Full opinion text
BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORRIS, J., joined. MARTIN, J. (pp. 655-60), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. OPINION ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Michael Beuke (“Beuke”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Beuke raises thirteen issues for our review. Because Beuke filed his habeas petition prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we apply pre-AEDPA standards of review. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). After careful consideration, we find Beuke’s arguments to be without merit and therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. I. On May 14, 1983, Gregory Wahoff offered a ride to Michael Beuke who was walking along the side of the road. Once inside Wahoffs car, Beuke produced a .38 caliber revolver and demanded that Wa-hoff drive to a rural area in Hamilton County, Ohio. When they reached a sufficiently secluded area, Beuke led Wahoff into the woods; Wahoff eventually charged towards Beuke, attempting to wrestle the gun away from him. After this effort was unsuccessful, Wahoff began to run away, but Beuke shot him in the back, lodging a bullet in his spine and paralyzing him. Beuke then placed the gun against Wa-hoffs face and fired a second shot, which passed through Wahoffs cheek and lodged in the ground. Wahoff was fully conscious at this point, but he pretended to be dead and apparently succeeded in fooling Beuke, who returned to the car and drove off. Later that day, the police found Wa-hoff and took him to the hospital for emergency treatment; Wahoff survived Beuke’s brutal attack. A few weeks later, on June 1, 1983, the police discovered Robert Craig’s body in a ditch on the side of a rural road in Cler-mont County, Ohio. Craig worked as a deliveryman supplying fresh fish to local restaurants, and during these travels, he would often offer rides to hitchhikers in the area. Beuke allegedly told Michael J. Cahill, a man with whom Beuke worked, that he killed Craig after Craig picked him up along the side of the highway. An autopsy on Craig’s body revealed that he was shot twice in the head and once in the chest, and the police found his abandoned car in the parking lot of a local shopping mall. Two days later, on June 3, 1983, Bruce Graham saw Beuke walking down the highway with a red gas can in hand. In an effort to help the apparently stranded traveler, Graham offered Beuke a ride to the nearest gas station. As he had done with Wahoff, Beuke brandished a short-barreled revolver and instructed Graham to drive to a rural area. When they arrived at the secluded destination, Beuke immediately fired at Graham. The bullet grazed Graham’s forehead, inflicting a minor but bloody wound. After an unsuccessful effort to wrestle the gun from Beuke, Graham sought refuge in a nearby farmhouse. As Graham fled, Beuke fired several shots, one of which struck Graham in the shoulder. After Beuke realized that Graham had escaped to safety, he got into the car and left the scene of the shooting. Sometime thereafter, Beuke’s co-worker, Cahill, told the police what he knew of Beuke’s involvement in the “mad hitchhiker” shootings. The police obtained a warrant and searched the car that Beuke had been driving, which he had borrowed from Cahill. The police discovered a cup that had been removed from Wahoffs car, a red gas can, and a blood-stained football jersey. The officers arrested Beuke who, at the time of his arrest, was in possession of a .38 caliber revolver — the same type of weapon he used to shoot Wahoff in the back. In July 1983, an Ohio grand jury returned a ten-count indictment against Beuke, charging him with one count of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted aggravated murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of kidnap-ing, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon. The aggravated murder charge included two specifications, either of which, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt, would make Beuke eligible for the death penalty under Ohio law: (1) committing aggravated murder as part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful attempt to kill two or more persons, and (2) committing aggravated murder in the course of an aggravated robbery. Beuke’s jury trial began on September 19, 1983. The prosecution introduced extensive evidence implicating Beuke in the “mad hitchhiker” shootings, including Wa-hoffs and Graham’s testimony of their nearly fatal encounters with Beuke, evidence linking the bullets extracted from Wahoff and Craig to Beuke’s gun, Beuke’s fingerprints on Wahoffs and Craig’s automobiles, and Cahill’s testimony about Beuke’s confession. On October 5, 1983, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all ten counts and the two specifications, making Beuke eligible for capital punishment. Beuke’s counsel moved for a continuance of the penalty hearing, but the trial court granted only a short, one-day continuance and set the hearing for October 7, 1983. At the penalty hearing, Beuke introduced a presentence report and mitigation testimony from his parents. Unpersuaded by the defense’s evidence, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating evidence and recommended that Beuke be sentenced to death. The trial court adopted the jury’s recommendation and imposed the death penalty. Beuke appealed his conviction and sentence to the Ohio First District Court of Appeals, alleging twenty-six assignments of error. The appellate court denied Beuke’s appeal in March 1986. See State v. Bueke, No. C-830829, 1986 WL 3750 (Ohio Ct.App. Mar.26, 1986). Beuke then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio; that appeal was denied in 1988. See State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 526 N.E.2d 274 (1988). Beuke next sought a writ of cer-tiorari from the United States Supreme Court, which was denied in 1989. See Beuke v. Ohio, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1356, 103 L.Ed.2d 823 (1989). In November 1989, having completed his direct appeal, Beuke filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, asserting eighty-five errors and requesting an evidentiary hearing. Some of the newly raised claims not asserted on direct appeal included ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and a Brady claim for the withholding of exculpatory evidence. The trial court summarily denied Beuke’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. In August 1991, the state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, see State v. Beuke, No. C-900718, 1991 WL 155219 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 14,1991), and the Ohio Supreme Court denied discretionary review, see State v. Beuke, 62 Ohio St.3d 1496, 583 N.E.2d 968 (1992). On June 18, 1992, Beuke filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the district court, asserting ninety-two grounds for relief. The state filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Beuke had not exhausted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because he did not raise that claim in a motion for delayed reconsideration, as was required under the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1992). On June 30, 1992, perhaps realizing that he had yet to exhaust his state remedies, Beuke filed a motion for delayed consideration with the Ohio First District Court of Appeals, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. In September 1992, the district court granted the warden’s motion and dismissed Beuke’s habeas petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. In December 1992, the Ohio First District Court of Appeals denied Beuke’s motion for delayed consideration because he failed to demonstrate good cause to justify his untimely filing as required by Ohio’s procedural rules. