Full opinion text
BERZON, Circuit Judge: The Bureau of Land Management (the “BLM” or the “Bureau”) is charged with managing “the public lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people.” 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c); see also id. § 1712(a), (c). That task, which the Supreme Court has characterized as “enormously complicated,” Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”), 542 U.S. 55, 58, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004), requires careful planning. The issue in this case is whether the BLM complied with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., when it developed a land use plan covering a large portion of Oregon. The Oregon Natural Desert Association, Committee for the High Desert, and Western Watersheds Project (collectively “ONDA”) contend that the BLM has not done so because it has failed (1) properly to analyze the effects of the plan on lands under its control possessing “wilderness characteristics”; and (2) properly to analyze management options for grazing and off-road vehicle use throughout the region covered by the plan. The district court granted summary judgment for the BLM. We reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the Bureau. I. Background A. The Physical and Legal Landscape 1. Southeastern Oregon The BLM-managed land at issue (which we will sometimes refer to as the “planning area”) spreads over roughly four and a half million acres of rugged, remote land in southeastern Oregon’s Malheur, Grant, and Harney Counties. These lands lie in the rain shadow of the Cascade and Coastal ranges, and so are sunny and semi-arid. The sagebrush plains that characterize the region are varied by high mountains, rising to over 8,000 feet, and by the valleys of the Malheur and Owyhee rivers. A similar landscape (not at issue in this appeal) extends into Idaho to the east. We have described that region, in terms equally applicable to the Oregon lands, as “[s]tartling in its ecological diversity, from arid sagebrush desert to lush juniper woodlands,” and as including “spectacular and wild canyonlands” along the Owyhee river. Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir.2002). It is not simply the landscape that marks the planning area. The area is also home to tens of thousands of people who live and work in this dry and demanding territory. European settlement of the region began as immigrants moved west over the Oregon Trail and intensified with the discovery of gold in the Owyhee Mountains in the 1860s, bringing miners and ranchers into the landscape. Today, about 30,000 people live in Malheur County, which makes up the bulk of the planning area. Although the service and outdoor recreation industries are growing significantly, farming and ranching still drive the economy. The old mines are largely tapped out and do not employ many people, and portions of the range were degraded in the early years of settlement. These days, Malheur County’s economic indicators are significantly below statewide averages for Oregon, and a sizable portion of the population is below the poverty line. Federally owned land makes up a large portion of the region, giving the BLM an important role. Its land use planning choices influence both the unique and irreplaceable natural resources of the planning area and the local economy, which is strongly tied to the outdoors. The choices available to the BLM are governed in large part by three statutes of central relevance to this appeal: the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the Wilderness Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. We discuss each statute in turn. 2. Federal Land Management a. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act The BLM’s land management authority is defined by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (the “FLPMA”), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. Although the BLM existed before the passage of the FLPMA, see 43 U.S.C. § 1731(a), its role was extensively revised by that statute, which, among other changes, establishes systems for information gathering and land use planning. The FLPMA directs that the Secretary of the Interior, who oversees the BLM, “shall, with public involvement ..., develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands.” Id. § 1712(a); see also SUWA, 542 U.S. at 58-60, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (describing the land use planning process). Among other requirements, these plans are to “use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield”; “use a systematic interdisciplinary approach”; “give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern”; and “weigh long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c). The BLM “shall manage the public lands” in accordance with these plans. Id. § 1732(a). To ensure that the BLM has adequate information to perform this task, the FLPMA also directs that: The Secretary shall prepare and maintain on a continuing basis an inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values (including, but not limited to, outdoor recreation and scenic values), giving priority to areas of critical environmental concern. This inventory shall be kept current so as to reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and other values. Id. § 1711(a). The BLM, in other words, is obligated to “arrange for resource, environmental, social, economic and institutional data and information to be collected, or assembled if already available.” 43 C.F.R. § 1610.4-3. The Bureau is, in particular, to collect “[n]ew information and inventory data [that] will emphasize significant issues and decisions with the greatest potential impact.” Id. Land use plans are to “rely, to the extent it is available, on the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and other values.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4). An extensive public comment process also provides information for the formulation of BLM land use plans. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.2 (discussing public participation). The land use plans thus developed guide “[a]ll future resource management authorizations and actions ... and subsequent more detailed or specific planning, shall conform to the approved plants].” Id. § 1610.5-3. After a land use plan is approved, “[a]ny person who participated in the planning process and has an interest which is or may be adversely affected by the approval or amendment of a resource management plan may protest such approval or amendment.” Id. § 1610.5-2(a). Once the Director of the BLM has ruled on any protest, the decision is final and the plan may be adopted. Id. § 1610.5-2(a)(3), (b). b. The Wilderness Act and the FLPMA Among the resources to be managed on federal lands, lands with statutorily-defined wilderness characteristics are of particular importance. Congress identified the conservation of such lands as a national priority in the Wilderness Act of 1964 (the “Wilderness Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 et seq. See also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1055-56 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (describing the passage of the Wilderness Act). The FLPMA, which was enacted later, interacts