently discovered that the tape recorder had failed, he obtained another recorder and saw petitioner once again, at 11:10 a.m. the next day, June 2. Petitioner repeated the confession he had given earlier. Petitioner insists that his confession— given first to Krauss and Putnam and then twice to Williams — was coerced by Williams’s threat to have Beggs charged as an accessory to murder unless he confessed. He does so despite the fact that the threat did not induce him to confess on the spot and that more than twenty-four hours passed before he actually confessed to Krauss and Putnam. The state habeas court found no merit in petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim. Although the court did not, in its disposi-tive order, explicitly address petitioner’s argument as we have phrased it, the court necessarily rejected it. The court found that Manning had conducted a reasonable investigation into the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s confession and had performed competently in presenting his motion to suppress. Among other things, Manning obtained transcripts of the recorded statements petitioner had given the police; requested and obtained a commitment hearing at which he examined Williams about his interrogation of petitioner; effectively cross