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed that decision. See State v. Beuke, 67 Ohio St.3d 1500, 622 N.E.2d 649 (1993). In November 1993, Beuke filed with the Ohio Supreme Court a motion for delayed reinstatement of his direct appeal, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review. The Ohio Supreme Court denied that motion in March 1994. In May 1994, Beuke filed a new habeas petition with the district court, which, after it was amended, included eighty-eight grounds for relief. More than a year after he instituted these habeas proceedings, Beuke filed two motions to expand the record, and a petition for leave to conduct discovery. The district court denied all of these motions on October 18, 1995. The very next day — October 19, 1995 — the district court denied Beuke’s habeas petition, concluding that he had procedurally defaulted fifty-eight of his eighty-eight claims, and rejecting the remainder of his claims as ■ lacking substantive merit. Beuke obtained a certificate of probable cause from the district court, and filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. We granted Beuke’s motion to hold this case in abeyance pending the completion of (1) his second attempt at state post-conviction relief and (2) his civil suit seeking documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). In August 1996, Beuke filed a second petition for post-conviction relief with the state trial court, alleging that newly discovered evidence he had obtained from the FBI showed that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. The trial court rejected Beuke’s second petition for post-conviction relief, finding that he had not satisfied the statutory requirements to proceed with a second petition. The appellate court affirmed this denial, see State v. Beuke, 130 Ohio App.3d 633, 720 N.E.2d 962 (1998); the Ohio Supreme Court denied discretionary review, see State v. Beuke, 85 Ohio St.3d 1443, 708 N.E.2d 209 (1999); and the United States Supreme Court declined to review the case, see Beuke v. Ohio, 528 U.S. 934, 120 S.Ct. 336, 145 L.Ed.2d 262 (1999). While Beuke was pursuing his second attempt at post-conviction relief, he simultaneously appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia the FBI’s denial of the bulk of his FOIA request. The D.C. District Court denied Beuke’s appeal by granting summary judgment to the FBI, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed in May 1998. In October 1999, Beuke informed this court that he had concluded his collateral litigation, and filed a motion to remand proceedings to the district court so that he could introduce newly acquired evidence and add recently exhausted claims. We denied Beuke’s motion to remand in July 2002. Beuke then filed a motion to expand the record to submit documents obtained during his second petition for post-conviction relief and FOIA litigation. We denied this motion to expand the record in April 2006, and the parties thereafter submitted briefs and presented oral arguments on the issues before this court. II. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), became effective on April 24, 1996. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 322, 117 S.Ct. 2059. The provisions of AEDPA “generally apply only to cases filed after the [AED-PA] became effective.” Id. at 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059. Because Beuke filed his habe-as petition in May 1994, prior to AEDPA’s effective date, we will apply pre-AEDPA standards of review. See Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir.1999). Under the pre-AEDPA standards, we review de novo the district court’s disposition of a habeas petition. Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir.1997). “Determinations of law, or determinations involving mixed questions of fact and law ... receive de novo review.” Mapes, 171 F.3d at 413. Historical facts as found by the state court “are presumed correct and are rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. Beuke raises thirteen issues for our review on appeal; two of these issues are closely related constitutional challenges to Ohio’s death penalty scheme, and we will address them as a single claim. We accordingly have separated our analysis into twelve sections. A. Procedural Default of Beuke’s Claim for Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Beuke first argues that the district court erroneously concluded that he procedurally defaulted fifty-eight of his eighty-eight habeas claims. Federal courts must consider four factors when assessing whether a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims. Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir.2000); see also Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986). Our analysis begins with the first three factors of the procedural default inquiry: First, the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule. Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction. Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture is an “adequate and independent” state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim. Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138) (alterations omitted). “Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not complied with and that the rule was an adequate and independent state ground,” the court must move to the fourth factor. Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. The fourth factor allows a petitioner to avoid or excuse procedural default if he demonstrates “that there was cause for him to not follow the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court found that Beuke had procedurally defaulted fifty-eight of his eighty-eight claims. Effectively conceding that the first three factors of procedural default are satisfied, Beuke focuses his argument on the fourth factor, contending that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim establishes the “cause” and “prejudice” to save all of his fifty-eight defaulted claims. We have previously acknowledged that an ineffective-assistance claim “can serve as both cause and prejudice, excusing a procedural default in an underlying substantive claim[.]” Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir.2006). But the ineffective-assistance claim “can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the habeas petitioner can satisfy the ‘cause and prejudice’ standard with respect to the ineffective-assistance claim itself,” that is, only if the ineffective-assistance claim was not itself procedurally defaulted. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-51, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Franklin, 434 F.3d at 418. Accordingly, we must consider whether Beuke procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance claim. The district court found that Beuke’s ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted because the Ohio appellate court found that claim to be “waived and barred from further review by [Beuke’s] failure to move for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals following the denial of his direct appeal.” In 1989, Beuke completed his direct appeal and instituted his first petition for post-conviction relief, in which he — for the first time — asserted his ineffective-assistance claim. At that time, however, the clearly established precedent in the Ohio First District Court of Appeals mandated that “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ... may not be entertained by a trial judge when considering a petition for postconviction relief,” but that the petitioner instead should present this claim directly to the state appellate court in a motion for reconsideration. State v. Rone, No. C-820640, 1983 WL 5172, at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Aug.31, 1983); see also Hicks v. Collins, 384 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he rule was well settled in the court of appeals where [the petitioner] appealed [i.e., the Ohio First District Court of Appeals] that ineffective appellate counsel claims should be asserted in reconsideration applications”). Over two years later, in February 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (1992), which pronounced for the entire state that “claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are not cognizable in post-conviction proceedings,” noting instead that such claims should be raised “in an application for reconsideration in the court of appeals.” Id. at 1208. Four months after the Mumahan decision, and nearly three years after the conclusion of his direct appeal, Beuke filed a motion for reconsideration with the Ohio First District Court of Appeals. Not surprisingly, the court denied the motion, holding that Beuke did not establish good cause for his untimely filing because the law had been well settled in the Ohio First District Court of Appeals that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be brought in a motion for reconsideration. Beuke contends that he cannot be held to have procedurally defaulted this claim because when he filed his motion, the Ohio courts did not have a firmly established and regularly followed procedural rule governing motions for reconsideration. But Beuke’s argument ignores the fact that, dating back to 1983, it had been clear to litigants in the Ohio First District Court of Appeals that a criminal defendant must present his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in a motion for reconsideration, not in a petition for post-conviction relief. Turning to our circuit’s precedent, Beuke argues that his situation is controlled by Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2006). We, however, are convinced that this case is controlled by Hicks v. Collins, 384 F.3d 204 (6th Cir.2004). In Franklin, we held that “at the time [the petitioner] filed his Motion for Delayed Reconsideration ..., the Ohio courts did not have a ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ procedural rule governing the timeliness of such motions.” Franklin, 434 F.3d at 418. We viewed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Muma-han as creating ambiguities on the timeliness of motions for reconsideration, id. at 418-19, and because Franklin completed his direct appeal soon after Mumahan— while the Ohio courts were in a period of limbo on this issue — we held that Franklin could not be faulted for filing his motion to reconsider in an untimely manner. The Franklin decision specifically distinguished Hicks as a case that “applies to a time before Mumahan.” Id. at 420. Unlike the petitioner in Franklin, the petitioner in Hicks completed his direct appeal and instituted his post-conviction relief proceedings prior to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Mumahan. Hicks, 384 F.3d at 212. Hicks improperly included his ineffective-assistance claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, and the state trial court dismissed Hick’s petition because the Ohio First District Court of Appeals, the district in which Hicks’s direct appeal was heard, clearly required an ineffective-assistance claim to be brought in a motion for reconsideration. The Ohio Supreme Court then decided Mumahan, and Hicks waited another seven months after that decision before filing his motion for reconsideration. The Hicks court held that the procedural rule requiring ineffective-assistance claims to be asserted in a timely filed motion for reconsideration “was well settled in the court of appeals where Hicks appealed [i.e. the Ohio First District Court of Appeals]” and therefore “represented] an established adequate and independent state ground” upon which to deny Hicks’s claim. Id. The procedural history in Beuke’s case is nearly identical to that of Hicks. Here, as in Hicks, (1) the petitioner improperly asserted his ineffective-assistance claim in his petition for post-conviction relief in the Ohio First District Court of Appeals; (2) the Ohio Supreme Court issued Mumahan after the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief; and (3) the petitioner waited several months following Mumahan to file his motion for reconsideration. Therefore we find that this case is controlled by Hicks, and we conclude, based on that precedent, that Beuke procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance claim. In summary, the clearly established rule in the Ohio First District Court of Appeals — adopted long before Beuke concluded his direct appeal — demanded that Beuke present his ineffective-assistance claim in a motion for reconsideration. Beuke initially violated this rule by including his ineffective-assistance claim in his first petition for post-conviction relief. Recognizing his blunder, Beuke filed a motion for reconsideration more than three years after the conclusion of his direct appeal, long after the deadline for filing such a motion had passed. See Ohio App. R. 26. This firmly established and regularly followed procedural rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground upon which to foreclose judicial review, and Beuke has not established cause and prejudice for his untimely compliance. Accordingly, Beuke, like the petitioner in Hicks, has procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and, in turn, cannot use that claim as cause and prejudice to excuse his other defaulted claims. See Edwards, 529 U.S. at 450-51, 120 S.Ct. 1587; Franklin, 434 F.3d at 418. We thus affirm the district court’s conclusion that Beuke procedurally defaulted fifty-eight of the eighty-eight claims in his habeas petition. B. Procedural Default of Beuke’s Brady Claim Beuke next asserts that the prosecution violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Brady requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is “material either to guilt or to punishment.