with the Wilderness Act to provide the BLM with broad authority to manage areas with wilderness characteristics contained in the federally owned land parcels the Bureau oversees, including by recommending these areas for permanent congressional protection. The Wilderness Act is intended to “assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). A “wilderness” is defined, “in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape,” as: an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value. Id. § 1131(c). The Wilderness Act did not directly address the BLM’s management of its lands. The FLPMA remedied this deficiency by providing specifically for a review of wilderness resources on BLM lands, see 43 U.S.C. § 1782, and by ensuring that lands with wilderness characteristics are regularly inventoried for use in land use planning. First, the FLPMA provides in pertinent part that: Within fifteen years after October 21, 1976, the Secretary shall review those roadless areas of five thousand acres or more and roadless islands of the public lands, identified during the inventory required by[43 U.S.C.] § 1711(a) ... as having wilderness characteristics described in the Wilderness Act ... and shall from time to time report to the President his recommendation as to the suitability or nonsuitability of each such area or island for preservation as wilderness ... Id. § 1782(a). Upon such a recommendation, the President is to advise Congress “of his recommendations with respect to designation as wilderness of each [agency-recommended] area,” and Congress may then act to “designate] as wilderness” the lands it deems appropriate. Id. § 1782(b); see also SUWA, 542 U.S. at 58, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (explaining that “Congress made the judgment that some lands should be set aside as wilderness ... ”); Smith v. U.S. Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that “[t]he areas ultimately granted wilderness status by Congress must, by law, remain protected and free from development.”); 43 C.F.R. § 6302.11 (explaining that wilderness areas will generally only be “open to uses consistent with the preservation of their wilderness character and their future use and enjoyment as wilderness”). In the interim period between the BLM’s review of lands “identified during the inventory ... as having wilderness characteristics” and Congress’s final preservation decision, the BLM must, with a few exceptions not relevant here, manage all the lands it has reviewed “so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness,” whether or not it believes them to be suitable for such preservation. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). The recommended lands, managed under this “non-impairment” standard, are referred to as “wilderness study areas” (“WSAs”). See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 2373. Importantly, although 43 U.S.C. § 1782 provides a mechanism by which the BLM may submit lands to Congress for legislation preserving them, the BLM’s authority to identify lands with “wilderness characteristics” is not limited to the § 1782 process. Rather, as § 1782 makes clear, it is the 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) general resource inventory process, which catalogues “all public lands and their resource and other values,” id., that is to identify lands “as having wilderness characteristics described in the Wilderness Act.” Id. § 1782(a); see also Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305, 309-10 (C.D.Cal.1985) (describing the “inventory preparation requirement of [§ 1711]” as the first step in the wilderness review and designation process of § 1782); Wilderness Soc’y, 119 I.B.L.A. 168, 170-72 (1991) (discussing the wilderness process as occurring under both §§ 1711 and 1782). In other words, wilderness characteristics are among the “resource and other values” of the public lands to be inventoried under § 1711. The BLM’s land use plans, which provide for the management of these resources and values, are, again, to “rely, to the extent it is available, on the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and other values.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(4). We discuss the significance of the FLPMA’s recognition of wilderness characteristics as an “other value” to be inventoried under § 1711 and managed under § 1712 at length below. c. The National Environmental Policy Act “Approval of a resource management plan is considered a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6. For that reason, the land use planning process implicates the third major statute we address today, NEPA, which requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for such actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). In NEPA, Congress declared as a national policy “creat[ing] and maintain[ing] conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.” Id. § 4331(a). NEPA’s purpose is realized not through substantive mandates but through the creation of a democratic decisionmaking structure that, although strictly procedural, is “almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision[s].” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989); see also Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1072-73 (9th Cir.2001) (describing NEPA’s theory of democratic decisionmaking). By requiring the consideration of environmental factors in the course of agency decisionmaking on major federal actions, NEPA serves two purposes: First, “it ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.” Second, it “guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004) (quoting Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349, 109 S.Ct. 1835) (internal citations and alteration omitted). In other words, by requiring agencies to take a “hard look” at how the choices before them affect the environment, and then to place their data and conclusions before the public, see Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir.2007), NEPA relies upon democratic processes to ensure—as the first appellate court to construe the statute in detail put it—that “the most intelligent, optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made.” Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.Cir.1971). “NEPA’s purpose is not to generate paperwork—even excellent paperwork—but to foster excellent action.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c). As “public scrutiny [is] essential to implementing NEPA,” id. § 1500.1(b), “[a]n agency preparing a final [EIS] shall assess and consider comments both individually and collectively, and shall respond ..., stating its response in the final statement.” Id. § 1503.4(a). Responses may include “[d]evelop[ing] and evaluat[ing] alternatives not previously given serious consideration by the agency” and “[s]upplement[ing], improv[ing], or modifying] its analyses.” Id. If an agency opts not to make changes, it must, at least, “[e]xplain why the comments do not warrant further agency response, citing the sources, authorities, or reasons which support the agency’s position.” Id. § 1503.4(a)(5). Because NEPA “ ‘simply guarantees a particular procedure,’ ” rather than a substantive result, we have characterized the rights and obligations it creates as “fundamentally unlike” those of substantive land management statutes like the FLPMA. Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998)); see also Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 350-51, 109 S.Ct. 1835 (discussing NEPA’s procedural focus). Nonetheless, the statute remains “the broadest and perhaps most important” of the environmental statutes. Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1111. The EIS is NEPA’s chief tool, designed as an “action-forcing device to [e]nsure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. To fulfill its purpose, an EIS must “provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (enumerating EIS requirements). To fulfill this mandate, agencies must “consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action” in an EIS, Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 781 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (9th Cir.2006)); see also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 1502 (discussing EIS requirements), including the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the action. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.8 (defining those terms). As the EIS is intended to be used to guide decisionmaking, the alternatives analysis is naturally “the heart of the environmental impact statement.” Id. § 1502.14. In that section, the agency must “Vigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.” Id. “The existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate.” Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir.1998)). B. The BLM’s Plans for Southeastern Oregon With this background in mind, we turn to the BLM’s planning process for southeastern Oregon. We begin with the BLM’s initial wilderness review of the region, which it conducted pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1782’s mandate to recommend WSAs to the President for permanent legislative preservation as wilderness. By November 1980, the BLM identified 32 WSAs in the planning area, covering slightly less than 1.3 million acres. A final EIS considering the BLM’s recommendations was completed in 1989, and the BLM transmitted its recommendations to the President in October 1991. It advised permanent preservation for twenty-one of the WSAs. The report also identified about three thousand acres of land adjoining WSAs that could be acquired for preservation as wilderness. In 1992, the President submitted these recommendations, without change, to Congress, which has not yet acted upon them. The BLM has not since inventoried any lands in the planning area outside of the WSAs for wilderness characteristics. In August 1995, the BLM, in accordance with its regulations, published a public notice that it would prepare a resource management plan for the region. See Intent to Prepare a Resource Management Plan for the Andrews, Malheur, and Jordan Resource Areas, Oregon, 60 Fed.Reg. 44,042 (Aug. 24, 1995); see also 43 C.F.R. § 1610.2(c) (providing for public notice when planning commences). The Southeastern 8566 Oregon Management Plan (the “Southeast Oregon Plan” or the “Plan”) is intended to guide management of the area for the next twenty years. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Proposed Southeastern Oregon Resource Management Plan and Final Environmental [Impact] Statement (“FEIS”) xii (2001). Some three years after initiating the planning process, the BLM announced that the draft Plan and an accompanying EIS were available for public comment. See Notice of Availability of Draft Southeastern Oregon Resource Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement, 63 Fed.Reg. 56,660 (Oct. 22, 1998). ONDA reviewed the draft EIS and Plan, and then raised some concerns in a comment letter to the BLM. ONDA noted that it had been years since the BLM’s last inventory of lands with wilderness characteristics and argued that the BLM should make certain its information was accurate before designing a management strategy for the region: The time has come for the agency to conduct a reinventory of [roadless] lands [in southeastern Oregon], Such an inventory ... should exclude those areas already designated as WSAs and focus instead on other lands that were overlooked or deemed ineligible during the first inventory. It is crucial that any wilderness re-inventory also assess newly acquired state and/or private inholdings. During BLM’s original wilderness inventory, some potential WSAs were deemed ineligible due to management issues resulting from large private inholdings. In situations where these inholdings have since been acquired, BLM must reconsider the eligibility of those lands as WSAs. We are confident that the BLM may be able to identify additional lands that should be protected.... ONDA also contended that the draft EIS did not “evaluate a reasonable range of alternatives,” particularly with regard to grazing, and did not adequately address cumulative impacts, again paying particular regard to grazing pressures. It also raised concerns regarding the draft Plan’s treatment of offroad vehicles (“ORVs”), contending that the Plan left too much land open to that use, without considering more conservation-oriented management. Having reviewed these comments, along with dozens of others, the BLM made some modifications to its EIS and proposed Plan and issued both in final form in 2001. See Notice of Availability of Proposed Southeastern Oregon Resource Management Plan and Final Environmental Impact Statement; and Proposed Area of Critical Environmental Concern Designations, 66 Fed.Reg. 55,946 (Nov. 5, 2001). It is these documents that are at issue in this appeal. We next describe the EIS’s treatment of the wilderness, grazing, and ORV issues. 1. Wilderness Issues After receiving ONDA’s comments on the draft EIS and Plan suggesting the need to give more attention to lands with wilderness characteristics, the Bureau wrote in the final EIS that: A global reinventory by BLM to address wilderness values within the planning area is outside the scope of this plan. In accordance with FLPMA, with substantial public input and review, BLM has completed its required evaluation and assessment of wilderness values on public lands with earlier planning efforts. The agency’s wilderness recommendations in Oregon derived from those planning efforts have been submitted and are presently awaiting consideration by Congress. FEIS, Vol. Ill at 105. BLM further explained that “[t]he wilderness process started in 1978, the Final EIS [for that process] was completed in 1989, with the Record of Decision, and recommendation of the Secretary of Interior [as to preservation] submitted in October 1991.” FEIS, Vol. I at 12. The BLM therefore considered such issues as “[eliminated from [detailed [s]tudy,” because further permanent wilderness preservation “hingefd] on congressional actions.” Id. The EIS therefore did not consider the effects of the Plan on areas with wilderness characteristics not already designated as WSAs, nor analyze management options for the wilderness values in such areas. As we noted earlier, in its 1991 wilderness report, the BLM identified roughly three thousand acres of land adjacent to WSAs that could be added to them. In the 2001 final EIS, the Bureau considered alternatives for protecting the “wilderness characteristics” of this limited additional area. See FEIS, Vol. I at 627. The Plan observed, in connection with these lands, that “[u]nder FLPMA, wilderness preservation is part of BLM’s multiple-use mandate, and wilderness is recognized as part of the spectrum of resource values considered in the land use planning process.” Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Southeastern Oregon Resource Management Plan and Record of Decision (“Plan ROD”) 104 (2003). The BLM considered two possibilities for these lands-adding the land to the WSAs, or not adding the land. See FEIS, Vol. I at 373-75. In discussing the first possibility, the BLM proposed to manage such additions as WSAs, under the non-impairment standard of 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). Id. at 374. Yet, the BLM did not intend to recommend such lands for congressional preservation, which would implicate § 1782; instead, it intended to use its normal management authority, derived from its broad land use planning authority, to replicate the non-impairment standard. See id.; see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1732. Aside from these few thousand acres of land, however, other areas with wilderness values not already identified in the 1991 review were not singled out for analysis and planning purposes. Therefore, for the remainder of this opinion, except as otherwise noted, when we refer to “wilderness characteristics,” “wilderness values,” or land with those values, we refer to areas outside both the WSAs in the 1991 report and the adjacent lands that the BLM proposed adding to them. The BLM did consider granting some degree of additional protection from development and other disruptive uses to several hundred thousand acres of land in “areas of critical environmental concern.” FEIS, Vol. I at 276-368; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(3) (requiring the BLM to give priority to area of critical environmental concern in land use planning). These critical areas are broadly defined as “areas within the public lands where special management attention is required ... to protect and prevent irreparable damage to important historic, cultural, or scenic values, fish and wildlife resources, or other natural systems or processes, or to protect life and safety from natural hazards.” 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(a). Designation as a critical area does not, of itself, “change or prevent change of the management or use of public lands.” Id. The Plan, however, contemplated various limitations on ORV use, mineral leasing, and plant collection, among other protections, for such areas. The critical areas protected by the Southeast Oregon Plan are limited, however. Also, the overlap between the critical area criteria and the statutory definition of wilderness values is only partial. Compare 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(a) (defining areas of critical environmental concern) with 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(1)-(4) (describing wilderness characteristics). As a consequence, the BLM does not structure its critical area decisions to protect wilderness characteristics, nor does designation as a critical area necessarily imply the presence of wilderness characteristics. In fact, several of the areas of critical environmental concern contain roads or other signs of human use that would be incompatible with wilderness values. See, e.g., FEIS, Vol. I at 293, 299, 303. Some other critical areas, however, do not contain such features and lie, in whole or in part, in existing WSAs. See, e.g., id. at 286, 291, 304, 307, 309, 331, 347. In sum, although the BLM considered incorporating a small amount of land into the WSAs, and protecting some other regions as critical areas, it explicitly disclaimed any general obligation to analyze the impacts of its Plan on wilderness values, or to consider management options for areas with those values, and took no action contrary to that statement. 2. Alternatives Analyses In considering alternatives for resources for which it did acknowledge its authority to plan, the BLM studied several courses of action. It put forth seven alternatives—A, B, C, D, D2, E, and a single alternative describing the proposed resource management plan, designated as “Proposed RMP” or “PRMP”—which it used to analyze various constellations of management options. See FEIS, Vol. I at 152-85. Of note, alternative B would continue present management as a “no action” alternative; alternative D2, added after comments were received on the draft EIS, generally favors more conservation; and alternative E was included to analyze the possibility of ending all uses other than conservation, even though the BLM believed that alternative was not valid because it conflicted with the Bureau’s multiple use mandate. See id. at xiii, 137-38, 152. The Proposed RMP alternative was ultimately selected for use in the final Plan. Plan ROD at v. We describe the alternatives in detail as they relate to grazing and ORV use. a. Grazing Issues The BLM sets basic grazing practices and goals in its land use plans. See 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-8 (mandating consideration of grazing management in land use plans). Grazing occupies large swathes of the public lands in southeastern Oregon and has considerable economic and environmental impacts. The BLM therefore analyzed grazing options for its proposed Plan in the EIS. See FEIS, Vol I. at 246-55. In doing so, the BLM considered alternatives that would adjust both the extent of land open to grazing and the intensity of grazing allowed on public land. The BLM predicted that the general management priorities specified by some of the alternatives analyzed in the EIS would cause grazing intensity to increase over time, while others would result in a decrease in grazing intensity. Most of the alternatives considered would initially maintain grazing near current levels and would not change the amount of land allocated to grazing. See FEIS, Vol. I at xxii, 246-55. Only one alternative deemed valid by the Bureau, Alternative D2, contemplated substantial grazing restrictions, with regard to both area and intensity. (The BLM also considered barring all grazing on public lands in Alternative E but, as noted, it explained that such an alternative could not validly be selected.) The areas closed to grazing in Alternative D2, which considered by far the largest closure, cover portions of the shores of wild and scenic rivers in the planning area, along with some critical areas and several other protected land types. See id. at 250-53. Because the BLM did not consider management choices for lands with wilderness characteristics, it did not consider limiting grazing in those areas in particular. We summarize the alternatives in the following table. As mentioned above, the PRMP alternative was selected for use in the Plan. It is worth noting that, of the alternatives deemed viable by the BLM, only Alternative D2 would close more than about 1% of the land in the planning area to grazing: than about 1% of the land in the planning area to grazing: Alt. A Alt. B Alt. C Alt. D Alt. D2 Alt. E Alt. PRMP Total AUMs allocated 420,584 420,584 420,584 420,584 288,084 0 420,584 Projected change in AUMs over +/-0 +/-0 time (%) + 0 to 10 + 0 to 5 to 10 -0 to 20 -0 to 10 0 to 10 Est. acres not allocated 1.45 4.6 to grazing 50,600 41,900 50,600 50,600 million million 58,900 Percent of area not allocated to grazing 1.1% 0.91% 1.1% 1.1% 31.5% 100% 1.3% b. ORV Issues “The approval of a resource management plan ... constitutes formal designation of off-road vehicle use areas.” 