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A Brady violation includes three elements: (1) the evidence “must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching”; (2) the “evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently”; and (3) “prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Beuke first raised his Brady claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the prosecution failed to produce (1) a list of individuals suspected of involvement in the “mad hitchhiker” shootings and (2) evidence showing that the prosecution’s witness, Michael Cahill, changed his story several times. The Ohio appellate court held that this claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it could have been raised on direct appeal and was inappropriate in a post-conviction proceeding. See Beuke, 1991 WL 155219, at *2. Beuke again asserted a Brady claim in his habeas petition, identifying numerous pieces of favorable evidence that the government did not disclose prior to trial, including the list of other suspects and inconsistent statements by Michael Cahill. After filing his petition, Beuke claimed that he had discovered more suppressed evidence, so he filed two motions to expand the record and a motion for leave to conduct further discovery. In these motions, Beuke sought to compel the production of, among other things, all Michael Cahill’s recorded statements. The district court denied Beuke’s request to expand the record or compel discovery because Beuke should have made this evidence part of the record in state court and, in any event, none of the proffered evidence involved a fact that was material to his conviction. Despite denying Beuke’s motions, the district court admitted four documents that Beuke proffered to the court: (1) a transcript of David Pierce’s interview with the police (which allegedly contradicted Ca-hill’s testimony), (2) a transcript of Rick Polly’s interview with the police (which allegedly contradicted Cahill’s testimony), (3) a written summary of an interview between FBI agents and Michael Cahill, and (4) documents showing Robert Craig’s criminal history. In a subsequent order, the district court held that Beuke procedurally defaulted his Brady claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal. On appeal, Beuke argues that the prosecution’s failure to disclose this favorable evidence constitutes the cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of his Brady claim. A habeas petitioner can show cause where he failed to raise a constitutional issue because it was “reasonably unknown to him” at the time. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). Because the State does not directly dispute “cause,” we will assume, without deciding, that the prosecution’s withholding of exculpatory or impeachment evidence caused Beuke to default his Brady claim. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (finding that the government’s withholding of exculpatory evidence, combined with two other factors not present here, were sufficient to constitute cause). Our analysis, therefore, turns on the issue of prejudice. “Prejudice, for purposes of procedural default analysis, requires a showing that the default of the claim not merely created a possibility of prejudice to the defendant, but that it worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of constitutional dimensions.” Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 388 (6th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170-71, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). Procedural default analysis on the issue of prejudice mirrors Brady materiality analysis, see id., so in determining whether Beuke has proeedurally defaulted his Brady claim, we will follow the Supreme Court’s example and proceed under a Brady materiality analysis. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936. When engaging in Brady materiality analysis, we find that “[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is ... shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’ ” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). In reviewing for materiality, we consider the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence, not each item in isolation. Id. at 436, 105 S.Ct. 3375. On appeal, Beuke presents nine pieces of evidence that he alleges the prosecution failed to disclose in violation of Brady: (1) inconsistent statements that Cahill made to the Hamilton County Sheriffs Department and to the grand jury; (2) inconsistent statements that Cahill made to the FBI; (3) FBI documents indicating that one of the prosecution’s witnesses (who Beuke believes to be Cahill) was a paid informant; (4) FBI documents showing that Cahill was under investigation for child pornography offenses; (5) Rick Polly’s statements that contradicted Cahill’s testimony; (6) Wahoffs and Graham’s initial description of their assailants, neither of which matched Beuke’s physical appearance; (7) a list of other criminal suspects investigated by the police; (8) an investigating officer’s handwritten notes suggesting that Wahoff was shot by a gun different from that used to shoot Craig and Graham; and (9) records disclosing Craig’s criminal history. Beuke contends that the first five pieces of undisclosed evidence could have impeached the credibility of Michael Cahill, that Wahoff s and Graham’s initial description of their assailants could have impeached their in-court identifications of Beuke, and that Craig’s criminal history could have contradicted the angelic picture the prosecution painted of the victim. But Beuke does not indicate how the prosecution’s failure to disclose the list of other criminal suspects or the investigating officer’s handwritten notes caused him prejudice at trial. We begin with the heart of Beuke’s Brady claim, which is the undisclosed evidence that would have been useful for impeaching Michael Cahill. Cahill testified that Beuke told him the story of how he killed Robert Craig, and Cahill relayed the details of this story to the jury. Beuke contends that Cahill’s inconsistent statements could have been used to impeach his testimony, but he does not highlight any inconsistencies between Cahill’s prior statements and his testimony at trial. Importantly, Beuke does not allege that Cahill presented inconsistent testimony on an important issue of guilt, such as Beuke’s confession to killing Craig, but merely that Cahill’s inconsistencies on tangential issues — as well as other evidence such as the FBI’s investigation of Cahill for child pornography — undermine his overall credibility. We doubt that this evidence would do much to undermine Ca-hill’s testimony relating Beuke’s confession. But even if we were to assume that this undisclosed evidence would have tarnished Cahill’s credibility beyond repair, it does not negate or even diminish the substantial objective evidence of Beuke’s guilt. Beuke emphasizes the importance of Ca-hill’s testimony by asserting that the prosecution’s proof of Craig’s murder was dependent upon the credibility of Cahill’s testimony. The record