43 C.F.R. § 8342.2(b). The EIS for the Southeast Oregon Plan therefore considers options for ORY management. The BLM uses a three-tier system to manage ORVs, designating areas as open, closed, or limited. See id. § 8340.0—5(f)—(h), 8342.1. In areas designated as open, “all types of vehicle use is permitted at all times.” Id. § 8340.0—5(f). Areas designated as limited are “restricted at certain times, in certain areas, and/or to certain vehicular use.” Id. § 8340.0-5(g). Although these limits “may be of any type,” they generally take the form of limits on the number or kind of vehicle allowed, seasons of use, or available routes. Id. Finally, unless specially authorized, ORV use is “prohibited” in areas designated as closed. Id. § 8340.0-5(h). The BLM may also implement closures in any area, regardless of its ORV designation, if ORVs turn out to cause “considerable adverse effects” to an area’s resources. Id. § 8341.2. Such a closure would remain in force until “the adverse effects are eliminated and measures implemented to prevent recurrence.” Id. The seven alternatives that the BLM considered in the EIS vary almost entirely by the amount of land they allocate between the open and limited use categories. See FEIS, Vol. I at xxii, 269-73. The BLM never considered closing a significant amount of land to ORVs. Nor did it consider any management option explicitly geared towards protecting wilderness values from ORV use. In the EIS, the most protective designation considered-limited—meant restricting ORVs to existing routes in WSAs and other sensitive areas and imposing some seasonal area closures to protect wildlife. See id. at 269-73. Despite the nomenclature, the existing routes limitation allows for some ORV travel off existing routes, as most “limited” area designations in the Plan allow “motorized vehicle-supported camping, unless otherwise posted to meet other resource management objectives, ... up to 150 traveled feet off an existing road.” Id. at 273; see also id. at 136, 269-73. None of the considered alternatives would have closed more acreage to ORV use than was closed before the Plan went into effect. Instead, every alternative opened more land to some kind of ORV use than was permitted before. See id. at xxii, 269-73. The “PRMP” alternative, which was selected, opens roughly 20,000 acres of previously closed land to some ORV use. The alternatives considered are as follows: C. The Protests and ONDA’s Survey C. The Protests and ONDA’s Survey 1. ONDA Protests the Proposed Southeast Oregon Plan and EIS In December 2001, ONDA filed a protest with the BLM of the Plan and final EIS. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2 (describing protest procedures). The protest sounded the same themes ONDA had raised in its comments on the draft EIS: First, ONDA again charged that the BLM had failed to analyze wilderness values in the EIS and Plan. It cited several instances in which BLM employees had informed ONDA, when pressed, of changed circumstances in areas outside of WSAs such as planned construction and development projects that never occurred, and pointed out that “ONDA and the general public have no idea how many additional instances of new information and changed circumstances exist with respect to non-recommended wilderness areas,” because the EIS does not address the matter. This failure to provide information on wilderness values, ONDA argued, violated NEPA’s requirement that the Bureau engage in fully-informed decision-making. ONDA further argued that the BLM’s response to ONDA’s comments on the draft EIS, in which the Bureau had maintained that its wilderness obligations were at an end with the completion of the 1991 wilderness report, was mistaken. It contended that the BLM had a continuing duty to inventory wilderness values on its lands under 43 U.S.C. § 1711 and that it could protect lands with such values using the broad multiple use authority provided by 43 U.S.C. § 1712. Second, ONDA raised concerns over the limited alternatives considered in the EIS for grazing management, as well as the EIS’s alleged failure to consider the cumulative impacts of grazing. Third, ONDA contended that, as the BLM had “considered] no alternative that closes more than 0.8% of the public lands within the planning area” to ORV use, the Bureau had committed a “clear violation” of NEPA’s alternatives requirement. The BLM denied the protest in September 2002. It considered ONDA’s' comments in some detail: First, as it had done in response to ONDA’s comments on the draft EIS, the BLM construed ONDA’s concerns as requesting that it reassess the recommendations it made in its 1991 wilderness report, conducted under 43 U.S.C. § 1782. It again explained that the § 1782 wilderness review was a “one-time” responsibility. It dismissed ONDA’s NEPA concerns regarding wilderness issues summarily as “not ... clear.” The BLM answered ONDA’s concerns over the grazing alternatives analysis by stating that the alternatives it had considered would have different “effects [from each other] in both the short and long term.” And it responded to ONDA’s concerns over ORVs by stating that the limited designation would “provid[e] a comparable degree of protection” as the closed designation, and that the alternative analysis was therefore sufficient. The BLM then adopted the Plan and EIS in a record of decision (“ROD”), see 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2, and announced its availability in April 2003. See Notice of Availability of the Record of Decision for the Southeastern Oregon Resource Management Plan and Final Environmental Impact Statement, 68 Fed.Reg. 16,307 (Apr. 3, 2003). 2. ONDA’s Survey Because the BLM had not responded to its wilderness concerns, ONDA decided to undertake a survey of land with wilderness characteristics outside of the WSAs, documenting changes that had occurred since November 1980, when the BLM completed the inventory supporting its 1991 preservation recommendations. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, Wilderness Inventory Recommendations: Vale District (“ONDA Survey”) (2004). In doing so, ONDA relied upon wilderness inventory procedures described in the BLM’s guidance documents. ONDA Survey at i-ii; see also Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, BLM Wilderness Inventory and Study Procedures, H-6310-1 (“2001 Handbook”) 5-16 (2001) (rescinded 2003) (providing the procedures used by ONDA). The wilderness characteristics ONDA reviewed were those described in the Wilderness Act and incorporated into the FLPMA. In February 2004, ONDA submitted the results of its survey to the BLM. Because the survey was submitted well after the ROD was issued, it is not part of the administrative record. “However, in NEPA cases, the court may extend its review beyond the administrative record and permit the introduction of new evidence where the plaintiff alleges that an EIS has ... swept stubborn problems or serious criticism under the rug.” Or. Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526-27 (9th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The survey was admitted in the district court on that ground, and the BLM does not appeal that ruling. We describe the survey here without expressly approving or disapproving its particular empirical findings. Instead, we discuss it to demonstrate how the presence of wilderness values may change over time, and how wilderness characteristics may have been reestablished in parts of the area covered by the Southeast Oregon Plan. ONDA explained that there had been significant changes since the BLM’s last inventory. Lands the BLM had previously determined lacked wilderness characteristics had reverted to a more natural state and, ONDA maintained, now did have such characteristics. Many of these changes occurred, ONDA reported, because little-used roads had deteriorated since November 1980. Because 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(1) defines wilderness as an area which “generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature,” the BLM has long treated the presence of roads as canceling out any other wilderness characteristics an area might otherwise have, as they defeat the “natural conditions” wilderness characteristic. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (providing that the § 1782 review should focus on roadless areas); Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Wilderness Inventory Handbook; (“1978 Handbook”) 6 (1978) (discussing roadlessness); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (defining wilderness characteristics). “In determining whether an area may be subject to further consideration of wilderness characteristics, BLM has distinguished roads that had been actively maintained from ways that were maintained solely by the passage of vehicles. The presence of ways did not render an area ‘roaded’ so as to eliminate that area from further evaluation as wilderness.” Colo. Envtl. Coalition, 161 I.B.L.A. 386, 391 (2004) (citation and footnote omitted). See also 2001 Handbook at 10; 1978 Handbook at 5. ONDA concluded that many roads had become “ways” over the years, and that other human impacts had also been reduced. For instance, ONDA represented that in the 62,479 acre Battle Mountain area, roads had decayed to become “nearly invisible overgrown way[s].” ONDA Survey at 1-3. In the 11,433 acre Beaver Dam Creek area, in ONDA’s view, a former road was “rutted and washed out in places.” Id. at 13. Roads that had precluded consideration of the 45,760 acre Black Canyon area had, according to ONDA, deteriorated so much that they were almost nonexistent. Id. at 29. In the 32,148 acre Clark’s Butte area, ONDA reported that a road was now an “overgrown, washed-out way with little sign of use,” id. at 65, and what had once been small reservoirs had dried up and vanished, id. at 66. And the Lower Owyhee Can an 11,578 acre area that the BLM had deemed to be without wilderness characteristics in 1980 because of nonnative grass seeding, had, as described in the survey, returned to largely native vegetation. Id. at 180. In short, ONDA presented the landscape as having changed significantly. In all, the ONDA study concluded that there are now more than 1.3 million acres of land in the planning area outside the WSAs that display wilderness characteristics. Id. at i. The BLM did not, however, alter the Plan or otherwise take action on ONDA’s new information. D. The Litigation Meanwhile, in July 2003, ONDA filed suit against the BLM. In its first amended complaint, ONDA alleged that the Plan and EIS violated NEPA, the FLPMA, and the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 et seq. Because we ultimately remand on NEPA grounds, we do not address the causes of action under the FLPMA and the Taylor Grazing Act, which may no longer pertain after remand, but focus instead on the NEPA issues. Continuing to pursue the issues raised in its comments and protest, ONDA contended in its complaint that the BLM had violated NEPA by (1) “fail[ing] to take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of the proposed action, because the Plan and FEIS do not present adequate baseline information and discussion on critical environmental resources and/or resource issues, including ... current conditions of ... non-WSA roadless areas;” (2) failing adequately to analyze the cumulative impacts of the Plan; and (3) “failing] to analyze and discuss a reasonable range of alternatives ... with respect to areas allocated to livestock grazing and to off-highway vehicle restrictions.” Both ONDA and the BLM moved for judgment on the administrative record. Cf. Pit River Tribe, 469 F.3d at 778 (stating that “[b]ecause this is a record review case, we may direct that summary judgment be granted to either party based upon our de novo review of the administrative record”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Riddell v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 457 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir.2006) (explaining that judgment on the administrative record “is a form of summary judgment”). The district court granted judgment to the BLM, adopting the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge to whom the case had been assigned. Specifically, the district court first held, citing SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137, that the BLM was not “legally required to perform a wilderness inventory,” and so could not be faulted for failing in the EIS to analyze non-WSA land that might now have wilderness characteristics, or to discuss management options for such lands. The court also decided that the BLM had adequately considered cumulative impacts; that the BLM had considered an adequate range of grazing alternatives, in part because all of the alternatives allowed the BLM to adjust grazing AUM allocations over the course of the Plan, and in part because Aternative D2 considered closing a significant area to grazing; and that the BLM had considered a proper range of ORV alternatives, as both the limited and closed designations provided protection from off-road traffic. ONDA timely appealed. Analysis Standard of Review ‘district court’s determination on summary judgment that the BLM complied with NEPA is reviewed de novo.’ ” Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Kern, 284 F.3d at 1069-70). Judicial review of the BLM’s compliance with NEPA is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Pit River Tribe, 469 F.3d at 778. Under the APA, we must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” if, among other things, they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also, e.g., Pit River Tribe, 469 F.3d at 778 (reviewing an EIS under § 706(2)(A)); Earth Island Inst., 442 F.3d at 1156-57 (same); Lowe, 109 F.3d at 526 (same). Land with Wilderness Characteristics The BLM did not explicitly consider wilderness values in its EIS, despite ONDA’s repeated requests that it discuss and analyze wilderness characteristics on its lands in southeastern Oregon. To determine whether it violated NEPA by failing to do so, we consider the nature of the BLM’s authority and obligations with regard to wilderness characteristics and the BLM’s rationale for not considering lands with wilderness values. “In order to decide what kind of an environmental impact statement need be prepared, it is necessary first to describe accurately the ‘federal action’ being taken.” Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proc. (S.C.R.A.P.), 422 U.S. 289, 322, 95 S.Ct. 2336, 45 L.Ed.2d 191 (1975). Thus, just as “[w]here an action is taken pursuant to a specific statute, the statutory objectives of the project serve as a guide by which to determine the reasonableness of objectives outlined in an EIS,” Westlands Water, 376 F.3d at 866, so too do the statutory objectives underlying the agency’s action work significantly to define its analytic obligations. Put differently, because “NEPA places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action,” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978), the considerations made relevant by the substantive statute driving the proposed action must be addressed in NEPA analysis. Here, the BLM is charged with “managing] the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield,” 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a), and with developing a resource management plan which would allow it do so, id. § 1712(c). The EIS and Plan, specifically, were “prepared to provide the BLM ... with a comprehensive framework for managing public land” in southeastern Oregon. FEIS, Vol. I at 3. Among the BLM’s “primary goal[s]” was to “develop management practices that ensure the long-term sustainability of healthy and productive land, consistent with principles of ecosystem management.” Id. To fulfill this purpose, then, the EIS supporting the Plan had to consider the land resources and values, see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), 1711(a), 1712(c)(4), 1732(a), relevant to its long-term management strategy- In ONDA’s view, the remaining analysis is straightforward: The BLM did not consider wilderness values, despite comments urging it do so. ONDA observes that the Plan itself identifies wilderness as “part of the spectrum of resource values considered in the land use planning process,” Plan ROD at 104, and argues that the FLPMA places management of wilderness values squarely within the BLM’s land use planning authority. ONDA also observes that the Plan could affect such values on lands outside of the WSAs. So, in light of the Plan’s purpose of providing a “comprehensive framework for managing public land,” NEPA requires analysis of these issues in the EIS. Because the EIS offers no discussion of non-WSA lands with wilderness values other than a disclaimer of any obligation to consider them, it did not provide a “full and fair discussion” of the impacts of the Plan and the alternatives before the BLM, and so violated NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. The BLM sees the question very differently. In its view, “wilderness characteristics” matter for one, and only one, purpose: They provide criteria to be used in the 43 U.S.C. § 1782 survey of lands to recommend for permanent preservation, which, the Bureau argues, was a “onetime” duty. No other provision of the FLPMA, the Bureau maintains, “requires BLM to conduct inventories of, or otherwise specially consider, ‘wilderness characteristics’ in land use planning, and BLM completed the [§ 1782] wilderness review in 1991.” Indeed, the BLM goes so far as to suggest that ONDA came up with the very idea of wilderness characteristics: [I]n arguing that BLM has not satisfied NEPA, ONDA seeks to impose upon BLM its own framework for managing public lands. This framework is centered around ONDA’s notion of “the wilderness resource,” a management category that is found nowhere in any governing law and consists only of vaguely-described “characteristics” that ONDA believes should drive BLM’s planning and evaluation processes. If the Court were to accept ONDA’s argument, any group could assign a label to a set of “characteristics” and then argue that BLM must inventory for and analyze those values in order to satisfy the FLPMA and NEPA. This is not, and cannot be, the law. The BLM, in other words, essentially dismisses ONDA’s argument that wilderness characteristics constitute one of the values of the public lands, which it may manage under the multiple-use mandate in its land use plans. Instead, it sees wilderness characteristics of importance only for a purpose already past. So, while the Bureau acknowledges that it could manage its lands to promote such characteristics, just as it could manage its land to promote many goals, does not acknowledge wilderness characteristics as a value of the public lands specifically identified by the FLPMA, and so sees no reason to address “wilderness characteristics” as a discrete resource category in its EIS. Following this line of argument, the BLM points out that it has considerable methodological discretion as to how it complies with NEPA and argues that its consideration of the Plan’s effects need not embrace “ONDA’s notion of the ‘wilderness resource,’ ” as long as it otherwise provides a full and fair discussion of the Plan. This argument comports with the BLM’s responses to ONDA’s comments, which rely solely on the fact that the BLM completed a 43 U.S.C. § 1782 review years ago to justify excluding any consideration of wilderness values in the EIS now. Our question, then, is whether ONDA is right, and wilderness characteristics are among the values the FLPMA specifically assigns to the BLM to manage in land use plans, of whether the BLM is right, and wilderness characteristics have no independent vitality apart from their use in the § 1782 process. If ONDA is correct, then the BLM’s reliance on its completion of the 1991 wilderness report cannot, of itself, justify excluding a wilderness values analysis entirely from the EIS. This question is placed in sharper focus because, after the EIS was completed, the BLM entered into a settlement regarding the reach of the BLM’s management authority concerning wilderness. In an April 2003 settlement with the state of Utah, the BLM agreed to an interpretation of 43 U.S.C. § 1782 limiting the BLM to a one-time review of areas with wilderness characteristics, for the purpose of recommending such areas for permanent congressional preservation, with the review power expiring “fifteen years after October 21, 1976,” see 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The BLM therefore agreed (1) that it would cease recommending lands for permanent preservation as wilderness; (2) that it would not, going forward, “establish, manage or otherwise treat public lands ... as WSAs or as wilderness ... absent congressional authorization”; and (3) that it would withdraw the 2001 Handbook, which contained guidelines for further wilderness recommendations. See Utah v. Norton, 396 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (10th Cir.2005) 8585 (describing the history of the litigation leading to the settlement); see generally Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96-CV-0870, 2006 WL 2711798 (D.Utah Sept.20, 2006) (describing the settlement). The settlement, then, tracks—but, as we shall see, only in part—the BLM’s position in this case regarding its one-time obligation to consider wilderness characteristics on BLM land. The Attorney General lacks the power “to agree to settlement terms that would violate the civil laws governing the agency,” United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Executive Bus. Media, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 3 F.3d 759, 761 (4th Cir.1993)), so the Utah settlement is only valid if it comports with the FLPMA, NEPA, and other relevant law. The parties maintain, nonetheless, that we need not directly consider the legality of the 2003 Utah settlement agreement in this case. We agree. Wilderness values are among the resources which the BLM can manage under 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712 and 1732. Wilderness characteristics are not simply a checklist to be used in completing the 1782 survey, and they are certainly not just one of ONDA’s “notions,” as the BLM would have it. As a result, the BLM’s response to ONDA’s concerns in the EIS—that, because it had completed the § 1782 survey wilderness characteristics were “outside the scope” of the EIS for the land use plan-was incorrect and, standing alone, does not satisfy NEPA’s requirements. To explain this conclusion, we consider the statutory and regulatory structure binding the BLM. We then turn to the Bureau’s own guidance documents and other public statements, which are consistent with our understanding, and then address relevant case law. We next consider the BLM’s salient counter-arguments. Finally, we explain how the BLM may address its error on remand. 1. Statutory and Regulatory Authority Read carefully and in context, the FLPMA makes clear that wilderness characteristics are among the values which the BLM can address in its land use plans, and hence, needs to address in the NEPA analysis for a land use plan governing areas which may have wilderness values. As we have explained, wilderness characteristics are enumerated by the Wilderness Act, in 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(1)-(4). They are incorporated into the FLPMA in several ways. In addition to the language of 43 U.S.C. § 1782, discussed above, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(i) provides that “[t]he term ‘wilderness’ as used in section 1782 of this title shall have the same meaning as it does in section 1131(c) of Title 16”—which is the Wilderness Act definition. See also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 762 (9th Cir.1982) (referring to “wilderness features” to be used in federal land management); Watt, 608 F.Supp. at 309 (“[W]ilderness characteristics [are those] as described in the Wilderness Act.”). The BLM similarly records in its current land use planning handbook that wilderness characteristics are “naturalness, outstanding opportunities for solitude, and outstanding opportunities for primitive and unconfined recreation,” a paraphrase which closely tracks 16 U.S.C. § 1131(1)-(3). Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Land Use Planning Handboox, H-1601-1 (“2005 Handbook”) Appx. C 12 (2005); see also 2001 Handbook 10-16 (describing wilderness characteristics); 1978 Handbook 6 (same). The Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”), an administrative adjudicative body of the Department of the Interior which has jurisdiction over the BLM, see generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.400 et seq., has also long held as much. See, e.g., Colo. Envtl. Coalition, 165 I.B.L.A. 221, 223 n.3 (2005) (explaining that the 43 U.S.C. § 1782 review concerns “wilderness characteristics as described in the Wilderness Act”); Michael Huddleston, 76 I.B.L.A. 116, 118 (1983) (explaining that wilderness characteristics are defined by the “statutory criteria” of the Wilderness Act); Tri-County Cattleman’s Ass’n, Idaho Cattleman’s Ass’n, 60 I.B.L.A. 305 (1981) (stating that “[t]he wilderness characteristics alluded to in [§ 1782] are set forth in ... 16 U.S.C. 1131(c)”); Save the Glades Comm., 54 I.B.L.A. 215, 217 (1981) (same). The BLM’s present suggestion that ONDA came up with the idea of wilderness characteristics is then both wrong and inexplicable, in light of the long history of the statutory “wilderness characteristics” concept. As noted earlier, the FLPMA’s provision directing the BLM to conduct an initial wilderness review provides that “those roadless areas of five thousand acres or more and roadless islands of the public lands ... having wilderness characteristics described in the Wilderness Act” are to be “identified during the inventory required by section 1711(a).” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a). Notably, the statute does not direct that areas with wilderness characteristics be identified only as part of recommending such areas for “preservation as wilderness.” Id. Instead, it contemplates a “review ” of areas already so “identified,” id. (emphasis added), in the course of the general BLM “inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values,” an inventory process which is to be “kept current so as to reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and other values.” Id. § 1711(a). In other words, reading §§ 1711(a) and 1782(a) together, the statute specifically contemplates that the § 1711(a) inventory process includes identification of wilderness characteristics—including those that are “new and emerging” or which arise from “changes in conditions”—and that it will do so continuously, with no time limit. As to the BLM’s authority to include such identified lands in its management planning, the multiple use management and planning mandates of 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712 and 1732 pertain to the “management of the public lands and their various resource values.” Id. § 1702(c). Section 1711(a), again, provides for “an inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values.” Because wilderness characteristics are to be identified by that inventory, they are, as we earlier explained, necessarily among those “resource and other values.” And, as wilderness characteristics are among the “resource and other values” recognized under the FLPMA, they are to be managed as part of the complex task of managing “the various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.” Id. § 1702(c); see also id. § 1732(a) (“The Secretary shall manage the public lands under principles of multiple use. ... ”). This management is to be done “in accordance with land use plans developed ... under section 1712 ... when they are available.” Id. § 1732(a). Land use plans, in turn, must “use and observe the principles of multiple use.” Id. § 1712(c)(1), whether or not the § 1711 inventory “is available,” id. § 1712(c)(4). Once the statute is so understood, it becomes evident that permanent preservation of wilderness using the 43 U.S.C. § 1782 process is just one aspect of the BLM’s broader management authority for lands with wilderness characteristics. In SUWA, the Supreme Court confirmed as much. See 542 U.S. at 58-59, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (describing setting aside some lands “as wilderness at the expense of commercial and recreational uses” as one of the choices before the BLM); see also id. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 2373 (“Aside from the identific