discloses a different story, however, because it is clear that the prosecution presented other concrete evidence, in addition to Cahill’s testimony, linking Beuke to Craig’s murder. This objective evidence includes the officers’ discovery of Beuke’s fingerprints in Craig’s car and forensic evidence indicating that the bullets removed from Craig’s body were fired from Beuke’s gun. Thus, contrary to Beuke’s assertions, Cahill’s testimony was not the central piece of evidence holding together an otherwise feeble case, but was merely one piece of a cumulative evidentiary puzzle. We find that because the objective evidence sufficiently linked Beuke to Craig’s murder, the suppressed evidence undermining Ca-hill’s credibility does not tend to undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 293-94, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (refusing to find prejudice where the record contained “considerable forensic and other physical evidence linking petitioner to the crime,” because this objective evidence indicated that the “petitioner would have been convicted ..., even if [the witness] had been severely impeached” by the undisclosed evidence). Cf. Jamison, 291 F.3d at 391 (finding prejudice where, unlike here, the undisclosed evidence would have impeached vital prosecution testimony, leaving only one piece of highly suspect physical evidence upon which to base the conviction); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (finding Brady materiality satisfied where, unlike here, “ ‘the essence of the State’s case’ was the testimony of eyewitnesses”). The other undisclosed evidence does not bolster Beuke’s claim of materiality under Brady. Beuke does not provide this court with Wahoff s and Graham’s initial descriptions of their assailants, and we cannot determine how far afield their descriptions may have been. In any event, we are hard-pressed to believe that an inaccurate sketch or physical description would undermine an in-court identification by victims who had lengthy exposures to their assailant, during which each of them endured a prolonged car ride with a gun pointed directly at him. Moreover, Beuke does not establish, and we do not see, how the outcome of his trial was prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to disclose a list of other criminal suspects, Craig’s criminal record, or the investigating officer’s handwritten notes. Considering as we must the cumulative effect of all nine pieces of undisclosed evidence, we find that Beuke has failed to establish a “reasonable probability” that the disclosure of this evidence would have altered the result of this proceeding. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Because this evidence is not material under Brady, Beuke cannot show prejudice to excuse procedural default. See Jamison, 291 F.3d at 388. And because Beuke cannot establish prejudice to excuse his proeedurally defaulted Brady claim, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim. C. Right to an Impartial Jury — Limitation of Questioning at Voir Dire Beuke asserts that the state trial court violated his right to an impartial jury by preventing him from asking prospective jurors why they wished to serve on the jury. The trial court prohibited this line of questioning because it unnecessarily “put[ ] the juror on the spot,” and subjected him or her to a potentially embarrassing exchange. Beuke raised this claim on direct appeal, and the Ohio Supreme Court found that the trial court’s ruling was “well within its discretion and that the defense otherwise exercised great latitude in examining the jurors for enmity or bias.” Beuke, 526 N.E.2d at 286. The district court similarly found that “[t]rial judges have broad discretion in determining whether questions may be asked during voir dire ” and that the trial court did not commit “constitutional error in restricting these questions.” The Supreme Court has consistently “stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire ... in ... areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973) (noting the “traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting voir dire”). In the context of voir dire, the trial court violates the defendant’s constitutional rights only when it restricts a “constitutionally compelled” question. See Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 424-25, 111 S.Ct. 1899. A proffered voir dire question is not constitutionally required simply because it “might be helpful in assessing whether a juror is impartial”; instead a question is constitutionally compelled only where the “failure to ask [that] question[ ] ... renders] the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 425-26, 111 S.Ct. 1899. Beuke contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights because his questions probing the jurors’ desires to serve on the jury would have exposed their potential biases. Even though this line of questioning might have helped to expose juror bias, its omission does not result in a fundamentally unfair trial, and therefore it is not constitutionally compelled. See id. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not commit constitutional error by restricting defense counsel’s questioning at voir dire. D. Right to an Impartial Jury — Refusal to Dismiss Prospective Jurors for Cause Beuke argues that the state trial court violated his right to an impartial jury by denying his request to strike four prospective jurors for cause. Beuke requested that the court remove the first of these prospective jurors, the wife of one police officer and the mother of another, because her voir dire testimony indicated that she believed a criminal defendant probably did “something” in order to be charged with a crime and that she had a tendency to side with the prosecution and law enforcement over a defendant. When pressed further, however, this woman stated that she could be an impartial juror and acknowledged that she would follow the court’s instructions and put aside her tendencies to agree with law enforcement rather than with a suspected criminal. Beuke requested the removal of the second candidate because she stated that if Beuke was convicted, she “would vote for capital punishment” in order to ensure that he would not get parole. But when questioned by the judge, she repeatedly indicated that she would be a fair and impartial juror who followed the court’s instructions. Beuke requested that the third candidate be removed for cause because of her statement that she would disregard the court’s instructions and vote for the death penalty based upon her belief that any person who intentionally takes the life of another forfeits his own right to live. Upon further questioning, however, she indicated that she would follow the court’s instructions in recommending the defendant’s sentence. Beuke asked the court to remove the fourth candidate because she expressed her belief that Beuke “must have done something” if the prosecutor was bringing these charges against him; but when questioned by the court, she too acknowledged that she would follow the court’s instructions and apply the presumption of innocence. After the court refused to dismiss these four candidates for cause, the prosecution used one of its peremptory challenges to excuse the first, and Beuke used three of his twelve peremptory challenges to remove the other three. Beuke contends that the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury because the court’s denial of his request to remove these four prospective jurors for cause forced him to use valuable peremptory challenges to remove them. Even if we were to assume that the trial court should have dismissed these jurors for cause — a conclusion that is severely belied by the record and applicable case law, see Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 618-19 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that “the trial court cannot be faulted for not disqualifying for cause a juror who consistently says that she thinks she can be fair”) — there is no legal basis for Beuke’s impartial jury claim. “Any claim that the jury was not impartial ... must focus ... on the jurors who ultimately sat” on the jury, not on those dismissed through peremptory challenges. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). Beuke does not challenge the impartiality of any juror who actually sat on the empaneled jury, but only of four prospective jurors who were dismissed through peremptory challenges. Thus, Beuke’s only alleged injury is the loss of his peremptory challenges, and it is well settled that the loss of a peremptory challenge does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury because “peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension.” Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273 (citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 663, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)); accord United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). We accordingly reject Beuke’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his request to dismiss prospective jurors for cause because he “cured” this alleged error when he removed those jurors with his peremptory challenges. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273; Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 521 (6th Cir.2003). E. Right to an Impartial Jury — Dismissal of Prospective Jurors Further pressing the impartial jury claim, Beuke next contends that he was denied this right when the trial court improperly excused six prospective jurors who expressed any opposition to the death penalty. “[A] juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, ... must be removed for cause.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). “[T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quotations omitted). “[T]his standard ... does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with ‘unmistakable clarity’ ” because such an exacting standard does not comport with the realities of voir dire questioning. Id. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844. A state court trial judge’s conclusion that a prospective capital-sentencing juror should be excluded for cause because of his views on the death penalty is a finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness from this court on federal habeas review. Id. at 428-29, 105 S.Ct. 844. Beuke asserts that the trial court improperly removed six prospective jurors. The first two indicated that they would not impose the death penalty under any circumstances because it conflicted with their religious beliefs. The third similarly stated that he could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances, and the fourth indicated that she did not “believe” she could impose the death penalty even if the facts and law warranted such punishment. Unlike the others, the fifth and sixth were slightly less adamant in their opposition to the death penalty. The fifth initially stated that she did not “think” she could impose the death penalty even if required by the law and facts. When pressed further, however, she indicated that she would “try” to follow the law and impose the death penalty if warranted by the law, but ultimately affirmed that she could not agree to a verdict recommending death. The sixth candidate’s testimony was similarly inconsistent. Although at one point she stated that there may be a proper case where the death penalty would be warranted, she eventually attested to her unalterable opposition to a sentence of death. After reviewing the voir dire testimony in the record, we find no constitutional error in the trial court’s dismissal of these six prospective jurors. We find that each of the first four candidates stated unequivocally that he or she would not impose death under any circumstances, and the law requires that such jurors — with unshakable opposition to the death penalty— be removed for cause. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728, 112 S.Ct. 2222. And although the fifth and sixth candidates both waffled and hedged when discussing their willingness and ability to impose the death penalty, ultimately both stated that they would be unable to join a verdict that imposed the death penalty even if mandated by law, and were therefore unfit for service on a jury charged with the burden of considering capital punishment. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. Especially in light of the deference afforded to the trial judge’s conclusions on these issues, see Bowling, 344 F.3d at 519, we find no constitutional error in the trial court’s dismissal of these prospective jurors. F. Due Process — The Testimony of the Murder Victim’s Wife at the Guilt Phase of Trial Beuke next alleges that the testimony of Robert Craig’s wife at the guilt phase of trial violated his due process rights. Mrs. Craig testified that her husband had picked up two hitchhikers and provided them with a place to sleep just three weeks prior to his murder. She also stated that she and her husband had three children, one of whom was born shortly before trial and was given the name Robert, in memory of his father. Beuke objected to this testimony and moved for a mistrial; the court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a mistrial. On appeal, Beuke argues that Mrs. Craig’s testimony violated his due process rights because it was irrelevant and highly inflammatory. We are severely limited in our ability to grant federal habe-as relief because of a state court evidentia-ry ruling: we can grant relief only in the limited circumstances where the state court’s decision was “so fundamentally unfair as to violate the petitioner’s due process rights.” Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir.2001). The categories of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness” have been defined “very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). Beuke himself admits that the constitution “erects no per se bar” to “the admission of victim impact evidence,” see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); see also Hicks, 384 F.3d at 222 (noting our approval of “victim impact evidence during the guilt phase ... as an extension of Payne”), and he concedes that we can find a constitutional violation only if Mrs. Craig’s testimony resulted in a “fundamentally unfair” trial, see Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597; Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 532-33 (6th Cir.2000). Beuke has provided no directly applicable legal authority, but only bald, conclusory allegations that Mrs. Craig’s testimony was irrelevant and highly inflammatory. We find no merit in this argument. Mrs. Craig’s testimony may be divided into two categories: (1) testimony about her husband’s history of picking up hitchhikers and (2) testimony about her children. Contrary to Beuke’s assertions, Mrs. Craig’s testimony about her husband’s history of picking up hitchhikers is entirely relevant when considering — and indeed probative for establishing — whether he offered Beuke a ride on the day of his murder. We certainly find no error — let alone a constitutional error — in admitting this testimony. Mrs. Craig’s testimony about her children, while perhaps not relevant to the issue of guilt, was minimal and largely insignificant. In less than one-half page of transcript testimony, Mrs. Craig told the jury that she had three children, provided their respective ages, and stated the name of her newborn child, Robert. Admission of these three brief statements about the victim’s family was not constitutionally improper, see Hicks, 384 F.3d at 222 (approving the use of victim-impact evidence at the guilt phase of trial); Byrd, 209 F.3d at 532 (same), because it was not inflammatory and did not otherwise create a fundamentally unfair trial. We thus conclude that Mrs. Craig’s brief testimony did not violate Beuke’s due process rights. G. Denial of Beuke’s Requests for a Continuance prior to the Penalty Phase Beuke argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion for a continuance prior to the penalty phase. The jury returned its guilty verdict on Wednesday, October 5, 1983, at 9:23 p.m. Just minutes later, the judge held a sidebar and asked Beuke’s attorneys if they could be ready for a sentencing hearing by the following afternoon. Defense counsel responded, “Come on ..., [t]here is no way in the world.” The judge proceeded to set the sentencing hearing for the morning of Friday, October 7,1983, and told defense counsel to request any necessary materials, such as a presentence investigation, by early the next morning. In response, defense counsel opined that this quick turnaround was “a little ridiculous under the circumstances.” After the judge sequestered the jury, defense counsel reiterated their belief that the Friday morning sentencing hearing did not provide “adequate time to prepare.” The court, however, ordered all the attorneys to return the next morning so that defense counsel could make a formal request for a presentence investigation. At the Thursday morning hearing, defense counsel stated that they were “not waiving [their] objection that ... there ha[d] not been sufficient time to make adequate determinations or to prepare to come to th[e] [sentencing] hearing.” Defense counsel then presented a formal request for a presentence investigation and psychiatric evaluation, and indicated that Beuke’s parents would be the only two mitigation witnesses called at sentencing. At the beginning of the Friday morning sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated their objection to the quick turnaround between the guilt and penalty phases, noting that “there hasn’t been sufficient time.” Defense counsel then objected to having only one hour to review the presentence investigation and psychiatric evaluation, whereupon the court provided a thirty-minute recess so counsel could further review those reports. A trial court’s denial of a continuance rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where there is “an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.’ ” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)); United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 371 (6th Cir.1991). “There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841. To obtain habeas relief, it is not sufficient for the petitioner to show that the trial court arbitrarily denied the continuance request; he “must also show that the denial of a continuance actually prejudiced his ... defense.” Burton v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764, 772 (6th Cir.2004). “Actual prejudice may be demonstrated by showing that additional time would have made relevant witnesses available or otherwise [would have benefited] the defense.” Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 396 (6th Cir.2003). We reject Beuke’s claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his request for a continuance. Beuke has not demonstrated that he made a “justifiable request” for a continuance, see Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610; his counsel did not state any particular reason why the trial court should grant the continuance, asserting only that the court provided “insufficient” or “inadequate” time to prepare and that the judge’s timetable was a “little ridiculous under the circumstances.” Such generalized objections do not constitute a justifiable request for a continuance. While it is true that only thirty-six hours separated the jury’s verdict and the commencement of the sentencing hearing, Beuke’s attorneys had two-and-a-half months to prepare for the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. And as we address further below, the record does not establish that counsel did not prepare for the penalty phase during that pre-trial period. Beuke’s claim additionally fails because he has not established prejudice from the trial court’s denial of his request for a continuance. Beuke contends that the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to investigate and present mitigation evidence showing: he did not have many friends; he held a low opinion of himself; he had a need to prove himself to others; he was a haphazard follower; he exhibited extreme personality traits; he frequently used drugs; he was raised in a strict religious home where he was “always under a microscope”; his family lived frugally; his mother was timid; and his father was domineering. We fail to see how this evidence would have benefited Beuke’s mitigation defense and, in any event, the jury received much of this information through the testimony of Beuke’s parents, who collectively testified that Beuke’s father did not have a “well-paying job,” their family did not have a lot of money, they attended church regularly, and their household was “run on the Ten Commandments.” Mrs. Beuke also told the jury about an incident in Beuke’s childhood where he did not get along with other children. We conclude that Beuke has not shown prejudice resulting from the trial court’s denial of his request for a continuance. Because Beuke did not articulate a justifiable basis for a continuance, and because he failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the denial of his request, we find his claim to be without merit. H. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during the Penalty Phase Beuke argues that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. An ineffective assistance of counsel violation contains two components: (1) counsel’s performance must have been deficient and (2) counsel’s deficient performance must have prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We begin by considering the deficiency element. “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance” under “prevailing professional norms,” and thus to establish deficient performance, the habeas petitioner must show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When engaging in this inquiry, we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Beuke contends that his counsel rendered deficient performance at the penalty phase by: (1) requesting a presentence investigation, which revealed to the jury some prejudicial information, including his criminal history and victim-impact statements; (2) obtaining an inadequate-psychiatric evaluation from the probation department; and (3) presenting an inconsistent closing argument based on a “residual doubt” theory. Beuke first raised these arguments — as bases for his ineffective-assistance claim — in his petition for post-conviction relief, and the state appellate court found that “each of these issues could fairly have been made on direct appeal from Beuke’s convictions” and thus each was “barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” Beuke, 1991 WL 155219, at *4. Beuke entirely ignores — -and most certainly does not challenge — the state court’s finding that Beuke was procedurally barred from asserting these arguments, and we see no basis upon which to disturb the state court’s resolution of this issue. We will, therefore, as the district court did, ignore these three bases for Beuke’s ineffective-assistance claim. Beuke next argues that his counsel performed deficiently at the penalty phase by failing to investigate mitigating factors. “[F]ailure to investigate possible mitigating factors and failure to present mitigating evidence at sentencing can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Coleman, 244 F.3d at 545; see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Our circuit’s precedent has distinguished between counsel’s complete failure to conduct a mitigation investigation, where we are likely to find deficient performance, and counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation, where the presumption of reasonable performance is more difficult to overcome: [T]he cases where this court has granted the writ for failure of counsel to investigate potential mitigating evidence have been limited to those situations in which defense counsel have totally failed to conduct such an investigation. In contrast, if a habeas claim does not involve a failure to investigate but, rather, petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the degree of his attorney’s investigation, the presumption of reasonableness imposed by Strickland will be hard to overcome. Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 552 (6th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir.2005). In the present case, defense counsel did not completely fail to conduct an investigation for mitigating evidence. Counsel spoke with Beuke’s parents prior to penalty phase of trial (although there is some question as to how much time counsel spent preparing Beuke’s parents to testify), and presented his parents’ testimony at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel also asked the probation department to conduct a presen-tence investigation and a psychiatric evaluation. While these investigatory efforts fall far short of an exhaustive search, they do not qualify as a complete failure to investigate. See Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 613 (6th Cir.2002) (finding that defense counsel did not completely fail to investigate where there was “limited contact between defense counsel and family members,” “counsel requested a presen-tence report,” and counsel “elicited the testimony of [petitioner’s] mother and grandmother”). Because Beuke’s attorneys did not entirely abdicate their duty to investigate for mitigating evidence, we must closely evaluate whether they exhibited specific deficiencies that were unreasonable under prevailing professional standards. See Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 701 (6th Cir.2006). Beuke specifically alleges that his attorneys’ performance was deficient because they unreasonably delayed their mitigation investigation until after the jury issued its guilty verdict and thus failed to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation. We will generally find that an attorney has rendered deficient performance if he waits until after a conviction to begin his mitigation investigation. See Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 676-77 (6th Cir.2001) (finding deficient performance where it “appear[ed] that trial counsel did not begin preparing for the mitigation phase of the trial until after conviction”); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding deficient performance where “the lawyers made virtually no attempt to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial until after the jury returned its verdict of guilty”). After reviewing all the evidence, we conclude that Beuke has not established that his attorneys waited until after the jury issued its guilty verdict to begin their mitigation investigation. Beuke is apparently asking this court to assume, based primarily on his attorneys’ request for a continuance prior to the sentencing hearing, that they did not begin their preparations prior to the jury’s conviction. That assumption, however, rests on sheer speculation. The evidence in the record is not clear as to when trial counsel began their mitigation investigation and what that investigation entailed. In their affidavits, Beuke’s attorneys both state that they “expend[ed] an extraordinary amount of hours in preparation for trial, the trial itself, and post[-]trial matters, including the preparation for the penalty phase.” While counsel’s itemized billable hours sheets expressly identify only the day between the guilt and penalty phases as “preparation for mitigation hearing,” those itemized sheets indicate that many pre-conviction billable hours were spent at the “county jail,” in “conference with Beuke’s parents,” “reviewing] psychiatric reports,” and in “review of law and preparation.” Some or all of these activities could have been focused on the mitigation investigation; Beuke has not provided enough evidence to confirm or deny that conclusion. As the habeas petitioner, Beuke has the burden of establishing his counsel’s deficient performance, and he has failed to present evidence from which we can find such deficiency. See Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir.2006) (noting that the petitioner “provided no basis for a finding that trial counsel’s investigation was unreasonable” because he did not introduce “any statement from trial counsel describing what [counsel] did or did not do in investigating [the petitioner’s] background”). Even if we were to find trial counsel’s performance to be deficient, Beuke cannot establish the prejudice prong of his ineffective-assistance claim, which requires him to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Darde